Memorial For The Petitioners

Table of Contents
TEAM CODE:__
5th National Moot Court Competition, 2015
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF GOD’S ISLAND
Writ Petition (Civil) No.___/ 2015
Clubbed with
Writ Petition (Civil) No.___ / 2015
(Filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950)
Mriga Family & Ors…………………………………….…................................Petitioners
versus
Union of God’s Island & Ors……………………………………………………Respondents
Written Submissions on behalf of the Petitioners,
Counsels for the Petitioners.

Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.......................................................................................i-iv
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION............................................................................. v
STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................................................................vi-vii
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ......................................................................................... viii
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS................................................................................... ix
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED.................................................................................... 1-19
1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IS NOT VALID IN LAW
2. THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT IS NOT UNCONDITIONAL
3. LIQUOR POLICY BY THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD’S ISLAND SHOULD BE
REASSESED
4. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE GUILTY OF PENAL OFFENCE
PRAYER........................................................................................................................ 20
MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS

Index of Authorities i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
1. Adi Vishveshara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi & ors v. State of Uttar
Pradesh 1997 (4) SCC 606.
2. Akhila Publishers Pvt. Ltd v. State of Karnataka, 1983(3) KarLJ 378
3. AmanPreet Singh and Ors v. Governmnet of India and Ors., AIR 1996 P & H 284
4. Asharambapu v. Amans Singh Dangi&Ors. (Case No.6347/2013)
5. Ashok Lanka v. Rishi Dixit, 2006 (9) SCC 90
6. Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India and Ors., 2008 (6) SCC 1
7. Atheist Society of India v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1992 AP 310
8. Azeez Basha and Anr. v. Union of India, AIR 1968 SC 662
9. Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, AIR 1987 SC 748
10. C.V. Santha v. State of Karnataka., 2006 (5) KarLJ 361
11. CIT v. Mr.P. Firm Maur., AIR 1965 SC 1216
12. Commr. of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta, AIR 2004 SC 2984
13. D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., 1993 (3) SCC 259
14. Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh., AIR 1959 SC 648
15. Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union v. Delhi Administration., AIR 1992
SC 789
16. Dr.Subrahmaniam Swamy v. State of Kerala, ILR 2011(1) Ker 833
17. Dropti Devi v. Union of India, AIR 2012 SC 2550
18. Father C.R. Prabhu v. State of Jharkhand & Anr., Cr. M. P. No. 683 (2012)
19. Food Corporation of India v. Kamadhenu Cattle Feed Industries Ltd., AIR 1993 SC
1601
20. Gopinath v. Ramachandra, 1958 (Cut) 485

Index of Authorities ii
21. H.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao of Gwalior and Ors v. Union of India and Anr., AIR
1971 SC 530
22. Har Shankar v. Dy. Excise and Taxation Commissioner , 1974 (1) SCC 737
23. I.R. Coelho v. State Of Tamil Nadu & Ors, AIR 2007 SC 861
24. In Re: Ramlila Maidan Incident, D/-4/5-6-2011 AIR 2012 SC(Supp) 266
25. Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, AIR 2011 SC 2365
26. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299
27. J and K National Panthers Party v. Union of India, AIR 2011 SC 3;
28. K. Mukundaraya Bhenoy v. State of Mysore, AIR 1960 Mys 18
29. Kanaka Durga Wines and Ors v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1995 (3) ALT 228
30. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461
31. Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India and Ors, AIR 2006 SC 3127
32. Kutti Chammi Moothan v. Rana Pattar, 1978 (19) Cri LJ 960
33. M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India., AIR 1995 SC 605
34. M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, AIR 2007 SC 71
35. M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P., AIR 1998 SC 145
36. M/S Bhagawati Vanaspati Traders v. Senior Superintendent of Post Offices , Meerut
2015 (1) SCC 617
37. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
38. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789
39. Mohd.Bilal & Anr v. State of NCR Delhi CRL.A. 243/2013
40. Moore v. Hussey (1609) Hob 93 (96)
41. National Building Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan & Ors., AIR 1998 SC
2279
42. Navjyoti Coop. Group Housing Society v. Union of India 1992 (4) SCC 477
43. Nikhil Soni v. Union of India & Ors. Civil W.P. No. 7414/2006
44. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Muncipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180

Index of Authorities iii
45. P. N. Kaushal and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., 1978 (3) SCC 558
46. Pannalal Bansilal Pitti v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 1023
47. Pickard v. Sears1837 6 Ad & El. 469
48. Public Services Tribunal Bar Association v. State of U.P. and Anr., 2003 (1)SCR 666
49. Pyara Lal Sharma v. Managing Director., AIR 1989 SC 1854
50. Ram Prasad & Anr. v. State of UP., AIR 1952 All 878
51. Ram Pravesh Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. 2006 (8) SCC 381
52. Rati Lal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388
53. Razakbhai Issakbhai Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 659
54. Re Berubari case, AIR 1960 SC 845
55. S. Veerabadran Chettiar v. E V Ramaswami Naicker., AIR 1958 SC 1032
56. S.P Mittal v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1
57. S.R.Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918 AIR 1962 SC 853
58. Saidullah Khan v. State Of Bhopal., AIR 1955 Bhopal 3
59. See Sri Babu Ram Alias Durga Prasad v. Sri Indra Pal Singh., AIR 1988 SC 3021
60. Shiv Sagar Tiwari v. Union of India, 1997 (1) SCC 444
61. Shri Jagannath Temple Puri Management Committee v. Chintamani Khuntia., 1997 (8)
SCC 422
62. Society for Un-Aided P. School of Rajasthan v. Union of India, AIR 2012 SC 3445
63. Society for Un-Aided P. School of Rajasthan v. Union of India., AIR 2012 SC 3445
64. Sona Krishnamoorthy v. The Commissioner, Writ Appeal (MD) No.243 of 2009
65. Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Ors. v. State of Mysore and Ors., AIR 1958 SC 255
66. St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389
67. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. McDowell & Co. and Ors., 1996 (3) SCR 721
68. State of Kerala v. Chandra Mohan, 2004 (3) SCC 429
69. State of Kerala v. Kandath Distilleries., AIR 2013 SC 1812

Index of Authorities iv
70. State of Maharashtra v. Hans George (1964) 67 Bom LR 583 AIR 1965 SC 722
71. State Of Punjab v. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu., 2014 AIR SC 3004
72. State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala., AIR 2014 SC 2407
73. T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Ors v. State of Karnataka and Ors, 2002 (8) SCC 481
74. The Special Officer v. R Prabhakaran W.P.Nos.27168 to 27172 of 2009, 2029 and
2030 of 2010
75. Vishnu Pratap Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1990 SC 522
76. Vithal Dattatraya Kulkarni and Ors. v. Shamrao Tukaram Power SMT and Ors., 1979
(3) SCC 212
77. Waman Rao v Union of India, 1981 (2) SCC 362
BOOKS
1. K D Gaur, Criminal law: Case and Materials, (7thEdn., 2013);
2. Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, 1999, Edited by Bryan A. Garner
3. The Compact Oxford Reference Dictionary, Edited by Catherine Soanes
4. Webster’s New World College Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 2006, Edited by Michael
Agnes
5. Basu D.D., Constitution of India, 14th Edition 2009, Lexis Nexis Butterworth Wadhwa
Nagpur.
6. Jain M.P, Indian Constitutional Law, 6th Edition 2011, Lexis Nexis Butterworth
Wadhwa Nagpur.
WEBSITES
1. www.scconline.com
2. www.legalcrystal.com
3. www.indiankanoon.com
4. www.cdjlawjournal.com
5. www.legalperspective.com
6. www.lawyersclubindia.com

Statement of Jurisdiction v
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE PETITIONER HAS APPROACHED THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT OF
GOD’S ISLAND UNDER ART. 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950.

Statement of Facts vi
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. God’s Island is the most populous peninsular subcontinent off the Coast of Canopy Sea.
It is a multireligious, multicultural and multilinguistic parliamentary democracy elected
by universal adult franchise. It is a country which believed in mutual coexistence and
secular tolerance. The country experienced large amount of migration including the
conquest of Dark Isles in 1700AD, who regulated and managed indigenous sects.
2. The colonial power was particularly interested in Deer’s Cave situated in the state of
Leoland. The temple was famous for its riches and antique nature encompassing gold
and platinum idols.
3. The Deer Temple belonged to a religious denominational sect known as ‘Mriga’ which
originated long back in 550 AD. They had inherited the hereditary rights if
administration and maintenance of Deer temple. It was patriarchal family with little
contact with the Government of God’s Island. This peculiar religion worshipped a
variety of deities, including plants and animals. The temple was visited by lakhs of
devotees regularly; the belief was that the temple treasures including the deer temple
were descended from the heavens.
4. The colonial power had so many unsuccessful attempts to take over the temple resulting
eventually in an agreement with the Mriga family which mandated legal recognition of
their lineal rights. The agreement was signed and validated by the King of Darks Isles
in 1901, and held State would never interfere in the temple affairs.
5. The recent re-discovery of treasure hidden in the crypts by the National Bureau of
Ancient Antiquities in the 2011 made the temple a nucleus of media and governmental
attention, the executive officer appointed by the Govt alleged that there were acts of

Statement of Facts vii
misappropriation by the family. While the country ran into a financial crisis due to the
failure of the state run liquor. Many other social institutions including public hospitals
and schools were depending on it, the employees lost their jobs and they were devoid of
salary for 6 months. They had filed a writ petition before the High Court. The industry
had been nationalized with previous cases of sale of spurious liquor by private
individuals.
6. The state of Leoland enacted a legislation which enabled them for complete control for
temple and use of treasure for day to day administration. The minister for religious
affairs of Leoland declared that the treasure would be utilized for revival of liquor
industry. The Mriga family filed a writ petition before the high court challenging the
impugned legislation claiming it hurt their religious beliefs. The court held the
legislation valid and the family not a denominational sect. The court also remarked
about criminality in Govt officials’ actions in converting the treasure to gold bullions,
but which could be excused as it was a case of necessity.
7. The Mriga sect now approaches the apex court challenging the High court order. While
the case was pending, the Government of God’s Island amended Article 26 of
Constitution relating to denominational sect which empowered state intervention. The
amendment was enforced through a special gazette with immediate effect. The writ
petitions along with connected petitions are heard by the apex court.

Statement of Issues viii
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IS VALID IN LAW?
2. WHETHER THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT IS UNCONDITIONAL?
3. WHETHER THE LIQUOR POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD’S ISLAND
SHOULD BE REASSESSED?
4. WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE GUILTY OF PENAL
OFFENCE?

Summary of Arguments ix
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IS NOT VALID IN LAW.
The petitioners contend that the amendment brought about to Article 26 of the
Constitution is invalid. This is because secularism is a basic structure of the constitution
[A]; Art.26 of the constitution forms a part of secularism [B]. Thus, the amendment
abrogates the basic structure [C].
2. THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT IS NOT UNCONDITIONAL.
The petitioners assert that the sovereign right is not unconditional. This is for the
reasons that the impugned enactment is unconstitutional [A] and since the agreement
concluded between the foreign rulers and the family is valid and binding [B].
REASSESED.
It is the contention of the petitioners that the policy to promote the Liquor Industry by
utilizing the treasure of Deer Temple is to be reassessed as it is against religious
sentiments [A] and further runs contrary to the Directive Principle of Liquor prohibition
[B]. It is further submitted that the Right to Livelihood is being violated [C].
4. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE GUILTY OF PENAL OFFENCE.
The petitioners intend to substantiate the point by proving that the action by the
Government officials defiled the sanctity of Deer’s Temple [A], they had the
knowledge that such defilement would insult the denominational family [B].
Furthermore, it is submitted that the defence of Necessity cannot be invoked [C].

Arguments Advanced 1
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IS NOT VALID IN LAW.
1. The Union Government of God’s Island passed an amendment to the Constitution of
God’s Island on 30.12.2014. The amendment was ratified and enforced on 12.02.2015
with immediate effect. The proposed amendment deprived the religious denominations
of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 26 of the Constitution.
2. The petitioners submit that Secularism is a basic structure of the constitution [A];
Art.26 of the constitution forms a part of secularism [B]. Thus the amendment is not
valid in law as it abrogates the basic structure [C].
A. Secularism is a basic structure of the constitution.
3. The Preamble to the Constitution is a key to open the mind of the makers, and it shows
the general purpose for which they made the several provisions.1 It expresses the
legislative intent “thought and dreamt for so long”.2 The Preamble of the Constitution
resolves the people to secure to its citizens “liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith
and worship” and also declares it to be “Secular”3. It eliminates God from matters of
the State and ensures that no one shall be discriminated against on the ground of
religion.4 The Constitution of India embodies the quintessence of diverse facets
of secularism.5
4. The Supreme Court in the landmark judgement of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of
Kerala6, conceived the notion that secularism is a part of the basic structure when the
majority judges defined their understanding of the debatable phrase. Sikhri, C.J. named
“secular character of the Constitution” as one of them; Shelat and Grover, JJ. stated
1
Re Berubari case AIR 1960 SC 845
2
Sir Alladi Krishnaswami- Constituent Assembly Debates. Vol 10, 417.
3
Inserted by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976.
4
St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat AIR 1974 SC 1389
5
Atheist Society of India v. Government of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1992 AP 310
6
AIR 1973 SC 1461

that “secular and federal character of the Constitution” were among the main
ingredients of the basic structure. The Court finally propounded the widely accepted
rule that “...the fundamental features of the Constitution, namely, secularism,
democracy and the freedom of the individual would always subsist in the welfare
state.”
5. This principle was further deliberated upon by the Apex Court in the M. Nagaraj v.
Union of India7 case wherein the Court arrived at the conclusion that:
“...principles of federalism, secularism, reasonableness and socialism etc. are
beyond the words of a particular provision. They are systematic and structural
principles underlying and connecting various provisions of the Constitution. They
give coherence to the Constitution. They make the Constitution an organic
whole.”
6. Thus secularism has been upheld by the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court “as a
basic feature of the Constitution”8.
B. Art.26 of the constitution forms a part of secularism.
7. Article 26 of the Constitution guarantees the right of every religious denomination or a
section thereof, to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable
purposes; to manage its affairs in matters of religion; to acquire property and to
administer it in accordance with law.9
8. The secular nature of the Constitution of India was discussed for the first time by the
Supreme Court in the case Sardar Taheruddhin Syedna Saheb v. State of Bombay10
wherein Ayyangar, J., had explained that:
7
AIR 2007 SC 71
8
S.R.Bommai v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 1918 see also T.M.A.Pai Foundation and Ors v. State of
Karnataka and Ors (2002) 8 SCC 481
9
Society for Un-Aided P. School of Rajasthan v. Union of India AIR 2012 SC 3445; see also: S. Azeez Basha
and anr. v. Union of India AIR 1968 SC 662
10
AIR 1962 SC 853

“Articles 25 and 26 embody the principle of religious toleration that has been the
characteristic feature of Indian civilisation from the start of history. The
instances and periods when this feature was absent, being merely temporary
aberrations. Besides, they serve to emphasise the secular nature of the Indian
democracy which the founding fathers considered to be the very basis of the
Constitution.”
9. The Rajasthan High Court, in its most recent decision, while upholding the findings of
the Apex Court, opined that “Since India is a secular state the state is not to associate
with religion and is not to interfere with it.”11 The secular character of our Constitution
is a matter of conclusion to be drawn from various Articles conferring fundamental
rights; and if the secular character is not to be found in Part III, it cannot be found
anywhere else in the Constitution because every fundamental right in Part III stands
either for a principle or a matter of detail.12 Thus, the concept of secularism and the
fundamental rights under Articles 25 to 28 are guaranteed to followers of all religions.13
10. In the light of legal principles enunciated herein it is submitted before this Court that
Article 26 of the Constitution clearly forms a part of the concept of secularism.
C. The amendment abrogates the basic structure.
11. The basic structure theory imposes limitation on the power of the Parliament to amend
the Constitution.14 Even though by Article 368 the Parliament is given the power to
amend the Constitution, that power cannot be exercised so as to damage the basic
features of the Constitution or so as to destroy its basic structure.15
11
Nikhil Soni v. Union of India & Ors. Civil W.P. No. 7414/2006 decided on August 10, 2015
12
I.R. Coelho (Dead) By Lrs v. State Of Tamil Nadu & Ors AIR 2007 SC 861
13
Dr.Subrahmaniam Swamy v. State of Kerala ILR 2011(1) Ker 833
14
Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India and Ors AIR 2006 SC 3127 see also: Public Services Tribunal Bar
Association v. State of U.P. and Anr. [2003] 1 SCR 666 ; State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. McDowell & Co.
and Ors. [1996] 3 SCR 721
15
Supra n.6 see also: Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789

12. Thus the indispensable condition which must be satisfied in amending the Constitution
is that it must not affect the basic foundation and structure of the constitution.16 The
Supreme Court had discussed the various important opinions expressed by the
Kesavanada case judges which have been claimed as an “epoch-making decision”17 in
the Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India and Ors18 case:
“Sikri, CJ, held that: the expression 'amendment of this Constitution' does not
enable Parliament to abrogate or take away fundamental rights or to completely
change the fundamental features of the Constitution so as to destroy its identity.
Shelat & Grover JJ. (at p 291) concluded that : Though the power to amend
cannot be narrowly construed and extends to all the Articles it is not unlimited so
as to include the power to abrogate or change the identity of the Constitution or
i t s b a s i c f e a t u r e s .
Khanna, J. (at p. 758, 759) concluded that: The power to amendment under
Article 368 does not include power to abrogate the Constitution nor does it
include the power to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution.”
13. The amendment to Art.26 of the Constitution is against the basic tenets of secularism.
Secularism is part and parcel of the basic structure of the Constitution. Thus the
petitioners humbly submit that the amendment made to Art.26 of the Constitution is
invalid in law since it alters the basic structure.
II. THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT IS NOT UNCONDITIONAL
14. The state government of Leoland, in order to meet the financial crisis caused due to
Liquor Corporation, convened a midnight session on 03.03.2014 and passed a
controversial mandatory legislation. The enactment gave the Government complete
16
Dropti Devi v. Union of India AIR 2012 SC 2550 see also; J and K National Panthers Party v. Union of India
AIR 2011 SC 3; Indian Medical Association v. Union of India AIR 2011 SC 2365;
17
Waman Rao v Union of India (1981) 2 SCC 362
18
(2008) 6 SCC 1 see also: Indira Gandhi Nehru v. Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 2299

control over the temple establishment further granted them sovereign right over the
unearthed treasure.
15. The petitioners assert that the sovereign right is not unconditional. This is for the
reasons that the impugned enactment is unconstitutional [A] and since the agreement
concluded between the foreign rulers and the family is valid and binding [B].
A. The impugned enactment is unconstitutional.
16. The state legislation granted complete control over the administration of the Deer
Temple to the state government. It is contended that the legislation is unconstitutional
since, Article 26 of the Constitution is being violated (1) and furthermore, the Mriga
family has a legitimate expectation over the temple administration (2).
1. Article 26 of the Constitution is being violated.
17. Article 26 gives freedom to manage religious affairs, subject to public order, morality
and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof to establish institutions
for religious and charitable purpose, to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, to
own and acquire movable and immovable property and to administer such property in
accordance with law.19
18. The Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term ‘denomination’ as a collective
designation especially of a religious sect.20 It must be a recognised branch of a church
or religion.21 Denominations are a particular religious body with a specific name.22
19
Pannalal Bansilal Pitti v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1996 SC 1023
20
Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, 1999, Edited by Bryan A. Garner
21
The Compact Oxford Reference Dictionary, Edited by Catherine Soanes
22
Webster’s New World College Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 2006, Edited by Michael Agnes

19. The Supreme Court in a plethora of decisions has held that “A religious denomination
or organization enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rights
and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion they hold and
outside authority has no jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in such matters.”23
20. A law which takes away the right of administration from the hands of a religious
denomination altogether and vests it in any other authority would amount to a violation
of the right guaranteed by Article 26 of the Constitution of India.24 The Apex Court in
the case of S.P. Mittal v. Union of India25 cleared the fog around the definition of the
term ‘religious denomination’ when it stated that:
“The words "religious denomination" in Article 26 of the Constitution must take
their colour from the word 'religion' and if this be so, the expression "religious
denomination" must also satisfy three conditions: (1) It must be a collection of
individuals who have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as
conducive to their spiritual well-being, that is, a common faith; (2) common
organisation; and (3) designation by a distinctive name.”
21. The statement of facts gives a clear insight on the notion that the Deer Temple was
administered by a denominational family. The sect is a patriarchal joint family with
vast properties. It was an endogamous group which worshipped variety of deities,
including plants and animals. The legends surrounding the Temple treasure were
closely interlinked with the ancestry of the denominational family. They are known by
a distinctive name ‘Mriga’.
23
Commr. of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta AIR 2004 SC 2984 see also: Bijoe Emmanuel v.
State of Kerala AIR 1987 SC 748; Sri Venkataramana Devaru and others v. State of Mysore and others AIR
1958 SC 255
24
Rati Lal v. State of Bombay AIR 1954 SC 388 see also: K. Mukundaraya Bhenoy v. State of Mysore AIR
1960 Mys 18
25
AIR 1983 SC 1

22. Hence it is submitted that the family comes under the purview of a religious
denomination. Furthermore, the enactment does not restrict but takes away this
religious right in total. There is no particular circumstance arising in the case scenario
which forces the government to legislate upon considerations of public order, morality
and health.
2. The Mriga family has a legitimate expectation.
23. The doctrine of legitimate expectation falls within the purview of the rule of non-
arbitrariness integrated in Article 14 of the Constitution.26 It is a well settled position in
law that the doctrine of “legitimate expectation” operates in the domain of public law
and in appropriate case, constitutes a substantive and enforceable right.27 The doctrine
of legitimate expectation has been developed, both in the context of reasonableness and
in the context of natural justice.28
24. The Supreme Court in the case of Ram Pravesh Singh & Ors v. State of Bihar &Ors29
had defined the concept of legitimate expectation by declaring that:
“Legitimate expectation is an expectation of a benefit, relief or remedy that may
ordinarily flow from a promise or established practice. The term 'established
practice' refers to a regular, consistent predictable and certain conduct, process
or activity. The expectation should be legitimate, that is, reasonable, logical and
valid. It is procedural in character based on the requirement of a higher degree
of fairness as a consequence of the promise made, or practice established."
25. The Apex Court has recognized that by reason of application of the said doctrine, an
aggrieved party would be entitled to seek judicial review, “If he could show that a
decision of the public authority affected him of some benefit or advantage which in the
26
Food Corporation of India v. Kamadhenu Cattle Feed Industries Ltd AIR 1993 SC 1601
27
M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P AIR 1998 SC 145
28
National Building Construction Corporation v. S.Raghunathan & Ors AIR 1998 SC 2279
29
(2006) 8 SCC 381

past he had been permitted to enjoy and which he legitimately expected to be permitted
to continue to enjoy either until he was given reasons for withdrawal and the
opportunity to comment such reasons”.30
26. The Mriga family has been supervising the administration and management of the
rituals and properties of the Deer Temple ever since 1700. Therefore, the family has a
legitimate expectation to continue the temple supervision for it is reasonable, logical
and valid.
27. A post-constitutional law made under Article 13(2) which contravenes a fundamental
right is nullity from its inception and a still-born law.31 Hence, it could be concluded
that the impugned enactment violates the fundamental rights under Articles 26 and 14
of the Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional.
B. The agreement is valid and binding.
28. The denominational sect as per an agreement entered into with the alien rulers on
17.08.1898 was given the sole power to administer and manage the temple property.
The agreement prohibited any takeover of the shrine on any pretext, thus safeguarding
the ancient rights and obligations of the denominational family. The petitioners affirm
that the agreement entered during colonial rule is valid and binding, since, the
agreement has not lapsed with reference to the Indian Independence Act, 1947 (1) and
because the doctrine of estoppel applies (2).
1. The agreement has not lapsed.
30
. Navjyoti Coop. Group Housing Society v. Union of India (1992) 4 SCC 477
31
Deep Chand v. State of U.P. AIR 1959 SC 648

29. On India having obtained independence the suzerainty of the British Crown over
the Indian States lapsed primarily because of Section 7 of the Indian Independency
Act, 1947.32 The proviso to Section 7 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 states that
notwithstanding the lapse of suzerainty and lapse of treaties, effect shall, as nearly as
might be, continued to be given to the provisions of any such agreement referred to in
Section 7(1) of the Act which related to customs, transit and communications, posts and
telegraphs or other like matters until the provisions in question were denounced by the
Ruler of the Indian State or by the Dominion or Province or were superseded by
subsequent agreements.33
30. Moreover, the Supreme Court of India in the controversial Mulliperiyar case34 had
narrowed the application of section 7 of the Act of 1947 to only agreements of political
nature when it enumerated that:
“Section 7(1) of Act of 1947 uses the expression “all treaties and agreements”
but, in our opinion, the word “all” is not intended to cover the agreements which
are not political in nature. This is clear from the purpose of Section 7 as it deals
with lapsing of suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States and the
consequence of lapsing of suzerainty. Obviously, the provision was not intended
to cover the agreements and treaties other than political.”
31. Section 7 (1)(c) of the Act of 1947 applies to the agreements and treaties entered into
between the Majesty and persons representing a tribal group or area.35 A tribe is a unit
of socio-political organization consisting of a number of families, clans or other groups
32
Vishnu Pratap Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors AIR 1990 SC 522
33
H.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao of Gwalior and Ors v. Union of India and anr AIR 1971 SC 530
34
State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala AIR 2014 SC 2407
35
Indian Independence Act of 1947, see Section 7(1)(c)

who share a common ancestry and culture.36 The statement of facts depicts that the
Mriga family originated as a clan in the plateus of God’s Island.
32. In the case at hand the agreement has not been denounced by any of the parties to it nor
has it been superseded by a subsequent agreement. The nature of the agreement in
question is not political.
2. The doctrine of estoppel applies.
33. The Doctrine of estoppel in modern times has been extended so as to embrace
practically any act or statement by a party which would be unconscionable to permit

37
him to deny. The rule has authoritatively been described in the case of Pickard v.
Sears38 as:
“Where one by his words or conduct wilfully causes another to believe the
existence of certain state of things and induces him to act on that belief so as to
alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the
latter a different state of things as existing at the same time.”
34. A party may be precluded by his actions or conduct or silence when it is his duty to
speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had.39The Apex Court in
the case of State of Punjab &Ors v. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu,40 while discussing the
principle had observed that:
“It is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel the
principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate is inherent in it. The Doctrine
of Estoppel by election is one among the species of estoppel in pais (or equitable
36
State of Kerala v. Chandra Mohan (2004) 3 SCC 429
37
M/S BhagawatiVanaspati Traders v. Senior Superintendent of Post Offices , Meerut 2015 (1) SCC 617
38
1837 6 Ad & El. 469
39
See Sri Babu Ram Alias Durga Prasad v. Sri Indra Pal Singh AIR 1988 SC 3021
40
2014 AIR SC 3004

estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this law a person may be precluded, by
way of his actions, or conduct or silence when it is his duty to speak, from
asserting a right which would have otherwise had.”
35. Thus it is submitted that the law does not permit a party to both approbate and
reprobate.41 The Government of God’s Island has passively accepted the agreement
since it had not questioned the same for over a long period of time. The mala fide
intentions catapulted the Government to invalidate the agreement only after the
accounting of the temple property. Thus it could be concluded that the agreement is
valid since the Indian Independence Act does not nullify it and moreover the
Government is prevented from estoppel.
36. Since, the impugned enactment is unconstitutional and the agreement is valid and
binding, the petitioners humbly submit that the sovereign right of the Government over
the temple treasure is not unconditional.
III. LIQUOR POLICY BY THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD’S ISLAND SHOULD BE
REASSESED.
37. The state legislature of Leoland enacted a law whereby it has the sole rights over the
temple property. The Minister for Religious Affairs stated that the treasure would be
utilized for reviving the liquor industry.
38. It is the contention of the petitioners that the policy to promote the Liquor Industry by
utilizing the treasure of Deer Temple is to be reassessed as it is against religious
sentiments [A], and further runs contrary to the Directive Principle of Liquor
41
CIT v. Mr.P. Firm Maur AIR 1965 SC 1216

prohibition [B]. It is further submitted that the claim by the employees of the liquor
industry that their Right to Livelihood is being violated has no rationale[C].
A. Utilization of temple treasure would hurt religious sentiments.
39. With relation to administration of property which a religious denomination was entitled
to own and acquire, the religious denomination had undoubtedly the right to administer
such property but only in accordance with law.42The Apex Court has held that the
above clause is a fundamental right and cannot be taken away by any legislation.43
40. Lord Macaulay in drafting the Indian Penal Code had indicated the danger of ignoring
the religious sentiments of the people of India which could lead to spread of
dissatisfaction throughout the country.44 Even the inculcation of matters in the syllabus
of young school students which in a way directly or indirectly affects or hurts the
religious sentiments is to be curtailed.45
41. In Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay &Ors46the Apex Court held that:
“the exercise of power by the State authorities or the Court to divert the trust
property or funds for purposes which it considers expedient or proper was an
unwarranted encroachment on the religious institutions in regard to the
management of their religious affairs.”
42. The Supreme Court of India in the Adi Vishveshara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple,
Varanasi & ors v. State of U.P.47 case had delivered that the use or sale of liquor within
or around temple premises hurts the religious sentiments of the citizens as it violates the
42
Supra n 24
43
ShriJagannath Temple Puri Management Committee v. Chintamani Khuntia (1997) 8 SCC 422
44
M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 605
45
AmanPreet Singh and Ors v. Governmnet of India and Ors AIR 1996 P & H 284
46
Supra n 24
47
(1997) 4 SCC 606.

basic tenets of the religion and therefore the practice could be prohibited. The state
cannot intervene in matters which will constitute the basic tenets of the religious
denominations and state cannot intervene in it.48
43. The denominational sect had inherited the hereditary and lineal rights of worship and
the appropriation of the temple. The liquor policy promulgated by the State would
utilize the temple treasure for reviving the liquor corporation totally disregarding the
lineal rights of the denominational family. This utilization of the temple property hurts
the religious sentiments of the denominational family and the believers.
B. Directive Principles relating to liquor prohibition should be considered for
Governmental Policies.
44. Article 47 has been identified as a part of the Directive Principles of State Policy which
is fundamental in the governance of the country.49 The State has the power to
completely prohibit the manufacture, sale, possession, distribution and consumption of
liquor as a beverage because it is inherently dangerous to the human health.50 The Apex
Court has upheld various prohibitive measures and policies under this provision.51
45. The Supreme Court has repeated and reiterated the ill effects of liquor and the need for
prohibition while deciding the Ashok Lanka v. Rishi Dikshit52case wherein it
propounded that:
“Article 47 of the Constitution of India clearly casts a duty on the State at least to
reduce the consumption of liquor in the State gradually leading to prohibition
48
SonaKrishnamoorthy v. The CommissionerWrit Appeal (MD) No.243 of 2009
49
State of Kerala v. Kandath Distilleries AIR 2013 SC 1812 see also: Kanaka Durga Wines and Ors v.
Government of A.P. 1995 (3) ALT 228; VithalDattatrayaKulkarni and others v. ShamraoTukaram Power SMT
and others (1979) 3 SCC 212;
50
Har Shankar v. Dy. Excise and Taxation Commissioner 1974 (1) SCC 737 see also: P. N. Kaushal and others
v. Union of India and others (1978) 3 SCC 558
51
RazakbhaiIssakbhaiMansuri v. State of Gujarat, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 659
52
2006 (9) SCC 90

itself. It appears to be right to point out that the time has come for the States and
the Union Government to seriously think of taking steps to achieve the goal set by
Article 47 of the Constitution of India. It is a notorious fact, of which we can take
judicial notice, that more and more of the younger generation in this country is
getting addicted to liquor. It has not only become a fashion to consume it but it
has also become an obsession with very many. Surely, we do not need an indolent
nation.”
46. With the development of law, even certain matters covered under Part IV relating to
directive principles have been uplifted to the status of fundamental rights.53 It cannot be
said that fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution is superior to the
54
directive principles of state policy. When a policy is being formulated the directive
principles have to be considered and the courts which discuss the specifications of the
policy should also take note of the very same.55
47. In the case at hand the liquor industry was controlled and maintained by private
individuals. There have been reports of spurious liquor being sold highlighting its
harmful effects on the community. The revival of liquor industry promotes the use of
liquor which gradually would affect the younger generation. It is humbly submitted that
the Governmental Policy must be governed by the Directive Principles of Liquor
Prohibition.
C. The Right to Livelihood is not absolute.
48. The right to livelihood, which is an inherent part of right to life guaranteed under
Article 21, is not absolute.56 A person can be deprived of his life and personal liberty if
53
In Re: Ramlila Maidan Incident, D/-4/5-6-2011 AIR 2012 SC(Supp) 266
54
Supra n 6
55
Supra n 9
56
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Muncipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180

two conditions are complied with, first, there must be law and secondly, there must be
procedure prescribed by that law, provided that the procedure is just, fair and
reasonable.57 The scope of the said right is wide and brings within its ambit right to
livelihood.58
49. The Supreme Court while deciding the case of Delhi Development Horticulture
Employees Union v. Delhi Administration59, even though accepted the principle of right
to livelihood, further deliberated on the condition that:
“But this country has so far not found feasible to incorporate the right to
livelihood as a fundamental right in the constitution. This is because the country
has so far not attained the capacity to guarantee it and not because it considers it
any less fundamental to life.”
50. The Karnataka High Court had also enumerated the principle that the majority rights
would outweigh the rights of the minority by stating that: “A person may be rendered
shelterless in the event if it serves the larger public interest. Broadly speaking general
interest of the society dominates over the interest of individuals is concerned.”60
51. Government servants have no right to claim that government must pay their salary or
revive the industry.61 The right to livelihood is not absolute and can be curtailed.62
Therefore the claim that the livelihood of the employees is being affected because of
the failure of the liquor does not stand its ground.
57
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
58
Shiv Sagar Tiwari v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 444
59
AIR 1992 SC 789
60
C.V. Santha v. State of Karnataka 2006 (5) KarLJ 361
61
Pyara Lal Sharma v. Managing Director AIR 1989 SC 1854
62
D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd (1993) 3 SCC 259

52. Since, the religious sentiments of the masses are being hurt and the directive principles
are to be considered for formulation of governmental policies, the petitioners submit
that the policy is to be reassessed.
IV. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE GUILTY OF DEFILING THE SANCTITY
OF DEER’S TEMPLE.
53. It is the cardinal principle of good government that every man should be suffered to
profess his own religion and that no man should be suffered to insult the religion of
another.63
54. In the present matter it is humbly submitted before this honourable Court that the
Government officials entered the temple with an intention to defile and disfigure the
sanctity of the temple and through that insult the denominational sect. The petitioners
intend to substantiate the point by proving that the action by the Government officials
defiled the sanctity of Deer’s Temple [A], they had the knowledge that such defilement
would insult the denominational family [B]. Furthermore, it is submitted that the
defence of Necessity cannot be invoked [C].
A. The act of government officials of Leoland defiled the sanctity of Deer’s temple.
55. The very object of this section 295 of the Indian Penal Code is to punish all those
individuals including the State who defiles or destroys with an intention to defile the
sanctity of the place of worship for their benefits.64
56. The acts of ‘defilement’ include destruction, damage or deform places of worship or
objects which are considered to be sacred.65 The purpose of this provision is to respect
63
Kutti Chammi Moothan v. Rana Pattar, (1978) 19 Cri LJ 960
64
Gopinath v. Ramachandra 1958 (Cut) 485

and protect the religious susceptibilities of persons of different religious
denominations.66
57. In Father C.R.Prabhu v. State of Jharkhand &Anr67 the Court observed the position of
the basic tenets and integral parts of various religious denominations thus:
“There is a particular belief in sub sect of Christianity , namely, The ‘Nemha’
sect which considers trees inside the church premise to be an integral part of
their religious beliefs. Therefore no conclusion can be drawn regarding the
beliefs of various sects.”
58. The idols found in the vaults are considered sacred by the Mriga sect. In addition to this
belief, they had inherited the lineal rights and are believed to have descended with the
deer idol from the heavens. It is considered to be an integral part of their religious
belief. Hence it is submitted that the act of government officials defiled the sanctity of
the place.
B. They had the knowledge that such defilement would insult the denominational
family.
58. Section 295 clearly states that the defendants are liable under this provision if they have
committed the act with knowledge that such act would insult the particular group.68 In
Saidullah Khan v. State of Bhopal69 the court held the accused guilty under this Section
for throwing a cigarette on a Hindu idol which was taken out for procession. The court
further enunciated that the accused would be supposed to have the knowledge that the
Hindus were likely to consider such defilement to be an insult to their religion.70
65
Akhila Publishers Pvt ltd v. State of Karnataka, 1983(3) KarLJ 378
66
S. VeerabadranChettiar v. E V RamaswamiNaicker, AIR 1958 SC 1032
67
Cr. M. P. No. 683 (2012)
68
Ram Prasad &Anr v. State of UP AIR 1952 All 878
69
AIR 1955 Bhopal 3
70
Ibid

60. It is an accepted belief that the denominational family who were known to have
descended with the deer idol, from the heavens, and thus were entitled to a highly
respected position in the religious life of Leoland.
61. The High Court of Leoland had associated criminality with the action of the
government employees. The Government employees had the knowledge that their
action could bring insult to the denominational family.
C. The defence of necessity cannot be invoked.
62. The defense of necessity as enumerated in Section 81 of Indian Penal Code requires the
following ingredients to be fulfilled:
(a) The act must have been without any criminal intention to commit the same.71
(b) The act committed must be proportional and to the purpose.72
(c) The act must have been committed to prevent graver harm.73
63. It is cardinal to this Section that the act committed must be without any criminal
intention, or without the knowledge of the possible outcome.74The act committed must
be in proportion to the needs of the situation.75
64. The government officials had razed down structures. They had also converted the idols
and sculptures which were held sacred by the denominational family. They had
complete knowledge about the fact that the denominational family was respected in the
religious society of God’s Island as the hereditary owners of the treasure. Hence it is
submitted that the actions of the officials are not eligible to qualify for act of Necessity.
71
State of Maharastra v. Hans George AIR 1965 SC 722
72
Mohd.Bilal & Anr v. State of NCR Delhi CRL.A. 243/2013
73
The Special Officer v. R Prabhakaran W.P.Nos.27168 to 27172 of 2009, 2029 and 2030 of 2010
74
Asharambapu v. Amans Singh Dangi&Ors(Case No.6347/2013)
75
See K D Gaur, Criminal law: Case and Materials, (7thEdn., 2013); Moore v. Hussey (1609) Hob 93 (96).

65. Thus it is submitted that the Government officials are liable for penal offence; as they
have defiled the religious place with the knowledge of the same.

Prayer 20
PRAYER
In the light of issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the petitioners
humbly pray that the Hon’ble Supreme Court may kindly adjudge and declare that:
1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IS NOT VALID IN LAW.
2. THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT IS NOT UNCONDITIONAL.
REASSESSED.
4. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE GUILTY OF DEFILING THE SANCTITY OF
DEER TEMPLE.
Or may kindly pass any other order that the Hon’ble Supreme Court may deem fit. For this
act of kindness the petitioners shall in duty bound forever pray.
Respectfully Submits
Sd/-
Counsels for Petitioners

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Table of Contents

5th National Moot Court Competition, 2015

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF GOD’S ISLAND

Writ Petition (Civil) No.___/ 2015

Writ Petition (Civil) No.___ / 2015

(Filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950)

Mriga Family & Ors…………………………………….…................................Petitioners

Union of God’s Island & Ors……………………………………………………Respondents

Written Submissions on behalf of the Petitioners,

Counsels for the Petitioners.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ......................................................................................... viii

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED.................................................................................... 1-19

1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IS NOT VALID IN LAW

2. THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT IS NOT UNCONDITIONAL

3. LIQUOR POLICY BY THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD’S ISLAND SHOULD BE

4. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE GUILTY OF PENAL OFFENCE

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS

2. Akhila Publishers Pvt. Ltd v. State of Karnataka, 1983(3) KarLJ 378

4. Asharambapu v. Amans Singh Dangi&Ors. (Case No.6347/2013)

5. Ashok Lanka v. Rishi Dixit, 2006 (9) SCC 90

7. Atheist Society of India v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1992 AP 310

8. Azeez Basha and Anr. v. Union of India, AIR 1968 SC 662

9. Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, AIR 1987 SC 748

10. C.V. Santha v. State of Karnataka., 2006 (5) KarLJ 361

11. CIT v. Mr.P. Firm Maur., AIR 1965 SC 1216

12. Commr. of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta, AIR 2004 SC 2984

14. Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh., AIR 1959 SC 648

16. Dr.Subrahmaniam Swamy v. State of Kerala, ILR 2011(1) Ker 833

17. Dropti Devi v. Union of India, AIR 2012 SC 2550

20. Gopinath v. Ramachandra, 1958 (Cut) 485

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS

25. Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, AIR 2011 SC 2365

26. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299

27. J and K National Panthers Party v. Union of India, AIR 2011 SC 3;

28. K. Mukundaraya Bhenoy v. State of Mysore, AIR 1960 Mys 18

30. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461

33. M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India., AIR 1995 SC 605

34. M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, AIR 2007 SC 71

35. M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P., AIR 1998 SC 145

37. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597

38. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789

39. Mohd.Bilal & Anr v. State of NCR Delhi CRL.A. 243/2013

40. Moore v. Hussey (1609) Hob 93 (96)

44. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Muncipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS

47. Pickard v. Sears1837 6 Ad & El. 469

49. Pyara Lal Sharma v. Managing Director., AIR 1989 SC 1854

52. Rati Lal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388

54. Re Berubari case, AIR 1960 SC 845

55. S. Veerabadran Chettiar v. E V Ramaswami Naicker., AIR 1958 SC 1032

56. S.P Mittal v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1

58. Saidullah Khan v. State Of Bhopal., AIR 1955 Bhopal 3

66. St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389

68. State of Kerala v. Chandra Mohan, 2004 (3) SCC 429

69. State of Kerala v. Kandath Distilleries., AIR 2013 SC 1812

MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS

71. State Of Punjab v. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu., 2014 AIR SC 3004

72. State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala., AIR 2014 SC 2407

77. Waman Rao v Union of India, 1981 (2) SCC 362