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PROF. R. V.

DHANAPALAN NATIONAL MOOT


COURT COMPETITION, 2023

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF SINDIA

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

IN THE MATTER OF

W.P. _____ OF 2023

SINDIAN COUNCIL FOR LEGAL SERVICE &


STATE BAR COUNCIL OF THAINADU,
MALLUNADU AND TULUNADU …PETITIONERS

V.

UNION OF SINDIA &


BAR COUNCIL OF SINDIA …RESPONDENTS

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS


PROF. R.V. DHANAPAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2023

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PARTICULARS PAGE. NO.


LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 4
1. CASES 4
2. STATUTES 6
3. JOURNALS 6
4. WEBSITES 6
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 7
STATEMENT OF FACTS 8
ISSUES RAISED 9
I. WHETHER THE PETITION IS ADMISSIBLE?
II. WHETHER THE AMENDMENT AND RULE PERTAIING
TO UNIFORM STANDARDS IN LEGAL EDUCATION BY
BCS IS ARBITRARY TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES AND THE RIGHTS GURANTEED TO
CITIZENS AND NON-CITIZENS?
III. WHETHER THE AMENDMENT AND RULE PERTAIING
TO UNIFORM STANDARDS OF ENROLMENT IN THE
BAR VIOLATES CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS AND
PRINCIPLES?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 10
ARUGMENTS ADVANCED 11
PRAYER 27

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PROF. R.V. DHANAPAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2023

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION EXPANSION

& And
§ Section
⁋ Paragraph
AIR All India Reporter
Anr Another
Art Article
BCS Bar Council of Sindia
Bom Bombay
Del Delhi
Ed Edition
Hon’ble Honourable
HC High Court
No. Number
Ors Others
SBC State Bar Council
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court reporter
UOI Union of India
v. Versus
Vol Volume

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

I. CASES

SCASE TITLE CITATION


1. B. Balakrishna Pillai vs. The Bar Council of India and Ors; MANU/TN/0878/2011
2. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India & others [1984] AIR 802 (SC)

3. Bar Council of India v. Bonnie Foi Law College MANU/SC/0115/2023


4. Bar Council of India vs. A.K. Balaji and Ors. Civil Appeal Nos. 7875-
7879, 7170 and 8028 of
2015
5. Chiranjit Lal Choudhary v. Union of India [1951] AIR 41
6. Farzana Batool Vs Union of India And Others LL [2021] SC 213

7. G.S.Pavana Krishna Murthy v. Government of A.P. [1994] 1 ALT 290


8. Gauri Shankar v. Union of India AIR [1995] SC 55
9. Gautham Kapoor v. State of Rajasthan AIR [1987] Raj 174
10. Haniraj L. Chulani v. Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa; AIR [1996] SC 1708
11. Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & others [1992] 4 SCC 305

12. K. Kumaraswamy and Ors. vs. State of A.P. and Ors; MANU/AP/0294/1991
13. L. Jayanthi vs. The Secretary to Government Tamil MANU/TN/3173/2019
Development and Information (Advertisement) Department
and Ors;
14. Lakhan Lal vs. State of Orissa; AIR [1977] SC 722
15. Leaap forwarders pvt. Ltd. V. Comissioner [2001] 3 ALT 131
16. M.R.F. Ltd. v. State of Kerala [1999] AIR 188 (SC)
17. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR [1978] SC 597
18. Mansukhlal v. State of Gujarat, [1997] 7 SCC 622
19. Mohammed Ishaq v. S. Kazam Pasha [2009] 12 SCC 748
20. Motibhai Vithalbhai Patel and Anr. v. State of Gujarat [1961] AIR 93 (Guj)
21. Municipal Corpn. of the City of Ahmedabad v. Jan AIR [1986] SC 1205
Mohammad Usmanbhai
22. P.Ramachandran vs. The State of A.P. and Ors; MANU/AP/1251/2021
23. Papnasam Labour Union v. Madura Coats Lid., AIR [1995] SC 2200
24. Perali Water User Association, Guntur and Ors. vs. MANU/AP/0113/2002
Government of Andhra Pradesh
25. R.K. Garg v. Union of India [1981] 4 SCC 675

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26. Rajiv Ranjan Singh 'Lalan' and Ors. vs. Union of India [2006] MANU 3568
(UOI) and Ors (SC)
27. Rishabh Duggal v. Bar Council of India W.P 1023 of 2016

28. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India and Anr [1982] AIR 149 (SC)
29. Sachidanand Pandey and Anr. v. State of West Bengal and [1987] 2 SCR 223
Ors;
30. Sagir Ahmed v. The Govt of the State of Uttar Pradesh; AIR [1954] All 257

31. Secretary, Board of Intermediate Education, Hyd. v. [1999] 6 ALT 785


S.Srivalli
32. Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Corporation [1989] AIR 1988 (SC)
Committee
33. State of Kerala v. A. Lakshmi Kutty; [1986] 4 SCC 632
34. State of M.P. v. Nivedita Jain [1982] 1 SCR 759
35. State of Rajasthan v. Lata Arun [2002] 6 SCC 252
36. State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal & others [2010] 3 SCC 402

37. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar AIR [1952] SC 75


38. State of West Bengal v. Ratnagiri Engineering Private [2010] 4 SCC 453.
Limited
39. Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of [2014] 8 SCC 682
Investigation and Anr;

40. Supdt. & Remembrance of legal affairs v. State of West AIR [1975] SC 1030
Bengal
41. 3 Supreme Court advocates on Record Assn. v. Union of [2016] 5 SCC 1
India;
42. Suraz India Trust vs. Union of India [2017] 14 SCC 416
43. Suresh Kumar Koushal v. NAZ Foundation AIR [2014] SC 563
44. The Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [1992] MANU 0532
(SC)
45. Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corp., AIR [1994] SC 988

46. Union of India v. Paul Manickam AIR [2003] SC 4622

47. University Grants Commission V. Sadhana Chaudhary [1997] IILLJ 272 SC


48. Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India AIR [2005] SC 2677

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II. STATUES AND REGULATIONS

S. NO TITLE OF LEGISLATION PAGE NO.

1. The Constitution of Sindia Passim


2. The Advocates Act, 1961 Passim
3. The Bar Council of Sindia Rules Passim
4. The Certificate and Place of Practice (Verification) Rules, 2015 Passim

III. JOUNARLS

S. NO TITLE OF JOURNAL PAGE. NO


1. All India Reporter (AIR) Passim
2. Supreme Court Cases (SCC) Passim
3. Delhi Law Times (DLT) Passim
4. Supreme Court Reporter (SCR) Passim
5. Madras Law Journal (MLJ) Passim

IV. WEBSITES

S. NO TITLE PAGE NO.


1. www.scconline.com Passim
2. www.livelaw.in Passim
3. www.manupatrafast.com Passim
4. www.lexisnexis.com Passim

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Respondent disputes the jurisdiction invoked by the Petitioner in the instant matter, under
Article 321 of the Constitution of Sindia.

“32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part-


(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo
warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any
of the rights conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1
) and ( 2 ), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the
local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme
Court under clause ( 2 )
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise
provided for by this Constitution.”

The present memorial on behalf of the respondent sets forth the facts, contentions and
arguments in the present case

1
INDIAN CONST. art.32. (pari materia to The Constitution of Sindia).

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FACTS OF THE CASE

[¶ 1] Sindia is a Socialist Secular Democratic Republic that gained independence in 1947.


The legal profession played a significant role in the post-independence governance of the
country. The Sindian Advocates Act was passed in 1961, creating the Bar Council of Sindia as
a statutory authority. As far as legal education is considered, it also evolved since 1950. The
education is rendered through national law schools, university, colleges, deemed university
with the Bar council’s approval.

[¶ 2] The law minister had said legal reform shall be the prime aim of the government. The
law minister promised to meet the problems of Bar and Bench. In November 2022 the law
minister proposed an amendment to Advocates Act. Amended-Sec 2(a) reads as - An advocate
is a person who after completion of law graduation and after receiving the Certificate of
Practice from BCS is enrolled with any State Bar council in compliance with other provisions
of the Act. Also, under Sec 7, additional powers were assigned to the BCS wrt education and
enrolment. Rules pertaining to uniform standard in legal education and enrolment were
introduced. The law minister stated the purpose of the changes is to revive the legacy of legal
profession. Concentration is on quality than quantity.

[¶ 3] States like Mallunadu, Tulunadu, Akalistan, Banglachal, and Thai Nadu stated that Bar
council power tends to override the State subject i.e. education. Sindian Council of legal service
is a nationwide human right advocacy body. On January 2023 Sindian Council for Legal
Service filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court of Sindia. The State Bar council of Thai
Nadu, Mallunadu and Tulu Nadu filed case on violating the fundamental right and interfering
with States and State power conferred by the Constitution and Act in the Supreme Court of
Sindia challenging the Amendment and the notification. The matter is merged and the case is
posted for argument with immediate attention by the Honourable Supreme court of Sindia.

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ISSUES RAISED

______________________________________________________________________________

I. WHETHER THE PETITION IS ADMISSIBLE?

______________________________________________________________________________

II. WHETHER THE AMENDMENT AND RULE PERTAINING TO


UNIFORM STANDARDS IN LEGAL EDUCATION BY BCS IS
ARBITRARY TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND THE
RIGHTS GURANTEED TO CITIZENS AND NON-CITIZENS?

______________________________________________________________________________

III. WHETHER THE AMENDMENT AND RULE PERTAINING TO


UNIFORM STANDARDS OF ENROLMENT IN THE BAR VIOLATES
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS AND PRINCIPLES?

______________________________________________________________________________

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

___________________________________________________________________________

I. WHETHER THE PETITION IS ADMISSIBLE?

The Respondent contends that the Petition is not maintainable as a Public Interest Litigation as
the impugned legislation does not violate fundamental rights. The Petition’s admissibility is
also challenged on the ground that policy decisions are not justiciable.

___________________________________________________________________________

II. WHETHER THE AMENDMENT AND RULE PERTAINING TO UNIFORM


STANDARDS IN LEGAL EDUCATION BY BCS IS ARBITRARY TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND THE RIGHTS GURANTEED TO
CITIZENS AND NON-CITIZENS?

No. The setting of a uniform standard in legal education is not arbitrary to the constitutional
principles guaranteed as contented by the petitioners. The amendments are not ultra-vires to
the advocate’s act, and no fundamental rights have been violated. The classifications are to be
upheld as constitutional and reasonable since they were introduced in the light of protecting
and preserving the legal profession.

___________________________________________________________________________

III. WHETHER THE AMENDMENT AND RULE PERTAINING TO UNIFORM


STANDARDS OF ENROLMENT IN THE BAR VIOLATES
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS AND PRINCIPLES?

The amendment with respect to enrolment of advocates, significantly modifies the scope of the
definition of advocate and also introduces powers to the Sindian Bar Council regarding
enrolment. The Rules brought forth also discuss the aspect of enrolment and lays down certain
qualifications. The counsel for the Respondent submits that no violation of rights have been
caused and the Petition is deemed to be dismissed. The arguments in this regard have been
divided into the powers of the authority and allegations against Part III of the Constitution.
___________________________________________________________________________

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY SINDIAN COUNCIL FOR LEGAL


SERVICE UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION IS MAINTAINABLE?

[¶ 1] The respondents would like to humbly submit before the Hon’ble Court that the writ
petition filed by Sindian Council for Legal Service under Article 32 is not maintainable. The
respondents would like to make the following submissions in furtherance of the same.

1.1 THE PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE AS A PUBLIC INTEREST


LITIGATION
[¶ 2] The respondents would like to submit before this Hon’ble Court that Sindian Council
for Legal Service does not possess the right to file this petition.

[¶ 3] The Supreme Court possess an important jurisdiction with respect to public interest
litigations and the same must not be a medium for frivolous petitions which would be nothing
but an abuse of the process of Court 2. The concept of public interest litigation is of immense
value as it provides justice to those who have no access to Courts because of their social
backwardness3.

[¶ 4] A public interest litigation may be termed as the legal action initiated in a Court of law
for the implementation of public interest, wherein the legal rights or liabilities of the public or
any community are at threat4. What action would constitute “general interest of the public” is
not determinable as it is impossible to provide an inclusive definition that would cover every
objective in the realm of public purpose5.

[¶ 5] As this Hon’ble Court has observed, officious interveners with no public interest should
not be permitted to misspend the Court’s precious time6. The waste of judicial time of this

2
State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal & others; [2010] 3 SCC 402
3
Rajiv Ranjan Singh 'Lalan' and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors; [2006] MANU 3568 (SC)
4
The Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary; [1992] MANU 0532 (SC)
5
Motibhai Vithalbhai Patel and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Anr; [1961] AIR 93 (Guj)
6
Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & others; [1992] 4 SCC 305

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Court, is a matter of serious concern7. It has, on multiple occasions, upheld that only a person
whose fundamental right is infracted shall be allowed to seek the Court’s intervention8. The
Courts have always been cautious to entertain only bona fide public interest litigations in order
to preserve the importance of the jurisdiction it so holds in writ petitions that are of the nature
of public interest litigations9.

[¶ 6] Additionally, the counsel for the Respondent argues that the Courts in Sindia have
always maintained that, a writ of mandamus is not a writ of right and is not granted as a matter
of course - ex debito justitiae. Its grant (or refusal) is at the discretion of the court10. There must
be a judicially enforceable right for the enforcement of which a mandamus will lie11. Courts
are obliged to refuse mandamus, unless, it is shown that there is a clear legal right of the
applicant or statutory duty of the respondent and there is no alternative remedy available to the
applicant12. Subsequent submissions of this Respondent stand to establish that no fundamental
rights have been infracted in the instant case.

[¶ 7] The Supreme Court in the case of Sachidanand Pandey and Anr. v. State of West Bengal
and Ors.13, propounded that:
“It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest
in the proceeding of PIL will have a locus standi and can approach the court to
wipe out the tears of the poor and needy, suffering from violation of their
fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or private profit or political
motive or any oblique consideration.”

[¶ 8] It is the submission of this Respondent that the instant Public Interest Litigation by the
Sindian Council for Legal Service is ill-intentioned. A body looking to promote advocates of
the country, by filing the instant case, is standing against reforms that would drive the
profession in a positive direction.

7
Suraz India Trust vs. Union of India; [2017] 14 SCC 416
8
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India & others; [1984] AIR 802 (SC)
9
L. Jayanthi vs. The Secretary to Government Tamil Development and Information (Advertisement)
Department and Ors; MANU/TN/3173/2019
10
State of Kerala v. A. Lakshmi Kutty; [1986] 4 SCC 632
11
P. Ramachandran vs. The State of A.P. and Ors; MANU/AP/1251/2021
12
Mansukhlal v. State of Gujarat; [1997] 7 SCC 622
13
Sachidanand Pandey and Anr. v. State of West Bengal and Ors; [1987] 2 SCR 223

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1.2 PRESENCE OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES RENDERS THIS PETITION NOT-


MAINTAINABLE
[¶ 9] It is true that both Article 226 and 32 of the Sindian Constitution confer writ jurisdiction
upon the High Courts and the Supreme Court respectively. However, the courts on numerous
occasions have recognized that the scope of Article 226 are wider than that of Article 3214.

[¶ 10] This Hon’ble Court has itself imposed a self-restraint in its own wisdom on the exercise
of jurisdiction under Article 32 where the party invoking the jurisdiction has no effective
adequate alternative remedy in the form of Article 226 of the Constitution15. However, when it
comes to writ petition challenging the Constitutional validity of any provision, then the
petitioner should file writ petition before High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution16.

[¶ 11] Moreover, in order to invoke the jurisdiction under Art. 32 of the Constitution to
approach this Court directly, it has to be shown by the petitioner as to why the High Court has
not been approached, could not be approached or it is futile to approach the High Court. Unless
satisfactory reasons are indicated in this regard, filing of petition in such matters directly under
Article 32 of the Constitution is to be discouraged17. Thus, in the absence of an explanation for
why Article 32 was preferred over Article 226, the counsel submits that the Petition should not
be entertained

1.3 MATTERS OF POLICY ARE NOT JUSTICIABLE IN NATURE


[¶ 12] Not every default by the State or any public authority is justiciable in nature and
political pressure groups, at times, tend to use the process of Court to achieve their motives
which weren’t possible by way of administrative process18.

[¶ 13] 'Justiciable' means liable to try. The power of judicial review vests in this Court to
defend the values of the Constitution and also rights of the citizens. Such power, however, must
be exercised within judiciously permissible limitations19. By very nature, certain decisions are
not justiciable. Broadly speaking an issue is not justiciable if the judicial process is unsuitable

14
Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India; AIR [2005] SC 2677
15
Mohammed Ishaq v. S. Kazam Pasha; [2009] 12 SCC 748
16
State of West Bengal v. Ratnagiri Engineering Private Limited; [2010] 4 SCC 453.
17
Union of India v. Paul Manickam; AIR [2003] SC 4622.
18
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India and Anr; [1982] AIR 149 (SC)
19
Perali Water User Association, Guntur and Ors. vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh; MANU/AP/0113/2002

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for reaching decisions on such issues either because the Court lacks expertise or there are no
manageable standards to consider and appreciate the evidence placed before the Court20.

[¶ 14] A very important observation was made in this regard in the case of State of Rajasthan
v. Lata Arun21, whereby the court had significantly considered this issue and opined as under:
“The points involved in the case are twofold: one relating to prescription of
minimum educational qualification for admission to the course and the other
relating to recognition of the Madhyama Certificate issued by the Hindi Sahitya
Sammelan, Allahabad as equivalent to or higher than +2 or 1st year of TDC for
the purpose of admission. Both these points relate to matters in the realm of policy
decision to be taken by the State Government and the authority vested with power
under any statute. It is not for courts to determine whether a particular
educational qualification possessed by a candidate should or should not be
recognized as equivalent to the prescribed qualification in the case.”

[¶ 15] The court in the case of Leaap Forwarders Pvt. Ltd. V. Comissioner22 of central
exercise and custom, Guntur has also observed the statuatory authorities, when they make a
policy decision, such decisions shall be immune from the scrutiny of courts.

[¶ 16] Drawing from the above observation, we submit that, the decision to lay down
conditions for education and/or enrolment is a policy decision decided by the authorities
concerned, exercising their powers under relevant statutes. Such a decision cannot be called
into question before a court of law.

[¶ 17] In addition to that, the petitioners cannot file any suit against the respondents, as clearly,
the respondents are acting in good faith in correspondence to preserve, protect and promote the
legal profession which is the guardian of legal rights to ensure better administration of justice.
The respondents have initiated a step on reviving the legacy of legal profession by
concentrating on quality than quantity, as only qualitative professionals make the profession
qualitative and by filing a petition against it, the petitioners are obstructing the need of the hour.
Therefore, the respondents shall remain immune to any legal suits or proceedings that are
sought against them.

20
Secretary, Board of Intermediate Education, Hyd. v. S.Srivalli; [1999] 6 ALT 785
21
State of Rajasthan v. Lata Arun; [2002] 6 SCC 252
22
Leaap forwarders pvt. Ltd. V. Comissioner; [2001] 3 ALT 131

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It is hence the humble prayer of this Respondent that, the Petition shall not be entertained and
be dismissed with costs.

___________________________________________________________________________

II. WHETHER THE AMENDMENT AND RULE PERTAINING TO UNIFORM


STANDARDS IN LEGAL EDUCATION BY BCS IS ARBITRARY TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND GUARANTEED RIGHT OF CITIZEN AND
NON-CITIZENS?
[¶ 1] The respondents would like to submit before this Hon’ble Court that the setting of a
uniform standard in legal education is not arbitrary to the constitutional principles guaranteed
as contented by the petitioners. The amendments are not ultra-vires to the advocate’s act, and
no fundamental rights have been violated. The classifications are to be upheld as reasonable
since they were introduced in the light of protecting and preserving the legal profession.

2.1 THE RULES ARE NOT ULTRA-VIRES THE ADVOCATE ACT


[¶ 2] It is the humble submission of the respondents that since the amendment came into
effect on 2nd November 2022 the Bar council of Sindia had powers to regulate the standard of
legal education and attain uniform legal education standard. And with the power so vested upon
it, The BCS had brought about the changes to the rules wherein, the maximum age for
admission was prescribed as well as admission were to be exclusive only for citizens of the
country, the powers for which were provided by the recent amendment to the Advocates
Act,1961. Therefore, adequate powers have been vested upon the bar Council of Sindia to bring
in the amendment to the rules through the insertion of section 7 (h) (a) wherein powers and
functions of the bar council have been extended to regulate the standard of legal education and
to attain uniform legal education standard.

2.2 NO VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS


[¶ 3] The counsel for the respondents submits that in the case of Chiranjit Lal Choudhary v.
Union of India23 it has been held that the Government can make laws which has different
applications on different groups or classes of persons for some specific need and purpose,
provided the classification has been made reasonably and is free from arbitrariness. The
provisions in the amendment and rules are far from being arbitrary in nature, in fact they are
extremely tenacious in keeping the legal profession's standards high.

23
Chiranjit Lal Choudhary v. Union of India; [1951] AIR 41

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[¶ 4] It is the humble submission of the respondents that a reasonable classification is not


only permitted but is necessary if the society needs to progress. In R.K. Garg v. Union of
India24, the Supreme Court held that Article 14 of the Indian constitution forbids class
legislation but it does not prohibit the reasonable classification of objects, persons, and
transactions for the purpose to achieve specific needs by the parliament. A need to regulate the
legal profession arose when there existed prominent issues such as fake lawyers, disciplinary
and enrollment issues considering which the amendments were brought about making the
classification based on age and citizenship reasonable.

[¶ 5] At times, even administrative necessity or convenience has been upheld as a basis of


classification.25 It is to be noted that 80000 applications of non-citizen Indian Law Degree
holders are pending with 300 allowed due to judgement in favour of litigants, these numbers
are in surge and gives rise to various enrolment issues and takes up a lot of the court’s time. It
is therefore addressed by the BCS by way of introducing these new rules and restricting the
admissions to only the citizens, which therefore has a rational nexus for the sake of
convenience.

[¶ 6] The writ petition in Rishabh Duggal v. Bar Council of India26 was filed under Article
32 of the Constitution of India, against the said Circular No. 6 that restored Clause 28 by the
Bar Council of India (BCI) which provides for a maximum age limit of 20 years and 45 years
for taking admission into the 5 and 3 years Law degree course respectively, an order was passed
by the hon’ble SC to reconsider the age limit after hearing the various stakeholders but the
criteria of specifying age as an unreasonable restriction was not promulgated.

[¶ 7] As all persons are not equal by nature or circumstances, the varying needs of different
classes or sections of people require differential treatment. This leads to classification among
different groups of persons and differentiation between such classes. Accordingly, to apply the
principle of equality in a practical manner, the courts have evolved the principle that if the law
in question is based on rational classification it is not regarded as discriminatory.27 Keeping

24
R.K. Garg v. Union of India; [1981] 4 SCC 675
25
Supdt. & Remembrance of legal affairs v. State of West Bengal; AIR [1975] SC 1030
26
Rishabh Duggal v. Bar Council of India; W.P 1023 of 2016
27
Gauri Shankar v. Union of India; AIR [1995] SC 55, at 58

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the different classes in mind, the BCS has been flexible with providing an extended age limit
for the OBS, SC and ST categories.

[¶ 8] While the right to pursue higher (professional) education has not been spelt out as a
fundamental right in Part III of the Constitution, it bears emphasis that access to professional
education is not a governmental largesse as enumerated by the supreme court in Farzana
Batool Vs Union of India And Others28 and in the case of Bar Council of India vs. A.K. Balaji
and Ors.29 The court had righteously declared that foreign lawyers/firms are not entitled to
practice law in India either on the litigation or nonlitigation side unless they fulfil the
requirement of the Advocates Act, 1961, and the Bar Council of India Rules. Indirectly, the
classification based on citizenship has been approved subject to the sections of the Advocate
Act and rules of the BCS.

[¶ 9] In the case of M.R.F. Ltd. v. State of Kerala,30 the court examined the reasonableness
of a statutory provision which has to be kept in mind, they are, a) the directive principles of
State Policy, b) restrictions must not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature so as to go beyond
the requirement of the interest of the general public, c) In order to judge the reasonableness of
the restrictions, no abstract or general pattern or a fixed principle can be laid down so as to be
of universal application and the same will vary from case to case as also with regard to changing
conditions, values of human life, social philosophy of the Constitution, prevailing conditions
and the surrounding circumstances, d) a just balance has to be struck between the restrictions
imposed and the social control envisaged by Article 19(6), e) Prevailing social values as also
social needs which are intended to be satisfied by the restrictions, f) There must be a direct and
proximate nexus or reasonable connection between the restrictions imposed and the object
sought to be achieved. If there is a direct nexus between the restrictions, and the object of the
Act, then a strong presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the Act will naturally arise.

[¶ 10] The restriction to citizens only falls under the purview of Article 41, wherein the state
can within the limits of its economic capacity and development make effective provisions with
regards to education and unemployment. With the current statistics of Sindia at hand, there is
a constant hike in the growth rate of lawyers, (up to 25% surge in next 5 years) it is primal for

28
Farzana Batool Vs Union of India And Others; LL [2021] SC 213
29
Bar Council of India vs. A.K. Balaji and Ors; Civil Appeal Nos. 7875-7879, 7170 and 8028 of 2015
30
M.R.F. Ltd. v. State of Kerala; [1999] AIR 188 (SC)

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the state to ensure that in light of development of the standards of the professional field, the
restrictions are to be treated as coherent. Considering the provisions of Article 46, BCS has
provided a relaxation period wrt age restriction for the SC, ST, and OBCs.

[¶ 11] Any action taken with a view to giving effect to any one or more of the Directive
Principles would ordinarily, subject to any constitutional or legal inhibitions or other overriding
considerations, qualify for being regarded as reasonable, while an action which is inconsistent
with or runs counter to a Directive Principle would incur the reproach of being unreasonable.
So also, the concept of public interest must as far as possibly receive its orientation from the
Directive Principles.

[¶ 12] Any action taken with a view to giving effect to any one or more of the Directive
Principles would ordinarily, subject to any constitutional or legal inhibitions or other overriding
considerations, qualify for being regarded as reasonable, while an action which is inconsistent
with or runs counter to a Directive Principle would incur the reproach of being unreasonable.
So also, the concept of public interest must as far as possibly receive its orientation from the
Directive Principles.31

[¶ 13] There is bound to be some degree of inequality when there is a segregation of one class
from the other. However, such segregation must be rational and not artificial or evasive. 32 In
such a situation, it is essential to remain mindful that it is impossible to compare the legal
profession to any other profession and declare that this is an unfair classification under
professional standards because there is a need to control the profession's rate of growth and
simultaneously preserve its quality. This is of utmost priority because, despite the exponential
growth rate in the legal profession, Sindia only ranks 79th out of 139 countries part of the World
Justice Index which determines the standard of administration of justice.

[¶ 14] In Papnasam,33 the Supreme Court has stated that the following principles and
guidelines should be kept in view while considering the constitutionality of a statutory

31
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India; AIR [1978] SC 597; Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corp; AIR
[1994] SC 988
32
Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation and Anr; [2014] 8 SCC 682
33
Papnasam Labour Union v. Madura Coats Lid; AIR [1995] SC 2200

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provision imposing restriction on a Fundamental Right guaranteed by. Art.19(1)(a) to (g) when
challenged on the ground of unreasonableness of the restriction imposed by it:
“…(d) In interpreting constitutional provisions, the court should be alive to the felt
need of the society and complex issues facing the people which the legislature
intends to solve through effective legislation.
(e) In appreciating such problems and felt need of the society the judicial approach
must necessarily be dynamic, pragmatic and elastic.
(f) It is imperative that for consideration of reasonableness of restriction imposed
by a statute, the court should examine whether the social control as envisaged in
Art. 19 is being effectuated by the restriction imposed on the Fundamental Right.
(g) The Rights guaranteed to a citizen by Art. 19 do not confer any absolute or
unconditional right. Each Right is subject to reasonable restriction which the
legislature may impose in public interest. It is therefore necessary to examine
whether such restriction is meant to protect social welfare satisfying the need of
prevailing social values.
(h) The reasonableness has got to be tested both from the procedural and
substantive aspects. It should not be bound by procedural perniciousness or
jurisprudence of remedies.
(i) A restriction imposed on a Fundamental Right guaranteed by Art. 19 must
not be arbitrary, unbridled, uncanalised and excessive and also not unreasonably
discriminatory. A restriction, to be reasonable must also be consistent with Art. 14
of the Constitution.
(j) In judging the reasonableness of the restriction imposed under Aft. 19(6), the
court must bear in mind Directive Principles of State Policy.
(k) Ordinarily, any restriction so imposed which has the effect of promoting or
effectuating a Directive Principle can be presumed to be reasonable restriction in
public interest.”

[¶ 15] The distinction between citizens and non-citizens for the purpose of admission is also
reasonable because, ultimately, only earning a law degree would enable one to practise law by
enrolling in the Bar Council. However, only citizens are permitted to do so in accordance with
Section 24 of the Advocates Act of 1961. When the parent legislation in itself has a
classification wrt to citizenship, the rules in furtherance of it cannot be scrutinized as irrational.

Thus, the Respondent counsel humbly submits that the restriction laid down is reasonable and
does not violate the constitutional provisions.

________________________________________________________________________

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III. WHETHER THE AMENDMENT AND RULES PERTAINING TO UNIFORM


STANDARDS OF ENROLMENT IN THE BAR, VIOLATES EXCEEDING
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS AND PRINCIPLES?

[¶ 1] The amendment with respect to enrolment of advocates, significantly modifies the


scope of the definition of advocate and also introduces powers to the Sindian Bar Council to
legislate on matters regarding enrolment. The Rules brought forth also discuss the aspect of
enrolment and lays down certain qualifications for the same. The said rules and amendment
are hereby challenged by the Petitioner. The counsel for the Respondent submits that no
violation of rights have been caused and the Petition is deemed to be dismissed. The arguments
in this regard have been divided into the powers of the authority and allegations against Part
III of the Constitution.

3.1 THE AUTHORITIES ARE VESTED WITH ABLE LEGISLATIVE


COMPETENCE TO INTRODUCE THE RULE AND MAKE AMENDMENTS TO THE
ACT
[¶ 2] As recent as in February 2023, the Supreme Court in the case of Bar Council of India
v. Bonnie Foi Law College34, the Apex Court has categorically pronounced that A plain reading
of Sections 6(a), 6(b), Section 24(1)(e) and Section 28(2)(d) of the said Act indicates that the
functions of the State bar Council relates to preparing and maintenance of rolls and the
admission of persons as advocates on its roll. However, in stark contrast, the Rule making
power of the Bar Council of India under Section 49(1)(ag) of the said Act empowers the Bar
Council of India to prescribe rules that could specify a class or category of persons who are
entitled to be enrolled. The meaning of “entitle” would indicate that the Bar Council of India
could prescribe such conditions which would give the right or claim to a person to be enrolled
as an advocate. Thus, Bar Council of Sindia’s role prior to enrolment cannot be ousted.

[¶ 3] Section 49, as reproduced below, gives a general power to Bar Council of Sindia.
Clause (ag) requires the attention of this court:
“49. General power of the Bar Council of India to make rules –
[(1)] The Bar Council of India may make rules for discharging its funtions
under this Act, and, in particular, such rules may prescribe- …. …. …. ….
…. ….
(ag) the class or category of persons entitled to be enrolled as advocates;”

34
Bar Council of India v. Bonnie Foi Law College; MANU/SC/0115/2023

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[¶ 4] The meaning of the word “entitlement”, would indicate that the Bar Council of India
could prescribe such conditions, which would give the right or claim to a person to be enrolled
as an advocate.

[¶ 5] The objective of the legislature while giving wide powers to the Bar Council of India
under Section 49, which gives it the powers to make Rules, read with Section 24(3)(d), which
gives it the powers to prescribe the norms for entitlement to be enrolled as an Advocate under
the Rules of the Bar Council of India, leads us to the conclusion that these are adequate powers
with the Bar Council of India under the said Act to provide such norms and Rules.

[¶ 6] Additionally, the new amendments have significantly conferred such exclusive powers
with respect to enrolment with the Bar Council of Sindia under the impugned Section 7 (e) (b).
Thus the legislative competence to introduce the amendment or the rule shall not be in dispute.

3.2 THE ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 IS BASELESS

[¶ 7] The counsel for the Respondent most humbly submits that, the classification made in
respect of taking the ASBE, i.e. allowing only graduates within three years of completion of
the course to attend the exam, is not an unjustified classification and does not violate Article
14. What is prohibited under Article 14 is Class Legislation. Reasonable classification has been
allowed in numerous cases35. Reasonable Classification is always based on real and substantial
distinction, bearing a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by such legislation.

[¶ 8] In the case of State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, the Supreme Court of India,
stated the twin test for reasonable classification. The court held that for the classification to
pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled:
i. Classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia
ii. The differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved
by the Act.

35
Suresh Kumar Koushal v. NAZ Foundation; AIR 2014 SC 563

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[¶ 9] It is observed by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Nivedita Jain36, that "the
regulation prescribes the eligibility age of a candidate for admission to medical courses. For
maintaining proper standards in medical colleges and institutions it comes within the
competence of the Council to prescribe the necessary qualification of the candidates who may
seek admission into these colleges. While referring to the requirement of the age restriction,
the Court observed that "the regulation leaves no doubt that it is mandatory."

[¶ 10] In the case of Gautham Kapoor v. State of Rajasthan37, the Court observed that The
classification on the basis of age is a reasonable classification unless the age prescribed is
arbitrary or unreasonable.

[¶ 11] The Apex Court in the case of University Grants Commission V. Sadhana Chaudhary38,
had categorically observed that
"it is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot
always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the
choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When
fixing a line or a point is necessary and there is no mathematical or logical way of
fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted
unless it is very wide off the reasonable mark."

[¶ 12] This decision should put an end to the controversy raised by the petitioners. While
Section 24 of the Act prescribes the minimum age for enrolment as twenty-one years complete,
there is no provision in the Act which can be said to prescribe the maximum age for entry into
the profession. Since the Act is silent on this point the Bar Council of India was required to
resort to its rule making power.

[¶ 13] Section 49(1) confers power on the Bar Council of Sindia to make rules, inter alia, for
discharging its functions under the Act. Section 49(1)(ag) when read with Section 24 of the
Act confers wide powers on the Bar Council of India39 to indicate the class or category of
persons who may be enrolled as advocates which power would include the power to refuse
enrolment in certain circumstances. The obligation to maintain the dignity and purity of the
profession and to punish erring members carries with it the power to regulate entry into the

36
State of M.P. v. Nivedita Jain; [1982] 1 SCR 759
37
Gautham Kapoor v. State of Rajasthan; AIR 1987 Raj 174
38
University Grants Commission V. Sadhana Chaudhary; (1997) IILLJ 272 SC
39
B. Balakrishna Pillai vs. The Bar Council of India and Ors; MANU/TN/0878/2011

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profession with a view to ensuring that only profession-oriented and service-oriented people
join the Bar and those not so oriented are kept out.

[¶ 14] Counsel for the Respondent submits that a person who has already spent the best years
of his life in pursuing some other profession or occupation cannot be said to have the correct
attitude of a service-oriented professional and cannot be expected to maintain the high
standards of professional conduct. According to the Respondent, persons who retire from
various institutions, when admitted to the legal profession use their earlier contacts to canvass
for cases; a conduct which brings down the standard of professional ethics and has a very
adverse influence on the minds of young fresh entrants to the profession. It is no answer to state
that disciplinary action can be taken against those who deviate from the standard of conduct
expected of a member of the Bar40 because all cases of infraction of the Code of Conduct do
not come to the notice of the Bar Council and behavior leaves a lingering effect on the
profession. It is in order to uphold the high standards of professional morality and integrity that
the Bar Council of India was compelled to enact a rule restricting the entry into the legal
profession by prescribing that only those within three years of completion of the course are
allowed to take the exam.

[¶ 15] The Bar Council of Sindia contends that it has acted bona fide within the framework of
the Act and the Constitution. According to it the right to practise as an advocate not being a
fundamental right but only a privilege conferred by the Act can always be withdrawn and in
any case reasonable restrictions can be imposed even if it were a fundamental right under
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The restriction imposed by the newly added rule is to serve
a public purpose and can never be termed as unreasonable, violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution. Since the upper age limit has been fixed to save the legal profession from decay
and deterioration it is difficult to comprehend how it can be said to be inconsistent with Article
21 and for that matter Article 14 of the Constitution.

[¶ 16] This is the intelligible diffrentia to prove the classification and the nexus can been seen
in the need to uphold and protect the profession. The Courts have opined that the differentia
which is the basis of the classification and the object of the act are distinct things and what is
necessary is that there must be a nexus between them i.e., the object of the law and the

40
Supreme Court advocates on Record Assn. v. Union of India; [2016] 5 SCC 1

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grouping41. The Preamble of the Act states the intent of the legislation is to consolidate the law
regarding the legal profession. The nexus can be found in the understanding that only when
entry into the profession is regulated, can the members of the profession be governed in an able
fashion. Numerous judgements of the courts have allowed setting of minimum age limit for
entry into professional courses for the purpose of maintaining the dignity of the profession42.
Thus the Respondent humbly submits that this Court shall be convinced to hold that the
classification made on the basis of age within which a person shall take the ASBE exam, is not
violative of Article 14.

3.3 REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS AS ENVISAGED UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(G)


HAVE ONLY BEEN LAID DOWN
[¶ 17] While Article 19 is known for the freedom it grants to the citizens of the country. One
facet of said Article 19, is Article 19 (1) (g), which guarantees that all citizens shall have the
right to practice any profession, or to carry on occupation, trade or business. A similar
constitutional right is also granted in Article 301. The guarantee under Article 19(1)(g) extends
to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation or trade, within the jurisdiction of
Sindia43.

[¶ 18] Exercise of the Right under Article 19 (1) (g) is not absolute and has been subject to
the restrictions under Article 19 (6). The first part of Article 19 (6) provides that restrictions
in the interest of general public, shall be permissible. In the case of Municipal Corpn. of the
City of Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohammad Usmanbhai44, the Apex Court opined that, the
expression 'in the interest of general public' is of wide import comprehending public order,
public health, public security, morals, economic welfare of the community and the objects
mentioned in part IV of the Constitution. Nobody can dispute a law which provides for basic
amenities and for the dignity of human labour as a social welfare measure in the interest of
general public.
[¶ 19] Apart from the general rule of public interest, Article 19(6) provides for two other
restrictions which are reproduced below:
“(6) Nothing in sub clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any
existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law

41
Gautam Kapoor v. State; MANU/RH/0043/1987
42
G.S. Pavana Krishna Murthy v. Government of A.P; [1994] 1 ALT 290
43
Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Corporation Committee; [1989] AIR 1988 (SC)
44
Municipal Corpn. of the City of Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohammad Usmanbhai; AIR 1986 SC 1205

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imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the


exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause, and, in particular, nothing
in the said sub clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it
relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,
the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any
profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or the carrying on
by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade,
business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of
citizens or otherwise.”

[¶ 20] Clause (i) clearly states that, technical or professional qualifications can be laid down
and such qualification shall be reasonable under Article 19 (6). It is, therefore, clear that what
is provided under Article 19(6)(i) is that the State can impose reasonable restrictions on the
practising of any profession or carrying on any occupation trade or business by enacting
legislation prescribing professional or technical qualifications which may be necessary for the
purpose of practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business45. Subject
to the acquisition of such technical qualifications by a citizen he has got a right to carry on any
profession, occupation, trade or business46.

[¶ 21] It is the humble contention of the Respondent that, the age bar that restricts persons
who graduated more than three years ago is only a professional qualification and hence shall
be permissible under Article 19(6). On the same ground on which the rule is found not to have
fallen foul on the anvil of Article 14, as the impugned rule has to be treated as imposing a
reasonable restriction on the said fundamental right is also, therefore, has to be held not to be
arbitrary or unreasonable from any viewpoint47.

[¶ 22] The Apex Court in Bar Council of India v. Bonnie Foi Law College48 observed that,
even if a person has a law degree or enrolment, it does not mean that his ability to assist the
court would continue with him if there are long hiatus period of time in some unconnected job.
He would have to hone and test his skills afresh. Thus, if there is a substantial break, norms
should be specified by the Bar Council of India, as regards to what has to be done to regain that
qualification.

45
Sagir Ahmed v. The Govt of the State of Uttar Pradesh; AIR 1954 All 257
46
K. Kumaraswamy and Ors. vs. State of A.P. and Ors; MANU/AP/0294/1991
47
Haniraj L. Chulani v. Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa; AIR 1996 SC 1708
48
Bar Council of India v. Bonnie Foi Law College; MANU/SC/0115/2023

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[¶ 23] In lieu of these reasonable grounds, the Counsel wishes to submit that in the interest of
general public, this move can be deemed necessary in the background that the legal profession
is becoming increasingly competitive and the need arises for the statutory bodies to lay down
regulations regarding entry into the profession to safeguard the dignity and morals of this noble
profession. And professional qualifications being a permitted restriction under Article 19 (6),
the instant rule shall thus fall within its ambit too.

[¶ 24] Additionally, arguendo, if this court was to observe that the instant rule is beyond a
reasonable restriction and falls within the realm of prohibition for the reason that it prohibits
entry of persons that graduated over three years, this counsel would like to invite the attention
of the Bench to the case of Lakhan Lal vs. State of Orissa49, where it was held that there can
be no doubt that the constitution makers intended the word restriction to include prohibition
also.

Thus, the Respondent counsel humbly submits that the restriction laid down is reasonable and
falls within the ambit of Article 19 (6).

49
Lakhan Lal vs. State of Orissa; AIR 1977 SC 722

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PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced, and authorities cited. It is
most humbly prayed before this Hon’ble Court that it may be pleased to

1. Declare, the Writ Petition as not admissible

2. Declare, the amendment and rule pertaining to uniform standards in legal


education by BCS is not arbitrary

3. Declare, the amendment and rule pertaining to uniform standards of enrolment


in the bar as not violative of constitutional limits.

AND/OR, pass any order or orders that the court may deem fit in and proper in the
circumstances of the case and in the interest of Justice, Equity, and Good Conscience.

All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.

Date: (S/d)

Place: Supreme Court of Sindia (Counsels for Respondent)

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