TNSR Journal Vol 6 Issue 2 Elgin Lanoszka

The Scholar Texas National Security Review: Volume 6, Issue 2 (Spring 2023)
Print: ISSN 2576-1021 Online: ISSN 2576-1153
SWEDEN, FINLAND,
AND THE MEANING OF
ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP
Katherine Kjellström Elgin
Alexander Lanoszka
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Sweden, Finland, and the Meaning of Alliance Membership
Rationalist understandings of military alliances argue that a formal

treaty underpinning the security relationship is crucial for deepening
and rendering more efficient defense cooperation between countries.
However, Sweden’s and Finland’s cooperation with NATO prior to 2022,
when the two countries announced their intentions to formally join the
alliance, was far more substantial than what rationalist explanations
would expect. Traditional approaches to military alliances overlook the
importance of ontological, or identity-based, considerations that come
with being a formal member of an alliance. Accordingly, not only is signing
a treaty functionally important, it is also significant in terms of what it
implies for national identity in terms of security policy. For Sweden and
Finland, this suggests that the greatest change with NATO membership
will be with regard to identity and strategic culture.
R
ussia’s February 2022 invasion of Finnish membership in NATO would undermine
Ukraine revived a question that had European security and necessitate some sort of re-
been somewhat closed for decades: sponse.4 High-level Russian officials have said that
Would Sweden and Finland join NATO Swedish and Finnish membership in NATO would
as formal members? The answer quickly proved to “require changing the whole palette of relations
be “yes.” For the first time ever in both countries, with these countries.”5 However, Russian bluster
a majority of the Swedish and Finnish populations about retaliatory actions quieted once the deci-
favored joining NATO.1 The two Nordic neighbors sion had been formally made.6 The Russian Foreign
declared their intent to join the alliance in May Ministry warned vaguely of reinforcing military
2022 and, after spending several weeks negotiating units near Finland, despite how many forces have
with Turkey over its security concerns, obtained a already been committed to Ukraine.7
clear pathway toward membership.2 Finland ulti- Though several analysts and political leaders
mately became the first of the two to become a for- have argued that Swedish and Finnish member-
mal member in April 2023.3 For their part, Russian ship is a game-changer for the international secu-
leaders had previously asserted that Swedish and rity environment and NATO planning, the change
1 Matti Koivisto, “Ylen kysely: Enemmistö suomalaisista kannattaa Suomen Nato-jäsenyyttä,” Yle, Feb. 28, 2022, https://yle.fi/uu-
tiset/3-12336530; and Fanny Westling, “Majoritet av svenskarna vill att vi går med i Nato,” Aftonbladet, March 4, 2022, https://www.aftonbladet.
se/nyheter/a/RrBKv5/for-forsta-gangen-vill-en-majoritet-av-svenskarna-att-vi-gar-med-i-nato.
2 “Türkiye, Finland, and Sweden Sign Agreement Paving the Way for Finnish and Swedish NATO Membership,” NATO, June 28, 2022, https://
www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_197251.htm?selectedLocale=en.
3 “Finland Joins NATO as 31st Ally,” NATO, April 4, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_213448.htm. As of writing, Sweden is still
an invitee to NATO, awaiting approval of accession protocol from Turkey and Hungary.
4 Tony Barber, “Russian Truculence Causes Concern in Sweden and Finland,” Financial Times, Jan. 4, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/1c5e-
c0c4-16e2-4d44-889d-1c76e059dff3; Charles Szumski, “Russia Threatens Sweden and Finland Over NATO Membership, Again,” Euractiv, March 14,
2022, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/russia-threatens-sweden-and-finland-over-nato-membership-again/; and Brendan
Cole, “Finland Joining NATO Means ‘Destruction of Their Country’: Russian Lawmaker,” Newsweek, April 7, 2022, https://www.newsweek.com/
russia-finland-dzhabarov-ukraine-stoltenberg-nato-retaliation-1695854.
5 Szumski, “Russia Threatens.”
6 In late June 2022, after Sweden and Finland were invited to apply for membership, Russian President Vladimir Putin said, “If Finland and
Sweden wish to, they can join [NATO]. That’s up to them.” He vaguely warned that if military personnel or infrastructure were deployed on their
territory, Russia would need to respond. Andrew Roth, “Putin Issues Fresh Warning to Finland and Sweden on Installing NATO Infrastructure,”
The Guardian, June 29, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/29/russia-condemns-nato-invitation-finland-sweden.
7 Andrew Osborn and Jake Cordell, “Russia Says Finland’s NATO Accession Is Dangerous Historic Mistake,” Reuters, April 4, 2023, https://www.
reuters.com/world/europe/russia-finlands-nato-accession-carries-risk-escalation-2023-04-04/. Of course, Russia may yet follow through on its
threat in the future. See Nicholas Lokker and Heli Hautala, “Russia Won’t Sit Idly By After Finland and Sweden Join NATO,” War on the Rocks,
March 30, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/03/russia-wont-sit-idly-by-after-finland-and-sweden-join-nato/.
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The Scholar
that membership brings for the Nordic countries ter-military consultations, military-technical coop-
themselves has received less attention outside of eration, joint military exercises, and inter-military
the region.8 Being a NATO member clearly has cru- confidence-building measures. The extent of insti-
cial benefits, primary among them having direct tutionalization between the two Nordic countries
input in joint military planning and gaining a sense and NATO is so high that the degree of defense
of protection from Article 5, which provides that an cooperation that they presently have with NATO
attack against one is an attack against all. Impor- is arguably greater than what most formal alliances
tantly, NATO planners can now assume Swedish have exhibited historically, defying rationalist and
and Finnish participation, rather than treating it as functionalist explanations of alliance politics.
a variable. As such, they can bring those countries’ The political importance of joining NATO not-
capabilities into the planning process for opera- withstanding, the practical benefits to Sweden and
tions in and outside of the Baltic region. With every Finland are significant and yet less than what some
Nordic country a member or soon to be a mem- observers might think. Still, if relations between
ber of NATO, the alliance — and Russia — faces a Sweden, Finland, and NATO were so close without
different political geography in the region. Indeed, membership, why did Sweden and Finland apply
international relations scholars argue that formal- to join in 2022 and not earlier? Sweden’s and Fin-
ized security ties make cooperation more efficient land’s search for ontological security — the need
by making commitments more credible and by re- to feel secure in one’s identity — is one significant
solving some of the worries that states might have factor that helps to explain their decisions not to
about the reliability of their potential allies.9 The apply for NATO membership for as long as they
implication of this theoretical perspective is that did, despite seeking closer cooperation with the
Sweden’s and Finland’s cooperation with NATO alliance. After not joining the alliance at its concep-
was inefficient until now. tion, Sweden and Finland came to adopt national
Yet, as we show, prior to joining NATO, these two security identities as non-NATO members. In final-
countries had already achieved a very high level of ly making the decision to join NATO, they not only
defense cooperation across multiple dimensions in changed the political map of Europe, but also their
a manner that is unusual in the history of military own self-identification as non-allied states, which
alliances. This high level of cooperation is puzzling will alter how others see them. It is this political
from the perspective of international relations the- and identity change that is at the heart of why their
ory. As Sweden and Finland establish themselves decisions to join NATO are so important. Thus, we
within NATO, it would be easy to overstate how challenge rationalist understandings of alliances,
much more interoperability and military coopera- demonstrating both that high levels of defense co-
tion they will receive as members. operation can occur without formal alliances and
In this article, we evaluate Sweden’s and Fin- that countries join alliances for reasons that ex-
land’s defense cooperation with NATO to provide tend beyond functionality and efficiency.
a more informed basis for understanding what will We do not argue that being proper members of
change — and what will not change — with them NATO will not benefit Stockholm and Helsinki, or
joining the alliance. During the Cold War, the two that their membership will neither augment the
countries approached NATO differently, with Fin- alliance nor make existing cooperation more effi-
land being far more distant than Sweden in its rela- cient.10 With NATO membership, they can partic-
tionship with the alliance. Despite this difference, ipate directly in joint military planning, be auto-
they followed roughly similar trajectories in their matically involved in political consultations, and
cooperation with NATO after the Cold War ended. receive a clear Article 5 pledge. NATO will gain
Using a framework for analyzing the institutionali- from counting among its members two democratic
zation of defense cooperation, we show that there states with strong militaries, together possessing
has been an unusual amount of defense coopera- the ability to mobilize several hundred thousand
tion across several key dimensions: treaties, in- troops in wartime, high-quality aircraft (which
8 See, e.g., Jonathan Masters, “How NATO Will Change If Finland and Sweden Become Members,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 29, 2022,
https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-nato-will-change-if-finland-and-sweden-become-members; Ignas Jačauskas, “Finland, Sweden in NATO Would Be
‘Game Changer’ for Baltic Security – Lithuanian PM,” LRT, April 14, 2022, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1673389/finland-sweden-in-nato-
would-be-game-changer-for-baltic-security-lithuanian-pm.
9 James D. Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” Annual Review of Political Science 3, no. 1 (June 2000): 63–83, https://doi.org/10.1146/
annurev.polisci.3.1.63.
10 We focus on the benefits to Sweden and Finland of joining NATO, rather than the benefits to NATO of them joining, since the decision to
apply for membership is ultimately up to the potential member(s) in question.
35
will soon include F-35s), significant naval capabil- provide a large enough shock to change their al-
ities, intelligence acumen, and more.11 Important- liance status identity. We conclude by discussing
ly, NATO also benefits from Swedish and Finnish what the importance of identity and ontological se-
membership by being able to plan for contingen- curity as an alliance consideration means not only
cies that would involve their armed forces. Nor for Sweden and Finland, but also for our under-
do we argue that Sweden and Finland share the standing of alliance politics in general.
same security identities or face identical security
concerns or relations with NATO. The relations
between each country and NATO will change, and Standard Understandings of Alliance
the two Nordic states must learn what it means to Formation and Formalization
be full NATO members.12 Rather, our point is that
the importance of Sweden and Finland signing the The reluctance of Sweden and Finland to join
Washington Treaty is more rooted in politics and NATO before 2022 raises a key question that has
perceptions than in military practicalities, and that prompted much theorizing by international rela-
both supporters and detractors of these countries tions scholars: Why do states form treaty alliances?
joining NATO likely overstate their case by relying The cases of Sweden and Finland pose a particular
on arguments based on the technical defense coop- problem when answering this question, because
eration benefits. many of those theories predict that Sweden and
We begin by defining what we mean by allianc- Finland should have sought NATO membership
es and reviewing scholarly explanations for why prior to 2022.
states create and formalize them. These explana- Let’s first define what we mean by an “alliance.”
tions shed little light on Sweden’s and Finland’s Although some scholars have defined alliances
relationship with NATO because they predict that as both formal and informal military security ar-
these countries should have been formal members rangements between two or more states,13 we fa-
of the alliance long before 2022. We then discuss vor a narrower definition: An alliance requires a
how Sweden and Finland have historically aligned founding treaty signed by two or more states that
with NATO. Because Finland was under the Soviet contains either reciprocal or one-sided promises
sphere of influence during the Cold War, this sec- of military support against some external threat.
tion focuses more on Sweden. But, despite coming We exclude informal arrangements because of the
from different starting points, Finland and Sweden measurement problems associated with a defini-
have followed similar trajectories regarding their tion that makes tacit alignments and treaty-based
alignment with NATO since the Cold War ended. alliances functionally equivalent to one another.
Using a framework for measuring defense coop- It would be difficult to determine reliably, for ex-
eration, we demonstrate that, after 1991, Sweden ample, how much military cooperation one must
and Finland became deeply institutionalized with observe to elevate a relationship between multiple
NATO, similar to what one might expect of formal states to the status of an informal alliance. This
allies. This institutionalization complicates ration- point is crucial regarding Sweden and Finland. It
alist expectations of alliance formation, leading would be impossible to know at what point in the
us to argue that these explanations miss a crucial past their defense cooperation with NATO, or any
factor in alliance considerations: identity and onto- particular NATO member for that matter, would
logical security. Sweden and Finland sought deep have qualified as an alliance under this broader
institutionalization with NATO, but remained out- definition of the term.
side of the alliance. The shift in their national se- One major explanation for why states form alli-
curity identities from non-allied to allied is critical. ances emphasizes threat perceptions. Stephen Walt
It required Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 to hypothesizes that states establish alliances when
11 See, e.g., John R. Deni, “Sweden Would Strengthen NATO with Fresh Thinking and an Able Force,” The New Atlanticist (Atlantic Council),
May 18, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/sweden-would-strengthen-nato-with-fresh-thinking-and-an-able-force/;
and Heljä Ossa and Tommi Koivula, “What Would Finland Bring to the Table for NATO?” War on the Rocks, May 9, 2022, https://warontherocks.
com/2022/05/what-would-finland-bring-to-the-table-for-nato/. On conceptualizing the strengths that Sweden and Finland brought to the alliance
prior to expressing membership in NATO, see Katherine Kjellström Elgin and Anna Wieslander, “Making NATO’s Partnerships More Strategic: Sweden
and Finland as Partner Models for Development,” in NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond, ed. Jason Blessing, Katherine
Kjellström Elgin, and Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy Institute/Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, The Johns
Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, 2021).
12 On how Finland might adjust to NATO membership, see Matti Pesu and Tuomas Iso-Markku, “Finland as a NATO Ally: First Insights into
Finnish Alliance Policy,” Finnish Foreign Policy Paper 9, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Dec. 15, 2022, https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/
finland-as-a-nato-ally.
13 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 12.
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they face shared threats, which may be a function up to the fight. After all, the problem that states face
of capabilities, intentions, and geography (while under international anarchy is that no supreme au-
noting that states do not form alliances to balance thority exists to monitor and enforce agreements or
only against another state’s capabilities, defined in to punish non-compliance. Because war is risky and
terms of population, military power, and economic costly, states might renege on promises to aid an-
wealth).14 A state is most threatening to others if other state militarily. A written commitment makes
it has offensive military capabilities and revisionist such promises more credible because it generates
intentions vis-à-vis the territorial status quo and if reputational costs if it is violated. Violating a trea-
it is geographically close by. According to this ar- ty that has been domestically ratified demonstrates
gument, the threat posed by Russia should have that a state’s leadership has acted in bad faith, there-
incited Sweden and Finland to form an alliance by hurting its reputation and hampering prospects
with other Euro-Atlantic states earlier considering of eliciting cooperation from other partners in the
Russia’s revitalized military capabilities, demon- future. A public, written commitment sends a strong
strated willingness to undermine the territorial international signal that at once reassures partners
status quo in Europe, and proximity.15 To be sure, and deters adversaries by affirming red lines. Given
as described below, the two countries have deep- these pressures to respect the treaty, even during a
ened their defense ties with NATO since Russia military crisis, states can confidently deepen their
seized Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Russia’s inva- cooperation with each other via joint military exer-
sion of Ukraine in 2022 could have heightened per- cises and regular consultations that would not oth-
ceptions of Russia as a threat, but a theory based erwise be possible.17
on threat perception alone would need
to account for why Sweden and Fin- Thus, Sweden and Finland
land decided to join in 2022, but not
in 2014. How severe must a threat be sought and arguably acquired
to convince a state to join an alliance?
As intuitive as it may be, Walt’s bal- several of these efficiencies
ance-of-threat theory still leaves un-
explained why and, importantly, when without formalizing an alliance.
states sign written treaties rather than
simply align with one another against a common Formalizing a commitment has other benefits.
threat. This shortcoming is by design: Walt aims One danger in alliance politics is that allies can
to explain both informal and formal arrangements pose certain entrapment risks, whereby a state
because he defines alliances broadly to cover both adopts policies or undertakes actions that could
alignments (e.g., China and Russia, as of 2023) and put overbearing pressure on its ally to defend or
treaty commitments (e.g., NATO). However, keep- side with it in a conflict no matter its own culpa-
ing the distinction between alignment and alliance bility. Put differently, formal alliances can create
is important precisely because countries spend a moral hazard problem if an ally believes that it
time negotiating alliance treaties, which in turn re- will be shielded from the costs of its own actions
inforces the notion that this type of defense coop- and so behaves more aggressively than it otherwise
eration, at least in theory, functions in a systemati- would. A dilemma might arise if efforts to narrow
cally different manner from alignment.16 the commitment to offset those risks end up trig-
James Morrow offers a rationalist explanation for gering new concerns on the part of the ally that
why states formalize their alliance commitments it could be abandoned to an adversary. A written
through a treaty. He argues that formal — that is, agreement can manage this dilemma if states adopt
written and ratified — commitments permit greater language that either specifies the scope of the alli-
efficiency in security cooperation by alleviating, at ance obligation or leaves vague the circumstanc-
least to some extent, fears about allies not showing es under which the alliance obligation would be
14 Walt, The Origin of Alliances, 5. On external threats and alliance formation, see also Jesse C. Johnson, “External Threat and Alliance Forma-
tion,” International Studies Quarterly 61, no. 3 (September 2017): 736–45, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqw054. For a threat-centred explanation of
Finland’s decision to seek NATO membership, see Pesu and Iso-Markku, “Finland as a NATO Ally,” 11–12. For such an explanation regarding Sweden’s
decision, see Mike Winnerstig, “From Isolationist Neutrality to Allied Solidarity: The Swedish Road to NATO Membership,” International Centre for
Defence and Security, Sept. 26, 2022, https://icds.ee/en/from-isolationist-neutrality-to-allied-solidarity-the-swedish-road-to-nato-membership/.
15 Anna Wieslander, “‘The Hultqvist Doctrine’– Swedish Security and Defence Policy After the Russian Annexation of Crimea,” Defence Studies
22, no. 1 (2022): 1–25, https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2021.1955619.
16 Paul Poast, Arguing About Alliances: The Art of Agreement in Military-Pact Negotiations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019).
17 Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?”
37
triggered. In the latter case, the resulting ambiguity activity since at least 2014, and both are highly con-
could create sufficient doubt for the ally such that cerned with the security challenge posed by Rus-
it does not think it will receive support by pursuing sia. Sweden, specifically, has bolstered its defense
policies that its defender might find disagreeable.18 of the island of Gotland amid worries that it could
Formal treaties thus make defense cooperation be the site of a Russian fait accompli. Regarding
more efficient and robust. Hence, many definitions outside options, no alternative alliance that balanc-
of military alliances emphasize the presence of a es against Russia exists. The proximity of the two
written agreement.19 Of course, a military alliance is countries to Russia affords few opportunities for
not just any formal institution: It involves a pledge buck-passing. Neither are capable of unilateral ac-
to fight in an anarchic environment where the stakes tion, owing to their relatively small size.23
are potentially existential.20 Still, this observation One final explanation for why countries sign
is consistent with institutionalist arguments about formal alliances is that they have a shared sense
the value of treaties: They can at once constrain of identity and culture. This intuitive explanation
and weed out those states that might otherwise en- specifically argues that like-minded countries with
gage in undesirable activities. Institutions set the similar cultures and governance systems are more
rules of the game and improve cooperation because likely to trust each other, with one result being the
they increase information flows, reduce transaction formation of “security communities” among such
costs, and facilitate credible commitments.21 How- countries.24 Thomas Risse-Kappen argues that NA-
ever, as we will see in the cases of Sweden and Fin- TO’s continued existence is rooted in its members
land, although a formal commitment might make having a shared identity and not simply in receiv-
some aspects of cooperation more efficient, the ing functional benefits from the formal military alli-
two countries already conduct exercises, consult, ance.25 As liberal democracies, Sweden and Finland
and cooperate with NATO countries. Thus, Sweden clearly self-identify with Europe, having joined the
and Finland sought and arguably acquired several European Union and often aligning with European
of these efficiencies without formalizing an alliance. and NATO states on a number of issues. Yet, this
According to Paul Poast, states sign treaties when particular shared identity and culture did not, on
their war plans are compatible and they have no its own, lead Sweden and Finland to seek NATO
attractive outside options, such as seeking an al- membership before 2022. More importantly, as we
ternative alliance, passing the buck (that is, getting discuss below with respect to Sweden and Finland,
others to balance against an adversary instead), or identity is multi-dimensional. Having the same ba-
taking some form of unilateral action.22 Whether sic political values may not be sufficient for alli-
war plans really drive alliance formation is debat- ance formation if a country’s historical geopolitical
able: If having compatible war plans enables alli- alignment itself feeds into its identity.
ance treaty-making, then why do alliances struggle The arguments above indicate that states typically
to produce actual war plans, if they ever attempt form alliances due to threats, functional benefits, or
to do so? Still, if threats are what drive war plans, basic shared political values and identity, and that
then Sweden and Finland should have been com- they negotiate alliance treaties to render their de-
patible with NATO on this basis long before 2022 fense cooperation more efficient. These arguments
— arguably, their threat perceptions and war plans suggest that Sweden and Finland should have joined
should be more compatible than those of Mon- NATO before 2022. However, they did not do so,
tenegro and North Macedonia, NATO’s previous with the prediction — from the standpoint of theory
newest members. Both Sweden and Finland are on — that they would have inefficient or underprovid-
the Baltic Sea, which has seen heightened military ed defense cooperation with the alliance.
18 Tongfi Kim, “Why Alliances Entangle but Seldom Entrap States,” Security Studies 20, no. 3 (2011): 350–77, https://doi.org/10.1080/096364
12.2011.599201. See also Daina Chiba, Jesse C. Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds, “Careful Commitments: Democratic States and Alliance Design,”
Journal of Politics 77, no. 4 (October 2015): 968–82, https://doi.org/10.1086/682074.
19 See, e.g., Alexander Lanoszka, Military Alliances in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2022): 13–18. See also Poast, Arguing
About Alliances.
20 Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” International Organization 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 357–78, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706526.
21 Beth A. Simmons and Daniel J. Hopkins, “The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory and Methods,” American Political Science
Review 99, no. 4 (November 2005): 623–31, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055405051920.
22 Poast, Arguing About Alliances.
23 That said, Finland’s strategic culture has emphasized self-sufficiency, resulting in an impressively large reserve force.
24 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
25 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and
Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
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Swedish and Finnish State Department were apprehensive of the pres-

(Non-)Cooperation with NATO sure that Moscow could exert in the region. They
During the Cold War advocated including Denmark, Iceland, Norway,
and Sweden in the Western Union — an alliance
Before measuring their patterns of cooperation proposal that would eventually materialize as NA-
in the period between the Cold War and Russia’s TO.29 However, Swedish leaders had long pursued
2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we explore a strategy of neutrality, believing that survival
how the two Nordic countries have historically required not antagonizing anyone. Such was the
varied in their relations toward NATO. Finland’s benefit of not being a member of NATO. Stock-
history with and proximity to the Soviet Union holm sought a “Nordic balance,” operating on the
pushed it away from NATO during the Cold War. theory that the Nordic countries should cooper-
In contrast, Swedish leaders cooperated closely ate with one another to reduce the influence of
with NATO, albeit discreetly, while still emphasiz- the great powers in the region.30 Stockholm feared
ing that signing the treaty was a step too far. losing Helsinki to Moscow. Swedish leaders ar-
At the start of the Cold War, Finland perceived gued that if their country joined NATO, Finland
the acute threat that the Soviet Union posed. Af- would risk becoming a Soviet satellite state. Thus,
ter fighting the Winter War and the Continuation instead of joining NATO, Sweden advocated for a
War in the 1940s, Finland was in a precarious po- non-aligned Scandinavian defense union. This ini-
sition: Moscow demanded heavy war reparations, tiative failed, but Sweden maintained its neutrali-
forced Finland to lease it a port just 30 kilometers ty and rejected NATO membership.
from Helsinki, took roughly one-tenth of Finnish Sweden’s decision not to align could have hurt
territory, and imposed limitations on the Finnish U.S. and NATO interests, were it not for several
military. In 1948, to mitigate the danger that the features of Swedish defense policy. First, Sweden
Soviet Union represented and to regain sovereign- had a much larger military force than Norway and
ty over Finnish territory, Helsinki signed the Trea- Denmark, both founding members of NATO. In
ty on Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assis- the 1970s, the Swedish military, if mobilized, was
tance — what one retired Finnish diplomat called arguably on par with those of France, the United
“a special feature [of the Soviet-Finnish relation- Kingdom, and West Germany.31 Sweden’s own mil-
ship] that clearly distinguished Finland from the itary posture provided a strong deterrent against
other European countries that pursued a policy Soviet aggression in Scandinavia.
of neutrality.”26 Views on this treaty’s meaning for Second, Sweden arrayed its defenses primari-
Finnish-Russian relations vary, but its importance ly toward the Soviet Union and so, militarily, its
is indisputable. Many Western observers at the non-alignment was biased in NATO’s favor. Swed-
time believed that Finland had already been lost ish authorities engaged in intelligence cooper-
and so NATO members made little effort to bring ation with NATO members throughout the Cold
it into their fold or to include it in other security War and, in the 1950s, even requested Bomarc,
discussions.27 Helsinki had no official diplomatic Hawk, and Sidewinder missiles from Washing-
contacts with NATO until the Cold War ended.28 ton. Justifiably concerned that Sweden posed a
Though slightly further from the Soviet threat, nuclear proliferation risk, the United States de-
Sweden was still sensitive to the geopolitical con- clined to sell the country Bomarcs but agreed to
text in Scandinavia. As early as 1948, members of sell the other two types of missile.32 Such cooper-
George Kennan’s policy planning staff at the U.S. ation endured despite major controversies, such
26 Klaus Törnudd, “Finnish Neutrality Policy During the Cold War,” SAIS Review of International Affairs 25, no. 2 (Summer–Fall 2005): 44,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26999271.
27 See Juhana Aunesluoma, Britain, Sweden and the Cold War, 1945–54: Understanding Neutrality (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
28 Tuomas Forsberg and Matti Pesu, “The ‘Finlandisation’ of Finland: The Ideal Type, the Historical Model, and the Lessons Learnt,” Diploma-
cy & Statecraft 27, no. 3 (2016): 478, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2016.1196069; Mats Bergquist et al., The Effects of Finland’s Possible
NATO Membership: An Assessment, Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Finland), April 29, 2016, 9, https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/others/
effects-finlands-possible-nato-membership-2016.
29 Dov S. Zakheim, “The United States and the Nordic Countries During the Cold War,” Cooperation and Conflict 33, no. 2 (June 1998): 118,
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0010836798033002001.
30 Nils Andrén, “The Nordic Balance: An Overview,” Washington Quarterly 2, no. 3 (1979): 4962, https://doi.org/10.1080/01636607909477407.
31 Gunnar Åselius, “Swedish Strategic Culture After 1945,” Cooperation and Conflict 40, no. 1 (2005): 27, https://doi.org/10.1177%
2F0010836705049732.
32 S. Moores, “‘Neutral on Our Side’: U.S. Policy Towards Sweden During the Eisenhower Administration,” Cold War History 2, no. 3 (2002):
48–49, https://doi.org/10.1080/713999963.
39
as Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme’s criticism Measuring Swedish and Finnish
of the U.S. deployment of B-52s in Vietnam. Nev- Cooperation with NATO Since
ertheless, he remained prepared to host B-52s on the 1990s
Swedish territory should war with the Soviet Un-
ion break out.33
Third, Swedish leaders recognized that they Many alliance theories would expect that, given
were unlikely to keep Sweden neutral in a general the newfound permissiveness in the international
European war.34 Sweden would clearly side with system after the fall of the Soviet Union, Sweden
the West. Its leaders even expected at least some and Finland would have sought NATO membership
NATO members to assist Sweden in the event of because they shared basic democratic values with
military conflict. Given Sweden’s tilt against the other member states and had presumably com-
Soviet Union, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower patible threat assessments or war plans. But — at
approved NSC 6006/1 in 1960, a strategic docu- least prior to 2022 — both countries deliberately
ment averring that “in the event of Soviet bloc refrained from seeking membership. Existing in-
aggression against Sweden alone, be prepared ternational relations theory — and particularly ra-
to come to the assistance of Sweden as part of tionalist explanations of alliances — would suggest
a NATO or UN response to the aggression.”35 As that their decision not to join was made at the ex-
Adm. Elmo Zumwalt later reflected, “The fact that pense of efficient and robust defense cooperation
Sweden’s neutrality was backed up by sturdy mil- with NATO. But how much defense cooperation has
itary capabilities and by the ‘unofficial alliance’ really been taking place? And what has been the tra-
gave me less cause for concern than those who jectory of each country since the Cold War ended?
didn’t know what we were up to.”36 Rationalist theories of alliances have expectations
During the Cold War, Sweden and Finland faced about what sort of defense cooperation should take
different circumstances and varied in their rela- place between states in the absence of an alliance
tionships with the United States and NATO. For treaty. Simply put, such theories argue that states
Sweden, a position of official neutrality was adopt- that do not seek membership in an alliance will be
ed lest Finland should become further enmeshed limited in their cooperation with alliance members.
with the Soviet Union. Yet, Sweden aligned itself Because the alliance treaty serves as a screening
closely with the United States and NATO. Finland’s and constraining device, being formal allies should
own freedom of maneuver vis-à-vis the Soviet Un- lead to greater efficiency insofar as it dramatically
ion was limited given its wartime experiences. Al- lowers barriers to cooperation.37 Not being a mem-
though these case-specific factors might help ex- ber of a formal alliance should mean higher trans-
plain why neither country joined NATO during the action costs, greater uncertainty, and fewer credible
Cold War, they ceased being directly operative af- commitments — handicaps that should preclude
ter the Soviet Union collapsed and a more permis- large amounts of defense cooperation. However, as
sive international environment emerged. If Sweden we will see, the Swedish and Finnish cases demon-
and Finland were held back from realizing closer strate that significant defense cooperation can take
ties with NATO because of the power and influ- place outside of alliance structures.
ence of the Soviet Union, then they no longer had To measure the depth of cooperation between
to deal with any such constraint. Indeed, NATO Sweden, Finland, and NATO in the period between
itself would see former treaty allies and occupied 1991 and 2022, we rely on Alexander Korolev’s study
countries of the Soviet Union join its ranks in the on China and Russia’s military alignment. In devel-
subsequent post-Cold War era. oping five indicators that signal the breadth and
depth of alliance institutionalization, Korolev of-
fers a useful and flexible framework for measuring
the degree of security cooperation between states,
33 Magnus Christiansson, “The NATO Question in Sweden Under the Trump Presidency: Military Non-alignment Between Power Politics and
Feminist Foreign Policy,” in Finland, Sweden & NATO: Did Trump Change Everything? ed. Jaan Siitonen (Helsinki, Finland: The European Liberal
Forum, 2017), 41.
34 Robert Dalsjö, “The Hidden Rationality of Sweden’s Policy of Neutrality During the Cold War,” Cold War History 14, no. 2 (2014): 175–94,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2013.765865.
35 Quoted in Moore, “Neutral on Our Side,” 50.
36 Quoted in Zakheim, “The United States,” 122.
37 On the screening and constraining features of formal agreements, see Simmons and Hopkins, “The Constraining Power of International Treaties.”
40
The Scholar
regardless of whether they have a formal treaty and Finland already enjoyed a high level of defense
commitment.38 After all, much as China and Russia cooperation with NATO despite being outside the al-
do not have a formal defense pact with one another, liance before 2022, but these benefits were possible
Sweden and Finland did not have one, let alone seek only because of NATO’s own adaptation in the post-
one, from NATO and its members until 2022. Cold War security environment.
The first indicator is whether a formal alliance
treaty exists that outlines the terms and condi- Indicator 1: Formal Treaty?
tions under which the signatories provide each
other security assistance. The second indicator Before each sought to join NATO, Sweden and
pertains to whether mechanisms exist that pro- Finland had no formal security treaty with any
vide for inter-military consultations, which can country.39 However, they are both members of the
facilitate mutual understanding and offer a sense European Union and so they have signed the Trea-
of predictability, while reducing the possibility of ty of the European Union, which entered into force
misperceptions that can be harmful to the secu- in 2009. Article 42, paragraph 7 of the treaty does
rity relationship. The third indicator addresses technically constitute a mutual defense clause,
military-technical cooperation, which concerns the providing that “[i]f a Member State is the victim of
purchase of military equipment and exchange of armed aggression on its territory, the other Mem-
technical expertise. It can, at its deepest extent, in- ber States shall have towards it an obligation of aid
volve joint design and arms production. The fourth and assistance by all the means in their power, in
indicator focuses on regular joint military exercis- accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations
es. Such activities enhance force compatibility and Charter.” Additionally, Article 222 of the treaty —
interoperability as well as signal reassurance to the solidarity clause — promises assistance to any
partners and resolve to adversaries. Inter-military member state that experiences a terrorist attack or
confidence-building measures constitute the fifth natural or man-made disaster.
indicator and can include efforts to create trust Is Article 42.7 a backdoor formal commitment to
by demilitarizing borders, de-securitizing politi- NATO? Significant overlap in institutional mem-
cally contentious issues, and sharing information bership between the two organizations does exist:
on military activities. These five indicators signal Outside of Sweden and Finland prior to 2023, the
moderate institutionalization. Korolev also iden- only E.U. members not part of NATO were Austria,
tifies indicators of deep institutionalization of co- Cyprus, and Ireland, whereas Montenegro, North
operation, particularly among treaty allies: an in- Macedonia, Norway, Turkey, and the United King-
tegrated military command, joint troop placement dom are European NATO members that are not (or
or an exchange of military bases, and a common no longer, in the United Kingdom’s case) part of the
defense policy. European Union. Nevertheless, the interpretation
In examining Sweden’s and Finland’s relation- that the E.U. agreement amounts to NATO’s Article
ship with NATO according to each indicator, we 5 commitment is incorrect. Article 42.7 enshrines
demonstrate that both countries, under Korolev’s the supremacy of NATO commitments for those
framework, would have qualified as being at least E.U. members that are party to them and makes
“moderately” institutionalized with NATO before no mention of E.U. institutions. Still, one legal as-
2022, despite not being full-fledged members of the sessment of how Article 42.7 compares to Article
alliance. Indeed, some NATO members themselves 5 of the Washington Treaty notes similar wording,
would be similarly considered to be moderately in- with key differences being the former’s emphasis
stitutionalized because of a lack of basing exchanges on obligation and “armed attack” (as opposed to
and joint troop placements. Of course, Swedish and the Washington Treaty’s “armed aggression”).40
Finnish relations with NATO are not the only things Article 42.7 dilutes this sense of compulsion, not-
that have changed since the Cold War ended. NATO ing that it “shall not prejudice the specific char-
itself has changed. As we elaborate below, Sweden acter of the security and defense policy of certain
38 Alexander Korolev, “On the Verge of an Alliance: Contemporary China-Russia Military Cooperation,” Asian Security 15, no. 3 (2019): 236–37,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1463991.
39 Upon making the decision to seek NATO membership, Sweden and Finland received written security assurances from the United Kingdom,
as well as more informal verbal assurances from other NATO members, so as to eliminate any gap in coverage that Russia could exploit before their
eventual membership. Patrick Wintour, “UK Goes Further than Any Other NATO Country in Sweden and Finland Pledge,” The Guardian, May 11,
2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/11/johnson-security-assurances-sweden-and-finland-not-just-symbolic.
40 J.F.R. Boddens Hosang and P.A.L. Ducheine, “Implementing Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union: Legal Foundations for Mutual Defence
in the Face of Modern Threats,” Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-71 (2020): 21, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3748392.
41
Member States,” an implicit recognition of the joined.48 Such protests indicate that they perceive
neutrality policy of some members.41 Moreover, a difference between E.U. membership and NATO
the Article 42.7 clause has been interpreted “very membership, and so do not see Article 42.7 as Arti-
narrowly.”42 Its invocation by the French govern- cle 5 in disguise.
ment in the aftermath of the 2015 terrorist attacks
was largely informal, leading to no institutional Indicator 2: Inter-Military Consultations?
proceedings at either the council level or at NATO.
Moreover, the fact that Sweden and Finland both Sweden and Finland began nurturing official ties
decided to join NATO signals their belief in the in- with NATO when they joined the Partnership for
adequacy of E.U. security assurances.43 Peace program in 1994. With the Cold War over and
To the extent that potential adversaries’ views democratization on the horizon for former mem-
matter, although Russian leaders have increasing- bers of the Soviet bloc, the North Atlantic Council
ly labelled the European Union as a menace, most met in Rome in November 1991 to explore how it
of this rhetoric seems to treat NATO as the true could enhance security cooperation in Europe. One
threat.44 Following the European Union’s launch month later, it established the North Atlantic Co-
of its Eastern Partnership initiative in 2009, Rus- operation Council as the main forum for dialogue
sian President Dmitri Medvedev commented, “We between NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries.
tried to convince ourselves [that the EU project is The Partnership for Peace built on the North At-
harmless] but in the end we couldn’t. … What wor- lantic Cooperation Council. Signed by Sweden,
ries us is that in some countries attempts are be- Finland, and 21 other countries, the Partnership
ing made to exploit this structure as a partnership for Peace’s main document called on signatories
against Russia.”45 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be transparent in their defense planning and
of the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Concept budgeting, to ensure democratic control of their
lumped NATO and E.U. enlargement together as militaries, to maintain the capacity to contribute to
threatening.46 Still, other statements reveal that U.N.-authorized missions and to missions backed
Russian leaders are more sensitive to NATO than to by the Organization for Security and Co-operation
the European Union, in terms of their being securi- in Europe, and to cultivate military relations and
ty organizations. For example, just before the 2022 interoperability with NATO. The North Atlantic Co-
invasion of Ukraine, Russian demands focused on operation Council evolved into the Euro-Atlantic
NATO enlargement and not on E.U. membership, Partnership Council in 1997, which would further
even though Ukraine’s negotiation of an Associat- facilitate consultations between NATO members
ed Agreement in 2013 was apparently unacceptable and partnership countries. Ambassadors as well
enough for Putin to trigger a crisis with Ukraine as foreign and defense ministers meet regularly
that led to war in 2014.47 Similarly, Russian leaders in this forum. The Political-Military Steering Com-
have spent much more energy talking about Swed- mittee is the main forum for the Partnership for
ish and Finnish relations with NATO than they do Peace for consultations on political and conceptual
the European Union. In 2018, Russian Defense Min- issues. The Military Cooperation Working Group
ister Sergey Shoigu decried Sweden’s and Finland’s is the forum that covers military matters, where-
closer ties with NATO and threatened action if they as the Partnership Coordination Cell undertakes
41 Elie Perot, “The Art of Commitments: NATO, the EU, and the Interplay Between Law and Politics Within Europe’s Collective Defence Architec-
ture,” European Security 28, no. 1 (2019): 52, https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2019.1587746.
42 Sven Biscop, “The European Union and Mutual Assistance: More than Defence,” The International Spectator 51, no. 2 (2016): 120, https://doi.
org/10.1080/03932729.2016.1181453.
43 In describing the country’s security environment after the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, a Swedish report, which helped lay
the path toward membership, concluded that “the conditions for a shift towards collective defence within the EU are lacking.” “Deterioration
of the Security Environment: Implications for Sweden,” Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Sweden), 2022, 26, https://www.government.se/legal-docu-
ments/2022/05/ds-20228/.
44 Natalia Chaban, Ole Elgström, and Olga Gulyaeva, “Russian Images of the European Union: Before and After Maidan,” Foreign Policy Analysis
13, no. 2 (2017): 480–99, https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orw055.
45 Andrew Rettman, “EU-Russia Summit Ends with Prickly Exchange Over Energy,” EUObserver, May 23, 2009, https://euobserver.com/for-
eign/28173.
46 “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016),”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Dec. 1, 2016, https://interkomitet.com/foreign-policy/basic-documents/foreign-policy-con-
cept-of-the-russian-federation-approved-by-president-of-the-russian-federation-vladimir-putin-on-november-30-2016/.
47 “Agreement on Security Measures for the Russian Federation and the Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Dec. 17, 2021, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803.
48 Edward Lucas, “Shoigu Looks North,” CEPA, July 30, 2018, https://cepa.org/shoigu-looks-north/.
42
The Scholar
military planning, especially regarding military ex- Coalition membership in the International Secu-
ercises and other joint military activities. rity Assistance Force and other missions (such
Even before the Partnership for Peace was of- as NATO-led peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and
ficially established, misunderstanding surround- Herzegovina and Kosovo, as well as the 2011 in-
ed its purpose. Some initially saw it as a way to tervention in Libya, in the case of Sweden) nev-
delay NATO enlargement. Others saw it as part ertheless allowed them to undertake operational
of the process that states had to undergo before joint consultations and planning. As the security
joining the alliance. A more accurate assessment environment changed, Sweden and Finland in-
of the Partnership for Peace, however, emphasiz- creasingly gained representation in other NATO
es its flexibility and adaptability, with the partner- summit meetings. Most notably, at the 2016 War-
ship serving different purposes for different states. saw Summit the Swedish prime minister and the
From the outset, Sweden and Finland never saw Finnish president were invited to join the NATO
Partnership for Peace as a “waiting area” for get- heads of government meeting, normally reserved
ting into NATO.49 Rather, they saw in it an oppor- for members of the alliance. The two Nordic coun-
tunity to internationalize their defense strategies tries also participated in the 2018 Brussels Sum-
at a time when the threat environment had be- mit, the communiqué of which noted that NATO
come more benign and NATO military operations is “dedicated to further strengthening our co-
were focused increasingly on out-of-area missions operation [with Sweden and Finland], including
rather than territorial defense. Besides wishing to through close political consultations, shared sit-
strengthen European security, Sweden and Fin- uational awareness, and joint exercises, in order
land sought to expand their peacekeeping roles.50 A to respond to common challenges in a timely and
2003 communication produced by the government effective manner.”52 Swedish and Finnish leaders
of Sweden to the Riksdag described participation did not attend the 2019 and 2021 summits in Brus-
in the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic sels and London, respectively, though other infor-
Partnership Council as “constitut[ing] the prime mation-sharing mechanisms have been put into
instrument for developing the military and civil in- place. In October 2021, the North Atlantic Council
teroperability that countries must have in order to visited Sweden and, in its first official visit, Fin-
be able to contribute to international crisis man- land.53 Sweden and Finland receive filtered infor-
agement and peace support operations.”51 Indeed, mation at lower levels of classification through
since NATO had, at that time, moved away from the Air Situation Data Exchange, although observ-
deterrence and territorial defense to take on out- ers have argued that this system is inadequate.54
of-area operations, crisis management was one of More recently, NATO Secretary General Jens
the areas of cooperation that the Partnership for Stoltenberg vowed in March 2022 — before either
Peace aspired to develop. Crucially, participating country submitted its intent to join the alliance —
states were thus able to engage with NATO plan- to include the two Nordic countries in all discus-
ning, command structures, and decision-making, sions regarding Ukraine.55
albeit without rights or veto power. Sweden and Finland have widened their consul-
That said, Sweden and Finland had also become tations not only with NATO itself, but also with
more involved in NATO proceedings, including several individual members and groups of mem-
conversations about deterrence. Before 2014, bers. They have formalized a consultations pro-
their participation in major NATO military process within the Nordic Defence Cooperation, an
ceedings was largely limited to the International organization created in 2009 that comprises those
Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan. two Nordic countries as well as Denmark, Iceland,
49 Michael Ruhle and Nicholas Williams, “Partnership for Peace: A Personal View from NATO,” Parameters 24, no. 1 (1994), https://doi.
org/10.55540/0031-1723.1717.
50 István Szónyi, “The Partnership for Peace as a Process of Adaptation,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 11, no. 1 (1998): 30, https://doi.
org/10.1080/13518049808430327.
51 Marita Ulvskog and Laila Freivalds, “Sweden’s Cooperation in the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP),”
Government Communication 2003/04:84, March 11, 2004, 3, https://www.government.se/contentassets/2e85a5b2191c4a4393afbd2e608cc613/
swedens-cooperation-in-the-euro-atlantic-partnership-council-eapc-and-partnership-for-peace-pfp.
52 “The Brussels Summit Declaration,” NATO, July 11, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm.
53 “NATO Chief Visits Helsinki, Leaves Door Open for Finnish Membership,” Yle, Oct. 25, 2021, https://yle.fi/news/3-12158569.
54 Joakim Erma Møller, “Trilateral Defence Cooperation in the North: An Assessment of Interoperability Between Norway, Sweden, and Finland,”
Defence Studies 19, no. 3 (2019): 244, https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2019.1634473.
55 Vivienne Machi, “NATO Brings Finland, Sweden On Board for All Ukraine Conflict Discussions,” Defense News, March 4, 2022, https://www.
defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/03/04/nato-brings-finland-sweden-on-board-for-all-ukraine-conflict-discussions/.
43
and Norway. It serves to foster closer military domestically (e.g., seafaring fast attack craft, mine-
ties among the five Nordic countries by building layers, and minesweepers), but had also diversified
upon pre-existing initiatives that date back to the the sources of its weapons imports, notably among
1990s. Although it stagnated institutionally short- NATO members. The most significant purchase
ly after its establishment, concerns about Russia that the Finnish Defense Forces made in the early
following its aggression toward Ukraine in 2014 re- 1990s was that of 62 F/A-18 Hornets from the Unit-
ed States, which bear U.S.-made armaments
As the security environment such as the AIM-9 Sidewinder, the AIM-120
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile,
changed, Sweden and and the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile,
the last of which Finland received before sev-
Finland increasingly gained eral NATO allies.60 Finland also operates the
U.S.-Norwegian-made National Advanced Sur-
representation in other face-to-Air Missile System, which replaced the
Soviet-made Buk-M1 air defense system. Ad-
NATO summit meetings. ditionally, Finland has received military hard-
ware from many European NATO countries,
vitalized the organization.56 In 2019, its members including 100 used German-made Leopard 2A6
established the Nordic Defence Cooperation Crisis main battle tanks from the Netherlands. It uses
Consultation Mechanism to improve information Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems manufactured
sharing and consultations. Sweden and Finland jointly by Germany and Sweden. Finland still oper-
also participate in and consult with the Joint Ex- ates several Soviet-made infantry fighting vehicles
peditionary Force, a British-led force launched at and armored personnel carriers, though a Polish
the 2014 NATO summit that is focused on North- multispectral camouflage system called Berber-
ern Europe. Notably, in 2017, Helsinki, Stockholm, ys-R has been incorporated into some modernized
and Washington concluded a trilateral agreement versions of the BMP-2s. Various utility vehicles
aimed at improving Nordic defense cooperation.57 are also made in the United Kingdom and Germa-
Emphasizing consultations and information-shar- ny.61 Crucially, Finland decided to order 64 F-35s in
ing, this agreement built on existing bilateral de- late 2021, with President Joe Biden touting the deal
fense cooperation agreements between Sweden as providing a “strong foundation for even closer
and Finland from 2014 and was complemented by bilateral defense ties for years to come.”62
bilateral statements of intent signed by the U.S. De- Because of its peculiar neutralist policy, Sweden
partment of Defense with each country’s defense was still in a position to procure U.S. military hard-
ministry in 2016.58 ware during the Cold War. However, its defense
industrial base was large enough for Sweden to
Indicator 3: Military-Technical Cooperation? produce many of its armaments for all three main
services. Sweden received Hawk and Sidewinders
When the Cold War ended, the bulk of Finland’s from Washington, but not the Bomarc missiles it
military equipment was either made domestically had also requested. Sweden purchased its fleet of
or in the Soviet Union.59 By the end of the 2010s, C-130 Hercules from the United States in the 1960s
Finland still produced a large share of its platforms as well. Currently, the backbone of the Swedish Air
56 Håkon Lunde Saxi, “The Rise, Fall, and Resurgence of Nordic Defence Cooperation,” International Affairs 95, no. 3 (2019): 659–80, https://
doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz049; and Ann-Sofie Dahl, “Back to the Future: Nordefco’s First Decade and Prospects for the Next,” Scandinavian Journal of
Military Studies 4, no. 1 (2021), http://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.85.
57 “Trilateral Statement of Intent among the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defence of the Repub-
lic of Finland and the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Sweden,” Government Offices of Sweden, May 2018, https://www.defmin.fi/files/4231/
Trilateral_Statement_of_Intent.pdf.
58 “Action Plan for Deepened Defence Cooperation Between Sweden and Finland,” May 2014, https://www.defmin.fi/files/2833/ACTION_PLAN_
FOR_DEEPENED_DEFENCE_COOPERATION_BETWEEN_SWEDEN_AND_FINLAND.pdf; “Statement of Intent Between the Secretary of Defense of the
United States of America and the Minister for Defence of Sweden,” June 2016, https://www.regeringen.se/globalassets/regeringen/dokument/fors-
varsdepartementet/statement-of-intent-swe_us-20160608.pdf; and “Statement of Intent Between the Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Finland,” October 2016, https://www.defmin.fi/files/3543/Statement_of_Intent.pdf.
59 See International Institute of Strategic Studies, Military Balance 91, no. 1 (1991): 88, https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/tmib20/91/1.
60 “Boeing F/A-18 Hornet,” The Finnish Defence Forces, accessed May 1, 2023, https://puolustusvoimat.fi/en/equipment#/asset/view/id/201.
61 International Institute of Strategic Studies, Military Balance 121 (2021): 99–101.
62 “Readout of President Biden’s Call with President of Finland Sauli Niinistö,” The White House, Dec. 13, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/12/13/readout-of-president-bidens-call-with-president-of-finland-sauli-niinisto/.
44
The Scholar
Force is the Swedish-made JAS 39 Gripen. Swe- produces component parts for aircraft; provides
den does still have in its inventory those C-130s maintenance, repair, and operations services in avia-
and dozens of helicopters produced in the United tion, and co-owns Norwegian ammunition manufac-
States and elsewhere in the European Union.63 Per- turer Nammo. The Nordic Defence Cooperation has
haps most significant is how, in comparison to the had ambitions for joint procurement, but they have
National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems largely fallen short.67 Nevertheless, some meaningful
purchased and operated by Finland, Sweden has defense integration across the North Atlantic exists.68
purchased the more expensive but longer-range
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Indicator 4: Joint Military Exercises?
Enhancement from Lockheed Martin following an
agreement concluded with U.S. officials in August As non-members of the alliance, Sweden and Fin-
2018.64 Like Finland, Sweden uses a variety of infan- land regularly participated in exercises run by both
try weapons imported from NATO countries. NATO and NATO member states. Counting the
Prior to 2022, there had been moderate activity number of exercises in which they have participated
in terms of joint development and procurement of is difficult because of the numerous definitions and
weapons systems and military equipment. Sweden configurations of those exercises. What is impor-
signaled its interest in cooperating with the Brit- tant is that Sweden and Finland have been involved
ish-led Tempest future combat aircraft program, be- in many NATO-led or NATO member-led exercis-
coming the first international partner involved in that es, spanning a range of scenarios and capabilities.
project. For the United Kingdom, Sweden’s participa- Crucially, since 2014, Swedish and Finnish contribu-
tion is especially welcome because of Saab’s record of tions to these exercises hit several “firsts” and have
producing combat-capable aircraft in a cost-effective grown in operational and command complexity.
manner. Importantly, this partnership has precedent. These exercises often feature military coordina-
When it was still known as British Aerospace, BAE tion scenarios in the Baltic region. For example,
Systems contributed to the manufacture and market- Sweden and Finland both participate in the annual
ing of Saab’s Gripen fighter. Indeed, before 2004, it naval exercise Baltic Operations (BALTOPS), which
had a 35 percent stake in the Swedish company. Some Stockholm hosted in 2022.69 BALTOPS — one of
argue that Sweden and the United Kingdom may have the largest exercises in northern Europe — trains
common uses for the Tempest fighter jet, owing to advanced naval warfare capabilities, including an-
their threat perceptions of Russia.65 Patria, the most ti-aircraft, anti-surface, and anti-submarine war-
notable Finnish defense manufacturer, is 50.1 percent fare.70 The 2015 exercise marked the first time
owned by the Finnish government and 49.9 percent that U.S. and other NATO member naval infantry
owned by Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace AE, which landed on Swedish and Finnish shores.71 In 2018,
is half owned by the Norwegian government.66 Patria Sweden and Finland both sent troops to NATO’s
63 Military Balance 121 (2021), 147–50.

64 Jen Judson, “Sweden Locked In to Buy Patriot Missile Defense System,” Defense News, Aug. 10, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/digi-
tal-show-dailies/smd/2018/08/10/sweden-locked-in-to-buy-patriot-missile-defense-system/.
65 Andrew Chuter, “Sweden to Join British ‘Tempest’ Next-Gen Fighter Push,” Defense News, July 7, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/
global/europe/2019/07/07/sweden-to-join-british-tempest-next-gen-fighter-push/.
66 Military Balance 121 (2021), 81.
67 Dahl, “Back to the Future.”
68 Additional joint development and procurement decisions have been announced since Sweden and Finland announced their application for
NATO membership. For example, Finland and Sweden have joined 15 NATO allies in the European Sky Shield initiative, which aims to strengthen
European air and missile defense through, among other things, the common acquisition of air defense equipment and missiles. Moreover, in 2022,
Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom announced the joint procurement of BvS10 all-terrain vehicles in support of Arctic operations. Both
Nordic states have also begun processes of negotiating defense cooperation agreements with the United States. See “14 NATO Allies and Finland
Agree to Boost European Air Defence Capabilities,” NATO, Oct. 13, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_208103.htm; “European Sky
Shield Initiative Gains Two More Participants,” NATO, Feb. 15, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_211687.htm; and “Sweden, Ger-
many, United Kingdom Jointly Acquire 436 BAE Systems BvS10 All-Terrain Vehicles,” Business Wire, Dec. 16, 2022, https://www.businesswire.com/
news/home/20221216005114/en/Sweden-Germany-United-Kingdom-Jointly-Acquire-436-BAE-Systems-BvS10-All-Terrain-Vehicles. Finally, Denmark,
Finland, Norway, and Sweden have announced their intention to establish a unified Nordic air defence whereby they will pool about 300 fighter jets
between them. Howard Altman, “Nordic Air Defense Pact Combines Forces of Hundreds of Fighter Aircraft,” The War Zone, March 24, 2023, https://
www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/nordic-air-defense-pact-combines-forces-of-hundreds-of-fighter-aircraft.
69 NATO headquarters first planned and executed BALTOPS in 2015. United States Naval Forces Europe has had a leading role since BALTOPS
began in 1972. See also “BALTOPS 22 Kicks Off in the Baltic Sea,” NATO, June 8, 2022, https://shape.nato.int/news-archive/2022/baltops-22-kicks-
off-in-the-baltic-sea.
70 “BALTOPS 20 Press Release,” NATO, June 1, 2020, https://sfn.nato.int/activities/current-and-future/exercises/baltops-20.
71 Justyna Gotkowska and Piotr Szymański, Between Co-operation and Membership: Sweden and Finland’s Relations with NATO, Centre for
Eastern Studies, no. 62, February 2017.
45
Trident Juncture exercise hosted by Norway. The and Norwegian air forces train together in execut-
exercise simulated an Article 5 scenario in the ing air combat scenarios.75
Arctic and involved over 40,000 troops.72 Prior to Finland and Sweden regularly participate in vari-
this event, the United States and Sweden trained ous NATO annual crisis management exercises and
in the Stockholm archipelago, testing interopera- have frequently been the only non-member states
bility and giving their forces experience in the ter- invited to participate fully in NATO exercises ad-
rain. It also allowed U.S. marines to try a Swedish dressing collective defense scenarios. Notably, they
multi-use 84mm rifle that the U.S. military had an- were the only partner states to participate in the
nounced plans to order.73 Sweden and Finland also 2011 exercise, the first in a decade framed around
practice using cyber and asymmetrical capabilities Article 4 or 5 issues.76 The crisis management ex-
with NATO and its member states. In 2021, teams ercises in 2016, 2017, and 2019 also tested Article 4
from Sweden and Finland placed first and second, and 5 coordination, with Sweden and Finland the
respectively, in Locked Shields, the world’s largest only non-allied participants.77 In the 2016 exercise,
international live-fire cyber defense exercise, host- according to media reporting, Sweden fully mobi-
ed by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre lized its military and allowed NATO forces to use
of Excellence.74 On most weeks, Finnish, Swedish, Swedish naval and air bases, as well as territorial
72 Megan Friedl, “U.S. Joins NATO’s Trident Juncture Exercise,” Department of Defense, Oct. 18, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/
Article/Article/1666272/us-joins-natos-trident-juncture-exercise/.
73 Shawn Snow, “Marines Are on Sweden’s Coast Preparing for Largest NATO Exercise as Russia Grumbles,” Marine Corps Times, Sept. 4, 2018,
https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2018/09/04/marines-are-on-swedens-coast-preparing-for-largest-nato-exercise-as-
russia-grumbles/.
74 “Sweden Wins Locked Shields 2021 Cyber Defense Exercise,” ERR, April 17, 2021, https://news.err.ee/1608181522/sweden-wins-locked-
shields-2021-cyber-defense-exercise.
75 “Protecting Airspace Over Northern Finland and Entire Nation,” Lapland Air Command, The Finnish Defence Forces, accessed May 2, 2023,
https://ilmavoimat.fi/en/lapland-air-command/about-us.
76 Gotkowska and Szymański, Between Co-operation and Membership.
77 “Crisis Management Exercise 2019,” NATO, May 3, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_165844.htm.
46
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waters and airspace.78 build mutual trust and understanding. Official doc-
Further demonstrating their ever-closer ties uments and speeches from Swedish, Finnish, and
with NATO, Sweden and Finland also exercise NATO representatives emphasize common val-
in events hosted by NATO member states under ues.82 They seem to be part of a shared security
national auspices. They have regularly participat- community that has a collective identity.83 During
ed in Norway’s Cold Response exercises, meant their application process, despite some concerns
to test cold-weather fighting for NATO and Part- about burden-sharing, most NATO members were
nership for Peace members. Notably, Sweden and quick to support the Finnish and Swedish applica-
Finland contributed to Cold Response 2022, which tions.84 Worries about entrapment are apparently
took place during Russia’s full-fledged invasion absent, for neither Sweden nor Finland has major
of Ukraine.79 They have furthermore hosted their parochial disputes with Russia.
own national exercises and invited NATO member
states to participate. Sweden’s 2017 Aurora exer- Other Indicators: Integrated Military
cise, for example, tested the defense of Gotland Command, Troop Garrisoning, and Common
and was Sweden’s biggest military exercise in more Defense Policy
than 20 years, with participants from Finland and
NATO member states, including the first major U.S. Other signs of deep institutionalization are an
military contingent to exercise in Sweden. One of integrated military command, joint troop place-
the objectives was to test the Host Nation Support ment or exchange of military bases, and a com-
Treaty with NATO that Sweden ratified in 2016, and mon defense policy. In Korolev’s assessment of the
it was the first time that a major military exercise Sino-Russian relationship, moving into the initial
in Sweden relied on foreign military assistance.80 stages of deep institutionalization is enough for
him to declare that those powers are “on the verge
of an alliance.”85 These levels of deep institution-
Indicator 5: Inter-Military alization are difficult to assess given classification
Confidence-Building Measures levels, but the indicators discussed already reveal
that the Swedish and Finnish relationship with
In his examination of China and Russia, Korolev NATO has arguably moved past the initial stages
stipulates that inter-military confidence-building and is deeply institutionalized.
measures “may not be necessary in a traditional Though outside of the political decision-making
discussion of alliance institutionalization. … How- process before membership, Sweden and Finland
ever, many assessments highlight lack of trust as a have significant experience in integrated military
major weakness of China-Russia relations.”81 That command with NATO. With the alliance taking on
perceived lack of trust seemingly does not exist out-of-area operations, both Nordic countries con-
in relations between Sweden, Finland, and NATO. tributed to nearly all of NATO’s major operations.
They have no major disputes and, as demonstrated Within NATO missions, Swedish and Finnish per-
above, distrust hardly figures in their cooperation sonnel have both served under other multinational
(or lack thereof ). Through a series of military and commands and held operational command them-
political consultations, exercises, and other in- selves. In 2006, Sweden took operational command
teractions, Sweden, Finland, and NATO regularly of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Mazar-e-
78 Mikael Holmström, “Försvaret mobiliserades i krigsspel med Nato,” Dagens Nyheter, June 1, 2016, https://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/fors-
varet-mobiliserades-i-krigsspel-med-nato/.
79 “NATO Allies Demonstrate Strength and Unity with Exercise Cold Response in Norway,” NATO, March 15, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/news_193199.htm.
80 Mike Winnerstig, “The Strategic Ramifications of the Aurora 17 Exercise in Sweden,” ICDS, Oct. 2, 2017, https://icds.ee/en/the-strategic-ram-
ifications-of-the-aurora-17-exercise-in-sweden/.
81 Korolev, “On the Verge,” 236.
82 See, e.g., “Relations with Sweden,” NATO, April 6, 2021, updated April 12, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52535.htm.
83 Anna Wieslander, “What Makes an Ally? Sweden and Finland as NATO’s Closest Partners,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 17, no. 2 (2019):
194–222, https://doi.org/10.1057/s42738-019-00019-9.
84 Hungary and Turkey were the two exceptions. They delayed ratifying Finland’s and Sweden’s accession protocols, thus protracting negotiations.
Most of the publicly declared issues that forestalled ratification concerned bilateral issues that Turkey and, to a lesser degree, Hungary have raised.
Those issues had much more to do with Sweden than with Finland. Hungary and Turkey also used the occasion to engage in domestic and international
signalling directly unrelated to the accession processes of the two countries. As of writing, Turkey and Hungary have approved Finland’s accession
protocols, but not Sweden’s. Paul Levin, “The Turkish Veto: Why Erdogan Is Blocking Finland and Sweden’s Path to NATO,” Foreign Policy Research
Institute, March 8, 2023, https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/03/the-turkish-veto-why-erdogan-is-blocking-finland-and-swedens-path-to-nato/.
85 Korolev, “On the Verge,” 147.
47
Sharif in Afghanistan as part of the International Admittedly, Swedish and Finnish defense integra-
Security Assistance Force mission. Swedish and tion and institutionalization may not be entirely
Finnish officers have also served as the command- efficient — for example, receiving filtered informa-
ing officers of multinational brigades in Kosovo tion at lower levels of classification through the Air
and Bosnia and Herzegovina.86 Accordingly, Swe- Situation Data Exchange — but their level of de-
den and Finland “were incorporated into the op- fense cooperation is nevertheless impressive and
eration[s] almost on the same basis as forces of exceeds what rationalist arguments would expect.
the member states.”87 Their military officers are To be sure, that Sweden and Finland already pur-
represented in NATO’s multinational headquarters sued those forms of cooperation reflects how NATO
in Mons, Belgium, and at its Multinational Com- itself has changed considerably since the Cold War.
mand Northeast in Szczecin, Poland, the head- Although its founding members established NATO
quarters responsible for Baltic Sea planning. The to deter the Soviet Union from attacking the Eu-
degree of joint troop placement is limited, but both ro-Atlantic region, it evolved institutionally so as
Finland and Sweden have signed Host Nation Sup- to strengthen defense ties, to improve inter-allied
port agreements, mechanisms that facilitate their consultations, and to facilitate internal coordina-
hosting of NATO troops on their territory during tion. Its military organizations sought to become
exercises and crises as well as wartime operations. more streamlined, interoperable, and agile.88 NATO
Regarding a common defense policy, prior to Swe- survived the collapse of the Soviet Union, partly
den’s and Finland’s membership applications, the because it had developed institutional assets that
two countries and NATO evidently did not have a are difficult to reproduce but sufficiently adapt-
written defense agreement, but they have coordi- able to changing circumstances.89 NATO thus po-
nated on issues of shared concern. Both countries sitioned itself to offer its expertise, legitimacy, and
have agreed to the European Union’s Common Se- resources for a wider mission set that, in the post-
curity and Defence Policy, to which most NATO Cold War era, includes crisis management, coun-
members are also party. ter-terrorism, stability projection, and other tasks
broadly conceived as relating to security.90
Summary Meanwhile, the scope for cultivating partner-
ships with countries outside the alliance also en-
The level of defense integration and institution- larged and bureaucratic mechanisms were built
alization that Sweden and Finland had with NATO accordingly. By 2009, NATO itself was a thickly in-
prior to 2022 is impressive. Sweden and Finland en- stitutionalized international organization, with 350
gaged with extensive consultative bodies belonging committees and working groups meeting at least
to NATO as well as several of its members through twice a year at NATO headquarters — some even
various formats. They both pursued military-tech- several times each week.91 The institutional mech-
nological cooperation through joint arms produc- anisms to handle NATO’s new partners also grew.
tion and standardization. They also participated in Diego Ruiz Palmer observes that “many of NATO’s
many military exercises, some of which involved committee meetings and long-standing informa-
Article 4 or Article 5 scenarios. Both sides exhib- tion-exchange and cooperative activities are con-
ited the sort of trust that appears to be absent in ducted with the participation of interested partners
the Sino-Russian relationship, which also has seen and other non-NATO nations on a routine basis.”92
defense ties expand despite having no formal alli- After the Berlin Wall fell, NATO began creating
ance. Swedish and Finnish military personnel have new relationships with non-allies. By 2021, NATO
fallen under NATO’s military command in certain had 40 formal non-allied partners, grouped around
operations and are present at its headquarters. several partnership formats like the Partnership
86 Juha Pyykönen, Nordic Partners of NATO: How Similar are Finland and Sweden Within NATO Cooperation? Finnish Institute of International
Affairs, 2016, 50–53.
87 Pyykönen, Nordic Partners of NATO, 54.
88 Seth A. Johnston, How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance Since 1950 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2017), 147.
89 Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War,” International Organization 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2000):
705–35, https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551343.
90 This broadening of the alliance agenda has costs. See Thierry Tardy, “The Risks of NATO’s Maladaptation,” European Security 30, no. 1 (2021):
24–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2020.1799786.
91 Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, “Reforming NATO’s Institutions: Pressing Need, Enduring Obstacles, New Opportunities,” Politique étrangère 5 (2009):
184, https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2009-5-page-173.htm.
92 Ruiz Palmer, “Reforming NATO’s Institutions,” 178.
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for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istan- Russia after its annexation of Crimea. With defense
bul Cooperation Initiative, and Partners Across the budget increases in 2022 and 2023, Finland now
Globe.93 The proliferation of these forums allows meets the 2 percent spending pledge adopted by
for the widened scope for cooperation that NATO NATO members at the 2014 Wales Summit, and the
has created to work with potential partners like Swedish government aims to meet the 2 percent
Sweden and Finland in such a way that they could threshold by 2026. Both countries also bring strong
avoid becoming official members, while still ben- military capabilities into the alliance.97
efiting from substantial cooperation, before 2022. These observations raise an important question:
What is likely to change with Sweden and Finland
What Difference Does NATO Membership Make? becoming NATO members? Obviously, they will be
able to participate in the North Atlantic Council;
Sweden and Finland were able to cooperate ex- to acquire rights as members, including the abil-
tensively with NATO prior to 2022 despite not be- ity to invoke Article 4 (to call on alliance-wide
ing official members. Historically, their level of de- consultations) and Article 5 (to mobilize an alli-
fense cooperation with the alliance exceeds what ance response against external aggression); and
many formal allies in the past have accomplished. to participate in joint military planning. These key
Germany and Austria-Hungary had a treaty com- benefits should, in turn, increase their deterrent
mitment that some have argued played a crucial and defense effect against possible Russian aggres-
role in sparking World War I, and yet the two allies sion. Other benefits to Sweden and Finland exist —
had in place few consultative bodies, did not adopt specifically, better integration of air defense assets
common war plans, and rarely conducted exercises and greater air situational awareness.98 They would
together.94 New Zealand is signatory to an alliance also be able to participate in the Nuclear Planning
treaty with Australia and the United States, but Group and, if the security situation in Europe
its anti-nuclear disposition has limited its involve- further deteriorates, in possible nuclear-sharing
ment in military planning and exercises and ulti- arrangements. Moreover, their membership elim-
mately disrupted the fully trilateral nature of the inates a key incongruity that has marked defense
alliance.95 North Korea has a treaty alliance with planning in the Baltic region, especially after 2014.
China but the two countries undertake neither Although Sweden and Finland have a lot at stake in
joint military exercises nor consultative meetings. the security of the Baltic countries, NATO defense
Little technical cooperation exists, and the alliance planners previously could only have made assump-
is thinly institutionalized. tions about their participation in any contingency
Even within NATO, one could argue that Sweden involving the Baltic region so long as they were
and Finland have more regularly contributed than outside of the alliance’s formal structures. Having
certain members vis-à-vis the security challenge Sweden and Finland in NATO also provides one
posed by Russia. At times during the Cold War, U.S. single membership body to enhance coverage of
leaders saw Sweden as doing more for containing the Baltic Sea region, streamlining planning for all
the Soviet Union than Denmark.96 One could make members.99 NATO planners have increasingly real-
the same argument for other contemporary NATO ized that the Baltic Sea region — given geography,
members, given their recalcitrance in contribut- local connectivity, and the nature of the Russian
ing to deterrence and defense measures related to threat — should be considered one operational
93 Sophie Arts and Steven Keil, “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” German Marshall Fund, Feb. 16, 2021, 3,
https://www.gmfus.org/news/flexible-security-arrangements-and-future-nato-partnerships; and Thierry Tardy, “From NATO’s Partnerships to Securi-
ty Networks,” in NATO 2030: New Technologies, New Conflicts, New Partnerships, ed. Thierry Tardy (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2021).
94 Marcus Jones, “The Alliance that Wasn’t: Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I,” in Grand Strategy and Military Alliances, ed. Peter R.
Mansoor and Williamson Murray (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
95 Gerald Hensley, Friendly Fire: Nuclear Politics and The Collapse of ANZUS, 1984–1987 (Auckland, NZ: Auckland University Press, 2013).
96 Moore, “‘Neutral on Our Side,’” 49–50.
97 For overviews, see, e.g., Ossa and Koivula, “What Would Finland Bring to the Table for NATO?”; Deni, “Sweden Would Strengthen NATO with
Fresh Thinking and an Able Force”; and Hanna Ojanen, “Finland and Sweden in NATO: The Potential of New Security Providers,” NDC Policy Brief no.
18, NATO Defense College, November 2022, https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1769.
98 Bergquist et al., “The Effects of Finland’s Possible NATO Membership: An Assessment.”
99 For Swedish considerations, see Ann-Sofie Dahl, “Debatt: Nato Blir Vad vi Gör Det Till,” Dagens Industri, May 15, 2022, https://www.di.se/
debatt/debatt-nato-blir-vad-vi-gor-det-till/.
49
area.100 This, in part, meant that the involvement den and Finland both sought closer cooperation
of Sweden and Finland was seen as vital for any with NATO but not membership until 2022, the
contingencies in the region. The changed political technical aspects of cooperation do not provide
geography that comes with Swedish and Finnish enough explanatory value. Instead, one critical
membership not only makes military planning — factor as to why states decide to join an alliance,
particularly for flows of reinforcements in a Baltic or actively decide to stay out of an alliance, may
scenario — easier, but also provides new dynamics be their identity. The shift in identity and strate-
with which Russia must contend, to say nothing of gic culture that membership entails for all inter-
a newly expanded border with the alliance itself. ested parties could help to explain Swedish and
These benefits are valuable, but NATO member- Finnish decision-making.
ship may not necessarily be the inflection point in Ontological security — the notion that iden-
terms of day-to-day defense cooperation that some tities can become so well entrenched and hab-
seem to think. As a report commissioned by the it-forming that they become a form of security
Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted, in their own right — may be what drives the
attachment to a particular status regarding alli-
the deepest effects [of membership] would ances, notwithstanding what is happening at the
not be in the sphere of military policy and practical level.102 These identities become impor-
dispositions. … The shift would be geopolit- tant for the state, its potential allies, and even its
ical and strategic in nature, as momentous, adversaries. As Jelena Subotić writes, states can
for example, as Sweden’s decision to be- have their own “autobiographies” that amount to
come neutral some two centuries ago, or Po- “stories states tell to and about themselves.”103
land joining NATO at the end of the nineties. States — or, more specifically, political leaders,
These were decisions conceived for the long elite intellectuals, educational institutions, and
haul, which transformed the positioning of popular media outlets — construct these narra-
these states as political and strategic actors. tives to give meaning to and comprehend their
In other words, the decision to join NATO role and positioning in international politics.
would not be a mere incremental extension These narratives are not immutable. They are
of Finland’s increasingly close partnership subject to contestation, whether with respect
with NATO.101 to their core substance or their interpretation.
Nevertheless, ontological security stems from a
Membership might indeed represent a sea feeling that a certain identity is stable. As such,
change, but the center of gravity of the change symbolic deviations from these established iden-
would not rest on force structure or technical co- tities come to carry more weight than they merit
operation. Instead, membership will change the substantively in terms of defense cooperation.
geopolitical outlook of these states, their securi- With regard to alliance status, it is not so much
ty identities, and their strategic cultures. That is, the functional benefits that might matter most to
these changes will be significant for how those political elites and key stakeholders in society, but
societies have identified themselves in the se- what a potential alliance membership might mean
curity realm, and how others might understand for that state’s very identity as a national security
those identities. actor. The prospect of membership may be unset-
Traditional accounts of alliances are missing tling to key stakeholders in a state no matter the
a critical, fundamental value of written treaties. level of defense cooperation up to that point, pre-
What formal NATO membership functionally en- cisely because it would upset this identity. Main-
tails is no doubt important, but those functional taining a certain identity related to alignment
benefits are just one among many considerations. becomes a goal unto itself, regardless of whether
Crucially, in seeking to understand why Swe- geopolitical circumstances have changed enough
100 Anna Wieslander, “A ‘New Normal’ for NATO and Baltic Sea Security,” NATOSource, Oct. 5, 2015, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/
natosource/a-new-normal-for-nato-and-baltic-sea-security/; Martin Herem, “Estonian Chief of Defence Forces: Regional Cooperation as the Main
Enabler,” Defense News, Dec. 2, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2019/12/02/estonian-chief-of-defence-forces-regional-coopera-
tion-as-the-main-enabler/; and Jan van Tol et al., Deterrence and Defense in the Baltic Region: New Realities, Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, 2022.
101 Bergquist et al., “The Effects of Finland’s Possible NATO Membership,” 57.
102 Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma,” European Journal of International Re-
lations 12, no. 3 (2006): 341–70, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1354066106067346; and Ayşe Zarakol, “States and Ontological Security: A Historical
Rethinking,” Cooperation and Conflict 52, no. 1 (2017): 48–68, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0010836716653158.
103 Jelena Subotić, “Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy Change,” Foreign Policy Analysis 12, no. 4 (2016): 611, https://doi.
org/10.1111/fpa.12089.
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ACCORDING TO ONE POLL,

BET WEEN JANUARY AND
FEBRUARY 2022, SUPPORT
FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP IN
SWEDEN JUMPED BY NE ARLY
10 PERCENTAGE POINTS.
51
to warrant altering that very identity. are defensive-minded, and yet differ as to what
Adversaries, too, might pay attention to any se- their militaries’ core tasks should be.105 Finland
curity identity shifts. Despite being fully aware of has valued territorial defense above international
any functional defense cooperation that may have operations, whereas the reverse has traditionally
existed between partners prior to establishing been true for Sweden. Some argue that Finland
formal alliance ties, an adversary could still as- has practiced realpolitik with a focus on self-re-
sess that some fundamental change — even if it is liance, whereas others emphasize its steady
ultimately symbolic — has transpired when states commitment to a multilateral security order in
do sign an alliance treaty. In addition, members of Europe.106 Whichever is the case, these strategic
the society whose state is contemplating joining cultures persevere because they are seen as ap-
an alliance themselves might regard the shift in propriate, and thus legitimate, by major stake-
status as significant in its own right, regardless holders in Swedish and Finnish society because
of whether defense cooperation has changed as a they explain which rules ought to be followed.
result. Treaty membership, therefore, does more This societal and elite concern about securi-
than possibly provide functional advantages — if ty identity can shed light on Sweden’s and Fin-
a state wants to be identified as an allied state, land’s decision to seek increased cooperation with
treaty membership might have an intangible ben- NATO prior to February 2022, but not member-
efit on its own. ship. Particularly after 2014, both states desired
Accordingly, an identity as a non-allied state closer relations with NATO and were increasingly
could became so integral to a state’s own concep- welcomed into NATO processes. However, they
tion of self that it might refrain from seeking mem- both made it clear that strengthened cooperation
bership in an alliance, whatever the pre-existing did not mean that they were joining the alliance.
level of defense cooperation and institutionaliza- Karin Enström, then Swedish defense minister,
tion. Non-alliance status may have domestic legit- told reporters, “There is a very sharp difference
imacy and thus buy-in from major stakeholders in between being a member and not being a mem-
society, whether among members of the public or ber.”107 Several experts at the time emphasized
the political elite. Ontological security thus sug- the countries’ traditions and identity conceptions
gests that a state would continue to seek non-al- relating to neutrality and non-alignment as major
lied status for its own sake. barriers to a decision to apply for membership.108
In the case of Sweden and Finland, countries As Jacob Westberg noted in 2016, one major cost
generally associated with non-alignment, their of Swedish membership in NATO would be “the
non-membership status vis-à-vis NATO appears definitive end of the national self-image that is
to have had intrinsic worth for both their own so- still alive in many Swedes – the image of Sweden
cieties and Russia.104 Much analysis on Swedish as an alliance-free and neutral state.”109
and Finnish defense policies emphasizes those Public opinion surveys can offer some corroborat-
countries’ strategic cultures, defined as the reg- ing evidence that, despite an increasingly unstable
ularized set of beliefs and practices that shape international environment and the fact that Sweden
which core military tasks their militaries perform, and Finland were deepening their cooperation with
what operational mandates govern them, and the NATO, support for remaining outside of the alliance
overall willingness to use force in those societies. was enduring. Specifically, popular support for joining
The standard wisdom is that Sweden and Finland NATO was consistently limited and in a minority po-
104 Tuomas Forsberg, “Finland and NATO: Strategic Choices and Identity Conceptions,” in The European Neutrals and NATO: Non-Alignment,
Partnership, Membership? ed. Andrew Cottey (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); and Karl Ydén et al., “Sweden and the Issue of NATO Member-
ship: Exploring a Public Opinion Paradox,” Defence Studies 19, no. 1 (2019): 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2019.1568192.
105 Fredrik Doeser, “Finland, Sweden, and Operation Unified Protector: The Impact of Strategic Culture,” Comparative Strategy 35, no. 4 (2016):
292, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2016.1222842.
106 Henrikki Heikka, “Republican Realism: Finnish Strategic Culture in Historical Perspective,” Cooperation and Conflict 40, no. 1 (March 2005),
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0010836705049736.
107 Associated Press, “Finland and Sweden to Strengthen Ties with NATO,” The Guardian, Aug. 27, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/aug/27/finland-sweden-strengthen-ties-nato.
108 See, e.g., Judy Dempsey, “Judy Asks: Should Finland and Sweden Join NATO?” Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe, May 21, 2014, https://
carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/55657.
109 “Det finns dock ytterligare en kostnad förknippad ett svenskt medlemskap i Nato: det skulle innebära det definitiva slutet för den nationella
självbild som fortfarande är levande hos många svenskar – bilden av Sverige som en allians-fri och neutral stat…” Jacob Westberg, “Säkerhet utan
alliansfrihet: Svenska alliansstrategiers teori och praktik,” Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift 118, no. 4 (2016): 439, https://journals.lub.lu.se/st/article/
view/16436 [translated by authors].
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sition.110 In Sweden, support for membership varied members. That this lesson was not internalized
more across time. For example, support rose from in 2014 highlights, at the very least, that the scale
29 percent in 2013 to 38 percent in 2015, the year of the security shock must be very great, though
after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, but it had gone how great is difficult to anticipate. The 2022 inva-
back down to 29 percent by 2017. From 1994 to 2019, sion fundamentally challenged assumptions about
many of those surveyed were largely ambivalent peace and stability in Europe, leading Swedish
on the question. Indeed, the majority of respond- and Finnish leaders and societies to question not
ents did not express strong feelings, answering that only how to bolster physical security but how to
membership was neither a “very good” nor a “very self-identify in a new security environment. Petteri
bad” idea.111 Orpo, the leader of the main Finnish opposition
The conversation about Sweden’s and Finland’s party in 2022, argued for NATO membership that
relationship with NATO evolved quickly following year by saying, “For me, NATO membership is not
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Ac- just about the pros and cons, it’s a bigger question
cording to one poll, between January and February about our identity.”115
2022, support for NATO membership in Sweden The discussions about NATO membership in
jumped by nearly 10 percentage points.112 Long- both Sweden and Finland have emphasized the
held opinions about NATO membership by parlia- shock induced by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as
mentary parties shifted in both countries, enabling well as concerns about identity, tradition, and se-
each to make the unprecedented move to seek curity. The Finnish government more quickly de-
NATO membership in 2022.113 For the first time cided to seek NATO membership, though it saw it
ever, opinion polls indicated majority support for as vital that Sweden reach the same conclusion. In
NATO membership in both countries. May 2022, the Finnish government released a re-
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early port describing the new security environment, de-
2022 was shocking enough to produce a sea change scribing the invasion as a “fundamental change.”116
in popular attitudes, thereby shifting Swedish and Pragmatically, the report emphasized that Russia’s
Finnish societies and elites away from seeking on- demands that NATO no longer expand would lim-
tological security through their non-allied status. it Finland’s future room for maneuver.117 Hence
Such a major security shock was necessary for Finnish President Sauli Niinistö averred that “[w]
this transformation in public opinion.114 Why did hat we see now, Europe – the world – is more di-
this shock prove enough to shake Swedes’ and vided; there’s not very much room for nonaligned,
Finns’ identities as non-aligned countries? The in-between.”118 The Swedish debate took longer,
governments in Helsinki and Stockholm might driven in part by more complicated domestic pol-
have drawn lessons from the invasion of Ukraine itics. The leading Social Democrat party had long
about the limits of NATO partnership, perceiving made non-membership in NATO a party platform.
that Article 5 protections truly only apply to full Richard Milne of the Financial Times described it
110 Sami Metelinen, “Nato-jäsenyyden kannatuksessa on tapahtunut hyppäys,” EVA, Oct. 26, 2021, https://www.eva.fi/blog/2021/10/26/na-
to-jasenyyden-kannatuksessa-on-tapahtunut-hyppays/; Charly Salonius-Pasternak, “The Defence of Finland and Sweden: Continuity and Variance
in Strategy and Public Opinion,” Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Briefing Paper no. 240, June 2018, https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/06/bp240_the-defence-of-finland-and-sweden.pdf.
111 Ulrika Andersson, Anders Carlander, and Patrik Öhberg, Regntunga Skyar, SOM Institute, report no. 76, June 25, 2020, 339, https://www.
gu.se/som-institutet/resultat-och-publikationer/bocker/regntunga-skyar. For more on the variation, see Salonius-Pasternak, “The Defence of Finland
and Sweden.”
112 Westling, “Majoritet av svenskarna.”
113 Lukas Lindström, “Riksdagspartierna samlas för att diskutera Nato – så här kommenterar partierna Natofrågan,” Yle, March 1, 2022, https://
svenska.yle.fi/a/7-10013590; and Pontus Mattsson, “SD svänger – öppnar för medlemskap i Nato,” Sveriges Radio, March 4, 2022, https://sveriges-
radio.se/artikel/sd-svanger-oppnar-for-medlemskap-i-nato.
114 On how significant international events induce major foreign policy change, see David A. Welch, Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy
Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
115 Richard Milne, “‘It’s a Radical Change’: The Prospect of Finland Joining NATO Draws Nearer,” Financial Times, April 4, 2022, https://www.
ft.com/content/83b5041b-6bcf-49de-b180-43c354a3302d.
116 “Government Report on Changes in the Security Environment,” Finnish Government, 2022, 1, https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/
handle/10024/164002/VN_2022_20.pdf.
117 Hanna Ojanen, “NordNATO: Why the Case for Finland to Join NATO Is Stronger than Ever,” European Council on Foreign Relations (blog),
May 10, 2022, https://ecfr.eu/article/nordnato-why-the-case-for-finland-to-join-nato-is-stronger-than-ever/.
118 Paulina Firozi, “Finland’s Niinisto Says Talks with Putin on NATO Bid Were ‘Calm and Cool,’” Washington Post, May 15, 2022, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/15/russia-ukraine-war-news-live-updates-putin/.
53
as “a party whose identity is in part built on two coalitions would be based on shared interests and
centuries of non-alignment.”119 With an election oc- could therefore emerge also without the existence
curring in the fall of 2022, the polls indicating pop- of formal treaties.”124
ular support for NATO membership seem to have Nor does our argument about ontological secu-
changed the position of the Social Democrats.120 rity suggest that Finland and Sweden identified as
With public opinion shifting, and the Social Demo- non-aligned to the same degree or that each feels
crats and the Swedish government turning toward the same need to be ontologically secure. Sweden’s
membership, the deteriorating security environ- behavior, due both to culture and to its greater dis-
ment created a strong impression on the Swedish tance from the threat posed by Russia, may be bet-
body politic. Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena ter explained by its identity as a non-aligned state.125
Andersson described the aggression as “a water- Finland, perceiving a greater threat from Russia,
shed moment for Sweden,” while highlighting that may have relied more on a pragmatic understand-
“after 200 years of military non-alignment, Sweden ing of geopolitics and security in making its decision
has chosen a new path.”121 not to seek NATO membership until 2022. Howev-
Ontological security, of course, may not be er, Juhana Aunesluoma and Johanna Rainio-Niemi
the only explanation for why Finland and Swe- highlight the role of identity in Finland’s decision to
den were reluctant to join NATO prior to 2022. pursue neutrality during the Cold War.126 Whatever
Indeed, the security situation, domestic politics, the original reason, as neutrality and non-alignment
strategic culture, and other factors likely came policies became more entrenched in both Sweden
into play. Non-alignment in some ways brought and Finland, they also became more associated with
more flexibility: Finland, for example, could use national identity and strategic culture. As one Swed-
the “NATO option” as a deterrent signal to Russia, ish analyst wrote, “[t]o be a Swede was to be non-
threatening to join the alliance if Russia were too aligned and neutral.”127
aggressive. Other considerations existed as well, Arguments about the functional benefits of alli-
including questions about defense spending, nu- ance treaties may be missing this important dimen-
clear policies, and possible Russian reactions. Giv- sion. These arguments can illuminate some of the
en Sweden’s and Finland’s geographic placement, context for why states may choose to join alliances,
if they were attacked, it would be difficult for but they often fail to predict when alliances may be
NATO not to intervene, and Swedish and Finnish formed. The conditions necessary for alliance sign-
cooperation with NATO made that support even ing are often too difficult to foresee. Outside securi-
more likely.122 One reason for them to cooperate ty shocks, therefore, are likely to influence alliance
was to ensure that Sweden, Finland, and NATO formation more than is often acknowledged, there-
could operate well together, if necessary.123 For by preventing theories of alliance formation from
some, Sweden and Finland were receiving many being reliably predictive. These security shocks, as
of the benefits of NATO membership without the in the case of Sweden and Finland, can be brought
downsides. As Matti Pesu and Tuomas Iso Mark- on by increased threats, but the intersection of that
ku observe, Helsinki’s pre-2022 strategy “banked threat perception with a country’s security identity
on the (historically valid) assumption that in a is vital. And so, at least for Sweden and Finland,
potential conflict with Russia, Western wartime the meaning of acquiring NATO membership in the
119 Richard Milne, “Sweden’s Social Democrats Agonise Over Nato Membership,” Financial Times, May 9, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/
a34f3caa-2e79-42fa-9f1b-e9f92087d273.
120 Charlie Duxbury, “Dramatic U-Turns by Social Democrats in Sweden, Finland Paved Way to NATO,” Politico, May 15, 2022, https://www.
politico.eu/article/dramatic-u-turns-by-social-democrats-in-sweden-finland-paved-way-to-nato/.
121 “Remarks By President Biden, President Niinistö of Finland, and Prime Minister Andersson of Sweden After Trilateral Meeting,” The White
House, May 19, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/19/remarks-by-president-biden-president-niinis-
to-of-finland-and-prime-minister-andersson-of-sweden-after-trilateral-meeting/.
122 See, e.g., Andrea Shalal, “NATO Should Defend Sweden, Finland if Attacked: NATO Official,” Reuters, Nov. 29, 2017, https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-nato-russia-idUSKBN1DT30V; and Carl Bergqvist, “Determined by History: Why Sweden and Finland Will Not Be More than NATO
Partners,” War on the Rocks, July 13, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/07/determined-by-history-why-sweden-and-finland-will-not-be-more-
than-nato-partners/.
123 On integration, but not alliance membership, as a strategy for small powers, see Wieslander, “The Hultqvist Doctrine.”
124 Pesu and Iso-Marku, “Finland as a NATO Ally,” 11.
125 Ulrika Möller and Ulf Bjereld, “From Nordic Neutrals to Post-Neutral Europeans: Differences in Finnish and Swedish Policy Transformation,”
Cooperation and Conflict 45, no. 4 (2010): 363–86, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836710386870.
126 Juhana Aunesluoma and Johanna Rainio-Niemi, “Neutrality as Identity? Finland’s Quest for Security in the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War
Studies 18, no. 4 (2016): 51–78, https://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article/18/4/51-78/13896.
127 Winnerstig, “From Isolationist Neutrality to Allied Solidarity.”
54
The Scholar
2020s differs dramatically than what would have One of the major take-aways from our analysis
been the case during the Cold War and the three is that the literature on alliance politics attaches
decades thereafter.128 too much weight to the functional benefits that an
alliance treaty provides.130 The standard argument
is that treaties allow signatories both to clari-
Conclusion fy the terms of the agreement and to inject suf-
ficient vagueness so that they retain freedom of
This article considers what joining the NATO maneuver lest their commitments be manipulated
alliance truly means for Sweden and Finland. and exploited. By shepherding these agreements
Prior to indicating their intention to join in 2022, through domestic legislatures, these treaties also
Sweden and Finland already demonstrated a high signal the serious intent that allies have for sup-
level of defense cooperation institutionalization, porting each other in a manner that is transpar-
according to Korolev’s framework, especially with ent to domestic and international audiences, in-
respect to consultations, military-technical coop- cluding those adversaries that the alliance serves
eration, and joint military exercises. Of course, al- to deter. A treaty thus opens the way for more
liances are ultimately about promises to defend efficient defense cooperation between states that
and not necessarily about deepening defense co- would not otherwise occur.
operation for its own sake. That said, precisely Yet, the case of Sweden and Finland compli-
because promises to defend often lack credibility, cates this rationalist perspective. Both countries
NATO invests in a raft of programs relating to col- had been able to deepen their defense coopera-
lective defense, crisis management, and cooperation with NATO and NATO members across var-
tive security in order to improve the prospects of ious dimensions absent a formal treaty commit-
peace and stability. ment. The resulting defense cooperation may not
Accordingly, the level of defense cooperation have been entirely efficient — as with the case of
has both extrinsic and intrinsic importance and information sharing — and certain functional ben-
so Sweden and Finland are well-positioned al- efits remained out of reach, as with regular partic-
ready vis-à-vis NATO. In fact, compared to oth- ipation in bodies like the Nuclear Planning Group
er possible contenders for NATO membership, and the North Atlantic Council, so long as they
the practical significance of Sweden and Finland were outside of NATO. Nevertheless, the magni-
joining the alliance is far less.129 In this way, some tude of defense cooperation is arguably greater
observers of their membership process may be than what rationalist perspectives would expect.
overselling the technical benefits to cooperation, What is important about the treaty, and thus
although Sweden and Finland joining will provide the alliance, is not necessarily just functional but
them with the significant benefits of having vot- also ontological and political. The treaty itself has
ing rights, full participation in key bodies like the a symbolic aura that affects national identity and
North Atlantic Council, and Article 5 reassuranc- sends a political message about the alignment and
es. Nevertheless, that their membership in NATO identity of a country. In the case of Sweden and
is considered so important — despite how their Finland, the threat that Russia now represents is
joining has far less practical significance than enough for the countries to change long-standing
if other countries were to join (e.g., Ukraine or identities as non-aligned states. Swedish and Finn-
Georgia) — highlights the political and symbol- ish full participation in NATO offers military and
ic value that states put on the formal treaty. Al- other functional benefits, but it is this political and
though the day-to-day practices of Swedish and identity shift that provides much of the thrust of
Finnish cooperation with NATO may not change why Swedish and Finnish membership of NATO is
as drastically as sometimes portrayed if they were a significant development in European security.
to become members, their signing of the Washing-
ton Treaty may still represent a sea change.
128 Of course, if Sweden or Finland had applied for NATO membership in the 1970s and the 1980s, the decision would have also entailed mem-
bership in the North Atlantic Council, voting rights, and joint military planning. However, the two Nordic countries and NATO would have had to
develop inter-military consultations and military-technical cooperation, and they would not have had the experiences accrued from military exercis-
es, joint production, and even military operations that they have now. On how this past cooperation eased the NATO membership applications, see
Christopher Skaluba and Anna Wieslander, “Why Finland and Sweden Can Join NATO with Unprecedented Speed,” New Atlanticist, May 13, 2022,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-finland-and-sweden-can-join-nato-with-unprecedented-speed/.
129 See Andrew T. Wolff, “The Future of NATO Enlargement After the Ukraine Crisis,” International Affairs 91, no. 5 (2015): 1103–21, https://doi.
org/10.1111/1468-2346.12400.
130 See Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?”
55
Katherine Kjellström Elgin, Ph.D., is a fellow

at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assess-
ments (CSBA) and is also currently serving as a Re-
search Fellow at the Modern War Institute at West
Point. Prior to joining CSBA, she served as a DAAD
Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute
of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Internation-
al Studies. Dr. Elgin has also held positions at the
Brookings Institution and the Long Term Strategy
Group in Washington, D.C. She earned her Ph.D.
in Public Affairs (Security Studies) from Princeton
University’s School of Public & International Affairs.
Alexander Lanoszka, Ph.D., is assistant pro-

fessor in the Department of Political Science at
the University of Waterloo and visiting professor
at the College of Europe in Natolin. Previously, he
worked at City, University of London and has held
fellowships at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology and Dartmouth College. His most recent
book is Military Alliances in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury (Polity, 2021). He earned his Ph.D. in Politics
from Princeton University.
The authors would like to acknowledge the excel-

lent feedback received from Chris Bassler, Ambassa-
dor Eric Edelman, Thomas G. Mahnken, Hugo Meijer,
and Luis Simón. Any mistakes are the authors’ alone.
Image: NATO131
131 For the image, see https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pictures/images_mfu/2023/4/04g-mfa-ceremony-fin/230404g-001.jpg.
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TNSR Journal Vol 6 Issue 2 Elgin Lanoszka

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The Scholar Texas National Security Review: Volume 6, Issue 2 (Spring 2023)

Print: ISSN 2576-1021 Online: ISSN 2576-1153

Rationalist understandings of military alliances argue that a formal

Swedish and Finnish State Department were apprehensive of the pres-

63 Military Balance 121 (2021), 147–50.

ACCORDING TO ONE POLL,

Katherine Kjellström Elgin, Ph.D., is a fellow

Alexander Lanoszka, Ph.D., is assistant pro-

The authors would like to acknowledge the excel-

131 For the image, see https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pictures/images_mfu/2023/4/04g-mfa-ceremony-fin/230404g-001.jpg.

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