The Byzantine­Bulgarian Confrontation in the first Half of the 10th Century

and Kyivan Rus’

«The Byzantine­Bulgarian Confrontation in the first Half of the 10th Century and
Kyivan Rus’»

by Dmytro Gordiyenko

Source:
Byzantinoslavica ­ Revue internationale des Etudes Byzantines (Byzantinoslavica ­ Revue
internationale des Etudes Byzantines), issue: 1­2 / 2012, pages: 156­166, on www.ceeol.com.
 The Byzantine-Bulgarian Confrontation
in the first Half of the 10th Century
and Kyivan Rus’

Dmytro GORDIYENKO (Kyiv)

The first half of the 10th century is of great importance in the history
of Southeastern Europe. At that time Bulgaria claimed itself as a powerful
competitor of Byzantium in the Balkans region, while in the north coast
of the Black Sea Kyivan Rusí declared itself to be an important factor in
the foreign policy in the North. However, if Byzantine-Bulgarian and
Byzantine-Rusí relations of that period are sufficiently covered in historio-
graphy,1 the interlacing of all three factors of international politics
(Byzantium, Bulgaria, Rusí) and the Rusí-Bulgarian relations in first half
of the 10th century have not found their proper coverage in historiogra-
phy2 yet. That can be explained, first of all, by a lack of sufficient sources.
In fact, the sources give only fragmentary and indirect information about
the Rusí-Bulgarian relations of the period mentioned. Therefore, ìthe
role of Bulgaria in the formation of ancient Rusí ... is undervalued in the
historiographyî3 and at the same time, as G. LITAVRIN notes, Bulgarian
relations to Constantinople were an example for the Rusí ruling elite con-
cerning Rusí-Byzantine system of economy, as well as political and cultur-
al relations in the 9th ñ the beginning of 11th centuries.4

1 See, for example: Ă. Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Âčçŕíňč˙, Áîëăŕðč˙, Äðĺâí˙˙ Ðóńü (IX-

íŕ÷ŕëî XII â.), Ńŕíęň-Ďĺňĺðáóðă 2000, 398.
2 Typically, the scientists in their exploration restrict themselves to study cul-
tural mutual influence between the two nations [See, for example: Ĺ. ĂĹÎÐĂČĹÂ,
Íŕ÷ŕëî áîëăŕðńęî-ðóńńęčő ęóëüňóðíűő č ëčňĺðŕňóðíűő ńâ˙çĺé, in: Ðóńęî-
áúëăŕðńęč âðúçęč ďðĺç âĺęîâĺňĺ, Ńîôč˙ 1986, 12-22; Ă. ÖŔÍĘÎÂŔ-ĎĹŇĘÎÂŔ,
Ęóëüňóðíč č ďîëčňč÷ĺńęč âðúçęč č îňíîřĺíč˙ ěĺćäó Áúëăŕðč˙, Ęčĺâńęŕ Ðóńč˙
č Âčçŕíňč˙ ďðĺç ðŕííĺňî ńðĺäíîâĺęîâčĺ, in: Ðóńęî-áúëăŕðńęč âðúçęč ďðĺç
âĺęîâĺňĺ, Ńîôč˙ 1986, 71-81; Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Ęóëüňóðíűé ďĺðĺâîðîň â Áîëăŕðčč č
Äðĺâí˙˙ Ðóńü, in: Ęčðčëî-Ěĺňîäčşâńęč ńňóäčč. Őčë˙äŕ č ńňî ăîäčíč îň ńěúðňňŕ
íŕ Ěĺňîäčé, Ęí. 4, Ńîôč˙ 1987, 393-403]. The political component is partly exam-
ined only in the works of G. Litavrin [Ă. Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Äðĺâí˙˙ Ðóńü, Áîëăŕðč˙ č
Âčçŕíňč˙ â IX-X ââ., in: Čńňîðč˙, ęóëüňóðŕ, ýňíîăðŕôč˙ č ôîëüęëîð ńëŕâ˙íńęčő
íŕðîäîâ. IX Ěĺćäóíŕðîäíűé ńúĺçä ńëŕâčńňîâ, Ěîńęâŕ 1983, 62-76], although sci-
entists also focused on cultural and economic components.
3 Ă. Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Âčçŕíňč˙, Áîëăŕðč˙, Äðĺâí˙˙ Ðóńü (IX-íŕ÷ŕëî XII â.),
Ńŕíęň-Ďĺňĺðáóðă 2000, 6.
4 Thus, by assumption of G. Litavrin, in the conclusion of the Rusí-Byzantine
156 agreement in 911 Rus¥ took into account the Bulgarian experience concerning
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The Byzantine-Bulgarian Confrontation in the first Half ...

The fact of close territorial contact between Bulgarians and Rusí peo-
ple in the basin of Transnistria and the Danube mouth5 favored the rela-
tions between them in the 9th and 10th centuries. At the end of 9th ñ
beginning of 10th centuries Bulgarian government established a stable
authority in the north of the Danube mouth.6
It is known that along the upper part of the stream of the Dniester
River and near upper Vistula lived such a group of Slavic tribes, as the White
Croats were.7 And thus, some East Slavic tribes settled gradually in the
South-Danube region8 which means that Bulgarians and the Rusí had con-
tacts in the Dniester and Danube area. In addition, in the conditions of
political centralization of East Slavic tribes around Kyiv this area must have
been in the sphere of interests of Grand Prince Authority,9 whose interests
directly coincided with aspirations of the Bulgarian government.10
At that time Kyiv tried to conquer the tribes Tiwerci and Ulichs.
According to the Primary Chronicle, during the reign of Oleg Tiwerci
moved to the west bank of Dniester,11 and during the reign of his succes-
sor Igor Ulichs moved to the area between Dniester and Southern Buh.12

the treaty with Byzantium in 716, according to which Bulgarian Empire guaran-
teed peace in exchange of the contribution payment and establishing intergov-
ernmental trade [Ă. Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Âčçŕíňč˙, Áîëăŕðč˙, Äðĺâí˙˙ Ðóńü, 135; idem,
Ęóëüňóðíűé ďĺðĺâîðîň â Áîëăŕðčč č Äðĺâí˙˙ Ðóńü, 395, 401].
5 Ĺ. ĚČŐŔÉËÎÂ, Ęčĺâńęŕ Ðóńč˙ č Áúëăŕðč˙ ďðĺç Ő â., in: Ðóńęî-áúëăŕðńęč
âðúçęč ďðĺç âĺęîâĺňĺ, Ńîôč˙ 1986, 62; Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Ęóëüňóðíűé ďĺðĺâîðîň â
Áîëăŕðčč č Äðĺâí˙˙ Ðóńü, 401.
6 Ĺ. ĚČŐŔÉËÎÂ, Çŕ ðóńęî-áúëăŕðńęŕňŕ ĺňíč÷ĺńęŕ ăðŕíčöŕ äî ęðŕ˙ íŕ Ő âĺę,
Ăîäčříčę íŕ Ńîôčéńęŕ˙ óíčâĺðńčňĺň 3 (1973) 195-198.
7 Ë. ÍČÄĹÐËĹ, Ńëŕâ˙íńęčĺ äðĺâíîńňč, Ěîńęâŕ 1956, 155.
8 Ŕ. Í. ÍŔŃÎÍÎÂ, “Ðóńńęŕ˙ çĺěë˙” č îáðŕçîâŕíčĺ ňĺððčňîðčč äðĺâíĺðóńńęî-
ăî ăîńóäŕðńňâŕ, Ěîńęâŕ 1951, 130.
9 Remarkably, the first mention of the name ìRusíî in medieval German
sources was used to indicate ethnonim or residents of a territory (in Latin form
Ruzarii) associated with the area of the Bavarian Danube [Ŕ. Â. ÍŔÇŔÐĹÍĘÎ,
Äðĺâí˙˙ Ðóńü íŕ ěĺćäóíŕðîäíűő ďóň˙ő: Ěĺćäčńöčďëčíŕðíűĺ î÷ĺðęč ęóëüňóð-
íűő, ňîðăîâűő, ďîëčňč÷ĺńęčő ńâ˙çĺé IX-XII ââ., Ěîńęâŕ 2001, 18]. Also in the
charter of Emperor Otto II of 979, the mountain which is located in the south of
the Danube between the rivers Ibs and Grosso Erlauf, is called Rûznic, which also
comes from ethnonim ìRusíî [ibidem, 20]. Thus, in the first half of 9th century
ethnonym ìRusíî is present on the territory of Bavarian Danube [ibidem, 25-26].
10 So, V. Nikolaev assumed that the famous Nikolaos I Mystikosís threat Symeon
(as below) was caused by the fact that at that time it was going to be the conflict
between Rusí and Bulgaria in Transnistria and because of the domination over
Tiwerci and Ulichs, who were not conquered by Kyiv [Â. Ä. ÍČĘÎËŔĹÂ, Ę čńňîðčč
áîëăŕðî-ðóńńęčő îňíîřĺíčé â íŕ÷ŕëĺ 40-ő ăă. Ő â., Ńîâĺňńęîĺ ńëŕâ˙íîâĺäĺíčĺ 6
(1982) 49-55].
11 Ďîëíîĺ ńîáðŕíčĺ ðóńńęčő ëĺňîďčńĺé. Ň. 2: Čďŕňüĺâńęŕ˙ ëĺňîďčńü, Ěîńęâŕ
1962, Ńň. 9.
12 Íîâăîðîäńęŕ˙ ďĺðâŕ˙ ëĺňîďčńü ńňŕðřĺăî č ěëŕäřĺăî čçâîäîâ, Ěîńęâŕ ñ
Ëĺíčíăðŕä 1950, 109. 157
 Dmytro Gordiyenko

Kyivís actions in reference to these tribes restrained the movement of

nomadic tribes to the west in the North Black Sea region (Hungarians,
Pechenegs, Ouzoi, etc.). However, the ìsteppe factorî weakened the influ-
ence of the Bulgarian government in that region.13 Thus, the question of
conquering the tribes was left open for Rusí and for Bulgaria as well.
In the history of Byzantium, the beginning of the Macedonian
dynastyís reign was marked by the entry of the Empire into a new era in
its history ñ the period of the highest cultural and later a political devel-
opment, too. On the international stage the character of relations
between Byzantium and neighboring countries (not only the East or West,
but the North as well) is largely determined by the peculiarities of its
geopolitical location.14 At that time no state in the world had a direct con-
tact, peaceful or hostile, with so many countries and peoples, as
Byzantium had. The situation was complicated by the fact that the Empire
never had reliable natural boundaries; safety was not secured from any
side.
Strengthening of Byzantium in the East was very important for the
policy of the Empire in the Balkans and in the Northern Black Sea region.
In addition, each of the Slavic states ñ Rusí, Moravia, and South Slavs
caused certain problems to Byzantium.15 The Rusí attacks on
Constantinople in 860 were remembered for two centuries in Byzantium,
and its rescue was explained by the patronage of the Virgin. It is remark-
able that the chronicler marked the origin of Rusí from this campaign.16
Exactly this Rusí attack forced Byzantium to restore the alliance with
Khazaria to maintain a balance of forces in the northern region.17
In ìDe administrando imperioî Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus put
the Empire to the center of the world. The emperor described the neigh-
boring nations purely in succession according to clockwise. Constantine
started this description from the north. Despite some semantic meaning
of this principle18 we can assume the particular importance of the north-
ern region for the Empire at that time, too. So the emperor singled out
13 Ĺ. ĚČŐŔÉËÎÂ, Ęčĺâńęŕ Ðóńč˙ č Áúëăŕðč˙ ďðĺç Ő â., 64.
14 Ă. Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Ăĺîďîëčňč÷ĺńęîĺ ďîëîćĺíčĺ Âčçŕíňčč â ńðĺäíĺâĺęîâîě
ěčðĺ â VII-XII ââ., in: Âčçŕíňč˙ ěĺćäó Çŕďŕäîě č Âîńňîęîě. Îďűň čńňîðč÷ĺńęîé
őŕðŕęňĺðčńňčęč. Ńá. ńňŕňĺé, Ńŕíęň-Ďĺňĺðáóðă 1999, 11.
15 Ą. ÎŃŇÐδÎÐŃÜĘČÉ, ˛ńňîðł˙ Âłçŕíňłż, ďĺð. ç íłě. Ŕíŕňîëł˙ Îíčřęŕ, Ëüâłâ
2002, 213.
16 ĎŃÐË., Ň. 2, Ńň. 12; Ę. Ĺ. ËČ, Ďðîčńőîćäĺíčĺ Ðóńč: čńňîðčęî-ëčíăâčń-
ňč÷ĺńęčé ŕíŕëčç, in: Ěîăčë˙íńüęł ÷čňŕíí˙ 2003 ðîęó: Çá. íŕóę. ďð.: Ďŕě’˙ňęč
Äŕâíüîż Ðóńł â ńňóäł˙ő ńó÷ŕńíčő â÷ĺíčő: łńňîðł˙, äîńëłäćĺíí˙, çáĺðĺćĺíí˙, ed.
Â. Ě. Ęîëďŕęîâŕ ňŕ łířł, Ęčżâ 2004, 238.
17 Ą. ÎŃŇÐδÎÐŃÜĘČÉ, ibidem, 213.
18 See: Â. Â. ĎĹÍŃĘÎÉ, Ńďðŕâĺäëčâűĺ č íĺńďðŕâĺäëčâűĺ âîéíű â âčçŕíňčéńęîé
ňðŕäčöčč (íŕ ďðčěĺðĺ áîëăŕðî-âčçŕíňčéńęčő âîéí), in: Ěčð Âčçŕíňčč /
158 Ěŕňĺðčŕëű íŕó÷. ńĺěčíŕðŕ, îňâ. ðĺä.-ńîńň. Í. Í. Áîëăîâ, Áĺëăîðîä 2007, 93.
 The Byzantine-Bulgarian Confrontation in the first Half ...

the chapters about Pechenegs (1ñ8), Hungarians (3, 4), Rhoses (2),
Bulgarians (5), that is, the peoples who lived near the northern borders
of the Empire. Similarly, the 13th chapter was devoted to ìthe peoples of
the Northî19 pointing out the great importance of the region for the
Empire. In the struggle against barbarians Byzantine diplomacy skillfully
used a system of ìalliancesî. Thus, Constantine called Serbs and Croats his
allies in the Balkans, whereas in the Northern Black Sea region in the first
half of the 10th century the Empire counted on an alliance with
Pechenegs. They had to oppose Rusí as well as the Hungarian horde and
Bulgarians. Pechenegs played an important role as trade mediators
between Kherson and Rusí, Khazaria and other northern people.
Therefore, as A. VASILIEV marked, Pechenegs were very important for
Byzantium both in political and economic sense in the 10th century. 20
In mid-10th century Byzantium survived three major Rhos attacks
(860, 907 and 941).21 Two of them occurred in the period of Macedonian
dynasty. All these campaigns were held as sea expeditions, and therefore
the way of the Rusí fleet inevitably passed along the Bulgarian Black Sea
coast. On that account it was quite problematic for Rusí to attack
Constantinople without silence consent of the Bulgarian government.
According to chronicle, Oleg with a great army came to Constantinople
and forced Byzantine emperors to negotiate with him and to conclude a
favorable trade agreement for Rusí. In Romanos I Lekapenos time the
Capital was in danger. Although Igorís first campaign was unsuccessful in
941, during the second campaign of the Ruthenian prince the Byzantines
decided not to risk and at great distance Romanos decided to come into
terms with Rusí, giving the prince and boyars generous gifts.22
The growing Rusí state power caused an anxiety in the Byzantine rul-
ing circles. However, the relations with Bulgaria were of paramount
importance for the Byzantine Empire in the first half of the 10th century.
Unlike Basil I, Leo VI had no defined foreign policy and during his rule
one of the largest Balkan conflicts in the Byzantine history broke out ñ a
war with Symeon I the Bulgarian. Byzantium was forced to ask Hungaryís
help that in response to the call of Byzantium firstly intervened in the con-
flict among European states. At that time Hungary occupied the territory
between the rivers Dnieper and Danube along the north-western Black
Sea coast. This attack of Hungary was totally unexpected for Symeon, for
north-eastern border of Bulgaria was not fortified and the Byzantine fleet

19 See: Constantinus Porphyrogenitus, De administrando imperio, ed. B. G. Nie-

buhrii, CSHB III, Bonnae 1840.
20 Ŕ. Ŕ. ÂŔŃČËÜĹÂ, Čńňîðč˙ Âčçŕíňčéńęîé čěďĺðčč. Âðĺě˙ äî Ęðĺńňîâűő
ďîőîäîâ (äî 1081 ă.), Ńŕíęň-Ďĺňĺðáóðă 1998, 428.
21 At least as far as we know it from sources.
22 ĎŃÐË, Ň. 2, 34-35. 159
 Dmytro Gordiyenko

conveyed the Hungarian army across the Danube.23 For his part, Symeon
asked Pechenegs for help. They defeated the Hungarians and forced
them to retreat to the Middle Danubian plain, while Byzantium was
defeated by the Bulgarians (896) and had to pay annual tribute to
Symeon.
The Balkan war paralyzed the acts of the Byzantines against Arabs in
the East and the West. However, right after weakening the Balkan threat
the Empire began to build its fleet. After a great victory over the Arab fleet
in October 908, Byzantium suffered a crushing defeat in spring 912 in the
campaign against Crete. In this expedition there were seven hundred of
Rusí sailors mercenaries as a part of the Byzantine army.24 This indicates
a new stage in the Byzantine-Rusí relations. The Rusí peopleís participa-
tion in the expedition was probably a result of the Rusí-Byzantine agree-
ment of 911.25
With the death of Leo VI the power passed to his brother Alexander.
The new emperor tried to break with all that could be related to his pre-
decessor. The change of the rulers on the Byzantine throne had also a
noticeable impact on the foreign policy of the Empire. Thus, Alexander
refused to pay annual tribute to the Bulgarians. In response of it Symeon
began military operations against the Empire26 but soon after it the
Emperor Alexander died (6 June 913). At that time Constantine VII
Porphyrogenitus remained the only representative of the Macedonian
dynasty. The regency for the seven-year emperor was headed by the patri-
arch Nikolaos I Mystikos.
The rule of Symeon I the Great (893-927) is ìa new eraî27 in the his-
tory of Bulgaria. He had received good education in Constantinople and
became a leader of a new type in the history of Bulgaria. After Symeon
had learned the ancient and Byzantine political doctrine, the main task of
his activities was to defeat Byzantium and become an emperor in
Constantinople,28 which, as noted by G. OSTROGORSKY, gives to the
Symeonís wars a special character and caused extreme danger to the
Empire.29 Indeed, in the Middle Ages the title of ìthe Empireî was com-

23 Ŕ. Ď. ĘŔĆÄŔÍ ñ Ă. Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Î÷ĺðęč čńňîðčč Âčçŕíňčč č Ţćíűő

ńëŕâ˙í, Ńŕíęň-Ďĺňĺðáóðă 1998, 168-169.
24 Constantini Porphyrogeniti De cerimoniis aulae byzantinae libri duo, CSHB, ed. J. J.
Reiske, Bonnae 1829, Vol. I, 651.
25 Ą. ÎŃŇÐδÎÐŃÜĘČÉ, ibidem, 233; Ă. Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Âčçŕíňč˙, Áîëăŕðč˙,
Äðĺâí˙˙ Ðóńü (IX- íŕ÷ŕëî XII â.), 66.
26 Ŕ. Ď. ĘŔĆÄŔÍ, Ę âîďðîńó î íŕ÷ŕëĺ âňîðîé áîëăŕðî-âčçŕíňčéńęîé âîéíű
ďðč Ńčěĺîíĺ, in: Ńëŕâ˙íńęčé ŕðőčâ, Ěîńęâŕ 1959, 23.
27 Ô. Č. ÓŃĎĹÍŃĘČÉ, Čńňîðč˙ Âčçŕíňčéńęîé čěďĺðčč. Ň. 3. Ďĺðčîä Ěŕęĺäîí-
ńęîé äčíŕńňčč (867-1057), Ěîńęâŕ 2002, 329.
28 Ibidem.
160 29 Ą. ÎŃŇÐδÎÐŃÜĘČÉ, ibidem, 236.
 The Byzantine-Bulgarian Confrontation in the first Half ...

bined with the right of a hegemony in the world, in which only one
Christian Empire could be.
In August 913 Symeon was again under the walls of Constantinople.
Nikolaos I Mystikos sent pastoral letters to Symeon, which of course had
no impact on the Bulgarian ruler.30 Then the Patriarch threatened him
with a union of Byzantium and Rusí, Pechenegs, Alans and western Turks
(Hungary)31 that was for nothing too, because among those people
Bulgarian emissaries acted successfully.32 The Patriarchís threat with Rusí,
probably, was conditioned by a Rusí-Byzantine union, which was conclud-
ed in the agreement of 911. Nevertheless, the fact that the agreement was
then concluded, except for mentioning participation of Rusí people in
the campaign of the Empire against the Arabs in Crete, could be con-
firmed by the form, in which in the charter of emperors Constantine and
Romanos to Rusí archon 2 gold solidus33 signet was sent, testifying the
high status of the Rusí ruler in the Byzantine hierarchy of nations.
Similarly, in order to fulfill articles in the agreement of 911, G. LITAVRIN
has supposed that at the time interval 920-922 years (during the war
against Symeon) emperors Romanos I Lekapenos and Constantine VII
Porphyrogenitus sent a charter to Prince Igor with a request to help in the
war against Bulgaria.34 Thus the threat of the Patriarch was not entirely
groundless. In addition, in his epistle Nikolaos I Mystikos meant real ìpos-
sible campaign (as a specific campaign) against Bulgaria, where Rusí
forces were exactly from Rusíî but not as part of the Byzantine army,
where Rusí people probably were.35 While this request did not reach its
goal, the Rusí-Byzantine agreement of 911, according to G. LITAVRIN,
remained in force until 941.36
Although Symeon overestimated his forces (he was simply unable to
take by storm the most powerful fortress in the medieval world of that
time), the government capitulated and Nikolaos I Mystikos went to con-
siderable concession for Bulgarians. According to the agreement, one of
the Symeonís daughters might have become the wife of Constantine VII,

30 Ä. ŔÍĂĹËÎÂ, Ěĺňîäű âčçŕíňčéńęîé äčďëîěŕňčč â îňíîřĺíč˙ő ń Áîë-

ăŕðčĺé ďî äŕííűě ďčńĺě ęîíńňŕíňčíîďîëüńęîăî ďŕňðčŕðőŕ Íčęîëŕ˙ Ěčńňčęŕ,
Âîďðîńű čńňîðčč ńëŕâ˙í 1 (1963) 60-68. However, the researcher restricted him-
self to considering the ìreligiousî and ìhistoricalî arguments of Patriarch. The
threats of allied Ruses, Pechenegs, Alans and Hungarians liabilities were not con-
sidered.
31 Nicolai, Constantinopolitani archiepiscopi, Epistolae, ed. J.-P. Migne, PG 111,
1863, 153.
32 Ô. Č. ÓŃĎĹÍŃĘČÉ, ibidem, 338.
33 Constantini Porphyrogeniti De cerim., 690.21-691.1.
34 Ă. Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Âčçŕíňč˙, Áîëăŕðč˙, Äðĺâí˙˙ Ðóńü (IX-íŕ÷ŕëî XII â.), 68.
35 Ibidem, 95
36 Ibidem, 68. 161
 Dmytro Gordiyenko

and Symeon received the title of an emperor, though only Bulgarian.37

The brilliant Symeonís victory won over the Byzantine army in August 20,
917 near river Achelous eliminated a large part of the Byzantine army. At
the same time Symeon took a part of Macedonia and proclaimed himself
unauthorized ìtsar and autocrat of the Bulgarians and Romeisî, while the
Bulgarian church ñ independent of Constantinople.38
However, owing to a palace upheaval in Constantinople the mother
empress Zoe returned again to power. The new government declared the
marriage agreement with Bulgaria invalid and the coronation of Symeon
ineligible.39 The war between Bulgaria and Byzantium in 919 broke out with
renewed force. Byzantium was forced to dare a vigorous counteroffensive.
Romanos Lekapenos, the Armenian peasantís son, led the navy of
Byzantium. However, this campaign was defeated by Symeon. Despite the
defeat Romanos succeeded his position within the Empire. He dismissed
the Empress Zoe from power, and in May 919 proposed marriage of the
juvenile basileos Constantine VII and his daughter Helen. Thus Romanos
received the title basileopater, and in December 17 the same year he was
proclaimed a co-emperor.40 These Romanosís steps ruined completely
the plans of Symeon.
The Byzantine-Bulgarian conflict was of a great importance for the
entire Balkan peninsula. Interests of the two warring countries came into
collision particularly in Serbia. Bulgarian ruler was involved in Serbo-
Croatian cases where he suffered considerable defeats. After these fail-
ures, he planned a new campaign against Byzantium, but soon he died in
May 27, 927. With the death of Symeon the great era of Bulgarian wars
against Byzantium for dominance in the Balkans41 came to the end. The
Symeonís successor Peter I immediately concluded a peace treaty with
Byzantium and in return for it he was recognized as a king of Bulgaria and
married Princess Maria Lekapene, a granddaughter of the emperor
Romanos I and a daughter of his eldest son Christopher.42 Thus the
Bulgarian conflict was resolved and during some time relations with
Bulgaria remained peaceful.43 The position of Byzantium was strength-

37 Ŕ. Ď. ĘŔĆÄŔÍ ñ Ă. Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Î÷ĺðęč čńňîðčč Âčçŕíňčč č Ţćíűő ńëŕâ˙í,

171.
38 Ibidem, 171-172.
39 Ą. ÎŃŇÐδÎÐŃÜĘČÉ, ibidem, 236.
40 Ibidem, 237.
41 Ŕ. Ď. ĘŔĆÄŔÍ ñ Ă. Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Î÷ĺðęč čńňîðčč Âčçŕíňčč č Ţćíűő
ńëŕâ˙í, 173.
42 Ą. ÎŃŇÐδÎÐŃÜĘČÉ, ibidem, 238-239.
43 Ă. Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Âíóňðĺíí˙˙ č âíĺří˙˙ ďîëčňčęŕ Âčçŕíňčč âî âňîðîé
ďîëîâčíĺ Ő-ďĺðâîé ÷ĺňâĺðňč XI â., in: Čńňîðč˙ Âčçŕíňčč.  3-ő ňîěŕő, îňâ. ðĺä.
162 Ń. Ä. Ńęŕçęčí, Ěîńęâŕ 1967, II, 214.
 The Byzantine-Bulgarian Confrontation in the first Half ...

ened in other Slavic countries. So Serbia recognized the supremacy of the

Empire and Bulgaria fell within the scope of the Byzantine culture. From
the beginning of Christianization this process had been growing fast and
in the first half of the 10th century it reached its zenith.
In mid-tenth century Byzantium was forced to join the struggle
against the Egyptian Arabs. Therefore the Empire needed peace in the
West and especially in the North, from which threat arose repeatedly for
Byzantium in the first half of the tenth century. As mentioned, the main
enemies in the North were Bulgaria and Rusí. However, in contrast to
Bulgaria, which was a neighbor and the Empire could control it (it was
difficult to make unexpected attacks), and attacks could have been made
in response, what Tzimiskes and Basil II did successfully, Rusí was far and
was isolated by both natural and political conditions ñ there was the land
of Khazar and Pechenegs between Byzantium and Rusí. Therefore
Constantinople was interested in using the political factor for its personal
benefit, especially using Pechenegs to prevent attacks from Rusí on the
Capital of the Empire, that was also illustrated in the treatise of
Constantine.
In Kyiv, the political situation in Byzantium and the Balkans was care-
fully observed as well. A bright example of this was the campaign in 907,
which was completely unexpected for the Empire. The chronicles of Rusí
presented the campaign as a grand operation of Oleg against
Constantinople. However, the attack of Oleg was not mentioned in
Byzantine sources. Probably at that time some significant military skir-
mishes did not take place. As G. LITAVRIN assumes, Byzantines preferred
the peaceful actions concerning Rusí44 as opposed to armed resistance.
According to the chronicle, at that time Constantinople paid an indem-
nity and agreed to pay an annual tribute to Rusí.45
Since the middle of the 9th century Byzantine economy rose, that was
reflected in foreign trade activities of the Empire. However,
Constantinople considered foreign trade as an important but not a major
component of foreign relations, and it submitted to policy. So, as
A. DOMANOVSKY notes, there were export restrictions to those goods, ìfree
trade of which could raise the priority of diplomacy over commerceî.46
But, besides, direct ìeconomic exchangeî was important for the economy
at that time and so-called ìnon-economic exchangeî was carried out pri-
marily to preserve a certain status, not profit.47
44 Ă. Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Âčçŕíňč˙ č Ðóńü â IX-X ââ., in: Čńňîðč˙ Âčçŕíňčč. Â 3-ő
ňîěŕő, îňâ. ðĺä. Ń. Ä. Ńęŕçęčí, Ěîńęâŕ 1967, II, 230.
45 ĎŃÐË, Ň. 2, 21-22.
46 Ŕ. Ě. ÄÎĚŔÍÎÂŃÜĘČÉ, Äĺðćŕâíčé ęîíňðîëü ňŕ ðĺăóëţâŕíí˙ ňîðăłâëł ó
Âłçŕíňłż IV-IX ńň., Őŕðęłâ 2007, 15.
47 See: The Economic History of Byzantium. From the Seventh through the Fifteenth
Century, ed. A. E. Laiou, Washington 2002, Vol. 1-3, 675. 163
 Dmytro Gordiyenko

The importance of the Black Sea market for the Byzantine Empire is
well known. In the 10th century Rusí had very active trading relations to
Byzantines. This trade, as M. LEVCHENKO noted, was beneficial not only for
Rusí but also for Byzantium.48 The initiative in the development of
Byzantine-Rusí relationships was taken from Kyiv, which gradually con-
firmed its rights in international relations by force.
The practice of political and trade relations of Rusí and Empire were
told in the Byzantine agreements with Rusí 907 and 911. At that time poli-
tics and commerce were closely interrelated in Rusí. Only the central gov-
ernment was able to provide their own merchants favorable trading con-
ditions with other states and to ensure the safety of the merchant cara-
vans. Accordingly, the Rusí-Byzantine trade was carried out exactly by the
great princeís power. The lack of princely letters or stamps deprived buy-
ers of their privileges in the markets of the Empire.49 On the other hand,
as G. LITAVRIN noted, merchants of the states, that had no diplomatic
agreements with Byzantium, had no right to trade both in the Capital and
in other cities of the Empire.50
According to A. DOMANOVSKY, the important aspect of foreign eco-
nomic activity of the Empire was to provide transcontinental trade routes
from India and China without middlemen. These attempts through the
North Caucasus and Northern Black Sea region were successful.51
So, the Byzantine dealings with the northern regions were important
part of the Empireís economic life. Byzantium attentively guarded the
Black Sea from any penetration into its basin. The realization of the
monopoly right to use the navigation on the Black Sea was provided easi-
ly from the south ñ it was difficult to pass the landing stage and maritime
defense of Constantinople without being noticed. However, the situation
was more complex in the North Pontic region, where Rusí very strongly
expressed itself as a maritime state. Consequently, Kherson was very
important for Constantinople.
Thus in the second Symeonís war the agreement between the Empire
and Rusí was very advantageous for Kyiv, and it was very important for the
government of Rusí. There are no grounds in the sources for concluding
that the termination or restriction of the Rusí-Byzantine trade took place
in that period.52 The non-interference of Rusí in the conflict between

48 Ě. Â. ËĹÂ÷ĹÍĘÎ, Î÷ĺðęč ďî čńňîðčč ðóńńęî-âčçŕíňčéńęčő îňíîřĺíčé,

Ěîńęâŕ 1956, 18.
49 Ă. Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Âčçŕíňč˙ č Ðóńü â IX-X ââ., 230.
50 Ă. Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Âčçŕíňč˙, Áîëăŕðč˙, Äðĺâí˙˙ Ðóńü (IX-íŕ÷ŕëî XII â.), 23.
51 Ŕ. Ě. ÄÎĚŔÍÎÂŃÜĘČÉ, Äĺðćŕâíčé ęîíňðîëü ňŕ ðĺăóëţâŕíí˙ ňîðăłâëł ó
Âłçŕíňłż, 10.
52 G. Litavrin assumed that in the time of the Symeonís war against Byzantium
the route ìfrom the Varangians to the Greeksî stopped its existence.
164 [Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Ęóëüňóðíűé ďĺðĺâîðîň â Áîëăŕðčč č Äðĺâí˙˙ Ðóńü, 396].
 The Byzantine-Bulgarian Confrontation in the first Half ...

Bulgaria and Byzantium on anybodyís side can be explained by this fact.

Support of Bulgaria could have cancelled Rusí-Byzantine agreement,
while the an action against Bulgaria on Nikolaos I Mystikosís appeal could
have also paralyzed, on the one hand, economic ties with Bulgaria53
which Rusí54 was interested in; on the other hand ties with Byzantium,
because the part of trade route known as ìfrom the Varangians to the
Greeksî led along the Bulgarian Black Sea coast, along which, according
to Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Rusí had to make 5-6 stops.55 Thus, by
G. LITAVRINís assumption, agreements of Rusí with Greeks were mediated
by simultaneous agreements of Kyiv with Preslav court.56 Symeon also
could not harm the Rusí trading caravans passing to Constantinople; oth-
erwise he could be attacked by the ally of Byzantium ñ Rusí, which
Bulgaria would not have stood then.
However, the situation changed during the reign of the Bulgarian
king Peter I who signed a peace treaty with Byzantium. Therefore, during
the first Igorís raid on Byzantium, Bulgarians reported it to Romanos I
Lekapenos. Afterwards it is not surprising, that in the other campaign in
Constantinople Igor ordered Pechenegs to attack and rob Bulgaria in
order to neutralize its force.57
It is remarkable that the ambassadors of the emperor met Igorís army
on Danube ñ the Bulgarian border, where a peace treaty was concluded
in 944,58 according to which the fruitful stage in relations of pagan Rusí
with Empire began.59 Thus since 927 the Byzantium was at peace with
Bulgaria, the Rusí-Byzantine agreement of 944 contributed both the Rusí-

53 At that time they were quite active in the region of the Lower Danube ñ from
the Danubeís orifice to Dniester. [See, for example: Ĺ. ĚČŐŔÉËÎÂ, Ęčĺâńęŕ
Ðóńč˙ č Áúëăŕðč˙ ďðĺç Ő â., 65; Â. Á. ĎĹÐŐŔÂĘÎ, Äðĺâíĺðóńńęčĺ ęóďöű â
Ďîäóíŕâüĺ (ďî ŕðőĺîëîăč÷ĺńęčě äŕííűě), in: Âîńňî÷íŕ˙ Ĺâðîďŕ â čńňîðč÷ĺńęîé
ðĺňðîńďĺęňčâĺ (Ę 80-ëĺňčţ Â. Ň. Ďŕřóňî), Ěîńęâŕ 1999, 209]. The name of the
local Eastern Bavarian unit of money and weight scoti, which comes from the Rusí
merchants vocabulary, also points out the active trade affairs of Rusí in the
Danube region. [Ŕ. Â. ÍŔÇŔÐĹÍĘÎ, ibidem, 34].
54 According to archeological data, activities of merchants from the region of
Lower Danube are not fixed in Kyiv, but traces of Rusí merchants can be easily
traced in that region [Â. Á. ĎĹÐŐŔÂĘÎ, Äðĺâíĺðóńńęčĺ ęóďöű â Ďîäóíŕâüĺ (ďî
ŕðőĺîëîăč÷ĺńęčě äŕííűě), 219].
55 Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De administrando imperio, ed. Gy. Moravcsik,
Budapest 1949, 62, 97-104; see too: Ă. Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Äðĺâí˙˙ Ðóńü. Áîëăŕðč˙ č
Âčçŕíňč˙ â IX-X ââ., 72.
56 Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Ęóëüňóðíűé ďĺðĺâîðîň â Áîëăŕðčč č Äðĺâí˙˙ Ðóńü, 395, 396;
Ă. Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Äðĺâí˙˙ Ðóńü. Áîëăŕðč˙ č Âčçŕíňč˙ â IX-X ââ., 71-74.
57 See: Â. Ä. ÍČĘÎËŔĹÂ, ibidem, 50-55; Ă. Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Âčçŕíňč˙, Áîëăŕðč˙,
Äðĺâí˙˙ Ðóńü (IX-íŕ÷ŕëî XII â.), 77.
58 ĎŃÐË., Ň. 2, 35.
59 Ă. Ă. ËČŇŔÂÐČÍ, Âčçŕíňč˙, Áîëăŕðč˙, Äðĺâí˙˙ Ðóńü (IX-íŕ÷ŕëî XII â.), 98. 165
 Dmytro Gordiyenko

Bulgarian economic and political ties.60 We can assume that exactly from
that time a penetration of Christianity in Slavic rite Rusí began by
Bulgarian missionaries.61
So, the main factor in the interaction of Rusí and Bulgaria in the
mentioned period was the Byzantine politics of both governments.
However, seeking to strengthen its position in the region of the Northern
Black Sea region Rusí offended the interests of Bulgaria. Therefore the
preservation of Byzantine positions in the Balkans was important for Kyiv.
Rusí was forced to maintain friendly relations with Bulgaria, because with-
out ìconsentî of Bulgarians, whose territory had been gone, Rusí could
not make an unexpected attack on Constantinople. That is why Igor did
not go alone with punitive action against Bulgaria, and leveled Pechenegs.
The unstable situation inside the country after the agreement signed in
927, which the part of the Bulgarian nobility did not recognize, forced
Bulgarians to regulate relations with Rusí. Especially after rebellions in
Bulgaria in 928 and 93062 Peter was forced to consider the opposition
party. Moreover, these rebellions were secretly supported by Byzantium.
After the rebellion of Peterís younger brother Ivan, the latter was offi-
cially condemned and Byzantines first brought him to Constantinople,
then to the thema Armeniakoi, where he got married with a noble
Byzantine girl.63 That is why Hungary by force received the right of unim-
peded passage through the territory of Bulgaria in a campaign to
Byzantium, which was a direct violation of the peace treaty of 927.
Bulgaria was not able to resist Rusí, making the Bulgarian government
conduct more flexible policy in the east.
Instead, for Empire Rusí, it quickly consolidated and accumulated its
force and could become a guarantor of political stability in the north, as
opposed to an unstable alliance with the nomads Pechenegs. The spread
of Christianity among the Rusí population gave the Empire hope for
spreading their political and ideological (religious) influence on the
young state. In Bulgaria with the signing of a peace treaty in 927 process
of infiltration and assimilation of Byzantine cultural values went faster,
and at that time, by mediation of the Bulgarian, probably, the Byzantine
influence began to penetrate quickly to the territory of Kyiv Rusí.

60 G. Litavrin assumed that Kyiv concluded an agreement with Peter without the
existence of which was unthinkable the Olíga trip to Constantinople [Ă. Ă. ËČ-
ŇŔÂÐČÍ, Äðĺâí˙˙ Ðóńü. Áîëăŕðč˙ č Âčçŕíňč˙ â IX-X ââ., 72-74].
61 See: Ŕ. Á. ĂÎËÎÂĘÎ, Őðčńňčŕíčçŕöč˙ âîńňî÷íîńëŕâ˙íńęîăî îáůĺńňâŕ č
âíĺří˙˙ ďîëčňčęŕ Äðĺâíĺé Ðóńč â IX ďĺðâîé ňðĺňč XIII âĺęŕ, Âîďðîńű čńňîðčč
9 (1988) 59-71.
62 Î. Â. ČÂŔÍÎÂŔ, Âîńńňŕíčĺ 930 ă. â Áîëăŕðčč č Áîëăŕðî-Âčçŕíňčéńęčĺ
îňíîřĺíč˙, in: Ńëŕâ˙íĺ č čő ńîńĺäč. Ěĺćäóíŕðîäíűĺ îňíîřĺíč˙ â ýďîőó
ôĺîäŕëčçěŕ, Âűď. 1, Ěîńęâŕ 1989, 34.
166 63 Ibidem, 38.