Running head: HEURISTIC DECISION MAKING 1

Heuristic Decision Making Across Adulthood

Morgan K. Taylor1,2, Elizabeth J. Marsh1,2, & Gregory R. Samanez-Larkin1,2

Author Note
1
Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, 417 Chapel Drive, Duke

University, Durham, NC 27708, USA

2
Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, 308 Research Drive, LSRC

Building, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA

Correspondence should be addressed to Morgan K. Taylor, Department of Psychology &

Neuroscience, 417 Chapel Drive, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA.

E-mail: morgan.k.taylor@duke.edu

This work was previously presented at the 2022 Cognitive Aging Conference in Atlanta,

Georgia. De-identified data are available at: https://osf.io/pkhnd

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Abstract

In general, research on aging and decision making has grown in recent years. Yet, little

work has investigated how reliance on classic heuristics may differ across adulthood. For

example, younger adults rely on the availability of information from memory when judging the

relative frequency of plane crashes versus car accidents, but it is unclear if older adults are

similarly reliant on this heuristic. In the current study, participants aged 20 to 90 years old made

judgments that could be answered by relying on five different heuristics: anchoring, availability,

recognition, representativeness, and sunk cost bias. We found no evidence of age-related

differences in the use of the classic heuristics — younger and older adults employed anchoring,

availability, recognition, and representativeness to equal degrees in order to make decisions.

However, replicating past work, we found age-related differences in the sunk cost bias — older

adults were more likely to avoid this fallacy compared to younger adults. We explain these

different patterns by drawing on the distinctive roles stored knowledge and personal experience

likely play across heuristics.

Keywords: heuristics, decision making, knowledge, adulthood, lifespan

Public Significance Statement

People often rely on shortcuts when making decisions. For example, they anchor on the

asking price of a house when making an offer and overestimate the frequency of high profile

events like plane crashes. The current study demonstrates that older adults use these shortcuts at

a similar rate as younger adults. This work highlights that certain decision-making strategies are

preserved with age and is consistent with findings that semantic knowledge remains intact

throughout older adulthood.

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Heuristic Decision Making Across Adulthood

Younger and older adults alike make many decisions on a daily basis. Some decisions

(e.g., what to eat for breakfast, what to wear to work) are simple and require minimal effort,

while others (e.g., where to invest your money, which medication to take) are more complex and

tap into numerous cognitive resources. In the face of the aging population (Cire, 2016),

researchers have begun to more closely examine how older adults make decisions, especially as

they relate to the preservation or decline of various cognitive resources across adulthood (e.g.,

Finucane et al., 2002; Mata et al., 2015; Strough et al., 2011a; Strough et al., 2020). Much of this

work has focused on older adults’ use of simpler strategies or heuristic processing in general, but

less published work has examined older adults’ usage of classic heuristics (e.g., anchoring,

availability), which younger adults often rely on to make decisions. Here, we investigate whether

there are age-related differences in the use of four classic heuristics: anchoring, availability,

recognition, and representativeness.

How can the existing literature on aging and decision making inform whether there are

adult age differences in classic heuristic use? In general, older adults’ use of simpler decision

strategies is well documented. In a meta-analysis, Mata and Nunes (2010) found that compared

to younger adults, older adults search for less information before making decisions. Older adults

also favor smaller sets of options (Reed et al., 2008; Reed et al., 2013) and prefer to consider one

important attribute (take-the-best) instead of several (weighted additive rule) when choosing

between alternatives (Mata et al., 2007). These instances all reflect older adults’ tendency to

engage in satisficing behavior (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2016); they choose the option that is “good

enough” for their purposes and not necessarily “the best” with respect to maximizing.
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Researchers have proposed several explanations for why older adults rely on simpler

strategies when making decisions. First, consistent with the theory of bounded rationality

(Simon, 1990), older adults’ declining fluid intelligence may leave them with fewer cognitive

resources, making less-demanding strategies appealing (Finucane et al., 2005). Supporting this

idea, one study found that lower fluid cognitive ability mediated older adults’ poorer

performance on a battery of decision making tasks (Adult Decision Making Competence (A-

DMC); Bruine de Bruin et al., 2012). Subsequent studies have documented associations between

specific fluid and crystalized cognitive abilities and age-related differences in decision making

(for a review, see Strough et al., 2020). Second, most laboratory decision making tasks are

hypothetical and the choices made are often not meaningful outside of the lab; older adults may

not be motivated to expend effort on these tasks because they are less relevant to their personal

goals (Hess et al., 2013). On a more positive note, older adults have more knowledge and life

experience, allowing them to adaptively adjust their decision making strategies based on the

context or environment (Queen et al., 2012; Mata et al., 2007).

Here, we make a distinction between using simplified strategies due to reductions in

cognitive resources and using specific heuristics because they are cognitively efficient. Broadly,

a heuristic is defined as “a strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal of making

decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex methods” (Gigerenzer &

Gaissmaier, 2011, p. 454). Classic work has highlighted many common heuristics and detailed

how they may lead to biased and systematic errors (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Yet, more

recent work contends that despite their occasional faults, heuristics can lead to more accurate

inferences under uncertainty than more complicated strategies (Neth & Gigerenzer, 2015).

Heuristics have developed and are continually used because they are simple, quick, and often
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yield accurate answers. Some research has focused on the development of such heuristics,

examining differences in heuristic use in children and adolescents as compared to college-aged

adults (e.g., Jacobs & Potenza, 1991; Jetter & Walker, 2020; Guerten et al., 2015). In contrast,

there is a dearth of research on older adults’ use of many of the classic heuristics outlined by

Tversky and Kahneman (1974), even though adulthood provides many opportunities for

individuals to learn that heuristics offer efficient ways to make good choices. As such, we predict

that many common heuristics are implemented equally across the adult lifespan.

In this study, we examined the heuristics of anchoring, availability, recognition, and

representativeness. We selected these heuristics because they are well known in the literature,

remain highly cited (e.g., in 2021 there were 1,142 publications that cited Tversky & Kahneman,

1974), and have few to no empirical studies conducted with older adults. In the anchoring

heuristic, people make estimates by starting from an initial value and adjusting to the final

answer. Different starting points garner different estimates, which are biased toward the initial

values (e.g., participants’ estimates of the percentage of African countries in the United Nations

(25% vs. 45%) differed based on the initial value they were given (10% vs. 65%); Tversky &

Kahneman, 1974). Availability is used when the frequency or probability of an event is judged

by the ease with which an example comes to mind (e.g., incorrectly estimating there are more R

words in the English language because it is easier to recall words beginning with the letter R than

words with R as their third letter; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In recognition, if one of two

alternatives is recognized and the other is not, then one can infer that the recognized alternative

has the higher value with respect to the criterion (e.g., incorrectly estimating that Minneapolis,

MN has a higher population than Mesa, AZ because Minneapolis is the more familiar city;

Pachur et al., 2009). Finally, representativeness involves evaluating the probability that
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something is true based on the degree to which one thing resembles another (e.g., assuming it is

more likely that Steve, a shy, withdrawn man with a passion for detail, is a librarian instead of a

salesman or physician; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).

For comparison purposes, we also examined the sunk cost fallacy, a bias where there are

known adult age differences. People are said to be susceptible to the sunk cost fallacy when they

continue a behavior or action because of their previously invested resources (i.e., time, money,

effort), even if the behavior or action is no longer rewarding (e.g., continuing to watch a movie

you dislike because you already paid for the ticket; Arkes & Blumer, 1985). Studies have shown

that older adults, perhaps due to their decreased time horizons, greater life experience, or

improved emotion regulation, are less susceptible to the sunk cost fallacy than younger adults

(e.g., Strough et al., 2008; Strough et al., 2014; Bruine de Bruin, 2014).

To our knowledge, there is only one study on adult age difference in the availability

heuristic (Maley, 2000), two studies on adult age differences in the recognition heuristic (Pachur

et al., 2009), and no existing studies on adult age differences in either the anchoring heuristic or

representativeness heuristic. None of these studies found age differences between younger and

older adults, but their sample sizes were small (n = 18 per age group in Maley, 2000; an average

of 50 per age group in Pachur et al., 2009). Of course, there may be many unpublished studies

that examine adult age differences in heuristics; studies showing null effects are much more

likely to be relegated to the file drawer. Yet, null effects of aging are not uninteresting, as it is

important to understand what abilities are spared with age (Lakens et al., 2020; Isaacowitz,

2020). Null results in this case would suggest that heuristic use is preserved as one gets older.

Such results would be consistent with findings that crystallized intelligence, or the accumulated

knowledge one gains about the world through socialization, experience, and education, increases
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and stabilizes across the lifespan (Craik & Bialystok, 2006) and contributes to the preservation

and/or improvement in decision making with age (Samanez-Larkin & Knutson, 2015). However,

more research is needed to corroborate this hypothesis.

In the present study, a sample of over 300 participants aged 20 to 90 completed a series

of tasks to clarify potential similarities or differences in heuristic use across adulthood. Heuristic

use is automatic and widespread among younger adults—even among experts (e.g., Brannon &

Carson, 2003; Englich et al., 2006)—leading us to predict that older adults should be at least as

likely as younger adults to rely on heuristics. Given the few existing studies that found null age

effects and the lack of specific theoretical predictions for increased reliance with age, we

hypothesized that we would not find any age differences across adulthood in the use of

anchoring, availability, recognition, and representativeness. To preview, we found support for

our hypothesis – we found no evidence for adult age differences in the use of these classic

heuristics. In contrast (and consistent with previous literature), we found age differences in the

sunk cost fallacy; younger adults were more susceptible to this bias than older adults.

Method

Transparency and Openness. We report how we determined our sample size and

describe all manipulations and measures in the study. The de-identified data, materials, and

analytic code are available on OSF (see Author’s Note). Data were analyzed using JASP, version

0.16.2 (JASP Team, 2022). This study’s design and analyses were not pre-registered.

Participants. Three hundred and eight participants (Mage = 54.20, SD = 18.99, range =

20-90, 166 female, 42.8% White, 29.2% African American, 28% Hispanic/Latinx) were

recruited through Qualtrics Panels. We under sampled White participants and over sampled
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African American and Hispanic/Latinx participants in order to address historical exclusions of

the latter populations in cognitive aging research and increase the generalizability of our

findings. All participants were included in the analysis. Our sample size was calculated in

G*Power to be able to identify small main effects of age (f2 = .03) with 0.85 power using an α of

.05. This effect size was based on previous studies that found age-related differences in the sunk

cost bias (e.g., Bruine de Bruin et al., 2014; Strough et al., 2008; Strough et al., 2016). This study

was approved by the Duke University Health System Institutional Review Board.

Table 1

Participant demographics

Ages 20-39 Ages 40-59 Ages 60-79 Age 80-90

Number of 87 88 87 46
participants

Average Age (SD) 31.02 (5.21) 48.83 (5.95) 67.55 (4.64) 83.02 (2.98)

Number 57 | 30 58 | 30 47 | 40 4 | 42
female | male

% White | African 35% | 32% | 33% 34% | 32% | 34% 35% | 33% | 32% 91% | 7% | 2%
American | Latinx

Average Years of 14.55 (2.02) 14.25 (1.87) 14.69 (1.90) 15.39 (2.79)
Education (SD)

Note. For simplicity, age is grouped into four categories above, but is treated as continuous in

analysis. Only the oldest age group (80-90) significantly differs from the others in gender,

ethnicity, and years of education; these demographics are equivalent in all other age groups.
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Materials. Three to six scenarios demonstrating each heuristic were adapted from

various sources (see Appendix). As these heuristics are prompted in different ways across the

literature, we included three instances of anchoring, availability, representativeness, and sunk

cost fallacy in order to capture a fuller range of heuristic responding. We included six instances

of recognition to allow for three examples each of the disease prevalence and city population

inference tasks (Pachur et al., 2009).

Anchoring Heuristic. We used scenarios listed in Furnham and Boo (2011): height of the

tallest redwood tree, length of the Mississippi River, and gestation period of an African elephant.

Participants first decided whether the height, length, or gestation period were greater than or less

than the given anchor and then estimated the exact measure.

Availability Heuristic. Adapted from Tversky and Kahneman (1973), we used a

shortened version of the “famous names problem” that was implemented in Braga et al. (2015).

Sixteen names were given: five were famous men and one was a famous woman (e.g., David

Beckham, Britney Spears). The other ten names were taken from the 2011 census list of the most

frequent U.S. names (e.g., Richard Miller, Sarah Wilson). After the names were listed in random

order one by one, participants decided whether more men or women’s names were presented

(note: an equal number of men’s and women’s names were shown). We also used the letter

likelihood scenario from Tversky and Kahneman (1974) for the letters R and K. Participants

decided whether it was more likely that a randomly sampled English word started with the target

letter or had the target letter as its third letter (the correct answer is the third letter, but it is easier

to recall words that begin with the target letter).

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Recognition Heuristic. We adapted the disease prevalence and city population inference

tasks used in Pachur et al. (2009). Participants saw two options and chose the one they believed

has higher prevalence in the U.S. (e.g., shigellosis vs. E. coli) or has the higher population (e.g.,

Dublin vs. Minsk), respectively. Choice of the more familiar option (i.e., E. coli or Dublin)

would indicate use of the recognition heuristic.

Representativeness Heuristic. We used the Linda problem from Tversky and Kahneman

(1983), the lawyer vs. engineer base rate problem from Kahneman and Tversky (1973), and the

marble problem from Kahneman and Tversky (1972). In the Linda problem, participants were

given a description of Linda (e.g., bright, outspoken 31-year-old woman concerned with issues

of social justice) and asked to indicate whether it is more probable that Linda is 1) a bank teller

or 2) a bank teller that is active in the feminist movement. In the lawyer vs. engineer problem,

participants were told that 30 engineers and 70 lawyers were interviewed by psychologists. They

then received one randomly chosen description of one of the interviewees (e.g., Jack has no

political interests and enjoys carpentry and math puzzles) and were asked to predict the

probability (0-100%) that the man is an engineer. In the marble problem, five children are

playing a game and 20 marbles are distributed randomly among them. Participants selected

which of two distributions (Distribution A: 4,4,5,4,3; Distribution B: 4,4,4,4,4) was more likely

to occur after several rounds of the game. In all scenarios, reliance on the representativeness

heuristic means choosing the option that matches one’s expectations (i.e., knowledge about the

characteristics of lawyers vs. engineers) rather than focusing on the probabilities.

Sunk Cost Fallacy. We used three scenarios adapted from Bruine de Bruin et al. (2014)

and Strough et al. (2014) and participants decided on a scale from 1 (most likely to stick with

plans) to 6 (most likely to cancel plans) how willing they were to forego their plans. For
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example, participants read a scenario about losing interest in a project and then rated their

likelihood to continue or stop working it.

Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants completed demographic

information about their age, sex, education level, and ethnicity. They then completed three

blocks of decision scenarios. Each block contained two recognition scenarios and one scenario

tapping each of the following heuristics: sunk cost bias, availability, representativeness, and

anchoring. Presentation of each heuristic within a block was randomized and high versus low

anchors were counterbalanced across participants. Finally, participants were asked seven open-

ended response questions, including whether they looked up the answers to any questions and

whether they had prior exposure to the scenarios used in the study. Then, for each of the five

heuristics, participants were asked to describe what strategy they used to make their decision.

Finally, participants were compensated for their participation directly through Qualtrics.

Results

Anchoring. First, we computed independent samples t-tests on participants’ estimates to

confirm that the items used in the study produced anchoring effects. Anchoring occurred when

participants estimated the height of the tallest redwood tree and the length of the Mississippi

River. The redwood tree was estimated as shorter (M = 128, SD = 126) when participants were

given a low anchor (65 feet) versus a high anchor (500 feet; M = 630, SD = 972); t(306) = -6.17,

p < .001, d = -.71. Similarly, the Mississippi River was estimated as shorter when participants

were given a low anchor of 200 miles (M = 939, SD = 1,729) versus a high anchor of 20,000

miles (M = 15,980, SD = 35,670); t(306) = -5.29, p < .001, d = -.60. Participants did not show an

anchoring effect when estimating the gestation period of an African elephant. Estimates were
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similar regardless of whether participants were given a low anchor (12 months; M = 23.7, SD =

45.1) or high anchor (32 months; M = 25.2, SD = 12.1); t(306) = -.388, p = .698, d = -.044.

Next, we put participants’ estimates on the same scale by calculating the absolute

proportional difference from the anchor. That is, we computed the absolute difference between

the estimate and the anchor and divided it by the anchor. For completeness, we report the age

effect results for the two items that showed anchoring and the one that did not separately below.

Height of tallest redwood tree and length of Mississippi River. To evaluate the effect of

age on the use of anchoring, we computed a repeated-measures ANCOVA, with item (redwood

height, Mississippi River length) as a within-subject factor and age (continuous) as a between-

subject factor. The main effect of age was non-significant, F(1, 305) = .034, p = .854, as was the

age by item interaction, F(1, 305) = .000002, p = .999, ηp2 < .001. In other words, the degree of

difference between estimates and their anchors did not vary based on age. The age effect

remained non-significant after controlling for sex, ethnicity, and education, F(1, 301) = .297, p =

.586.

Gestation period of an African elephant. Evaluating age effects for a single item

eliminated the need for a categorical item factor, so we computed a simple linear regression.

There was a non-significant main effect of age, b = –.012, 95% CI = [–.027, .004], t = –1.48, p =

.140, which remained non-significant after controlling for sex, ethnicity, and education, b = –

.008, 95% CI = [–.025, .009], t = –.951, p = .342. See Figure 1 for the age effects of each

anchoring item separately.

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Redwood Tree Mississippi River African Elephant

(feet) (miles) (months)
100
r = .019 r = .006 30 r = –.084
difference from anchor
Absolute proportional

15 75
20
10 50

10
5 25

0 0 0
20 40 60 80 20 40 60 80 20 40 60 80
Age Age Age

5 5 5
difference from anchor
Absolute proportional

r = .040 r = .058 r = .024

4 4 4

3 3 3

2 2 2

1 1 1

0 0 0
20 40 60 80 20 40 60 80 20 40 60 80
Age Age Age

Figure 1. The absolute proportional difference between participants’ estimates and the

anchors they were given for height of the tallest redwood tree (left), length of the Mississippi

River (middle), and gestation period of an African elephant (right) did not differ across age

groups. The top row includes all data points. The bottom row shows that the pattern of results is

unchanged even after matching the ranges for absolute proportional difference by removing

extreme values. In all plots, zero indicates estimates that were equal to the anchors provided.

Plots depict simple regression lines with 95% confidence intervals (gray bands) and correlations

(r) between age and anchoring use; analyses controlling for covariates are reported in the text.
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Availability. A score of 1 was assigned to responses that followed the availability

heuristic (i.e., selected that more men’s names were presented in the list, selected first letter in a

word). A score of 0 was assigned to responses that did not follow this heuristic. On average,

participants chose the more available option over half of the time (M = 59%, SD = 35%). To

evaluate the effect of age on the use of availability, we computed a repeated-measures

ANCOVA, with item as a within-subject factor and age as a continuous between-subject factor.

We found a small item by age interaction, F(2, 612) = 3.17, p = .043, ηp2 = .01, driven by a

positive relationship between age and heuristic use in the R letter likelihood scenario, r(306) =

.12, p = .036. However, this interaction was not robust and did not remain significant after

controlling for sex, ethnicity, and education, F(2, 604) = 1.18, p = .309, ηp2 = .004. The main

effect of age was non-significant, F(1, 306) = .389, p = .533 and remained non-significant after

controlling for sex, ethnicity, and education, F(1, 302) = .0006, p = .981.

Recognition. A score of 1 was assigned to responses that followed the recognition

heuristic (e.g., selected Dublin—the more familiar option— even though Minsk has the higher

population). A score of 0 was assigned to responses that did not follow this heuristic. On

average, participants chose the more familiar option most of the time (M = 77%, SD = 19%). To

evaluate the effect of age on the use of recognition, we computed a repeated-measures

ANCOVA, with item as a within-subject factor and age as a continuous between-subject factor.

The main effect of age was non-significant, F(1, 306) = .434, p = .511, and there was no item-

level interaction with age, F(1, 306) = .018, p = .894, ηp2 < .001. The age effect remained non-

significant after controlling for sex, ethnicity, and education, F(1, 302) = .013, p = .909.

Representativeness. The representativeness scenarios used different scales, in that the

Linda and marble problems require a binary choice and the lawyer vs. engineering problem
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involves generating a percentage. To put all responses on the same scale, answers of 40% and

above in the lawyer vs. engineer problem were counted as heuristic responses. The correct

percentage is 30% as there were 30 engineers in the sample. Technically, a response of 31% or

higher suggests heuristic responding, but we chose 40% to select a value that is meaningfully

different from 30%. Using a stricter cutoff (i.e., 35%) did not change the results. Across tasks,

representative responses (i.e., selecting that Linda is a bank teller and feminist, selecting Marble

Distribution A) were scored as 1 and non-representative responses were scored as 0. On average,

participants chose the more representative option most of the time (M = 76%, SD = 24%). To

evaluate the effect of age on the use of representativeness, we computed a repeated-measures

ANCOVA, with item as a within-subject factor and age as a continuous between-subject factor.

The main effect of age was non-significant, F(1, 306) = .545, p = .461, and there was no item-

level interaction with age, F(2, 612) = 2.28, p = .103, ηp2 = .007. The age effect remained non-

significant after controlling for sex, ethnicity, and education, F(1, 302) = .039, p = .843.
Use of Representativeness

1.00 1.00 1.00

Use of Recognition
Use of Availability

0.75 0.75 0.75

0.50 0.50 0.50

0.25 r = –.038 0.25 r = –.038 0.25 r = .042

0.00 0.00 0.00

20 40 60 80 20 40 60 80 20 40 60 80
Age Age Age

Figure 2. Participants’ average use of the availability heuristic (left), recognition

heuristic (middle), and representativeness heuristic (right) across different scenarios did not
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differ across age groups. Plots depict simple regression lines with 95% confidence intervals (gray

bands) and correlations (r) between age and heuristic use; analyses controlling for covariates are

reported in the text.

Bayesian Analyses of Age Differences in Anchoring, Availability, Recognition, and

Representativeness. To assess the relative evidence in support of the null or alternative

hypotheses, we conducted simple Bayesian linear regressions. Age was included as a predictor of

anchoring, availability, recognition, and representativeness heuristic use. Consistent with our

frequentist results, we found moderate evidence in favor of the null hypothesis (BF01 > 6),

indicating that the data is at least six times more representative of the null hypothesis (there are

no age-related differences in heuristic use) versus the alternate hypothesis (there are age-related

differences in heuristic use). See Supplemental Table 2 for full results.

Sunk Cost Fallacy. Across scenarios, participants were slightly likely to cancel plans

(3.73 on a scale of 1 to 6; SD = 1.16). To evaluate the effect of age on the use of the sunk cost

fallacy, we computed a repeated-measures ANCOVA, with item as a within-subject factor and

age as a continuous between-subject factor. There was no item-level interaction with age, F(2,

612) = 1.44, p = .238, ηp2 = .005. However, there was a significant main effect of age, F(1, 306)

= 4.55, p = .034. Simple linear regression confirmed that age significantly predicted avoidance of

the sunk cost fallacy – as age increased, so did the likelihood that participants would forego their

plans, b = .007, 95% CI = [.0006, .014], SE = .003, t = 2.13, p = .034. The age effect was not

significant after controlling for sex, ethnicity, and education, b = .007, 95% CI = [–.0005, .014],

SE = .004, t = 1.84, p = .067. However, the point estimate was identical and the confidence

interval was highly overlapping with the simple age effect. This effect is similar in size to what
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has been reported in previous studies that found age-related differences in the sunk cost bias

(Bruine de Bruin et al., 2014; Strough et al., 2016). Simple Bayesian linear regression found

evidence in favor of the alternate hypothesis (BF10 > 1), indicating that the data is relatively more

representative of the alternate hypothesis (there are age-related differences in the sunk cost bias)

versus the null hypothesis (there are no age-related differences in the sunk cost bias). See

Supplemental Table 3 for full results.

6
Likelihood to cancel plans

r = .12

20 40 60 80
Age

Figure 3. Age-related differences in participants’ likelihood to cancel plans on a scale of

1 (most likely to stick with plans) to 6 (most likely to cancel plans). Plot depicts simple

regression line with 95% confidence interval (gray band) and correlation (r) between age and

avoidance of the sunk cost fallacy; analyses controlling for covariates are reported in the text.
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General Discussion

In this study, we found that classic heuristic use was common across adults of all ages.

Age did not significantly impact 1) how far participants’ estimates were from the anchors they

were given (anchoring heuristic), 2) how often participants chose the more accessible option of a

pair (availability heuristic), 3) how often participants chose the more familiar option of a pair

(recognition heuristic), and 4) how often participants chose the option that most closely

resembled a target description (representativeness heuristic). However, there were age-related

differences in the sunk cost bias. Older adults were more likely to avoid this fallacy and chose to

forego their plans more often than younger adults.

Although the age difference in the sunk cost fallacy is small, it is consistent with others in

the literature. One possible explanation for age-related differences in this heuristic and not the

others may be related to learning that occurs across the lifespan. The longer one lives, the more

opportunities one has to learn that persistence is not always worthwhile. In fact, several studies

have suggested that age-related improvements in the sunk cost bias are related to affect and

experience (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2014; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Bruine de Bruin et al.,

2012). And while self-reports should be taken with caution, 78% of participants reported that

they relied on life experiences while rating their likelihood to cancel plans (see Supplemental

Table 1). These findings are in line with research that suggests that age-related differences in

certain decision making tasks may be related to age-related differences in fluid and crystalized

cognitive abilities. Similar to the sunk cost fallacy, some tasks (e.g., making internally consistent

probabilistic judgments of getting into a car accident vs. driving accident free) rely more on

crystallized capabilities that improve with age, while other tasks (e.g., applying designated

decision strategies when choosing between multiple products) rely more on fluid capabilities that
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decrease with age (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2012; Li et al., 2013; Del Missier et al., 2013; Strough

et al., 2011a). Prior researchers have speculated about the role of age-related differences in

specific fluid and crystalized abilities (Agarwal et al., 2009) or cognitive and affective abilities

(Peters et al., 2007) in decision making across adulthood, yet relatively few studies (e.g., Li et

al., 2013; Li et al., 2015) have directly measured multiple domains of cognitive (fluid and

crystalized) or affective abilities across adulthood to confirm that they specifically account for

age-related variance in choice (see review in Strough et al., 2020).

In contrast to life experience reducing susceptibility to the sunk cost fallacy, experience

might preserve use of the classic heuristics because they often lead to the correct answer

(Gigerenzer & Gaissmeier, 2011). Heuristics are shortcuts that reflect a common state of the

world: in most cases, more populous cities are mentioned in the news, learned about in schools,

and are common travel destinations. Thus, using the cue of familiarity would typically lead one

to choose the correct answer. Even experts use these heuristics, although sometimes to a lesser

degree. One review found that auditors tended to respond heuristically (e.g., use anchors, neglect

base rates) in neutral tasks, but this behavior was mitigated in familiar and job-related tasks

(Smith & Kida, 1991). Yet, some experts in other domains (e.g., real estate agents, legal

professionals, nurses) are still susceptible to heuristic responding even when making decisions in

their area of expertise (Northcraft & Neale, 1987; Englich et al., 2006; Brannon & Carson,

2003). Related work in finance reveals that the use of heuristic-like rules of thumb may increase

with age as investors gain more experience (Korniotis & Kumar, 2011). Together these studies

highlight the pervasive nature of heuristic use even after significant domain-specific experience.

Some views contend that we use heuristics to reduce effort, especially in the face of

capacity limitations (e.g., limited time, motivation; Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). With even
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HEURISTIC DECISION MAKING

fewer cognitive resources, older adults might be expected to be more likely to use heuristics.

However, many of the cognitive mechanisms proposed to underlie these heuristics do not show

declines with age. More specifically, accrued knowledge about the world plays a role in all of the

heuristics that did not show age effects. Availability effects are linked to the ease with which

information is retrieved from memory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). To the extent that the task

is asking people to retrieve from semantic memory, we would not expect age-related differences.

Older adults generate category examples at the same rate as younger adults (Light & Albertson,

1989), so we would expect them to be similarly able to generate words starting with K or with K

as its third letter. The recognition heuristic also draws on stored knowledge. People rely on a

global sense of familiarity as a way of choosing their answer (Pachur & Hertwig, 2006). The

relative familiarity of two diseases or cities should not differ as a function of age given the

obscurity of the unfamiliar option (Pachur et al., 2009). Finally, the representativeness heuristic

draws on well-learned schemas and depends on the degree of similarity between the target

person/event/sample and the population from which it is drawn (Galavotti et al., 2021).

Schematic knowledge is preserved in healthy aging and is believed to be a major aid to memory

when episodic details are forgotten (Siegel et al., 2020). Informally, participants reported

drawing on their knowledge to solve all of these decision scenarios, especially the recognition

(65%) and representativeness heuristic scenarios (66%) (see Supplemental Table 1).

In contrast, it is less clear what role knowledge plays in the anchoring heuristic. Plausible

anchors are more likely to sway decisions (Sugden et al., 2013), but specific expertise in a

domain may reduce reliance on anchors altogether (Smith et al., 2013). In the present case, we do

not have any reason to believe there are age-related differences in specific knowledge of the
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HEURISTIC DECISION MAKING

height and length of the tallest redwood tree or Mississippi River, respectively, thus it is not

surprising that we did not find age-related differences in anchoring.

These results are unlikely to be attributable to the online nature of the study. Paralleling

earlier papers showing similar results across laboratory and Amazon Mechanical Turk samples

(see Buhrmester et al., 2018 for review), research is now emerging showing similar adult age

effects across in-person and online samples from various data collection platforms (e.g., Greene

& Naveh-Benjamin, 2022; Seaman et al., 2021). Furthermore, we found an age difference in the

sunk cost fallacy using our online sample, replicating an effect observed numerous times in the

laboratory (Strough et al., 2008; Strough et al., 2011b). More generally, older adults have been

the fastest growing users of the internet for over a decade, with the gap between younger and

older adults’ smartphone, tablet, and internet usage steadily decreasing over time (Faverio,

2022). Thus, aging samples in online studies are likely becoming more representative of the

general aging population.

Future studies should address some of our limitations. While we attempted to recruit a

diverse set of participants, this sample was not nationally representative, especially in the oldest-

old group of 80-90 year olds, so our findings may differ when including people from other ethnic

and educational backgrounds (though we note we have no specific predictions about how

heuristic use might vary as a function of these factors). Additionally, Qualtrics Panels was unable

to provide us with the number of invited individuals who did not participate, thus underlying

differences may exist between those who participated and those who did not. This study was also

cross-sectional instead of longitudinal, so age differences may reflect cohort differences instead

of changes with age. However, it is not clear exactly what cohort difference might be predicted

to explain these effects. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the heuristic tasks used
 22
HEURISTIC DECISION MAKING

hypothetical scenarios; it is possible that participants’ responses to these scenarios do not reflect

their real-world decision making. This concern is especially valid for older adults; in other

domains (e.g., prospective memory), it has been shown that older adults behave differently in

laboratory studies than they would in everyday life (e.g., Rendell & Thomson, 1999; Henry et

al., 2004).

Moving forward, an interesting future direction for this research would be to explore

whether these results would extend to individuals with age-related diseases. To the extent that

cognitive impairment is mild and semantic knowledge is intact, we would not expect there to be

differences in heuristic use between healthy and clinical populations. However, if a breakdown

of semantic processing does occur, as is believed to be the case in Alzheimer’s Disease (AD;

Verma & Howard, 2012), then we would expect to see differences from healthy controls. AD

populations may have deficits in heuristic use because they are not readily able to rely on their

semantic knowledge. For example, Balthazar and colleagues found that patients with amnesiac

mild cognitive impairment (aMCI) performed normally on the Boston Naming Test (BNT), a

semantic assessment that asks participants to name line drawings of objects of increasing

difficulty (2008). Mild AD patients performed significantly worse on the BNT, but were able to

boost their performance to that of aMCI patients and healthy controls after they were given

semantic (i.e., a short explanation of the picture) and phonemic (i.e., the first phonemes of the

target word) cues upon making a naming error. Thus, we can speculate that people with MCI, but

not AD, would use heuristics to the same degree as healthy controls. People with AD may need

certain cues and nudges in order to use heuristics effectively.

Overall, we believe it is important to highlight the skills and abilities that are preserved in

healthy aging. Null age effects should not automatically be relegated to the file drawer; they may
 23
HEURISTIC DECISION MAKING

reveal something significant about the preservation of certain aspects of human cognition with

age (Lakens et al., 2020; Isaacowitz, 2020). For example, the current work suggests that adaptive

strategies like heuristics are used consistently throughout the adult lifespan; older adults are not

more likely to use them than younger adults. These results challenge some earlier speculation

that older adults might be more reliant on heuristic processing compared to their younger

counterparts (Peters et al., 2000) and identify yet another preserved aspect of cognition in healthy

aging. In fact, related prior research has shown that the simplifying decision strategies of older

adults produce high quality decisions in everyday life (Mata & Nunes, 2010). More generally,

knowledge about what is preserved across adulthood could be useful when developing tools and

strategies for optimizing older adults’ decision making.

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HEURISTIC DECISION MAKING

Appendix

Anchoring

Scenario Low High Source

Anchor Anchor

Is the height of the tallest redwood 65 500

tree less than or greater than __ feet?

Is the length of the Mississippi River 200 20,000

Adapted from Furnham and
greater than or less than __ miles?
Boo, 2011
Is the gestation period of an African 12 32
elephant less than or greater than __
months?

Availability

Scenario Option 1 Option 2 Source

Suppose one samples a word (of three

letters or more) at random from an Word starts R is the third
English text. Which of the following is with R letter
more likely?
Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974
Suppose one samples a word (of three
letters or more) at random from an
Word starts K is the third
English text. Which of the following is
with K letter
more likely?

Now you will see a list of names one by

one*
Women's Adapted from Braga
Men's names
Did the list we just presented contain names et al., 2015
more _________?

Note. *The list contained an equal number of male (Thomas Anderson, Richard Miller, David
Beckham, Michael Jordan, George Clooney, Brad Pitt, Chris Brown, Paul Jones) and female
names (Jennifer Moore, Elizabeth Clark, Barbara Smith, Linda Johnson, Britney Spears, Sarah
Wilson, Louise Martin, Sandra Murphy).
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HEURISTIC DECISION MAKING

Recognition

Scenario Option 1 Option 2 Source

Which illness has the higher Spotted Fever

annual incidence in the United Rickettsiosis Malaria
States?

Which illness has the higher

annual incidence in the United Tetanus Leptopirosis
States?
Which illness has the higher
annual incidence in the United Shigellosis E. coli
States? Adapted from Pachur
et al., 2009
Which Mexican city has the
higher population? Cancun Ecatepec

Which European city has the

higher population? Minsk Dublin

Which African city has the

higher population? Cape Town Abidjan

Representativeness

Linda Problem (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983)

Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a
student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also
participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.

Which is more probable?

• Linda is a bank teller
• Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement

Base Rate Problem (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973)

A panel of psychologists have interviewed and administered personality tests to 30 engineers and
70 lawyers, all successful in their respective fields. On the basis of this information, descriptions
of the 30 engineers and 70 lawyers have been written. Below, you will find one of those
descriptions, chosen at random from the 100 available descriptions.
 26
HEURISTIC DECISION MAKING

Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four children. He is generally conservative,
careful, and ambitious. He shows no interest in political and social issues and spends most of his
free time on his many hobbies which include home carpentry, sailing, and mathematical puzzles.

What is the probability that Jack is an engineer (0-100%)?

Marble Problem (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972)

Five children (Alan, Ben, Carl, Dan, and Ed) are playing a game. On each round, 20 marbles are
distributed at random among them. Consider the following distributions:

A: 4, 4, 5, 4, 3
B: 4, 4, 4, 4, 4

In many rounds of the game, will there be more results of Distribution A or Distribution B?

Sunk Cost Fallacy (Adapted from Bruine de Bruin et al., 2014 and Strough et al., 2014)

You have driven halfway to a vacation destination. Your goal is to spend time by yourself. You
feel sick. You feel that you would have a much better weekend at home. You think that it is "too
bad" you already drove halfway, because you would much rather spend the time at home. Please
think about what you would do if you were in this situation. Would you be more likely to stick
with your plans (1) or to cancel your plans (6)?

After a large meal at a restaurant, you order a big dessert with chocolate and ice cream. After a
few bites, you find you are full and you would rather not eat any more of it. Would you be more
likely to eat more (1) or to stop eating it (6)?

You have been working on a project related to one of your hobbies. Lately, you have lost interest
in the project. Whenever you work on it, you are bored and wish that you were doing something
else. You must decide what to do. Would you be more likely remain committed to the project (1)
or stop working on it (6)?
 27
HEURISTIC DECISION MAKING

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