G.R. No.

159520 September 19, 2006

FELISA L. PEÑA, petitioner,

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
seeking to set aside and to declare null and void the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
53088 dated 24 April 2003 and its Resolution2 dated 14 August 2003, which affirmed the Decision3 of the
Office of the President dated 12 May 1999 declaring as valid and subsisting the mortgage between Queen’s
Row Subdivision, Inc., and herein respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).

The antecedent facts of the case are:

On 13 March 1985, herein petitioner Felisa Peña acquired three subdivision lots, covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title No. T-89547, No. T-89647, and No. T-89662 of the Register of Deeds of Cavite, from
Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc., through its President Isabel Arrieta, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, with
a right to repurchase the same within two months, for the sum of P126,000.00 plus interest. However,
petitioner alleged that Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc. failed to repurchase said lots and refused to deliver the
corresponding titles of the said subdivision lots because the same were mortgaged to herein respondent
GSIS, allegedly sometime in 1971 and 1972, without the written approval of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) as required by Presidential Decree No. 957, otherwise known as "The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree."

Thus, on 21 January 1994, petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific Performance, Annulment of Mortgage, and
Damages4 before the HLURB Regional Office against Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc., its President Isabel
Arrieta, and respondent, asking for the cancellation of the mortgage to respondent and the consolidation of
ownership to her, alleging that the mortgage of the subject lots to the respondent was null and void because it
had no written approval of the HLURB as required under Presidential Decree No. 957.

Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc. and its President Isabel Arrieta did not file any responsive pleading.
Respondent, on the other hand, filed its Answer asserting that the subject properties had been mortgaged,
foreclosed, and transferred to its name even before the petitioner purchased the same.

HLURB, through Housing and Land Use Arbiter Cesar A. Manuel, rendered a Decision5 dated 20 December
1995 in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Confirming the sale of Queen’s Row Subdivision lots covered by TCT Nos. T-89547, T-89647, and
T-89662 of the Register of Deeds of Cavite in favor of [petitioner] and consolidating ownership thereof
in favor of the latter;

2. Declaring the mortgage of the subject lots to respondent GSIS as voidable insofar as [petitioner] is
concerned but valid only as evidence of indebtedness insofar as Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc. and
[respondent] GSIS are concerned;

3. Directing respondent GSIS to deliver the owners (sic) duplicate copy (sic) of the titles of subject lots
to the [petitioner] within thirty days from finality hereof;

4. Directing the Register of Deeds of Cavite to cancel the annotation of the mortgage on said TCTs
Nos. T-89547, T-89647, and T-89662, without prejudice to the right of [respondent] GSIS to collect the
obligation of Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc.;

5. Directing respondents Queens Row Subdivision, Inc. and Isabel Y. Arrieta to jointly and severally
pay [petitioner] the sums of P200,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages; P200,000.00 as and
 by way of moral damages; P100,000.00 plus 30% of the award granted to [petitioner], as and for
attorney’s fees and the cost of suit.

Let copy of this judgment be furnished the Register of Deeds of Cavite.6

On 30 January 1996, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal7 from the afore-mentioned Decision. On 9 February
1996, HLURB Arbiter Manuel issued an Order8 denying the said appeal, citing Sections 22 and 23 of
Resolution No. R-537, Series of 1994, "Adopting the 1994 Rules of Procedure of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board,"9 which states that:

Section 22. Petition for Review. - No motion for reconsideration of or mere Notice of Petition from the
decision shall be entertained. Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision, any aggrieved party
may, on any legal ground and upon payment of the review fee, file with the Regional Office or directly
with the Board of Commissioners a petition for review. Copy of such a petition shall be furnished the
other party and the Regional Office in case the petition is directly filed with the Board of
Commissioners.

Within ten (10) days from receipt of a petition or an order of elevation from the Board, the Regional
Officer shall cause the elevation of the records to the Board of Commissioners thru the Appeals
Review Group.

Section 23. Contents of a Petition for Review. – The petition for review shall contain the petitioner’s
assignment of errors on the decision sought to be reviewed, the issues to be resolved, the law on
which it is based and the arguments in support thereof.10

Petitioner then claimed that for failure of respondent to file the proper mode of appeal within the reglementary
period before the HLURB, its Decision dated 20 December 1995 already became final and executory.11

However, on 25 September 1996, respondent filed a Motion to Declare Judgment Null and Void Ab
Initio12 before the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB, claiming that the Regional Office of HLURB had no
jurisdiction to resolve the Complaint for it involved title to, possession of, or interest in real estate, the
jurisdiction of which belonged to the Regional Trial Court. Respondent also contended that the mortgage
transaction was exempt from the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 because it was entered into prior
to the effectivity of the said decree. Then, on 20 January 1997, the HLURB Board of Commissioners issued
an Order13 denying the said Motion for lack of merit.

Dissatisfied, respondent sought reconsideration of the aforesaid Order on 24 April 1997. Still, on 14 July
1997,14 the HLURB Board of Commissioners denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the respondent
because the Decision of HLURB dated 20 December 1995 has already become final and executory as early
as March 1996.15 The HLURB Board of Commissioners granted, however, the Ex-Parte Motion for Execution
dated 20 December 1995 filed by petitioner.

Once again aggrieved, respondent appealed the foregoing Order of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to
the Office of the President. On 12 May 1999, the Office of the President issued the assailed Decision,
declaring that:

The Order appealed from being clearly erroneous, this Office is constrained to excuse the failure of
the [respondent] GSIS to file the proper Petition for Review, a mere procedural infirmity incomparable
to the injustice that is sought to be prevented.

WHEREFORE, the Order of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board dated July 14, 1997 is
hereby SET ASIDE and the mortgage of the subject lots to [respondent] GSIS declared VALID and
SUBSISTING.16

Consequently, on 4 June 1999, petitioner filed a Petition for Review17 under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure before the Court of Appeals alleging that the Office of the President committed the following grave
and serious errors, to wit: (1) in not holding that the Decision of the HLURB Regional Office dated 20
December 1995 had become final and executory; (2) in not holding that the HLURB Board of Commissioners
as well as the Office of the President had no jurisdiction or authority to revive, review, change, or alter the
said final and executory Decision dated 20 December 1995; (3) in excusing and ignoring the failure of
respondent to file the proper Petition for Review; (4) in not holding that said Decision of the HLURB Regional
Office dated 20 December 1995 was supported by substantial evidence, and; (5) in issuing the Decision in
question dated 12 May 1999 and in setting aside the Order of the HLURB Board of Commissioners dated 14
July 1997 and holding that the mortgage of subject lots to respondent valid and subsisting.

The Court of Appeals subsequently rendered its Decision on 24 April 2003 denying the Petition for Review
filed by petitioner and affirming the Decision of the Office of the President dated 12 May 1999.

On 15 May 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision. Nevertheless, the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution dated 14 August 2003 denied said Motion because there were no new or substantial
reasons to reverse or even modify the challenged Decision.

Hence, this Petition.

In the petitioner’s Memorandum,18 she avers that the Decision of the HLURB Regional Office dated 20
December 1995 had long become final and executory for failure of the respondent to seasonably appeal or
file a Petition for Review within the reglementary period. Consequently, the Office of the President had no
more jurisdictions over such final and executory judgment.

She further argues that a final and executory judgment rendered by the HLURB Regional Office cannot be
revived by the filing of a Motion to Declare Judgment Null and Void Ab Initio several months after it had
become final and executory.

Finally, she claims that the Court of Appeals may have been misled by the confusing arguments of the
respondent and overlooked the fact that the Decision of HLURB Regional Office dated 20 December 1995
has already become final and executory. Hence, the Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in affirming the Decision of the Office of the President that reversed or changed a final
and executory judgment of the HLURB Regional Office.

In contrast, respondent, in its Memorandum,19 maintains that the outright dismissal of its Notice of Appeal by
the HLURB Regional Office on the ground that the filing thereof was prohibited under the HLURB Rules,
denied respondent justice inasmuch as it has meritorious claims. Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in
affirming the Decision of the Office of the President that set aside the Order of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners dated 14 July 1997 and declaring as valid and subsisting the mortgage of the subject lots to
respondent.

From the foregoing arguments of the parties, this Court identifies the following issues for resolution in this
Petition, to wit:

I. Whether the Office of the President can set aside and reverse a judgment of the HLURB Regional
Office that has long become final and executory for failure of the respondent to interpose the proper
mode of appeal within the reglementary period as provided for in the 1994 Rules of Procedure of
HLURB; and

II. Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the Decision of the Office of
the President that reversed a final and executory judgment of the HLURB.

Noteworthy is that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, except where it is
granted by statute in which case it should be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of law.20 In other words, appeal is a right of statutory and not of constitutional origin.21 The perfection of an
appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional22 and the failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final
and executory and, hence, unappealable,23 for it is more important that a case be settled than it be settled
right.24 Furthermore, it is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer be attacked by any of the
parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.25 Just as the losing party
has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also the winning party has the correlative right
to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.26

Under Section 2227 of the 1994 Rules of Procedure of the HLURB, no Motion for Reconsideration of or a mere
Notice of Petition from the Decision shall be entertained. What are required under said HLURB Rules are for
the aggrieved party to file a Petition for Review within 30 days from receipt of the Decision on any legal
ground and upon payment of the review fee.

In the case at bar, it must be noted that after the HLURB Regional Office rendered its 20 December 1995
Decision, respondent, instead of filing a Petition for Review within 30 days from receipt of the said Decision
which was the proper mode of appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, opted to file a mere Notice
of Appeal on 30 January 1996 which was denied in the Order of HLURB Arbiter Manuel dated 9 February
1996 because it was prohibited by the Rules of HLURB. Consequently, for failure of the respondent to file the
proper mode of appeal within the reglementary period, the afore-mentioned Decision of the HLURB became
final and executory as early as March 1996.

It is true, as the Court of Appeals mentioned in its Decision, that rules of procedure are mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice and their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided28 and they cannot be
blindly adhered to if they would serve no other purpose than to put into oblivion the very lis mota of the
controversy under scrutiny.29 However, there are certain procedural rules that must remain inviolable like
those setting the periods for perfecting an appeal or filing a Petition for Review, for it is doctrinally entrenched
that the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that right must comply with the
statute or rules. These rules, particularly the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary
period specified in the law, must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions
against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business.30

The Notice of Appeal filed by the respondent cannot equate to the Petition for Review required by the HLURB
Rules. The Notice of Appeal filed by the respondent merely states that:

Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) thru counsel, unto this Honorable Office
most respectfully gives notice that it is appealing the Decision dated 20 December 1995 of HLURB
Arbiter, Hon. Cesar A. Manuel to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board on both questions of
law and fact.

Pasay City for Quezon City, January 30, 1996.31

whereas, the Petition for Review under Section 23 of the 1994 HLURB Rules must contain the petitioner’s
assignment of errors on the decision sought to be reviewed, the issues to be resolved, the law on which it is
based and the arguments in support thereof. There is a wide difference between Notice of Appeal and a
Petition for Review in terms of substance that the relaxation of the rigid rules of procedure cannot be
permitted.

Furthermore, it was highly improbable for the respondent to be so unmindful of the HLURB Rules of
Procedure regarding the proper mode of appeal. Additionally, it must be noted that when respondent filed its
Notice of Appeal, it did not even state the reason why instead of filing a Petition for Review it filed a Notice of
Appeal. Hence, HLURB Arbiter Manuel of the Regional Office cannot be faulted when he denied respondent’s
Notice of Appeal as it was prohibited under the HLURB Rules. Also, there is nothing to prevent the 20
December 1995 Decision of the HLURB Arbiter Manuel from becoming final and executory since respondent
failed to perfect its appeal in the manner and within the period provided for in the HLURB Rules. Where a
party does not institute the correct mode of appeal such as a Petition for Review instead of a mere Notice of
Appeal, he loses it.32

Since the 20 December 1995 Decision of HLURB Regional Office was already final and executory, no court,
not even the highest court of the land, can revive, review, change or alter the same. It is already well settled
in our jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies rendered pursuant to their quasi-
judicial authority, have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of
the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata, which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority, applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive,
or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction.33

In view of the foregoing, the Motion to Declare Judgment Null and Void Ab Initio filed by respondent on 25
September 1996, or after so many months from the finality of the Decision it seeks to be declared null and
void, can no longer be entertained by the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The same was just an attempt to
reinstate an appeal that had already been lost. Even granting arguendo that the said Motion was proper, still,
the allegation therein of the respondent that the HLURB Regional Office had no jurisdiction over the case
because it involved title to, possession of, or interest in real estate, the jurisdiction of which supposedly
belonged to the Regional Trial Court, was not sufficient to warrant the declaration of the Decision of the
HLURB as null and void. Such ground relied upon by the respondent is untenable because the jurisdiction
involving unsound real estate practices and other matters in connection thereto belongs to HLURB.

It must be remembered that Presidential Decre No. 1344 of 2 April 1978 expanded the jurisdiction of the
National Housing Authority (NHA) to include the following:

Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition
to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

On 7 February 1981, Executive Order No. 648 transferred the regulatory and quasi-judicial functions of the
NHA to Human Settlements Regulatory Commission.

Section 8. TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS. — The regulatory functions of the National Housing

1. Regulation of the real estate trade and business;

2. Registration of subdivision lots and condominium projects;

3. Issuance of license to sell subdivision lots and condominium units in the registered units;

4. Approval of performance bond and the suspension of license to sell;

5. Registration of dealers, brokers, and salesmen engaged in the business of selling subdivision lots
or condominium units;

6. Revocation of registration of dealers, brokers and salesmen;

7. Approval of mortgage on any subdivision lot or condominium unit made by the owner or developer;

8. Granting of permits for the alteration of plans and the extension of period for completion of
subdivision or condominium projects;

9. Approval of the conversion to other purposes of roads and open spaces found within the project
which have been donated to the city or municipality concerned;

10. Regulation of the relationship between lessors and lessees; and

11. Hear and decide cases on unsound real estate business practices; claims involving refund filed
against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers or salesmen and cases of specific performance.

Executive Order No. 90 dated 17 December 1986 changed the name of the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission to Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).34
When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the
subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of said
administrative agency or body. Split jurisdiction is not favored.35 Therefore, the Complaint for Specific
Performance, Annulment of Mortgage, and Damages filed by petitioner against respondent, though involving
title to, possession of, or interest in real estate, was well within the jurisdiction of the HLURB for it involves a
claim against the subdivision developer, Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc., as well as respondent.

Attention should also be called to the fact that respondent failed to act promptly to protect its rights after
HLURB Arbiter Manuel denied its Notice of Appeal. It did not even offer an explanation why it took many
months before it filed its Motion to Declare Judgment Null and Void Ab Initio with the HLURB Board of
Commissioners. For such inaction of the respondent for a long period of time, the 20 December 1995
Decision of the HLURB Regional Office became final and executory and that was the price respondent had to
pay for its delayed reaction.

Thus, when the Office of the President acted upon the appeal of the respondent and thereby reversing the
final and executory Decision of the HLURB Regional Office, it acted without jurisdiction. It bears stressing that
after the Decision of the HLURB Regional Office had become final and executory as early as March 1996,
even the Office of the President had no more jurisdiction to revive, review, change or alter the same. Such
final resolution or decision of an administrative agency also binds the Office of the President even if such
agency is under the administrative supervision and control of the latter.36

In sum, the Decision of the HLURB Regional Office dated 20 December 1995 had become final and
executory for failure of respondent to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period in the manner provided
for in the HLURB Rules. Hence, the said Decision became immutable; it can no longer be amended nor
altered by the Office of the President. Accordingly, inasmuch as the timely perfection of an appeal is a
jurisdictional requisite, the Office of the President had no more authority to entertain the appeal of the
respondent. Otherwise, any amendment or alteration made which substantially affects the final and executory
judgment would be null and void for lack of jurisdiction.37

This Court had stated before that administrative decisions must end sometime, as fully as public policy
demands that finality be written on judicial controversies. Public interest requires that proceedings already
terminated should not be altered at every step, for the rule of non quieta movere prescribes that what had
already been terminated should not be disturbed. A disregard of this principle does not commend itself to
sound public policy.38

The rule on finality of decisions, orders or resolutions of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative body is "not
a question of technicality but of substance and merit," the underlying consideration therefore, being the
protection of the substantive rights of the winning party.39 Nothing is more settled in law than that a decision
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made
by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.40

The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to
an effective and efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be
not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Court must guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that
result and must frown upon any attempt to prolong the controversies. The only exceptions to the general rule
are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,
void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable.41

The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body
must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules, and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to
dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no
end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who
exercise the power of adjudication. Any act, which violates such principle, must immediately be struck
down.42 Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the
judgments of what are ordinarily known as courts, but it extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had
been conferred.43

As a final point. Having said that the Decision of the HLURB Regional Office dated 20 December 1995 had
become final and executory, it was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals to affirm
the Decision of the Office of the President reversing the HLURB Regional Office, because such Decision was
rendered by the Office of the President without jurisdiction. Hence, when the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision of the Office of the President, it likewise acted without jurisdiction. Well-settled is the rule that once a
judgment has become final and executory, no court, not even this Court, has the power to revive, review,
change or alter the same.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. Both the Court of Appeals and
the Office of the President have no more jurisdictions to review much more to reverse the 20 December 1995
Decision of the HLURB Regional Office, as it was already final and executory. Thus, the Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated 24 April 2003 and its Resolution dated 14 August 2003 affirming the Decision of the Office
of the President dated 12 May 1999 declaring as valid and subsisting the mortgage between Queen’s Row
Subdivision, Inc. and herein respondent are SET ASIDE and the Decision of the HLURB Regional Office
dated 20 December 1995 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.