Rivista di estetica

65 | 2017
law and the faculty of judgement

Theatrical Scripts
Adam Andrzejewski and Marta Zaręba

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URL: https://journals.openedition.org/estetica/2169
DOI: 10.4000/estetica.2169
ISSN: 2421-5864

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Date of publication: 1 August 2017
Number of pages: 177-194
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 Adam Andrzejewski, Marta Zaręba
THEATRICAL SCRIPTS1

Abstract
We analyse the role of a theatrical script and its relation to the literary work and the
theatrical performance. We put forward an Argument from Modality, which demon-
strates structural and functional differences between literary works and theatrical scripts.
Next, we answer some potential challenges to our argument. We demonstrate that the
failure to realize the far-reaching consequences of a clear distinction between the liter-
ary work and the theatrical script is a source of confusion in the debate on the relata of
the relation of interpretation. In particular, we show that the relation of interpretation
does not hold directly between the literary work and the theatrical performance. It is
mediated by the script. The script interprets the literary work by filling in its places of
indeterminacy and adjusting it for stage purposes. Moreover, the script, which is a set
of instructions, is executed rather than interpreted in a theatrical performance.

1. Introduction

Imagine you have seen a theatrical performance Catiline based on Henrik Ibsen’s
dramatic work with the same title. You noticed, surprisingly, that the performance
enjoyed many changes with respect to Ibsen’s work. Say, differences in the plot
and main characters. You are a bit confused. This is because you expected that the
performance should be somehow faithful to the work of dramatic literature. This
situation, which many theatregoers will no doubt recall from their own experience,
could be, at least partly, interpreted in ontological terms. It motivates the question
about the relation in which a theatrical performance stands to the literary work
it is based on. The problem invites two different responses:

1
Material from this paper has been presented in Stockholm, Lisbon, Oxford, Warsaw and
Dublin. We are grateful in particular to Jim Hamilton, Andrew Huddleston, Iwona Lorenc,
Katarzyna Paprzycka and Mieszko Tałasiewicz for helpful discussion.
Rivista di estetica, n.s., n. 65 (22017), LVII, pp. 177-194 © Rosenberg & Sellier

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 (1) the relation between the theatrical performance and the literary work is that
of interpretation: the performance is an interpretation of the literary work; or
(2) the performance is not an interpretation of the literary work.

It is often argued that (1) implies an endorsement of a view that theatrical

performance is not an independent work of art, while (2) implies that theatri-
cal performance is indeed an independent and unique work of art2. In other
words, the status of a theatrical performance depends on the relation in which
a performance stands to the underlying literary work. Despite the fact that
we do not seek to decide which of these two views is justified, we are going
to take a closer look at the problem which is of no small importance to the
understanding of the relationship between the performance and the literary
work3 and, consequently, to the development of the ontology of theatre. The
problem concerns the nature and the role of the theatrical script in the staging
of a theatrical performance. The distinction between the literary work and the
theatrical script is widely acknowledge and defending it is not needed. However,
treating this distinction as obvious and trivial is perhaps a reason for overlooking
the role it could play in a theory of theatrical performance. To justify this claim
we present a highly metaphysical argument which is not devoted to establishing
the existence of the distinction. Rather, it aims to show the ontological grounds
of the distinction and its far-reaching consequences. We argue that a consistent
application of the above distinction allows us to reconcile seemingly opposite
views on the ontology of theatre.
The article is structured in the following way. First, in §2 we sketch an epitome
of the discussion within the contemporary analytic philosophy of theatre and
diagnose the root of a certain disagreement. Section §3 is devoted to describing
the problem which springs from the fact that the distinction between a literary
work and a theatrical script plays no significant role in the literature on the
subject. Section §4 sketches out and analyses the Argument from Modality,
which is intended to show that there are the structural and functional differences
between literary works and theatrical scripts. Next, in section §5, we present
and refute potential challenges to our claim. From there, we go on to the final
section §6 where we show how an emphasis of a role of the script can solve the
disagreement presented at the beginning part of this article (§2).

2
See e.g. Carroll 2001, Hamilton 2001, Osipovich 2006 and Saltz 2001.
In this article we limit our discussion to those theatrical performances only that are staged
3

based on some literary works. Of course, there are theatrical performances that are not based
on any preexisting literary works, eg., experimental theatre or happenings. Such productions,
however, are not the subject of our analysis.

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 2. Contemporary debate on the relation of interpretation: An example

Let us begin with a presentation of the exemplary view in the debate on the rela-
tion of interpretation within the contemporary analytic philosophy of theatre. David
Saltz sides4 with the view that every theatrical performance is a unique production
and it is not an interpretation of a literary work5. One of the most intuitive attempts
to explicate the concept of interpretation is made by Richard Wollheim, who says:

The word “interpretation” has very definite associations. For the interpretative situa-
tion is one we in general conceive somewhat as follows: There are certain facts of the case;
these facts can be conclusively established by reference to evidence; there are also certain
constructions that can be placed upon these facts, these constructions, which are what we
call interpretations, are not uniquely determined by the facts, nor is there any other way in
which they can be conclusively established; interpretations are, therefore, assessed by refer-
ence to pragmatic considerations, or to considerations of theory, intuition, judgment, taste,
plausibility, etc.; the distinction between fact and interpretation is comparatively clear-cut6.

David Saltz refers to Richard Wollheim, in whose view: «there is essentially an

element of interpretation» in theatre because «the token has properties in excess
of those of the type»7. Next, Saltz challenges this view by raising two different
objections. The first refers to Wollheim’s view and sees the essence of the relation-
ship between a literary work and its performance in the former’s capability of
existing outside the type8. Saltz’s argument boils down to the following statement:
«The elements that a performance adds to a play, however, very often imply no
propositions about the play at all»9. So if the performance contains some ad-
ditional elements in excess of those of the literary work, then the performance
is not an interpretation of the literary work, given that they do not relate to it
at all. We shall refer to this position as the Additional Elements Argument10.
Saltz’s second objection refers to Noël Carroll’s influential view according to
which the concept of interpretation is the key element of thinking of theatrical
performance as a work of art. The core of Carroll’s concept, more elaborately

4
Saltz 2001: 229-306.
5
See also Hamilton 2007: 31-33; Woodruff 2008: 37; Wolterstorff 1975: 118-119.
6
Wollheim 1980: 103-104.
7
Ibidem: 98.
8
Ibidem: 100-101.
9
Saltz 2001: 301.
10
Not all positions according to which the theatrical performance is the interpretation of the
literary work would be undermined by the Additional Elements Argument. Cf. Novitz 2000;
Thom 1993; Fischer-Lichte 1992. An illuminating analysis of these positions can be found in
Hamilton 2009.

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 presented in the section §3, is that the literary text serves as a recipe or instruc-
tions for theatrical performances. The main objection Saltz raises to Carroll’s
theory is this: for Carroll, to fulfil the instructions is to interpret them. Unlike
Carroll, Saltz stresses that although fulfilment of instructions has an interpre-
tative element, instructions cannot be regarded as interpretation. (Let us call
this objection the Instructions Argument). For example, the interpretation of
the instruction: «Pass me a pinch of salt so that I could make a risotto», comes
down to specifying what we understand by pinch. Once that is taken care of,
we simply fulfil the instruction rather than interpret it, seeking to make sure
that in doing so we interpret the recipe with due diligence. So if a literary text
is a set of instructions (it is Carroll’s view), and if a fulfilment of this instruc-
tions for the purpose of performance is not an interpretation (it is Saltz’s view),
then the theatrical performance is not an interpretation of the literary work.
The general conclusion Saltz reaches is that the theatrical performances are
independent of the underlying literary works and there is no special relationship
between these two entities, specifically, no interpretative relationship11.
In the concluding section (§6) of this article, we shall attempt to show, how-
ever, that the application of the clear-cut distinction we have made between a
script and a literary work can significantly refine the conclusions reached by
Saltz in his analysis. Consistent application of the distinction between script
and literary work may have – we hope to prove – an impact on further debate
on the ontological status of a theatrical performance.

3. The role of the script in theories of theatre

This part of the article concerns itself with the analysis of a certain observa-
tion made against the background of the contemporary analytic philosophy of
theatre. The contemporary debate about the relationship between the literary
work and the theatrical performance usually disregards the role the theatrical
script plays in this relationship. Moreover, where a distinction is indeed made
explicitly it is not analyzed in sufficient depth. Thus, the script/literary work
distinction itself is not considered terribly interesting in the context of the
performance-text relationship analysis where the textual material is performed
on stage. The problem, in its heart, amounts to the fact that the script does not
play important role within the philosophical theory of theatre.
In order to better illustrate the problem, we shall look now at some views on
the relationship between the literary work and the script taken verbatim from
the literature on the subject.
According to Noël Carroll:

11
Saltz 2001: 304.

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 There is drama as composition and drama as performance. Drama as composition
involves an author who creates an artwork – a play text or performance plan. Drama
as performance involves executors – performers who make the performance plan qua
recipe manifest by way of an interpretation (or an iterated series of interpretation).12

In the light of Carroll’s words, Waiting for Godot is a work of art in regard to two
art forms: drama as composition (i.e., the text of Waiting for Godot) and drama as
performance (i.e., the actual performance of Waiting for Godot). Thus, drama
encompasses two categories of things: abstract entities (drama as composition)
and events (drama as performance). A typical example of the former is of course
a work of dramatic literature.
According to Carroll, drama as composition serves as a recipe or instructions
for theatrical performances: «[…] play texts are regarded simply as recipes –
semiporous formulas – to be filled in by executors in the process of producing
performance artworks – rather than as fixed artworks in their own right»13.
Since the literary work is simply a set of instructions to be fulfilled in staging
the performance (and fulfilment, according to Carroll, can assume a number of
forms), the performance is a kind of interpretation of the literary work. However,
drama as composition and drama as performance can be evaluated aesthetically
independently from each other and as such remain independent works of art14.
As we can see, Carroll does not make a clear distinction between a work
of dramatic literature and a theatrical script. Both are designated by the term
play-text (and are used alongside the term play-plan, which refers to a set of
unwritten scenarios, strategies, gambits or riffs which are embodied in impro-
vised performances). What is more, dramatic works and theatrical scripts are
lumped together as ‘drama as composition’ and are juxtaposed with ‘drama as
performance’. This leads us to conclude that Carroll regards theatrical scripts
as literary works15. (It would appear that the opposite is also true, i.e., literary
works are scripts for theatrical performances. The conclusion is supported by
Carroll’s own words whereby he regards literary works as instructions for the
staging of theatrical performances.)
A similar line is taken by Ted Nannicelli, who claims that theatrical scripts
are work-determinative for theatrical performances, that is, they are instructions
for the staging of performances. Crucially, he exalts them to an artistic status by
virtue of the fact that theatrical scripts are literary works and, in particular, works

12
Carroll 2006: 101.
13
Ibidem: 108-109.
14
Ibidem: 106-111.
The same conclusion with reference to Carroll’s proposal is reached by Ted Nannicelli. See
15

Nannicelli 2011a: 406-408.

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 of dramatic literature16. According to Nannicelli, this explains why theatrical
performances interpret the script (or literary work) while at the same time we
cannot regard them as actual instances of the script.
Identifying the two is common for the opponents of the theory according to
which theatrical performances are interpretations of literary works. In his polemic
with Carroll’s views17 James Hamilton notes that with the last hundred years «this
has been a literary text when it functions as a script for performance»18. The state-
ment captures the quintessence of the traditional view on the ontology of theatrical
performance, which Hamilton refers to elsewhere as the literary model19. (Here
we refer to his reconstruction of this view. However, Hamilton presented and de-
fended the alternative ingredience model)20. In keeping with this theory, theatrical
performances are always performances of some literary works. Supporters of the
theory say the same applies to, e.g., improvised theatre. Here, says Hamilton, the
performance is a performance of the script (it is about the script), which we can
produce by transcribing the particular performance. The script is then produced
‘retrospectively’ in relation to the performance, i.e., we write it out having first seen
the play21. In reviving the traditional view on the nature of theatrical performance,
Hamilton does in fact identify a literary work with a theatrical script. This is be-
cause, in his analysis, Hamilton claims that the possibility of there being a script
(based on a transcript) in improvised theatre would support the literary model22.
A similar understanding should inform our reading of David Osipovich,
who argues against the theory that theatrical performances are interpretations
of literary works. Osipovich says:

The underlying assumption here is that all theatrical performances can be scripted.
This allows the literary theory to acknowledge that performances have elements in excess
of their scripts while still asserting the script’s ontological primacy23.

16
Nannicelli 2011b: 406.
17
Carroll 1998.
18
Hamilton 2001: 309.
19
Hamilton 2007: 23-26.
20
According to this view a performance is never a performance of some other work, nor is it
ever a performance of a text. The text of the literary work could be used as one of the ingredients
to create a performance. Ibidem: 31-33.
21
Ibidem: 26.
22
Someone could argue that Hamilton’s position is rather epistemic than metaphysical in
nature. That is, for Hamilton, it is mostly important to grasp and describe the actual practices of
performers and spectators rather than to engage into the purely metaphysical dispute. Although
we find ourselves in a nearly complete agreement with such the claim, we still see a need for
establishing a general ontological framework for the philosophy of theatre.
23
Osipovich 2006: 461.

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 What Osipovich means is that in order to prove the theory that performances
are not interpretations of literary works one has to show that theatrical per-
formances are (by nature) unscripted. And if the performance is unscriptable,
there is no possibility that it can be regarded as an interpretation of text24. As
we can see again, according to Hamilton and Osipovich, the fact that theatri-
cal performances cannot be scripted shows that theatrical performances are not
interpretations of works of literature.
The above statements have been quoted here to reaffirm that, in the case of
the theorists, we are dealing with a purely lexical distinction between a literary
work and a script. Both terms are used interchangeably in diverse arguments
and the concept of script does not play important role within the philosophical
theory of theatre.

4. Argument from modality

The Argument from Modality shows how important is distinction between the
theatrical script and literary work. The argument is not designed to establish the
existence of the wildly acknowledged distinction but it aims to show the ontological
grounds of the distinction and its far-reaching consequences. It also helps to describe
the nature of the relationship between these two objects and theatrical performance.
Suppose there is a theatrical performance T which comes with a script S
written by person β, where T is a performance of literary work L written by
person α. For the sake of the argument, let us make the following background
assumptions:
[A1] Theatrical performance T is true to the intention of author (β) of script
(S). Idealizing a little, let us assume that no important detail was left out in
the performance of the play, that is, neither the actors nor the script writers
erred in any way in bringing the play to the stage.
[A2] Both script S and literary work L exist, but they are unknown to us (we
have no epistemic access to them). All we know is performance T.

The Argument from Modality can be formulated as follows:

1. Consider a situation in which, even though we have no access to S, we wish

to reconstruct25, on the basis of T, such a script S* that would be the closest to
S, i.e., such S* which could be used to perform T. Then:

24
Ibidem: 464-465.
In this case reconstruction is taken to be a kind of creation, i.e., creation of another copy
25

(token) of the text which is (maximally) similar to the original thus they fall under the same type.

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 [Premise 1] Given the theatrical performance T staged at time t1 it is always
possible to reconstruct script S* at time t2 which will be similar to S.

The similarity of S* to S admits of degrees. Thus, in order to create a script Sn*

which is maximally similar to S, we can use the following procedure: based on S* we
stage performance T1. Next, based on performances T and T1, script S1* is created,
which itself serves as the basis for performance T2, etc. In case Sn* on the basis of all
previous T (where n approaches infinity: n→∞), we get a script which is maximally
similar to S. In this idealized situation, the premise takes on the following form:

[Premise 1’] Based on theatrical performance T staged at time t1 it is always

possible to reconstruct at time tn script Sn* (where n→∞), which is maximally
similar to S.

2. Let us now consider a situation where, despite not having access to liter-
ary work L, we wish to reconstruct L* that would be closest to L, i.e., L* whose
performance is T. Then:

[Premise 2] Based on theatrical performance T staged at time t1 it will almost

never be possible to reconstruct at time t2 literary work L* which would be similar
to L.

Were an analogical procedure to be used in the context of Premise 1, i.e., staging

performance T1 based on literary work L*, followed by creating literary work L1*
based on T and T1 and performing T2 based on L2*, then, with n→∞, we would
not approach L. That is, L*, L1*, L2* may differ significantly from one another.

[Conclusion] Thus, the relationship between literary work L and theatrical

performance T is not the same as the relationship between script S and theatrical
performance T.

The above conclusion can be stated as follows: given their different modal and
epistemic properties, we should not identify the script with the literary work,
each of which stands in a different relation to the theatrical performance26. This
fact becomes apparent when we consider that, in an idealized situation, we are

26
According to the principle of nonidentity of discernibles, object which have incompatible
properties are not identical. One could raise a question whether such properties like being-derived-
from-T and not-being-derived-from-T can be regarded as differential properties (many philosophers
assume that epistemic or ‘intentional’ properties fail to differentiate things – the fact that an un-
educated plumber knows that water is hot but does not know that H2O is hot says nothing about
the identity or lack of it between water and H2O. In consequence, the fact that S and not L can
be derived from T does not preclude S and L being identical. We shall refer to this point in §5.

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 able to extract the script from the theatrical performance, but we are not, in
principle, able to extract the literary work from any other work, at least not to
the same extent as we can from the script.
Let us see how the above argument works in practice. If we are in a theatre watch-
ing the preview of theatrical performance (T) of Waiting for Godot (L) by Samuel
Beckett (α), directed by Roger Blin (β) based on some script (S), then, based on
this performance, we will be able to create script (S*), which would be similar to the
script penned by (β). Moreover, if we were to run through the tiresome procedure
described in step 1, we would be able to get a script maximally similar to S. On
the other hand, we would not be able to reconstruct, based on T, literary work (L),
which would be similar to Samuel Beckett’s work (α). We can of course, in such
circumstances, create some literary work on the basis of this performance, but the
probability that this work will be similar (or maximally similar) to Beckett’s work
is close to zero. The difference will be even more apparent if our original work is
written in prose or is a lyrical composition, rather than a piece of drama.

5. Possible challenges

As with any philosophical argument, the Argument from Modality is open

to a barrage of criticism. The part of the article that follows deals with two such
attacks that may be launched against each of the premises in our Argument. Let
us call them the Script Unreconstructibility Objection and the Literary Work
Reconstructibility Objection. Refutation of the above objections will not only
help us defend the Argument but also throw some light on the nature of a script
and its relationship with a literary work.
5.1 Script Unreconstructibility
In keeping with Premise 1 of our Argument from Modality, we can reconstruct
the theatrical script from any theatrical performance (working backwards). The
main argument against being able to do so is that every performance has certain
unique spatiotemporal properties that a script is not capable of supporting. Ac-
cording to Osipovich, at the heart of a theatrical performance is the interaction
of a particular cast with a particular audience, which, being a product of unique
circumstances, cannot be recaptured in a script

[…] the very fact that a theatrical performance occurs in real time and in the physi-
cal presence of its audience means that the possibility exists for the unexpected – for
spontaneous creation on the part of the actors and spontaneous happenstance on the
part of the world27.

27
Ibidem: 463.

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 It is worth noting that Osipovich’s argument is credible in so far as the script,
by its very nature, contains the elements listed above, that is, the script reflects the
spatiotemporal requirements as to the interaction of a particular cast of actors with
a particular audience. It also bears mentioning that, as a rule, a script is not created
for the purposes of a performance on a given day, for example, 12th November,
1987. Scripts are written for a string of theatrical performances delivered by a cast
for the benefit numerous audiences. A script is clearly something different than a
synopsis or a transcript of a theatrical performance from a particular day and place.
It contains many places of indeterminacy that need filling in28. Thus, the result of
reverse script creation based on a theatrical performance is not a simple summary
of the performance. Moreover, reverse script creation requires special skills, different
from those needed to make a transcript or to write a synopsis of the performance.
It would appear then that a script contains places of indeterminacy and because
it is more than just a transcript, it does not have to (and in fact cannot) support
all the properties of a performance (such as being performed at a particular place
and time). This way one and the same script can be the basis for running many
performances (seen by different theatregoers at different times). A similar point
was expressed by Ted Nannicelli, who, in a polemic with Noël Carroll, claims that
we cannot identify a screenplay with a transcript of a film29. In other words, being
able to script a performance does not imply that there can be no spontaneous and
unique interactions between the audience and the actors in a theatrical performance.
The way to think about a script is as consisting of two main parts: dialogue
(so called primary text) and stage directions (so called secondary text). A point
worth noting is that the stage directions in a script differ significantly from those
in a literary work30. Stage directions in a literary work, which is intended to
be received through reading, are there to help the reader visualise the depicted
world and to use his imagination to fill the places of indeterminacy31.
5.2 Literary work reconstructibility
In keeping with Premise 2 of the Argument, using a theatrical performance
based on literary work L as our guide, it will almost never be possible to reconstruct
literary work L*, such that it is similar to L. The premise may seem counterintui-
tive from the perspective of the conventional view referred to by theorists as the

Cf. Roman Ingarden’s notion of indeterminancy: «We find such a place of indeterminacy,
28

whether it is impossible, on the basis of sentences in the work, to say whether a certain object
or objective situation has a certain attribute». See Ingarden 1973: 50.
29
Nannicelli 2011a: 409.
30
Writing a theatrical script is a protracted process, mainly because the script is subject to
numerous modifications during rehearsals. Each time the director can modify the script to fit
the circumstances (time, place, number of actors, etc.).
31
Ingarden 1973: 19-90.

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 literary model or interpretationism32. This view assumes that where theatrical
performance T is a presentation of literary work L on stage, the relationship
between T and L is that of interpretation33. Supporters of this view claim that
theatrical performances, being an interpretation of some literary work, enable the
viewer to gain direct access to this work34. The fact that the viewer gains access to
the underlying literary work through the theatrical performance is an argument
in favour of reconstructibility of the literary work based on the performance seen
on stage. Thus, in line with the claims made by interpretationism, Premise 2 of
our Argument is simply false – it is not true that a theatrical performance does
not provide access to the literary work the performance is based on.
When the objection is formulated as above, we have two defences to range
against it. First, the objection can be read in two ways: weak and strong. The
strong reading asserts that we are always able to reconstruct the literary work
via the theatrical performance; the weak reading suggests it is possible only in
some circumstances.
An observation which will underpin our response to the stronger reading
of the objection is this: literary works play a number of different roles – they
are used for educational purposes, as persuasion tools, they contain a moral or
political message, they are used by the lyrical I / narrator as a means of channel-
ling their feelings, etc. It is worth keeping in mind though that one of the more
important, if not the most important, functions of a literary work is its poetic
function, closely connected with the language side of it. The poetic function is
marked by the focus of attention being turned to the linguistic message. The
purpose of a literary work is essentially for it to be read. The poetic function
of the language shapes the aesthetic reception of the work35. Ultimately, the
aesthetic evaluation of a literary work concentrates on the work itself and can-
not be achieved with another work of art as its basis. Moreover, every literary
work is a record of someone’s view about the order of things in the world, i.e.,
it performs a representative function (or epistemic function); it facilitates crea-
tion of the depicted world. Thus, if we are not able to reconstruct the linguistic
characteristics of the literary work (i.e., a certain ordered sequence of expression-

32
Hamilton 2007: 23-26.
33
Susan L. Feagin made some extremely interesting remarks concerning the distinction be-
tween dramatic action and narration described in terms of different ways of presenting a story
(through the acting the story out and through telling it) and differences in effects on those who
are watching a dramatic action in theater as opposed to those who are listening to someone tell
a story and those reading plays (or scripts). See Feagin 2011: 155.
34
Some strands of this theory (i.e., classical approach originating with Aristotle) regard a
theatrical performance as a kind of addition to the literary work. The performance allows us to
grasp the message conveyed by the literary work and subsequently express it through stagecraft.
Cf. Aristotle 1984: 232-233.
35
Jakobson 1960.

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 items), we are not able to reconstruct the world presented in this work (its
representative function) and to capture its poetic function36. Let us come back
to Premise 2 of our Argument: a theatrical performance does not enable us to
reconstruct a work of dramatic literature whose dialogue and stage directions
have been significantly modified for staging purposes in particular cases (eg.,
some scenes were cut, rearranged, etc.). Even if it was possible to reconstruct
the depicted world, any reconstruction of the linguistic characteristics which
determine the poetic function of the work would not be possible, which is best
illustrated by theatrical performances based on prose works. To sum up, being
able to reconstruct the representative (epistemic) level of the work does not go
hand in hand with being able to reconstruct its poetic characteristics.
This is not the case with a theatrical script and attempts to reconstruct the script
based on a theatrical performance. It could be argued that the main function of a
script is to bring to the stage a performance, that is, to bring into existence certain
intentional sequences of states of affairs. Note that if we regard the script as a set
of certain instructions necessary to put on a performance (used by the director for
pragmatic purposes), then an exact duplication of the form in which the instruc-
tions have been rendered is not necessary to stage the performance (it is a sufficient
but not a necessary condition). In other words, two instructions (imperatives) in a
similar but different language form (eg., «If you want to keep your life, go to the
convent.» / «If you value your life, become a nun.») can have the same content
and do an equally good job of bringing about certain states of affairs (as is the case
with two sentences formulated differently but expressing the same proposition).
With the strong reading of the objection dismissed, the question arises whether
we can dispose of the weak one as well. Note that in situations when we are
dealing with a particular literary work, which is actually identical to the script
at the language level, it may appear that, despite Premise 2 of the Argument,
we are able to reconstruct the literary work based on the theatrical performance
(since, by Premise 1, we are able to reconstruct the script). Note too that from
the historical point of view some literary works first existed as theatrical scripts

36
This does not mean that as a result of attempts at recreation we are not able to produce
any literary work. The work we will produce though will be substantially dissimilar to the original
literary work L (the poetic and the performative roles played by both works, the original and the
recreation, will be substantially different). We do not deny, however, that they will be similar at
some level, especially that one way of viewing the relation of similarity is to regard two objects as
similar if they have at least one property in common (they are similar in that particular respect).
To consult the alternative views of the relation of similarity see Wittgenstein 1953: §§65-67 and
Russell 2011: 58-63. We say that script S* is maximally similar to S, we take it to mean that it
performs the same function as S to the maximum degree. Whenever we say that literary work
L* is maximally similar to L, it too, to the maximum degree, performs the same function as L.
The principle as such does not rule out that the relation of similarity obtains for reasons other
than performing-the-same-function-as (the principle has been conceived with the sufficient rather
than necessary conditions in mind).

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 (see Hamlet) and only in time became literary works in the strict sense of the
word (i.e., works that were intended to be read).
In order to respond to this challenge, let us carry out the following thought
experiment. Suppose that some avant-garde literary work is indistinguishable
in its form from a washing machine manual. This work is of course a work of
art in every respect. Suppose also that John, who was trying to fix his washing
machine, had lost his instructions manual. The statement we wish to prove is:
John can use the avant-garde work37 to fix his washing machine if he perceives
this work as a set of imperatives which, once fulfilled, will cause a certain state
of things to exist. By analogy, object O can be perceived as a script only if it is
regarded as a set of instructions that must be fulfilled. If object O is perceived
as a literary work, it cannot be both a washing machine manual and an avant-
garde work of literature to the same person at the same time.
To clarify matters, let us consider another example illustrating the problem
and the proposed solution. Suppose there is some work of dramatic literature
which is also fairly unconventional (let us call it The Confession). The work is
characterized by brevity, short dialogue as its mode of verbal expression, no stage
directions, being identical in form to the script, etc. The work is used to stage
a theatrical performance. In this situation, the procedure for script and liter-
ary work recreation alike will, at the outset, yield: L=L*=S=S*. In other words,
despite our intentions, the example shows that a script is a literary work and
that trying to distinguish between the two is pointless.
It is hard deny that in the above example we are actually recreating the literary
work. It should also be sufficiently clear that it is not possible to perceive the end
product both as a literary work and a script at the same time. This is because
the script and the literary work, existing in their own right, have two mutually
exclusive properties: a literary work cannot be modified (due to its poetic func-
tion), while a script as a set of instructions can have minor modifications made
to it. Its modality is thus different and exemplifying by one object these two
properties is incoherent. This discovery can be interpreted more radically, that is,
it could be claimed that we are dealing here with two collocating non-identical
but indistinguishable in terms of form objects, or else that the identity of the
script and the literary work is contingent. On the latter understanding, let us
assume that there is (i) person δ, who is staging performance Z based on X and
Y. In this case, only objects of type X are literary works per se, while objects of
type Y are literary works contingently (in certain special circumstances). This
means that the primary function of a theatrical script is its pragmatic function
(being-a-set-of-instructions), rather than an aesthetic (poetic) function, as is
the case with a literary work.

37
Let us also assume that the content of the literary work is identical to the content of the
washing machine manual.

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 6. Implementation of the script / literary work distinction

We have argued so far that the Argument from Modality motivates the fact
that there is an the actual difference between literary works and scripts. This
observation seems to be an uninteresting point in itself. However, the distinction
does become more important when we use it to clarify current debate on what
a theatrical performance is. We shall try to show, using the example introduced
in §2, how the proposed distinction between a literary work and a script can
help trace the paths of development of the theatrical work theory.
6.1 We shall first address the Additional Elements Argument. The argument
appears to be reducible to the following schema:

(1) Theatrical performance T consists of an ordered sequence of states of

affairs {A, B, C, …} and literary work L consists of an ordered sequence of
imagined states of affairs {a, b, c, …}.38
(2) Theatrical states of affairs {A, B, C, …} correspond to literary states of
affairs {a, b, c, …} such that A is mapped onto a, B is mapped onto b, etc.
(3) If the theatrical state of affairs A is an interpretation of the literary state
of affairs a, then A is mapped onto a.
(4) If no literary state of affairs x corresponds to theatrical state of affairs X,
then X is not an interpretation of x.

Consequently, in a situation where theatrical performance T consists of a

large number of states of affairs which do not correspond to the intentional
states of affairs constituting literary work L, we cannot claim, according to
Saltz, that T interprets L.
In order to evaluate Saltz’s argument, we shall try to use the distinction between
a script and a literary work we have proposed earlier (§4). In our view, even if
we grant Saltz’s theory and accept that a performance full of additional elements
in excess of what can be found in the literary work is for this very reason not
an interpretation of the literary work, it seems that in this particular case we are
dealing with the interpretative element in respect of the literary work via the
script. Note that a script (but not a literary work) is a set of instructions writ-
ten with the express purpose of bringing into existence a particular theatrical
performance. Secondly, it seems that in writing a theatrical script we rely on a
particular literary work, which we modify for the sake of the performance. If

38
Let us assume that a theatrical performance consists of a sequence of states of affairs, eg.,
scenes, dialogues, while the literary work is made up of imaginative sequences, intentional states
of affairs (eg., describing actions of characters in the depicted world). Note that the term im-
aginative states of affairs can be replaced – depending on the type of ontology of a literary work
we accept – with text or quasi-logical judgments. The point made by the Additional Elements
Argument remains largely unchanged despite varying conceptions.

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 we are to look for an interpretative element anywhere in this process, then this
is the place: creation of the script itself (understood as a set of instructions) can
be regarded as an interpretation of some literary work. The point is not incon-
sequential in that it could be endorsed by Saltz himself, who claims elsewhere
that in following cooking recipes we actually interpret them (eg., concerning
the definition of pinch)39. In our view, there are at least three ways in which the
script can interpret the underlying literary work:

(a) Filling the places of indeterminacy in the literary work

Literary works often leave out some details of character description leaving
them to the reader’s imagination. A script, which is an adjustment of the story
for the purposes of stage performance, contains information about how the
actor is to carry himself on stage, speak, dress, etc. Each of these fillers can be
an interpretation.

(b) Choice of dialogues

Not all dialogues which can be found in the literary work are so impor-
tant as to be included in the theatrical performance. The script contains
only those dialogues which, from the director’s point of view, are crucial to
his achieving the aim of the performance. Choosing some dialogues over
others from the entire literary work is an interpretation of that work: the
director decides which parts of the work are key for plotting story lines in
the theatrical performance.

(c) Transformation of dialogues and the world depicted for stage purposes
The script often modifies the world depicted in the literary work (e.g., by
changing the setting which forms the backdrop to the story) and transforms
the dialogue. Changes can be made to the chronological order of the dialogue,
lines can be lengthened or shortened, the language can be stylized, etc.

As we can see, the Additional Elements Argument acknowledges the exist-

ence of parts of a theatrical performance that do not correspond in any way
to parts of the literary work, e.g., additional dialogue between characters, a
setting which is diametrically different from that described in the literary work,
or even a change of sex of one of the characters. At this juncture, however,
three points merit attention.
Firstly, the grounds which form the basis for the Additional Elements Argu-
ment may well be the basis for the so called Missing Elements Argument. On
this view, the majority of theatrical performances do not contain all storylines
traced out in the literary work. If that is the case indeed, then, by analogy, the

39
Saltz 2001: 302.

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 Additional Elements Argument should not be regarded as undermining the view
that theatrical performances are interpretations of literary works.
Secondly, those additional elements are in fact an interpretation of the liter-
ary work through the medium of the script. Furthermore, the script contains
places of indeterminacy of its own which are filled in in its making (plus greater
or lesser modifications made during rehearsals). In effect, any additional scene
or dialogue in a theatrical performance, even though it does not refer explicitly
to any particular part of the literary work, refers to the literary work regarded
as a certain integrated whole. For example, modification of a character’s closing
monologue refers to the whole work, since the monologue was enhanced with
messages that are meant to bring into sharp relief key developments in the whole
literary work. This way turning the spotlight on the role of the script occupying
the ground between a literary work and a theatrical performance can shed light
and rebalance the importance of the place and the role of the interpretative
relationship in a literary work.
6.2 Let us turn briefly now to Saltz’s Instructions Argument directed at Carroll’s
conception. In the light of the distinction we have made earlier into a script and
a literary work, it remains for us to agree with Saltz that instructions are actually
filled in rather than interpreted. Carroll’s theory views a literary work as a set of
instructions whose purpose is to help stage a theatrical performance. However,
given our distinction, it is the script, not the literary work, that should be treated
as a set of instructions due to the different functions the two objects perform
(i.e., the pragmatic function of the script and the poetic function of the literary
work). Moreover, as we have indicated above, even if a particular text can do
either as a literary work or as a script (or a set of instructions), it cannot be both
for the same person at the same time (as noted earlier, the two are incompatible
in terms of their modal properties). Paradoxically, our approach allows us to
reconcile these two positions – aiming at a pluralist conception and abandon-
ing the limiting monistic view. Following Saltz, we hold that instructions are
essentially filled in, rather than interpreted, but we don’t take this to mean that
the literary work itself is not interpreted. In keeping with Carroll, we subscribe
to the set of instructions view, but add a qualification that it is the script, rather
than the literary work, that serves as a set of instructions. In other words, our
aim is to show how indicating the role of the script in the context of the above
debate allows us to refute the Additional Elements Argument while bringing into
an emphasis of the role of the being-instructions-for-a-theatrical-performance
relationship. This approach makes it possible to keep the valuable aspects of
both positions. It reconciles the two views by introducing the idea of the script.
To sum up, we take a firm view that, under our approach, the interpretative
relationship does not occur directly between the literary work and the theatrical
performance. It is mediated by the script. It is the script that interprets the literary
work filling in its places of indeterminacy and adjusting it for stage purposes. The
script, however, as a set of instructions, is not itself the subject of interpretation.

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 Rather, it is executed in order to bring about a certain sequence of states of affairs
(in this case, a theatrical performance). We wish to make it clear though that our
observations do not rule out Saltz’s final conclusion whereby every performance
is a unique production. The aim of this article was to show that the distinction
between a script and a literary work has a bearing on the current debate on the
ontology of theatre. It can be seen that at least with some theatrical performances
the interpretative relationship is key for their genesis, i.e., it applies at the time a
script is produced based on a literary work.

7. Conclusion

Although the argument presented here and further analysis of the theoretical
application of the script – literary work distinction may appear highly metaphysi-
cal, paradoxically they are actually in tune with the widely-felt intuitions about
the nature of theatre. At their heart are strictly descriptive intuitions reflecting
artistic practice regarding most theatrical performances whereby the script and
the literary work are not as a rule seen as being identical. Thus, taking into ac-
count artistic practice and the ramifications of our argument here, we propose
that current debate on whether a theatrical performance is an interpretation of
a literary work be refocused on answers to the following pair of questions: Is a
theatrical performance an interpretation of the underlying script?, and Is the
script an interpretation of the underlying literary work? Our proposal to modify
the original debate is meant to imply that questions concerning the ontology of
theatre are far more complex than they may at first appear. Surely, one of those
questions is a question about the nature and role of a theatrical script, which
we have sought to flesh out and analyse in our article.

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