INVESTMENT AND COMPETITION LAW PSDA | MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

S NO. CONTENTS PAGE NO

1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 2
2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 3
3. STATEMENT OFJURISDICTION 6
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 7
5. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 8
6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 9
7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCES 11
Issue I- There is NO violation of Section 3(3)(a) of the Act……11
[A]- There is no collusion between DLLC and RIPL
1. there is absence of Anti- Competitive agreements between
them
2. Circumstantial Evidence adduced is consistent with
independent conduct
[B] The Conduct of two companies do not cause AAEC
1. the conduct of the respondent is not driving existing
competitors out of the market
2. this conduct cause benefit to the consumers and efficiency
gains.
Issue II- There is NO violation of Section 3(3)(c) of the Act…..14
1. Absence of Agreement or Collusion
2. Independent Business Decision

8. PRAYER 21

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INVESTMENT AND COMPETITION LAW PSDA | MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION ACTUAL TERM

& And
¶ Paragraph
§ Section
AAEC Appreciable Adverse Effect On Competition
AIR All India Reporter
ANR. Another
CMA Competition and Markets Authority
EU European Union
i.e. That is
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reporter
UOI Union of India
VS. Or V. Versus
VIZ Namely
Ltd. Limited
Pvt. Private
DLLC Delaware Limited Liability Company
RIPL Rameshwaram India Private Limited
RPM Resale Price Maintenance
HC High Court
r/w Read with
Ors. Others
OS Operating System
IIT Indian Institutes of Technology
CCI Competition Commission of India
COMPAT Competition Appellate Tribunal
Hon’ble Honorable

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

LEGAL PRECEDENTS

INDIAN CASES

S. No. CASE NAME PAGE No.

1. Ajay Devgun Films v. Yash Raj Films (P) Ltd, 2012 SCC OnLine 14
Comp AT 233.
2. CCI v. Bharti Airtel & Ors.,(CIVIL APPEAL Numbers 11843 OF 2 16
2018)
3. CCI v. SAIL, (2010) 10 SCC 744. 12, 13, 16
4. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 US 752 (1984). 12
5. DG (IR) v. Modi Alkali and Chemicals Ltd, 2002 CTJ 459. 12
6. In Re, Alleged cartelization in supply of LPG Cylinders procured 13
through tenders by Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (HPCL) v.
Allampally Brothers Ltd., Case No. 64 of 2014 (CCI).
7. In Re, Alleged cartelization in the matter of supply of spares to Diesel 12
Loco Modernization Works, Indian Railways, Patiala, Punjab, [2014]
CCI 32.
8. In Re, Suo-Moto Case Against LPG Cylinder Manufactures, 2012 SCC 13
OnLine CCI 12.
9. Jyoti Swaroop Arora v. CCI & Ors., (2016) 231 DLT 396. 12
10. Rajasthan Cylinders and Containers Ltd. v. Union of India, 2018 SCC 13
OnLine SC 1718.
11. Shailesh Kumar v. Tata Chemicals Ltd., Case No. 66 of 2011, (CCI). 12

FOREIGN CASES

S. No. CASE NAME PAGE No.

1. Case C-360/92 P. Publishers Association, [1995] ECR I-23 13

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2. “Case No. 17-CV-00220-LHK” Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Qualcomm Inc., 18

411 F. Supp. 3d 658, (N.D. Cal. 2019)
3. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corporation v. Commission, [2007] ECR II 11
3601.
4. Case T-86/95, Compagnie Generale Maritime, [2002] ECR II-1011. 13

5. Intel Corporation v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 542 U.S. 241 18

(2004)
6. United States of America v. Microsoft Corporation, 253 F. 3d 34 (D.C. 17
Cir. 2001)

STATUTES

1. The Competition Act, 2002, 12 of 2003, Acts of Parliament (India)

2. The Sherman Anti-trust Act, 1890

GUIDELINES, REPORTS AND REFERENCES

1. Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of The Treaty on The Functioning

of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements, (2011/C11/01),
86.
2. Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, (2004/C101/08),33.
3. Raghavan Committee Report, Report of High-Level Committee on Competition
Policy Law, 4.3-1.

BOOKS

1. Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay, The EU Law of Competition, (3rd ed. 2014)
2. S.M. DUGAR, GUIDE TO COMPETITION LAW 423 (6th ed. 2016)
3. Avtar Singh's Competition Law (2nd ed. 2024)
4. Taxmann's Competition Laws Manual with Case Laws Digest (10th ed. 2023)
5. Competition Law in India (3rd ed. 2013)

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6. Abir Roy, Competition Law in India: A Practical Guide (2nd ed. 2016)
7. Alison Jones & Brenda Surfin, EU Competition Law Texts, Cases and Materials,
(6th Ed., Oxford University Press 2016).

JOURNALS AND ARTICLES

1. Avinash Amarnath, The Oligopoly Problem : Structural and Behavioral

Solutions Under the Indian Competition Law, 55, JILI 283, 298-300 (2013).
2. Iga Małobęcka, Hub-and-spoke cartel - how to assess horizontal collusion in
disguise?, 8, AKADEMIA LEONA KOŹMIŃSKIEGO 64, 64-78 (2016).
3. Maurice E. Stucke, Is Competition always good?, 1, JOURNAL OF
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, 162, 162-197 (2013)
4. Mohit Chawdhry, A Framework to Evaluate Non-Price Factors in Competition
Regulation,2016
5. Moreno Belloso, Natalia, Google v Commission (Google Shopping): A Case
Summary 6 (November 17, 2021)

DATABASES

1. www.scconline.com
2. www.manupatra.com
3. www.jstor.org
4. www.epw.in

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Informants have invoked the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Commission under section
19(1) of The Competition Act, 2002.

Section 19(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 reads as follows:

19. (1) The Commission may inquire into any alleged contravention of the provisions
contained in subsection (1) of section 3 or sub-section (1) of section 4 either on its own
motion or on—

(a) receipt of any information, in such manner and] accompanied by such fee as
may be determined by regulations, from any person, consumer or their association
or trade association; or

(b) a reference made to it by the Central Government or a State Government or a

statutory authority.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Delaware Limited Liability Company (DLLC), based in Chennai, was established in 2010. It has
created an operating system known as Endroid and offers services such as Delaware Mail, Delaware
Map, Delaware Search, and Delaware U-Tube. This operating system is essential for smartphones
and tablets to operate applications and programs.

Rameshwaram India Pvt. Ltd (RIPL), another company located in Delhi, was also founded in 2010.
It has developed an operating system called N-droid and provides services like Rameshwaram Mail,
Rameshwaram Search, and Rameshwaram Map. The operating systems developed by both
companies are utilized by smartphone and tablet manufacturers to run their applications and
programs.

The founders of these companies are graduates of IIT Madras and share a strong friendship. They
jointly organize employee training and capacity-building programs in either Delhi or Chennai,
typically every two years. The programs conducted include workshops on Software Testing,
Embedded System, Linux, Architecture, Cybersecurity, and Data Analysis at various venues.

The top executives of these companies convene biannually to discuss their business strategies and
expansion plans.

DLLC’s operating system and services are not accessible in North and North East India, while
RIPL’s operating system and services are unavailable in South India. They offer their products and
services at a uniform price across India. These companies prohibit their buyers from dealing with
the operating systems and services of other companies. Sellers can only offer the maximum
allowable discount as instructed, and non-compliance with the discount scheme will result in no
future dealings with the sellers.

Two individuals, Danish Khan and Santosh Kumar, lodged a complaint against these companies,
accusing them of anti-competitive practices.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE I

WHETHER THERE IS A VIOLATION OF SEC 3 (3) (A) OF THE

COMPETITION ACT 2002?

ISSUE II

WHETHER THERE IS A VIOLATION OF SEC 3 (3) (C) OF

THE COMPETITION ACT 2002?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. Whether there is a violation of sec 3 (3) (a) of the Competition Act 2002?

DLLC and RIPL argue that they are not engaged in any anti-competitive agreements, as defined
under Section 3(3)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002, and are not participating in any collusive
behavior. They maintain that their meetings are not used for fixing prices or engaging in other anti-
competitive activities, but rather serve legitimate business purposes.

The companies argue that there is no evidence of a formal agreement between them to engage in
anti-competitive practices. According to the Act, an agreement can be written or oral and
enforceable by legal proceedings or not. However, the companies state that their meetings are
focused on mutual business interests such as sharing information to achieve economies of scale
and efficient resource allocation. These are legitimate activities that can lead to better use of
resources and reduce costs for both companies.

DLLC and RIPL further contend that any circumstantial evidence suggesting parallel business
behavior is consistent with rational, independent conduct rather than concerted action. They
emphasize that similarity in actions or decisions does not automatically imply an anti-competitive
agreement, especially when both companies are operating independently and making choices
based on their respective business strategies. The companies' conduct does not cause appreciable
adverse effects on competition (AAEC) in the relevant market. They point out that their activities
do not drive existing competitors out of the market or foreclose competition. There is no evidence
of significant market share changes or adverse effects on competition that could be attributed to
their collaboration.

Moreover, DLLC and RIPL emphasize that their practices bring benefits to consumers and result
in efficiency gains. By collaborating on joint ventures and strategic partnerships, they can achieve
economies of scale and innovate in their respective fields, such as technology development and
research.

These collaborations may also lead to the production of eco-friendly products and advancements
in technological innovation, which benefit consumers and the market. The companies also argue
that price parity agreements allow them to offer consistent pricing to consumers across different
regions, ensuring fairness and transparency in pricing.

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In summary, DLLC and RIPL assert that their business practices are based on legitimate reasons
and serve the interests of both the companies and the consumers. They deny any anti-competitive
behaviour under the Competition Act, 2002, and emphasize the lack of collusion and the positive
impact of their collaboration on the market.

II. Whether there is a violation of sec 3 (3) (c) of the Competition Act 2002?

The provided text addresses the allegation of anti-competitive behavior under Section 3(3)(c) of the
Competition Act 2002 by emphasizing the absence of agreement or collusion between Delaware
Limited Liability Company (DLLC) and Rameshwaram India Pvt Ltd (RIPL). There is no substantial
evidence indicating the existence of a concerted effort or understanding between the two companies
aimed at distorting competition in the relevant market. Both DLLC and RIPL operate as independent
entities with distinct corporate structures, management teams, and business strategies tailored to meet
their respective market demands.

The occasional joint activities between DLLC and RIPL, such as capacity-building programs and
business meetings, serve legitimate business purposes such as knowledge-sharing and professional
development, rather than coordination of market behavior. Participation in such joint activities does
not equate to collusion or anti-competitive conduct. The text further underscores the necessity for
concrete evidence to substantiate allegations of collusion, drawing on legal precedents such as
Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd and CCI vs Bharti Airtel, which
highlight the requirement for robust evidence to prove anti-competitive practices.

The text also addresses the companies' independent business decisions, noting that DLLC and RIPL
operate autonomously based on their respective objectives and market dynamics. The companies
compete on the merits of their products, services, and innovations rather than engaging in collusion.
Collaborative efforts between the companies aim at fostering innovation and industry advancement,
which benefits the overall technology sector.

Finally, the text references notable cases such as Uber Technologies Inc. vs. Competition and Markets
Authority (CMA), Amazon and Flipkart vs. CCI, and European Commission vs. Google (Android) to
demonstrate the importance of monitoring the conduct of dominant players in technology sectors to
prevent anti-competitive behavior. These precedents emphasize the need for competition authorities
to ensure that any joint initiatives between DLLC and RIPL do not result in anti-competitive outcomes
that harm consumers or restrict market competition.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE I- Whether there is a violation of sec 3 (3) (a) of the Competition Act 2002?
It is respectfully contended before the Hon’ble CCI that the respondent companies have not
engaged in any kind of purchase or price fixing agreement as defined under section 3(3)(a) of the
act. This Section deals with anti-competitive agreements, including those that directly or
indirectly determine purchase or sale prices. One of the important pre requisites of this provisions
given under section 3(1) is cartels defined under section 2(c).1
It is respectfully contended before the Hon’ble Competition Commission of India that DLLC and
RIPL are not engaged in any cartel or horizontal agreement and do not violate the provisions of
Section 3(3) R/w Section 3(1) of the Act because of two reasons, first,[A] there is no collusion
between DLLC and RIPL, and second, [B] the conduct of the two companies do not cause AAEC,
[A] THERE IS NO COLLUSION BETWEEN DLLC ANDk RIPL
The respondents contend that there is no collusion between the two companies because, first, there is
absence of anti-competitive agreement between them [1], second, circumstantial evidences adduced
is consistent with independent conduct [2]
1. There is absence of anti-competitive agreement between them.
Agreement has been defined inclusively under Sec. 2(b) of the Act.2 According to the
provisions of the Act, an agreement may be in writing or oral or may be enforceable by legal
proceedings or not.
European Union [“EU”] Competition bodies also consider the importance of sharing
information in connection with certain types of arrangements; these arrangements are
specifically exempt from prosecution through block tax exemption. The Liner Consortium is
exempt and is free to exchange knowledge to achieve economy of scale and better use of ship
space. R & D contracts are also exempt. Information sharing between companies helps to
further increase allocation efficiency by ensuring efficient allocation of resources between
rivals. This allows for one to make the best use of available resources, minimize waste, and
reduce costs.3

1
Section 2(c) of the Competition Act, No. 12 of 2002
2
Section 2(b) of The Competition Act, No. 12 of 2002, INDIA CODE (2002) [for brevity ‘Competition Act’].
3
Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corporation v. Commission. [2007] ECR II-3601.

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Competition in a free market ensures the attainment of economic efficiency. 4 In the present
case, there is achievement of economies of scale, spreading the risks and costs of R&D,
increasing incentives for research and innovation, acquisition of new technologies skills from
the pooling of complementary resources or capabilities, collective training and workshops for
the employees.5
2. Circumstantial evidence adduced is consistent with independent conduct
Respondents contend that it is a settled proposition of law that proof of conscious parallel
business behaviour is circumstantial evidence but such evidence, is insufficient unless the
circumstances under which it occurred make the inference of rational, independent choice less
attractive than that of concerted action.6
It is also contended that in an investigation of cartelization, the first issue to be established is
whether there was an agreement and then the behaviour of the members of the cartels had to
be seen with reference to the said agreement.7 The existence of a cartel can only be presumed
on the basis of the behaviour of the members of the alleged cartel.8 Merely because two or
more enterprises are doing similar or identical thing, will not find an agreement within the
meaning of §3(1) unless some meeting of their minds or common intention to do so is
established.9
Further, in absence of any conclusive evidence of concerted action, the ‘preponderance of
possibility’ is considered.10 However, the companies have legitimate reasons for collaborating
and conducting joint ventures or strategic partnership. Such collaborations are intended to the
development of new technologies, products and services that benefit the consumers and the
market as whole. The meetings could be focused on areas of mutual interest, such as technical
innovation, research and development, or capacity-building programs for their employees.
While the fact that the companies' executives meet regularly11 might raise concerns, the mere
act of meeting does not prove anti-competitive behaviour. There needs to be clear evidence of
agreements that restrict competition or fix prices for the meetings to be considered cartel
behaviour. In the absence of such evidence, the meetings should not be presumed to violate
competition laws.

4
CCI v. SAIL, (2010) 10 SCC 744.
5
See: Moot Proposition ¶ 3
6
Shailesh Kumar v. Tata Chemicals Ltd., Case No. 66 of 2011, (CCI).
7
DG (IR) v. Modi Alkali and Chemicals Ltd, 2002 CTJ 459.
8
In Re, Alleged cartelization in the matter of supply of spares to Diesel Loco Modernization Works, Indian
Railways, Patiala, Punjab, [2014] CCI 32.
9
Jyoti Swaroop Arora v. CCI & Ors., (2016) 231 DLT 396.
10
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 US 752 (1984).
11
See: Moot Proposition, ¶ 4

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The Sherman Act from which the Act has been inspired, is a comprehensive charter of
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.12
Therefore, the Act also happens to encourage free and fair competition in the market, which
means the motive of gaining profits does not contravene any provision, as long as it is well
within the limits prescribed by law.13 Furthermore, it can be stated that the similarity in price
between RIPL and DLLC is due to the nature of the services.14
Accordingly, in the mere presence of circumstantial evidence, the ‘preponderance of
possibilities’ cannot be presumed to be the gravest one, when there are multiple other
circumstances that could have occurred as a result of the said circumstances the existence of a
horizontal agreement between DLLC and RIPL cannot be established.15

[B] THE CONDUCT OF TWO COMPANIES DO NOT CAUSE AAEC

AAEC is an essential requirement of § 3(1) of the Act which can be established by having due regard
to all or any of the factors contained in § 19(3).16 Accordingly, the submission of the RESPONDENTS
is two-fold, first, the conduct of the companies are not driving existing competitors out of the market
[1] and second, these agreements cause benefits to the consumers and efficiency gains [2].

1. The conduct of the respondents are not driving existing competitors out of the market.
It is submitted that the meetings conducted and the training programs conducted mutually by
the respondent companies does not drive existing competitors out of the market. The
elimination of competition in the market depends on the degree of competition existing prior
to the agreement and on the impact of the restrictive agreement on competition.17 For this
purpose, the market share of the parties is considered.18
Assuming arguendo, the market share of the DLLC and RIPL in the relevant market of
‘Operating System’ is consistent even post entering the alleged agreements. Moreover, there
are also no evidences of driving of existing competitors out of the market or foreclosure of

12
Maurice E. Stucke, Is Competition always good?, 1, JOURNAL OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, 162,
162-197 (2013).
13
CCI vs. SAIL, Supra, at Note 4
14
In Re, Suo-Moto Case Against LPG Cylinder Manufactures, 2012 SCC OnLine CCI 12.
15
Rajasthan Cylinders and Containers Ltd. v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1718.
16
In Re, Alleged cartelization in supply of LPG Cylinders procured through tenders by Hindustan Petroleum
Corporation Ltd. (HPCL) v. Allampally Brothers Ltd., Case No. 64 of 2014 (CCI).
17
Case T-86/95, Compagnie Generale Maritime, [2002] ECR II-1011.
18
Case C-360/92 P. Publishers Association, [1995] ECR I-23; See also: ALISON JONES & BRENDA
SUFRIN, EU COMPETITION LAW, TEXTS, CASES AND MATERIALS, 252 (6th ed., Oxford University
Press 2016).

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competition by hindering the entry into the market or price fixing and causing adverse effect.19
Accordingly, the conduct of the DLLC and RIPL does not cause AAEC in the relevant market.
2. This conduct cause benefit to the consumers and efficiency gains
Firms that are collaborating on some socially valuable activity may need to agree to do away
with competition so as to establish the cooperative society. Restrictive contract which are
designed to promote use of energy efficient manufacturing processes, technological
innovation and production of eco-friendly products is explicitly permitted as exception.20
Here, DLLC and RIPL is incorporated for the sole purpose of technological advancements.
Accordingly, the parity agreements create price parity, which allows the enterprises to publish
the lowest price they can offer, and because of the DLLC and RIPL’s polices of parity
agreements the purchasers eventually had to reduce their prices21 which has led to consumer
benefit.
Moreover, in absence of price parity restriction, competition on non-price parameters may
also be harmed, thereby adversely affecting the scientific and technological innovation in the
relevant market.22
Accordingly, the conduct of respondent companies do not cause AAEC in the relevant market.

ISSUE II- Whether there is a violation of sec 3 (3) (c) of the Competition Act 2002?

1. Absence of Agreement or Collusion:

In addressing the allegation of anti-competitive behavior under Section 3(3)(c) of the
Competition Act 2002, it is respectfully contended before the Hon'ble CCI that there is a
conspicuous absence of any evidence indicating the existence of an agreement or collusion
between Delaware Limited Liability Company (DLLC) and Rameshwaram India Pvt Ltd (RIPL).
To substantiate claims of anti-competitive conduct, there must be clear and compelling evidence
demonstrating a concerted effort or understanding between the parties aimed at distorting
competition in the relevant market. However, upon thorough examination of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the operations of DLLC and RIPL, it becomes evident that the mere

19
Ajay Devgun Films v. Yash Raj Films (P) Ltd, 2012 SCC OnLine Comp AT 233.
20
S.M. DUGAR, GUIDE TO COMPETITION LAW (Arijit Pasayat et al. eds., 6th ed. 2016).
21
See: Moot Proposition ¶ 5
22
See: Avinash Amarnath, The Oligopoly Problem : Structural and Behavioural Solutions Under the Indian
Competition Law, 55, JILI 283, 298-300 (2013), Mohit Chawdhry, A Framework to Evaluate Non-Price Factors
in Competition Regulation,2016

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similarity in the nature of their businesses and the occasional joint activities do not suffice to
establish an anti-competitive agreement or collusion.
Firstly, it is imperative to acknowledge that DLLC and RIPL are independent entities operating
within the competitive landscape of the technology industry. Both companies have distinct
corporate structures, management teams, and business strategies tailored to meet the demands of
their respective markets. While they may share similarities in offering operating systems and
related services for smartphones and tablets, this does not inherently imply collusion or anti-
competitive behaviour. In fact, the existence of multiple competitors within an industry is often
indicative of a healthy and dynamic market environment where consumers benefit from increased
choice and innovation.
Furthermore, the occasional joint activities undertaken by DLLC and RIPL, such as capacity-
building programs and business meetings, are primarily aimed at knowledge-sharing and
professional development rather than coordination of market behaviour. These collaborative
efforts are commonplace in industries characterized by rapid technological advancements and are
essential for fostering innovation and maintaining competitiveness. However, it is crucial to note
that participation in joint activities does not necessarily translate into collusion or anti-competitive
conduct. These activities serve legitimate business purposes and contribute to the overall growth
and development of the industry.
Moreover, the absence of evidence indicating any direct communication or agreement between
DLLC and RIPL regarding market behavior or pricing strategies further undermines the allegation
of collusion. Competition authorities typically scrutinize communications, agreements, or
concerted actions that demonstrate a mutual understanding to distort competition. However, in
the absence of such evidence, it would be speculative to conclude the existence of anti-
competitive conduct based solely on the incidental similarities or joint activities between the
companies.
In light of the foregoing, it is evident that the mere existence of similarities in business operations
or occasional joint activities between DLLC and RIPL does not provide sufficient grounds to infer
the presence of an anti-competitive agreement or collusion. To establish a violation of Section
3(3)(c) of the Competition Act 2002, there must be concrete and substantiated evidence
demonstrating a concerted effort by the parties to distort competition in the relevant market. As
such evidence is conspicuously absent in this case, it is respectfully contended that the allegations
of anti-competitive behavior against DLLC and RIPL lack merit and should be dismissed.

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Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd:23 In the case of Competition
Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd, the Competition Commission of India (CCI)
emphasized the critical importance of concrete evidence in establishing allegations of collusion.
The case underscored the stringent evidentiary standard required to prove collusion and reiterated
that unsubstantiated suspicions or conjectures are insufficient to establish a violation of
competition law. In this case, the CCI's stance serves as a precedent highlighting the necessity for
robust evidence when alleging anti-competitive behavior, particularly collusion, in the
marketplace. The Commission's position underscores the principle that competition law
enforcement should be based on facts and evidence rather than mere assumptions or allegations.
Relating this precedent to the issue at hand concerning the alleged anti-competitive behavior of
Delaware Limited Liability Company (DLLC) and Rameshwaram India Pvt Ltd (RIPL), it
becomes evident that the burden lies on the accusers to provide concrete evidence demonstrating
collusion between the two companies. Mere similarities in their business operations or occasional
joint activities, such as capacity building programs and business meetings, do not automatically
imply collusion or anti-competitive behaviour. To establish a violation of Section 3(3)(c) of the
Competition Act 2002, the accusers must present substantiated proof of a concerted effort
between DLLC and RIPL aimed at distorting competition in the relevant market. This proof
should consist of tangible evidence such as communications, agreements, or concerted actions
indicating a mutual understanding to restrict competition or engage in anti-competitive practices.
Drawing from the precedent set by the Steel Authority of India Ltd case, it is evident that
unsubstantiated suspicions or conjectures are insufficient to establish a violation of competition
law. Therefore, unless concrete evidence demonstrating collusion between DLLC and RIPL is
presented, the allegations of anti-competitive behavior remain unsubstantiated and lack merit. In
conclusion, the precedent set by the Steel Authority of India Ltd case reinforces the principle that
allegations of collusion or anticompetitive behavior must be supported by concrete evidence to
warrant enforcement action. Until such evidence is provided in the case at hand, DLLC and RIPL
should be presumed innocent of any anticompetitive conduct.
CCI vs Bharti Airtel :24 In the case of CCI vs Bharti Airtel, the Competition Commission of
India (CCI) dismissed allegations of collusion against Bharti Airtel, emphasizing the requirement
for concrete evidence to substantiate claims of anti-competitive behavior. The commission
highlighted the insufficiency of evidence to establish the existence of an anti-competitive

23
1 (2010) 10 SCC 744
24
Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel & Ors.,(CIVIL APPEAL Numbers 11843 OF 2 2018)

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agreement and reiterated that mere parallel conduct does not constitute collusion under
competition law. This precedent underscores the CCI's approach to anti-competitive behavior,
which prioritizes the necessity for robust evidence to support allegations. It emphasizes that
competition law enforcement should be grounded in factual evidence rather than speculation or
assumptions. Relating this precedent to the issue at hand concerning the alleged anti-competitive
behavior of Delaware Limited Liability Company (DLLC) and Rameshwaram India Pvt Ltd
(RIPL), it becomes evident that the burden lies on the accusers to provide concrete evidence
demonstrating collusion between the two companies. The mere fact that DLLC and RIPL operate
in similar markets or engage in occasional joint activities does not automatically imply collusion
or anti-competitive conduct. To establish a violation of Section 3(3)(c) of the Competition Act
2002, the accusers must present substantiated proof of a concerted effort between DLLC and
RIPL aimed at distorting competition in the relevant market. This proof should consist of tangible
evidence such as communications, agreements, or concerted actions indicating a mutual
understanding to restrict competition or engage in anti-competitive practices.
Drawing from the precedent set by the CCI vs Bharti Airtel case, it is evident that allegations of
collusion or anti-competitive behavior cannot be sustained without concrete evidence. Mere
parallel conduct or incidental similarities in business operations are insufficient grounds to
establish collusion under competition law. Therefore, unless concrete evidence demonstrating
collusion between DLLC and RIPL is presented, the allegations of anti-competitive behavior
remain unsubstantiated and lack merit. DLLC and RIPL should be presumed innocent of any anti-
competitive conduct until such evidence is provided.
In conclusion, the precedent set by the CCI vs Bharti Airtel case reaffirms the principle that
allegations of collusion or anti-competitive behavior must be supported by concrete evidence to
warrant enforcement action. Until such evidence is presented in the case at hand, DLLC and RIPL
should not be presumed guilty of anti-competitive conduct.
United States v. Microsoft Corporation25
In this landmark case, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) alleged that Microsoft
engaged in anticompetitive conduct by bundling its Internet Explorer web browser with its
Windows operating system, thereby stifling competition in the browser market. However, the
court ultimately ruled that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish an anti-competitive
agreement or collusion between Microsoft and other parties. This case underscores the importance
of concrete evidence in proving allegations of anticompetitive behavior.

25
United States of America v. Microsoft Corporation, 253 F. 3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

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 INVESTMENT AND COMPETITION LAW PSDA | MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS

Intel Corporation v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. - In this case, Advanced Micro Devices
(AMD)26 alleged that Intel engaged in anti-competitive conduct by offering rebates and incentives
to computer manufacturers in exchange for exclusive agreements to use its microprocessors.
However, the court ruled that AMD failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating the
existence of an anti-competitive agreement or collusion between Intel and the manufacturers. This
case highlights the necessity for substantiated proof when alleging collusion in the technology
industry.
Qualcomm Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)27 - In this case, the FTC alleged that
Qualcomm engaged in anti-competitive behavior by using its dominant position in the
semiconductor market to impose unfair licensing terms on smartphone manufacturers. However,
the court ruled in favor of Qualcomm, stating that the evidence presented by the FTC was
insufficient to prove an anti-competitive agreement or collusion between Qualcomm and the
manufacturers. This case underscores the requirement for concrete evidence in establishing
allegations of collusion.

2. Independent Business Decisions:

Delaware Limited Liability Company (DLLC) and Rameshwaram India Pvt Ltd (RIPL) are
distinct entities with independent corporate structures, management teams, and business
strategies. They operate within the competitive landscape of the technology industry, catering to
different markets and customer bases. While both companies may offer similar products and
services, such as operating systems for smartphones and tablets, their business decisions are
driven by their individual goals and objectives rather than any coordinated effort to restrict
competition. DLLC and RIPL make independent decisions regarding various aspects of their
business operations, including product development, pricing strategies, marketing initiatives, and
distribution channels. These decisions are based on factors such as market demand, consumer
preferences, technological advancements, and competitive dynamics. The companies compete
with each other and other market players based on the merits of their products, services, and
innovations rather than engaging in collusion or anti-competitive behavior.
The joint capacity-building programs and business meetings organized by DLLC and RIPL serve
the purpose of knowledge-sharing, skill development, and professional networking within the
industry. These collaborative efforts are common in sectors characterized by rapid technological

26
542 U.S. 241 (2004)
27
“Case No. 17-CV-00220-LHK” Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, (N.D. Cal.
2019)

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INVESTMENT AND COMPETITION LAW PSDA | MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS

advancements, where companies benefit from sharing expertise, best practices, and insights. The
objective of these programs and meetings is to enhance the capabilities of employees, foster
innovation, and promote industry growth. It is important to emphasize that the participation of
DLLC and RIPL in joint activities does not imply any coordinated effort to stifle competition or
manipulate the market. Rather, these initiatives contribute to the overall development and
competitiveness of the industry by facilitating the exchange of ideas and expertise among industry
players.
In summary, DLLC and RIPL operate as independent entities, making autonomous business
decisions based on their respective objectives and market dynamics. The joint capacity-building
programs and business meetings organized by the companies are aimed at knowledge-sharing and
professional development rather than coordinating market behavior or stifling competition.
Therefore, the mere existence of joint activities between DLLC and RIPL does not substantiate
allegations of anti-competitive behavior, as these initiatives are conducted in accordance with
industry norms and contribute to the overall advancement of the technology sector.
Uber Technologies Inc. vs. Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) - In this case, the
CMA found that Uber's acquisition of Autocab, a taxi dispatch software provider, could
potentially reduce competition and harm consumers. The CMA highlighted the importance of
scrutinizing acquisitions in the technology sector to prevent anti-competitive behavior and
maintain market competitiveness. Similarly, in the issue at hand, the competition authorities must
carefully examine the activities of DLLC and RIPL to ensure that their joint initiatives do not
result in anti-competitive practices that harm consumers or restrict market competition.
Amazon and Flipkart vs. CCI- In this ongoing case, the CCI is investigating allegations of anti-
competitive practices by Amazon and Flipkart in the Indian e-commerce market. The case
highlights the regulatory scrutiny faced by technology companies engaged in joint activities or
collaborations that may impact market competition. Similarly, the activities of DLLC and RIPL
must be subject to scrutiny to ensure compliance with competition laws and prevent any potential
anti-competitive conduct.
European Commission vs. Google (Android)28 - In this case, the European Commission fined
Google for 6 abusing its dominant position in the mobile market by requiring manufacturers to
pre-install Google apps on Android devices. The case underscores the importance of monitoring
the conduct of dominant players in the technology sector to prevent anti-competitive behavior
that may harm competition and innovation. Similarly, the competition authorities must assess the

28
Moreno Belloso, Natalia, Google v Commission (Google Shopping): A Case Summary 6 (November 17, 2021).

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market impact of DLLC and RIPL's activities to prevent any abuse of market power or anti-
competitive practices.
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) vs. Facebook and Giphy - In this case, the CMA
launched an investigation into Facebook's acquisition of Giphy, a popular GIF-sharing platform,
over concerns that the acquisition could stifle competition in the digital advertising market. The
case highlights the need to scrutinize mergers and acquisitions involving technology companies
to prevent anti-competitive behavior and protect market competition. Similarly, any collaboration
or joint activities between DLLC and RIPL must be assessed to ensure they do not result in anti-
competitive outcomes that harm consumers or restrict market competition.

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PRAYER

Whereof in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced, and authorities cited, it is most humbly
prayed before the Hon’ble Competition Commission of India that this Hon’ble court may be pleased
to hold that:

1. DLLC and RIPL has not violated section 3(3)(a) of the Act.
2. DLLC and RIPL has not violated Section 3(3)(c) of the Act.

Also, pass any order in favour of the petitioners that it may deem fit in light of equity, fairness, and
good conscience.

For this act of kindness, the Respondent shall duty-bound forever pray.

On Behalf of Respondents

Counsels for Respondents

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