INTRODUCTION TO IDEOLOGY

Our lives may be more boring than those who lived in apocalyptic times,but being
bored is greatly preferable to being prematurely dead because of some ideological
fantasy.(Michael Burleigh,The Third Reich: A New History,2000) We are now again
in an epoch of wars of religion,but a religion is now called an ‘ideology’.(Bertrand
Russell,‘Philosophy and Politics’,Unpopular Essays,1950) Ideology is ...a system of
definite views,ideas,conceptions,and notions adhered to by some class or political
party.[Ideology] is always a reflection of the economic system predominant at any
given time.(Soviet Philosophical Dictionary,1954) Political debate is widespread in
society. Whether we are aware of it or not, most of us are, at a very simple level,
political philosophers. In democratic societies like the UK and the USA citizens are
expected to have opinions on a wide range of issues that either directly as individuals
or collectively as citizens affect their lives. Even at a simple, unsophisticated level we
have views on the ‘correct’ form of government, freedom, equality and equal rights,
the ‘proper’ role of government in society, how ‘democratic’ one’s own political
system is, the right levels of public spending, and so on. How we think about these
and many other subjects will be influenced by the kinds of ideological beliefs we
carry around in our heads, the product of our social conditioning, our life experiences
and our reflections on them, the nation we live in, our educational level and our social
class. We regularly draw on this store of ideological beliefs when we try to make
sense of the world. They may not be logical, well structured or even consistent
(tortured are those who try to force their experiences into an ideological straitjacket;
and, given enough power, they will often similarly torture others into wearing the
same garment), but one’s opinions and actions will make reference to those beliefs.
Ideologies can be seen as a form of intellectual ‘map’ to help us find our way about
the world, understand our place in it, analyse the political and social events going on
around us. Maps vary in their degree of accuracy. One can assess their value by
comparison with objective reality and debate with others. Ideologies are associated
with power structures. Politicians seek power. Their ideology and the social,
economic and political circumstances of the time influence what they do with that
power when they have achieved it. Indeed, it is impossible to separate the two. This
applies even to those who deny having an ideology. The use of power always takes
place in a framework of ideology. Modern politics can only be properly understood by
reference to the great ideological movements: conservatism, liberalism, socialism,
fascism, and so on. Ideologies tend to have a bad press. They are often dismissed as
‘errors’ or ‘untruths’. If ideology is ‘a window on the world’ it is a window with glass
that distorts the vision. The viewer has difficulty thinking beyond these distortions
and assumes what he or she believes to be the ‘truth’. Ideology often distorts ‘reality’
and encourages conflict: ‘One man’s ideology is another man’s falsehood.’
Nevertheless, one must not fall into the trap of assuming that all ideologies are of
equal validity. They should be respected as important ways of understanding the
world. One should also attempt to examine one’s own ideological beliefs, to better
understand the role of ideology in politics and society.

The meaning of the term ‘ideology’

So, given that ideology is very important in politics, what is‘ideology’? Is there
something about ideological thought that is distinct from other forms of thinking?
David Joravsky provides a useful starting point: When we call a belief ideological,we
are saying at least three things about it: although it is unverified or unverifiable, it is
accepted as verified by a particular group,because it performs social functions for that
group.1 In other words, holders of beliefs do not need to have had them ‘proved’ by
some rational, scientific form of testing. To the believers they are the ‘truth’, the
‘reality’. All political ideologies claim ‘true’ definitions of liberty, equality, justice,
rights and the ‘best’ society. The ‘particular group’ mentioned above might be any
social group: class, nation, profession, religious organization, party or pressure group.
All will have sets of ideological assumptions that are unquestioningly accepted as
‘proper’. The ‘social functions’ ideologies perform are numerous. They will include
the creation of a sense of group solidarity and cohesion for members of that group
through shared ideological values; an explanation of the past, an analysis of the
present, and, usually, a vision of the future with some description of how a better
future will come about. There has always been a widely held view in politics and
political philosophy that ‘ideology’ merely provides a cloak for the struggle for
power, the real stuff of politics. To justify their power and to persuade the people to
obey, follow and support them, rulers use ideologies of various kinds. Machiavelli
advised, in The Prince(1513), that religion was a very useful tool for the ruler. To
Machiavelli the real objective of politics was the getting and keeping of power.
Appeals to the welfare of the people were merely part of what we would call the
ideological window-dressing, hiding the raw struggle for power. Machiavelli put his
finger on one of the most important roles of ideological belief systems (if we may
include religion as one of these, for the moment). Until the last couple of centuries, in
most societies the dominant form of belief was religion. During the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries rational and scientific forms of thought provided a growing
challenge to religion. By the eighteenth century there were sharp and bitter tensions
between religious and secular attitudes. One of the features of the Enlightenment was
a strong, rational critique of religious beliefs and the perceived baleful influence of
religion on politics. It was hoped that one could use reason to discover the laws
governing the organization and functioning of society as the laws of science were
being used to discover the workings of nature. Once religion and other forms of
irrational thought were removed from political discourse, it was believed, rational
programmes would enable human society to improve dramatically. These ‘rational’
forms of thought contributed to the criticism of the ancien régime in France, the
French Revolution, and the development of what we now call ‘political ideologies’
that dominated political debate in Europe and the world during the following two
centuries. Far from introducing new forms of rationality into politics, ideological
forms of thinking tended to create new forms of ‘irrational’ thinking, stirring up and
releasing deep political passions that in many ways resembled the emotional
commitment to religion. Indeed, political ideologies for many became ‘pseudo-
religious’ belief systems that had many of the hallmarks of religious commitment:
‘heretics’ were persecuted, ‘true’ interpretations of the creed formulated, ideological
‘prophets’ identified and definitive texts written to direct the ‘faithful’ into ‘correct’
ways of thought.

Marxism and economic/class factors

By the middle years of the nineteenth century industrialization was transforming the
economies, societies and the belief systems of the Western world. A new way of
thinking about society was required. Many writers at the time contributed to the
development of what came to be called a science of society: ‘sociology’. The most
influential were Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who had a striking influence on the
study of ideology. In fact, they claimed to have created a ‘science’ of ideology. In
their studies of early industrial society Marx and Engels, especially in The German
Ideology (1846), argued that there was a close link between the material conditions of
society, the ways in which wealth was produced (the ‘substructure’), and the resultant
class structure and belief systems (the ‘superstructure’). As the economic system
changed so would the ideological system that sustained it, as would the class system
that arose from the economic ‘relations of production’ associated with it. Class
interests, in their view, shape ideologies. Take liberalism, for example. Liberalism is
an ideology. It claims, like all ideologies, to be a universal set of ‘true’ values that are
appropriate for all people in all societies, and not just in a liberal society. Marxists
believe that this is not the case. They argue that liberalism is of considerable use as an
ideological tool to protect and reinforce the class interests of the property owning
classes (the ‘bourgeoisie’) and help them to exploit the working classes (the
proletariat). Liberalism may make eminent sense to the bourgeoisie, Marxists argue,
and it may even convince members of the proletariat, but it essentially serves the
interests of the former and helps the exploitation of the latter. As ideology is
associated with class interests, once society has become a one-class society as a
consequence of the inevitable ‘proletarian revolution’, these ‘false’ bourgeois
ideologies will disappear. It is worthwhile identifying the interests behind ideological
statements of principle by politicians. There is much that is of value in the Marxist
analysis of ideology, despite the failure of political systems that described themselves
as ‘Marxist’, such as the Soviet Union. However, there was a tendency for Marx and
Engels and their ideological descendants to claim that their analysis of society is the
one most in line with objective reality – the ‘truth’. V. I. Lenin, the Russian
revolutionary, refined this doctrine of ideology further. In What is to be Done? (1902)
Lenin not only worked out a strategy for a revolutionary party but saw socialist
ideology as the ideology of the proletariat, a tool which they could use in their
struggle for power with the ruling classes. This is a key development in the study of
ideology. Henceforth, all Marxist analysis of ideology would treat it as a tool of class
interests, whether working-class or ruling-class. Thus the Soviet Union, created by
Lenin and built around his revolutionary party, was governed by people using a
socialist ideology as the justification for their rule. The ‘exploitation of man by man’
under capitalism was replaced by the ‘exploitation of man by man’ under Soviet
socialism.

‘Dominant ideologies’ and ‘ideologies of resistance’

One can understand that ideologies may be perceived as a tool used by dominant
social groups to maintain and enhance their established power position in a struggle of
ideas. Antonio Gramsci, in Selections from the Prison Notebooks (1921–35), stressed
the important role of dominant, or ‘hegemonic’, ideologies in capitalist societies as
the means by which the dominant capitalist classes maintain their rule. Dominant
ideologies permeate all aspects of society, from popular culture to the education
system, from religious institutions to sports. Such ideologies legitimize the political
system and the established social system in the minds of the working classes and
ensure that the ‘slave is persuaded that he is free’: ‘The proletariat wear their chains
willingly. Condemned to perceive reality through the conceptual spectacles of the
ruling class they are unable to recognize the nature or extent of their own servitude.’2
However, dominant ideologies do not have the field all to themselves. Social and
political groups in subservient power positions do not always accept the legitimacy of
the system in which they live. Ideologies of resistance, or ‘counter-ideologies’,
develop to give purpose and meaning to the social and political struggles of those
wishing to reform or overthrow a given social and political structure. An ideology
may shift from being a counter-ideology to a dominant ideology by means of political
success: Lenin’s Bolshevik Party, for example, took over the Russian state and
created the Soviet Union. Or an ideology might be one of both domination and
resistance. Nationalism, for example, can be used by dominant nations as ‘imperialist
nationalism’ or by subject nations as ‘anticolonial nationalism’, the former to support
their power, the latter to challenge the status quo.

‘Restrictive’ and ‘relaxed’ ideologies

It would be wrong to assume that, although ideological thinking forms a part of all
our waking thoughts, the experience of it and degree or intensity of commitment to a
set of ideological beliefs are the same for all people. One can make a distinction
between what might be called ‘restrictive’ ideological thought and ‘relaxed’
ideological thought. ‘Restrictive ideologies’ are a tightly argued body of ideas that
logically hang together in a well-constructed framework, as can be seen in the ‘great
texts’ of the ideological traditions that have shaped modern political life. Liberalism,
conservatism, socialism, Marxism, fascism and the other ideological traditions and
movements all have a recognized body of literature expounding the main tenets of
their ideological belief systems. So, for example, the writings of John Locke, Adam
Smith, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill have considerably influenced the
development of liberalism. No study of conservatism in Britain would be complete
without reference to the speeches and writings of Edmund Burke, in particular his
Reflections of the Revolution in France(1790). Marxism, and its class analysis of
capitalist society, is, of course, honoured by its eponymous core thinker and
voluminous writer, Karl Marx. Hitler and Nazism, Stalin and Stalinism, Mao and
Maoism. In all these cases it is impossible to think of the movement without also
thinking of the ideological tracts that shaped its image along lines formulated by the
leader.
The term ‘restrictive ideologies’ conjures up the image of rigidity, narrowness and
bigotry in the ideological cause. It does not necessarily describe some of the great
texts associated with political movements. They provide a reference point for thought
and action, a sense of identity with, and commitment to, the movement, and often
demonstrate a degree of flexibility in practical use that enables ideologies to keep in
touch with the world around us and so remain relevant to contemporary concerns.
Indeed, democratic politicians sometimes clearly state their political programme in
terms of a struggle of ideologies Paradoxically unless we stake out our ideological
boundaries and defend them against external assault and internal subversion we will
not attract to our cause the millions of non-ideological supporters who are necessary
for our victory. A clear statement of our philosophy is essential to our success and
perhaps our survival as a major political force.3 However, all too often restrictive
ideologies can become mere excuses for lack of rationality on the part of the
ideologically committed. Ideology becomes a source of narrow-mindedness and
unthinking conformity that crushes the originality of the individual adherent. The
lives of millions can be oppressed, distorted or lost by political movements driven to
impose an ideological ‘truth’ on their society. ‘Relaxed ideologies’, on the other hand,
are sets of ideological assumptions shared by a social group. Such beliefs are often
not clearly thought out or logical or coherent. They may be indirect and accidental
connections of ideology and power. We are all creatures of ideology, even though our
ideologies are not necessarily well thought out or logical. The holders of relaxed
ideological beliefs may not even be aware that their opinions are ideological; they
seem to be just ‘common sense’.

‘Left’, ‘Right’, and ‘Centre’

These terms are a common shorthand in discussions of politics – so common, in fact,
that one often uses them without a real grasp of what they mean. The application of
‘left’ and ‘right’ to politics derives from the French Estates General(1789), chaired by
King Louis XVI. Delegates were divided into aristocratic members, who sat at the
right hand of the king, and the revolutionary and populist members, who sat to the
left. Those on the political right stress patriotism, order, social discipline, traditional
values, suspicion of over-powerful governments, and freedom and individuality as a
higher political ‘good’ than equality. The centre has somewhat different political
values, involving less inequality, a greater role for the state in helping individuals, a
greater stress on freedom, and optimism about the possibilities for improving human
nature and society. To the left of the centre the emphasis on the role of the state in
creating greater social equality grows, including collective ownership of the means of
production, greater emphasis on class rights and a class analysis of society. One might
imagine a political ‘spectrum’, a horizontal axis, with these ideas and principles
shading into one another, rather than distinctive ‘boxes’ with sharp dividing lines
between them on principles of social and economic policy. Political scientists also
identify a vertical axis of degrees of ‘authoritarian’ or ‘democratic’ inclinations of
ideological supporters. Another vertical axis might be identified as leaning towards
the ‘status quo’, or ‘conservative’, view of resisting change as compared with the
‘revolutionary’ or ‘radical change’ wings of an ideological movement. In recent years
the political ‘spectrum’ has been largely replaced as a conceptual tool by a ‘political
horseshoe’, in which the far left and far right bend round to be so close as to have
much in common in terms of authoritarianism and totalitarianism. It is relatively easy
for some voters to shift their support from communist to fascist parties and vice versa.
The nature of modern domestic and international politics has raised questions about
the continuing validity of the spectrum model of political values and ideologies,
which originated in the nineteenth century, for the early twenty first century. Green
politics, environmentalism, feminism, gay politics and animal rights, as well as
religious politics, do not fit very easily into such a conceptual framework.

The end of ideology?

It might seem strange, given our view that ideological thought is a permanent feature
of politics, to claim that ideology is in decline or even ‘dead’. Yet several writers have
argued this, most notably Daniel Bell and Francis Fukuyama. Daniel Bell, in The End
of Ideology(1960) and later in an article in Government and Opposition(1988), argued
that ideological debate was in decline as a means of understanding society. Societies
have changed so much that ‘old ideological’ forms of analyzing those societies,
especially Marxism, are virtually useless. Modern societies are concerned with non-
ideological problem solving. They have become more moral, more liberal and only
distantly connected with a class analysis of society. Bell’s analysis was greatly
influenced by the Cold War struggle and the need to show that Marxism was defunct
both as a conceptual tool and for political action.
Francis Fukuyama, in The End of History and the Last Man (1992), elaborated ideas
he had previously published to argue that the end of the Cold War had shown the
triumph of liberalism and liberal democracy to be the ideologies of modern scientific
and technological societies. Liberal democracy was of universal application and
represented the ultimate objective of mankind. Ideological conflicts arising out of
feminism, nationalism, environmentalism and anti-racism are merely representations
of the fundamental worth of liberal-democratic values. Indeed, they take place within
a framework of liberal-democratic ideological assumptions. Bell and Fukuyama and
other ‘end of ideology’ writers have been very influential. But they have been
attacked for being propagandists for American economic and political domination of
the planet. They have also been attacked for having ideas that are in fact highly
ideological in themselves and for systematically ignoring evidence that challenges
their thesis. There are many peoples, such as those in the Islamic world, who adhere
to ideological systems that do not assume that the ‘American’ way is best, or that
liberal democracy is the answer to their social and economic problems.

The transmission of ideologies

We have observed that ideologies arise out of particular social circumstances and
reflect the structures of power in society. An ideology, however, is customarily
presented as a natural and rational analysis of society. It will carry with it the
assumption, overt or covert, that opposing ideologies are somehow unnatural and
irrational. Ideologies claim they are universally applicable to all peoples in all
societies and are not the product of a particular time and place. They create a
particular language of meaning and explanation to encourage the individual to
develop a sense of being a full member of a major movement for social reform.
Certain words and images will act as ‘triggers’ to stimulate a chain of ideas associated
with a particular ideology, to encourage solidarity among its supporters and stress the
divisions among the supporters of counter ideologies. As part of this, criticism of the
ideology will be associated with negativity and can be dismissed as such by its
supporters. These points may give the impression that one is talking about the
restrictive ideological forms of ideology, but they also apply to the relaxed forms of
ideology in society. A study of newspapers, television programmes and
advertisements reveals many subtle, and not so subtle, conscious or unconscious,
‘tricks’ of the ideological transmission trade. Ideological assumptions thus affect all
aspects of society: family, political parties and pressure groups, local and national
politics, and international politics. One must not, however, think that ideologies
emerge as part of a conspiracy by a Machiavellian elite to brainwash the public. This
would be far too simplistic a view of how ideology develops. Members of the elite in
any society rise from that society and generally share the ideological and cultural
values of most of its members. There is an ideological element to most aspects of
culture. The elite themselves may not realize they are acting selfishly. They may
genuinely believe that their views are in the interests of all in society. Marxists,
however, would claim such a view of the elite’s awareness of their interests and
ideology to be naive. There are many vehicles by which ideological values are
transmitted to society: they include family, work, friends, the mass media, political
parties and other political and social institutions. The family plays a crucial role in the
socialization of new citizens into the ideological values of their society. There are
power relations between men and women, parents and children, all of whom are
influenced by ideological concepts, often unthinkingly acted upon by the members of
that family. A child’s first experiences of power in society and the ideological values
it acquires occur, almost literally, with their mother’s milk in the context of the
family. Families have an enormous effect on the life chances of their members.
Especially important are their occupational and social-class positions, which will play
a major role in influencing the educational level of the children, their future
occupations, their religious and moral values and their choice of friends. All of these
factors will have ideological messages that influence the political values of the
individuals concerned. Most such ideological values will be of the relaxed kind, but
some people will seek a more restrictive ideological expression of their political views
and will join a political party.
Political parties are clearly ideological vehicles, designed to fight elections by
appealing to the electorate with a manifesto containing policy proposals that are
shaped by ideological values. They must appeal to the electorate with some resonance
with the electorate’s own ideological values, garnering enough support to win seats in
parliament and, possibly, control of the local or national government. Appointments
to cabinet posts by, say, the British prime minister, will be made with reference to a
range of factors, which will include experience, competence, intelligence, loyalty; but
one of the most important will be ideological compatibility and conformity with the
prime minister’s outlook and the broad ideological and policy aims and objectives of
the party.

The importance of ideology in modern history

By now the importance of ideologies in political discourse should be clear. But if
there are any lingering doubts, the importance of ideology can be observed in the
shaping of world history.
The musings of thinkers have ideological content which, in a myriad of direct and
indirect ways, influences the thoughts, policies and actions of politicians and people
alike. There is not some ‘real’ world where people act in a pragmatic manner. We can
only understand the world by reference to ideological points of view, while at the
same time being aware of the limitations and distortions of our own deeply held
ideological beliefs. One can, therefore, gain some idea of the importance of this key
link between ideology, thinkers, power and society by studying examples from
history. Ideological debate was an important feature of political life before the
twentieth century, but it has influenced politics during the twentieth century in ways
that are different from previous times. To begin with, governments and politicians
seek clear ideological justifications for their actions and consciously attempt to carry
out policies in line with an ideological agenda. Next, modern communications
technology ensures that ideological debate and competition is now global in scope.
Furthermore, modern states buttress their power by manipulating public opinion along
ideological lines by appealing to ideological principles shared by voters and rulers
alike. Third, the role of genuine public opinion (formed as a result of people’s own
experiences) in influencing policy is reduced. Ideological ‘spin doctors’ manipulate
public opinion to such an extent that there is little ideological debate that does not
originate from within the political elites. Finally, sections of the intellectual classes in
liberal societies adopt the ideological views and positions of extreme political parties
and provide political and economic elites with powerful ideological tools for
manipulation of the citizenry.
Political ideology now, more than ever before, is very closely linked to state power
whatever the political system. The twentieth century, and one sees little hope that this
will change in the twenty-first, was one in which ideological falsification,
exaggeration and simplification held sway. Ideologies have often taken on the guise
of ‘political religions’, pursuing some form of human perfection, the elimination of all
social conflicts, and making claims of being the only vehicles for the ‘truth’. It seems
as if this form of ideological politics is a natural product of the mobilization of
millions of voters in a mass democracy. If one accepts Eric Hobsbawm’s thesis, in
The Age of Uncertainty (1994), that the twentieth century makes historical coherence
by being considered as lasting from 1914 to 1991, then it was dominated by
ideological struggles for dominance among liberal democracy, fascism and
communism. Societies shaped by liberalism dominated the international system at the
start of the twentieth century, although a strain of pessimism seemed to be in the
ideological and intellectual air, despite a previous century of great economic, social,
political, technological and cultural progress. A belief that the onward march of
liberal civilization would not last was a theme among many thinkers as 1900 dawned.
The First World War was a greater shock than people could possibly have imagined.
It badly disrupted the global economic system that had been created by Britain in the
nineteenth century and wrecked the liberal assumption of inevitable progress. During
the two decades after 1918 pessimism deepened as liberalism appeared discredited
and out-dated to millions of Europeans. Many therefore turned to fascism and
communism, which they envisaged as offering youthful, optimistic and more effective
ideologies of renewal and progress. One could hardly say that ideology does not
matter when one considers its impact on the domestic politics of Italy, Germany and
the USSR under Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin, respectively. Fascism and communism
contained the most extreme elements of ideology found among the many forms of
twentieth-century ideological thought. Complex realities were simplified into one
fundamental truth of a struggle of good and evil, right and wrong, with a chosen
group based on class, race or belief leading the way to a better world. Political
opponents, ‘undesirable’ racial groups and whole social classes were subject to
stereotyping, oppression, incarceration and extermination in line with ideological
considerations. Common also to both fascist and communist movements was the
hatred and contempt for liberal values and parliamentary democracy, which
supposedly betrayed the nation or the class.
The consequences for the international balance of power were very great. Nazi
foreign policy was formed by an aggressive ideology of expansion. Western liberal
democratic suspicions of communist Russia (suspicions that were reciprocated by
Stalin) dogged attempts to create a united diplomatic front in the face of the Nazi
threat and contributed to the slide into war in the late 1930s. The Nazi–Soviet Pact of
August 1939 was shocking not only in terms of its strategic implications, but also in
the breathtaking implausibility of two ideological enemies making a non-aggression
treaty. Equally implausible was the alliance between liberal democracy and
communism that arose during the war that followed. The Second World War was an
ideological struggle with several military dimensions. Fascism and Nazism fought a
war against liberal democracies in the West, which their leaderships hoped could be
ended by a negotiated peace, despite the Allied declared policy of ‘unconditional
surrender’. Nazism fought another war against Soviet communism in the East, a war
in which there could be no ideological compromise, no end other than the total defeat
of side or the other, a war of incredible levels of ferocity and brutality. Nazi ideology
defined whole groups as ‘sub-human’ and the extermination of millions of Jews,
Gypsies and Slavs followed. A third ideological conflict, that between the liberal
West and Soviet communism, was suspended while Nazi Germany still posed a threat.
But even before fighting in Europe had ended, the conflict that was to lead to the Cold
War was well under way, with growing suspicion and hostility between the Anglo-
Americans on one side of a divided Europe and the Soviets on the other. The Cold
War was the second great ideological struggle of the century. The planet divided into
a bi-polar world of liberal-democratic nations under the leadership of the USA and a
communist world under Soviet leadership. A ‘Third World’ between the two, neither
communist nor capitalist, progressively became the battleground for the ideological
and military conflicts of the Cold War. Only the possession of massive conventional
forces and nuclear weapons by both the USA and the USSR prevented the deep
ideological animosity between the two superpowers from erupting into war during the
many crises that punctuated their struggle. By the mid-1980s the Cold War was
coming to an end and the ideological conflict was winding down. However, nothing
prepared the world for the dramatic end of the Soviet Union and the communist
regimes in Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991. The post-Cold War world seemed
to be one in which the ideological struggles of the previous seventy years had come to
an end. Liberal democracy appeared triumphant, with the last of its totalitarian
enemies gone. However, the end of communism did not mean the end of ideology.
Virulent nationalism erupted in Yugoslavia, tearing the state apart, and again in
Chechnya, Georgia and other parts of the former Soviet Union. Fascism began to
march again in many of the previously communist nations of the East and gained new
supporters in the West. Finally, as the new century dawned, virulent Islamic
fundamentalism offered a massive challenge to the smug ideological assumptions of
the West of a decade earlier.
Ideology was not dead. It had never been absent even in the supremely pragmatic
politics of Britain.

The role of ideology in British politics during the age of consensus

It is often stated that the British are ‘pragmatic’ in their political and social
arrangements and not greatly influenced by ideological considerations. Implied in this
is an assumption, itself ideological (related to nationalism), that British politics is a
superior way of doing things compared to the consciously ideological ‘European’
politics. Yet ideological values greatly influenced the development of British politics
during the twentieth century, as one can see from a quick resumé of British political
thought. Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations(1776), and David Ricardo, in
Principles of Political Economy(1817), have had great influence on the development
of free-market economics in Britain during the last two hundred years. Liberal ideas
about the minimal state and free trade as the best means towards economic growth
and the generation of wealth owe much to their works. Indeed, it is impossible to
follow an economic debate today without hearing people, often unconsciously, using
the ideas of these long-dead liberal economists. John Locke, writing almost a century
before Smith, expressed key liberal elements of the importance of property and
individual conscience in economic and political discourse in his Two Treatises of
Government (1690). John Stuart Mill, in On Liberty(1859), drew together widespread
liberal beliefs of his day to create a powerful statement on behalf of individual
freedom. Late nineteenth century New Liberals reinterpreted liberalism to encourage
a greater role for the state in society so as to enhance individual potential in ways that
the minimal state would not do. These thinkers and their ideas have had a
considerable influence on the development of the post-war consensus, and will no
doubt continue to influence twenty-first century politics and economics.
The modern British political debate over the welfare state, the NHS, education,
employment and taxation levels makes reference to ideological values. Modern Neo-
Liberals (who make a strong case for a return to nineteenth-century classical
liberalism) face an uphill battle against the dominance of social-democratic ideology
in the debate. So strong is the ideological consensus, so deeply entrenched in the
social and political values of modern Britain, that it is almost impossible for us to
imagine life in a society without these values and the institutions created to bring
them into existence. This may be true in the case of the restrictive view of ideology.
There is, apart from the political extremes, very little reference to liberalism,
socialism, conservatism, and so on, in the debates that occur in British politics. Even
at election time, so it is argued, there is little that might be called ideological, only a
pragmatic reference to, for example, what level of taxes to pay for public services.
However, that is not the case with relaxed ideologies. Some writers, such as Samuel
Beer, in Modern British Politics (1965) and Britain Against Itself (1982), and Peter
Jenkins, Mrs Thatcher’s Revolution (1987), have argued that British politics is very
ideological; so ideological, in fact, that it has damaged the country’s economic
performance as incoming governments abruptly changed policies in line with their
ideological commitments: nationalisation and privatisation, high taxes or low taxes,
high public spending or spending cuts, and so on.

The post-war consensus and ideology

Even if the arguments of Beer and Jenkins are not completely accepted there are
grounds for claiming that British politics has been very ideological in the relaxed
sense of the term, even if not in the restricted sense. The post-war era since 1945 has
been dominated by an ideological ‘consensus’, whatever the pragmatic claims made
for it. Policy considerations, while acquiring the label ‘pragmatic’ or even ‘common-
sense’, can be ideological in their underlying assumptions, in a sense that is associated
with social democracy. From the wartime coalition government until the early 1980s
all the major parties, both in and out of government, largely agreed on the basics of
government policy. These included the following: •a commitment to full employment
by the use, if necessary, of Keynesian Demand Management techniques; •the creation
of a welfare state with extensive social benefits in terms of health (the NHS),
pensions, childcare and benefits, unemployment and sickness payments and
expanding educational opportunities; •the encouragement of economic growth to
ensure full employment and the means to pay for welfare state provision; •a ‘mixed
economy’ of state-owned (‘nationalised’) key industries, such as coal, steel, railways,
working within an economy that largely remained in private hands; •a ‘corporatist’
(sometimes called ‘tri-partist’) approach to economic planning that involved the co-
operation of government, business and organized labour; •the dissolution of the
empire (largely completed within twenty years of 1945); a commitment in defence
and foreign policy to the Atlantic Alliance with the USA, the acquisition and
maintenance of a nuclear deterrence, and, from the late 1950s, closer political and
economic links with the states of Western Europe. There was often little difference
between Labour and Conservative governments. Their pragmatism was based on the
acceptance of similar policy goals in order to win elections. Yet this is clearly an
example of ideology. It assumes a significant role for the state in the economy and
society. There is a strong belief in state intervention to improve social and economic
conditions, a belief based on a very clear set of ideological assumptions that can be
identified as being ‘centre-left’ or ‘social-democratic’ in their orientation. However,
even during the high point of this consensus, from, say, 1945 to the early 1970s, there
were those in both major parties who were opposed to the consensus policies of their
respective leaderships. The left of the Labour Party wanted greater state intervention
and control in society and the economy, while the right of the Conservative Party
wanted a massive withdrawal of the state from any areas of social and economic
activity and a significant reduction in the levels of taxation. They had little actual
effect on the policies of their parties, as consensus politics appeared to be what the
majority of the electorate wanted. Political debate and electoral competition revolved
around who could manage the system best, who could deliver the greatest level of
economic growth, public services and social improvement for least cost and effort.
This social-democratic consensus was successful in establishing an ideological grip
on British politics for a number of reasons. The mass unemployment, poverty and
failure of the 1930s discredited the minimal state policies of the governments of the
day. The Second World War involved massive state intervention in the form of ‘War
Socialism’ that led to victory. If such methods could defeat the Nazis why, it was
widely demanded, should state planning not defeat poverty and unemployment
afterwards? At last, the long economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s appeared to
show that Keynesian economics worked and governments did not have to make
difficult choices about state spending and private income levels. Economic growth
would enable Britain to have both excellent public services and high individual
standards of living.

Challenges in the 1970s

The 1970s challenged the post-war consensus. There were a number of reasons for
this. The post-war economic boom came to an end with growing economic
difficulties, especially rising inflation and unemployment. Economic decline became
more obvious as mining, shipbuilding, steelmaking, textiles and heavy engineering
went into apparently terminal decline. With that decline came the shrinking of trade-
union membership. By the 1970s the postwar generation that grew up with the welfare
state and social democracy were a majority of the electorate. At the same time
economic prosperity was growing in the new service sector and white-collar areas of
the economy. With that came a new individualism, a new impatience at the inefficient
and collectivist provision of state-run services and industries. In both the Labour and
the Conservative parties the anti-consensus elements recognized their opportunities
for power. The Labour Party moved to the left, thereby losing both members and a
close connection with the Labour Government(1974–79). In 1981 it split over
ideological issues, with many of its right wing going on to form the Social
Democratic Party (before ending up after its demise a few years later in the Liberal
Democrat Party). The Conservatives moved to the right, slowly at first, but gathering
pace under the leadership of Mrs Thatcher after 1975. These ideological changes were
of significance in the following decade. The Labour Party was condemned by voters
as extreme, and it subsequently lost four elections in a row. The Conservative Party,
in power (1979–97), was able to pursue policies that challenged many aspects of the
post-war consensus.

A new consensus?
The Thatcher and Major governments attempted to create a new right-of centre
ideological consensus for British politics, heavily influenced by neo-liberalism, and to
bring about a fundamental shift away from the social democratic consensus. The
features included the following: The concept of the mixed economy was to be
challenged by the transfer of state-owned industries to the private sector, a process
known as ‘privatisation’. Corporatism was to be rejected and the role for trade unions
and business in formal government economic planning was to be ended. There was a
strong commitment to market economics as the best means of ensuring economic
efficiency and high levels of economic growth. Keynesian economic management
was to be abandoned, along with the commitment to maintaining full employment.
Inflation was to be the major economic ‘dragon’ for the government to slay, by the
adoption of free-market and ‘monetarist’ policies. The welfare state was to be
challenged with cuts in benefits and entitlements, the introduction of more means
testing for claimants, and the introduction of market solutions into the health and
education services.
The level of taxation on both individuals and businesses was to be steadily reduced as
incentives for both to work harder, and take risks and succeed. There were clearly
strong elements of liberalism at work here in the economic policies and in the stress
on individualism and individual choice and effort. Conservatism raised the role of the
family, traditional values, patriotism, discipline and hierarchy. It was even possible to
see elements of Marxism in the emphasis on the role of economics in building society.
The new consensus can be recognized in the Labour Party’s shift to a right of-centre
programme under Neil Kinnock, John Smith and, especially, Tony Blair. There was
no significant reversal of Conservative policies after Labour came to power in 1997.
Welfare spending was kept under tight control, helped by high levels of economic
growth and low unemployment. Attacks were made on benefit fraudsters and the
automatic nature of some benefits. There was considerable support for free-market
capitalism, no return to corporatism and no great changes to the tough trade-union
legislation of the 1980s. No nationalisation occurred, although Conservatives claimed
that the end of RailTrack in 2001, during Labour’s second term, was the thin end of
the wedge leading to renationalisation. Even policies such as the minimum wage and
family income-tax credits were designed to encourage people into work rather than
rely on state benefits. Pragmatic policies, yes, but with ideological underpinnings
familiar to the post-war consensus and its successor.

Summary
People have ideological beliefs, even if these beliefs are not very coherent.
Ideological beliefs are beyond rational or scientific testing, whatever the claims of
their proponents. Such beliefs perform a social role for those who hold them. Some
critics argue that ideologies are simply instruments of power, wielded by the
dominant groups in society. Another hostile opinion is that ideologies, especially
‘restrictive’ ones, mentally enslave those who believe in them. Some modern thinkers
have argued that ‘ideology is dead’, that no one believes in any ideology, and that
conflicts no longer have an ideological basis. Opponents of such views can point to
abundant evidence that liberal capitalism is deeply influenced by ideology.
Ideological beliefs were of profound influence in twentieth-century history. New
forms of ideology, such as militant Islamism, seem likely to be important in the
twenty-first century. While it may be true that ideology in the ‘restrictive’ sense is
largely absent from British politics, this is certainly not the case with ‘relaxed’
ideology. From 1945 to 1979 there was a clear consensus between the major parties
which constituted such an ideology. A consensus exists today, though it is far more
influenced by neo-liberalism than was the case in the period before 1979.