SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 222369 and 222502. November 16, 2020.]

STRONG FORT WAREHOUSING CORPORATION , petitioner, vs.

REMEDIOS T. BANTA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

LOPEZ, J :
p

The validity of real estate mortgage contracts is the core issue in this
Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the Court of Appeals' (CA)
Decision 2 dated May 25, 2015 in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 99511 and 100241.
ANTECEDENTS
Antonio Banta (Antonio), married to Remedios Banta (Remedios),
formed Metro Isuzu Corporation (MIC) and obtained series of loans from
Westmont Bank in the name of MIC. The loans were evidenced by several
promissory notes signed by Antonio and Remedios. On November 23, 1995,
Antonio executed a deed of Real Estate Mortgage (REM), 3 covering several
of their conjugal properties, to secure a loan of P25 million from Westmont
Bank. On February 6, 1997, Antonio and Westmont Bank amended the REM
to increase the loan to P36 million. 4
On October 27, 1998, Remedios filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2907-MN, to
nullify the REM and the amendment to the REM, including the various
promissory notes and credit agreements that were executed by Antonio and
Westmont Bank. Remedios alleged that her signatures on the loan
documents were forged. She did not sign these documents as she and
Antonio had been separated since 1991. As proof of the forgery, she
submitted Questioned Documents Report No. 519-798 dated August 13,
1998 (QDR), issued by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and the
PNP Crime Laboratory Document Examination Report No. 131-98 dated
August 20, 1998 (PNP Crime Laboratory Report), stating that the questioned
signatures on the documents and standard signatures of Remedios "as not
having been written or signed by one and the same person." 5 In its answer
to the complaint, Westmont Bank invoked the principle of mortgagee in good
faith and insisted that the loan documents are genuine. 6
At the trial, and after presenting her witnesses on August 1, 2003,
Remedios requested for 15 days to file her formal offer of documentary
evidence. The request was followed by numerous motions for postponement
by Remedios that dragged the case for 3 years, until she finally filed her
Consolidated Formal Offer of Evidence 7 on July 19, 2006. Westmont Bank
moved to expunge the formal offer because of the unreasonable delay in its
submission, but the trial court denied the motion. Westmont Bank assailed
the denial of the motion with the CA. In a Decision dated February 29, 2008.
8 The CA ordered that the formal offer of evidence of Remedios be expunged
from the records, thus:
At this point, it is all too obvious that the flood waters and the
renovation are mere lame excuses which cannot justify the overlong
and unreasonable delay in the filing of private respondent's formal
offer of evidence. The time frame and event being referred to in the
Order denying petitioner's motion to expunge is way too far from the
time private respondent started to seek postponements from 1
August 2003 because her documents were allegedly still with the NBI
for examination and she claimed that she was about to submit a
proposal for amicable settlement which never came about. As glaring
as the dilatory antics of private respondents were as they are likewise
deplorable, public respondent never took charge over the
proceedings and instead quietly gave his complicity to private
respondent's utter disregard of court orders and set deadlines. This
behavior of private respondent cannot receive a similar approval from
this Court.
xxx xxx xxx
While litigations should as much as possible be decided on the
merits and not on technicalities, a litigant who has exhibited
downright disregard, bordering on defiance and insolence, of the
rules that make for an orderly proceeding will not be tolerated further
in his mockery of the courts and even of his opponent's substantive
rights. 9 x x x.
On petition for review on certiorari to this Court, we affirmed the CA
Decision in Our August 20, 2008 Resolution. 10
During the pendency of the petition with the CA and this Court, trial
continued. Westmonk Bank presented its witnesses and formally offered its
documentary evidence. On rebuttal, Remedios was recalled to the witness
stand and identified various checks and receipts as proof of her genuine
signature. She also presented the QDR issued by the NBI, and the PNP Crime
Laboratory Report which were previously ordered expunged from the
records, and submitted them anew in her formal offer of rebuttal evidence.
Over Westmont Bank's objection, the trial court admitted Remedios' formal
offer of rebuttal evidence. 11
Meanwhile, Remedios filed another complaint before the same court,
docketed as Civil Case No. 4950-MN, against Antonio and Westmont Bank to
nullify the deed of real estate mortgage dated August 4, 2000, and various
promissory notes in which Remedios appeared as a signatory. She similarly
alleged that her signatures on the REM and the promissory notes were
forged. After trial, on May 8, 2012, the trial court decided in favor of
Remedios and ordered the nullification of the 2000 REM and the Continuing
Surety Agreement executed by Antonio and Westmont Bank, and declared
the promissory notes without legal effect on Remedios. Westmont Bank's
motion for reconsideration was denied in the trial court's Order dated July 17,
2012. 12
On August 31, 2012, the trial court rendered a Decision13 in Civil Case
No. 2907-MN, declaring the 1995 REM and the 1997 amendment to the REM
void, and the promissory notes without legal effect insofar as Remedios is
concerned, thus:
Having established the fact x x x that the purported signatures
of plaintiff in the loan and mortgage documents were not those of
plaintiff Remedios, it follows that the contracts of loan in favor of
Metro Isuzu Corporation, and the mortgage contracts entered into as
security for the payment thereof, do not have the consent of plaintiff
Remedios. Hence, the loan contracts are invalid as against plaintiff
Remedios, and defendant Bank cannot hold her personally liable for
any of these loans.
As a logical consequence, the second issue is likewise resolved
in favor of plaintiff The real estate mortgage constituted on the
subject properties forming part of the conjugal partnership of gains
case without the consent of plaintiff Remedios, as one of the
registered owners and as spouse in all the transfer certificate of titles
of these properties before liquidation and separation of properties in
the annulment proceedings then pending before the court, is null and
void. 14
The trial court denied Westmont Bank's motion for reconsideration in
its Order dated November 21, 2012. Westmont Bank appealed the trial
court's August 31, 2012 Decision and November 21, 2012 Order in Civil Case
No. 2907-MN; and the May 8, 2012 Decision and July 17, 2012 Order in Civil
Case No. 4950-MN, to the CA. The appeals were docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
100241 and CA-G.R. CV No. 99511, respectively. Pursuant to the CA's May 2,
2014 Resolution, the two appeals were consolidated. Onshore Strategic
Assets, Inc. (Onshore) substituted Westmont Bank in both appeals.
Meanwhile, Strong Fort Warehousing Corporation (Strong Fort) moved to be
substituted for Onshore as appellant in CA-G.R. CV No. 100241. 15
On May 25, 2015, 16 the CA rendered the assailed Decision, affirming
the invalidity of the REM, as well as the promissory notes with respect to
Remedios on account of her forged signature, and reducing the award of
damages for being excessive, to wit:
Remedios categorically denied having contracted any loan from
Westmont Bank and disavowed the genuineness of her purported
signatures on the 1995 REM and 1997 Amendment to the REM. In the
case of Dela Rama v. Papa , the Supreme Court elucidated that there
is no rule that automatically discounts the testimony of the alleged
writer as to the genuineness or spuriousness of his own signature.
The testimony of the very person whose signature is put in question
has probative value, whether such testimony is offered to affirm or
dispute the genuineness of his signature; it satisfies the requirement
under Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court on how the
genuineness of handwriting must be proved. The evidentiary weight
of such testimony wholly depends on its strength viewed in
conjunction with the totality of evidence at hand.
xxx xxx xxx
The expunction of the NBI's QDR and the PNP-CLDER does not
mean that Remedios has no evidence at all to prove forgery. x x x.
 With more reason then, Remedios' testimony, which was clear and
positive, taken together with Susan's admission that the Remedios
who appeared before the RTC was not the same person who sighed
the 1995 REM and 1997 Amendment to the REM, may be sufficient to
establish plaintiff-appellee's claim. Besides, x x x, Our own
independent examination of the questioned signatures and Remedios'
genuine signatures on her complaint and the signatures and
Remedios' genuine signatures on her complaint and the various
checks she issued sufficiently proved the falsity of her purported
signatures on the 1995 REM and the 1997 Amendment to the REM.
Therefore, the aforesaid mortgage documents are null and void
because Remedios did not give her consent thereto.
xxx xxx xxx
OSAI and SFWC's predecessor-in-interest, Westmont Bank, fell
short of the required degree of diligence, prudence, and care in
approving the 1995 REM, 1997 Amendment to the REM, and August
4, 2000 REM. Based on the records of the nullification of the 1995
REM and 1997 Amendment to the REM case, the bank approved the
REMs without conducting a credit investigation on Remedios.
Westmont Bank did not bother to ascertain if the woman introduced
by Antonio as his wife was actually Remedios. Susan's allegation that
she asked for Remedios' drivers [ sic ] license is belied by the fact that
only a CTC was indicated as proof of identity in the questioned REMs.
It also appears from the tenor of Susan's testimony that the bank
merely relied on Antonio's representation because at that time[,] he
was a valued client.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100241 and CA-
G.R. CV No. 99511 are PARTIALLY GRANTED . The August 31, 2012
Decision and November 21, 2012 Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 74, Malabon City in Civil Case No. 2907-MN as well as the May
8, 2012 Decision and July 17, 2012 Order in Civil Case No. 4950-MN
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. In both cases, the awards of
moral and exemplary damages are reduced to P100,000.00 and
P50,000.00[,] respectively. All other aspects of the assailed Decisions
stand.
SO ORDERED. 17 (Citations omitted.)
Onshore and Strong Fort's motion for reconsideration was denied. 18
Hence, Strong Fort 19 filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Strong Fort contends that the CA erred in not reversing the trial court when it
admitted Remedios' rebuttal evidence that had been expunged from the
records, such as the NBI's QDR and the PNP Crime Laboratory Report.
Corollarily, since the NBI's QDR and the PNP Crime Laboratory Report had
been expunged, the opinions of handwriting experts, Arcadio Ramos and
Florenda Negre regarding the said documents become mere hearsay and
baseless. The admission in evidence of the BPI checks showing Remedios'
sample signatures, and the various promissory notes containing her forged
signatures during the rebuttal stage, is improper because it violates Section
(Sec.) 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that a plaintiff must
present his evidence in chief before the close of the proof, and may not add
to it by the device of rebuttal. The 1995 REM and the 1997 amendment to
the REM are presumed valid because they are notarized documents.
Moreover, contrary to the findings of the CA that Antonio and Remedios
presented only one Tax Identification Number, the spouses also presented
their individual Residence Certificates as proofs of their identity. Atty.
Avelino Agudo, the Notary Public who notarized the 1995 REM, required
them to produce competent evidence of identity, and verify their respective
signatures on the subject document. Also, there was no categorical
admission from Susan Tan that the person who appeared before the trial
court as complainant in this case, is not the same person who signed the
1995 REM and the 1997 amendment.
As to the award of moral and exemplary damages, there is no evidence
that Westmont Bank acted in a wanton, fraudulent, and malevolent manner.
Remedios, on the other hand, is guilty of inexcusable negligence in failing to
protect her interest in the conjugal properties by filing an action for judicial
separation of property one year after her separation from Antonio in 1991.
Assuming that Remedios' signatures on the 1995 REM and its 1997
amendment, and the 2000 REM were forged, the REMs should not be
nullified entirely, but should remain valid with respect to the conjugal
properties covered by the mortgage that belong to Antonio. Lastly, the
nullification of the subject deeds of mortgage, which are merely accessory
contracts, does not affect the validity of the promissory notes, which are the
principal contracts.
RULING
The petition is bereft of merit.
Evidence that is ordered expunged from the records cannot be
considered in favor of, and against a party for any purpose. To expunge
means to strike out, obliterate, or mark for deletion. In all respects, an
expunged evidence does not exist in the records and, therefore, has no
probative value. Here, it is undisputed that the QDR issued by the NBI, and
the PNP Crime Laboratory Report were expunged from the records by virtue
of this Court's final and executory Resolution dated August 20, 2008. Though
admitted in evidence, these expunged documents were not the bases of the
trial court in concluding that Remedios' signature was forged.
Forgery must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and
the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a
forged signature in an instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the
alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by a
comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and
genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon to have
been forged. 20 Pertinently, Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 22. Â How genuineness of handwriting proved. — The
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes
it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the
person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
 witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge
of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the
handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness
or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the
party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine
to the satisfaction of the judge.
Remedios herself denied signing the 1995 REM and its 1997
amendment, and the 2000 REM. Her disavowal of her signatures on the
questioned documents has probative value, and thus, may be admitted in
evidence. This is the essence of our ruling in Dela Rama v. Papa , 21 which
was aptly cited by the CA, to wit:
Does Section 22 of Rule 132 accommodate the testimony of the
very person whose signature is disputed as a means to establish the
genuineness of handwriting? We believe that it does, x x x. After all,
the owner of such disputed signature may fall within the category of
"any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person
because he has seen the person write x x x and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person." In Alo v. Rocamora ,
plaintiff Alo presented in evidence a deed of sale establishing that he,
and not the defendant, was the prior purchaser of the land in
question. Alo himself testified as to the authenticity of the deed of
sale. In discussing whether the genuineness of such document was
proved, we cited the then Section 324 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which provides "any writing may be proved, either by anyone who
saw the writing executed; or by evidence of the genuineness of the
handwriting of the maker; or by a subscribing witness." x x x:
xxx xxx xxx
Section 324 of the Code of Civil Procedure is substantially
similar to Section 22 of Rule 132, so our application of the former rule
in Alo remains appropriate today. At the very least, Section 22 of Rule
132 does not exclude such testimony from consideration. It is in fact
well-established in the law of evidence that the testimony of the very
person whose signature is disputed is more than competent proof on
the genuineness of such signature. 22 x x x. (Citation omitted.)
Aside from Remedios' testimony denying her signature on the subject
independent assessment of the authenticity of Remedios' signature on the
1995 REM and its 1997 amendment. We quote the following findings of the
CA:
In the questioned signatures, the name "Remedios" appears to be
unclear and cannot be easily deciphered, while in the sample
signatures each letter of the word "Remedios" is legibly written. The
middle initial "T" on the assailed signatures is written very close to
the word "Remedios" while on the sample signatures, there is a space
between the letter "T" and "Remedios". In the word "Banta", the
capital "B" in the sample signatures is disconnected from the letter
"a", whereas in the questioned signatures the capital "B" is
connected to the letter "a". Noteworthy, the signatures appearing on
the 1995 REM and 1997 Amendment to the REM seem to have been
written by a person with wobbly hands while the sample signatures
appear to be written smoothly and with ease. Undoubtedly, these
 discrepancies can be easily noticed by mere physical appearance. 23

While it is settled that resort to handwriting experts is not

indispensable in the finding of forgery, their opinions are useful and may
serve as additional evidence to buttress the claim of forgery. Owing to their
special knowledge and trainings, they can help determine fundamental,
significant differences in writing characteristics between the questioned and
the standard or sample specimen signatures, as well as the movement and
manner of execution strokes. 24 In this case, the handwriting experts
testified based on the documents and signature examination which they
performed to analyze the possibility of forgery. They personally scrutinized
and compared Remedios' disputed signatures in the subject documents with
her authentic sample signatures. The handwriting experts detailed the
glaring and material significant differences between Remedios' genuine
signatures and those appearing in the questioned documents. To be sure,
their testimonies are not hearsay, nor rendered baseless by the fact that the
QDR and the PNP Crime Laboratory Report were expunged from the records.
Their opinions as expert witnesses can stand on their own and do not
depend on the QDR and the PNP Crime Laboratory Report for their
competence and probative value. Verily, the forgery was established by
evidence, other than the QDR and the PNP Crime Laboratory Report.
Anent the admission in evidence of the BPI checks and various
promissory notes during the rebuttal stage, we agree with Strong Fort that
the salve is not justified. Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court provides
that the parties may respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the
court, for good reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to
adduce evidence upon their original case. Thus, a plaintiff is bound to
introduce all evidence that supports his case during the presentation of his
evidence in chief before the close of the proof, and may not add to it by the
device of rebuttal. 25 In Lopez v. Liboro, 26 we provided the circumstances in
which additional evidence may be allowed at the rebuttal stage, to wit: a)
when it is newly discovered; b) where it has been omitted through
inadvertence or mistake; or c) where the purpose of the evidence is to
correct evidence previously offered.
Here, Remedios failed to justify the presentation of the promissory
notes and the BPI checks containing her forged and genuine signatures as
rebuttal evidence. To note, these documents constitute direct proof of
forgery, which is the main issue of the case, hence, these should have been
presented as evidence in chief. It was thus, an error on the part of the trial
court to allow these evidence on rebuttal. Nevertheless, it does not appear
from the records that Westmont Bank raised this issue on their appeal to the
CA. It was raised for the first time only in this petition for review. It is settled
that no question will be considered on appeal if it was not raised in the court
below. Otherwise, the court will be forced to make a judgment that goes
beyond the issues and will adjudicate something in which the court did not
hear the parties. 27
In arguing that Remedios is guilty of inexcusable negligence by failing
to file an action for judicial separation of property to protect her interest,
Strong Fort is apparently shifting the blame on Remedios. To be sure, there
is no law imposing an obligation upon Remedios to file an action in court to
protect her interest in the conjugal properties because her interest is already
protected and reserved for her by law as a conjugal partner. On the contrary,
it is Westmont Bank that failed to observe the required level of caution in
ascertaining the identity of the mortgagor and the genuineness of her
signature. We note that the bank approved the REMs without conducting a
credit investigation on Remedios. It did not also take steps to ascertain if the
woman introduced by Antonio as his wife was actually Remedios.
Accordingly, Westmont Bank must bear the consequences of its negligence.
Equally baseless is Strong Fort's argument that the subject deeds of
mortgage should remain valid with respect to the conjugal properties that
belong to Antonio. Antonio and Remedios were married on April 5, 1975, or
before the Family Code took effect in 1988. Hence, the applicable law is the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Article (Art.) 160 of the Civil Code provides that
"[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife." The subject deeds of mortgage were executed in various
years beginning 1995, or after the effectivity of the Family Code. Any
alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity
of the Family Code is governed by Art. 124, 28 which states:
ART. 124. Â The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties,
the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority
of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence
of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Any disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property by one spouse
must be consented to, by the other; otherwise, it is void. 29 Prior to the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the
conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a
legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into a title until it appears
that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and
settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder
resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its
dissolution. "Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal
assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally
determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net
assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective
heirs." 30 Consequently, even on the assumption that Antonio mortgaged
only his portion of the conjugal partnership, the mortgage is still theoretically
void because his right to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Notably, when Antonio executed
the assailed deeds of mortgage in 1995, 1997, and 2000, his marriage with
Remedios was still existing and the conjugal partnership was not yet
dissolved. As such, it could not be determined yet which of the conjugal
assets belong to Antonio that he can validly mortgage.
The nullity of the 1995 REM and its 1997 amendment, and the 2000
REM, notwithstanding, does not invalidate the loan as embodied in the
promissory notes executed by Antonio. A mortgage is merely an accessory
agreement and does not affect the principal contract of loan. The
mortgages, while void, can still be considered as instruments evidencing the
indebtedness. In Flores v. Spouses Lindo, Jr., 31 we pronounced:
The liability of x x x on the principal contract of the loan
however subsists notwithstanding the illegality of the mortgage.
Indeed, where a mortgage is not valid, the principal obligation which
it guarantees is not thereby rendered null and void. That obligation
matures and becomes demandable in accordance with the stipulation
pertaining to it. Under the foregoing circumstances, what is lost is
merely the right to foreclose the mortgage as a special remedy for
satisfying or settling the indebtedness which is the principal
obligation. In case of nullity, the mortgage deed remains as evidence
or proof of a personal obligation of the debtor and the amount due to
the creditor may be enforced in an ordinary action. 32
Being merely accessory contracts, the nullity of the subject deeds of
real estate mortgage on account of the forged signature of Remedios, does
not result in the invalidation of the loan obligation of Antonio.
Finally, whether or not the notarization of the 1995 REM is regular,
contrary to the findings of the CA; whether or not Atty. Avelino Agudo, the
Notary Public who notarized the 1995 REM, required Antonio and Remedios
to produce competent evidence of identity; whether or not there was
categorical admission from Susan Tan that the person who appeared before
the trial court as complainant in this case is not the same person who signed
the 1995 REM and the 1997 amendment; and, whether or not Westmont
Bank acted in wanton, fraudulent, and malevolent manner under the
circumstances — involve questions of fact which are beyond the ambit of
this Court's jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari, it is not this
Court's task to go over the proofs presented below to ascertain if they were
appreciated and weighed correctly, most especially when the CA and the
RTC speak as one in their findings and conclusions. While it is widely held
that this rule of limited jurisdiction admits of exceptions, none exists in the
instant case. 33
FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is DENIED.
 SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, Gesmundo, Lazaro-Javier and Rosario, * JJ., concur.
Â
Footnotes

* Designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2797 dated November 5,
2020.

1. Rollo , pp. 57-107.

2. Id. at 136-163; penned by Associate Justice Pedro B. Corales, with the

concurrence of Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Rodil V. Zalameda
(now a Member of this Court).

3. Id. at 231-233.

4. Id. at 121.

5. Id. at 122.

6. Id. at 140.

7. Id. at 207-219.

8. Id. at 110-119; penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with the

concurrence of Associate Justices Vicente Q. Roxas and Ramon R. Garcia.

9. Id. at 117-118.

10. Id. at 64. The August 20, 2008 Resolution of this Court attained finality on
January 15, 2009.

11. Id. at 15.

12. Id. at 19.

13. Id. at 120-134, penned by Judge Celso R.L. Magsino, Jr.

14. Id. at 126.

15. Id. at 10.

16. Supra note 2.

17. Supra at 154-162.

18. Rollo , pp. 37-39; Resolution dated January 20, 2016.

19. Supra note 1. On March 9, 2016, this Court received Strong Fort's Manifestation
(rollo, pp. 43-46), that Villaraza & Angcangco has entered its appearance as
counsel for Onshore, in substitution of Villanueva Caña & Associates. This
had been duly noted by the Court of Appeals in its August 22, 2014
Resolution (rollo, p. 48). The present petition was filed by Villanueva Caña &
Associates on behalf of Strong Fort only.
20. Heirs of the Late Felix M. Bucton v. Spouses Go., 721 Phil. 851, 860 (2013).

21. 597 Phil. 227 (2009).

22. Id. at 247-248.

23. Rollo , pp. 155-156.

24. Tortona v. Gregorio , n 823 Phil. 980, 994 (2018).

25. Heirs of Emilio Santioque v. Heirs of Emilio Calma, 536 Phil. 524, 544 (2006).

26. 81 Phil. 431 (1948), as cited in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, (4th Div.) , 678 Phil.
358, 398 (2011).

27. Bayan v. Bayan, G.R. No. 220741, August 14, 2019.

28. FAMILY CODE, as cited in Spouses Aggabao v. Parulan, Jr. , 644 Phil. 26, 36
(2010).

29. PNB v. Reyes , 796 Phil. 736, 744 (2016).

30. Spouses Lita De Leon and Felix Rio Tarrosa v. Anita B. De Leon; 611 Phil. 384,
397-398 (2009).

31. 664 Phil. 210 (2011), as cited in Rural Bank of Cabadbaran, Inc. v. Melecio-Yap ,
740 Phil. 35, 52 (2014).

32. Flores v. Spouses Lindo, Jr., id. at 218.

33. Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr., 269 Phil. 225 (1990).

n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official document.