A Framework for Implementation of Occupational Health

and Safety Management Systems in Process Industry

Samir R. Kale

The paper throws light on understanding the Introduction

proactive role that Occupational, Health and 1
Industrialization has brought with its wake several
Safety (OH&S) plays in process related unit problems one such is industrial accidents. With rapid
operations. It focuses on various hazards advances in industrial processes, newer type of
occuring in workplace of a process industry and danger to lifetime and health are being increasingly
how to mitigate this hazards through the introduced. Every year several lakhs of workers are
application of various tools that drives OH&S injured in industrial operations, preventing
with the help of real life examples. It also occupational illness, accidents, and injuries is the
describes the implementation stages of OH&S responsibility of everyone on the workplace. An
in a process industry. A case study has been organized accident prevention program that involves
illustrated to understand the consequences of employees and employers leads to the concept of
OH&S.
overlooking the safety aspects. The paper
2
concludes that inculcating safety culture right Various hazards had been identified in the
from design to development, results in reduced workplace, which includes chemical hazards,
accident rates and keep employers and physical hazards, biological hazards, ergonomic
employees safe. hazards, safety hazards, machine hazards, energy
hazards, materials handling hazards, work practice
hazards. The impact of these hazards on the
environment, workplace, workers health and
potential loss should be detected and appropriate
course of action should be suggested.
The occurrence of hazards is mainly due to
equipment failure, design deficiency, unsafe acts
caused by human errors, corrosion, abnormalities
in operation and maintenance or external events such
as explosion, fire, and natural disasters like storm,
earthquake etc .
3
2. Need of OH&S
• To Eliminate accidents occuring in the
workplace.
• To Establish a documented system for
identification and evaluation of occupational
hazards and subsequent risks.
• To Establish hazard and risk identification,
assessment and control procedure.

Vol. 28, No. 4, Oct.- Dec. 2003 29

• Identify and evaluate the OH&S risks of A.2 HAZOP :
activities, product and services. To identify the potentially hazardous
• Determine those risks that have significant situation and to arrive at agreeable options
impact on OH&S. to rectify design deviations and anomalies.
These method should be carried out as a part
3. Elements of OH&S of design activity .The pre-requisite guide
• Leadership and administration words for these study are No, More, Less,
As well as, part of, Reverse and Other than.
• OH&S committees / WH&S ( Workers Health Each of these words can be used to test the
and Safety) representatives operating conditions
• Education and training 5
B. Tree based techniques : In order to find a
• Communication particular fault or initialization discrepancy this
• Safe work practices and procedures techniques are used
• Hazard recognition, evaluation & control B.1 Fault Tree Analysis :
• Workplace inspections It is a method which involves estimating
• Accident/incident investigations the failures of a system which comprises
of many components.
• Emergency preparedness and response
4
B.2 Event Tree Analysis :
4. Techniques of OH&S
It is basically a result analysis technique
A. Qualitative analysis : These are classified into which gives outcome of a given initiating
Preliminary Analysis, Hazard and Operability event.
Studies (HAZOP) and Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis (FMEA). B.3 Cause Consequence Analysis :

B. Tree based techniques : These are classified It is a blend of Fault and Event tree features
into Fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, and also accounts for the delay factors to
cause consequence analysis, management evaluate the likely consequence due to
oversight risk tree and safety management failure cause in a system.
organization review technique. B.4 Management Oversight Risk Tree
C. Techniques for dynamic systems : These are (MORT) :
classified into GO method, and Diagraph/fault Safety MORT is a diagram which arranges
method safety program elements in an orderly and
A. Qualitative analysis is widely used in nuclear logical manner. Its analysis is carried out
plants and chemical processing industries, the by means of fault tree, where the top event
most documented Qualitative analysis method is "damage, destruction, other costs, lost
is the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis method production or reduced credibility of the
(FMEA). enterprise in the eyes of society". The tree
gives an overview of the causes of the top
A.1 FMEA : event from management oversights and
For identification of various failure modes omissions or from assumed risks or both.
that could occur during the plant operations
B.5 Safety Management Organization
and lead to undesired event (accidents or
Review Technique (Smort) :
injuries). Eliminating these failures is the
key to achieve safe operation . SMORT is a simplified modification of

Vol. 28, No. 4, Oct.- Dec. 2003 30

 MORT. This technique is structured by of the chemical and the safety measures while
means of analysis levels with associated handling such chemicals and also emergency steps
checklists, while MORT is based on a in case of a splash or a leakage.
comprehensive tree structure.
B. Design Systems & Procedures for safe conditions
C. Techniques for Dynamic Systems : These and practices to avoid dangerous operation,
8,9
techniques are used for treating dynamic accidents and near miss chances :
scenarios and dynamic process variables .
HAZARD TYPE BASIC CAUSE
C.1 Go Method : 1. Materials storage and 1. Inadequate
The GO method basically is a success handling engineering
oriented system analysis that uses various 2. Hand tools/equipments 2. Maintenance
operators. The three basic types are 3. Productive machine 3. Purchasing
independent, dependent and logic which safety
are used in model development . With the 4. Workstation design/ 4. Work standard
probability data for each independent and layout
dependent operator, the probability of
5. Lighting 5. Supervision
successful operation can then be calculated
6. Premises 6. Training
C.2 Diagraph/Fault Method : 7. Environmental hazards 7. Skill
This method is similar to a GO chart but 8. Welfare facilities 8. Motivation
uses AND OR gates instead. The 9. Personal protective 9. Abuse
connectivity matrix, derived from adjacency equipments
matrix for the system,will whether a fault 10. Work organization 10. Misuse
node will lead to the top event.
11. Other (specify) 11. Other (specify)
5. Methodology for Implementation of OH&S
Carry out the safety behaviour sampling in each
A. Identify possible hazards affecting man, department and prepare the list of unsafe acts
material, method, machine, and workplace in associated with each activity and also suggest the
6,7
the process industry : safe acts for the above activity. Keep the records
Hazard is defined as an event that has potential for for future references and avoid repeating it .
an incident. The particular Task/ Activity or Service For Example :
should be noted for a given hazard and also the basic
cause could be comprehended behind the Task/ Maintenance of a tank carrying hazardous chemical
Activity/Service and appropriate course of action in continuous process
should be chalked out from the observations as Unsafe Acts
highlighted below. Cause and effect diagram is the
• Not Isolating the tank from the present position
best adopted method to comprehend the unsafe
activity related to these 4 M's • No works permit for the workers carrying out
the job
Following is the Table indicating the hazards and
their possible basic causes in the process industry. • No slip plates used for Isolation

The next step is to identify the hazardous chemicals Safe Acts

in the process. The Material Safety Data sheets of • Isolating the tank from the line by proper slip
all such hazardous chemicals is available in the plating rather than using valves as there might
literature . This Sheets indicate the hazard potential be a chance for leakage through valves

Vol. 28, No. 4, Oct.- Dec. 2003 31

• Issuing three work permits : For Isolating, To emergency procedure are, raising the alarm,
carry out main job, For proper reconnections implementation of response action, clean up and
• Also ensure whether there are vapors near the restoration. The alarm will stir the response. The
maintenance area through portable gas detection response will activate at the individual level by
equipment the action guides and at the key personnel level
by the action plans.
Apart from these guidelines concept of safety
design should be practiced from previous Key Steps :
experiences as experience is the best teacher • Gathering information about the nature and
depth of emergency
Reactor Design
• Decision making (If previously such a case
• A tubular reactor is safer than pot reactor occurred what steps were taken ? Which are the
• Vapor phase reactors may be developed to liquid correct steps etc.)
phase reactors • Clean up and Restoration
Distillation Columns C. Occupational Health monitoring of workers
• Incorporate a narrow base and engineers :
• Internal calendrias and dephlegmeters There should be weekly check up of all
engineers and workers involved in the process
• Two distillation stages into one
and the health data sheet of particular employee
• Good control systems for ex Inferential control working in a particular department should be
recorded. The doctor attending should also
Exchangers
guide the employees about the occupational
• Use of higher flow rate hazards due to exposure of chemicals .
• Use of extended surface exchangers D. Determine the various indices according to
• High temp gradient ANSI rate for critical jobs of each
9
department in the process industry
Safety Systems
• Testing of safety systems connected with reactor The different indices are as follows
a Disabling Injury Frequency Rate (DIFR)
• Environment air should be checked to detect
leaks b Disabling Injury Severity Rate (DISR)
• Water deluge system should be checked c Average Day Charged (ADC)
• Safety valves should be regularly checked for DIFR is defined as the No of disabling injuries
setting (including illness) per million employee hours
worked.
B. Emergency Planning, Preparedness and
8,9
Response : DISR is defined as the No of days lost or
The procedure should ensure review and charged per million employee hours worked
revision of emergency preparedness and ADC is calculated to find average length per
response procedure after the occurrence of disabling injury
accident or emergency situations, wherever
necessary. E. Carry out risk analysis, DOW INDEX
CALCULATION, HAZOP Study and
The requirement of mock drills for testing these
HAZAN study for critical equipment
revised procedures should be documented in the
10
procedure.In General, the sequences in an Hazard is defined as physical situation with a

Vol. 28, No. 4, Oct.- Dec. 2003 32

 potential for human injury, damage to property, keep in mind that HAZOP and HAZAN are
damage to the environment or the combination concerned with hazards, not with operating
of these. problems.
A risk is the likelihood of a specific undesired HAZOP study includes streams which handle
event occurring within the specific period or in hazardous materials. Process which handle high
specified circumstance. temperatures and pressures, places where toxic and
inflammable materials are stored. The technique of
HAZAN is defined as the identification of HAZOP study aims at identifying hazardous
undesired events that lead to the situation and to arrive at agreeable options to rectify
materialization of a hazard, the analysis of the design deviations and anamolies.
mechanisms by which these undesired events
occur and usually the estimation of the extent, Real life Example :
magnitude and likelihood of any harmful
effects. Grasim Industries Ltd, Nagda has given priority to
safety in their organization by implementing WCM
While the Identification of the Hazard is a very in which safety is one of the pillars. FMEA &
important step towards safety it is only the first HAZOP of Auxiliary and Viscose Department for
steps. There is the chain of events or actions that critical equipment have been illustrated to indicate
has to be followed if we are to arrive at a safer the importance of this tools that drives OH&S.
process plant. The Hazard and operability is [Grasim Industries has obtained OHSAS -18001
applied to all new designs, but hazard analysis certification from DNV Veritas which is a authorized
should only be used selectively. Only the serious certifying body in India]. The sheets are illustrated
hazards need to be quantified. It is necessary to as follows.

(Unit : Grasim Industries Ltd, Birlagram)

Table 1 - FAILURE MODE EFFECT ANALYSIS (FMEA)

Department : AUX-1
Equipment : MSFE
Function : Spin Bath Concentration

S.No. Component Faliure Rating on 10 Point Scale Risk Corrective Action

Mode Effect Cause A B C Factor
Frequency Severity Detection AxBxC Activity Responsibility Target
Difficulty Date
1 Heater Top Rubber lining I.MSFE Stoppage i.High Temp. i. Temp. Pr.Operator C.E.
Dish End failure Faliure ii.Spin Bath ii.Improper rubber 8 7 5 280 Regulation
Leakage lining at junction ii. Better E & DD C.E.
rubber lining
quality

2 Heater Bottom Rubber lining I.MSFE Stoppage i.High Temp. I. Temp. Pr.Operator C.E.
Dish End failure ii.Spin Bath ii.Improper rubber 6 7 4 168 Regulation
Leakage lining at junction ii. Better E & DD C.E.
rubber lining
quality

3 Heater Shell Leakage Due I.MSFE Stoppage Due to acid leakage 5 7 4 140 Tubes & Rings Process C.E.
to Corrosion ii.Spin Bath from tubes and rings leakage to be Maint. C.E.
Leakage reduced
*C.E. =Convenient End

Vol. 28, No. 4, Oct.- Dec. 2003 33

 11
Dow Index Calculation case studies and how major accidents could have
been prevented .
The Dow fire and explosion Index is universally
used in evaluating the hazard category of a process The biggest three disaters concerning process
plant, area of exposure, expected losses in case of industries were as follows :
fire and explosion .
• The Methyl isocyanate plant of Union carbide,
The following is the Fire and Explosion Index range Bhopal
along with the degree of hazard but it is not without • Flixborough Disaster of UK
considering the loss control measures.
• Seveso Disaster
The detailed calculation of DOW INDEX in the
To understand precepts of safety from experience
DOW F& E I Hazard classification guide. These
of these disaters many inquiry committees were
Index is usually necessary to give a clearer picture
of fire and explosion hazards. Risk Assessment Criteria
F. Controlling the risks that have significant Hazard Rating Impact
impact on OH&S through critical
12 Low Medium High
assessment
Probability Low General Specific Formal
Risk assessment is the practical discipline Training Training Procedure
concerned with measuring and predicting the
Rating Medium Specific Formal Physical
frequency and severity of such events and it Training Procedure control
has been applied to problems of risk
management in field like environmental High Formal Physical Avoid
pollution, occupational safety, transportation Procedure control
and energy production. nominated and they studied the loopholes
Bold Letters : Acceptable occurring in the processes. To understand a
broader picture of a real life situation a recent case
Italicized : Precautionary Measures
study regarding the fire at a Refinery in West
Needed To Mitigate
Malaysia is taken. The details of this incident is
Bold And Underlined : Unacceptable given below.
Refineries are major hazard installations which
F & E Index Range Degree of Hazard possess large quantities of hazardous substances .Due
1-60 Light to the complexity and tightly coupled unit operations
in refineries the process parameters should be closely
61-96 Moderate monitored. These can be well understood from
previous case studies and implementing steps &
97-127 Intermediate
procedures for inherent safer design.
128-158 Heavy
On 28 April 1999 at approximately 8 p.m , the relief
159-up Severe valves system of ( Unit RV 3 and Unit RV 4 ) of the
desalter of a crude unit at a Refinery in West
Malaysia were exposed to the conditions exceeding
6. Case Study of a Refinery Fire at West
13 the design conditions. The system was unable to
Malaysia (1999)
cope with the resultant forces and the flange joints
In order to understand how overlooking safety downstream of the relief valves were open.
aspects can cause havoc it is necessary to discuss Hydrocarbons escaped to the atmosphere and fire

Vol. 28, No. 4, Oct.- Dec. 2003 34

ensued which lasted for 7 hours. Although the relief ❖ Safety culture should be adopted by carrying
valves were reset, the hydrocarbon gas flowed back out frequent safety audits and continuous risk
from the column. assessment
Cause and Consequences of the incident ❖ Active top management support for safety of
employees and workers
The immediate cause of the incident was the 3
exposure of the relief valves to conditions which 7. Benefits of OH&S
exceeded the design conditions. The pressure and Business Integration
temperature exceeded the design limits of the
system. Business can also be integrated with OH&S. The
ISO 14001 (EMS), ISO 9001 (QMS) can be
The consequences of the incident integrated with ISO 18001 (OHSAS) . The reason
❖ There were no resulting injuries for integration is that many of the information
required in the audit sheets is common and it
❖ The fire damaged the crude distillation column becomes redundant in all the three audit sheets so
and externals including piping, installation and effective integration should be planned and carried
platforms out as accordingly
❖ Unit down time was 24 days
Some steps of integrating the process is as follows
❖ The cost was estimated 250 million rupees • Do winning Designs
Causes of the incident • Implement Zero Accidents/Zero Strategy and
Actions
❖ Technical and operational errors .
• Optimize Process to Reduce Chemical use
❖ Errors due to lack of knowledge of project
management . • Select Equipment/Processes with clean
Technologies
❖ Lack of follow up by management
• Reduce Cleans
❖ Design stage errors accumulated due to changes
• Use continuous Risk assessment
in DCS system during commissioning stage.
❖ Tripping was not considered and therefore the 8. Conclusion
DCS software was modified and ultimately one This Paper focussed on various aspects of
of the crude pumps tripped following the opening Occupational Health and Safety in process industry.
up of relief valves which caught fire. Process industry being one of the most hazardous
Lessons to be learned from above incident industries can be vulnerable to many untoward
incidents. This accidents and near miss chances can
❖ Follow up from supervisors and managers be reduced drastically if one has an explicit OH&S
towards the process . policy. The procedures discussed if implemented and
❖ Design stage should include adequate safety demonstrated can create a better understanding
factors . between the employer and the employees and therein
results in zero breakdowns and zero accidents . It's
❖ Implement Effective project management the responsibility on the part of the employer to ensure
techniques. OH&S is implemented by adherence to Factories Act
❖ Operational errors should be avoided and well 1948 and by periodically carrying out audits (both
qualified operators should be trained in case of internal and external). With proper training, mock
an emergency for ex: How to shut the whole unit drills and slide shows of safe and unsafe acts the
if some triggering event is indicated etc. process industry can achieve the zero accident goal .

Vol. 28, No. 4, Oct.- Dec. 2003 35

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