Reddy (1979) TheConduitMetaphor
Reddy (1979) TheConduitMetaphor
Reddy (1979) TheConduitMetaphor
wisdom - this paradigm-consciousness - to human communication it- able to us today, to bring about substantive improvements in human
self. It may seem predictable that I, a linguist, would take such a communication, it may well be because this frame conflict has led us to
position. But, if I do, it is hardly disciplinary narrow-mindedness that attempt faulty solutions to the problem.
motivates me. In 1954, Norbert Wiener, one of the originators of infor- It is, of course, impossible to make such assertions without calling to
mation theory, ·and the "father of cybernetics," stated quite flatly: mind the speculations and arguments of many twentieth-century
"Society can only be understood through a study of the messages and figures-notably those of Whorl (1956) and of Max Black"s (1962d)
communications facilities which belong to it" (Wiener, 1954, p. 16). I reluctant but thorough refutation of Whorf. There is an old joke
have never thought of this statement as referring to things like the size about the Whorl hypothesis to the effect that, if it should be true, then
and adequacy of the telephone system. Wiener was talking primarily it would be by definition unprovable. For if two human beings not
about the basic processes of human communication - how they work, . only spoke radically different languages, but also thought and per·
what sort of wrinkles there are in them, when and why they are likely . ceived the world differently, well then they would be far too busy
to succeed -0r fail. The problems of society, government, and culture throwing rocks and spears at one another to ever sit down and estab-
depend ultimately on something like the daily box score of such sue· lish this as a fact. The grain of truth in this facetiousness can be found
cesses or failures to communicate. If there are too many failures, or sys- in SchOn's dictum that frame conflicts are "immune to resolution hv
tematic types of failure, troubles will multiply. A society -0£ near-per· . appeal to the facts." As he says, "New facts have a way of being eith~ .
feet communicators, though it would no doubt still face conflicts of <_.absorbed or disregarded by those who see problematic situations under
interest, might well be able to avoid many of the destructive, divisive :, conflicting frames." Now, for the past several years, I have been coli;ea-~
effects of these inevitable confilcts. :--ing some new facts and talking about them tvith many different pea:p~
286 MICHAEL J• REDDY The conduit metaphor
Very slowly. during this period of time, these new facts initiated a since these are locked within the skull and life process of each of us.
frame change in my own thinking about language. I had always been Surely, then, none of these three expressions is to be taken completely
interested in Uriel Weinreich's observation that, "Language is its own at face value. Language seems rather to help one person to construct
metalanguage." But after the frame change. I knew that, as a metalan- out of his own stock of mental stuff something like a replica, or copy,
guage, English, at least, was its own worst enemy. And I knew that of someone else's thoughts - a replica which can be more or less accu-
there was something more than mysticism to Whorrs ideas. At this rate, depending on many factors. If we could indeed send thoughts to
point, curiously enough, when everything seemed to fall into place for one another, we would have little need for a communications system.
me, it became much harder to talk to others about the new facts. For If there are dead metaphors in (1) through (3), then, they all seem
now· I was speaking across the chasm of frame conflict. to involve the figurative assertion that language transfers human
I mention these things because I want to suggest at the outset that thoughts and feelings. Notice that this assertion, even in its present,
the discussion that follows is a marvelous opportunity for one of those very gen_eral form, leads already to a distinct viewpoint on communica-
failures to communicate which we are concerned to prevent. It is a tions problems. A person who speaks poorly does not know how to use
little bit like the joke about Whorf. If I am right in what I believe language to send people his thoughts; and, conversely, a good speaker
about frames, then it may well be difficult to convince you, because the knows how to transfer his thoughts perfectly via language. If we i.vere
frames I am talking about exist in you and will resist the change. For to follow this viewpoint, the next question would be: What must the
my part, in writing this, I have made strenuous efforts to remember poor speaker do with his thoughts if he is to transfer them more accur-
what it was like before I shifted frames, and how long it took before ately by means of language? The surprising thing is that, ·whether we
the "new facts" made sense to me. At the same time, I should like to like it or not, the English language does follo'i-v this veiwpoint. It pro·
request that you, on your side, make yourselves receptive to what may vides, in the form of a wealth of metaphorical expressions, answers to
be a serious alteration of consciousness. To use Sch6n's terminology, this and other questions, all of which ans,vers are perfectly coherent
we are engaged perforce in frame restructuring, and special effort is with the assumption that human communication achieves the physical
called for. transfer of thoughts and feelings. If there were only a fe"\v such expres-
sions involved, or if they were random, incoherent figures of speech
arising from different paradigms - or if they were abstract, not partic-
The conduit metaphor ularly graphic images - then one might just succeed in dismissing
What _-do speakers o_f English say when communication fails or goes them as harmless analogies. But in fact, none of these mitigating cir-
astray? Let us consider (1) through (3), some very typical examples, cumstances comes into play.
( 1) Try to get your thoughts across better Typical solutions to the unskilled speaker's communications prob-
(2) None of Mary's feelings came through to me with any clarity lems are illustrated by (4) through (8).
(3) You still haven't given me any idea of what you mean, (4) Whenever you have a good idea practice capturing it in zvords
and do .as Schon has. suggested- take them as problem-setting stories, (5) You have to put each concept into words very carefully
as decriptions "of "what is wrong and what needs fixing." Are there (6) Try to pack more thoughts into fewer words
metaphors __ in.-.the examples? Do these metaphors set the directions (7) Insert those ideas elsewhere in the paragraph
for possible problem·solving techniques? Although (1) through (3) (8) Don't force your meanings into the wrong words.
contain no fresh metaphors, there is in each case a dead metaphor. Naturally, if language transfers thought to others, then the logical con-
After all, we .do not literally "get thoughts across" when we talk, do tainer, or conveyer, for this thought is words, or word-groupings like
we? This sounds like mental telepathy or clairvoyance, and suggests phrases, sentences, paragraphs, and so on. One area of possible
that communication transfers thought processes somehow bodily. difficulty is then the insertion process. 'J'he speaker might be generally
Actually, no one receives anyone else's thoughts directly in their minds unpracticed or careless about this, and so be admonished v..rith (4) or
when they are using language. Mary's feelings, in example (2), can be (5). As (6) shows, he could fail to put enough meaning in. Or, accord-
perceived directly only by Mary; they do not really "come through to , ing to (7), he could put the right meanings in, but put them in the
us" when she talks. Nor can anyone literally "give you an idea" - wrong place. Example (8), which stretches common sense most seri·
-----------------~--~-----------------·----·---
tion. He must find the meaning "in the words" and take it out of which denotes internal conceptual or emotional material. Apart from
them, so that it gets "into his head." Many expressions show that Eng- what seem to be minor stylistic co-occurence restrictions, these and
lish does view the matter in this way. other terms like them can be substituted freely for -0ne another. Thus~
(14) Can you actually extract coherent ideas from that prose? it is irrelevant to an example which one of these is present, and it
(15) Let me know if you find any good ideas in the essay would be helpful to have some abbreviation for the entire group. Let
(16) I don't get any feelings of anger out of his words. us picture each person as having a "repertoire" of mental an<l emo-
Curiously, my initial work on these expressions suggests that it is tional material. This will allow us to say that any term denoting a rep-
easier, when speaking and thinking in terms of the conduit metaphor, ertoire member, abbreviated "RM," will fit, say, as object in (1) and
MICHAEL J. REDDY The conduit metaphor 291
produce an example utterance. Underlying (1), (2), and (3), then, for us to abstract from the strict, "major" version of the metaphor, in
are what we shall call "core expressions," which can be written as fol- which thoughts and emotions are always contained in something. That
lows. is, the major framework sees ideas as existing eithe~ within human
(21) get RM across [underlying (1)] heads or, at least, ·within words uttered by humans. The "minor"
(22) RM come through (to someone) [underlying (2)] framework overlooks words as containers and allows ideas and feelings
(23) give (someone) RM [underlying (3)]. to flow, unfettered and completely disembodied, into a kind of
The parentheses in (22) and (23) indicate optional compliments. ambient space between human heads. In this case, the conduit of lan-
Examples (4) through (20), in addition to a term from the RM group, guage becomes, not sealed pipelines from person to person, but rather
all contain another term, such as "word," "phrase," "sentence," or individual pipes which allow mental content to escape into, or enter
"poem." These words, in their basic senses at least, designate the exter- from, this ambient space. Again, it seems that this extension of the
nal physical patterns of marks or sounds that do pass between speakers. metaphor is aided by the fact that, somewhere, we are peripherally aware
Such energies, unlike the thoughts themselves, are received bodily, and that words do not really have insides.
are what information theorists would have called "signals." If we- In any case, whatever the cause of the extension, there are three
adopt this generic name for the second group, and abbreviate jt as "s," categories of expressions· in the minor framework. The categories
then the core expressions for (4) through (6) are, imply, respectively, that: (1) thoughts and feelings are ejected by
(24) capture RM ins [underlying (4)]; speaking or writing into an external "idea space"; (2) t.ho':1ghts and
(25) put RM into s [underlying (5)]; ~eelings are reifi.ed in this external space, so that they exist independ-
(26) pack RM into s [underlying (6)]. ~nt of any need for living human beings to think or feel the';'; (3)
In the Appendix, the core expression is always given first, and then these reified thoughts and feelings may, or may not, find their way
followed by one or two examples. Obviously, each core expression can back into the heads of living humans. Some outstanding examples of
be responsible for a very large number of different sentences. ininor framework expressions are. for the first category,
The conduit metaphor, and the core expressions which embody it, put RM down on paper
deserve a great deal more investigation and analysis. ·My listing of the (27) Put those thoughts down on paper before you lose them!
core expressions is most likely far from complete, and the logical rever- pour RM out
berations of this paradigm affect both the syntax and the semantics of (28) Mary poured out all of the sorrow she had been holding in for
many words which are not themselves part of the core expressions. so long.
Later on, we shall focus- on one such reverberation, which affects the get RM out
entire ·5 group. Apart from this, however, 'tve shall have to be content (29) You should get those ideas out where they can do some good.
to close the present discussion with a brief characterization of some fur- And for the second category.
ther ~pes 6£ _c,ore expression. RM fioat around
Our examples thus far have been drawn from the four categories (30) That concept has been floating around for decades.
which co:i;istitute the "major framework" of the conduit metaphor. The RM find way
core exp!essions in these categories lmply, re;;;pectively, that: (1) lan- (31) Somehow, these hostile feelings found their way to the ghettos
guage functions like. a conduit, transferring thoughts bodily from one of Rome.
person to another; (2), in writing and speaking, people insert their find RM EX LOC
thoughts or feelings in the words; (3) words accomplish the transfer (32) You'll find better ideas than that in the library. .
by containing the thoughts or feelings and conveying them to others; (33) John found those ideas in the jungles of the Amazon, not m
and (4) in listening or reading, people extract the thoughts and feel- some classroom.
ings once again from the words. Beyond these four classes of expres- (Ex Loe here stands for any locative expression designating a
sions, there are a good many examples which have different, though place other than within human beings, that is, an external
clearly related, implications. The fact that it is quite foreign to locative.)
common sense to think of words as having "insides" makes it quite easy And for the third category,
absorb RM
MICHAEL J· REDDY The conduit metaphor 293
head was wood. But since it never occurred to him that anything but rock and wood, which he hopes B will understand. Soon A and B are
wood would be available or appropriate, he did not try to specify wood both ecstatic. All sorts of previous sets of instructions, not just about
for the head in his instructions. When B is about halfway finished with rakes, but about other things as well, now make perfect sense. They
the stone rake head, he connects it experimentally to the handle and have raised themselves to a new plateau of inference about each other
realizes with a jolt that this thing, whatever it is, is certainly going to and each o!her's environments.
be heavy and unwieldly. He ponders its possible uses for a time, an<l For purposes of comparison, let us now view this same situation once
then decides that it must be a tool for cligging up small rocks when you again, as the conduit metaphor would see it. In terms of the radical
clear a field for planting. He marvels at how large and strong person A subjectivist paradigm for human communication, what the conduit
must be, and also at what small rocks A has to deal with. B then metaphor does is permit the exchange of materials from the environ·
decides that two large prongs will make the rake both lighter and ments, including the actual constructs themselves. In our story, ,Ne
better suited to unearthing large rocks. would have to imagine a marvelous technological duplicating machine
Quite happy with both his double-bladed rock-pick and his new located in the hub. Person A puts his rake in a special chamber, pushes
ideas about what this fellow A must be like, person B makes three a button, and instantly precise replicas of the rake appear in similar
identical sets of instructions himself, for his rock·pick, and inserts them chambers for B, C, and D to make use of. B, C, and D do not have to
in the slots for A, C, and D. Person A, of course, now assembles a rock- construct anything or guess about anything. Should person B want to
pick following B's instructions, except that he makes it entirely of communicate with C and D about A's rake, there is no excuse for him
wood and has to change the design a little if a '\Vooden, two·pronged sending anything except an exact replica of that rake to these people.
'ii
I; head is to be strong enough. Still, in his largely rockless environment, There will still be differences in environments, but learning about
he cannot see much use for the thing, and worries that person B has mis· these is now a trivial matter. Everything B has ever sent to A has been
understood his rake. So he draws a second set of more detailed instruc.. constructed largely of rock, and A is thus perfectly aware of his neigh-
tions for the rake head, and sends them out to everyone. Meanwhile, bor's predicament. Even if the marvelous machine should falter now
over in another sector, person C, who is particularly interested in clear- and again, so that artifacts arrive damaged, still, damaged objects look
ing out a certain swamp, has created, on the basis of these multiple sets like damaged objects. A damaged rake does not become a hoe. One can
of instructions - the hoe. After all, when you are dealing with swamp simply send the damaged object back, and wait for the other person to
grass and muck, you need something that will slice cleanly through the send another replica. It should be clear that the overwhelming tend·
roots. And person D, from the same sets of instructions, has come up ency of the system, as vi~wed by the conduit metaphor,_ w!II always. be:
with a gaff. He has a small lake and fishes quite a bit. success without effort. At the same time, it should be similarly obvious
Although it would be interesting to get to know C and D, the pri- that, in terms of the toolmakers paradigm, and the postulate of radical
mary heroes of this story are persons A and B. We return now to them subjectivity, we come to just the opposite conclusion. Human commu·
for the climax of the great rake conversation, in which, to everyone's nication will almost always go astray unless real energy is expended.
surprise, some real communication takes place. A and B, who have had This comparison, then, brings to light a basic conflict between the
profitable interchanges in the past, and thus do not mind working conduit metaphor and the toolmakers paradigm. Both models offer an
quite hard at their communications, have been caught up in this rake explanation of the phenomenon of communication. But they come to
problem for some time now. Their instructions simply will not agree. totally different conclusions about what, in that phenomenon, are
B has even had to abandon his original hypothesis that A is a huge more natural states of affairs, and what are less natural, or constrained,
man who has only small rocks to deal with. It just does not fit the states. In terms of the conduit metaphor, what requires explanation is
instructions he is getting. A, on his side, is getting so frustrated that he failure to communicate. Success appears to be automatic. But if we
is ready to quit. He sits down near the hub and, in a kind of absent- think in terms of the toolmakers paradigm, our expectation is precisely
minded display of anger, grinds two pebbles together. Suddenly he the opposite. Partial miscommunication, or divergence of readings
stops. He holds these rocks up in front of his eyes and seems to be from a single text, are not aberrations. They are tendencies inherent in
thinking furiously. Then he runs to the hub and starts scribbling new the system, which can only be counteracted by continuous effort and by
instructions as fast as he can, this time using clever iconic symbols for large amounts of verbal interaction. In this view, things will naturally
296 MICHAEL J. REDDY The conduit metaphor 297
be scattered, unless we expend the energy to gather them. They are forced it to stay awake. Thus, there is the likelihood that arguments
not, as the conduit metaphor would have it, naturally gathered, with a about these models either will not be needed, or alternatively, if they
frightening population of wrong.headed fools working to scatter them. are needed, will fall on deaf ears until the biasing effect of the conduit
As many scholars have pointed out (Kuhn, i97oa; Butterfield, metaphor has been dealt with. Most important, then, is some survey of
1965), such shifts in the notion of what a thing does "naturally,'' that the evidence that the conduit metaphor can and does influence our
is, if left to its own devices, are the stuff of which scientific revolutions thinking.
are made. If the earth holds still at some center point, then it is the
motions of celestial bodies that must be theorized about and predicted.
But if the sun is at that center point, then we must theorize about the Semantic pathology
motion of the earth. In this regard, the present situation is a little Let us assume now, for the sake of argument, that it is agreed that
curious. The toolmakers paradigm is very much in accord with the communication functions as the toolmakers paradigm suggests, and not
long-postulated connection between information, in the mathematical as the conduit metaphor would have it. And let us assume further that
sense, and the entropy expression of the second law of thermodynamics the conflicting implications of the two frames are theoretically interest·
(Cherry, 1966, pp. 214-17). The second law states that if left to ing or even important. You may well grant me these things and still
their own devices, all forms of 01ganization always decrease in time. hold that the conduit metaphor expressions in everyday language do
Successful human communication involves an increase in organization, not really influence, or confuse, our thought processes. After all, all of
which cannot happen spontaneously or of its own accord. Thus, the us succeeded in shifting mental gears and thinking about language in
shift in viewpoint of the toolmakers paradigm merely seems to bring terms of the toolmakers paradigm right here in the present discussion.
the model of human communication into line with a previously extant The conduit metaphor did not prevent us from doing this. Where
paradigm from the physical sciences. But even though, mathematically, really is the problem? How can anything troublesome arise from a con-
information is expressed as negative entropy, debate and confusion ceptual frame that we were able to discard so easily? This is the ques-
have always surrounded this connection. And it may be that this confu. tion to which we shall address ourselves now. Can the conduit meta·
sion springs, in part at least, from the dominant position occupied by phor really bias our thinking? And if so, how?
the conduit metaphor in our language. For the conduit metaphor is To begin with, it must be made clear that no speaker of English, not
definitely in conflict with the second law. even your author, has discarded the conduit metaphor. Thinking in
But I do not want to argue too strongly either for or against either terms of the toolmakers paradigm briefly may, perhaps, have made us
of these models in this paper. I do not want to attempt any "appeal to aware of the conduit metaphor. But none of us will discard it until we
the facts" at this point. For the real question here is to what extent succeed in bringing about an entire series of linked changes in the Eng-
language can influence thought processes. To me, from my vantage lish language. The logic of the framework tuns like threads in many
point now, it seems that the toolmakers paradigm and radical subjec- directions through the syntactic and semantic fabric of our speech
tivism simply form a coherent, common.sense view of what happens habits. Merely becoming cognizant of this in no way alters the situa-
when we talk- a common.sense view which finds support in every· tion. Nor does it appear that one can adopt a new framework and
thing from this second law of thermodynamics to recent work in artifi· develop it while ignoring the cloth of the language. For everywhere
cial int.eUigence or cognitive psychology. But if my major claim is one runs into the old threads, and each one pushes conversation and
true- that the conduit metaphor is a real and powerful semantic thought back a little way toward the established pattern. No matter
structure in English, which can influence our thinking- then it fol- how othenvorldly this may seem, there is some exceedingly poignant
lows that "common sense" about language may be confused. I confess evidence that it has occurred and continues to occur.
tha_t it took nearly five years for me to come around to radical subjec- The precise claim being made here is important. It has to do, I
tivism as "common sense." What stood in the way was never a counter- think, with one of the ways in which people commonly misunderstand
argument, but rather the simple inability to think clearly about the the Wharf hypothesis. I do not claim that we cannot think momentar-
matter. My mind would seem to go to sleep at crucial moments, and it ily in terms of another model of the communication process. I argue,
was only the mounting weight of more and more evidence that finally rather, that that thinking will remain brief, isolated, and fragmentary
298 MICHAEL J• REDDY The conduit metaphor 299
i': the face of an entrenched system of opposing attitudes and assump- asking, "Did you get anything out of that article?", I have to say,
tions. "Were you able to construct anything of interest on the basis of the
I have not been able to gather hard statistics about the number of assigned text?" If one should look, I daresay even the present article is
core expression arising from the conduit metaphor. Indeed, inasmuch not free from conduit metaphor expressions. I ended the preceding sec·
as the concept of a "core expression" is itself somewhat loose, and inas- tion with a minor framework, category three example, (i41) in the
much as it is difficult in some cases to decide whether an expression Appendix, when I wrote: "The arguments \vill fall on deaf ears.°'
should or should not be listed, I am not sure whether hard statistics Practically speaking, if you try to avoid all obvious conduit metaphor
can ever be assembled. Nevertheless, the present tally of conduit expressions in your usage, you are nearly struck dumb when communi-
metaphor expressions is about 140. If one looks about for alterna~ cation becomes the topic. You can say to your way\vard student, "Try
tive ways of speaking about communication-ways which are either to communicate more effectively, Reginald," but it will not have
metaphorically neutral, or metaphorically opposed to the conduit nearly the impact of, "Reginald, you've got to learn how to put your
framework- the list of expressions numbers between 30 and 40. A thoughts into words."
conservative estimate would thus be that, of the entire metalingual But even if you could avoid all such obvious conduit "metaphor-
apparatus of the English language, at least seventy percent is directly, isms," this would still not free you fron1 the framew·ork. The threads,
visibly, and graphically based on the conduit metaphor. as I said, are nearly every1;vhere. To see that they go much deeper than
Whatever influence the remaining thirty percent might have appears just a list of expressions, I should like to resurrect a concept from pre-
to be weakened beyond this direct proportionality by several factors. transformational semantics. In his Principles of Sernantics, Stephen
First, these expressions tend to be the multisyllabic, latinate abstrac· Ullmann (1957, p. 122) makes use of the term seniantic patholog)'· A
tions ("communicate," "disseminate," "notify," "disclose," and so on) semantic pathology arises "whenever two or more incompatible senses
which are neither graphic nor metaphorically coherent. Thus, they do capable of figuring meaningfully in the same context develop around
not present an alternative model of the communication process, which the same name." For some time, my favorite English illustration of this
leav~-~ the notion of "putting ideas into words" as the sole available was the delicate and difficult problem of distinguishing sympathy from
conception. Second, most of them can be used with the adjunct "in apology. That is, "I'm sorry" can mean either "I empathize 1vith your
words" ("in s," more generally), thereby losing their neutrality and suffering," or "I admit fault and apologize." Sometimes people expect
lending added support to the conduit metaphor. "Communicate your apologies from us when we only \vish to sympathize, in V·.'hich case
feelings using simpler words," for example, succeeds in avoiding the saying, "I'm sorry/' is either the perfect hedge or the opening line of a
conduit metaphor, whereas, "Communicate your feelings in simpler fight. Other times, people think we are apologizing when they see no
words," does not. And finally, to the extent that etymologies are rele· need for us to apologize and respond with, "That's alright, it wasn't
vant, many of these expressions have roots which spring directly from your fault,"
the conduit framework ("express," "disclose/' etc.). See Part Two of As I studied the conduit metaphor, however, I came to rely on this
the Appendix for this listing. example less and less. I kept coming across terms which were ambigu·
The simplest, and perhaps most convincing illustration of our ous between what we have here called "repertoire members" and 'tvhat
dependence on the conduit metaphor core expressions is a test that can we have called "signals." I would find a word which, in its basic sense,
be performed by anyone. Familiarize yourself with the listingll in the referred to some grouping of the marks or sounds which we do
Appendix. Then begin to become aware of, and try to avoid, conduit exchange with one another. But then I would use it in sentences and
metaphors. Every time you find yourself using one, see if you can realize that it could refer just as easily and just as often to segments of
replace it with a neutral expression, or son1e circumlocution. My exp_e· human thought or emotions. Consider the word "poem," for example.
rience in teaching classes which dealt with this subject has been that I In (37) through (39),
am constantly called to account by my students for using the expres. (37) The poem was almost illegible
sions I am lecturing about. If I speak very carefully, with constant (38) The poem has five lines and forty words
attention, I can do fairly well at avoiding them. But the result is (39) The poem is unrhymed,
hardly idiomatic English. Instead of walking into a classroom and this word clearly refers to a text, some signals involving either rnad-:..s
MICHAEL J, REDDY The conduit metaphor 301
or sounds. For sake of clarity, let us call the word-sense operating here with one another and comparing notes. There is now not the slightest
POEM 1 (for an operational definition of "word-sense," see Reddy, 1973). basis for a metonymical extension of POEM1 to POEM 2. If \'le had
Now notice that, in (40) through (42), viewed language in terms of the toolmakers paradigm historically,
(40) Donne's poem is very logical these two profoundly different concepts would never have been
(41) That poem was so completely depressing accessed by the same word. Talking about an entire series of slightly,
(42) You know his poem is too obscene for children, or even terribly, different entities as if there were only one would
the most probable referent of the word is not a text, but rather the obviously have led to communicative disaster.
concepts and emotions assembled· in the reading of a text. I say "most We see, then, that things have taken a troublesome turn for our lin-
probable" here because it is possible to imagine contexts in which the guistic idealist. This ambiguity of the word "poem" is for him a real
referent is actually once again a text. Suppose, for instance, (41) is and severe semantic pathology. Other speakers, who accept the conduit
uttered by a teacher of penmanship about a child's hasty copy of some metaphor, can be perfectly blase about it. But he cannot. It befuddles
poem. Barring such unusual contexts, however, "poem" in these exam- the very distinction he is most concerned to make and bring others to
ples refers to conceptual and emotional material. The word-sense func- make. More troublesome still is the fact that this pathology is global. It
tioning here we shall call POEM2 • Example (43) can be read with is not an isolated development in the language, involving only the
either l'OEM1 or POEM2. word "poem." I have discussed "poem" here as a paradigm case for the
(43) Martha's poem is so sloppy! entire class of words in English which denote signals. Analogous exam-
It is easy to see that this ambiguity of the term "poem" is inti- ples are available for all of the s words discussed in a previous
mately related to the conduit metaphor. If the words in language con- section- "word," "phrase," "sentence," "essay," "novel," and so on.
tain the ideas, then POEM 1 contains POEM2, and metonymy, a process of Even the word "text" has the two senses, as evidenced by (44) and
meaning extension second in importance only to metaphor, takes over. (45).
That is, when two entities are always found together in our experience, (44) I am tired of illegible texts
the name of one of them - usually the more concrete - will develop a (45) The text is logically incoherent.
new sense which refers to the other. Just as ROSE1 ( = the blossom) In addition, all the proper names of texts, poems, plays, novels,
developed ROSE 2 ( = the shade of pinkish red) by metonymy, so speeches, and the like share this ambiguity. Notice,
POEM1 gave rise to POEM 2 • For, in terms of the conduit metaphor, the (46) The 0 Id Man and the Sea is 112 pages long
two are seen as existing together, the second within the first, and all (47) The Old Man and the Sea is deeply symbolic.
the conditions for metonymy are met. As long as we are happy with the Al; I became aware of this systematic, widespread semantic pathol-
conduit metaphor, then this ambiguity is in no way problematic, and ogy, I was, of course, far less impressed with the difficulties caused by,
is certainly not a semantic pathology. ''I'm sorry." For here was a case that involved more words than any
But now consider what happens to the linguistic idealist who wants pathology I had ever heard of. Furthermore, this case showed that
to think about communication in terms of the toolmakers paradigm semantic structures could be completely normal with respect to one
and radical subjectivism without making any c11anges in the English view of reality, and at the same time, pathological with respect to
language. In this new model, the words do not contain the ideas, and another view. Or in other words, here was some strong evidence that
so POEM1 does not contain POEM2• Instead, it is of greatest importance language and views about reality have to develop hand in hand.
to preserve a principled distinction between POEM1 and POEM2 • There Finally, I also noticed that this new, potential pathology affected what
is in most cases only one POEM1, one text, to worry about. But because might be called the "morphosemantics" of the words involved. Sup-
of the differences in repertories from one person to the next, and pose, for example, we pluralize the word "poem." As shown in (48),
because of the difficult task of assembling these mental and emotional (48) We have several poems to deal with today,
materials on the basis of the instructions in the text, it is obvious to this produces a form whose most natural referents are a number of
our theorist that there will be as many POEM2 's in existence as there POEM1 's, that is, a series of different texts. It would be quite unnatural
are readers or listeners. These internal POEM2's will only come to to utter (48) and mean that there were several internal POEM2's,
resemble one another after the people expend some energy talking Michael's POEM2, Mary's POEM2, Alex's POEM2, and so on, all constructed
;:
,,
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MICHAEL J. REDDY
The conduit metaphor
from the same POEM1, which were to be discussed on a given day. What
this means is that, although POEM11 pluralizes with the change in mor- common with our toolmakers paradigm. Information is defined as. the
phology. the other sense, POEM2, is lost in this change. In the case of ability to make nonrandom selections from some set of alternatives.
proper names, pluralization is even more problematic. For most names of Communication, which is the transfer of this ability from one place to
texts, there is no morphology defined for the plural. How should our another, is envisioned as_ occurring in the following manne:. T~e set
budding radical subjectivist pluralize The Old Man and the Sea"? of alternatives and a code relating these alternatives to physical signals
Does he say, "Our internal The Old Man and the Sea-s"? Or should it are established, and a copy of each is placed at both the sending a~d
be, "Our internal Old Men and the Sea"? And notice that it will not receiving ends of the system. This act creates what is known as_ an. a
help him very much to use (49), or (50). priori shared context," a prerequisite for achieving any commun1ca:1on
(49) Our versions of the poem whatsoever. At the transmitting end, a sequence of the alternatives,
(50) Our versions of The Old Man and the Sea. called the message, is chosen for communication to the other end. ~ut
For if, in (49), the word "poem" means POEM1, then this phrase this sequence of alternatives is not sent. Rather, the chosen alternatives
applies to variants of the text-which is not what he wants to say. On are related systematically by the code to some form. of energy patterns
the other hand, if "poem" means POEM2, then he is still in trouble. which can travel quickly and retain their shape while they do travel -
Now it sounds like there is one proper and correct POEl\r2, available to that is, to the signals.
us all, which we may however, for reasons of taste, alter slightly. The The whole point of the system is that the alternatives themselve~, a.re
radical subjectivism, the absolute nontransferability of any "correct" not mobile, and cannot be sent, whereas the energy patterns: the sig-
POEM,, is muddied completely by (49) and (50). This most important nals" are mobile. If all goes well, the signals, when they arrive at the
fact, that there is one POEM1 but necessarily ·many POEM2's, cannot be receiving end, are used to duplicate the original selection process and
expressed easily, consistently, or at all naturally. recreate the message. That is, using the relationsh~p~ of the code and
l!!!I
,,, This discussion, though it says by no means all that could be said, the copy of the original set of alternatives, the rece1v1ng end. c~n make
provides an initial illustration of what would happen to someone who the same selections that were made earlier on the trans~rutti~g en~
,Iii I really tried to discard the conduit metaphor and think seriously and when the message was generated. Quantification is possible in this
coherently in terms of the toolmakers paradigm. He would face serious framework only because one can set up measures of how. much the
linguistic difficulties, to say the least, and would quite clearly have to received signals narrow down the possible choices of preexistent alter-
ill
create new language as he restructured his thought. But, of course, he natives.
,,, In terms of our tOolmakers paradigm, the predefined set of alterna-
would he likely to do this only if he shared our present awareness of
I
,,
'I',,
the biasing power of the conduit metaphor. So far as I know, none of tives of information theory corresponds to what we have called the
the thinkers who have tried to present alternate theories of language "repertoire." The environments of the persons ~n the _wagon-v-:heel
'"
111 and the nature of meaning have had this awareness. Thus, the conduit compound all have much in common - otherwise their system. 0£
11
metaphor has undercut them, without any knowledge on their part of instructions would not work at all. The "signals" of the mathematical
'" what was happening. Of course, the problems caused by this confusion theory are exactly the same as our "signals" - the patterns that can
Iii
1!1 in aesthetics and criticism are legion, and it is easy to document my travel, that can be exchanged. In the world of the compoui:d, .they a:e
claims by analysis of works in this area. However, a more convincing the sheets of paper sent back and forth. Notice :iow, that,.. 1n infor~ -
documentation- indeed, the most convincing documentation one tion theory, as in our paradigm, the alternatives - the m.essages -
could wish for is to be found in the historical development of mathe- are not contained in the signals. If the signals were to arr~v~ at the
matical information theory. For here, if ever, with both a concept-free receiving end, and the set of alternatives was damaged or mISs1~?· the
algebra of information, and working machines to use as models, the proper selections could not be made. The signals .have no. ability to
effect of the conduit metaphor should have been avoided. But, in fact, bring the alternatives with them; they carry no little rephca of the
it was not. And the conceptual basis of the new mathematics, though message. The whole notion of information.as "the power to make selec·
not the mathematics itself, has beeri completely obscured by the seman- tions" rules out the idea that signals contain the message. . .
tic pathologies of the conduit metaphor. Now, this may be abundantly clear when spelled out in t!us fasl~1on.
The frame1vork of mathematical information theory has much in And it seems to remain clear as long as information theory is r:str1cted
to simple, technical applications. But as most of you know, this theory
MICHAEL J. REDDY The conduit metaphor
was hailed as a potential breakthrough for biology and the social sci- members involved with the communication. For conduit-metaphor
ences. And numerous attempts were made to extend its range of appli- thinking, in which we send and receive the MESSAGE2 within the
cation to include human language and behavior (see Cherry, 19q6). MESSAGE1, the ambiguity is trivial. But for a theory based totally on t~e
Such attempts, of course, were not simple and technical. They required notion that the 0 message" (MESSAGE2) is never sent anywhere, this
a very clear understanding, not so much of the mathematics of the choice of words leads to the collapse of the paradigm. Shannon and
theory, but rather of the conceptual foundations of the theory. By and Weaver were very careful to point out that the "received ~ign~ls" were
large, these attempts were all accounted to be failures. I think that the not necessarily the "transmitted signal" because of the possible interven-
reason. for these failures was the interaction of the conduit metaphor tion of distortion and noise. But they blithely wrote the word "mes-
with the conceptual foundations of information theory. As soon as sage" on the right, or receiving side of their famous paradigm (S~an·
people ventured away from the original, well-defined area of the math· non & Weaver, 1949, p. 7). At the very least they sho~ld ~ave w:itten
ematics, and were forced to rely more on ordinary language, the essen- "'reconstructed message" there. In their theory, sometlung 1s.1'ebuilt on
tial insight of information theory was muddled beyond repair. that right side which, hopefully, resembles the original message on the
The destructive impact of ordinary language on any extensions of left side. The ambiguity of the word "message" should have led them
information theory begins with the very terms the originators (Shan- to regard this word as a disaster and never to c.onsider it for use.
non and Weaver, 1949) chose to name parts of the paradigm. They If they did not, I believe it is because their thought processes ·v:er_e
called the set of alternatives, which we have referred to here as the responding to the biasing effect of the conduit metaphor. Weaver, it
"repertoire," the alphabet. It is true that in telegraphy the set of alter- seems could not hold the theory clearly in mind when he spoke of
natives is in fact the alphabet; and telegraphy was their paradigm huma~ communication, and used conduit metaphor expressions almost
example. But they made it quite dear that the word "alphabet" was constantly. "How precisely," h~ asked, "do the transmitted symbols
for them a technical coinage which was supposed to refer to any set of convey the desired meaning [italics mine]?" (p .. 4) Or h~ compared
alternative states, behaviors, or what have you. But this piece of two "messages, one of which is heavily loaded wi:h meaning and t~e
nomenclature is problematic when one turns to human communica- other of which is pure nonsense.'' (p. 8) In truth, it see~s that he still
tion. For years I taught information theory in a nonmathematical way thought of the MESSAGE2, the repertoire member.s, as be.1ng sent .across
to future English teachers, using the term "alphabet." Always this the channel, even though this destroys the notion of 1nform~uon as
seemed to confuse them, though I never could fathom why, until one selective power. Weaver hedges significantly when he descr:bes the
year, a student put up her hand and said, "But you can't call the alter- action of the transmitter. It "changes," he says, "the message 1r:to .the
natives the signals." Now it is strange, on the face of it, that Weaver, signal [italics Weaver's]." (p. 7) Really, t~i~ is a strange descnpt10n.
particularly, who was very concerned about applying the theory to A code is a relationship between two d1sunct systems .. It does not
human communication, would have let this go unnoticed. It confuses "change" anything into anything else. It m:rely preserves in the second
the all important distinction between signals and repertoire members. system the pattern of organization present 1n the first system. Marks or
Substituting the present term, "repertoire," for "alphabet" made my sounds are not transmuted into electronic pulses. No~ are ~h~ughts a~d
teaching much easier. emotions magically metamorphosed into words. Again, :hi~ is cond~1t
But another mistake in terminology makes it seem probable that metaphor thinking. There is no .justification whatsoever In 1nformat1on
Shannon and Weaver were· never quite clear themselves about the theory for talking about communication this way. . .
importance of- this distinction 'to their own system. Consider the choice It is worth noting that Shannon, who actually originated the math·
of the term "message" to represent the selection of alternatives from ematics, may have had a more coherent understanding than Wea;er.
the repertoire. "Message," as the following examples show, partakes of At some points in his own exposition, Shanno? used ~xac~ly the right
the same semantic pathology as "poem." ordinary language terms. He wrote, ''The receiver .ordinarily perfoi:ms
(51) I got your message (MESSAGE,), but had no time to read it the inverse operation of that done by the transmitter, reconstructing
(52) Okay, John, I get the message (MESSAGE.}; let's leave him the message from the. signal'' (p. 34). But it still does not seem that he
alone. perceived the damage done to the paradigm by his own and Weaver's
For information theory, this is extremely confusing, because MESSAGE1 conduit metaphorisms. .
means literally a set of signals, whereas MESSAGE2t means the repertoire Quite the same thing can be said for other ways of speaking asso-
MICHAEL J· REDDY The conduit metaphor
dated with information theory. They do violence to the theory, yet than accurate idea of its own workings, and if it has the power to bias
support and uphold the conduit metaphor admirably. Consider "encode" thought processes in the direction of this model, what practical impact
and "decode." These mean to put the repertoire members "into" code, does this have? We have seen evidence that the conduit metaphor can
and then take them out of code, respectively. Or think about the confuse serious attempts at theory building- but does it matter at all
term_ "information content." The theory conceives of information as the to the man on the street, to mass culture, to federal policymaking?
power to reproduce an organization by means of nonrandom selections. I must limit myself here to suggesting two ways in which the conduit
Signals do soniethi'ng. They cannot contain anything. If the conduit metaphor does matter to all speakers of English. To discuss the first
metaphor is capable of influencing thought processes, then why way, I whould like to return to the "stories" told in an earlier section
has an entire generation of information t11eorists talked in this confus· and add a final sequal.
ing and detrimental way? One would have to suppose that Weaver and It came to pass, one year, that an evil magician, who was an expert
many researchers who have followed him were simply bent on profes. at hypnosis, flew over the toolmakers' compound. Looking down, he
sional destruction. It seems easier to believe that the English language saw that, despite the formidable handicaps, A, B, C, and D were doing
has the power to lead them astray. quite well with their system of instruction sending. They were very
IA. recent anthology collecting psychological and sociological efforts aware that communicating was hard work. And their successes were
to create a communication theofy for human interactions points out in extremely rewarding to them, because they retained a distinct sense of
the introduction that "investigators have yet to establish a completely awe and wonder that they could make the system work at all. It was a
acceptable definition of communication'' (Sereno & Mortensen, i970, daily miracle, which had improved their respective standards of living
p. 2). Then it goes on to say, immensely. The evil magician was very upset about this, and decided
to do the worst thing he could think of to A, B, C, and D. What he did
Those models based upon a mathematical conception describe communication was this. He hypnotized them in a special way, so that, after they
as analogous to the operations of an information processing machine: an
event occurs in which a soutce or sender transmits a signal or message received a set of instructions and struggled to build something on the
through a channel to some destination or receiver [italics from anthology]. basis of them, they would immediately forget about this. Instead, he
(p. 71) planted in them the false memory that the object had been sent to
them directly from the other person, via a marvelous mechanism in the
Notice the statement, "transmits a signal or message." Here, twenty·one hub. Of course, this was not true. They still had to build the objects
years after Shannon and Weaver, the same confusion persists- can the themselves, out of their own materials - but the magician blinded them
";mess<lge" _Qe_ sent~_.,or not?. And it persists in almost every article of the to this.
volume. Consider one more brief example. "The theory (of As it turned out, the evil magician's shrewdness was profound. For
information] was concerned with the problem of defining the quantity even though, objectively, the communications system of the compound
of information contained in a message to be transmitted. . . " (p. 62 ). had not changed one bit, it nevertheless fell very quickly into disuse
Note that here information is contained in a transmitted "message." If and decay. And as it crumbled, so did the spirit of harmony and com·
the author means MESSAGEi. then he is thinking in terms of the conduit munal progress that had always characterized the relations of A, B, C,
metaphor, and saying that information is contained in the signals. If and D. For now, since they would always forget that they had assem-
he means MESSAGE 2 , then he is saying that repertoire members, '\vhich bled an object themselves and thus bore a large share of responsibility
are transmitted inside of signals, have inside of them something called for its shape, it was easy to ridicule the sender for any defects. They
information, which can be measured. Either way, the insight of infor- also began to spend less and less time working to assemble things~
mation theory has been overwhelmed. because, once the mental block descended, there was no feeling of
reward for a job well done. As soon as they finished an assembly, the
hypnosis would take effect, and suddenly- well, even though they
Social implications
were worn out, still, it was the other fellow who had done all the hard,
I should like to conclude with some remarks on the social implications creative work of putting it together. Any fool could take a finished
of the situation we have outlined. If the English language has a less product out of the chamber in the hub. So they came to resent, and
308 MICHAEL J, REDDY The conduit metaphor 3°9
therefore abandon, any assembly jobs that required real work. But this tive task of reconstruction and hypothesis testing. Doing this work well
was not the worst effect forseen by the evil magician when he cast his probably requires considerably more energy than the conduit meta-
peculiar spell. For, indeed, it was not long before each of the persons phor would lead us to expect.
came to entertain, privately, the idea that all the others had gone But we are still a long way from government policy in these effects.
insane. One would send instructions to the others £or some device of Let us turn, then, to the second example of the impact of the conduit
which he was particularly proud, just as he bad always done. Only now metaphor, which will help to close this gap. The expression employed
of course he believed that he sent, not instructions, but the thing itself. in (51 ), number 1 t 3 in the Appendix,
Then, when the others would send him instructions in return, to con~ (51) You'll find better ideas than that in the library,
firm their receipt of his, he would assemble the object, forget, think is derived from the conduit metaphor by a chain of metonymies. That
that they had returned him the thing itself, and then stare in horror at is, we think of the ideas as existing in the words, which are clearly
what he saw. Here he had sent them a wonderful tool, and they there on the pages. So the ideas are "there on the pages" by metonymy.
returned to him grotesque parodies. Really, what could explain this? Now the pages are in the books- and again, by metonymy, so are the
All they had to do was to successfully remove his object from the cham- ideas. But the books are in the libraries, with the final result that the
ber in the hub. How could they change it so shockingly in performing ideas, too, are "in the libraries." The effect of this, and the many other
an operation of such moronic simplicity? Were they imbeciles? Or was minor framework core expressions is to suggest that the libraries. with
there perhaps some malice in their behavior? In the end, A, B, C, and their books, and tapes, and films, and photographs, are the real reposi-
D all came privately to the conclusion that the others had either tories of our culture. And if this is true, then naturally we of the
become hostile or else gone berserk. Either way, it did not matter modern period are preserving our cultural heritage better than any
much. None of them took the communications system seriously any other age. because we have more books, films. tapes, and so on, stored
more. in more and bigger libraries.
Among other things, this sequel attempts to sketch some of the social Suppose now that we drop the conduit metaphor and think of this
and psychological effects of believing that communication is a "success same situation in terms of the toolmakers paradigm. From this point of
without effort" system1 when1 in fact, it is an "energy must be view, there are of course no ideas in the words, and therefore none in
expended" system. I am sure that no one has failed to realize that, to any books. nor on any tapes or records. There are no ideas whatsoever
the extent that the parable applies, the evil magician is the English in any libraries. All that is stored in any of these places are odd little
language, and his hypnotic spell is the bias imparted to our thought patterns of marks or bumps or magnetized particles capable of creating
processes by the conduit metaphor. This model of communication odd patterns of noise. Now, if a human being comes along who is capa-
objectifies meaning in a misleading and dehumanizing fashion. It ble of using these marks or sounds as instructions, then this human
influences us to talk and think about thoughts as ii they had the same being may assemble within his head some patterns of thought or feel-
kind of external, intersubjective reality as lamps and tables. Then, ing or perception which resemble those of intelligent humans no
when this presumption proves dramatically false in operation, there longer living. But this is a difficult task, for these ones no longer living
seems to be nothing to blame except our own stupidity or malice. It is saw a different world from ours, and used slightly different language
as if we owned a very large, very complex computer - but had been instructions. Thus, if this human who enters the library has not been
given the wrong instruction manual for it. We believe the wrong schooled in the art of language, so that he is deft and precise and thor·
:,i
things about it, and teach our children the wrong things about it, and ough in applying instructions, and if he does not have a rather full
simply cannot get full or even moderate usage out of the system. and flexible repertoire of thoughts and feelings to draw from. then it is
Another point from the story worth emphasizing is that, to the not likely that he will reconstruct in his head anything that deserves to
extent that the conduit metaphor does see communication as requiring be called "his cultural heritage."
some slight expenditure of energy, it localizes this expenditure almost Quite obviously, the toolmakers paradigm makes it plain that there
totally in the speaker or' writer. The function of the reader or listener is no culture in books or libraries, that, indeed, there is no culture at
is trivialized. The radical subjectivist paradigm. on the other hand, all unless it is reconstructed carefully and painstakingly in the living
makes it clear that readers and listeners face a difficult and highly crea· brains of each new generation. All that is preserved in libraries is the
310 MICHAEL J. REDDY
•"When you sketch a thought, don't do it in such compli- 24. bring tidings of/about RM (to someone)
cated sentences." "Someone should bring tidings of these thoughts to the
?13. impart RM (to someone) (NLI s) world at large."
"It's difficult to impart ideas to a class like this." 25. give account of RM (to someone) (NLI s)
*"I'll have to impart the idea in different words." "He could not give a clear account of Einstein's ideas."
14. give notice of RM (to someone) (NLI s) (Starred examples exist for any core expression >vith the
"What she gave notice of was her feeling of isolation." NLI s adjunct. But since the format of these should be clear
*'"You gave notice of your attitude in words yOu should not by now, I shall cease to provide such examples at this
have used." point.)
15. make RM known (to someone) (NLI s) 26. discuss RM (with someone) (NLI s)
"When did you make your idea known to her?" "I have never discussed my thoughts with John.''
*"You may have tried to make your anger known to them, 27. converse about RM (with someone) {NLI s)
hut y_ou did it in words that were bound to fail." "You should learn to converse intelligently about yoi.:r
16. advise someone Of/about RM (NLI S) feelings.''
"Did ·you ~dvisC- them about your feelings?" 28. exchange words about RM (with someone)
*"You certairi.ly advised him of your ideas in the right "John and I exchanged words about our feelings."
phrases.'' 29. have verbal interchange about RM (with someone)
17. apprise someone of/about RM (NLI s) "The class had several verbal interchanges about the ne•·•
"Mary did not apprise John of her thoughts.'' concepts."
•"John apprised the repairman of his feeling through the ?30. publish RM (NLI s)
simplest of words." "When are you going to publish your ideas?"
?!8. acquaint someone with RM (NLI s) ?31. make RM public (NLI s)
"I acquainted them with your feelings." "John does not know how to make his attitudes public."
'*' 0 You cannot acquaint him with the idea in those words," ?32. disseminate RM (NLI s)
19. enlighten someone about RM (NLI s) "How can we .disseminate such ideas?"
"How will you enlighten Mary about your thoughts?" II. Alternatives to Categories IC and IF of the Conduit Metaphor:
*"If you enlighten them about the concept in those words, Expressions which do not imply that words contain or convey
he may never speak to you again." meanings, or that ideas exist independent of human beings in <111
?20. disclose RM (to someone) (NLI s) abstract "space."
"When you get ready to disclose the ideas, let me know." 33. s symbolize RM
*"I would disclose the thoughts first in German, and only "Words symbolize meanings.''
later in English." "Gestures can symbolize various emotions."
21. notify someone of/about RM (NLI s) 34. s correspond to RM
"Have you notified anyone of these new feelings?" "The sentence corresponds to my thoughts.''
•"Notify your readers of this idea immediately in the first 35. s stand for RM
paragraph." "Sentences. stand for human thoughts.''
n. announce RM (to someone) (NL! s) ?36. s represent RM
"You should not announce these attitudes to the group.' "Language represents our thoughts and feelings."
•"You certainly could announce these ideas in different ?37. s mean/have meanings (to someone)
words.'' "I hope my words mean something to you."
23. bring news of RM (to someone) (It appears that we make up for the poverty of this cate~
"Henry brought news of Jeri's ideas." gory by reusing many CategOry I expressions withs >Yords-,
MICHAEL J, REDDY
1.•
~.
as opposed to humans, as subjects. Thus, "John's words '>;·"" Metaphor, Induction, and
tell us of his ideas," or "This sentence states your thoughts
:ii
'·ii plainly." Whether this personification of the signals is
Social Policy:
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,)i
linked to the-conduit metaphor or not, I have not yet deter-
mined. The conduit metaphor does view words as contain-
The Convergence of Macroscopic and
i!: ing ideas just as humans do, however. which could provide Microscopic Views
:1;
:11
•
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motivation for the transfer. That is, the signals could be
>j; "giving us the ideas they contain," just as, in speaking, hu- ;;:· ROBERT J. STERNBERG, ROGER TOURANGEAU,
::1"
,, mans "give us the ideas they contain.'' This question will AND GEORGIA NIGRO
have to a'vait deeper analysis.)
1 III. Alternatives to Categories ID and IG of the Conduit Metaphor: Metaphor can be studied in many different ways and at many different
:11
\!1j Expressions which do not imply that reading and listening are levels, any one of which may lead to valid insights into the nature of
acts of extraction, or that reified ideas reenter human heads from metaphoric generation, comprehension, and appreciation. The insights
l1j: an abstract ~·space."
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of any one approach to metaphor are perhaps most convincingly vali-
\I 38. understands/RM- but not •understand RM ins dated when they converge with the insights of a distinctly different
•'
;j
(;
.,I have some trouble understanding the sentence." approach, leading the student of metaphor to much the same conclu-
Ii "I can rarely understand his thoughts." sions, without regard to the particular method from which the conclu-
1! •••1 have never understood the meaning in that essay." sions derived.
!j.
n 39. comprehends/RM- but not •comprehend RM ins In his lucid and enlightening analysis of generative metaphor, Schon
~I
ii
?. ,, "Have you comprehended the sentence?" has reached conclusions strikingly similar in many ways to those we
' "She does not comprehend my thoughts." have reached in our analyses of metaphor and induction. As anyone
•"John comprehends few of the thoughts in Mary's paper." ~-'
might expect, where two independent research programs are involved,
?40. grasps - but not •grasp RM or •grasp RM ins there are a number of theoretical issues that are addressed by one of
"I have not yet grasped the sentence." the research programs but not by the other. However, in the central
""I have had little time to grasp his thoughts, especially core of overlapping issues, there is clear convergence in the conclusions
the meaning in the las~ chapter." we have independently drawn. In this chapter we should like to point
4~. construct a reading for s out and discuss the sources of convergence.
"It is easy to construct a reading for that sentence.'' What follows is divided into three sections. In order to relate our
42. build a reading for s work to SchOn's, it is necessary in the first section to say something
"How do you build readings for sentences like that?" about the motivation, approach, theory, and methods that underlie the
?43. get reading for s work in our laboratory on metaphor and induction. These underpin·
"How did you get that reading for that phrase?" nings of our research differ in many respects from SchOn's. Then, it is
?44· interprets possible in the second section to draw parallels between our conclu-
"I find it hard to interpret his paragraphs." sions and those of SchOn regarding metaphor, induction, and social
1·;.
45. follows policy. In the third section, we restate five basic questions about meta.
"I could follow his sentences easily." phor posed by Verbrugge and McCarrell (1977) and by SchOn, and
discuss how they are answered, or at least addressed, within our view of
metaphor.
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