SEC 25

G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989

SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner,

vs.
CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS,
GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL
DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.

FACTS: .

On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Pampook,
Regional Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur.

2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Mindanao (Assembly for brevity). Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members.

3. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity
as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter which reads:The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake
consultations and dialogues

4. You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook Assembly of your respective assembly on November 1 to 15,
1987, with venue at the Congress of the Philippines. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting
Secretary Alimbuyao sent to the members.

5. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice, After declaring the presence of a
quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session.

6. Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang Pampook,
"EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK
AUTONOMOUS REGION XII," 3 on the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared and
signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his
Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . . and nothing in
the record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever made . . ." 4 and that "such action
of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a
usurpation of the power of the Assembly," 5 that the petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash
from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," 6 and that he had
"filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on question which should have been resolved
within the c

ISSUE:

Whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize
power rather than mere administration.

HELD: YES

Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangays. Here shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 29

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 30

xxx xxx xxx

See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. 31

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to
the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an
autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through
the President (and the Department of Local Government). 32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous
in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of
the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes
unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of
Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central
government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President
shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions."33

34

Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason
can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the Sanggunian, in convening on
November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the Rules of
the Sangguniang Pampook since the Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective
nevertheless for lack of quorum.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the
Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang
Pampook," 35 but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals." 36 Of
course, there is disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by the petitioner effective
November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals" referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents
insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess
when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic] and
disunity. 37 The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly,
the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on
November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules. 38 Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly
interrupt any session. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in
question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could. do so. In the
second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible
reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the
respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his
back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess"
called on the ground of good faith.

It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in order to forestall the Assembly
from bringing about his ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced that the invitation was
what precipitated it.

In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a precedent, since, as we said, a recess
can not be validly declared without a session having been first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein, we are not giving
him a carte blanche to order recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof.

In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.