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Role of USSR in Liberation War

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32 views26 pages

Role of USSR in Liberation War

Uploaded by

2ymb45snb2
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Role of USSR

In Bangladesh Liberation
War
USSR Means

 USSR - a former communist country in eastern


Europe and northern Asia; established in 1922;
included Russia and 14 other soviet socialist
republics (Ukraine and Byelorussia and others);
officially dissolved 31 December 1991. Russia,
Soviet Union, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Introduction
 The two super powers that dominated a largely bipolar
world until the early 1990s played a significant role in
the liberation war of Bangladesh. The part they played in
the sanguinary birth of Bangladesh was defined by the
strategic shifts that occurred in the mid-1960s and early
1970s.
Introduction
 Since those times spectacular changes in the
international world order have transformed the world.
The Soviet Union, one of the super powers that had a
positive role in the emergence of Bangladesh, collapsed
from within by 1992.
The role of Soviet
Union
 Soviet Union (USSR) stands by the side of Bangladesh
during the revolution days in 1971.
1

 Soviet Union has extended its hand towards the


achieving of independence of Bangladesh in global
diplomacy.
2
 Soviet Union expoiled the attempt of Pakistan to stop the
war of liberation by giving Veto twice in the Security
Council of the United Nations taking stand in favour of
liberation war of Bangladesh.
3
 The Soviet Union was the first great power to deplore
publicly the Pakistani military crackdown on Bengalis.
4
 It was also the first major power to officially recognize
the State of Bangladesh, which it did within thirty eight
days of its de facto liberation from the Pakistani forces.
5
 The Soviet Union supported Bangladesh and Indian
armies, as well as the Mukti Bahini during the war,
recognising that the independence of Bangladesh would
weaken the position of its rivals—the United States and
the People's Republic of China.
6
 It gave assurances to India that if a confrontation with
the United States or China developed, the USSR would
take countermeasures. This was enshrined in the Indo-
Soviet friendship treaty signed in August 1971.
7

 The Soviets also sent a nuclear submarine to ward off


the threat posed by USS Enterprise in the Indian Ocean.
Three phases of Russian
assistance
1st Phase- March to June
2nd Phase- July to November
3rd Phase- 3 December to Independence
1st Phase-
March to June
 Play a neutral role
 30 March – 24th Congress of Communist party
 2 April – Stop Genocide (letter from Ussr president to
Yahiya khan )
 6-10 June – USSR Visit by Indian foreign minister
2nd Phase-
July to November
 9-10 July- Pakistan & china visit by US foreign minister
 9 august- India-USSR treaty
 27-29 September Indian prime minister Visit USSR
3rd Phase-
3 December to independence
 3rd Dec- India-Pakistan war
 7 Dec- veto
 7 Dec-
Why USSR supported
Bangladesh
 General Soviet policy in Asia
 India- Soviet relationship
 Soviet self image
 As a Super power
 Power struggle between China and the Soviet Union,
strategic conflict between Moscow and Washington
General Soviet policy
in Asia
 The response of the Soviet Union to the 1971 crisis in
East Pakistan was conditioned by the general Soviet
policy with regard to Asia in the 1960s. It was a policy
of growing involvement, initially undertaken to contain
America's influence in Asia, but increasingly directed at
stemming the diplomatic and military as well as
ideological advance of China which at that time was
emerging as the Soviet Union's principal rival in the
Third World.
 The Soviet Union's desire to present its credentials as an
Asian power, its desire to counter potential American,
Japanese or Chinese backed schemes for alliances and
alignments led to its launching in the spring of 1969 a
campaign for a system of collective security in Asia.
This campaign became the mainstay of the Soviet
Union's diplomacy in Asia as events and developments
in the South Asian sub-continent were setting the stage
for the conflict in East Pakistan.
India- Soviet relationship

 The Soviet Union's close tie with India was a vital factor
in shaping the Soviet response towards the East Pakistan
crisis in 1971. An amiable working relationship had
prevailed between the two countries since the visit of
Bulganin and Khrushchev to New Delhi in December
1955. The Indo Soviet ties were further strengthened in
the wake of the 1962 Sino Indian border war.
 India's defeat in the 1962 clash and the worsening Sino
Soviet relations eventually (mainly during 1969-1971)
caused Moscow to attach more significance to its ties
with India. As the dominant power in the South Asian
subcontinent, India could be built up as an effective
counterpoise to China and thus could provide help to
Moscow to contain Beijing militarily and diplomatically.
Soviet self image
 Another important factor behind the Soviet Union's
response and rather close involvement in the 1971 crisis
in South Asia was the Soviet self image as ―a Great
Power situated on two continents Europe and Asia‖
which, as the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko,
speaking in the Supreme Soviet in June 1968, said, did
not ―plead with anybody to be allowed to have their say
in the solution of any question involving the
maintenance of international peace, concerning the
freedom and independence of the peoples ...‖.

Andrei Gromyko
As a Super Power
 The relatively high priority given by the Soviet policy makers
to Bangladesh crisis in 1971 was the consequence of their
perception of the contemporary world and Asia and the proper
Soviet role in both the world and Asian dimensions as a great
power. Moscow was concerned about maintaining the stability
and security of its ally, India. It wanted to ensure the position
of India as the dominant power in South Asia. Bangladesh
might have been viewed by the leaders of the Soviet Union as a
―fringe responsibility to their Indian interests‖, but in 1971 it
was of considerable importance to them as the first test case of
their political and diplomatic abilities in an emerging
―triangular world‖.
 The Sino American detente had opened Moscow's eyes
to the new and none too pleasant possibility of being
cornered and isolated. The apparent convergence of the
Chinese and the American policies and objectives with
regard to the Bangladesh issue in 1971 increased the
Soviet fears in this respect and probably further hardened
the Soviet resolve to back Indian assistance to
Bangladesh.
Power struggle between China and the Soviet
Union, strategic conflict between Moscow and
Washington

 Thus behind all that happened in the sub-continent over the


1971 Bangladesh struggle ―was a power struggle between
China and the Soviet Union and a strategic conflict between
Moscow and Washington‖. In South Asia during December
1971 the Soviet Union seemed to have gained most from this
three-cornered fight.

Conclusion
Irrespective of the motives and gains of the Soviet Union in its
involvement in the Bangladesh war of liberation, its solid and
unflinching support to the Bengali cause was invaluable to the
Bengali. During the penultimate days of Indo-Pak war over
Bangladesh, the Soviet veto in the UN Security Council against
US backed proposal for ceasefire paved the way for the Indo-
Bangladesh allied forces to march into Dhaka and secure the
defeat and surrender of 90 thousand Pakistani troops on the
16th December 1971. Soviet Union's positive role thus
contributed immensely to the historic triumph of Bangladesh.

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