OECD Budgeting in Chinese Taipei

BUDGETING IN
CHINESE TAIPEI
OECD PAPERS ON BUDGETING

Volume 2024/01
This paper was approved and declassified by the OECD Committee of Senior Budget Officials
on 4 June 2024.
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3
Foreword
Chinese Taipei is an Invitee in the OECD Committee of Senior Budget Officials (SBO) and takes
an active part in its activities.
In 2023, it was agreed that the OECD would undertake a review of Chinese Taipei’s budget
process. This paper presents the results of that review. It is divided into five sections. The first
section provides an overview of Chinese Taipei’s economic and fiscal performance and outlines
key features of the “architecture” of public finances in Chinese Taipei. The second section profiles
the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS). The third section
discusses the budget formulation process. The fourth section discusses the budget approval
process. The fifth and final section presents main findings and key recommendations for the
Chinese Taipei authorities to consider.
OECD experts visited Chinese Taipei in March 2023 for extensive discussions with officials from
the DGBAS, the Department of Finance, the Development Council and line Departments. The
mission also met with officials from the Legislative Yuan, the Budgetary Research Center and
the Audit Office. In addition, the mission had an opportunity to exchange with leading academics
on these issues. A second mission visited Chinese Taipei in September 2023 for further fact-
finding and discussion with DGBAS officials.
Under the leadership of Elsa Pilichowski, Director for Public Governance, this paper was
prepared by Jón Blöndal, Head, Budgeting and Public Management, OECD. It benefitted from
editorial assistance and was prepared for publication and laid out by Meral Gedik.
The OECD wishes to extend its gratitude to all the officials it met for the generous time they spent
with the mission and the full and frank discussions. In particular, the OECD would like to thank
Mr. Dennis Liu and Ms. Una Chang of the DGBAS for their invaluable assistance throughout the
preparation of this review.
The views expressed in this report should not be attributed to any individual or organisation
consulted in its preparation.
The term Chinese Taipei is used throughout this report in line with OECD protocols. The names
of some governmental entities have been similarly modified.
BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

4
1 Introduction
Chinese Taipei has experienced extraordinary economic growth since the 1960s (Figure 1.1),
and today enjoys one of the highest per capita incomes in Asia. Sound macroeconomic policies
have underpinned these achievements.
Figure 1.1. GDP per capita, 1960-2018

5
Box 1.1. The Role of semiconductors

Chinese Taipei is the global leader in semiconductors, which drives its export-oriented
economy. It produces over two-thirds of all advanced semiconductors and dominates the
segment for the most advanced microchips essential to AI and other state-of-the-art
applications. It is the home to the largest eco-system of research clusters for semiconductors
in the world.
The importance of semiconductors to the economy and government finances of Chinese
Taipei cannot be overstated.
1.1. Prudent fiscal policy

An overriding emphasis on fiscal prudence – and small government – has characterised public
finances in Chinese Taipei over time (Figure 1.2, Figure 1.3, Figure 1.4).
A balanced budget was maintained throughout the high-growth years. Only modest deficits were
recorded following the financial crisis in 2008-9 and budgets were again largely balanced in the
years prior to the COVID-19 crisis. Debt levels are low by international standards, fueled also by
high GDP growth, and were declining steadily prior to the COVID-19 crisis. All government debt
is domestic debt.
Figure 1.2. Total Debt, % of GDP, 2012-22
General Fund Budget

40
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

6
Figure 1.3. Budget balance, % of GDP, 2012-23
General Fund Budget
0.4
0.2
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
-1
-1.2
-1.4
-1.6
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Figure 1.4. Revenue and expenditure, % of GDP, 2011-23

General Fund Budget
Revenue Expenditure
14
13.5
13
12.5
12
11.5
11
10.5
10
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Expenditures have grown largely in line with rising revenues over time, although strict
expenditure discipline was maintained following the global financial crisis, as shown in Figure 1.4.
The aggregate levels of revenue and expenditure are low in international comparison, especially
for such an advanced economy. This needs to be interpreted with care, however, as social
welfare spending is conducted largely through special funds with mandatory contributions
separate from the general budget. This is discussed further in Box 1.3 and the next section. It
also needs to be borne in mind that this was a period of rapid economic growth with significant
new nominal resources becoming available each year.

7
Chinese Taipei’s fiscal experience with COVID-19 was unique. The economy flourished during
this period driven by demand for semiconductors (Box 1.1). This resulted in a surge in
government revenue. Even with emergency support in full force, the budget only recorded
modest deficits in 2020 and 2021 and experienced a surplus in 2022.
This surplus generated great public pressure for the money to be returned. At the same time,
worldwide energy prices were surging following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. As
a response, innovative fiscal initiatives were taken which led to a significant fiscal deficit in 2023.
The measures were, however, constructed to be one-off or time-limited in duration and to support
long-term fiscal challenges. Specifically, the government distributed a universal cash payment of
TWD 6 000 [USD 200] to each and every citizen and provided subsidies to the power utility to
minimise rate hikes to households following the surge in global energy prices. The government
also made a substantial capital injection to the public pension fund to support its long-term
sustainability.
Box 1.2. Summary of special fiscal initiatives, 2022-2025

Universal cash payment TWD 142 billion (USD 4.4 billion)
Energy subsidies TWD 300 billion (USD 9.4 billion)
Capital Injection to Labour Insurance Fund TWD 225 billion (USD 7.1 billion)
In addition to the above, the government also increased spending on specific public works
projects on the basis they would support long-term economic growth.
Box 1.3. General Fund and Special Fund

The budget in Chinese Taipei is divided into two parts – the General Fund and the Special
Fund. The Special Fund consist of a number of individual funds, each of which is an
independent financial entity. The budget formulation procedures for the Special Fund is
generally the same as for the General Fund and both are scrutinised and approved by the
Legislative Yuan.
The key difference between the two is that the General Fund is financed mainly by general tax
revenue whereas entities in the Special Fund are funded mainly by their own dedicated
revenues sources, which can include revenue from the sale of goods and services and
mandatory contributions to social welfare funds (See next section). Some entities in the
Special Fund also receive appropriations from the General Fund.
1.2. Special funds for social welfare spending

Chinese Taipei has a comprehensive social safety net and spending on social welfare accounts
for one-fourth of total general budget outlays. However, most spending on social welfare takes
place outside of the general budget and through special funds. These are funded by mandatory
contributions from employers and employees, often supplemented by funding from the budget
itself. This applies particularly in the case of health care and pensions.

8
A National Health Insurance (NHI) system funds universal medical coverage. Its principal source
of financing is a mandatory payroll tax (currently 5.2%) that goes directly to the NHI. How the
payroll tax is shared between employers and employees varies. In addition, the government
makes contributions for low-income earners and ensures its overall viability.
A Labour Pension Fund (LPF) system administers individual retirement accounts for all workers.
Employers must contribute a percentage (6% in 2023) of an employee’s salary to their respective
individual retirement account. Employees can make additional voluntary contributions to their
account. The government guarantees a minimum rate of return on the accounts. Various other
corporate and profession-specific pensions funds are in operation as well in Chinese Taipei in
addition to the government-affiliated ones.
In addition, the Labour Insurance Fund (social security tier-1 pensions) has been undergoing
comprehensive reform in recent years. This pension fund is severely underfunded and represent
the greatest long-term fiscal challenge for Chinese Taipei. The government has been raising
contribution rates as well as making very significant capital injections to the fund as outlined
above.
The expenditures undertaken by these social welfare funds are mainly financed by social security
contributions equivalent to about 6% of GDP. This compares to general budgetary expenditures
of around 12% of GDP in recent years – see Figure 1.4 above.
The use of these special funds is largely a reflection of public attitudes towards government. The
contributions are perceived as premiums rather than taxes, and thus face less opposition than
taxes. This attitude is also reinforced by the fact that most medical services in Chinese Taipei
are provided by the private sector.
1.3. Fiscal responsibility legislation
Two laws have been enacted in Chinese Taipei to further promote fiscal responsibility – the Public
Debt Act of 1996 and the Fiscal Discipline Act of 2019. It is noteworthy that this legislation had
its origins in the Legislative Yuan, and not with the government. This demonstrates the
widespread commitment to fiscal responsibility in Chinese Taipei.
• The Public Debt Act mandates that the debt of the government may not exceed 40.6% of
GDP (three-year rolling average). Chinese Taipei’s debt sits well below these limits. New
borrowing may not exceed 15% of total expenditures each year. In addition, it requires
the government to allocate “at least 5% to 6%” of tax revenue for repayment of principal
on debt.i
• The Fiscal Discipline Act builds on the Public Debt Act and contains general provisions to
promote fiscal discipline and spending restraint. Most pronounced is a requirement to
identify the sources of funding for any new government expenditure. .
However, in many ways the latter only served to codify current practice. For example, the 2015
Long-term Care Services Act was accompanied by a series of new earmarked taxes to fund it.
These two laws come on top of the long existing organic Budget Act, which stipulates that current
revenue and expenditure be balanced except in extraordinary circumstances.

9
Box 1.4. Local governments

Chinese Taipei has twenty-two local governments. They receive grants from the government
to deliver many services – including education in schools. Local government have traditionally
also had property taxes as a principal source of own revenue. In line with a policy of greater
autonomy, local governments now have the power to enact taxes. There is, however, great
public resistance to such moves. Instead, local governments focus on securing larger grants.
This is the principal tension in inter-governmental finances in Chinese Taipei. The total amount
of debt held by local government is equivalent to about 4% of GDP. Similar fiscal responsibility
laws also apply to local governments.
1.4. Conclusion
The economic and fiscal situation of Chinese Taipei is enviable in most respects. It has a dynamic
economy underpinned by the dominance of the global semiconductor sector, low levels of public
debt and a commitment to expenditure discipline, backed by fiscal responsibility laws. Chinese
Taipei’s experience during COVID-19 and the resultant extraordinary revenue were disbursed in
a fashion compatible with its commitment to fiscal discipline.
Looking forward, the greatest fiscal challenge facing Chinese Taipei relates to its rapidly ageing
society and unfavourable demographics (very low birth rates). Most directly, this will impact old-
age pensions and care for the elderly. As noted above, the government has been extensively
reforming the pension system. A substantial amount of the extraordinary revenue during the
COVID-19 pandemic was devoted to the legacy pension fund.
Finally, it is worth noting that, at the end of 2023, Chinese Taipei had foreign reserves of USD
571 billion - the fourth largest foreign reserves in the world. These are managed by the central
bank and kept strictly from financing the budget. The amount of the foreign reserves is in excess
of balance of payments requirements and represents a great reserve fund for Chinese Taipei.
Note
i
Originally agreed as 40% of GNP, later modified to GDP at the equivalent level of 40.6%. The 5%-6%
range reflects a compromise between competing proposals in the Legislative Yuan.

10 
2 Directorate-General of Budget,
Accounting and Statistics
The Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) is a unique body with
extraordinary scope and power. It has a staff of over 12 800 located at its central office in Taipei
and in every budget entity at all levels of government. It lies at the centre of government, co-
located with the office of the Head of Government, and its staff accompany the Head of
Government to meetings. It has special independent power to issue “instructions” to government
entities. It is responsible for the formulation and implementation of the budget, and is the
government’s principal control agency. It sets accounting standards and produces the
government’s financial reports. It is the official economic forecaster. It acts as the statistics office
and census bureau.
The modern DGBAS traces its origins to the early 1900s when corruption was widespread in
Chinese Taipei and the quality of decision making in government was low. The DGBAS was
founded to foster good governance in Chinese Taipei, to professionalise decision making and
eradicate corruption. This is the historical underpinning for the fundamental role of DGBAS in
almost all aspects of government decision making and operations.
2.1. Organisation and functions

In discussing DGBAS, it is useful to think of it structurally in terms of consisting of three elements
– a DGBAS central office, DGBAS units in every line department and agency, and DGBAS units
in every entity in local governments (Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1. Organisation of DGBAS

 11
Of the 12 400 DGBAS staff, fewer than 400 work in the Central Office. The remaining staff
members are divided roughly equally among the units located in line departments and agencies
and the units in local governments.
The vast majority of DGBAS staff – estimated at over 70% – are involved in budget
implementation, including internal control. This also largely explains why most DGBAS staff are
located in line departments and agencies and in local government. The comprehensive
compliance procedures and internal control measures take place where the transactions occur.
2.2. DGBAS Central Office

The DGBAS central office consist of eight departments, two of which are dedicated to budgeting
– the General Fund Budget Department and the Special Fund Budget Department (Figure 2.2).
The General Fund Budget Department has a typical structure with a number of sections mirroring
and interacting with their respective departments and agencies (Figure 2.3). A budget
compilation section focuses on the aggregates and integrating the work of the various sections.
It also has a section that focused on the finances of local government. The Department has 77
staff.
The Special Fund Budget Department (Figure 2.3) scrutinises the various Funds (such as the
Health Insurance Funds and various pension funds), government enterprises, government
sponsored foundations and similar. These bodies are generally not dependent on the annual
budget funding for their operations. The Special Budget Fund Department focuses on the
government’s “ownership” interest in these bodies and fiscal risk implications. They review
business plans, governance arrangements and major strategic decisions. These must be
approved as part of the overall budget process. Each of the bodies will have a DGBAS unit in
place. The Department has 40 staff.
The Statistics Department is responsible for formulating the economic assumptions underlying
the budget.
The Accounting and Financial Reporting Department is responsible for producing the
government’s financial statements. It also sets accounting standards for the government.

12 
Figure 2.2. DGBAS organigram

 13
Figure 2.3. General Fund Budget Department and Special Fund Budget Department -
organigram
2.3. DGBAS units in line departments and agencies

Each line department and agency is required to have a DGBAS unit. There are currently 67 Level-
1 units and 1 120 Level-2 Units in place. Typically, a department would have one Level-1 unit
and a number of Level-2 units located in its affiliated agencies. Various organs, independent
councils and commissions would have their own Level-1 unit as well. The number and size of
each unit is set by the DGBAS central office. There are a few instances where entities are
considered too small for establishing a dedicated unit. In such cases, a single DGBAS unit serves
more than one entity.
The staff of these units are nominally the staff of the entity where the unit is located while they
serve there. They however remain part of the overall DGBAS personnel management system.
While they are paid by the entity where they are located, they are very much seen as “DGBAS
staff.” The DGBAS central office appoints the head and other senior staff of the Level-1 units.
The Level-1 units in turn appoint the staff of the Level-2 units. The heads of the DGBAS units
have a term of office of four years.
The overwhelming focus of the DGBAS units is on internal control. They have the sole authority
to validate or reject transactions. In budgeting, they must also take into account the views of their
respective Departments and agencies. How this works in practices varies greatly from one entity
to another. These units are the official interlocutors with the DGBAS central office in the budget
process. Their role is discussed further in the next section.

14 
2.4. DGBAS units in local governments

Despite the autonomy that local governments have come to enjoy in their finances, each local
government is required to have DGBAS units.
Each of the twenty-two local governments will have a Level-1 unit. In turn, there are 4 807 Level-
2 units in local governments. At the local level, there are many instances where multiple entities
share a single DGBAS unit. Individual schools are an outstanding example of such
arrangements.
All staff of DGBAS units in local government are fully integrated into DGBAS’ personnel
management systems. The head of each Level-1 Unit is appointed by DGBAS. Consultations are
held with the respective mayors/heads of local government on these appointments. This can be
sensitive, especially in cases where the mayors/heads of local government come from a different
political party. The head of each Level-1 unit appoints other staff.
In their work, the DGBAS units are jointly responsible to the DGBAS central office and to the
local government where they are located. In practice, they do not involve themselves extenisvely
in budgeting/policy-making. Rather, the DGBAS units in local governments will focus on budget
implementation, including internal control of transactions. The DGBAS units have the final say in
these matters at local government level as well.
Box 2.1. Department of Finance

In addition to DGBAS, there is a Department of Finance in Chinese Taipei. It is responsible
for tax policy, tax administration and customs.
A key area of interaction between the Department of Finance and DGBAS concerns the
revenue forecast which is the responsibility of the former and the economic assumptions the
responsibility of the latter.
The Department of Finance also disburses all money (and receives all moneys) through the
government’s Treasury Single Account. Payments are only made following validation by
DGBAS.
2.5. Conclusion
The story of DGBAS has been an overwhelming success in terms of its original mandate to
professionalise decision making and eradicate corruption. Chinese Taipei is now an advanced
economy and the circumstances that led to the current DGBAS could not be more different. It
may be timely to revisit the organisation and functions of DGBAS and embrace a greater focus
on the quality of expenditure.

 15
3 Budget formulation
Chinese Taipei has an extremely centralised approach to budgeting, dominated by the DGBAS.
It is very much focused on the maintenance of aggregate fiscal discipline.
The setting of spending ceilings at the start of April each year is the key milestone in the budget
formulation process. An intensive period of activity, starting in January, leads up to this. Baselines
are updated. Preliminary economic assumptions and revenue forecasts are prepared. New high-
level policy priorities are put forward and departments lobby for new spending. After setting
spending ceilings, departments prepare their budget submissions, often in excess of the ceilings.
Continued high-level discussions and lobbying takes place. Following updated economic
assumptions and revenue forecasts in August, the budget proposal is finalised and submitted to
the Legislative Yuan.
Table 3.1. Budget formulation calendar

Fiscal Year = Calendar Year
January-March Baselines updated
Preliminary economic assumptions and revenue forecasts
High-level discussions on policy priorities
Early April Spending ceilings set
May-July Departments prepare budget proposals
Review of budget proposals
High-level discussions on policy priorities
August Updated economic assumptions and revenue forecasts
Final preparations of budget proposals
End August Budget proposal submitted to Legislative Yuan
3.1. Updating baselines

The first step in the budget cycle is reviewing the baseline of existing expenditure for the
upcoming year. This takes place in the first quarter. The objective of DGBAS during this period
is to ensure that all baselines are up to date. The DGBAS units in line departments will request
updates from the various policy areas across their departments.
The role of the DGBAS units can vary greatly from one department to another department. In
some cases, they are viewed as a partner. Information flows easily. In other cases, the DGBAS
units are treated more as arm’s length bodies. In such cases, the various policy areas across the
department largely operate in isolation, and only provide the DGBAS units with the necessary
information to transmit to the DGBAS central office. Importantly, the DGBAS central office
conducts all of its communication with departments through the DGBAS unit.
The policy areas will often request increases that are well above what can be considered
legitimate updates to their baseline. They will nonetheless work to convince the DGBAS units of

16 
their spending pressures as this will be key to the setting of their spending ceilings. The DGBAS
units will engage in discussion with the respective policy areas to moderate these. The line
between baseline updates and new policies can be fine at times. At the end of the day, however,
the DGBAS units will transmit the figures the policy areas have put forward. The DGBAS central
office, informed by the DGBAS units, will judge what are legitimate updates to the baseline.
In the case of infrastructure spending and science and technology spending, the baseline
updates will be forwarded also to the Development Council and the Science and Technology
Council, respectively, for review. The role of these bodies in the budget process is unique
(Box 3.1).
Box 3.1. Development Council

The Development Council played a pivotal role in the early development of Chinese Taipei. It
formulated detailed four-year Development Plans that strongly informed budget decisions. As
Chinese Taipei has modernised, the Development Council has evolved and the Plan is more
of a commentary on structural issues.
The Development Council does however continue to maintain a comprehensive Infrastructure
Development Plan. This includes a long-term pipeline of new investment. As such, the Council
takes a leading role in reviewing all infrastructure-related spending in the budget to ensure its
consistency with the Plan. A small amount of “Social Development Projects” are also subject
to review by the Development Council.
The Science and Technology Council has a similar role in reviewing spending in that area and
ensuring its consistency with the Science and Technology Development Plan.
3.2. Economic assumptions and revenue forecast
At the same time, preliminary economic assumptions are being prepared by the Statistics
Department of DGBAS and an initial revenue forecast by the Department of Finance. The
forecast will indicate resource availability ahead of decisions on Spending Ceilings. These will be
ready by the end of March.
It is noteworthy that it is DGBAS itself that prepares the economic assumptions for the budget.
This includes the forecasts for GDP growth, the composition of GDP growth, the current account
and inflation.
The Department of Finance’s revenue forecast will naturally be informed by the economic
assumptions prepared by DGBAS, but the Department of Finance employs a conservative
approach to revenue forecasting. Actual revenue regularly exceeds forecast revenue – and at
times by very significant amounts.
There is not an independent body to assess the economic assumptions prepared by DGBAS. It
does however invite academics and external researchers to share their views on economic trends
and the economic assumptions for the budget. According to the Fiscal Discipline Act, DGBAS must
provide an “explanation” if there’s a difference of more than “twenty percent” between the forecasts
and assumptions formulated by DGBAS and the views of the invited academics and researchers.
The conservative approach to revenue forecasting serves as a buffer for any deviations that may
arise.

 17
3.3. Expenditure ceilings
The DGBAS central office will analyse all the baseline updates it has received, including the
reviews from the Development Council and the Science and Technology Council, and prepare a
report to the Head of Government. It will only incorporate into this report its judgment of legitimate
baseline updates, not the original proposals by Departments. DGBAS updates, on a standardised
basis, certain categories of expenses such as salaries.
The Department of Finance will also present its revenue forecast to the Head of Government.
There will be discussions with the Statistics Department of DGBAS and the Budget Departments
of DGBAS in arriving at the revenue forecast.
The report by DGBAS does not recommend specific expenditure ceilings. It is however the basis
for high-level discussions between the Head of Government, Head of DGBAS and Heads of
Departments, and the basis upon which the spending ceilings are arrived at.
An intense amount of lobbying for new policies and new spending occurs in the months leading
up to the decision on spending ceilings and it becomes more intense in the immediate period
before. With high economic growth, resources would typically exceed baselines for the upcoming
year, creating room for new spending.
These are resolved through a series of bilateral meetings between the Head of DGBAS and the
Heads of Departments. In some case, bilateral meetings occur between the Head of Government
and Heads of Departments.
In early April, the DGBAS issues the spending ceilings for each department. A department would
only be aware of its own spending ceiling, not those of other departments. The ceilings that
departments receive will reflect their updated baselines and any political decisions to increase
(or decrease) funding for a particular area. In formal terms, the spending ceilings are set for the
following year and the next three years. In practice, the focus is on the following year only
(Box 3.2).
Box 3.2. Four types of expenditure ceilings

The Expenditure Ceilings are divided into four categories:
• Operating expenditure
• Mandatory expenditure
• Infrastructure expenditure
• Science and technology expenditure
The latter two ceilings are simply to ring-fence the spending that is under the purview of the
Development Council and Science and Technology Council as detailed earlier. In recent
years, they have together account for about 10-15% of the budget. The ceiling for mandatory
expenditure covers 60-70% of total expenditure. This concept has a wide definition in Chinese
Taipei. The operating expenditure – accounting for 20-30% of total expenditure in recent years
– is a residual category and, in some ways, receives the greatest attention in the budget
process.
Salaries of government employees are considered in the mandatory category. This reflects
the tenured nature of government employment in Chinese Taipei. A comprehensive system
of manpower quotas (staff ceilings) is in place as a control to reinforce the spending ceilings.

18 
3.4. Budget submissions

Departments will then prepare their budget submissions.
In some cases, this will be a continuation of the work already undertaken as part of the process
of updating the baselines. In other cases, this will represent the first active involvement of
departments in the budget process. In such cases, their baselines will only have been updated
for the categories of expenditures centrally determined by DGBAS, such as salaries.
How departments approach the spending ceilings also varies. This also reflects the diversity of
how the DGBAS units operate in departments. As discussed earlier, this in turn reflects the varied
relationship they have with their “host” departments. In some cases, the DGBAS units support
the leadership of the department by providing a strategic overview of the different policy areas
for budgeting purposes with insights on strengths and weaknesses. In other cases, they are
treated at arm’s length.
In the former case, the various policy areas would present their submissions to the DGBAS unit
– often a recasting or enhancement of the originally submitted updates to their baselines. What
was rejected as an update to a baseline may well be funded within a larger spending ceiling. A
Review Committee, headed by the Deputy Head of the Department, will make the
recommendations to the Head of the Department on final choices to submit. The Review
Committee would include representatives of all the policy areas of the department with a leading
role played by the head of the DGBAS unit in informing choices.
In other cases, the spending ceilings will be deconstructed to the various policy areas. In effect,
even the smallest spending entity within the department will receive its own ceiling. Each of them
will prepare their submissions – for the first time in the process as they did not participate in the
baseline updating exercise.
In both cases, the final submissions may be higher than the spending ceiling. In fact, over half of
departments submit proposals that exceed their spending ceilings. The former are however more
strategic in nature having undergone a thorough internal review whereas the other proposes are
less developed. The DGBAS units will transmit the final proposals of the department, irrespective
of whether they exceed the spending ceilings or not.
There is very limited reallocation, even in departments with an elaborate review structure. This
is a reflection of the history of resource availability due to higher economic growth each year. At
the stage of providing budget submissions there may still be a view that additional resources will
become available in the final stage when new economic assumptions and revenue forecasts are
presented. Departments position for this, often informed by the discussion of priorities earlier.
Intensive lobbying continues.
To incentivise compliance with the spending ceiling for operating expenditure, DGBAS has put
in place a reward system. A department will receive a “bonus” of 0.5% for remaining within the
ceiling. This rises to 1% for being within the ceilings for two years, and 1.5% for three. The reward
is in the form of a “lump sum” that may be applied throughout the department. Only a few
departments benefit from this incentive system.
As with the case with baseline updates, infrastructure submissions and science and technology
submissions will be forwarded also to the Development Council and the Science and Technology
Council for review.
Budget proposals must be in accordance with instructions and guidelines set by DGBAS. The
instructions include information requirements needed to support the proposal. In the case of
infrastructure spending and science and technology spending, the proposals must also comply
with special information requirements set by them, including cost-benefit analysis for major
projects.

 19
Box 3.3. Performance information

Although the role of the Development Council in the budget process has fundamentally
changed since the Council was established, and is now limited to infrastructure spending,
each department is required to submit an annual planning document to the Council. These
documents provide details of each department’s policy objectives – often at very high-level –
and contain an abundance of performance data. Although the DGBAS participates in the
review of these documents by the Development Council, there appears to be ample scope to
improve the linkages between them and the budget.
Separately, DGBAS has in place a system of “performance assessments.” These
assessments contain performance measures that are centred around efficiency and spending
control, and compliance with these measures is linked with employees' financial benefits. In
reality, they serve as further controls on spending.
It is a work in progress to enhance the use of performance information in the budget process.
3.5. Finalising the budget proposal

In July, all spending proposals will have reached DGBAS, including the reviews from the
Development Council and Science and Technology Council. The DGBAS central office will have
been in constant communication with the DGBAS units in department during the period where
the proposals were being finalised. DGBAS will assess the proposals received, including the
ones in excess of the spending ceilings.
The updated economic assumptions and final revenue forecast will also be available at this time.
In view of the updated revenue forecast, there may be scope for additional spending than was
envisaged at the time of setting the spending ceilings.
An intensive series of meeting between the Head of Government, Head of DGBAS and the Head
of Department of Finance on the one hand and heads of line departments on the other hand
takes place for final consideration of the budget proposal.
The budget documentation is then finalised by DGBAS and submitted to the Legislative Yuan
just prior to the end of August.
Box 3.4. Accounting standards

Chinese Taipei budgets on a cash-basis and prepares budget execution reports on a cash-
basis. At the same time, it has adopted accrual basis for accounting and financial reporting.
Comparison tables are prepared to reconcile the two. The adoption of full accruals has been
a gradual process that started in 2016. A single IT system is in place across all levels of
governments which facilitates the timely and paperless preparation of financial statement.
The accounting standards used for financial reporting are set internally by the Accounting and
Financial Reporting Department of DGBAS. There is no independent accounting standards
mechanism in place, although DGBAS stated aim is to align with international standards.

20 
Box 3.5. Budget transparency

There is a very high level of budget transparency as well as a high level of public engagement
on fiscal issues in Chinese Taipei, as witnessed by the strong sentiment for fiscal discipline
and small government.
The budget and any special budgets are available in full, including on-line in machine-readable
format. Very detailed information is available on the finances of each entity. The government
publishes monthly budget execution reports (cash basis) as well as mid-year and annual
financial statements (accrual basis), including on-line in machine-readable format. Information
on future commitments, such as unfunded pension liabilities, and contingent liabilities, is
regularly disclosed as an inherent part of the financial statements.
Detailed information on government debt is regularly made available by the Department of
Finance. The Department also maintains a network of public displays in various venues
showing the total amount of government debt – “debt clocks.”
3.6. Conclusions
The overwhelming focus of the budget formulation process in Chinese Taipei is to maintain
aggregate fiscal discipline and control expenditures. It has a proven track record in achieving this
mission.
There is less of a focus on the institutional framework that supports the quality of public
expenditure.
Budgeting in Chinese Taipei has only an annual focus, notwithstanding the existence of a
nominal multi-year framework. Updating baselines is a singular event rather than an on-going
process. These two issues are mutually reinforcing.
The use of performance information to inform budget decision making is lacking despite the
collection of a wealth of such information by the Development Council. There is little attention
paid to re-allocation and spending review of baseline expenditures. Attention is focused on
incremental increases.
Addressing these issues may imply a change in the way DGBAS operates with a greater focus
on quality of public expenditures.
The lack of institutional independence for formulating economic assumptions and setting
accounting standards is noteworthy.
Budget transparency is exemplary although information on public finances may appear rather
dispersed to a casual user.

 21
4 Budget approval
The Legislative Yuan’s takes as its mission to promote and reinforce expenditure discipline in
Chinese Taipei. As discussed in the Introduction, it was the Legislative Yuan – at its own initiative
– that enacted the Fiscal Discipline Act. This is very much a reflection of popular sentiment.
Members of the Legislative Yuan regularly implore the government to exercise fiscal discipline
and they “interrogate” senior officials for their use of funds throughout the year.
The actual powers of the Legislative Yuan to amend the budget are however very limited. It can
only reduce expenditure; it may not increase expenditure. This has been interpreted to prevent
the Legislative Yuan from any reallocation of funds, (it may not reduce one appropriation to fund
an increase in another even if the net effect is zero).
As a principle, the Legislative Yuan exercises this power and proposes reductions in expenditure
from what is contained in the original proposal. The Legislative Yuan has however increasingly
taken to the practice of “freezing” appropriations, i.e. preventing the use of an appropriation, until
specific requirements have been met in the course of implementing the budget.
Box 4.1. The Legislative Yuan

The Legislative Yuan is a unicameral body with 113 members. The members serve four-year
terms and are eligible for re-election. Members are elected through a mixed system. Seventy-
three members are elected by simple majority vote in single-member constituencies and 34
members by proportional representation vote. Six seats are reserved for the Aboriginal
community.
For members elected by proportional representation, voters select political parties and
members are then chosen based on party candidate lists. At least half of the seats won by
each party must be filled by female candidates. Six seats elected by proportional
representation are reserved for Aboriginal candidates.
Parties need at least 5% of votes to secure a seat in the Legislative Yuan.
4.1. Budget approval cycle

The budget must be presented to the Legislative Yuan four months prior to the start of the fiscal
year, i.e. before the end of August each year. The Legislative Yuan must approve the budget one
month prior to the start of the fiscal year. The Legislative Yuan therefore has three months to
deliberate the budget.
Following the introduction of the budget, it has three readings in plenary session and is
scrutinised by the Finance Committee and seven sectoral committees. The Legislative Yuan is
supported by the Budgetary Research Center in its deliberations. The Audit Office also
contributes important input to the discussion.

22 
The presentation of the budget proposal is a high-profile event extensively covered by the media.
The government will highlight its policies and priorities. All political parties engage in the
subsequent discussion which often becomes quite boisterous. This occasion is a prime
opportunity for the parties and individual members to present themselves to the public. General
calls exhorting fiscal discipline often animate this discussion. The government responds as
appropriate.
This constitutes the first reading of the budget. It is then referred to the Finance Committee.
Table 4.1. Budget approval calendar

Fiscal Year = Calendar Year
End August Budget proposal submitted to Legislative Yuan
September First Reading in plenary
Budget proposal referred to the Finance Committee and sectoral committees
October Finance Committee and sectoral committees scrutinise budget proposals
Early November Each Standing Committee submits report to the Finance Committee
Finance Committee prepares its report
Negotiations among political leaders / Party caucuses
End November Second and Third Reading
Budget approved by Legislative Yuan
The Finance Committee plays a key role in scrutinising the budget proposal. It focuses on the
overall fiscal position, the budgetary aggregates and its economic impact. The Finance
Committee also has direct oversight responsibility for DGBAS, the Department of Finance and
the Central Bank.
For specific appropriations, the Finance Committee relies on the seven sectoral committees to
scrutinise their respective areas of competence. For example, the budget for the Department of
Education would be examined by the Education and Culture Committee. The Finance Committee
manages this process and sets specific timelines for each of the sectoral committees to report
back. Committee meetings are open to the public and are broadcast live.
The level of analysis and the time it takes to consider the budget proposal ranges across each
of the seven committees. They may invite senior officials to present on their proposal and to
answer questions. The committees will be assisted by the Budgetary Research Center in its work
as well as informed by the conclusions of the Audit Office. Outside groups and external experts
are rarely invited to participate in meetings where the budget proposal is being considered.
The focus of the committees is on discussing which appropriations to “freeze.” A common
practice in for the Legislative Yuan to “freeze” an appropriation. This entails that the
appropriations cannot be disbursed, or can only be partially disbursed, without the department
reporting back to Legislative Yuan after fulfilling specific requirements set by the committee. It is
also not uncommon for committees to undertake field visits departments.
Some committees complete their scrutiny in a meeting lasting only a few hours, others may take
several days. It is, however, always a short period of scrutiny.
The committees then submit a report to the Finance Committee. The reports will include a list of
appropriations to be frozen. If there are divergent views in the committees, they will all be
presented in the report. The Finance Committee will integrate all of the sectoral committee
reports together with its overview. This will be ready ahead of the Second Reading of the budget
in plenary. It is noteworthy that very few specific recommendations for reducing expenditure are
generally contained in this integrated report.

 23
The discussion on where to reduce expenditure takes place in negotiations among political
leaders or party caucuses following the report of the Finance Committee. They will agree (or a
majority will) where to reduce expenditure and by how much. The reductions are generally
across-the-board in nature and apply to categories of expenditures rather than to specific
programmes. DGBAS staff as is often at hand to provide costings and technical advice. These
negotiations conclude prior to the second reading in plenary. The negotiations will also finalise
any outstanding items resulting from the Report of the Finance Committee.
At the Second Reading, the proposed budget document itself is formally read article-by-article.
The review reports of the Committees are also presented. The conclusions of the negotiations
among political leaders are also formally introduced. A general discussion follows and a motion
to revise the budget proposal is made. Once the proposed budget bill has completed the Second
Reading, it proceeds immediately to the Third Reading and is formally approved.
There are standing procedures in place if the Legislative Yuan were not to approve the budget
prior to the start of the fiscal year. With the exception of new capital spending and new
programme expenditure, the government may continue to operate based on the same level of
spending previously authorised (previous year).
Box 4.2. Special Budgets

In extraordinary circumstances, a Special Budget may be proposed. Some provisions of the
fiscal responsibility laws do not apply to a special budget.
The extraordinary circumstances are defined as follows:
• Major Emergency
• Major Economic Event
• Major Calamities
• Major political events that takes place irregularly or once every few years.
Extensive use of Special Budgets was made in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Previously they had been used principally enacted at times of natural disaster. There has been
criticism that special budgets have been used in instances where expenditure could have
been made through the regular budget.
Special budgets receive expedited treatment in the Legislative Yuan.
4.2. Budgetary Research Center

The Budgetary Research Center provides analytical support to the Legislative Yuan in its
deliberations of the budget. It has a staff of 50 analysts and is organised into divisions to mirror
the committee structure of the Legislative Yuan. The staff of the Center attend meetings of the
committees and in effect act as the Committees professional staff on budget-related issues.
It prepares over 300 research reports each year. These range from a 2-volume flagship report
analysing the government’s budget proposal each year as well as numerous reports on individual
institutions and specific topics. The reports provide a comprehensive narrative and a wealth of
financial analysis. It is its principal reference for members of the Legislative Yuan in budget
scrutiny. Its reports are publicly available and attract media attention. It all supports the culture
of fiscal responsibility in Chinese Taipei.

24 
The Center also provides “consulting opinions” at the request of members of the Legislative Yuan.
4.3. Audit Office

Independent audit is performed by the Audit Office.
The financial statements of the government are prepared by the DGBAS. This must be completed
within four months of the conclusion of the fiscal year. The Audit Office must then complete its
audit of the government’s financial statements within three months and submit its audit report to
the Legislative Yuan.
As has been discussed throughout this report, there is a very strong focus on internal control in
Chinese Taipei to ensure that spending complies with the budget. In practice, inappropriate
budget execution is extremely rare in Chinese Taipei.
The Audit Office currently places a strong emphasis on further developing its work on
performance auditing.
The relationship with the Legislative Yuan is very strong. The Budgetary Research Centre and
the committees of the Legislative Yuan make strong use of its work in scrutinising the budget and
holding the government to account.
A particularly noteworthy aspect of how the Audit Office operates is the priority placed on
communication and engagement with stakeholders. This extends to citizens and civil society
groups directly through means such as focus groups, advisory committees and surveys.
Box 4.3. Limited Flexibility in Budget Implementation

The budget in Chinese Taipei is appropriated at an exceptionally detailed level.
• Re-allocation during the year is limited to changes only between object of expenditure
within the same account. Transfers may not exceed 20% of the original budget for both
the sending and receiving objects. No transfers can be used for personnel expenses.
• No transfers may be made for items deleted or reduced by the Legislative Yuan.
• Aside from fulfilling commitments already entered into, there is no possibility to carry-
forward unused funds to the next year.
Due to the strong system in place for internal control, the budget is generally implemented
exactly as the Legislative Yuan approved it. No carry-forwards and only minimal underspends.
4.4. Conclusions
The budget approval process in Chinese Taipei highlights the commitment to fiscal responsibility
in Chinese Taipei. The Legislative Yuan promotes a general culture of fiscal discipline and
demonstrates this by reducing total spending in the budget proposal each year.
The actual scrutiny of the budget proposal by the committees of the Legislative Yuan, however,
appears to be minimal and rely to a large degree on the conclusions of the Budget Information
Center and the Audit Office.

 25
5 Main findings and key

recommendations
This section draws together the main findings and key recommendations arising from the
previous discussion. It is organised in line with the OECD Spending Better Framework.
Figure 5.1. OECD Spending Better FrameworkI

26 
5.1. Fiscal Objectives
Chinese Taipei has clear fiscal objectives and enjoys widespread commitment for those
objectives. Fiscal responsibility and expenditure discipline is enshrined in legislation and political
commitment is well symbolised by the Legislative Yuan reducing spending when it considers the
government’s budget proposal.
This has been achieved by a strong focus on aggregate expenditure discipline. This fiscal culture
developed in a period of high economic growth when new fiscal space became available with
rising revenues. Looking forward, it is important for Chinese Taipei to develop a greater focus on
the quality of public spending and the reallocation of expenditures to fund new spending
pressures and new priorities.
Many of the findings and recommendations below can be seen directly in this light.
5.2. Economic Assumptions and Revenue Forecasts

Unbiased economic assumptions are crucial to avoiding revenue shortfalls and unplanned
spending pressures. Deviations in this area are a government’s greatest recurrent fiscal risk.
In Chinese Taipei, the economic assumptions are prepared internally in DGBAS and the revenue
forecasts internally in the Department of Finance. The conservative approach to revenue
forecasting employed by the Department of Finance implies a buffer against deviations.
Chinese Taipei may wish to consider establishing an external body to review the economic
assumptions and revenue forecasts.
In some OECD countries, responsibility for their production has been transferred to an
independent body.
5.3. Multi-Year Expenditure Baselines

Baselines are the foundation of the budgeting process. They illuminate the multi-year implications
of spending decisions, and act as an early warning of emerging expenditure trends. They
facilitate decisions to re-allocate resources, especially in case of structural reforms that require
a time horizon beyond the upcoming budget.
In Chinese Taipei, the budget formulation process is focused almost entirely on the following
year’s budget. The period of updating baselines in the budget formulation process could more
accurately be described as simply constructing a baseline. The previous year’s baseline would
not have been maintained.
Chinese Taipei may wish to revitalise the multi-year expenditure baselines in place by ensuring
that it is continually updated throughout the year. There should be a reconciliation of the baseline
and actual expenditure to encourage discipline in its preparation and foster transparency. This
would also enhance the efficiency of the annual budget process.
5.4. Top-Down Expenditure Ceilings

Expenditure ceilings operationalise the government’s high-level fiscal objectives in concrete
terms and reflect allocations and reallocations to fund new policy initiatives. Implicit in the concept

 27
of expenditure ceilings is that Heads of Departments should have flexibility to reallocate

resources within their overall expenditure ceilings.
Chinese Taipei has in place a robust system of expenditure ceilings. They are focused on the
control of aggregate expenditures. The ceilings are less effective in promoting reallocation of
spending within the total expenditure ceilings.
This is likely due to several factors. First, it is a historical legacy with the budget process focusing
on new incremental spending. It will take time to unwind this. Second, Departments may lack
capacity to effectively promote reallocation within their departments – this is discussed further
later in the section. Third, there are practical obstacles to reallocation. Some 60-70% of spending
is classified as mandatory and is therefore considered off-limits. What is mandatory with a one-
year time horizon, however, may be less mandatory with a longer time horizon. The multi-year
nature of the expenditure ceilings should be revitalised in tandem with the multi-year expenditure
baselines.
Chinese Taipei may wish to consider comprehensive action to further enhance the expenditure
ceilings and promote reallocation by Departments as described. Relaxing rules for in-year
transfer of appropriations should also be considered in this respect.
5.5. Regular Spending Reviews
Spending reviews are a powerful tool to identify opportunities for reallocation in order to align
spending with government priorities, and to control total expenditures. They focus in particular
on the accumulated baseline of expenditures. The scope of individual spending reviews may be
broad or narrow. Performance and results information, budget impact analysis, and public policy
evaluations are key inputs to spending reviews. Spending reviews are generally conducted jointly
by budget offices and line Departments and are inherent part of the budget process.
There is currently not a system in place in Chinese Taipei for conducting regular spending
reviews.
Chinese Taipei may wish to consider implementing a system of spending review. It may be
especially fruitful in an environment where there has been less systematic scrutiny on the
baseline of expenditures and significant amounts are classified as “mandatory.”
5.6. Informed Spending Decisions
Performance information helps inform spending decisions and improve expenditure

performance. It is a key support for spending review and reallocation of resources. Key
performance indicators and targets should be included in budget documents together with
monitoring mechanisms and regular reporting.
The budget and the budget process are also a powerful instrument for affecting change, including
in areas such as climate change and gender equality. Budget impact analysis is one of the tools
that can help inform how budget decisions impact both positively and negatively on specific high-
level policy goals.
The situation in Chinese Taipei with regard to performance information is complicated. A wealth
of performance data is collected by the Development Council. This is a legacy of the period when
the Plan informed budget decisions. This is no longer the case except in the case of infrastructure
spending and certain “Social Development Projects.” There would appear to be ample scope to

28 
rationalise the institutional responsibility and ensure performance information is for, and used for,
budget decision making.
Green budgeting and gender budgeting are in their infancy in Chinese Taipei. In the case of
gender budgeting, it is the responsibility of the Department of Gender Equality rather than
DGBAS. Gender budgeting as a tool would appear to especially relevant for Chinese Taipei to
promote women’s participation in the labour market and other initiatives stemming from the
demographic challenges in Chinese Taipei.
Chinese Taipei may wish to consider reforms in this area to yield returns from the considerable
investment it already makes in collecting performance information and also to realise the potential
benefits from green and gender budgeting.
5.7. Consider All Forms of Expenditures
Public spending comes in many forms. This includes appropriations authorised in the annual
budget, expenditure authorised in standing legislation (“entitlements”) and expenditures
authorised in tax legislation (“tax expenditures”). In addition, governments carry out significant
activity through loans, guarantees and other contingent liabilities that will – or may – have future
budgetary implications.
Chinese Taipei limits the use of tax expenditures and favours the use of direct spending as a
policy instrument. The few tax expenditures in place are listed in the annual budget
documentation with their estimated fiscal impact. There is a similar conservative approach to the
use of loans and guarantees. Only one significant guarantee is in place. Very detailed information
on this guarantee is presented in the budget documentation.
5.8. Line Departments as Partners

Line departments play a crucial role in the budget process. Top-down expenditure ceilings are
built on the concept of giving line departments more room to reallocate among their various
programmes while remaining within the same overall ceiling. They will have ownership over their
actions. They are also crucial to maintaining multi-year expenditure baselines and managing
robust performance information and spending reviews. In short, all aspects of modern budgeting
require line departments as partners. In order to do so, they need to have the capacity to do so.
In Chinese Taipei, there is no such capacity in line departments, in the sense that line
departments have ownership over the function. Rather, the DGBAS units in line departments fulfil
this role. As has been described previously in this report, the role of these varies tremendously.
They are very much focused on budget implementation (internal control) rather than providing
strategic advice to departments. Reallocation is uncommon.
Chinese Taipei may wish to consider detaching the budget formulation function in line
departments from the DGBAS units in line departments. (The DGBAS units would continue their
focus on budget implementation, internal control.) This would give line departments ownership
over the budget formulation function, they would no longer be treated at “arm’s length.” This
would support – and may in fact be a pre-requisite for – a culture of reallocation in line
departments. This could be implemented in a number of ways.

 29
5.9. Budget Transparency
All revenues and expenditures, assets and liabilities should be reported in a comprehensive,
timely, routine and reliable manner. Financial reports should be produced in accordance with
generally accepted accounting practice. The government should endeavour to make this
information available in a user-friendly manner and should promote awareness of fiscal issues
among the public and key stakeholders.
There is a very high standard of budget transparency in Chinese Taipei although information on
public finances may appear rather dispersed to a casual user. There is nonetheless an exemplary
level of fiscal literacy by the public and key stakeholders.
The government endeavours to produce its (accrual) financial statements in line with international
accounting standards. The actual standards in use in Chinese Taipei are however set internally
by DGBAS and may deviate from international standards.
Chinese Taipei may wish to consider establishing an independent accounting standards board,
or independent accounting standards advisory board, rather setting the standards internally.
5.10. Effective Budget Oversight

The legislature should provide for an inclusive, participative and realistic debate on budgetary
choices by offering key opportunities for the parliament and its committees to engage with the
budget process at all key stages of the budget cycle. It should have the necessary analytical
capacity to engage in the budget process in a meaningful manner.
Although it may not increase any appropriation, the Legislative Yuan has a strong influence on
budgeting in Chinese Taipei. It promotes expenditure discipline. It was its initiative that the two
most recent fiscal responsibility laws were enacted. It demonstrates this clear will by reducing
total spending in the budget proposal each year.
The Legislative Yuan has three full months to scrutinise the budget in detail. The actual scrutiny
by the committees of the Legislative Yuan is however minimal. No outside groups or experts are
invited to appear before the committees. They seem to rely to a large degree on the conclusions
of the Budgetary Information Center, its strong analytical arm, and the Audit Office.
The Legislative Yuan may wish to consider extending the time committees devote to scrutinising
the budget of the various Departments. This could also be an important opportunity to extend
public engagement in the budget process by inviting citizens groups to appear before the
committees. An enhanced role for sectoral committees would also be an impetus for the further
development of robust performance budget information as they would likely be a principal user
of such information.

30 
The OECD Papers on Budgeting provide insights on leading-edge institutional arrangements,

systems and instruments for the allocation and management of resources in the public sector.
The Papers bring together the best of the recent work of the OECD on budgeting and public
expenditures – reviewed by the OECD Committee of Senior Budget Officials (SBO).
We welcome feedback from our readers. Your views on how to improve the Paper series can
be sent to:
The Editors, OECD Papers on Budgeting,
OECD, 2, rue André-Pascal,
75775 Paris Cedex 16, France.
 sbo.news@oecd.org
The Editors
OECD PAPERS ON BUDGETING
Elsa Pilichowski
Director, Public Governance Directorate
Jón R. Blöndal
Editor-in-Chief
Meral Gedik
Executive Editor

 31
For more information, visit our website
https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/public-finance-and-budgets.html

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BUDGETING IN

OECD PAPERS ON BUDGETING

Cover design by Meral Gedik using image from © U.P.SD/Shutterstock.com.

Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

Figure 1.1. GDP per capita, 1960-2018

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

Box 1.1. The Role of semiconductors

1.1. Prudent fiscal policy

Figure 1.2. Total Debt, % of GDP, 2012-22

General Fund Budget

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

Figure 1.3. Budget balance, % of GDP, 2012-23

General Fund Budget

Figure 1.4. Revenue and expenditure, % of GDP, 2011-23

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

Box 1.2. Summary of special fiscal initiatives, 2022-2025

Box 1.3. General Fund and Special Fund

1.2. Special funds for social welfare spending

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

1.3. Fiscal responsibility legislation

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

Box 1.4. Local governments

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

2.1. Organisation and functions

Figure 2.1. Organisation of DGBAS

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

2.2. DGBAS Central Office

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

Figure 2.2. DGBAS organigram

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

2.3. DGBAS units in line departments and agencies

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

2.4. DGBAS units in local governments

Box 2.1. Department of Finance

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

Table 3.1. Budget formulation calendar

3.1. Updating baselines

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

Box 3.1. Development Council

3.2. Economic assumptions and revenue forecast

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

3.3. Expenditure ceilings

Box 3.2. Four types of expenditure ceilings

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

3.4. Budget submissions

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

Box 3.3. Performance information

3.5. Finalising the budget proposal

Box 3.4. Accounting standards

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

Box 3.5. Budget transparency

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

Box 4.1. The Legislative Yuan

4.1. Budget approval cycle

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

Table 4.1. Budget approval calendar

BUDGETING IN CHINESE TAIPEI © OECD 2024

Box 4.2. Special Budgets

4.2. Budgetary Research Center