Present the arguments (with justification) for and against broader regional integration

including the non-Anglophone Caribbean states (Guadeloupe, Martinique, Haiti and

Dominican Republic) while taking into consideration current global events. Can it
amplify their Foreign Policy? Use examples to defend your positions.

The Caribbean States have throughout the years realized the value of working to improve
regional integration, Regional integration can be strengthened through a more coordinated
intraregional trade and policy, and by doing this it will enhance the bargaining power at a
global level. Region integration there is potential to contribute to economic growth and
stability, sharing of resources, increased political stability, increase regional stability, cultural
exchange and diversity, and increased regional security, which in some ways is has its Pros
and cons.

WHAT IS REGIONAL INTEGRATION…… Regional integration is the process

by which two or more nation-states agree to co-operate and work closely
together to achieve peace, stability and wealth. (John McCormick, 1999)

OECS Commission…..” The term integration is generally regarded

as a process by which different independent units are brought
together or united to form a new larger unit. “

HISTORY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Allow me to give you a quick glimpse into history of regional

integration;

The first attempt at integration was the establishment of a Federation of British West Indian Colonies [the
Federa- tion] was mandated in 1947, at a Conference in Montego Bay Jamaica, it was not formed until 1958.
This federation though was established under a “British initiative. From a Brit ish perspective, the objectives
were administrative efficiency and centralisation; but the West Indian territories on the other hand, were
more interested in political independence”.

Although the Federation was intended as a political union, it never gained the unequivocal support of the
leading Caribbean politicians. In- deed, leading political luminaries, such as Norman Manley, Alexander
Bustamante, and Eric Williams refused to contest the federal elections. Given the lack of political support,
the federal structures were weak and was thus the Federation was short-lived, lasting from 1958 – 1962.

There were some positive impacts and ideas that came out of the Federation, such as UWI, the CCJ
and CARICOM …..

The leaders of the Caribbean recognised the need for closer cooperation in external trade and investments
negotiations, and this led, inter alia, to the establishment of the Caribbean Free Trade Association
(CARIFTA) in1965. It was agreed that CARIFTA would signal the beginning of what would become a
Caribbean Common Market and in 1972, the Seventh Caribbean Heads of Government Conference agreed
to transform CARIFTA into the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

26 independent and non-independent countries of the Caribbean

subregion. These countries are: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda,
Aruba, the Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands,
Cuba, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Haiti, Montserrat,
Netherlands Antilles,
Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Suriname,
Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos and the United States
Virgin Islands.

Consequently, CARICOM has the inherent capacity to coordinate a regional regime on international trade
and investments arrangements in a pro-active manner. The most signifi- cant achievements of
CARICOM are the establishment of; 1. the Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM) whose core
functions are to: advise, coordinate, facilitate, and negotiate. 2. the establishment of the Caribbean
Court of Justice (CCJ), if only in its original jurisdiction, and 3. the imminent establishment of the
Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME). A properly developed and coordinated CSME should
make the region, inter alia, more attrac- tive to foreign investors, and should facilitate easier and more
beneficial access for regional entrepreneurs who are interested in the international markets.

EXAMPLE OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Countries can come together in other functions of government like

education. In 1948, the ten territories of the then British West Indies
(Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica,
Montserrat, St. Kitts–Nevis–Anguilla, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago) established the University
College of the West Indies for cooperation in tertiary education –
one University to serve all the Member States. This integration of
education has continued at the level of secondary schools with the
creation of the Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC) in 1972 –
one regional body formed by all the Caribbean governments to
organise and regulate secondary school leaving examinations.
Current Trends – Challenges, Issues and Opportunities

Continued retention of the character of CARICOM as ‘community of Sovereign States’ and

reluctance to pool sovereignty at the regional level by moving towards supranationality of the
legal regime and governance arrangements.

Preference erosion affecting traditional agricultural commodity exports (bananas and sugar)
and the more recently established garment export sector.

Decline of the traditional development models in the region, manifested in a marked

slowdown in economic growth rates, rising fiscal deficits, high debt burdens and high rates of
poverty and unemployment in some states.

Emergence of new ‘existential threats’ to regional states in the form of climate change, the
rising incidence and cost of natural disasters and the impact of proliferating transnational
crime. (Girvan N. 2010)

- Institutional Mapping: CARICOM Regional Integration Agenda

Although a plethora of institutions exist, CARICOM remains the primary ‘umbrella’

integration institution of this region. Yet at the same time, it is unclear whether recently-
joined members are entirely satisfied with their membership, nor whether the commitment to
deepening and widening that has been a hallmark of CARICOM is as strong as it once was.
Much depends upon whether or not regional commitments are effectively and fully
implemented, and, also, how for example the conundrum of Dominican Republic
membership is resolved.

Functional Cooperations

Functional Cooperation is, arguably, the most successful aspect of CARICOM integration so
far. The Community lists twelve areas of functional cooperation

Education 2. Health 3. Environment and Sustainable Development 4. The Caribbean Sea 5.

Disaster Preparedness 6. Labour 7. Culture 8. Youth 9. Sport 10. Gender and Development
11. Illicit Drugs – Traffic and Abuse 12. Information and Communication

Notable examples of success are the Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC) in secondary
education, the University of the West Indies (UWI) in tertiary education, and the Pan-
Caribbean Partnership against HIV/AIDS in the area of health. Environment, natural disasters
and research and development are other notable successes of functional cooperation. Hence
there are the following institutions: Caribbean Agriculture Research and Development
Institute (CARDI), Caribbean Centre for Development Administration (CARICAD),
Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDEMA), Caribbean Environment Health
Institute (CEHI), Caribbean Food and Nutrition Institute (CFNI), Caribbean Meteorological
Institute (CMI), and the Caribbean Meteorological Organisation (CMO), the Council of Legal
Education (CLE) and the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC). Some
economists are of the view that the potential benefits of functional cooperation for
CARICOM are much greater than from economic integration, given the small size of the
economies and the limited scope for growth of intra-regional trade. (Brewster H. 2000)

- Assessment of Institutions and Organisations in Regional Integration

The strategic priorities of regional integration of the Caribbean are captured under the four
pillars of the Community. In each of these areas significant work has been conducted and
continues through programmes and projects of the Community, often in collaboration with
various stakeholders at the national as well as regional and international levels. Under the
economic integration pillar, there are two main priorities that can be highlighted; these are the
CSME and the implementation of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between
CARIFORUM and the European Union (EU).

The Single Market declaration which was signed in 2006 was intended to further the regional
integration impetus and advance, through the establishment of a solid regional economic
space, the sustainable development of the Caribbean in the current globalised world.

Under the CSME, key elements are: the free movement of goods and services through
measures such as eliminating all barriers to intra-regional movement and harmonising
standards to ensure acceptability of goods and services traded; the right of establishment of
CARICOM businesses in any Member State without restrictions; the Common External
Tariff (CET); the provision for sharing of collected customs revenue and external goods
importation; free movement of capital; a common trade policy; the free movement of labour,
providing for the transfer of social security benefits and establishing common standards and
measures for accreditation and equivalency.

Trade agreements and integration

The CARIFORUM-EU EPA came provisionally into force in 2008 after a laborious
negotiation process which was extremely controversial in the region. Put crudely, a divide
existed between on the one hand proponents of the EPA who wished to aggressively pursue
an offensive liberalisation strategy to access EU markets for services, and, on the other,
critics from academia and civil society who argued that it was an imperfect instrument of
development and gave away too much.(Bishop et al)

Security
In July 2002 the HoG approved over one hundred recommendations for cooperative action
submitted by The Regional Task Force on Crime and Security; security was formally adopted
as the fourth pillar of CARICOM integration in 2007. Consequently the CARICOM
Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (CARICOM IMPACS) was set up in 2007
with a remit to ‘administer a collective response to the crime and security priorities of
member states’ (Caricom-Impacs)

The common security arrangements established for the Cricket World Cup in 2007 with free
movement for CARICOM nationals and common CARICOM visas for non-nationals during
the duration of the event were hailed as an outstanding example of successful cooperation;
but there is great disappointment with the fact that these arrangements were ‘sunset’ limited
(in other words they had very specific time bound existence) and have not been continued by
governments. Of course, it is possible that were it not for the sunset clauses, the measures
may not have been passed in the first place. Yet once they were successfully up and running,
it seems a marked waste of resources to not continue them for the wider Caribbean
population, even if only on an experimental basis, particularly given that initial
implementation was expensive and took great effort.

The upcoming launch of CARIPASS, the CARICOM Travel Pass, which will be used within
ten countries of the Community, is another measure towards standardised and harmonious
border control facilities within CARICOM, including training, entry and exit procedures and
travel documents.31 CARIPASS is also envisaged to assist the region in transnational
security challenges such as illegal migration and human trafficking.

OECS Subregion
The OECS has recently been successful in fashioning deeper integration. In June 2010 the
Revised Treaty of Basseterre was signed to establish the OECS Economic Union and
subsequently came into force in January 2011. It makes provision for the pooling of national
sovereignty at the supranational level, with the OECS gaining legislative competence in five
areas: the common market and customs union, monetary policy, trade policy, maritime
jurisdiction and boundaries, civil aviation. (Revised Treaty of Basseterre) Over time, it is
conceivable that further areas of competence will become the purview of the sub-region,
rather than national governments. Issues which CARICOM has struggled to resolve have
been resolved within the OECS; for example all people of the sub-region will be able to move
and work freely in other member states by August 2011. In addition, it is expected that a
regional Assembly of Parliamentarians (with, initially, national politicians operating at the
OECS level) will also become influential in the organisation’s policymaking.

The significance of these changes is that the OECS is now integrating at a considerably
deeper level than CARICOM (which has, of course, historically always been the case). The
difference, today, however, is that the OECS has now deepened its integration process in an
explicitly supranational way. Were it to widen further – perhaps taking in Barbados or
Trinidad and Tobago – it may be quite conceivable that it could become the default
institution of regional governance in the Caribbean, hastening the further relative decline of
CARICOM.

][But arguments for regional integration would be;

1. Economic Growth and Stability:

• Pros: Regional integration with the inclusion of non-Anglophone Caribbean states can
lead to increased trade with a larger and more diverse market, which can help to boost
economic growth and stability, increasing employment and improving the living standards of
the population . For example the formation of CCJ, CARICOM, etc

• Cons: The integration process may face challenges in harmonizing economic policies
and addressing disparities among member states, potentially leading to economic imbalances.
For example, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has been working towards a Single
Market and Economy, with the aim of facilitating the free movement of goods, services,
capital and labour.

However, there are a number of reasons why Caribbean integration has struggled to
enjoy the same kind of effective deepening and widening that characterises the EU.35
These are:

1. CARICOM leaders have, because of the historical attachment to national sovereignty

in the region, been unwilling to relinquish and pool sovereignty at the regional level
in order to create the necessary supranational institutions of regional governance even
in light of the fact that the nominal value of such sovereignty has steadily diminished
over time;
2. The wide differences in size, levels of development, capacity, economic structure,
foreign trade orientation among members;
3. The EU is plainly far better-resourced than CARICOM and can fund its regional
institutions independently of external support. Moreover, the core members – and
especially Germany – have traditionally played a stabilising role as net contributors,
allowing others to free-ride under the understanding that collective stability would
ensue. The more powerful Caribbean countries, and especially Trinidad and Tobago,
have never wished to play the same role;
4. This is particularly important given the importance of regional funding in the EU,
which serves to overcome the economic and social divergence that can result from the
application of single market principles. No Caribbean country has had the means or
will to finance the kind of regional policy necessary to overcome fragmentation and
divergence, or even to fund genuinely Caribbean-wide infrastructure;
5. The EU began as a club of six members, and gradually deepened and widened
simultaneously over a long period of time, allowing the early advocates to set the
rules of the game, whereas CARICOM has always had fundamentally the same
membership (with only Haiti and Suriname joining of late);
6. Consequently, there has always remained a tension between deepening and
widening impulses within CARICOM, because, on the one hand, it has been
viewed very much as an Anglophone club by the member states, and, on the
other, the reality is that genuine deepening cannot go ahead (today) without the
engagement of the wider non-Anglophone parts of the region;
7. Finally, the size of many European countries has meant that ‘Europe’ has tended to be
removed from everyday politics, whereas in the Caribbean context, where societies
are much smaller and resources considerably more limited, the national opportunity
cost of regional policies is more immediately evident to local populations who might
suffer it. The net benefits of deeper integration for the Caribbean as whole, then, have
not been an easy sell for politicians.
OPTIONS FOR CHANGE

In the non-English speaking countries of the Dominican Republic and Suriname, there
is disenchantment with a process which implicitly considers them to be of secondary
importance. A number of factors were attributed to this viewpoint including political,
cultural and historical idiosyncrasies which have hindered efforts at creating closer ties.
For Suriname, geographical distance (on the South American mainland) and strong ties
with the Netherlands and the Dutch Caribbean, along with the fact that it is a relative
newcomer to CARICOM, has led many to feel that it exists at the margins of the
integration movement.36 Reasons for this include poor flow of information from the
wider Anglophone parts of the region, late adoption of regional arrangements
(Suriname is not, for example, a member of the CDB), disjunctures between legal
systems and cultural approaches to regional issues

Many in the Dominican Republic feel broadly the same way. Although the Dominican
Republic is not a member of CARICOM, it is a member of CARIFORUM. However,
the Dominican Republic has applied for CARICOM membership in the past, exploring
the possibility as early as 1974, and there is great resentment within the country
regarding the fact that CARICOM has continually rebuffed its advances.

2. Resource Sharing and Cooperation:

• Pros: Broader integration facilitates the sharing of resources and expertise among
member states. This can lead to collaborative efforts in areas such as education, healthcare,
and infrastructure development, enhancing overall regional development.

• Cons: Cultural and linguistic differences may pose challenges in effective

communication and coordination, potentially slowing down collaborative efforts and
hindering resource-sharing initiatives.

3. Political Stability is enhanced:

• Pros: Regional integration can contribute to political stability, giving the Caribbean a
stronger voice by fostering stronger diplomatic ties , and promoting peaceful coexistence. By
coming together Non-Anglophone states can participate in regional decision-making
processes, and leverage their collective influence to address common challenges and
influence global decision-making, which can lead to a more inclusive and stable political
environment. For example, the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) provides a platform
for regional cooperation and coordination on issues such as climate change and sustainable
development.

Cons: Disparities in political systems and ideologies among member states may lead to
disagreements and conflicts, potentially undermining the goal of political stability.

4. Cultural Exchange and Diversity:

• Pros: Broader integration allows for greater cultural exchange, fostering
understanding and appreciation among diverse communities. Non-Anglophone states can
contribute to the rich tapestry of Caribbean culture, promoting unity and tolerance.

• Cons: The preservation of cultural identity may become a concern, as the dominance
of one language or culture within the integration framework could overshadow the unique
contributions of non-Anglophone states.

5. Improved Regional Security:

Integrating the non-Anglophone Caribbean states into broader regional frameworks can
contribute to enhancing security and stability in the area. Cooperation on security matters,
such as joint efforts against drug trafficking and organized crime, can be bolstered through
integration, leading to a safer environment for citizens and promoting economic growth. The
Regional Security System (RSS) has been successful in coordinating security responses
among its member states (Barbados, Antigua & Barbuda, Saint Lucia, Grenada…to name a
few of its members).

Arguments Against Broader Regional Integration in the Caribbean, Including Non-

Anglophone States:

1. Sovereignty Concerns:

• Pros: Some argue that increased regional integration may compromise the sovereignty
of individual states. Non-Anglophone states may be hesitant to cede authority to a larger
regional body, fearing a loss of control over their domestic affairs.

• Cons: Overemphasis on sovereignty can hinder the effective implementation of

regional policies and limit the potential benefits of collaboration, potentially resulting in
missed opportunities for growth and development.

2. Economic Disparities (Unequal Economic Development):

• Pros: Economic differences among member states can create challenges in achieving
a fair and balanced integration. Non-Anglophone states may have varying levels of economic
development, particularly Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Integration could potentially
exacerbate existing economic disparities, leading to unequal distribution of benefits and
hindering progress towards shared goals. Efforts to address these disparities could strain the
integration process.

• Cons: Failure to address economic disparities may lead to unequal distribution of

benefits, with certain states bearing a disproportionate burden or receiving fewer advantages
from the integration.

3. Cultural and Language Challenges/Barriers:

• Pros: Cultural and language diversity can enrich the region, but it may also pose
challenges in terms of effective communication and shared identity. Non-Anglophone states
might face difficulties in fully participating in decision-making processes, due to language
these barriers.

• Cons: The dominance of English in regional affairs may marginalize non-Anglophone

states, leading to feelings of exclusion and hindering effective collaboration.

Transformation in the institutional culture and practice of CARICOM to reflect the fact that it
is no longer an exclusively Anglophone club. CARICOM meetings and documentation have
not yet provided effectively or comprehensively for the presence of Dutch and French
speaking members, and the mooted membership of the Spanish-speaking Dominican
Republic has been continually kicked into the long grass.

4. Implementation and Enforcement Issues:

• Pros: Critics argue that the successful implementation and enforcement of regional
agreements can be challenging, especially when dealing with a diverse group of states. Non-
Anglophone states might be concerned about the practicality and enforceability of regional
policies.

• Cons: Lack of commitment to regional agreements and difficulties in enforcing them

can undermine the effectiveness of integration efforts, preventing the realization of shared
goals and objectives.

In summary, the debate over broader regional integration in the Caribbean, including
non-Anglophone states, involves weighing the potential benefits of economic growth,
resource-sharing, and political stability against concerns related to sovereignty, economic
disparities, and cultural and linguistic challenges. The success of such integration efforts
depends on the ability to address these issues effectively and create a framework that
accommodates the diversity of the region. As an illustration, CARICOM has been working
towards the establishment of a Single Market and Economy with the intention of easing the
free movement of labour, capital, goods and services.

For example, global events such as the COVID-19 pandemic, further highlight the
importance of regional integration and collaboration among non-Anglophone Caribbean
states. The pandemic has demonstrated the need for joint efforts in areas, like healthcare
(there were Cuban nurses and doctors who came to lend their aid to different Caribbean
countries) emergency response and economic recovery.

By integrating with other Caribbean states, these non-anglophone countries can access a
wider range of resources, expertise, and funding to effectively combat the crisis and build
resilient health systems.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations for the political leadership It is clear that the HoG recognise the gravity of
the situation facing the Caribbean, and, moreover, in light of the planned retreat to take place
in mid-2011, that they are compelled to act accordingly. The key recommendations are to:

1. Settle the question of the CARICOM Secretary General by offering the position to
someone with gravitas and vision, and who commands the respect of both the HoG and the
wider region.

2. Empower that person to undertake a wide-ranging review and root-and-branch reform of

both the institutions and the purpose of CARICOM, as well as the broader range of regional
commitments, particularly under the CSME.

3. Immediately suspend the creation of new regional commitments until such a review is
completed, and the least problematic outstanding commitments are implemented, thus
displaying commitment to CARICOM and the CSME, and immediate and tangible benefits to
the wider Caribbean population.

4. Empower CARICOM as a genuinely implementative organ, giving it the legal space to

drive the implementation of decisions agreed by regional leaders.

5. Seek to solve the tension between national sovereignty and regional autonomy by taking
some courageous, small, experimental steps. First, establish a single ‘CARICOM’ embassy in
a country where the region has either no representation or limited representation. Second,
pool sovereignty in a single, clearly-defined area of policy where regional interests clearly
converge. To reiterate: the longer such meaningful reform waits, the greater the political,
social and financial costs of inaction, and the more diminished becomes the real value of
‘sovereignty’ to individual Caribbean countries faced with existential threats.

6. Establish a convention similar to the European notion of an Acquis Communautaire, which

is the idea that, once committed to forward implementation, the accumulation of treaties and
agreements taken at the regional level cannot be undone. Leaders should also strive to make
the fact, if not the detail, of regional integration an issue of bi-partisan consensus
domestically

7. Arrange a high-level meeting with officials in Santo Domingo with a view to solving the
conundrum of the Dominican Republic conclusively, clearly and quickly.

Recommendations for regional institutions

1. CARICOM, as noted above, needs to reorient its role towards becoming an

implementative institution, and it needs to be granted the political and legal space – as
well as the machinery and quality of leadership, through the new Secretary General -
to be able to do this.
2. Space should be made for greater popular participation in regional fora. Whether
through a revival of the Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians (ACCP)
 which is expanded to formally include civil society voices – or some other measure -
greater participation is crucial.
3. Effective communication must come to the centre of everything that regional
institutions do, along with the establishment of a Caribbean Broadcasting Corporation
with the kind of public service remit – and comprehensive coverage across the
internet, radio and airwaves – that characterises the BBC.
4. Create an accountability mechanism of some kind for everyday citizens, in
conjunction with civil society.
5. Beyond communications, a dramatic effort in upgrading the existing regional
infrastructure, as well as reducing transaction costs, needs to be at the forefront of the
Caribbean agenda. Central to this is the notion of sectoral development; particularly in
the exploitation of regional resources to encourage food security as a key economic
and social imperative.
6. UWI should rapidly reconsider its role as a regional university in terms of its purpose,
its spread across the region, the nature of the research that it conducts – and how that
research benefits the wider objectives of Caribbean progress – along with the practical
and technical assistance it can offer to regional co-ordination.

Recommendations for the private sector

The private sector can have a more significant impact on regional integration than is presently
the case by: a) developing clusters of Caribbean industries with complementary interests,
particularly in offensive extra-regional export industries, b) pressuring stakeholders to
develop infrastructure and policy frameworks for industries which ‘fit’ the productive
capabilities of different countries in the region (especially, for example, in agriculture and
food security), c) pushing for – and helping to develop – upgraded regional infrastructure,
particularly in communications and transport, and d) pushing for the full implementation of
the CSME and the EPA, such that the offensive interests of Caribbean businesses can be
realised in a timely fashion..

Recommendations for development partners

Facilitate research, whether academic or otherwise. In particular, the following: a) feasibility

studies in terms of cross-border projects; b) analyses of the effectiveness of either existing or
proposed regional institutions, including the counterfactual opportunity costs of not having
them, c) support for the various civil society activities (such as ‘integration watch’, contact
points) outlined in recommendations no. 15 and 16; and d) development of research clusters
which bring together academics, policymakers, technocrats, scientists etc. both within and
outside the region geared towards theorising workable, practical policy innovations to cope
with the issues that are afflicting the region today: debt burdens, climate change,
transnational crime, food security, sunrise industries and so on.

REFERENCES

Axline. A. (2000), Integration and Development in the Commonwealth

Caribbean: The politics of regional neotiations, Par 1. Retrieved from;
http://www.jstor.org

Bishop, M, L., Heron, T., and A. Payne (forthcoming) ‘Caribbean Development Alternatives
and the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement’, Journal of International
Relations and Development; and Girvan, N (2009) ‘EPA Lessons and the Canadian EPA’,
available at:
http://www.normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/girvan-guyana-presentation-22-
may09.pdf.

Brewster, H. (2000) ‘Identity, Space and the West Indian Union’ in (eds) Hall, K and D.
Benn, Contending With Destiny: the Caribbean in the 21st Century (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian
Randle); Mesquita Moreira, M. and E. Mendoza. (2007) ‘Regional Integration: What Is in It
for CARICOM?’ Economia, Fall, pp.97-142.

CARICOM. (2001) Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, available at:

http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/revised_treaty-text.pdf.

CARICOM-IMPACS website, at
http://www.caricomimpacs.org/impacs/index.php

Ding Ding and Inci Otker (February 4, 2020) Strengthening Caribbean Regional
Integration: IMF NEWS

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/02/04/NA020420-Strengthening-Caribbean-
Regional-Integration

Girvan, N., (2010) Are Caribbean Countries Facing Existential Threats? Available at:
http://www.normangirvan.info/girvan-existential-threats/

John McCormick. The European Union: Politics and Policies. Westview Press:
Boulder Colorado, 1999.
https://carleton.ca/ces/eulearning/introduction/what-is-the-eu/extension-what-is-regional-
integration/

Christopher P. Malcolm. Caribbean Integration: Within the CARICOM Framework: The

Sociohistorical, Economic, and Political Dynamics of a Regional Response to a Global
Phenomenon
LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 10 ] (2004)

https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1161&context=lbra

OECS Commission. ‘The Benefits of Regional Integration’

https://issuu.com/oecssecretariat/docs/oecs_regional_integration_teacher_s_resource_book/
s/12566729#google_vignette
Caribbean Community (n.d.). Retrieved from;
https://caricom.org/

Association of Caribbean States (n.d.). Retrieved from;

https://acs-aec.org/

Regional Security System (n.d.). Retrieved from;

http://www.caricom.org/regional-security-system

Stages of Caribbean Integration. Retrieved from;

Resources of Stages - The Growth of Caribbean Integration (weebly.com)

Bishop. Matthew Louis & Norman Girvan et al. Caribbean Regional Integration; ‘A Report
by the UWI Institute of International Relations (IIR). April 2011
Microsoft Word - Regional Integration Report - FINAL (caricom.org)

Lindsey. A,(2013), Caribbean Studies Modules 2, pp56-65. Retrieved from;

http://www.slideshare.net

Revised Treaty of Basseterre establishing the OECS Economic Union:

http://www.oecs.org/doclib/doc_download/506-revised-treaty-of-basseterre-establishing-the-
oecs-economic-union