A Step Towards Inclusive Federalism

in Pakistan? The Politics of the 18th

Amendment
Katharine Adeney*
*University of Sheffield; k.adeney@sheffield.ac.uk

Pakistan’s federal structures have been the subject of controversy since independence. Long-
standing demands for change have been made, particularly changes to the vertical and horizontal
division of resources and demands for a reorganization of provinces along ethno-linguistic lines.
The 18th Constitutional Amendment of 2010 introduced major changes to the federal system,
agreed by consensus. But have these changes gone far enough? This article analyses the changes
that were made, engaging with debates concerning the wisdom of creating ethnofederal units,
dividing core groups, as well as the optimal number of units. It concludes that while major changes
have been made, they have not yet gone far enough. The diversity of Pakistan should be seen as
a source of federal strength rather than as a weakness.

Pakistan’s federation suffers from multiple tensions. The vertical distribution of

powers, the number of provinces, their representation in central institutions, and
the inequitable distribution of resources have exacerbated tensions between the
provinces and the center, some of which have taken a violent turn. Many of these
tensions have assumed an ethnolinguistic nature. Since 1973, the constitution has
been amended several times, often by military rulers. In 2009, President Asif Ali
Zardari commissioned a Special Parliamentary Commission on Constitutional
Reforms (SPCCR) to roll back these amendments. The SPCCR’s report was released
a few months after consensus had been reached on the 7th National Finance
Commission’s (NFC) award. Both reports surprised even seasoned Pakistani
observers. This was partially because the level of agreement between rival political
parties and provinces was unprecedented. Observers were also taken aback because
the changes agreed by the NFC and recommended by the SPCCR fundamentally
altered many of the privileges of the center and also those of the Punjab, the
dominant province.
Pakistan’s federal system has been subject to little comparative scrutiny, partly
because of Pakistan’s weak democratic credentials. Exceptions include Ursula Hicks
(1978), Katharine Adeney (2007) and Harihar Bhattacharya (2010). Hicks was

Publius:The Journal of Federalism volume 42 number 4, pp. 539^565

doi:10.1093/publius/pjr055
Advance Access publication February 23, 2012
ß The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of CSF Associates: Publius, Inc.
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 540 K. Adeney

writing shortly after the secession of Bangladesh and was focused on the reasons
for the failure of the pre-1971 federation, while Adeney and Bhattacharya were
concerned with the management of diversity through federal structures within
Pakistan from a historical and comparative perspective. In contrast, the current
article deals with contemporary developments in the federal system which address
many of the structural problems in Pakistan’s federation identified by all three
authors. Many other authors on federalism have refused to accept democratically
challenged states as true federations (Chryssochoou 1998; McGarry and O’Leary
1993; Riker 1964). It cannot be denied that federal structures in Pakistan have been
undermined by military rulers and that political structures in Pakistan have tended
to be weakly institutionalized (Waseem 1994). But the many different federal
configurations adopted in Pakistan have affected relations between the center and
the provinces, inter-provincial relations, and intra-provincial relations, regardless
of whether or not elected politicians have formally held the reins of power.
The allegiance of different ethnolinguistic groups to the center varies markedly.
Although this author contends that predictions of Pakistan’s break up are
overplayed,1 the historical structure of the federation and the manner by which the
center has distributed political and economic resources to different provinces and
between different groups has affected the legitimacy of the federation and increased
conflict between certain groups and the center. The promotion of more inclusive
structures and attitudes is therefore vital, in order to reduce these conflicts, many
of which have taken a violent turn, in particular in Balochistan.
This article will first set out the debates surrounding federal design in divided
societies and discuss the Pakistani experience. Such an account is essential to
contextualize the significance of the changes introduced by the 7th NFC, agreed in
December 2009, and the 18th Amendment, signed into law by President Zardari on
the 19th of April 2010. The discussion will pay particular attention to the increase
in powers and resources of the provinces, as well as the ‘‘ethnicization’’ of elements
of the federation through the renaming of NWFP to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)
and the adoption of provisions to redress the underrepresentation of certain groups
in state institutions. It will conclude by discussing the remaining challenges facing
Pakistan’s federation and the likelihood of successful implementation.2

Managing Diversity Through Federal Systems

Contemporary debates in Iraq, Nepal, and Sudan demonstrate that the concerns
over federalism as an appropriate system of government for divided societies, ar-
ticulated by Nordlinger (1972, 32), remain. Although the examples given above are
postconflict societies, the worries expressed by academics and policymakers about
the effectiveness of federalism as a conflict management institution for divided
societies are pertinent for Pakistan. In the comparative federalism literature,

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 Inclusive Federalism in Pakistan 541

concern is often expressed that creating self-governing structures for territorially

concentrated groups, where ‘‘at least one constituent territorial governance unit is
intentionally associated with a specific ethnic category’’ (Hale 2004, 167), will
increase the desire for separation from the central government, and provide groups
with the institutional resources to effect this change (Nordlinger 1972; Vile 1982).
Philip Roeder has recently argued that ‘‘(e)thnofederal . . . institutions tend to create
or to keep alive conflicts in which the issue is not simply about rights of different
ethnic communities within a common-state, but whether the communities even
belong in a common-state at all’’ (2009, 208). Similarly, Henry Hale has noted that
those ethnofederations with a core ethnic region (those containing ‘‘either an
outright majority of the population or mak[ing] up at least 20 percent more of the
whole country’s population than does the second largest region’’) are likely to be
less stable (2004, 169). However, Hale’s conclusions are more optimistic than
Roeder’s—noting that many ethnofederations have survived if they have not had a
core ethnic region (author’s emphasis) (although many have experienced serious
tensions) (2004, 181).
Even those sympathetic to the federal model as a means of managing diversity in
some divided societies, notably John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, accept that
‘‘pluri-national federations make it easier for groups to secede should they want to
do so’’ (author’s emphasis) (2009, 6). The highlighted section of the quote is the
pertinent part. Not all ethno/pluri-national federal systems have failed. Federal
structures may be successful in creating dual loyalties (to the center and to the
unit) through increasing a sense of security.3 India has been the prime example
where the reorganization of states around ethnonational (in this case ethno-
linguistic) criteria has, rather than increasing pressure for secession, furthered
national integration. But India is not the only example where ethno/pluri-
federalism survives. Others include Spain, Canada, Nigeria, Belgium, Ethiopia,
Russia, Switzerland, Iraq, Bosnia–Herzegovina, and indeed Pakistan itself, albeit
many with tensions.4 Federations differ in design and the argument in this article is
that success or otherwise of a particular federal system in terms of managing
diversity depends on its design, regardless of whether it is an ethno/pluri-
federation. Differences in design include the number of units within a federation,
whether a core group is divided, whether groups are given formal or informal
access to decision-making institutions of state (noting that giving groups territorial
autonomy does not automatically give them a stake in the wider state), the division
of powers and the allocation of resources to manage these powers.
Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution was written after the secession of Bangladesh.
Many of the demands of the opposition were accommodated and it was designed
to be inclusive. Unlike its predecessors, the 1973 Constitution created a bicameral
legislature. The Senate is ‘‘demos-constraining’’ (Stepan 1999), with the four prov-
inces of the federation represented equally with fourteen seats apiece. In addition,

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 542 K. Adeney

Map 1 Provinces of Pakistan

there are eight seats for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and four
for the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT).5 FATA is administered directly from the
centre. Executive authority is exercised by the President on the advice of the Prime
Minister and no act of Parliament applies to FATA unless the President so directs.
Gilgit Baltistan (formerly the Federally Administered Northern Areas) and Azad
Kashmir do not have representation in the central legislature as their status is in
flux pending a resolution of the conflict with India over the status of Kashmir.
They both possess elected assemblies, but are subject to more central direction and
control than the four provinces.6 In common with most other federations,
Pakistan’s National Assembly (NA) is elected on the basis of population—giving
one province, the Punjab, a majority of seats within this chamber. The distribution
of seats institutionalizes the dominance of a core ethnic region at the heart of the

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 Inclusive Federalism in Pakistan 543

federation.7 As of the 1998 census, the most recent census available, Punjab’s
population was 55.6 percent of Pakistan’s total, although its total land area covers
just over a quarter of the territory. Its population is over 20 percent larger than the
next largest province, Sindh, with 23 percent of Pakistan’s population. A 2005
international report estimated Punjab produced 57 percent of Pakistan’s GDP
(Asian Development Bank et al. 2005).
By Hale’s criteria Punjab is a core region. Hale argues that federations with
core regions are less likely to be stable and this has indeed proved to be the case in
Pakistan. The three smaller provinces begrudge the fact that Punjab has the
majority of seats in the NA and has benefited from the lion’s share of financial
resources (allocated since 1971 on the basis of population). In addition, the fact
that Punjab possesses the majority of seats in the NA has meant that any political
party seeking to come to power in Pakistan has to be mindful of the Punjab vote
bank. The need to appease this vote bank has historically prevented political parties
such as the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) from pressing for changes in the federal
structures that would benefit the other provinces. Although these tensions have not
resulted in serious threats to the unity of Pakistan since the secession of Bangladesh
in 1971, they have resulted in numerous conflicts, notably in Balochistan, but also
in other provinces.
The concern to reduce Punjab’s dominance is often linked to the wider debate
concerning the number of units within federal systems. There is some evidence to
suggest that a larger number of units is beneficial for federal stability (Vile 1982;
Watts 1999; Adeney 2007, 171–172, 191–192), although the relationship is not
causal and there are notable exceptions, e.g., the Soviet Union. A larger number of
units is more likely to result in the core region being divided (as in India with
Hindi speakers, the Hausa Fulani in Nigeria, or German speakers in Switzerland).
As Hale has argued, the ‘‘existence of a single core ethnic region can . . . be parti-
cularly threatening to minority republics . . . strengthening the bargaining position
of the core group.’’ If this core group is divided into multiple regions, ‘‘high
hurdles to collective action’’ on the parts of this core region are introduced (Hale
2004, 174–176), potentially increasing the sense of security for smaller regions.
In addition, a federation with a larger number of units is more likely to experience
changing coalitions of interests on different issues and reduce the antagonism
that is likely to arise between a smaller number of units, especially in bipolar
federations (Adeney 2007, 171–172).8 In 1973, Pakistan created a federation with
four provincial units. The relatively small number of units in Pakistan
compounded the tensions caused by the existence of a core ethnic region and
the underrepresentation of certain groups in the core institutions of state.
As such, there are long-standing demands for the division of Punjab along ethnic
lines.

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 544 K. Adeney

It must also be noted that although federalism divides sovereignty between levels
of government, there is nothing about federal systems that guarantees groups access
to central power. Nondominant groups may not have their interests protected in a
federal system, even though they may be in a majority in a unit. The debate
between majoritarian and consociational federations has been a long-standing one
(Lijphart 1979; McGarry and O’Leary 2007). Although consociational forms of
government have been subjected to many criticisms (Barry 1975; Horowitz 2002),
the inclusion of major groups at the center in a federation is a mechanism that can
enhance their security and therefore promote harmonious relations between
groups. Their inclusion may be facilitated by formal power sharing mechanisms as
in Switzerland, or informal power sharing as in Canada and India. The importance
of central representation depends to some extent on the division of powers. In a
decentralized federation, where a high degree of financial and cultural powers
reside with the units of the federation, control of, and representation in, the center
is less important than in a centralized federation such as Pakistan, which has a core
ethnic region and a small number of units. In addition, representation in the core
institutions of a federal state is crucial for a group to have its interests protected.
Again, this representation can be formal, as in Belgium (Brans and Hondeghem
1999, 136), or informal, as in India (Potter 1996, 215).
Since 1971, Pakistan has survived as a federation and is in no danger of
splitting up. But there exist many serious tensions. First of these are the major
resentments concerning the allocation of revenues from the exploitation of
natural resources. Challenges to the construction of hydro-electric dams and the
receipt of revenues generated from their operation are a key demand of KP in
whose territory many of these dams are located. As in many other areas of
central and southern Asia water issues are controversial. Sindh is aggrieved that
Punjab gets the lion’s share of the water from the Indus for irrigation. Provinces
such as Balochistan have also resented the fact that the natural resources such as
oil and gas located within their borders have not financially benefitted the
province (as the revenue from their extraction has been allocated to the center
and the gas heats homes and businesses in provinces other than Balochistan)
(Tahir 2009).9
Second, these issues are connected with the lack of representation at the center,
particularly of Balochis and Sindhis. These issues have an impact on how groups
view the federation and the Punjab. At the time of independence the Pakistani elite
pursued an integrationist strategy of national integration. Islam was prioritized as
the unifying identity and regional and linguistic differences were de-legitimized
(Adeney 2007, 99–104). However, in practice, some groups were privileged in terms
of their access to, and representation in, the core institutions of state (Adeney
2009). Representation in the army and the bureaucracy, which are two core
institutions of the state in Pakistan, are ethnically skewed in favor of Punjabis (and

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 Inclusive Federalism in Pakistan 545

Map 2 Ethnolinguistic Composition of Pakistan

Notes: This map has been compiled from the 1998 district-level census reports. Districts have been
coded according to the largest group within the district. In the overwhelming majority of cases,
this group was also a majority of the population in that district. Publicly available census data on
language does not exist for Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan—hence the decision to leave them
blank. The ‘‘others’’ in KP are two separate groups: Hindko speakers (in the northeast of the
province) and Khowar speakers (in the north of the province)

less so in favor of Pakhtuns in the army, and Mohajirs in the bureaucracy)

(Kennedy 1987; Siddiqa 2007). Anti-Punjab feelings are high, amid talk of the
‘‘Punjabi empire.’’10
Third, and equally importantly, the south of Punjab is much less developed
than the rest of the province. This inequity in development has contributed to
the demand for the creation of a Seraiki province. Seraiki is a distinct language
(and is now categorized as such in the census, despite claims that it is ‘‘only a

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 546 K. Adeney

dialect’’ of Punjabi).11 Other provinces are also not particularly homogeneous as

Map Two demonstrates. There are tensions within and between the urban areas of
Sindh, particularly Karachi and the rest of the province. These tensions were most
violent in the 1980s and 1990s but continue to flare up (Harrison 1991; Kennedy
1984; Wright 1991). Other tensions concern the division in Balochistan between
Balochi and Brahvi speakers and Pashto speakers.12 Many of the latter support a
political party demanding either the merger of the Pashto speaking areas with KP,
or the creation of a separate Pashto speaking province from the Pashto speaking
areas of Balochistan.
These tensions have undermined the legitimacy of the Pakistani state in parts of
its territory. The State of Democracy in South Asia Survey reported very different
levels of allegiance to Pakistan among different ethnolinguistic groups (SDSA 2008,
255–261). It is no coincidence that many of the areas of Pakistan which are
seriously underdeveloped (and often have lower levels of allegiance to the Pakistani
state) are those in which Islamic extremist organizations have secured support.
The situation in FATA is well known, but the same applies to areas of Balochistan,
and (less well known) to southern Punjab. Southern Punjab is the area from which
demands for a Seraiki speaking province have been made (Rumi 2010). Although
the issue of Islamic extremism in Pakistan is beyond the scope of the article,
it underlines the importance of creating a more inclusive state, of which a more
balanced federal set up is an important part. The recommendations of the SPCCR
must be seen in this context.

The 7th NFC and the 18th Amendment

The twenty-seven member SPCCR was set up after consultation with leaders of all
political parties with representation in the federal parliament. The larger parties had
fewer representatives than their party strength allowed, ensuring that the smaller
parties received representation. The terms of the reference of the SPCCR were
to ‘‘propose amendments to the Constitution keeping in view the 17th Amendment,
Charter of Democracy (CoD) and provincial autonomy, in order to meet the
democratic and Islamic aspirations of the people of Pakistan’’ (SPCCR 2010). Two of
the nine criteria which informed the SPCCR’s deliberations were ‘‘strengthening
Parliament and Provincial Assemblies’’ and ‘‘Provincial Autonomy.’’ The 133-page
report was submitted in April 2010. The SPCCR recommended changes to
ninety-seven articles, many increasing provincial autonomy, although the concern to
rewrite the constitution to reverse the changes made by Musharraf’s Legal Framework
Order was paramount. The efficiency of the process has been remarked upon not only
by academics (e.g., Gazdar 2010) but also politicians. There was awareness by the
leaders of political parties of the dangers of returning to the politics of the 1990s,
where politicians co-opted the army to undermine their political opponents.

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 Inclusive Federalism in Pakistan 547

Politicians appreciated that the short-term political gains of army intervention

against their political opponents was outweighed by the weakening of the
democratic process. To maintain consensus, parties agreed not to ‘‘oppose the
Committee’s decision . . . (but would) reiterate their stated position without
prejudice to the Committee decision, through a note to be called, ‘a Note of
Reiteration’’’—eleven were submitted. Although there were constraints on the
SPCCR imposed by the army, notably with regard to recommendations concerning
FATA, the army assumed that the politicians would not be able to reach consensus,
thus explaining the relative freedom of the Commission.13 The 18th Amendment
Bill was passed unanimously by both houses of parliament and was signed into law
by President Zardari later that month.
This article concentrates on the changes introduced by the 18th Amendment
that were important for the management of diversity within the Pakistan
federation. These include the increase in provincial powers, the change in formula
for the vertical and horizontal distribution of resources, and the increased
ethnicization of the federation. Interestingly, many of these changes escaped public
notice—journalists were more concerned with the reduction in the power of the
president vis-à-vis the parliament and the conflicts between parliament and the
judiciary.14

The Increase in Provincial Powers and Resources

One of the changes that has excited interest in Pakistan has been the abolition of the
Concurrent List. Long-standing demands for the abolition of the Concurrent List have
existed (because the center could override provincial legislation on all subjects listed
on it). Federations divide sovereignty, but different federations do so in different ways.
Under the 1973 constitution, the Federal Legislative List (FLL) had sixty-seven
subjects; the Concurrent List (over which both center and provinces could enact
legislation) had forty-seven. All other powers resided with the provinces. Ian Talbot
rightly comments that this constitution ‘‘granted more autonomy to the provinces
than any previous’’ (2009, 229). However, the provision that any legislation enacted by
the Center on a subject on which it was competent to legislate would prevail over an
Act of a Provincial Assembly (Article 143) reveals the true locus of power, as the
Centre also prevailed on items on the Concurrent List. Although no documentary
record exists, many have alleged that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto promised the Balochi leader
Bizenjo that within ten years of the promulgation of the 1973 constitution, all powers
on the Concurrent List would reside in the provinces. Demands for the abolition of
the Concurrent List were therefore long-standing among many of the smaller
provinces in Pakistan before the recent changes.
After the adoption of the 18th Amendment, the Pakistan Constitution contains
only one list—the FLL, divided into two parts. Part I contains subjects that the

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Federal Government solely controls. Part II contains subjects that also come under
the purview of the Council of Common Interests (CCI), whose duty is to ‘‘promote
joint supervision of Federal resources and collective dispute management,’’ as well
as to take decisions on any controversial issues referred to them (SPCCR 2010).
The vast majority of powers on the Concurrent List have now been allocated to
the provinces, requiring the devolution of seventeen ministries from the center.15
Residual powers remain with the provinces. These changes will require a large
increase in provincial resources. As will be discussed below, there are real concerns
about provincial capacity to manage these powers, in terms of both human and
financial capital.
In December 2009, a few months before the SPCCR made its recommendation
on the abolition of the Concurrent List, the 7th NFC increased the amount of
resources available to the provinces. In 2006, Mohammad Zubair Khan calculated
that the federal government generated about 93 percent of the resources of the
federation, while its expenditure accounted for 72 percent (cited in Ahmed,
Mustafa, and Khalid 2007, 12). In the previous NFC Award (imposed by Musharraf
because of a lack of consensus in 2006), 45 percent of the divisible pool (which
includes all taxes) was allocated to the provincial governments (Ahmed, Mustafa,
and Khalid 2007, 9). In contrast, the 7th NFC provided that from 2011, 57.5
percent should be allocated to the provinces and 42.5 percent to the center. This
was a sizeable increase. The 18th Amendment went one step further and provided
that the provinces shall be given a greater share in the distribution of resources
between the center and the provinces and also that ‘‘the share of the Provinces in
each Award of National Finance Commission shall not be less than the share given
to the Provinces in the previous Award’’ (author’s emphasis) (Article 160 3A). The
changes to the distribution of resources are important, for symbolic as well as
financial reasons. In 2010, Hafiz Pasha calculated that almost Rs 300 billion would
be added to the four provincial budgets as a result of larger federal transfers; Rs 178
billion more than if the formula under Musharraf had been continued (2010).
However, although ‘‘the share of provincial governments in public expenditures
will rise from 30 percent to almost 36 percent,’’ this is still comparatively low in
relation to other federal systems. In Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, and Germany,
the provincial governments spend 60–70 percent. In most federations, provincial
spending is between 45 and 55 percent (including India, the United States, Spain,
and Mexico). Pakistan is therefore still comparatively centralized along fiscal lines
among federations (Anderson 2010, 17; Pasha 2010). In addition, since the NFC
was signed there has been a decrease in tax revenues received by the center—thus
reducing the absolute amount that can be distributed to the provincial
governments (Government of Pakistan 2011, Ch. 1). The implications of the
latter are discussed below.

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The 18th Amendment also sought to redress the concerns of Balochistan,

allowing the Balochi representatives on the SPCCR to sign the report.16 Before the
passing of the 18th Amendment, all ‘‘lands, minerals and other things of value
within the continental shelf . . . were [vested] in the Federal Government.’’ Revised
Article 172 now provides that ‘‘mineral oil and natural gas within the Province or
the territorial waters adjacent thereto shall vest jointly and equally in that Province
and the Federal Government.’’ The revised Article substantially increases the
resource base of provinces with natural resources—most areas of which reside
outside the Punjab. Revised Article 157 also provides that the Federal Government
must now consult a provincial government before constructing hydro-electric
power stations within its territory. This goes some way to appeasing the demands
of provinces such as KP, but fails to satisfy those downstream of such constructions.17
The significance of these changes should not be underestimated. As Asma Jahangir,
now chair of the Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan and the Human
Rights Commission of Pakistan has noted, these changes strike ‘‘at the heart of
institutions that feed on the largess of the federal government’’—a not so subtle
reference to the army (2010).

The Horizontal Distribution of Resources

One of the major tensions within Pakistan that has had implications for the affinity
of groups with the Pakistani state concerns the way that resources are distributed
between the provinces. Since 1973, and unusually for a federal system, resources
have been distributed solely according to population, benefitting the province of
Punjab (Jalal 1999, 220).18 Much of Punjab is already very developed and urbanized
compared to other provinces. The other provinces have long argued that allocating
resources according to population is grossly unfair. Sindh has argued that
allocations should be made on the basis of the provinces’ contribution to national
revenues—Sindh benefits from Karachi’s status as Pakistan’s major port (Ahmad
2010b, 18). Both KP and Balochistan have argued that ‘‘backwardness’’ (and
inverse population density in Balochistan) should form part of the criteria. These
calls for change were previously resisted by the NFC.
The 7th NFC went a long way to addressing these concerns. The revised formula
provided that 82 percent of resources allocated to the provinces was distributed
according to population, 10.3 percent for poverty/backwardness, 5 percent for
revenue generation and collection, and 2.7 percent for inverse population density.
The revised formula resulted in a 5.6 percent reduction of the share of Punjab
from the last consensus award of 1996. Punjab received 51.7 percent, there was a
1.3 percent increase in Sindh’s allocation to 24.6 percent, a 1.1 percent increase in
KP’s share to 14.6 percent,19 and a 3.8 percent increase in Balochistan’s share to 9.1
percent (The Nation 2010).

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I.A. Rehman, an astute observer of Pakistan’s politics, gives credit for agreement
over the revised formula to Punjab politicians, even going as far to name Chief
Minister Shahbaz Sharif of the PML-N who
informed the finance ministers of the three other provinces that Punjab was
prepared to examine alternatives to the traditionally followed formula. It is to
the credit of the Punjab government that it successfully resisted the opposition
to any alteration in the old formula, especially from some ostriches among
economic experts and bureaucrats (2009).

However, Punjab was enabled to compromise through a change in sequencing

within the NFC. Unlike in previous awards, agreement was reached on the formula
for the horizontal division of resources before that on the vertical division. Thus,
‘‘Punjab was brought around by the Federal Finance Minister’s assurance that the
Center would compensate Punjab for its absolute loss.’’20 The changes to the
allocation of natural resource revenue also, in the eyes of many Punjabi politicians,
stood to hit the center rather than the Punjab.

Ethnicization
The Pakistani state after independence sought to unify the country around Islam
(although Pakistan has never been a theocratic state) (Adeney 2007, 99–104). The
Pakistani power elite, traditionally termed the ‘‘Establishment,’’ eschewed any
recognition of ethnolinguistic identity, the recognition that provinces could adopt
provincial languages in 1973 being the sole exception. Therefore the renaming of
NWFP to KP is a major development. Formerly part of the Punjab, NWFP was
carved out as a security buffer against potential Russian expansion in 1901 by the
British. They created a predominantly Pushto-speaking state, with significant
Hazara minorities in the northeast of the province, as can be seen in Map Two.
Ever since independence, demands have been made by Pakhtuns for the renaming
of the province to Pushtoonistan or Pakhtunistan. The demand was fiercely resisted
by the center, ever fearful of legitimizing ethnic claims for recognition. The demand
for the name change did not feature in the Charter of Democracy, signed between
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in 2006, but it was a manifesto commitment of
the Awami National Party (ANP). The change of name reflects the importance of
coalition politics and the real importance attached to consensus and bargaining by
the SPCCR (Asghar 2010; Hindustan Times 2010).21 It was said at the time that the
ANP only secured a partial victory because the word ‘‘Khyber’’ was inserted before
Pakhtunkhwa to reinforce the territorial nature of the name. In fact, given the
ANP’s demands for FATA to be joined to KP, the inclusion of ‘‘Khyber’’ may
bolster their claims to FATA.22

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 Inclusive Federalism in Pakistan 551

The renaming of the province prompted immediate conflict, with the Hazara
community of KP demanding their own province23 [supported by the Pakistan
Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) and the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid)
(PML-Q)] (2009). Several people died in the violence that followed. The name
change has been popular in much of Pakistan. As one respondent opined: ‘‘[a]t
last, after 63 years, a province, which was nameless and was called by its directions,
now got its proper name.’’24 Another commented ‘‘[w]hy don’t we call Alaska,
NWFP?’’25 However, the change has also been controversial, some charging that ‘‘it
will only create further disunity in Pakistan,’’ pointing to the conflict with the
Hazara linguistic group in the province and asking why the province was not
renamed as ‘‘Hazara-Pakhtunkhwa.’’26
The second change introduced by the 18th Amendment concerns the attempt
to redress the well-documented under-representation of certain groups in the core
institutions of state such as the army and bureaucracy, one of the major causes of
ethnic tensions in Pakistan since independence (Kennedy 1984; Siddiqa 2011b).
Steven Wilkinson has correctly argued that Pakistan’s quota politics have been
a major cause for conflict between different ethnolinguistic groups (2000, 221).
But much of the tension relating to inequitable representation in the bureaucracy
revolves around the fact that these quotas are provincial rather than ethnic, contrary
to Wilkinson’s contention. One of the grievances of Balochis and Sindhis has
been that more educated Punjabis have moved into ‘‘their’’ provinces and are
able to avail themselves of the provincial quota, at the expense of Balochis and
Sindhis. The 18th Amendment recognized these tensions, and Article 27 of the
constitution now provides ‘‘that under-representation of any class or area in the
service of Pakistan may be redressed in such manner as may be determined
by . . . Parliament.’’ It remains to be seen how this redress will work in practice—
especially as it concerns intervention in the internal recruitment practices of the
army. In interviews with the author in 2007 several retired officers argued that the
recruitment strategies were becoming more inclusive (this strategy has recently been
confirmed by Ayesha Siddiqa [2011b]). In addition, formal recognition that
under-representation of certain groups is a political issue is an important
milestone. As noted above, lessons from other federal systems demonstrate the
importance of inclusion in the core institutions of state—territorial autonomy is
not sufficient for stability.

Explanations for the Compromise

The fact that politicians, especially those hailing from the Punjab, were willing to
compromise and were able to do so despite the opposition from the military and
civil bureaucracy is encouraging. They were willing to include the smaller political
parties on the SPCCR, and just as importantly, take their demands into account.27

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There are several explanations for the compromises made, especially from the
politicians representing the Punjab. The primary explanation is that, as noted,
although the horizontal distribution of resources was amended, Punjab was assured
it would be compensated by increased revenue transfers from the center. The
changes to the allocation of natural resource revenue also, in the eyes of many
Punjabi politicians, stood to hit the center rather than the Punjab. Several recent
commissions of the Center have recommended that Balochistan receive increased
resources and the political space provided by the departure of Musharraf in 2008
has provided an opportunity to put these recommendations into effect.
A less charitable explanation, but one that unfortunately carries weight, is that
Punjabi politicians expected little to change from the 18th Amendment; ‘‘[t]hey
know that agreeing to something does not always mean actually doing it.’’28 There
are major problems with implementation that have yet to be addressed and given
that Punjabis dominate the bureaucracy, ‘‘manipulat[ing] the implementation’’ was
an option.29 In addition, even if we take a more optimistic view, to think that
Punjab’s position will decline vis-à-vis the other provinces is dubious. It is the most
educated and developed province, dominating ‘‘political, intellectual and religious
discourse.’’ As one Pakistani professor of politics argued, ‘‘I do not believe that
Punjab’s position will decline. Politicians of Punjab think the same way.’’30
Finally, it was becoming increasingly difficult for Punjabi politicians and those
in the coalition at the center to dismiss the long-standing grievances of the other
provinces, especially in the new mindset of democratic compromise. Politicians
‘‘were left with little choice under the overall rubric of ‘reconciliation’ otherwise
risking being charged as being ‘bloody minded’.’’31 However, in the absence of the
promised compensation for Punjab, agreement would have been much less likely. It
is important to note that the compromises made, although ostensibly undermining
the power of the Punjab, are likely to strengthen the loyalty of people in the smaller
provinces to Pakistan. Therefore, the reworking of the federal compact can be seen
as benefitting the Punjab through creating a stronger and more stable federation:
‘‘they realize that in the long term their destiny is intertwined with the well being
of the rest of Pakistan.’’32 Although there has historically been a concern in
Pakistan that stronger provinces mean a weaker center, this perception is slowly
changing. Once stronger provinces are not seen to be as much of a threat, ‘‘any
easing of tensions arising from the 18th Amendment will be to [Punjab’s]
advantage as the core province of the Pakistani state.’’33

Everything Must Change to Stay the Same?

This article concludes with an assessment of the potential of these changes for the
management of diversity within Pakistan in a comparative context. Asma Jahangir
observed that the ‘‘amendments may face obstructions – not for their weaknesses

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 Inclusive Federalism in Pakistan 553

but for their strength’’ (2010). Her colleague, I. A. Rehman, concurred, arguing
that the reforms, despite falling short of some expectations are a major leap
forward (2010). As noted, the army was not expecting the politicians to be able to
reach a consensus on these issues and major changes, both symbolic and practical
were adopted.
The first question is whether the much-heralded transfer of responsibilities
following the abolition of the concurrent list will bring about good government and
a sense of inclusion? One of the claims made by advocates of federalism is that it
brings government closer to the people affected by it. Devolution of responsibilities
has the potential to increase the efficiency of service delivery and thus increase
certain group’s affinity to the state. Although not a federal system, Bolivia’s
experiences with decentralization were premised on ‘‘giving voice to the
disadvantaged people who saw little benefit during extended periods of centralized
rule’’ (Ahmad 2010a, 14). A similar outcome is possible in Pakistan; the changes
are likely to increase affinity with the center. However, there are few grounds for
optimism in the short to medium term regarding service delivery. Although
seventeen ministries have been devolved to the provinces, adequate resources have
not been devolved to finance these responsibilities, and central revenues have
declined as a result of a lower revenue trajectory than forecast at the time the
NFC was signed (Ghaus Pasha 2010). This has resulted in Rs 36 billion less than
predicted being transferred to the provinces (Government of Pakistan 2011).
To counter this, provinces need to raise substantially greater amounts of their own
revenue. To date they have lacked the political will and the capacity to do this,
although the Punjab is better positioned in this regard.
As a recent article in Dawn (2011) noted ‘‘[i]n a sense the new NFC award has
taken away the [provinces’] incentive to generate provincial taxes given that they
stand to get much higher shares from federal divisible pool without putting in their
own efforts.’’ The abolition of the concurrent list does pose serious questions about
the capacity of the provincial governments to deliver services, as argued by Senator
S. M. Zafar in his note of reiteration to the SPCCR (and also Sethi 2010; Almedia
2010). Previously, it had been estimated that the Federal Government was spending
Rs 190 billion on subjects that had fallen under the concurrent list and that a large
amount of resources would have to be transferred to the provinces (Haider 2009).
As Ehtisham Ahmad reminds us, the ‘‘18th Amendment reiterated the right of the
provinces to administer the GST [General Sales Tax] on services’’ (2010a, 25).
However, as the logistics of collecting this tax are enormous, Ahmad argues that it
would not be surprising if the amount of revenue collected from this source
declined (2010b, 18). There are also human resource issues; will the central
expertise effectively devolve to the provinces? Although provinces cannot develop
capacity to deliver these services unless they are given an opportunity to do so,
there is a real challenge posed by the radical extent of the devolution.

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All the above has potentially negative implications for service delivery. But to
what extent will it increase (or decrease) conflicts within Pakistan’s federal system?
As discussed, some provinces are less developed than others, and some areas of
provinces are less developed than others (e.g., southern Punjab). Despite the
reduction in Punjab’s share, it will continue to be dominant as its ‘‘economic base
is much deeper than the other provinces, and its ability to raise its own resources is
comparatively greater.’’34 It is a reasonable assumption that provinces like
Balochistan will struggle to deliver services as a result of weak infrastructure.
Although Balochistan has a greatly increased income stream, the condition of its
people, already impoverished and underdeveloped, may not improve. It is difficult
to be optimistic, especially in the short to medium term. One respondent opined
that the resource-rich provinces such as Balochistan are likely to see their newly
found wealth absorbed by companies or state agencies with Baloch ‘‘front men.’’35
Obviously, these are wider issues that cannot be solely addressed through federal
reform.
The second question relates to the issue of the small number of provinces. With
the majority of the population living within one ‘‘core’’ province, the small number
is likely to continue to be a force for federal instability. Ahsan Iqbal, Information
Secretary for the PML-N noted that the SPCCR ‘‘unanimously decided that, at
present, it is not feasible to open the scheme of present provinces. Therefore, no
new province was recommended’’ (Piracha 2010). Iqbal’s observation was
confirmed by the author’s discussions with politicians involved in the process in
April 2010. The issue is a controversial one and to have tried to resolve the issues
relating to provincial reorganization, even in the context of the radical changes
that were adopted in the 18th Amendment, could have derailed the process and
possibly even the democratic transition. Many believe that there are more pressing
issues facing Pakistan.36 A Gallup poll conducted in October 2010 reported
that 67 percent of Pakistanis opposed the creation of more provinces (Gallup
Pakistan 2011).
However, a member of the SPCCR, Senator Zafar of the PML-Q, lamented that
this was a lost opportunity, and others have expressed regret that the opportunity
was not taken to facilitate the future creation of more provinces through changing
Article 239(4).37 Article 239(4) states that any bill seeking to alter the limits of a
Province needs to have ‘‘been passed by the Provincial Assembly of that Province
by the votes of not less than two-thirds of its total membership.’’ This provision
places almost insurmountable obstacles to the creation of new provinces, which are
not supported by both the majority and the minority ethnolinguistic group in a
province. One of the reasons for the permissive nature of the Indian constitution
relating to the creation of new states was precisely to allow the federation to be
adaptive (it currently has twenty-eight states, plus seven Union Territories). The
provisions of Article 3 of the Indian constitution have been seen as a positive

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example by some of the smaller provinces, notably Balochistan and Sindh, but less
so by the Punjab. The 2011 Gallup poll results when disaggregated by province
‘‘revealed that Sindh and Balochistan (43% each) showed more support for the
creation of more provinces followed by Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (33%) and Punjab
(28%)’’ (Gallup Pakistan 2011).
It would be possible to make provinces more linguistically homogeneous
through reorganization as Map Two demonstrates. Examples include the creation
of a Seraiki-speaking province from southern Punjab and a district of KP,
a Hindko speaking province from areas of northeast KP, the merger of the
Pashto-speaking population in the north of Balochistan to KP, or for the
creation of a separate Pashto-speaking province [as variously articulated by the
Pakhtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP)]. Calls for the creation of a Seraiki
province are re-emerging (although those demands have been long standing, they
have increased in volume in the last three years) and have recently received support
from the PPP and the PML-Q (Ahmed 2010).38 The ANP, a coalition partner
in the current governing coalition demands that FATA be incorporated into
KP. Many in FATA have expressed a desire for independent provincial status
(Dawn 2010). There have been calls for the normalization of relations between
FATA and the rest of Pakistan for some time (e.g., Grare 2007), although the army
had pressed for the exclusion of the consideration of FATA in the SPCCR, for
operational reasons.
How will the refusal to entertain a reorganization of provinces in Pakistan affect
the management of diversity? A division of provinces, particularly the creation of a
new province from the Punjab, has been mooted as a solution to the dominance,
perceived and actual, of that province (Langah 2011). The province of Punjab has
traditionally been the main recruiting ground for the army and bureaucracy.
Resources have flowed to these areas, and dividing the province would in all
likelihood mean a significant reduction in resources, much more so than the
current reformulation of the NFC has done. It would also fragment its voting
power in the NA. Opposition to the division of the Punjab from vested interests is
therefore understandable. But the opposition is wider. The issue of dividing
provinces is extremely controversial elsewhere in Pakistan.39 Sindhis, including
Sindhi supporters of the PPP, have also opposed division. Their lukewarm support
for the Seraiki cause is partially explicable by the desire to maintain votes in the
Punjab heartland. But PPP parliamentarians are aware that any call for reorganizing
the province would open up calls for a division of Sindh ‘‘under the pretext of
creating new provinces.’’ A division of Sindh would obviously be unaccept-
able for the PPP, and they have argued that supporters of reorganization are
articulating issues ‘‘created by visible and invisible forces’’ (Abro 2010).40 Some
have even argued that plans to divide the Punjab are a means to increase Punjabi
representation.41

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To some extent there is truth to these claims; many military leaders such as
Zia-ul Huq considered imposing provincial reorganization. In 2011, the debate over
creating new provinces has increased in salience, but opened up a rift between
those supporting the creation of new provinces along ethnolinguistic lines and
those supporting new provinces along administrative lines. The military support
the creation of a Bahawalpur province, a former princely state in southern Punjab.
Its borders are not coterminous with the Seraiki speaking population in the area,
although there is some overlap. The military’s support is widely viewed as a strategy
to undermine the creation of an ethnolinguistically defined Seraiki-speaking
province (Siddiqa 2011a), in keeping with the integrationist nation-building
strategy adopted at independence. Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif stated in
April 2011 that if new provinces were ‘‘formed in south Punjab . . . Karachi should
also be made a new province’’ (Daily Times 2011b). A few days later the PML-N
clarified that their position was that ‘‘new federating units should be for adminis-
trative convenience, not based on ethnicity’’ (PML-N 2011). Such statements
confirmed the worst fears of Sindhis about where the issue of reorganization would
lead. However, as the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), a party whose main
base of support is Urdu speakers in Karachi, swiftly rejected the call for Karachi to
become an independent city-state, the issue was defused somewhat (Daily Times
2011a).
The issue of whether to proceed with provincial reorganization is difficult. On
the one hand, the status quo perpetuates the domination of a particular province.
However, there exist real demands for the creation of new provinces, particularly
from Seraikis. As long as the MQM holds to its position of not separating Karachi
from Sindh then the creation of a Seraiki speaking province is not likely to be
destabilizing. Reorganization of the Punjab through creating a Seraiki province
would also bring government closer to the people affected by it (although there is
also a need for a more effective local government system to complement rather
than undermine the provinces).42 Conceding the demand for a Seraiki province
would increase the demands for FATA and the Pashto-speaking areas of Balochistan
to be created either as separate provinces or joined to KP), but neither of these
demands are likely to be conceded as long as the security situation in those
provinces remains tenuous.
The creation of a Seraiki province would be a challenge to Pakistan’s nation
building strategy, premised around integration rather than multiculturalism.
However, the recognition of a Seraiki province would increase affinity with the
Pakistani state among Seraikis and other groups. It can also be argued that official
recognition of the multinational nature of the Pakistani state will strengthen rather
than weaken the federation, as long-standing demands have existed for such
recognition. Certainly, the reorganization of provinces along administrative lines as
advocated publicly by the Establishment in April 2011 would be likely to increase

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conflict still further and be seen as an antidemocratic move, particularly among

Sindhis. The creation of new provinces would be no panacea to all the tensions
within the federation—but could be a step in the right direction.43 The issue is not
going to go away.
Moving on from the issue of reorganization of provinces—the other issue
tackled by the SPCCR concerned the under-representation of certain groups,
notably Sindhis and Balochis from the core institutions of state. It is unlikely that
the provisions for parliament to redress the imbalances will be effective. Parliament
is a weak institution and the majority of questionnaire respondents were skeptical
that it would be able to effect any changes in this regard or indeed that it would be
even willing to try. As a lecturer from KP bemoaned: ‘‘One cannot touch sacred
cows in Pakistan, even Parliament’’ and a professor opined that ‘‘the power
structure is such that these lofty ideals will not be realized in near future.’’44
However, several authors and informed observers have noted that changes may
occur despite Parliament’s weakness: ‘‘All three services are somewhat likely to
redress the problem of underrepresentation because there is a realisation that
without correcting this imbalance that is tilted in favour of Punjab it may not be
possible to keep Pakistan united.’’45 Ayesha Siddiqa confirms the general picture
with regard to the army and its recruiting practices, but notes that the increased
recruitment from the under-represented groups is a means to neutralize identity
politics (2011b). An integrationist policy (as advocated by authors such as Donald
Horowitz (1993) is compatible with the successful inclusion of groups—ethnic
quotas are not the only way of securing such inclusion. However, Siddiqa questions
whether Sindhi and Balochis will reach the higher echelons of these institutions
(2011b). Although the inclusion of Sindhis and Balochis is to be welcomed,
increased recruitment is unlikely to decrease tensions if opportunities for
progression do not exist.

Conclusion
Pakistan to date has been a centralized majoritarian federation with a core ethnic
region and a small number of units. Lessons from the experiences of other
federations remind us of the dangers of core ethnic regions. The dangers posed by
core regions are compounded by a small number of provinces. Although Pakistan
faces many challenges, the design of its federation has increased disaffection with
the center and the core group—Punjabis. This disaffection exists regardless of the
democratic status of Pakistan (although it is increased during military regimes).
Given the comparative evidence and tensions that have been caused by the
dominance of the Punjab since 1971, and the accepted need to bring government
closer to the people affected by it, the failure of the SPCCR to at least initiate a
debate on the creation of new provinces, and to facilitate the ability of parliament

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to create new provinces, was a missed opportunity. The issues of delivery and
responsive government are important to the inclusion of all groups within
Pakistan, many of who have been alienated from the state by the current political
system, of which the federal design is an important part.
As argued, Pakistan is not in danger of splitting up—in common with
neighboring India, the army is strong and disciplined. The secessionist movements
that do exist, are factionalized. Many of the changes introduced by the SPCCR and
the 7th NFC have gone a long way to redressing the concerns of disaffected groups,
particularly concerning economic grievances. However, there remain real worries
about whether the inadequate resourcing of the new responsibilities will jeopardize
the expected political and economic gains from the constitutional review process.
As Ahmad opines, there is a risk of an ‘‘untenable situation in which there will be
insufficient financing available for the devolved functions, and could trigger a
significant backlash against the devolution process’’ (2010a, 25). And there are still
major challenges in Balochistan, where the recommendations of the SPCCR and the
7th NFC were welcomed as a first step, but Balochi politicians stress that there is a
long way to go. Although many political parties in Balochistan have signed up to
the accord and welcome the changes and dialogue with Islamabad, the province is
incredibly factionalized and violence and extra-judicial killings continue. Decades
of underdevelopment, exploitation and neglect will not and cannot be fixed
through pronouncements from Islamabad and it will take at least a generation for
meaningful changes to occur.
It is difficult to be optimistic about the prospects for democratic consolidation
in Pakistan, although there does appear to be awareness among the major
politicians that short-term deals with the army against one’s opponents backfire in
the long term (even if this awareness is borne out from a commitment to political
survival rather than democratic consolidation). Are the changes introduced in 2009
and 2010 likely to be of long standing duration? Will they be reversed if the
military takes over again? The SPCCR is obviously not the end game—much
depends on implementation and the willingness of politicians to continue their
cooperation on the big issues affecting the unity of Pakistan. However, the fact that
these conflicts and inequities have been so entrenched within Pakistani discourse
and that the politicians have managed to reach an agreement makes it unlikely that
the redistribution of resources will be unpicked. There also seems to be recognition
that groups need to be recruited into the core institutions of state. However, is it
a story of ‘‘too little, too late?’’46 Has the underdevelopment and systematic
marginalization of parts of provinces gone too far to rectify any chance of
meaningful inclusion within a generation? In addition, in Pakistan as a whole,
issues of economic development, the need for local government reforms, ending
corruption, and promoting good governance cannot be ignored.

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The 18th Amendment has therefore been an important step forward in center–
province relations in Pakistan and in relations between provinces. It has been common
in Pakistan to talk of provincial rights as if they detract from federal stability. But
stronger provinces may also lead to a stronger federation—recognition of provincial
rights (whether or not they are associated with a particular group) can strengthen
affinity with the federation. Recognition of diversity can also be a source of strength
(as the case of neighboring India demonstrates). However, the recognition of identities
through formally recognizing Pakistan as a multinational or multi-linguistic state
(as demanded by many of the smaller nationalities in Pakistan) or creating new
provinces around ethnolinguistic boundaries, are likely to continue to be opposed by
the Establishment. Although Pakistan’s federation has become more inclusive there
remains a long way to go.

Notes
I am grateful to the Forum of Federations for permission to use the material
contained in the reports of numerous meetings held during 2010 and 2011 in
Pakistan and Nepal as part of their program in Pakistan. I also greatly benefitted
from conversations with several politicians, academics, and civil society activists
during these meetings, too numerous to mention, but all of whom were incredibly
helpful. In particular I would like to thank the Centre for Civic Education Pakistan,
especially its Director Zafarullah Khan, for facilitating the distribution of a survey
to participants in the different provinces. Thanks are also due to all those who
filled the survey in, as well as Dr. Sean Carey, Dr. James Chiriyankandath, and
Haris Gazdar who commented on its design. The article also benefitted from the
feedback received at the BASAS Annual Conference in Southampton in April 2011,
as well as comments from Haris Gazdar, Zafarullah Khan, and the four anonymous
referees.

1. There are secessionist pressures in the province of Balochistan, but the province is
extremely divided: politically, tribally, and ethnolinguistically. There is no unified
secessionist movement that poses a credible threat to the integrity of Pakistan. Some
Baloch seek secession, others seek autonomy and control over resources. The situation is
similar to the politics of India’s northeastern states. Pakhtuns living within Balochistan
do not seek secession, indeed many seek a merger of the Pashto speaking areas with KP
or the creation of a separate province. Anatol Leiven concurs: ‘‘this less than heroic
insurgency does not as yet pose a serious threat to the control of the Pakistani military’’
(2011, 353).
2. This research is informed by primary research and access to policymakers involved in the
process, facilitated through the author’s involvement as Lead Consultant with the Forum
of Federations’ program in Pakistan. It also draws on an elite questionnaire, completed
by seventy-three respondents in 2011. This sample does not purport to be representative,

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but the responses to the questionnaire have informed the research for this article and
have provided support (or otherwise) for the author’s observations.
3. Federalism is premised on a division of sovereignty between at least two territorially
defined levels of government, but local government structures are also important in
bringing government closer to the people affected by it—thus it may be appropriate to
talk of triple loyalties.
4. As of the most recent census in Pakistan, 1998, all four provinces possess a majority
of one ethno-linguistic group. However, Pakistan’s federal system has never been
consciously organized along ethnolinguistic lines.
5. Politicians from the smaller provinces argue that the representatives of the Federal
Capital and FATA protect the interests of the centre against those of the units.
6. In 2009, Gilgit Baltistan had its status changed to that of a province, although it does not
have full provincial status, e.g. it has no representation in the central legislature and the
Prime Minister of Pakistan chairs its Council which has exclusive legislative powers over
fifty-five items enumerated on the Council Legislative List. Its elected assembly has exclusive
legislative powers over matters on the Assembly Legislative List. Residual powers reside
with the Government of Pakistan. Similar mechanisms operate in Azad Kashmir, although it
has a President rather than a Governor and a Prime Minister instead of a Chief Minister.
Residual powers reside with the Assembly in Azad Kashmir; there is no separate list
enumerating the powers of the Assembly (although certain items such as the defence and
external affairs of Azad Kashmir are allocated to the Government of Pakistan).
7. Effective power resides with the NA as the Senate is unable to initiate finance bills.
8. The secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 ostensibly occurred in a five unit
federation but the backdrop to the secession was the two unit federation in existence
until 1970.
9. Sui Gas was discovered in 1952 but it was only piped to Quetta in 1980. Much of the
province is still not connected to the gas grid. Author’s interview with Dr. Samina
Ahmed of International Crisis Group, January 2007.
10. Author’s interview with Mehmood Achakzai of the PKMAP in 2007, and more general
conversations with politicians and civil society activists in 2010.
11. Interviews in Pakistan, May 2005 and January 2007.
12. Balochi and Brahvi speakers were categorized separately until the 1998 census. As Map
Two relies on 1998 district level data, it has not been possible to disaggregate them.
Interested readers may wish to refer to the map of Balochistan in Gazdar et al. (2010,
11) that shows the divisions before 1998.
13. Conversations with Pakistani politicians and civil society activists including Bushra
Gohar of the ANP, June 2011.
14. Some have argued that these disputes were engineered by the army in a belated attempt
to derail the process. Conversations with Pakistani politicians and civil society activists
including Bushra Gohar of the ANP, June 2011.
15. Although subjects such as national planning and national economic coordination, the
supervision and management of public debt, the census, the extension of police powers
to another province, major ports, and interprovincial matters and coordination among
others have been moved to Part II of the FLL.

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16. Conversations with Balochi politicians, May 2010.

17. Sentiments expressed by a senior PPP politician to the author in May 2010.
18. Before 1971, when the majority of the population lived in the Eastern Wing, resources
were allocated according to economic sector—thus ensuring the majority of resources
were allocated to the Western Wing.
19. Although KP received an additional 1 percent of the divisible pool to recompense
the provincial government for the ‘‘War on Terror’’ (equivalent to 1.83 percent of the
provincial poll).
20. Email interview with Dr. Kaiser Bengali on 26 June 2011—Sindh’s nonstatutory (private)
representative on the NFC. Whether this will now happen as a result of the center’s
declining tax receipts is now doubtful.
21. Although the PML-Q opposed the name change in their note of reiteration and tried to
amend the bill in the Senate to retain the name of NWFP. The PML-N threatened to
derail the entire SPCCR report over the renaming issue, although this was coupled with
the issue of judicial appointments and was widely regarded as a bargaining tool.
22. Discussion with Bushra Gohar, NA member and Vice Chair of the ANP, June 2011.
23. Hazara speakers are not categorized separately in the census, but their location can be
seen as the ‘‘others’’ in northeast KP.
24. Kishwer Khan, lecturer, Karachi University, questionnaire response.
25. Khurram Hussain, PhD Student, Yale University (originally from Lahore), questionnaire
response.
26. Anonymous, questionnaire response.
27. Personal discussions with politicians involved in the process, April–May 2010.
28. Khurram Hussain, questionnaire response.
29. Aslam Khwaja, researcher from Sindh, questionnaire response.
30. Professor Mohammad Waseem, Lahore University of Management Sciences, question-
naire response.
31. Karachi-based analyst, questionnaire response.
32. Talat Masood, retired Lt. General and now a commentator and columnist based in
Islamabad, questionnaire response.
33. Professor Ian Talbot, University of Southampton, questionnaire response. Similar
comments were made by Professor Yunas Samad, University of Bradford.
34. Dr. David Taylor, retired academic, previously at SOAS and AKU, questionnaire
response.
35. Informed observer who wished to remain anonymous, questionnaire response.
36. Personal conversations with the author with politicians and civil society activists,
April–May 2010.
37. Personal conversations with the author, April–May 2010.
38. However, the PML-N has changed its stance, and now supports the creation of provinces
based on administrative convenience rather than ethnicity.
39. As this author can testify from experience of raising the issue with Pakistani decision
makers, and confirmed by the responses to the questionnaire.
40. Confirmed by discussions with senior PPP politicians, April–May 2010.
41. Discussions with senior PPP politicians, April–May 2010.

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42. I would like to thank Yunas Samad for reminding me of this point. The Musharraf
backed local government system was an exercise to undermine provincial assemblies.
When the provincial assemblies were restored they have systematically undermined these
structures, to the detriment of the people of Pakistan. Punjabi politicians and civil
society activists at the Punjab PAG stressed this issue and the importance of capacity
building at the local level.
43. ‘‘None of this will happen without much kicking and screaming’’ Khurram Hussain,
questionnaire response. The question is, would such conflict be worth the long-term
benefits to the federation or should this ‘can of worms . . . be left alone?’ (Professor
David Taylor, questionnaire response)
44. Professor Mohammad Waseem, questionnaire response.
45. Talat Masood, questionnaire response. He made similar assertions in an interview with
the author in Islamabad in January 2007.
46. Dr. Huma Baqai, Karachi, questionnaire response.

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