Intestate Estate of Deceased Enrique M.

Baluyut

G.R. No. L-33466

Facts:
In the intestate proceedings of Enrique M. Baluyut's estate, Victoria, Ma. Theresa, and Ma. Flordeliza Baluyut filed a
petition for intervention, claiming to be the illegitimate children of the deceased. They alleged continuous possession of
the status of children through overt acts of recognition and maintained them by the deceased and cohabitation of their
mother, Norma Urbano, with Enrique while he was married. The trial court initially ruled in favor of the petitioners,
declaring them forced heirs and awarding monthly support pendente lite. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the
decision, finding insufficient evidence of recognition or filiation.

Issue:
Were the petitioners recognized as illegitimate children of Enrique M. Baluyut, entitling them to hereditary rights and
support from his estate?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the petitioners failed to provide sufficient
evidence of acknowledgment as illegitimate children.

Reasoning:
For illegitimate (spurious) children to claim successional rights or support, their filiation must be established through
acknowledgment, either voluntary or compulsory. The Court found no evidence of voluntary acknowledgment as required
under Article 278 of the New Civil Code. Neither the birth certificates nor any authentic writing or statement in a court
record demonstrated recognition by Enrique.

The Court also ruled that the evidence presented for compulsory acknowledgment under Article 283 was insufficient. The
alleged acts, such as sporadic visits, financial support for hospital bills, and housing arrangements, were inconsistent with
public recognition or continuous possession of the status of children. The acts of the deceased indicated concealment
rather than acknowledgment.

The Court emphasized strict application of the rules in cases of compulsory acknowledgment, reaffirming the necessity of
clear, convincing, and positive proof. It held that acknowledgment, affecting the civil status of persons, could not be
subject to compromise.

ANDAL V. MACARAIG

Facts

Petitioner Mariano Andal filed for recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land in Camarines Sur on the
ground that he is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas. Mariano argues that the land was acquired by
Emiliano from his mother, respondent Eduvigis Macaraig, by donation propter nuptias. However, the legitimacy of
Mariano was questioned in this case on the ground that Emiliano was sick of tuberculosis from January 1941 until he
became disabled in September 1942. Since May 1942, Maria and Felix, the brother of Emiliano, are having an adulterous
relationship. In June 1943, Maria gave birth to Mariano Andal the petitioner.

Issue

Is the child legitimate?

Ruling

Yes. Mariano Andal is presumed to be the legitimate son because he was born within three hundred days following the
dissolution of the marriage [Article 108 of Civil Code]. That presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was
physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding
the birth of the child.

Birth of 300 days preceding

Was Emiliano still sexually capable?
Mariano Mariano’s birth

Yes. He only became disabled in September 1942 (He has still one month to
June 1943 Around August 1942
impregnate his wife and TB is not a hindrance)

The fact that the wife committed adultery cannot overcome this presumption. Although the husband was already suffering
from tuberculosis… that is no evidence of impotency, nor does it prevent carnal intercourse. “the reputation of the
tuberculous towards eroticism (sexual propensity) is probably dependent more upon confinement to bed than the
consequences of the disease.” -Hyman

CONCEPCION V. CA

Facts:
Petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almonte were married on December 29, 1989. They lived in Fairview,
Quezon City and a year later on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.

On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy,
alleging that her marriage with Mario Gopiao on December 10, 198- was never annulled. Although Ma. Theresa did not
deny marrying Mario, she averred that the marriage was a sham and that she have never lived with Mario at all.

The trial court said otherwise, and ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting, thus declaring her
marriage to Gerardo as void ab initio. It deemed Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to
Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Also, it allowed the child to use the surname of his father.

Ma. Theresa appealed and pleaded for the reverse of the court’s decisions. The Court of Appeals ruled that Jose Gerardo
was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage considering the fact that the second
marriage was void from the beginning. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo – under the law – is the child of the legal and
subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao.

Gerardo Concepcion moved for the reconsideration of the decision.

Issue:
Whether the child is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Gopiao or the illegimate child of Ma. Theresa and Gerardo.

Held:
The child, Jose Gerardo, is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised as per Art. 164 of the Family Code which states, “A child who is
conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.” It is fully supported by Art. 167 of the Family Code
which states, “The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress.”. The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of
the legitimacy. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.

Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and
thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. The minor cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate
status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law
determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised.
It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is. Additionally, public policy demands that there be no
compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded
to exploit his defenselessness.

As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa,
in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. Also, there being no such parent-child relationship
between the child and Gerardo, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit the child.

The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial
to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender years. Through its laws, the State safeguards
them from every one, even their own parents, to the end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and
members of society shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where,
as in this case, the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage. The child, by reason of his
mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard and care, including appropriate legal protection before as well as
after birth. In case of assault on his rights by those who take advantage of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise
in his defense with the single-minded purpose of upholding only his best interests

Jison vs. CA GR No. 124853

FACTS:
Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for recognition as illegitimate
child of the latter. The case was filed 20 years after her mother’s death and when she was already 39 years of age.
Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he impregnated Esperanza Amolar,
Monina’s mother. Monina alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as the
illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts and that of his family. It was likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and
spent for her education such that she became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank Examiner. Monina was able to
present total of 11 witnesses.

ISSUE:
WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.

HELD:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence
as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is
established. “To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the
manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear
manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a
nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such
in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously”.

The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences offered by Monina:
That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was employed by the former;
That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct.

SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competence evidence as to the
issue of paternity. Francisco’s lack of participation in the preparation of baptismal certificates and school records render
the documents showed as incompetent to prove paternity. With regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25
years of age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the position that if Monina were truly not Francisco’s
illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her
filiation. Monina’s evidence hurdles the “high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish one’s
illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on “open and continuous possession”. Hence, Monina proved her filiation
by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action well within the period
granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and
unjust. Petition was denied.

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be established in the same way and on
the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which
legitimate filiation is established, thus: ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing
evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. This Article reproduces, with amendments,
Articles 265, 266 and 267 of the Civil Code. For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second
paragraph, which MONINA relies upon given that she has none of the evidence mentioned in the first paragraph, a high
standard of proof is required. Specifically, to prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,
there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his,
by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such
acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and
treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously. By continuous is meant
uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular length of time.

LEE vs. CA (GR No. 118387, October 11, 2001)

FACTS:
Lee Tek Sheng sired children but on 2 different mothers. The private respondents (11 children) are the children from his
lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, while the petitioners (8 children, including Emma Lee) are the children he sired with his
concubine, Tiu Chuan. The private respondents filed 2 separate petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in
the records of birth of the petitioners. FIRST PETITION: On December 2, 1992, the petition against all petitioners, with the
exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the RTC of Manila (SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692) and later assigned to Branch 47.
SECOND PETITION: On February 3, 1993, a similar petition against Emma Lee was filed before the RTC of Kalookan
(SP. PROC. NO. C-16746) which was assigned to Branch 130. Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false
and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of "Keh
Shiok Cheng" as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name "Tiu Chuan", who is allegedly the petitioners'
true birth mother. The private respondents alleged that they are the legitimate children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh
Shiok Cheng who were legally married in China. In 1948, their father facilitated the arrival in the Philippines from China of
a young girl named Tiu Chuan. She was introduced as their new housemaid but she immediately became Lee Tek
Sheng's mistress. As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners. Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and
private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng,
falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners' mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal care and guidance to the petitioners. When Keh Shiok
Cheng died, Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all his children, including those of petitioners', be included in the
obituary notice of Keh Shiok Cheng's death that was to be published in the newspapers. It was this seemingly irrational
act that led to private respondents' discovery of the dishonesty and fraud perpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng.

Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the NBI to conduct an investigation into the matter. The NBI
prepared a report that pointed out, among others, the false entries in the records of birth of petitioners. It was this report
that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners' records of
birth with the lower courts. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions — SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 and SP.
PROC. NO. C-1674 — on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the
legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed
prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already prescribed. RTC RULING: In SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692, motion to
dismiss was denied. Both petitions — SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 and SP. PROC. NO. C-1674 — were given due course
by Brach 47 and Branch 130. Petitioners' Prohibition Temporary Preliminary

recourse: Petition for Certiorari and with Application for the Issuance of a Restraining Order and/or Writ of Injunction to the
Court of Appeals.

CA RULING:
Dismissed the peitioner’s petition and MR.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the resort to Rule 108 is improper.
NOTE: According to the petitioners, private respondents seek to have the entry for the name of petitioners' mother
changed from "Keh Shiok Cheng" to "Tiu Chuan" who is a completely different person. What private respondents therefore
seek is not merely a correction in name but a declaration that petitioners were not born of Lee Tek Sheng's legitimate wife,
Keh Shiok Cheng, but of his mistress, Tiu Chuan, in effect a "bastardization of petitioners." Petitioners thus label private
respondents' suits before the lower courts as a collateral attack against their legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108
proceeding.
RULING: The resort to Rule 108 is proper.

The proceedings are simply aimed at establishing a particular fact, status and/or right. Stated differently, the thrust of said
proceedings was to establish the factual truth regarding the occurrence of certain events which created or affected the
status of persons and/or otherwise deprived said persons of rights. It is precisely the province of a special proceeding
such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact. The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth
were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have
conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the
petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that
petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's children. There
is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.

In the leading case of Republic vs. Valencia, we affirmed the decision of Branch XI of the then CFI of Cebu City ordering
the correction in the nationality and civil status of petitioner's minor children as stated in their records of birth from
"Chinese" to "Filipino", and "legitimate" to "illegitimate", respectively. Although recognizing that the changes or corrections
sought to be effected are not mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, this Court, sitting en banc, held
therein that even substantial errors in a civil register may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. In the said case, we also laid down the
rule that a proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be
summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary proceeding when all the procedural
requirements under Rule 108 are complied with. To the mind of the Court of Appeals, the proceedings taken in both
petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners in the lower courts are
appropriate adversary proceedings. We agree. The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings adversarial
does not give trial courts the license to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which is limited to those corrections
contemplated by Article 412 of the New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature.

The petitioners point to the case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic, which is of a later date than Republic vs. Valencia. Far
from petitioners' theory, this Court's ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic does not exclude recourse to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil register. The only requisite is that
the proceedings under Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished from a summary
proceeding. Thus: "If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register] is merely
to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary
procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect
the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only
be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes which
affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action
depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are
notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary
admitted x x x."33 (Emphasis supplied.) It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be
dispensed with, and

the remedy granted upon mere application or motion. But this is not always the case, as when the statute expressly
provides. Hence, a special proceeding is not always summary. One only has to take a look at the procedure outlined in
Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per se. Rule 108 requires publication of
the petition three (3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec.4). The Rule also requires inclusion as
parties of all persons who claim any interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The civil
registrar and any person in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not the least, although the court may
make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the same (Sec. 7). Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia, that Rule 108,
when all the procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect
substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register. Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses
both the terms "corrected" and "changed". In its ordinary sense, to correct means to make or set right"; "to remove the
faults or errors from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute". The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected
nor does it distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude
that all entries in the civil register may be changed or corrected under Article 412. Thirdly, Republic Act No. 904847 which
was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially amended Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

"SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. — No entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change
of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. The above law speaks
clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed without need of
a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit
of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of
operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.

Liyao v Liyao

FACTS:

In 1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed an action for compulsory recognition as the
illegitimate son of William Liyao and sought successional rights.
Corazon was legally married to Ramon M. Yulo but was separated from him for over ten years during her cohabitation
with William Liyao from 1965 until his death in 1975.

Corazon lived with William Liyao, along with her children from her marriage, in a series of residences in Quezon City and
Manila. William Liyao had legitimate children, Tita Rose and Linda Christina, from his marriage to Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao,
who were aware of Corazon’s relationship with their father.

On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. (Billy) with William Liyao covering all medical expenses and
publicly acknowledging Billy during social gatherings. After William’s death on December 2, 1975, Corazon solely
supported Billy and sought legal recognition of his paternity.

Petitioner’s evidence included testimonies of William Liyao’s declarations and public actions acknowledging Billy as his
son. Respondents denied these claims, asserting William’s consistent residency with his legal family, governed by strict
principles and conservative lifestyle.

The Pasig RTC ruled in favor of petitioner, declaring William, Jr. as the illegitimate son entitled to successional rights. This
decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which upheld the presumption of legitimacy under the law.

Issues:
1. Whether William Liyao, Jr. could impugn his own legitimacy to claim rights as an illegitimate child of the late William
Liyao.- NO
2. The sufficiency of evidence to establish filiation with William Liyao despite the legal implications of his mother’s existing
marriage. NO

RULING:
1. Legitimacy Presumption:
The Court held that under the Civil Code, a child born during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate unless successfully
impugned by the husband or his heirs, highlighting the protective policy designed to shield legitimate children from the
stigma of illegitimacy.

2. Right to Impugn Legitimacy:

The Court emphasized that impugning legitimacy is a personal right of the husband (or his heirs in certain cases),
primarily due to the personal nature of marital relations and potential scandals. Consequently, William Liyao, Jr., through
his mother, lacked statutory standing to challenge his legitimacy in favor of claims to paternity by William Liyao.

3. Sufficiency of Evidence:
– Given the statutory bar against children choosing their filiation coupled with the absence of overwhelming evidence
contradicting William Liyao’s legitimate family life, the Court refused to entertain the evidentiary arguments on filiation.

Doctrine:
– The decision reiterates the principle that only the husband, under conditions specified by law, can impugn the legitimacy
of a child born within a valid marriage. This doctrine finds legal footing in Article 255 of the Civil Code and Article 164 of
the Family Code, emphasizing the inability of children to self-determine filiation outside lawful channels.
Principle: PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY. A child conceived or born during a lawful marriage is presumed legitimate;
mixed issues arise only from legally permissible challenges by the husband or heirs.

Fabillar v. Paller

FACTS: This case stemmed from a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession, and Damages filed by

respondents, Miguel Paller et. al., against Spouses Custodio and Paula (collectively, the Custodios) involving a parcel of

agricultural coconut land situated in Sitio Cabotjo-an, Brgy. Parina, Giporlos, Eastern Samar, with an assessed value of

P950.00.

Respondents claimed that the subject land was originally owned by their grandfather, Marcelino Paller (Marcelino). After

the latter’s death, respondents’ father, Ambrosio, was given his share of the subject land.

In 1995, respondent Demetria, daughter of Ambrosio, mortgaged the subject land to Felix R. Aide with right to repurchase.

Upon her return from Manila in 2000, she redeemed the same but discovered that the Custodios took possession of the

land and refused to vacate therefrom despite demands; hence, the complaint.

In their Answer, the Custodios claimed to be legitimate and compulsory heirs of Marcelino. They averred that

respondent’s father, Ambrosio, is not a child of Marcelino and, as such, has no right to claim the subject land.

To support respondents’ claim that Ambrosio is a child of Marcelino and Susana Paller, they presented a copy of

Ambrosio’s baptismal certificate indicating that his father was Marcelino.

The issue of whether or not Ambrosio is one of the children of Marcelino was raised by both parties in their respective pre-

trial briefs.

The MCTC declared respondents as the lawful owners of the subject land, and ordered the Custodios to surrender the

ownership and physical possession of the subject land, and to pay actual damages. It gave weight to the baptismal

certificate as sufficient and competent proof of Ambrosio’s filiation with Marcelino which the Custodios failed to

successfully overthrow.

Aggrieved, the Custodios appealed to the RTC, but in a Decision, the RTC affirmed the MCTC ruling.
Dissatisfied, Spouses Custodio and herein petitioners, heirs of Paula, elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA),

raisingthe defense of failure to state a cause of action for failure to declare heirship prior to the institution of the complaint

in accordance with the case of Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon. del Rosario [363 Phil. 393 (1999)].

The CA affirmed the RTC Decision, finding Marcelino to be the father of Ambrosio, thereby declaring that respondents, as

children of Ambrosio, have a right over the subject land. It rejected the Custodios’ claim of lack of cause of action for

failure to declare heirship prior to the institution of the complaint for having been raised only for the first time on appeal.

Petitioners and Spouses Custodio filed their motion for reconsiderationwhich was denied; hence, this petition solely filed

by petitioners.

Petitioners insist that the filiation of Ambrosio to Marcelino can only be successfully proved by virtue of declaration of

heirship by a competent court in a special proceeding, absent which, respondents cannot claim any right over the subject

land. Moreover, they insist that mere allegations in the complaint and the presentation of Ambrosio’s baptismal certificate

cannot be considered as competent proof of the claimed filiation.

ISSUE:

Whether Ambrosio’s baptismal certificate can be considered as competent proof of the claimed filiation with Marcelino.

RULING:

Ambrosio’s baptismal certificate cannot be considered as competent proof of the claimed filiation with Marcelino.

In the absence of the record of birth and admission of legitimate filiation, Article 172of the Family Code (Code) provides

that filiation shall be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Such other proof of

one’s filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered,

common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof

admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Rules).Article 175of the same Code also allows illegitimate children to

establish their filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children.

However, it is jurisprudentially settled that a baptismal certificate has evidentiary value to prove filiation only if

considered alongside other evidence of filiation (Heirs of Roldan v. Heirs of Roldan, G.R. No. 202578, September

27, 2017). Because the putative parent has no hand in the preparation of a baptismal certificate, the same has scant

evidentiary value if taken in isolation; while it may be considered a public document, “it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified, but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s

paternity.” As such, a baptismal certificate alone is not sufficient to resolve a disputed filiation, and the courts must peruse

other pieces of evidence instead of relying only on a canonical record.

In this case, the MCTC, the RTC, and the CA did not appreciate any other material proof related to the baptismal

certificate of Ambrosio that would establish his filiation with Marcelino, whether as a legitimate or an illegitimate son.

Contrary to the ruling of the said courts, the burden of proof is on respondents to establish their affirmative allegation that

Marcelino is Ambrosio’s father [Go Kim Huy v. Go Kim Huy, 417 Phil. 822 (2001)], and not for petitioners to disprove the

same, because a baptismal certificate is neither conclusive proof of filiation /parentage nor of the status of legitimacy or

illegitimacy of the person baptized.

Dezoller Tison vs. Court of Appeals and Teodora Domingo

Facts:
This case involves an action for reconveyance filed by Corazon Dezoller Tison and Rene R. Dezoller against Teodora
Domingo concerning a parcel of land in Quezon City originally owned by Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero
(Teodora), the aunt of the petitioners. Teodora died without descendants, leaving her husband and the petitioners, her
niece and nephew, as her surviving relatives. Subsequently, Martin Guerrero adjudicated the property to himself as the
sole heir and later sold it to Teodora Domingo.

Petitioners filed for reconveyance, claiming their right to inherit by representation. The trial court granted Domingo’s
Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence, effectively dismissing the case due to insufficient proof of petitioners’ filiation. The Court
of Appeals affirmed this decision, prompting the petitioners to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issues:
1. Whether the petitioners successfully proved their legitimate filiation to Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
2. Whether the petitioners are entitled to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
3. Whether the presumption of legitimacy and filiation applies in this case.

RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, ruling in favor of the petitioners. It found that:
1. The petitioners did not need to provide evidence of their legitimacy or filiation due to the existing presumption of
legitimacy for children born in wedlock, which cannot be collaterally attacked.
2. Given the lack of opposition evidence from Domingo, the presumption of legitimacy and filiation remained in favor of the
petitioners.
3. Documentary evidence offered by the petitioners, though not per se sufficient to prove legitimacy or pedigree, were
deemed admissible due to the opposing party’s failure to object at the time of offering. These documents, alongside the
declaration that Corazon was Teodora’s niece, were enough to establish their filiation to Teodora.
4. The petitioners and Teodora Domingo are declared co-owners of the disputed property, with the petitioners holding a
one-fourth share and Domingo a three-fourths share, due to the applicable provisions of the Civil Code concerning
inheritance by representation and the division of estate among surviving spouses and relatives.

Doctrine:
The case reiterates the doctrine of the presumption of legitimacy for children born in wedlock, a presumption that both
shifts the burden of proof to the party challenging the legitimacy and establishes a permanent status if unchallenged within
stipulated timeframes. Additionally, it highlights the permissibility of using declarations about pedigree in proving filiation
when direct evidence is unavailable, emphasizing the operational significance of necessity in admitting evidence to
prevent miscarriage of justice.
Class Notes:
– Presumption of Legitimacy: Presumed legitimacy for children born within a valid marriage, shifting the burden of proof to
the party disputing it.
– Evidence in Pedigree Cases: Declarations about pedigree are admissible under certain conditions, notably when
proving filiation directly to the declarant’s estate.
– Co-ownership in Inheritance: Highlights the distribution method of an estate among surviving relatives and a surviving
spouse under the Civil Code, with specific shares determined by the relationship and surviving family members.