Week 8:

Buddhist ethical perspectives on

abortion, suicide and euthanasia

Buddhist Ethics
BSTC2021 (Semester 1 AY 2024-25)
Instructor: Catherine Hardie
Centre of Buddhist Studies | Email: cehardie@hku.hk
Today’s class

• Midterm quiz: feedback

• Ethical complexities surrounding the termination of human life
• Buddhist ethical perspectives on abortion
• Buddhist ethical perspectives on euthanasia and suicide
• Addressing painful feelings through Buddhist ritual
The ending of human life: ethical complexities

• In Buddhist teachings – as exemplified in the first precept – the act of taking any
sentient life is regarded as a moral transgression with serious karmic
consequences. The taking of a human life is regarded as the gravest transgression.
• Abortion, suicide, and euthanasia all entail the ending of human life or potential
human life.
• Each of these acts is addressed in the early Buddhist scriptures, often with a strong
emphasis on prohibiting these acts. Yet the reasoning behind the prohibitions varies
and reflects distinctive aspects of Buddhist ethical thought.
Scriptural stance vs. contemporary views

• The scriptural stances on these ethical issues are interesting to explore

because they sometimes contrast sharply with contemporary views.
• Today, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide are often framed within ideas of
autonomy, personal choice, and rights—concepts that do not directly align
with Buddhist ethical frameworks, which emphasise non-harm, karma, and
compassion over individual autonomy.
• While traditional Buddhist teachings often present clear stances on issues
like abortion, euthanasia, and suicide, the concepts underlying these
stances may still allow for multiple, perhaps even contrasting, positions on
these issues, even within a Buddhist framework.
 Group exercise:
Reflect on the possible feelings, thoughts, and mental states of those involved in abortion,
euthanasia, and suicide. Imagine, for a moment, the experience of individuals making these
decisions, the weight of their motivations, and the emotions that may accompany their choices.
Then, consider the perspectives of those directly affected by these decisions—such as the family
members, healthcare providers, the unborn or those suffering at the end of life.
What might they be feeling or experiencing?
Buddhist ethical perspectives on abortion
The history of abortion: a snapshot

• The practice of abortion has been known since ancient times. Various methods have
been used to perform or attempt abortion, including the administration of herbs, the
use of sharpened implements, the application of abdominal pressure, and other
techniques.
• Moral attitudes toward abortion and its regulation have varied significantly across
time and place. In many contexts, abortion has been practiced and not generally
condemned, while in others it has been viewed as morally reprehensible and
punishable by law.
• Abortion increased in prevalence in the 20th century, particularly in industrialised
countries. This was due to various factors, including advancements in medical
technology that made abortion safer and more accessible, changing societal
attitudes towards sexuality and reproductive rights, and shifts in legal regulations
surrounding abortion.
• Socioeconomic factors such as urbanisation, economic instability, and changes in
family structure also contributed to the increase.
 In the United States, the debate over abortion is deeply polarised, with one
side advocating for the protection of the foetus's right to life from conception,
often aligned with conservative and religious groups.
On the other side, proponents argue for a woman's right to choose abortion
as a fundamental aspect of reproductive and bodily autonomy, often
championed by progressive and feminist groups.
Possible Buddhist approaches
1) The conservative ‘no abortions are morally permissible’ position
(consistent with traditional sources and supported by Buddhist precepts and teachings).
2) The ‘liberal’ or ‘pragmatic’ approach – one that acknowledges the moral status of the foetus
as life but also weighs the possibly competing interests of the mother or others.
Buddhism’s negative view of abortion

• Given its strong emphasis on the intrinsic value of life, Buddhism is commonly
viewed as opposed to abortion and practices that harm foetuses.
• The First Precept prohibits destroying life and affirms the importance of ahimsa or
non-injury. Other values associated with Buddhism, mettā (loving kindness), dāna
(giving), and karuṇā (compassion), favour sacrifice towards the wellbeing of others,
thus undermining reasons in favour of abortion.
• Furthermore, to the extent the practice comes up, Buddhist scripture either
explicitly forbids abortion or portrays it in a very negatively light.
Strong prohibitions in the monastic Vinaya on abortion

An example from the monastic literature that is much quoted states:

“An ordained monk should not intentionally deprive a living thing of life even if it is only
an ant. A monk who deliberately deprives a human being of life, even to the extent of
causing an abortion, is no longer a follower of the Buddha”
Seven cases of abortion mentioned in the Vinaya

• Keown reports that there are seven cases of abortion recorded in the Vinaya. They
range from a monk providing an abortive remedy to a married woman pregnant with
her lover’s child to cases of rivalry between co-wives where one seeks to induce
abortion in another for reasons of household politics. Keown notes that ‘[i]n all of
the cases where abortion brings about the death of the child as intended, the
judicial decision was that the offence fell into the category of “depriving a human
being of life” ’ (1995: 95).
Buddaghosa’s denunciation of abortion

Buddhaghosa, a renowned Buddhist scholar and philosopher who lived in ancient

India during the 5th century CE, in his commentary on these Vinaya texts, explains:
“The individual being begins from this tiny substance [and] gradually grows old with a
natural lifespan of up to one hundred and twenty years. Throughout all of this until
death, such is a human being . . . who should deprive it of life means ‘separating it
from life’ either at the stage of the embryo by scorching, crushing, or the use of
medicine, or at any subsequent stage by some similar kind of assault.” (Quoted in
Keown 1995: 94)
When does life begin? Buddhist embryology
Life begins at the moment of conception

Viññana

Egg Sperm
If life begins at conception, abortion is always wrong

1. The life of a human being exists at the very moment of conception.

2. Abortion, even at the earliest stage of foetal life, involves ending the life of a human being.

3. Killing a human being violates the First Precept and is therefore wrong.

4. Therefore, abortion is always wrong.

Doubts about this approach: Barnhart

• Michael Barnhart (2018) seeks to make a ‘liberal’ or ‘interest-based’ Buddhist case

for the moral permissibility of abortion in the early stages of pregnancy by
questioning the premise that ‘life begins at conception.’
• He states: ‘there is a meaningful empirical question about whether and when the
conceptus manifests viññana and there is no reason to think that point is at
conception.
• Rather than ‘take it on faith that Buddhaghosa is correct,’ he argues that pinpointing
the onset of the viññana later in pregnancy, sometime around the 20-week range,
can be experientially verified.
• Furthermore, he argues that only with the onset of consciousness does the foetus
have interests that must be taken into consideration: “Pre-sentient foetuses lack
interests and therefore moral status; sentient foetuses have interests and therefore
moral status.”
Barnhart continued:

• The primary interest that Barnhart identifies is the the newly sentient foetus’ interest
in not suffering.
• “In terms of this modified view, abortion of a pre-conscious, non-sentient conceptus
is simply the ending of the development of the biological basis of a human life
because the act represents intervention before the presence of viññana or the
gandhabba/Interbeing”.
• Barnhart concedes that although, on this view, women clearly have a right to abort
before sentience, the morality of that choice is “much cloudier”once the foetus is
conscious, at least to the point of sentience.
Are there cases in which abortion is ethically
permissible according to the conversative view?
1) What if the mother’s life is at stake?
• Scholars report that there are no scriptural or authoritative commentaries on
abortions performed for therapeutic reasons – i.e., to save the life of a mother.
• Per Robert Florida (2000): “It would seem to me that there is no clear guidance at
all…It would seem that the people involved are left to rely on their wisdom and
compassion to make a very difficult decision.”
• It could be argued that the existence of conflicting interests or even obligations
does not alter the wrongness of abortion. The fact that many people in society and
some Buddhists will often abort the foetus to save the life of the mother does not
minimise the wrong done by an abortion.
2) What if the mother’s health is at risk?
• On the conversative view, in the case of pregnancies which harm the health of the
mother but do not endanger her life, abortion would generally be ruled out.
• Women, in fact, could take this an opportunity for practise compassion: per Pinit
Ratanakul, one of Thailand's leading bioethicists, 'Compassion is self-giving and
self-denial - the voluntary sacrifice of one's rights beyond that which is socially
obligated.’ Any pregnancy, even if very inconvenient, may be seen as an opportunity
for the woman and the other people involved to practice loving-kindness and
compassion, by selflessly nurturing and protecting the developing person.
3) What if the future child will be born with disease or disability ?
• One could argue in favour of abortion if a women is carrying a foetus with some abnormality,
given that it will prevent the foetus’ future suffering.
• However, in some Buddhist societies it is usual to carry the baby to full term, including
babies with Down’s syndrome, because the mothers see the baby’s handicap as due to both
its and their own bad karma – which would follow logically from Buddhist principles – and
have no wish to increase their bad karma by having an abortion.
• Another factor is the preference for letting the bad karma of the child exhaust itself in the
present, rather than allowing it to lead on to further problems for the child.
• Those who go on to care for their handicapped children hope that their nurture, and other
good actions, will help overcome the bad karma of both the child and themselves.
4) What if the birth of the child will cause socioeconomic strain?
• Not justified on conservative view.
5) What if the pregnancy is the result of rape?
• No. In such a case a woman would be better to have the child and give it up for
adoption.
6) What if the mother does not feel the time is right to bring a child into
the world?
• Margaret Olivia Little (2009) emphasises:
“…sometimes the reason why women are moved to end pregnancies… decisions to abort
often represent, not a decision to destroy, but a refusal to create. ... Some women decide
to abort, that is, not because they do not want the resulting child…but because they do
not think bringing a child into the world the right thing for them to do.” (2009: 583)
Conservative Buddhist answer: the being will be born in some shape or form anyway,
soon, according to its karma. So it is better to do the best one can for it in the
circumstances it is already heading for.
Harvey’s ‘flexible’ approach
• Harvey (2000: 326) argues for a more flexible approach in An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics, enumerating
four situations that could render abortion a ‘necessary evil’:

1) where there is a real threat to the life of the mother

2) where there is a possible threat to the life of the mother

3) where there is rape causing great trauma

4) where the alternative is a mentally ill woman further traumatised by having to give her child up for adoption

• Harvey’s argument for following a more flexible approach is essentially that while killing a foetus is a moral
offence, the gravity of the offence varies depending on, among other things, the ‘age of the fetus’ (318) and
presumably therefore its stage of development.
Intention and the liberal view
While different commentators agree that is the internal motivation of an act that primarily
determines its karmic or moral nature, there are disagreements about whether the decision to
undergo an abortion could be underpinned by anything than negative intentionality:
Conservative view: “It would seem that abortion involves several grievous errors. Greed,
hatred, and delusion, the three root drives of unskilful men and women, seem to apply all too
well to abortion decisions.” (Robert Florida)
Liberal view: A woman could, if ‘free of fear and selfish concerns’, choose to abort as the “right”
course of action’ (Kapleau and Aitken). Both also insist on compassion for the woman who is
faced with the choice and an understanding that she can be choosing in a way that balances
competing sufferings.
Certain Buddhist values can be harnessed in support of women seeking abortions to mitigate
harmful impacts either on their own or on their potential children’s lives.
A woman-centred feminist approach:
Judith Jarvis Thomson

• "A Defense of Abortion" is a moral philosophy essay by Judith Jarvis Thomson

first published in Philosophy & Public Affairs in 1971.
“For what we have to keep in mind is that the mother and the unborn child are
not like two tenants in a small house, which has, by unfortunate mistake, been
rented to both: the mother owns the house.”
• Thomson’s argument centres on the concept of bodily autonomy. She
contends that even if the foetus has a right to life, this does not give it the
right to use a woman's body without her consent. She argues that a woman
has the right to control her own body and decide whether or not to allow a
foetus to remain inside her, even if this results in the termination of the
pregnancy.
What of a women’s right to choose?

• What of the woman’s right to choose an abortion, based on the idea that she has a
right to do what she wants with her ‘own’ body?
• Buddhism, with its emphasis that there is no self which can be found as ‘owner’ of
mental and physical processes, would dispute this:
This body, monks, is not yours, nor does it belong to others. It should be regarded as
(the product of) former karma, effected through what has been willed and thought out.
• Taniguchi thus says:
“If a woman can claim the woman’s right to the use of her body in the case of abortion,
saying ‘a fetus belongs to me, because it is in my womb, therefore, I can do whatever I
want to do with it’, she can also claim the right to the life of her one-day-old . . . In
reality, this is not so.”
The nature of precepts
• Moral behaviour in Buddhist systems then, is not an absolute in itself; it is a means towards a
religious end, the transcendence of those selfish cravings, which bind all beings to an
unending round of suffering.
• Accordingly all moral acts are understood either to be kusala karma, skilful deeds which are
beneficial to self and others, or akusala karma, unskilful deeds which harm self and others.
• Buddhist precepts are designed to provide guidelines for skilful activity. When the guidelines
are followed negative karmic consequences are avoided and good results accrue. Thus even
the precepts of morality laid down by the Buddha are not absolute commandments. They are
clearly understood as 'rules of training,' which the individual undertakes in order to advance
along the religious path.
• Note that the form of these precepts shows that they are understood to be personal
commitments or practical guidelines to be undertaken provisionally as steps on a religious
path. All Buddhist practitioners are expected to try to follow the first five, and their violation
involves karmic consequences for anyone, Buddhist or not. Nonetheless, they are not
absolute commandments.
 “The middle ground of pragmatism”
Ochiai Seiko, a Japanese Buddhist newspaper correspondent quoted by LaFleur in Liquid
Life, suggests a middle ground of pragmatism
“Of course we who are Buddhists will hold to the end that a foetus is ‘life’. No matter what
kinds of conditions make abortion necessary we cannot completely justify it. But to us it is
not just fetuses; all forms of life deserve our respect. We may not turn them into our
private possessions. Animals too. Even rice and wheat share in life’s sanctity. Nevertheless,
as long as we are alive it is necessary for us to go on ‘taking’ the lives of various kinds of
such beings.” (LaFleur 1992: 170)
While Mahayana Buddhism advocates respect for life, it also ‘teachings that it is inevitable for man to sacrifice
some forms of life in order to protect and nourish himself’ … ‘One should accept reality with all of its contradictory
demands on one’s karma’ (Japanese Buddhist Federation, 1978, quoted in Brooks, 1981:133)
Theory vs. practice: abortion in Buddhist societies

• Given the fact that abortion is mentioned at all in ancient sources, it seems reasonable
to assume it has always existed in Asian societies with large Buddhist populations. It is
now legal in Thailand, Sri Lanka, Burma, Taiwan, Hong Kong, mainland China and Japan—
all societies where Buddhism is heavily influential. However, it is often not freely
available (e.g. Sri Lanka, Thailand).
• Nevertheless, research shows that abortion is widely practised.
Mediating between practicality and an ethical ideal

Florida notes that “It is not at all surprising in cases like these, where religious theory
condemns a prevalent practice, to find that there are ritual ways to deal with the
ensuing psychological pressures.”
Mizuko kuyo

Rows of Mizuko Jizo statues in a Japanese temple.

Scholarship on Mizuko Kuyo

The mizuko kuyo ceremony has

generated considerable scholarly
attention and controversy
• On one side, a group of scholars with
LaFleur as the most prominent, see the
mizuko kuyo as a valid innovation
which skilfully weaves together various
strands of Buddhist and other
Japanese traditional concepts to
provide a compassionate aid for
grieving women.
• The other side sees the rite as a
modern aberration, a corruption of
Buddhism, which greedily exploits
women. Marketing the Menacing Fetus in Japan (1999) by Helen
Hardacre; The Haunting Fetus: Abortion, Sexuality, and
the Spirit World in Taiwan (2001) by Marc L. Moskowitz
American Roshi, Robert Aitken, on abortion

“Perhaps the woman considering abortion faces the most intimate and agonizing test.
Over-simplified positions of pro-life and pro-choice do not touch the depths of
dilemma..... I get the impression that when a woman is sensitive to her feelings, she is
conscious that abortion is killing a part of herself and terminating the ancient process,
begun anew within herself, of bringing life into being. Thus she is likely to feel acutely
miserable after making a decision to have an abortion. This is time for compassion for
the woman, and for her to be compassionate with herself and for her unborn
child....Once the decision is made, there is not blame, but rather acknowledgement
that sadness pervades the whole universe, and this bit of life goes with our deepest
love.”
• The consequences of violating the first precept are fully recognised, and the persons
involved are treated compassionately rather than judgementally.
 Buddhist ethical perspectives on suicide and
euthanasia
Buddhist perspectives on suicide
CONSIDERATIONS AGAINST SUICIDE

• Buddhism views the human lifespan is determined by karma, and that death will
come at the appointed time. To shorten life artificially through suicide or
euthanasia is seen by many as interfering with one’s destiny.
• According to Buddhist principles, as an attempted escape from suffering, suicide is
completely ineffective.
• Suffering is likely to continue unabated in future rebirths, possibly intensified.
• Dying in an agitated state of mind is seen as leading to a bad transition in the next
life.
• Suicide cuts short the potential for spiritual development in a ‘precious human
rebirth.’
• Potential devastating impact on others: co-dependent arising.
Does suicide breach the first precept?

• In principle, one could argue, yes.

• However, in the Maha-prajna-paramita-sa tra, attributed to Nagarjuna, it says:
“In the Vinaya it is said that suicide is not onslaught on a living being. Fault and karmic
fruitfulness result respectively from wrong done to others or benefiting others. It is not
by caring for one’s own body or killing one’s own body that one acquires karmic
fruitfulness or commits a misdeed. That is why it is said in the Vinaya that suicide is
not a fault of onslaught on a living being, but it is sullied by delusion, by attachment,
and by hate.”
• This passage still accepts that suicide is an unwholesome act, as it is associated
with the roots of unwholesome actions.
• In the Tibetan tradition, it is seen as one of the gravest bad actions.
General opposition to suicide in Indian Buddhism
Failure to prohibit suicide itself.

• The rule the Buddha introduced prohibits assisting others to commit suicide, not
suicide itself. Keown (2000) suggests the reason for this is likely to be the technical
one that the monastic rules are drawn up with a view to imposing appropriate
sanctions and penalties on those who break them. In the case of a person who has
killed himself, this question clearly does not arise.
Suicide by awakened beings: Channa’s case

• There is a small number of of well-known cases in the Pai canon when monks who were
sick and in pain took their own lives and received a posthumous endorsement from the
Buddha. The three most important cases are those of Channa, Vakkali, and Godhika.
• A special feature of these cases is that the monks in question attained arhatship as they
died and were not reborn.
• Because of this, something of a consensus has emerged among scholars that while
Buddhism is generally opposed to suicide it is prepared to make an exception in the
case of the enlightened, since they in some sense or other have transcended
conventional moral norms.
Other instances of sanctioned self-inflicted death

• The Vinaya lists several instances where self-starvation is acceptable, including

when it is because it is an unintended side-effect of a more important task
(meditative attainment).
• In the Mahayana literature, Bodhisattvas giving up their lives to save others,
including a family of starving tigers.
• Self-immolation, in East Asian Buddhist traditions, whereby a person kills
themselves as an act of protect so as to try compassionately to bring about an
improved situation in society.
Importance of intention: Kovak (2018)
• Suicidal acts are very often driven by profound emotional distress, confusion, and mental
affliction.
• Kovak argues that the more essential arbiter for judging the value, meaning, and effect of suicide
lies in the intention (cetanā) or motivation of the agent that informs it, being paradigmatically the
deciding factor of any wholesome or skilful (kusala) action, whether toward self or other.
• Should that intention involve the ‘poisons’ of desire (or greed) (lobha) or ignorance (moha), but
especially aversion or hatred (dosa), it is necessarily unwholesome or unskilful (akusala).
• If not, suicide is left, for the Pāli Buddhist sources, in some moral indetermination, but for the
Mahāyāna it is unequivocally an act, where these are absent, of moral-soteriological power.
• Thus, the problem of subjectivity raises an issue for evaluating the ethical status of suicide in
Buddhism.
Buddhist ethical perspectives on euthanasia

• Euthanasia: intentionally causing the death of a patient by act or omission in the

context of medical care.
• Voluntary euthanasia: when a mentally competent patient freely requests medical
assistance in ending their own life.
• Two principal modes: active and passive.
Active euthanasia: the deliberate killing of a patient by an act, for example by
lethal injection.
Passive euthanasia is the intentional causing of death by omission, for
example by failing to provide food, medicine, or some other requisite for life.
General opposition to “assisted suicide”: third pārājika

• The third pārājika is directed specifically at those who lend assistance to others in
ending their lives, which it calls ‘acting as the knife-bringer’.
• This would seem to apply to all forms of euthanasia, and also doctor-assisted
suicide, in which the physician typically assists the person who wishes to die by
prescribing lethal drugs, but not administering them personally.
But what about compassion?

• Contemporary advocates of euthanasia/assisted suicide argue that allowing

terminally ill individuals to end their lives can be an act of compassion, as it spares
them from prolonged agony and offers them a dignified exit from life.
• From this perspective, the decision to end someone's life is motivated by empathy
and a desire to relieve their pain and distress.
• However, in the incidents recorded in the Vinaya, the monks involved are held guilty
of an act entailing defeat in the monastic life, notwithstanding their compassionate
motivation to relieve the suffering of the individuals in question.
• What about skillful means in the Mahyana - would this justify a different conclusion?
Importance of intention: making death one’s aim

• In Buddhaghosa’s analysis of the incidents in the Vinaya, he holds that the core of
their wrongdoing was that the guilty monks ‘made death their aim.’ (VA.ii.464).
• It would therefore appear immoral from a Buddhist perspective to embark on any
course of action whose aim is the destruction of human life, regardless of the quality
of the motive in question.
• It may be concluded that while compassion is always a morally good motive, it does
not by itself justify whatever is done in its name.
Non-administering of treatment without
intention to cause death
• “Where treatment of a terminal illness is futile, the non-administering of treatment
might give up a chance to delay slightly death due to natural causes, but it would not
hasten it…and death would not be the aim. It would thus involve neither suicide nor
murder, and would be morally acceptable.”
• While withholding treatment would prevent the delay of death (as in passive
euthanasia), unless its intention was to thus cause death, it does not come under
the full definition of passive euthanasia. (Harvey, 2000: 303)

Passive euthanasia ≠ the refusal or withdrawal of medical treatment that incidentally

leads to the patient’s death.
Avoidance of ‘making death one’s aim’
A fine moral distinction?
“If one who is sick ceases to take food with the intention of dying when medicine and nursing
care are at hand, he commits a minor offence (dukkata). But in the case of a patient who has
suffered a ̇long time with a serious illness the nursing monks may become weary and turn away
in despair thinking ‘when will we ever cure him of this illness?’ Here it is legitimate to decline
food and medical care if the patient sees that the monks are worn out and his life cannot be
prolonged even with intensive care.” (VA.ii.467) Buddaghosa

• The contrast here is between the person who rejects medical care with the express purpose
of ending his life, and one who resigns himself to the inevitability of death after treatment has
failed and the medical resources have been exhausted.
• In the first case, the patient wishes to die; in the second case, the patient wishes to live but is
resigned to the fact that they are beyond medical help.
No obligation to preserve life at all costs

• Buddhaghosa’s scenario suggests that Buddhism does not hold there is a moral
obligation to preserve life at all costs.
• Recognising the inevitability of death is a central element in Buddhist teachings.
Death cannot be postponed forever, and Buddhists are encouraged to be mindful
and prepared for the end of life when it comes.
“To seek to prolong life beyond its natural span by recourse to ever-more elaborate
technology when no cure or recovery is in sight is a denial of the reality of human
mortality and would be seen by Buddhism as arising from delusion and excessive
attachment.” (Harvey, 2000)
• At a given point, it is desirable to letting things run their course.