The 1962 Sino India War - Maj Gen Harvijay Singh SM

INDO CHINA WAR: 1962
Maj Gen Harvijay Singh, SM
harvijay@hotmail.com Degh Tegh Fateh

INDEX
Ser No Subject Page No
1 A Brief Account 3-10
2 Ph-1 of the War 11-19
3 Analysis Of Ph 1 of the War 20-21
3 The Pd In Between 22-25
4 Ph 2 of the War 26-39
4 A Brief Account of Some Great Battles Fought 40-54
by the IA in the War
5 Ques- Ans 55-85
6 Short Notes 86- 95
2
INDO CHINA WAR – 1962: 20 Oct to 21 Nov
A BRIEF ACCOUNT
Despite great odds, vintage wpns, ltd amn, dizzy hts and inclement wx, Indian tps fought valiantly. Stories of heroism
emerged from the debris of war. IA’s 200 years of unblemished history was routed in just eight days, four days each
in Oct and Nov 1962. (The war was fought in two phs by the Chinese, they later declared unilateral Cease Fire and
withdrew to previously held locs).
Dateline
Oct 1950: Chinese tps cross the Sino-Tibetan bdy and move towards Lhasa.
April 1954: Sino-Indian Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between India and Tibet region of China signed.
May 1954: China and India sign the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence or Panchsheel.
June 1954: Zhou Enlai visits India for the first time, stresses on the adherence to the five principles
March 1955: India objects to the inclusion of a portion of India's N frontier on the official map of China, calling it an
infringement of Panchsheel
Nov 1956: Zhou Enlai visits India for the second time on a goodwill mission.
Sept 1958: India officially objects to the inclusion of a big chunk of N Assam and NEFA in China Pictorial.
Jan 1959: Zhou Enlai spells out for the first time China's claims to Indian territory both in Ladakh and NEFA.
April 1959: Dalai Lama escapes from Lhasa and crosses into India.
Aug 1959: Chinese tps open fire on an Indian picket near Migyitun in E Ladakh, killing an Indian soldier. They also
overrun the Indian outpost at Longju in NE Ladakh.
Sep 1959: China refuses to accept the McMahon Line. Beijing lays claims to territory in Sikkim and Bhutan.
Oct 1959: Chinese tps fire on an Indian ptl in the Aksai Chin area killing nine soldiers and capturing ten.
April 1960: A mtg in New Delhi between Zhou Enlai and Nehru to address the bdy question ends in deadlock.
June 1960: Chinese tps violate the Indian border near Shipki vill in the NE
Feb 1961: China further occupies 12,000 sq miles in the Ladakh.
Oct 1961: Chinese start aggressive border ptlling and est new mil fmns which start moving into Indian territory.
Dec 1961: India adopts the Fwd Policy to stem the advancing Chinese frontier line by est a few border outposts.
April 1962: China issues ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of the Indian frontier pers from the border posts.
Sep 1962: Chinese forces cross the McMahon Line in the Thag La region in the E and open fire on an Indian post.
Launch another intensified attk.
20 Oct 1962: China launches a massive multi-pronged attk along the border from Ladakh in the W to NEFA in the E.
15 Nov 1962: A massive Chinese attk on the E front. Tawang and Walong in the E sect over run, Rezang La and the
Chushul airport in the W shelled.
18 Nov 1962: Chinese tps capture Bomdi La in the NEFA region.
21 Nov 1962: China declares a unilateral ceasefire along the entire border and announces withdrawal of its tps to 20
km behind the LAC.
There were several tac and lgs reasons for our failure in Oct-Nov 1962... Little attempt was made by the Indian
Army, at any level, to study the Chinese tactics or how to counter them.
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INTRO
China and India both insist border sanctified by centuries of customs, agreements between local rulers, when only
Himalayan passes mattered and were used by seasonal trading caravans that provided valuable taxes to local rulers.
Elsewhere in the world, countries are fighting for territories with oil, gas or minerals. In this case, they’re geo-strat:
• China needs Ladakh’s Aksai Chin area to link Tibet to Xinjiang.
• India fears losing Arunachal Pradesh (then NEFA) would make its entire N-E vulnerable.
Root cause of conflict lies in an ill-defined, 3,440 km long border that both countries dispute. Sino-Indian border is
gen divided into three sects namely: Western, Middle, and Eastern.
• Western Sect - 2152 km border between Ladakh and Xinjiang.
LAC is concurrent with the Chinese Aksai Chin claim line.
• Central Sect - 625 km border from Ladakh to Nepal. Himachal
Pradesh and Uttarakhand border with Tibet. 225 KM in Sikkim.
Border well defined and follows geog features and water sheds.
• Eastern Sect - 1140 km bdy with Tibet - called McMahon Line.
Runs from E limit of Bhutan to Talu Pass at tri jn of Tibet, India,
and Myanmar. Defined by the principal of the watershed line.
In 1846, the British annexed Kashmir to secure the Northern frontiers of India. To sp its border claims, in 1865, W.H.
Johnson, of Svy of India proposed the "Johnson Line", putting Aksai Chin in Kashmir.
Aksai Chin: uninhabited barren plateau of high strat value to China; vital for passage between Tibet and Xingjiang.
During 1913-1914 at Simla tripartite conf involving a Tibetan delegate (Tibet was then an indep nation, remained
sovereign till 1950), a rep of Chinese govt, and Sir Henry McMahon, foreign secy of British Indian govt, a secret
bilateral agreement was signed with the Tibetan rep on a new border line in the East (McMahon Line).
• Chinese rejected the accord (claim Ivan Chan, Chinese delegate was not
auth), Tibetan govt too later disputed legality of McMahon Line.
• Also, McMahon Line was initially rejected by the British Indian govt as
incompatible with the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention.
• However, the British began using the McMahon Line on Svy of India maps in
1937, and officially published the Simla Accord in 1938.
• World War II and later, British expanded cont towards McMahon Line. By 1947, it became India’s NE border.
After People’s Republic of China (PRC) took over Tibet in 1951, India felt threatened and quickly extended adm and
mil cont in the E sect. In the same year, India took cont of Tawang: while the Tibetan govt fiercely protested, the
Chinese govt remained quiet. China’s silence was perceived by India as willingness to accept the McMahon Line.
Since 1960, first Chou en – lai and subsequently many others have been making swap offers that they will give up
their claim to Arunachal in return for Indian recognition of Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin.
On 7 Nov 1950, a month after China invaded Tibet, India’s Dy PM Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel wrote to PM Nehru,
described the sit along the N borders and warned against the possibility of invasion and advised GOI.
• He pointed out that while India regarded China as friends, they did not.
• Communist mentality advocates that whoever is not with them is against them, India must take note.
• Outside the Russian camp, India alone has been championing the cause of Chinese entry into the UNO, and
in securing from the Americans assurances on the ques of Formosa (Now Taiwan).
• India has done everything to assuage Chinese feelings, allay its apprehension and defend its legitimate claims.
• In spite of this, China continues to regard India with suspicion scepticism, mixed with a little hostility.
On this letter, PM Nehru opined that a Mil invasion by China was highly unlikely in the near future.
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In 1953 a Himmatsinghji Committee was formed to study problems created by Chinese aggression in Tibet and make
‘R’ about measures to improve adm, def, comn, etc. of frontier areas. The report has not been declassified even now.
Post-independence, India’s relations with China were structured by a strat of India’s long-term interests. It expressed
optimism of indep and a peaceful and prosperous Asia to encourage social and economic devp.
In 1954, China and India concluded Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence – Panchsheel (Trade and Interaction
across Tibet) which incl
• mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
• mutual non-aggression,
• mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
• equality and mutual benefit,
• and peaceful co-existence.
In the agreement, India surrendered many rights and privileges over Tibet, which the British had induced Tibet to
grant, there was also no mention of the border issues in the agreement (a maj faux pas).
While China felt it was better to postpone discussions on border issue, India’s interpretation of the agreement was
that the two countries had agreed that there was no border dispute.
Rd Across Aksai Chin Oct 1957: Through
1950s China planned and constr a rd
through its W frontier in Xinjiang and
Tibet. China announced completion of
the rd in Sep 1957. The rd entered
disputed territory just E of Sarigh Jilgnang
after which it ran through a number of
locs India recognized as its territory such
as Haji Langar. India saw it as a
contravention to Sino-Indian Agreement
of 1954.
One reasons for the 1962 war was that PRC wanted to push its W frontier further W of the rd to give it strat depth.
The fairly relaxed Sino-Indian relations of mid-1950s began to change from early 1958.
On 18 Oct 1958, India sent a memo to the Chinese govt, claiming Aksai Chin as Indian territory. In the memo to
Zhou Enlai, Nehru wrote, “There can be no ques of these large parts of India [shown within China on the Chinese
map] being anything but India and there is no dispute about it”.
In Jan 1959, Zhou’s reply highlighted several pts:
• both countries’ borders had never been formally demarcated,
• border disputes do exist between China and India
• Aksai Chin had always been under Chinese jurisdiction,
• though the McMahon line was illegal, China would consider accepting it if it could legitimize the McMahon
line if India waived or sharply modified its claim to Akai Chin.
This proposal was rejected by Nehru who insisted on sending Indian tps into all territories claimed by India.
In Mar 1959 - China launched a massive offensive in Tibet and dissolved Tibetan govt headed by Dalai Lama. Dalai
Lama fled to India (arrived at Khenzemane, received by 5 AR), China unhappy with reception by India, created a
perception that India can be a threat to Chinese rule in Tibet. Mao made a statement that the Lhasa rebellion was
caused by India. On 5 Apr 1959, the Panchen Lama assumed cont of the Tibetan govt.
5
On 25 Aug 1959 the First armed clash between PLA (2nd
Coy/ 1st Regt of Shannan Mil Sub Comd) and pers of 9 AR
of Indian post at Longju in Subansiri Frontier Div took
place resulting in two Indian cas.
Issue was resolved diplomatically and both sides
withdrew on 29 Aug 1960. India est a new post at Maja, 5
Kms S of Longju, but continued to ptl up to Longju. After
1962 War, PLA reoccupied Longju.
In 1959, Longju was a five days march from Limeking which was 12 days march from nearest rd at Daporijo, a total
of about three wks. The route passed through dense forests and consisted of indigenously built brs. The area of
Longju is populated by the Tagin tribe. On 28 Aug, three days later, Lok Sabha and Indian public were info by GOI
for the first time that serious disputes existed between China and India regarding India-Tibet border and a large
chunk of Indian territory in Ladakh was under Chinese cont.
• Nehru told the Lok Sabha that the Govt had thought it fit not to make the disputes public, as that would have
made their settlement more difficult.
• Nehru also announced that the IA will take over the Ner Borders in NEFA.
• This came as a big surprise; the Army had no resources. On 31 Aug 1959 COAS Gen Thimayya tendered his
resignation in protest which was withdrawn on persuasion by Nehru.
• End Nov, Nehru announced, IA to take over borders in Ladakh and NEFA, 4 Inf Div (5, 7 and 11 Inf Bdes)
mov from Ambala to the NE.
Yet both countries’ border dispute did not start in the
E sect along the McMahon line. The first border
dispute occurred in the Middle Sect in 1954: the
Barahoti dispute.
Kongka Pass Incident Oct 1959:
Kongka La lies on a spur of Karakoram rg that
intrudes into Chang Chenmo Valley adjacent to Aksai
Chin. China claimed the loc as its border in a 1956
map and attked an Indian ptl party (CRPF) Nine Indian
policemen were killed out of 70 and ten imprisoned.
This was a milestone in the escalation of the border
dispute. The party was led by an IB offr Dy Supdt,
Karam Singh. Oct 21 is celebrated as the Police
Commemoration Day.
After Kongka Pass incident, Zhou vis India, hoping to
solve the border disputes. During the mtg, Zhou made China’s proposal explicit: reciprocal acceptance of present
actualities in both sects and constitution of a bdy commission. India rejected the proposal, claiming that there will
be no compromise, no standstill agreement and no negotiations.
On 17 Mar 1960 – Ex Lal Quila
Lt Gen SPP Thorat, GOC in C Eastern Comd, conducted a mil ex that predicted the timing and nature of a possible
Chinese attk. Thorat wrote an assessment after a year-long study of Chinese build-up across McMahon Line.
In his report, Thorat said that “Sino-Indian ties, had undergone changes due to claims made by China upon large
Indian territories. China has also refused to recognise the McMahon Line and has made deliberate incursions into our
6
territory in Ladakh, Uttar Pradesh and NEFA. We are reqd to resist and evict any further incursions by China. This
requires us to be fully prep to undertake imdt mil action…”.
It was perhaps the most detailed mil drill carried out based on studies of IB reports, trn, time taken by Chinese tps to
cover dists and their prep to accurately predict a Chinese attk.
Army HQ and the Defence Minister paid little heed to the report. It was not even brought to the notice of the PM.
Chinese Moves for a Settlement of the Border Dispute During the Early Part of 1962
In Feb 1962, Chinese embassy officials in New Delhi info journalists of a ‘formula’ which incl:
• a joint Sino-Indian use of the Aksai Chin rd,
• fmn of a jt commission to demarcate the Ladakh border,
• and recognition by China of the McMahon Line.
In response, India insisted on Chinese withdrawals. Nehru insisted that three condns must be met:
• China must agree to vacate posts found to be in Indian-claimed territory after Dec 1960 border experts mtg,
• China to admit that the Aksai Chin rd traverses Indian territory in Ladakh and agree to constr an alt route,
• Publish the full text of the border experts Report.
Chinese suggested, they might give up claim to part of Ladakh, retaining ‘only’ the Aksai plain. Indian political
circles felt that we could compel the Chinese to cede some grnd, enabling the PM to save face with opposn, press,
and public. On 26 Feb 1962 Beijing delivered a lengthy and conciliatory note to India calling for negotiations to
reach a peaceful settlement of the bdy issues. India replied on 13 Mar and reiterated that the Chinese withdrawal
from Aksai Chin was an essential precondition for negotiations.
In late 1961, GOI opted for a form of mil pressure on China—called the Fwd Policy. The spark was provided by two
closely-related events.
• Sino-Soviet split, which began with Nikita Khrushchev’s doctrinaire repudiation of Stalin, and was cemented
by his aggressive drive for Soviet cont of nuclear bases on the Chinese coast.
• The flt of Dalai Lama to India in March 1959, once Mao withdrew the fiction of Tibetan autonomy, and
actuated the strat trans-Tibetan rd link passing through India’s Aksai Chin. A Rubicon was crossed once India
granted the Dalai Lama asylum, from which there has never been a turning back.
The Fwd Policy was Defensive initiatives to safeguard the territorial integrity of India. To circumvent the Chinese
expansion into the disputed areas. IA to "go as far as practicable ... and be in eff occupation of the whole frontier". In
NEFA, AR was tasked with setting up posts all along the McMahon Line.
Problems Faced in Implementation of the Fwd Policy: No rds. No modern mil eqpt, what little eqpt avlb was useless
at Himalayan hts, Army not ready to conduct comb ops in narrow R valleys and over 7000 feet deep gorges.
In continuation of the Fwd Policy, Op Onkar was launched to est addl posts in areas as near the Border as practicable.
By 20 July 1962, 34 posts (8 in Kameng, 7 in Siang and 11 in Lohit Frontier were est in NEFA).
The newly est posts, manned largely by AR, incl one at Dhola, est a little S of Namka Chu R on 4 Jun 1962, under
the guidance of Capt Mahabir Prasad of 1 SIKH, who had accompanied the AR Party.
Siting of this post in particular has caused much debate and many have gone to the extent of saying that it provided
the Chinese with the excuse they wanted to wage a war.
The post was ab initio to be sited at the jn of Tibet, Bhutan, and India, however excessive snowfall rendered the tri
jn inaccessible, and therefore was loc at Che Dong, on the S bank of Namka Chu.
The post was named after the Dhola ridge loc a Km to the S. Little was known at that time that the post would
become the centre stg of the Sino-Indian war of 1962.
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Chinese PM Zhou Enlai wrote to Nehru in Nov 1962 that Namka Chu Valley, Dhola Post, Khinzemane and Thagla Ridge
where hostilities commenced, were all N of McMahon Line, even as per co-ordinates of original McMahon map.
Zhou even provided the McMahon map co-ordinates; 270 44’ 6”N. [The Indian posn was that the McMahon Line
began at 290 48’ N.] As the McMahon Line was not demarcated on grnd, the loc of any pt could only be clarified or
fixed by reading off the longitude and latitude from the original McMahon map. Therefore, China was within its rights
to initiate a ‘defensive CA’ as Indian tps were N of the McMahon Line as per the McMahon map co-ordinates.
However, what Zhou did not mention, was that the original McMahon map also had place names indicated in this
sect. Two vills:
• Le in Tibet lay N of the McMahon Line, and,

Pangchen S of the McMahon Line and therefore in India.
• Logically, the bdy, as per the McMahon map, should be
somewhere in between these two vills.
• After China occupied Tibet in 1950, local officials from
both sides exch three letters in Aug and Sep 1953 and
Chinese [Tibetan] official, Dzongpon of Pemakoe, met
the Assistant Political Offr from Tawang and accepted
the Indian alignment of the bdy, i.e. Namka Chu,
Kinzemane, Dhola Post were S of the McMahon Line.
If we accept Zhou’s contention and stick to the co-ordinates as per original McMahon map to determine the bdy line.
The same logic would extend to the entire length of the McMahon Line.
If that were to be done, to go by co-ordinates of the original McMahon map, then the Sino-Indian bdy in the areas
near both Migyitun and Tulung La would be advanced even
further N, thereby incl both these areas in India. In the area E of
Tsari Sarpa, the Indian bdy, going by the original McMahon map
co-ordinates, would advance by at least seven miles to the N,
which would mean inclusion into India of additional Tibetan
territory of 70 sq miles!
When this proposal was put to Zhou by Nehru in his reply of 14
Nov 1962 that the Chinese cannot have it both ways – either
accept the McMahon Line alignment along the highest
watershed or go by the strict co-ordinates as per the original
McMahon map – the Chinese, realising the folly committed by
their Prime Minister,
• If they accepted the alignment of the McMahon Line based on the highest watershed principle, they then
had clearly crossed the McMahon Line and attked Indian posts [Dhola, Namka Chu, etc.] in Sep/Oct 1962
• If, on the other hand, they accepted the alignment of the McMahon Line as per the ‘strict co-ordinates’
principle, they then would lose about 70 sq miles of territory!
Not unsurprisingly, therefore, Zhou never responded to Nehru on this pt, perhaps deeply embarrassed.
8 Sep 1962, at 0800h, approx 60 Chinese tps crossed the Namka Chu and surrounded Dhola post and destroyed
two log brs in vicinity of the post. The post cdr, a JCO exaggerated the Chinese str to 600. He was ordered to hold
grnd and rfts ex 9 PUNJAB at Lumpu were mov to Dhola. On 20 Sep 1962, two Chinese threw hand grens wounding
three Indian soldiers. Firing from both sides continued intermittently till 29 Sep 1962.
8
On 22 Sep 1962, MOD issued written orders to
the COAS to take action for eviction of the
Chinese in the Kameng Div of NEFA as soon as
he was ready. The eviction op was
codenamed as LEGHORN.
7 Inf Bde was tasked via E Comd/33 Corps/4 Inf
Div. The Bde was ill prep, it lacked arty and lgs
sp. Cdrs in chain postponed the date of
completion of build up for offensive from 21
Sep to 29 Sep and later went on to change it to
01 Oct and 05 Oct. While there were
insurmountable difficulties in air drop of vital
stores incl amn. Cdrs and staff at all levels not
only failed to anticipate the reqmt but were
also found wanting in coord of the needs of
fwd tps.
While fwd dumping was in prog, Lt Gen
Umrao Singh, GOC 33 Corps was divested of
the resp of NEFA and task was handed over to
the newly raised 4 Corps under the
stewardship of Lt Gen BM Kaul. A very strg
turnover!!!!!
By Sep 1962 – PLA occupied Thagla Ridge.
The new corps cdr assumed charge on 4 Oct
resolved to commence Op LEGHORN by 10
Oct. He moved to Dhola imdt and ordered conc of all resources of 7 Inf Bde to Tsangdhar. The corps cdr witnessed
the sit on grnd and signalled HQ Eastern Comd as follows on 07 Oct 1962: -
• Bulk of our airdrops of sup, amn and winter clo were landing in inaccessible places.
• There were only three days’ ration avlb with 2 RAJPUT and 1/9 GORKHA Rifles and 50 rds of SA amn per man.
• Mors and its amn were still in transit between Lumpu and Dhola.
• Due to lack of winter clo men were spending ni at a ht of 15,000 feet in summer uniform with one blanket
(Boots were also in short sup).
• There was an acute shortage of civ porters, which, coupled with inaccurate drops was slowing down the lgs
build up.
• Addl ac be placed at disposal of 4 Corps imdt for task of air-drops.
• The Corps Cdr was taking steps to evict Chinese (despite the many difficulties) as ordered.
• Chinese with their superior forces were likely to dislodge us from any posn which we may initially capture.
On 8 Oct, the Corps Cdr ordered 2 RAJPUTS and 1/9 GORKHAS down from Tsanghar to join tps along the R line. The
bns were in place on 9 Oct. He decided to make a ‘positonal warfare’ mvre, since it was difficult for 7 Inf Bde to evict
the Chinese from Thag La. The plan incl occupation of Yumtso La, a little W of Thag La peak, where they would take
dominating posns behind the Chinese, as Yumtso La was still unoccupied. Gen Kaul chose the apph via Tseng-jong and
the task was assigned to the RAJPUTs.
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Positional Warfare: A form of warfare conducted along permanent and fortified front lines.
On 8 Oct, one pl of ‘D’ Coy/9 PUNJAB, under Maj MS Chaudhary left for Tseng-
jong to est a brH on the N bank of Namka Chu. The pl occupied loc at 1500 h. One
sec occupied Karpola II next morning.
One pl of A Coy of 9 PUNJAB, under Sub Chhail Singh, left for Tseng-jong on 9 Oct
at 1000 h to reinforce the pl under Maj Chaudhary. The Chinese did not react to
these moves; they only threw a gren at the Indian post at Br IV at about 2030 h.
Dawn of 10 Oct, when men from 2 RAJPUT were moving up the S bank of Namka
Chu, making for the planned crossing pt on the way to Yumtso La – a bn of PLA moved quickly down the ridge, to form
up for an attk on Tseng-jong. At the same time the Indian posn at Tseng-jong came under fire of hy mors. No sooner
was the fire lifted, and at 0800 h approx 800 Chinese attked the PUNJABis at Tseng-jong from the E and NE. After a hy
exch of fire for about 45 min, the attk was repulsed.
As Indian tps had only pouch amn, Maj Chaudhary requested for MMG and mor fire from Br IV posn request was not
accepted due tac reasons. A little later, the en reformed for a second time, and started asslting the Indians at 0930 h.
By then, the PUNJABis sec, under Hav Malkiat Singh, on Karpola II had moved close to the flk of the Chinese. The sec
opened fire at the bunched Chinese who were completely surprised, caught in cross-fire of LMGs and suffered hy cas.
They reacted by opening up hy mors. The Sec was asked to withdraw to Tseng-jong.
Maj Chaudhary contacted his Bn Cdr Lt Col RN Mishra, on radio and info him that as the en was forming up again, it
would be difficult to hold the grnd unless sp by MMGs and mors. Misra agreed, but it was turned down by Brig Dalvi
after consultations with Div and Corps Cdrs. Dalvi was of the opinion that the fire sp would have attracted a response
which may have been catastrophic for RAJPUTs who were on the move at that time. The en asslted the posn a third
time at 1200 h from three sides – N, E and W – with 82 mm Mors, 2-in Mors, grens and auto wpns. Hand to hand
fighting devp. Realising that the pl at Tseng-jong was no more in a posn to hold grnd, orders were issued at 1230 h by
the Bde Cdr to withdraw. Consequently, tps at Tseng-jong reached S of the Namka Chu at around 1530 h. In this action,
IA suffered – 6 dead, 11 wounded and 5 reported missing. Peking Radio and Press announced their cas as 77 dead and
approx 100 wounded. In the Tseng-jong episode, three MVC and two VrC were awarded to 9 PUNJAB.
Corps Cdr had personally witnessed the serious sit. The fact that Chinese could CA in a big way was also evident. Gen
Kaul sent a msg to E Comd and Army HQs that “a grave sit had devp” at Tseng-jong, and sought permission to present
the case before. Army HQs asked him to come to Delhi forthwith. Before leaving, Kaul told GOC 4 Div that instrs to
drive the en back were to be held in abeyance till he returned from Delhi and present posns were to be held.
The stg was now set for
the events that were to
unfold on 20 Oct. The
irony of the sit was that
Indian tps on the Namka
Chu could all along see the
Chinese recce, dply and
prep on the Thagla slopes
but could do nothing,
except to wait, while auth
in Delhi made plans to
throw the Chinese out!
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PH 1 OF THE SINO INDIA WAR 1962
Battle of NamkaChu • Completely tac unviable def line.

• Bns spread out along irrelevant
water line.
• No mutual sp, between localities.
• No depth, no res, no contingency
posn. Dominated by en.
• Disruption of Radio and Line comns
by the en.
• 34 Hy Mor Bty loc at Tangdhar was
to fire only on orders of the cdr, no
comn, 450 Mors went unfired.
• Withdrawal disorg and in small
parties.
• En infilt through gaps, attk from
rear
On ni of 19/20 Oct, herds of Yaks crossed over Namka Chu R; the Chinese were ascertaining the depth of water at their
selected crossing places, detonating mines and breaching wire obsts with the help of yaks.
By 5 AM on 20 Oct, PLA crossed the R on foot through gaps avoiding the guarded Brs. They crossed the R bare-foot.
Tele lines were cut. PLA contacted defenses of 7 Inf Bde units on a broad front from the defender’s rear. This was a
smart and well-rehearsed tac mvre by the en against a thinly defended border.
Indian tps were taken by surprise when assaulted from rear. RAJPUTs and GORKHAs dply at Br IV, III and area between
Br III and II fought gallantly but were soon over-powered.
The GORKHAs, who were holding posns on northern slopes of Tsangdhar, between Br III and II, were surprised when
they were attked suddenly from the flks and rear. They fought gallantly but could not withstand the Chinese assault.
Brigadier Dalvi and his party withdrew towards Serkhim area
through Dhola pass. Enroute, he was separated from most of the
others and was finally left with only Captain Talwar of 17 Para Fd
Regt and a few Other Ranks. On 22 Oct they ran straight into a
Chinese coy near Serkhim and were captured.
By AN of 20 Oct, Chinese had driven back Indian tps from Brs I to V
from Namka Chu, Tsangle, Khinzemane and Tsangdhar. Brunt of the
attk was borne by RAJPUTs, GORKHAs and AR. 4 GRENADIERs and
9 PUNJAB had not been attked. Deciding to pull back all tps to line
Hathungla -Chutangmu just after mid day, GOC 4 Inf Div spoke to
COs of 4 GRENADIERs and 9 PUNJAB ordering them to withdraw to
Hathungla. The bns commenced their withdrawals but could not
reach Hathungla, which was attk and occupied by the Chinese early
in the morn 21 Oct. Realising that the Div Tac HQ at Ziminthang
would soon be attked, Gen Prasad ordered its withdrawal to
Tawang.
Units of 7 Inf Bde were overrun, giving stiff resistance to PLA. Tac
HQs 4 Inf Div at Zimithang withdrew on 21 Oct to Tawang and subsequently to Dirang Dzong.
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20 Oct, 1962, PLA invaded India in Ladakh and NEFA. (19 Oct in DBO), they termed it as self-defence.
o Namka Chu attked at 0500h.
o 0800 Dalvi recommended withdrawal. 7 Inf Bde disintegrates.
o Even 9 PUNJAB and 4 GRENADIERS pull out but not to Hathungla as ordered.
Kameng Sect
• 7 Inf Bde occupying defences on Nam Ka Chu R Valley ceased to exist within 48 h.
• Tawang garrison was abandoned by 23 Oct. Se La & Bomdi La Bde Def Sects were lost after bitter fighting.
Lohit Sect
• Kibithoo was lost and Walong threatened.
Subnasisri And Siang Frontier Div
• Taksing in the Subansiri sect, and Manigong and Gelling in the Siang sect were lost.
E Ladakh
• Fierce fight was given to Chinese in Chip Chap R near Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) N of Galwan R; at Sirijap ahead of Finger
8, N of Pangong Tso Lake and at Rezang La ahead of Chusul Air fd.
24 Oct, there was lgs pause by the Chinese, their 2nd ph attk commenced at first lt on 17 Nov after a lull of 23 days.
12
Tawang Sect: (22 – 24 Oct 1962) • Tawang was not a natural defensive posn.
After Namka Chu, taking advantage of disorderly retreat, PLA It could be apch from many dir but
consolidated their gains and captured Lumpu-Ziminthang, chosen as a Vital Grnd.
creating favourable condns for capture of Tawang. • Tawang was well stked. Abandoning
Tawang in face of the en would have
Till 20 Oct, the defence of ‘Vital Ground’ Tawang was accorded serious implication on future ops.
low priority, placed under Cdr 4 Arty Bde. He was at Div Tac at • That Tawang was a Vital Grnd was
Zimithang on 19 Oct and could not fall back to Tawang since reversed on advice of DMO at AHQ inface
both heptrs assigned to 4 Inf Div were destroyed, Tawang was of the en.
two days by foot. Cdr 62 Inf Bde arr on 21 Oct with 4 • Initial aggression by 1 SIKH and Arty Guns
GARHWAL, other two bns were diverted to Jorhat. 4 GARHWAL at Bumla was not exploited. 1 SIKH was
was placed under comd 4 Arty Bde also 1 SIKH. Surprising surprised at the withdrawal order.
because Bumla and Tawang were an Inf Battle. Anomaly • By the time all mov upwards to Tawang
rectified on 23 Oct, too late. was stopped, 13 DOGRA and 16
GARHWAL had already arr.
• The withdrawal from Tawang was an
exodus. Large dumps of amn, sups and
clo painstakingly stked were abandoned.
En reached Lumla early hours 23 Oct. With the tps at his

disposal, GOC 4 Inf Div (Gen Niranjan Prasad) concluded
that Tawang was not defensible and that the Chinese
would by pass SIKHs on Bum La-Tawang track and make
for Se La. If Chinese blew up the br at Jang on Chaksang
track, they would trap Indian tps on Tawang side of the R.
He decided to withdraw all tps from Tawang to Se La and
fight the main battle there. He met Gen LP Sen at Tawang
on 23 Oct and sought his approval for withdrawal to Jang
on way to Se La. Reportedly, the Army Cdr told Prasad to
do whatever he wished, since he was Div as well as the
Corps Cdr.
Fwd HQ of Tibet Mil Comd ordered pursuit ops to commence at 1600 H on 21 Oct. The plan involved advance along
three different routes culminating in a three-pronged attk on Tawang. Force 419 (comprising three inf regts), 11 Inf
Div and four coys ex SMS (roughly a total str of six inf regts) were tasked for capture of Tawang. The outline plan:
• Main force consisting of Force 419 to advance from Lumpu via Lumla in the SW and capture Tawang in coord with
units of 11 Inf Div.
o 157 Inf Regt plus 3rd Bn ex 155 Inf Regt adv along W flk from Tsangdhar to Karpola I and on to Lumpu.
o HQ Force 419 with 154 Inf Regt leading and 155 Inf Regt less 3rd Bn were to carry out pursuit along the main
Axis Hathungla – Serkhim – Lumpu.
o One coy from 2nd Regt of SMS adv along E bank of Nyam Jang Chu to Ziminthaung where tac HQ of 4 Inf Div loc.
• 1st Bn of 31 Inf Regt was to advance from Takson Gompa via Gangshen Pass directly on to Tawang and assist the
main Force 419 advancing from the W for capture of Tawang.
• 33 Inf Regt of 11 Inf Div was to advance along the E flk from Bumla via Mukdong La directly on to Tawang Chu and
cut off the route of withdrawal from Tawang, as also prevent any rft coming from Derang Dzong.
• 32 Inf Regt of 11 Inf Div and four coys of Shanan Mil Sub District (SMS) were to advance on the main Axis Bumla
– Tawang via Milakteng La and coord their actions with both the forces advancing on the W and E flks.
13
Having secured Lumpu and Ziminthaung,
Fwd HQ of Tibet Mil Comd at 1630 H on
22 Oct, ordered tps ex SMS to capture
Bumla and exploit towards
Tawang. Bumla was held by a pl of 5 AR
and a pl ex 1 SIKH (dply slightly in depth)
with the remainder Coy of 1 SIKH dply at
Tongpeng La.
For Capture of Bumla, HQ SMS tasked
three coys ex 3rd Inf Regt with an arty
coy and elements of Frontier Guards;
placing all of them under comd Dy Cdr of
SMS. The plan was to outflk Indian posns
from the W using one coy in order to
sever the link between AR pl and 1 SIKH
pl. The other two coys were to launch the
main attk against Bumla from the SE.
The attk commenced at 0500 H on 23 Oct
and faced stiff opposn from 1 SIKH pl
under Sub Joginder Singh. However, the posn was overwhelmed after three attks. The attking tps had to call for rfts
from 33 Inf Regt and readjust their plans. Having eliminated the 1 SIKH pl at Bumla, 33 Inf Regt tps continued their attk
against the 1 SIKH coy at Tongpengla which managed to make a clean break and withdraw to Jung in good order. At
first lt on 24 Oct, four coys ex SMS resumed their adv towards Tawang.
Tawang was defended by 1 SIKH, 4 GARH RIFLES, one arty regt, an engr det, under comd of Brig Kalyan Singh, Cdr 4
Arty Bde (after HQ 7 Inf bde had mov out). As per Chinese estimates Tawang had a total str of about 2700 tps.
By last lt 23 Oct Tawang came under attk from many directions. There was no coord resistance and by first lt 24 Oct
Tawang was occupied by the
Chinese. They now cont all areas N
of Tawang.
The Chinese used bulk of their
forces (four regts out of a total of
six) to outflk and encircle Tawang,
and cut off the route of withdrawal
and prevent rfts. Only one third of
the forces were used for direct adv
on to the obj. This was typical of the
tactics that Chinese emp even in the
subsequent battles at Se-La and
Bomdi-La.
Chinese 11 Inf Div, in its outflking move on the E axis Tse La, Poshing La and Thembang to cut off rd Dirang Dzong–
Bomdila, marched 160 kms for six days and nis. There is no substitute for this mode of mob in the Himalayas. PLA
managed to attk depth posns such as Sela and Bomdila by infilt using man pack and inf mors moved by AT. The mov
of such deep penetration is one less studied aspect. However, what is clear is that such a capb is still a virtue.
14
If one was to ascribe a single reason for the debacle on the Namka Chu and fall of Tawang, it would be – a faulty battle
plan with poor genship and political interference. The tps fought valiantly against overwhelming odds, cas suffered by
7 Inf Bde units bear testimony.
Circumstances under which was Tawang vacated?
Army Cdr, Lt Gen P Sen was in Tawang on 22 and 23 Oct. Before landing at Tawang, he had flown towards Zimithang
to get an idea of the trn which he was not familiar with. Once in Tawang, he did not appear very confident after the
Nam Ka Chu rout of 7 Inf Bde. GOC 4 Ind Div, Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad was plg on falling back on Bomdila with Se-la
only playing the part of a delaying obstacle.
On the even of 23 Oct neither Delhi, Lucknow nor Tezpur had any idea where the next defensive line was supposed
to be; the only orders given until then were to abandon Tawang and Bum-la and fall back on Jang. The Dir of Mil Ops,
Maj Gen Monty Palit, based on one incomplete recce made almost two years ago, had made up his mind to dig in at
Se-la. COAS went along with his DMO.
Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad was sacked as GOC 4 Inf Div – for having lost the will to fight.
After occupying Tawang, the Chinese did not pursue the Indians and stopped their push north of Tawang Chu. There
was a lull in the fighting in Kameng which lasted a little over three weeks. This was forced on the Chinese by:
• The need to replenish sups and amn and induct fresh tps before undertaking any further thrust.
• The Chinese had suffered hy cas and already extended their lines of comns.
• They needed time to construct a rd up to Tawang to bring up their guns and hy eqpt.
• The br over Tawang Chu at Jang had been blown up by the IA and had to be re-constructed.
To gain time for making prep before commencing fresh attks, China issued a statement suggesting a ‘friendly
settlement’ of the bdy ques, a copy of which was sent by Premier Chou En-Lai to Prime Minister Nehru, through the
Chinese Charge d’Affairs in Delhi on the even of 24 Oct. The conditions stipulated by China were such that the offer
was bound to be rejected by India. Apart from its propaganda value, the statement was a ploy to gain time for the
Chinese to complete their preparations for a further offensive.
The Walong Sect: Further E in NEFA, Walong is loc near Indo-Burma • In Oct 1957, the Chinese had intruded
border on the banks of Lohit R. till Walong, withdrew when challenged.
• In summer of 1962 three posts est in
the area; forward posture.
• CO 6 KUMAON ordered to mov to
Kibithu with C Coy.
• 4 SIKH moved to Walong.
A subsidy was launched in the

Walong Sect. The Chinese aim was
to annihilate the Indian tps dply in
Walong Sect and adv upto their
claim line of 7 Nov 1959, i.e. almost
the foothills.
Initially on the Indian side, Walong
Sect was the resp of 5 Inf Bde which
was part of 4 Inf Div. AR manned the
BPs. In response to occasional
Chinese incursions through the
15
Lohit Valley, 2 RAJPUT was mov into the area. In Mar 1962, replaced by 6 KUMAON.
Unsound Decision to re-dply 6 KUMAON in Kibithu.
• Contrary to Thorat def line.

• Area ahead of Walong being held by AR Pl. Bn should have remained at Walong where def were well prep.
• Had Chinese pressed fwd, AR would have fallen back to Kumaoni loc, where Kumaonis would be waiting in
well prep def.
• Mov to unfamiliar grnd on short notice (Both Bns).
• No effective comd & cont set up at Kibithu, leading to creation of vacuum b/w Kumaon & AR eles.
• ROE dictated encounter with Chinese only by AR.
• Lines of comn further extended leading to lgs strains.
• Chinese at relatively dominating grnd with shorter lines of comn.
• By moving ahead the far trn for delay and harassing battle squandered.
• Narrow Lohit valley from Walong to Kibithu suitably defendable from Walong and not Kibithu
Walong, a small hamlet, is sit in the vicinity of Tri Jn of Tibet, Myanmar and India. It lies astride the ancient trade
route. The trn in the area is characterised by hi mtns, narrow valleys and dense forests.
The valley is divided by the Lohit R, a fast-flowing stream about 100 metres wide at its narrowest pt and 20-30 feet
deep. There was no br and mov from one bank to the other was by a cable called ‘a twine.’ There are numerous small
branches joining in, both from the E and W, emanating from steep narrow valleys. From the valley floor-around 700m,
the mtn peaks rise to approx 5000m, with vast variation in the temp.
Walong is about 30 km from the Tibetan border (McMahon Line) and
approx 200 km from the rd H (in 1962) at Teju on our side of the border
involving a march of 14 stgs over a goat track. A track from Walong also
led to Kibithoo along the W bank of Lohit R. Onwards, it hit the McMahon
Line; crossing into Tibet, culminating at Rima, an adm base on the
Chinese side. The sup line and tptn of tps was only by air. Teju airFd was
the nearest airlift pt. There was an airstrip at Walong, capable of handling
only lt ac like Otters or Caribous. After 1000 hours, even an Otter could
not opr due to strong winds.
Ops in Walong Sect can be divided into three distinct phs as under :-
• Initial Ops: 18 – 24 Oct.

• Reorg and Build-Up: 25 Oct – I3 Nov.
• Main Battle: 14 – 21 Nov.
Initial Ops: 18 – 24 Oct

In the first wk of Sep 1962, 6 KUMAON had been moved up and loc a few km short of the IB.
• A Coy was dply fwd at Dichu.
• B Coy at E Ridge.
• C Coy at Kibithoo.
• D Coy at Ladders.
By end Sep, 4 SIKH was also in the process of induction. Two of its coys had been air lifted into Walong. In the
meantime, Chinese activities had incr across the IB. Tac HQs of Chengdu Sub Area with 153 Regt and one reinforced
bn had stgd fwd. On 18 Oct, a recce ptl of 6 KUMAON reported presence of two Chinese offrs and about 50 men in the
area of Hill 100 (on the McMahon Ridge). On 21 Oct, lt sigs were observed on the Chinese side.
16
At 0015 H 22 Oct, the Chinese launched an attk on Kibithoo held by a coy of 6 KUMAON, with a bn size force, duly sp
by mors and MGs. The battle lasted for almost four hours. When the Chinese were Xg a br, the KUMAONs dem one
end of the br. The Chinese were trapped on the Br and exposed to MG fire of 6 KUMAON, 200 PLA soldiers were killed.
The Chinese ultimately were able to breakthrough, by sheer weight of numbers.
6 KUMAON withdrew to occupy a defensive posn at Walong, leaving behind a screen posn at Ashi Hill ex D Coy. In
early hours of 23 Oct, the Chinese attked the screen. At 0400 h, the same day, screen was ordered to withdraw.
By 24 Oct morning, PLA had contacted the main defences at Walong. By this time, 4 SIKH had occupied a defended
area at Walong along with two coys of 2/8 GORKHA Rifles. The SIKHS and GORKHAS repulsed the attk with very hy cas
on the PLA. The Chinese set the pine trees in the jungle on fire. This forced 4 SIKH to withdraw under smk and fire.
Having suffered hy losses, the Chinese halted their adv and occupied the hills overlooking the Bde Sect. These features
were named as Yellow and Green Pimples. Hereafter, there was a lull in the battle for some time, except for ptl clashes.
Subansiri and Siang Frontier Divs

Fwg the Longju incident in 1959,
Subansiri Frontier Div was
manned by 9 AR and Siang
Frontier Div by 11 AR.
On 27 Oct 1962, the Chinese
ordered the launch of ops
towards Limeking (Subansiri
Frontier
Div), Mechuka and Tuting (both
in Siang Frontier Div).
An ad hoc force of 2200 tps from
different units were earmarked
for this offensive. The Chinese
carried out prep ops between 21
and 30 Oct to secure posns along
the border before the main attk. The main attk was planned for 18 Nov.
17
DBO, Pangong Tso and Chusul Sect of E Ladakh: • Like rest of Border, IA took over in Aug 1959.
Karakoram Pass in N to Demchok in SE. • Infra very poor. Chinese well devp.
• Only Airfds – Leh, Chushul, landing strips – Fukche, DBO.
• Most posts air maint, air maint resources inadequate.
• Chinese int NW very eff.
• Indian Canberras eff Aerial recce.
114 (I) Inf Bde was raised in 1959 at Leh, with just two bns.
Geography of E Ladakh
• The N most part is Daulet Beg Oldi (DBO), a small out post on the
traditional Silk route that eventually crossed over the Karakoram Pass into
the Chinese province of Xinjiang.
• To the S of DBO is the Chang Chenmo – Galwan Valley sect.
Phobrang was the sp base for this Sect.
• Next came Chushul Sect that extended from Sirijap complex N of
Pangong Tso lake upto Rezang La, S of the lake.
• The Southern most sect was the Indus Valley Sect that extended
from Dungti to Demchok.
Except for Chushul and Indus Valley Sect on Indian side, there was no lateral comn avlb. Fighting, therefore, was
isolated and unconnected with other sects.
Chushul Sub Sect
Lies S of Chang Chenmo valley running NW to SE the continuation of Karakoram Rg, with hts over 6,000 m. The mtns
end on shores of Pangong Tso lake. The lake is over one KM wide and deep. It freezes in winter and even veh mov
over frozen ice is possible. In the AN strong winds give rise to high waves, making it difficult to cross. On the S bank
there are hi broken mtns that slope S to Spanggur lake. W of this lake there exists a clear gap between the mtns
called the Spanggur Gap. It is nearly two Kms wide and joins the Chushul plateau with the Tibetan plateau to the E.
To the W of Spanggur Gap lies the vill of Chushul. Between Chushul vill and Spanggur was loc the Chushul airFd. By
Oct 1962, through efforts of army engrs, this was capable of taking AN-12 and Packet ac.
Just before the conflict, the garrison at Chushul was also connected with Leh by a rd that passed over Tsaka La, a hi
pass S of Chushul. From this pt onwards the rd led NW along the bank of Indus R to Leh. The shorter N route to
Chushul was via Chang La near Karu - via Darbuk and Tangtse along the S bank of Pangong Tso lake. This was an old
caravan route and was fit for mules and yaks. W and NW of Chushul was the hi Ladakh Rg rising to over 20,000 feet.
This rg continues due SE. In the early phs of fighting in Ladakh, Chushul defs were held by two coys of 1/8 GR.
After being relieved by 5 JAT in the 2nd wk Oct 1962, a coy less pl str was dply in Sirijap complex N of Pangong Tso
Lake. This post was sup by boats and had no land link with the bn. S of Pangong Tso Lake was the Yula complex
consisting of three posts manned by another coy of 1/8 GR. Nearly two coys defended the Spanggur Gap. Both the N
shoulder named Gurung Hill and to the S named Maggar Hill, were held. In addn there was a post in the gap itself.
Since early Sep the Chinese had surrounded the Sirijap post. They had also constructed a rd joining their posts with
their HQ at Khurnak Fort. The total Chinese str opposite Chushul Sect was estimated to be a Regt. When in Apr 1960
the Ladakh border was handed over to the Army,
• 14 JAMMU & KASHMIR Militia was dply in the Northern half of the 480-KM long sect Demchok to DBO.
• 7 JAMMU & KASHMIR Militia was dply in the Southern half.
• As tension with China continued to mount, 1/8 GORKHA Rifles was inducted in Apr 1961, and assumed posns incl
and between the Galwan R and Chushul, thus shortening the frontages assigned to the other bns.
18
In Apr 1962 , in furtherance of India's Fwd Policy, 5 JAT Regt was inducted between Chip Chap R and Lunkung defile,
on the N end of the Spanggur Lake. This permitted the GORKHAS to conc on protecting the front between Lunkung
and Chushul, tps were still so thinly spread out that the vital Chushul airfd could be spared only two GORKHA pls.
114 Bde had no res. This shortcoming was partly remedied by the arr of 13 KUMAON Regt at Leh in Sep 1962.
When war broke out on 22 Oct, all Indian outposts fell to the Chinese asslt. Spread out without arty sp or the
possibility of rfts, these outposts, gen between 10 and 60 men, were ordered to hold out at all costs. The Chinese
attked with 10 and 30 times numerical superiority.
• Post Galwan, manned by 60 men from 5 JAT, suffered 30 killed and 18 wounded.
• Post Sirjap I, manned by 40 men from 1/8 GORKHAS under Maj Dhan Singh Thapa, fought off two attks by an
estimated 400 Chinese tps, and was then annihilated.
Chinese Aim
• Initially claim territory upto the line – DBO – Tr Jn, thereafter capture to provide depth to W Hwy in Aksai Chin.
• In Galwan – Chang Chenmo Sect, the Chinese claim line was cleverly drawn to incl passes and crest line for
complete obsn and domination of Indian defences and denying the same to IA.
• In Chushul Sect also, Chinese aim remained the same.
• In Demchok Sect, deny Demchok funnel to preclude any Indian offensive towards Tashigong to severe the W Hwy.
For Chinese, Chushul is gateway to
Leh. It lies 130 kms from Leh to NW
across Ladakh Rg, and, Rudok, the
Chinese launching base about a 100
km to the SW.
PLA crossed the border on 19/20 Oct
and attked. 5 JAT and 14 J&K Militia
gave a good fight at Chip Chap and
Galwan Valley and Demchok. After
the initial oppsn, they were overrun.
Early hours of 21 Oct, PLA attked
Srijap across Pangong Tso from more
than one dir with inf and lt tks. The
asslt, was preceded hy shelling.
Alfa Coy of 1/8 GORKHAs OC, Maj Dhan Singh
Thapa, repulsed two attks with hy cas on both
sides. The only RS held by the Coy was destroyed
in the shelling and post cut off from rest of the
Unit. After many attks, amn was running low. For
the GORKHAs who were at Sirijap, it was the last
man, last round moment. Maj Thapa and
remaining men came out of their bunkers with
Kukris for a hand-to-hand fight to the finish, few
seriously wounded were taken prisoners.
Maj Dhan Singh Thapa was taken a POW. Later
awarded PVC for exceptional bravery and ldrship. Chinese cas were estimated three times more than the GORKHAs.
After having captured Sirijap, the PLA units halted their offensive and prep to attk Chushul airfd and the valley to
get direct access to Leh.
19
ANALYSIS OF PH 1 OF THE WAR
In 1962, China was not a great mil pwr. But it still went for a war against India because of three principal reasons:
• A sense of insecurity over Tibet, particularly after Dalai Lama crossed over to India and est a govt-in-exile to
internationalise the issue and be a rallying force for Tibetans’ resistance against Beijing’s rule in Tibet.
• A diversionary strat by Chinese supremo Mao Zedong, whose politico-economic policy of “The Great Leap
Fwd” was a disaster, strening his opponents in Communists Party.
• Despite China being communist, Mao never gave up the country’s past culture in which the concept of
“Middle Kingdom” (China the centre of global civilisation and all nations must ack its political and cultural
supremacy by paying tributes) is deeply ingrained. Implies, China will not allow any other nation, at lE in Asia,
to be as imp. He wanted to show India that China was a great pwr and, had to ‘punish’ India once”.
Reasons for India’s Defeat
• A sense of great ideological arrogance of Indian ldrship: highly idealistic, devoid of grnd realities. If Mao
believed in the Middle Kingdom, Nehru thought of a world where militaries should be disbanded. By 1959
Nehru realised that his trust of China was a blunder and decided on the ‘Fwd Policy’, est posts in the
disputed areas often behind Chinese fwd posts. Nehru was also supremely confident that his policy of
nonalignment would get sp from USA and Soviet Union, deterring China from plg any maj attk on India.
• A monumental failure of Indian int in assessing that China was plg a maj attk. MI’s assessment in 1959 was
that a “maj incursion” was unlikely, because India’s pace of industrialization was better than China and PLA
was not capable enough “to sustain a maj drive across the ‘great land barrier’”. Also firmly sp by IB Dir B N
Mullick, the IB totally iden itself with the view from the S Block bureaucracy (MoD and MoE) that a ltd and hi
intensity war with China was “structurally impossible” in a nuclearised bipolar sys; any misadventure by
China would lead to global nuclear escalation, a strong deterrence for a conflict on the Himalayan border.
• Def Minister Krishna Menon repeatedly ignored pleas of the Army for funds to improve manpower and
wpn sys. The IA of 280,000 pers was short by 60,000 rank and file, 700 anti-tk guns, 5,000 RS, 1000s of Kms
of fd cable, 36,000 RS btys, 10,000 one-ton trucks and 10,000 three-ton trucks! Two regts of tks were not op
due to lack of spares. Indian tps were using .303 rifles, PLA was equipped with MGs/ Hy Mors/Auto Rifs.
• Army hierarchy deeply politicised. COAS, Gen P N Thapar was a acolyte of Menon and rejected every reqst
for better arms and strategies coming from below. Offrs with sound mil advice were replaced with those
submissive. Comd of newly formed 4 Corps was given to Lt Gen B M Kaul, who had never comd an active
fighting outfit? His mil strats were flawed, frequently ignored chain of comd - directly appch COAS, bypassing
GOC-in-C and gave orders directly to jnrs. Politicisation of the Army a key factor behind 1962 debacle.
• The sit could have been contained had the ldrship shown the guts to fight.
o Se La, Dirang and Bomdi La were formidably held on Tawang-Tezpur axis.
o The Tawang-Tezpur axis is 180 kms with addl 25 kms to reach Bum La.
o Bomdi La is at 11000 feet, Se La at 14000 feet and Tawang at 10000 feet; the higher areas like Bum
La are at 18000 feet plus.
o Due difficult trn and steep gradients travelling time beyond Dirang Dzong and to Tawang measured
in days not hours. Amn, rations and stores were either carried man/mule packed or air dropped.
o Extreme cold condns and wind chill factor could bring down temp below -100 C. Rs Nyamjang Chu,
Nam ka Chu etc were formidable obsts.
o There were few jeep-able trs in the region.
o The rd till Bomdi La was brd, by the time it reached Twang it was just a narrow strip.
Despite such formidable trn to the disadvantage of the attker, the Indian fmns could not hold their grnd.
20
• Another imp factor, was India’s decision of not using the Air Force. IAF was not used for any offensive and
was only confined to air dropping sups. The use of comb air power would have turned the tables on the
Chinese and the 1962 war could well have been a debacle for China. IB Director B N Mullick made
exaggerated assessment of attk by Chinese bombers on Indian cities if India had used the air force.
After the defeat at the battle of Namka Chu, Tawang Ridge was not suitable tactically for defence as it was on a
slope and did not have any domination. It was also possible to easily bypass and outflk it. Sela and Bomdila in the
rear were suitable for taking up defence. Thus, when widely distributed 7 Inf Bde in penny packets broke up ahead of
Twang Chu R, the next tac line of defence should have been Sela.
Having achieved their initial obj, the Chinese halted their offensive to refit and replenish.
• Starting from the 20 Oct offensive in Namka Chu to the adv on Tawang from then to 23 Oct evening, the
Chinese had suffered many cas and needed to regp.
• The trn was very difficult and consisted of only trs. The Chinese lines of comn had got extended. They also
needed to constr a rd from Bumla to Tawang. This work commenced imdt.
• Br 4 over Twang Chu had been blown by the IA and had to be reconstructed.
International Response During The Conflict:

▪ Western nations at the time viewed China as an aggressor and the war was part of a monolithic communist
objective to dictate the world.
▪ The United States was unequivocal in its recognition of the Indian bdy claims in the eastern sector, while not
supporting the claims of either side in the western sector.
▪ During the conflict, Nehru wrote two letters to the U.S. President John F. Kennedy, asking for 12 squadrons
of fighter jets and a modern radar system.
▪ He had also asked that these aircraft be manned by American pilots until Indian airmen were trained to
replace them.
▪ These requests were rejected by the Kennedy Administration.
▪ The U.S. provided non-combat assistance to Indian forces and planned to send the carrier USS Kitty Hawk to
the Bay of Bengal to support India in case of an air war.
▪ As the Sino-Soviet split heated up, Moscow made a major effort to support India, especially with the sale of
advanced Mig warplanes.
▪ India and the USSR reached an agreement in August 1962 (before the Cuban Missile Crisis) for the
immediate purchase of twelve MiG-21s as well as for Soviet technical assistance in the manufacture of these
aircraft in India.
▪ Britain agreed with the Indian position completely.
▪ The non-aligned nations remained uninvolved, and only the United Arab Republic openly supported India.
▪ Of the non-aligned nations, six, Egypt, Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Ghana and Indonesia didn’t
unequivocally condemn China which deeply disappointed India.
▪ Pakistan, which had had a turbulent relationship with India ever since the Indian partition, improved its
relations with China after the war.
21
THE PD IN BETWEEN
To gain time, on 24 Oct, Chinese premier Zhaou en Lai issued a reconciliatory statement which had more
propaganda value. The three-pt proposal for peace:
• Disengagement and withdrawal of both sides 20 km from the lines of actual cont.
• A Chinese withdrawal in the E sect of the border to the N of the LAC. A guarantee that neither side would
cross the line of present cont in Aksai Chin.
• The third pt was a proposal for talks between the premiers of both countries.
On 27 Oct, Nehru retorted. “There have been repeated declarations by the Govt of PRC that they want to settle the
differences on the border ques with India by peaceful means, though what is happening today is in violent
contradiction with these declarations,” he wrote, insisting on reverting to the bdy as it was prior to 8 Sep 1962.
Zhou turned this down, and instead suggested a return to McMahon Line in the E and Chinese claim line in Aksai
Chin. He again wrote to Nehru on 4 Nov, explaining his earlier proposals and requesting Nehru to re-consider.
Nehru replied on 4 Nov, stating that India could not agree to proposals, which envisaged China retaining territory it
had secured by aggression. He once again stated that both sides return to the posn as obtaining before 8 Sep. After
this, China launched a tirade of vituperative propaganda against India and against Nehru.
Reorg of the 4 Corps
When battle was joined, Lt Gen Kaul was stunned by Chinese retaliation and left the battle Fd of Dhola ridge for
Lumpu and thereon by hptr for Tezpur. The next day he was evac to Delhi Army hospital for high alt sickness. The
COAS decided to overhaul the top order and move some fmns.
• Maj Gen Harbaksh Singh was rushed to Tezpur to take over comd of 4 Corps. (Replace Kaul who was ill)
• Maj Gen A S Pathania, MVC, MC replaced Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad as GOC 4 Inf Div.
• Cdr 62 Inf Bde, Brig N K Lal was replaced by Brig Hoshiar Singh.
• 65 Inf Bde at Dirang Dzong got a new cdr, Brig GM Sayeed. (newly raised with two bns mov from
Secunderabad to NEFA)
• Brig Gurbaksh Singh, Cdr, 48 lnf Bde loc at Bomdi La was the only senior offr retained.
• 23 Inf Div pulled out of Nagaland. One Bde mov to Darrang bordering SE Bhutan. Second as Corps res Tezpur.
• 11 Inf Bde moved from Imphal to Walong to relieve 5 Inf Bde, mov to Central NEFA.
• 17 Inf Div mov from Punjab to Siliguri.
• 20 Inf Div mov from Ramgarh to Sikkim.
• 2 Inf Div raised in Tinsukhia for Central and Eastern NEFA.
• Two Armd Regts mov to the East. AMX-13 Tank Rget to 4 Corps and a Regt of Shermans to Siliguri.
• Western Theatre: 3 Mtn Div raised with
o 114 Mtn Bde at Chushul.
o 70 Mtn Bde of two bns and a tp of Armd cars for Dumti Demchok area.
o 163 Inf Bde moved from Kashmir to Leh for def of Leh.
The morale of 4 Corps was restored with appt of Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh who was a seasoned and strong mil ldr
and had vowed not to permit any withdrawal. Lt Gen B M Kaul, surprisingly, was reinstated on 30 Oct as 4 Corps
Cdr and Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh reverted to his old appt (GOC 33 Corps) (Which was not involved in the War).
Kaul and Pathania decided to convert Se La pass area, into an impregnable fort. Brig Hoshiar Singh was made in
charge; a tough soldier and liked by his tps mines were laid, barbed wires and build bunkers/trenches prep. Stks of
rations and amn were sufficient for 20 days. Se La top shoulders at 16000 feet were held strongly. Se La was ready to
take on the Chinese offensive by end of 28 Oct.
Dirang Dzong in the Valley of Dirang R was occupied by 65 inf Bde with 4 RAJPUT, 17 Maratha LI, a Fd bty and co-loc
was 4 Div HQ. The area was about 30 km from Sela and again well defended but down in a valley dominated by hts.
22
Bomdila at 10000 feet was defended by 48 Inf bde. It was the last bastion before foothills of Tenga valley – about 20
km from Dirang. It was defended by 5 GUARDS, 1 SIKH LI, 1 MADRAS and B sqn of 7 CAV with Stuart tks. Two Bns
were dply on the N apch and 5 GUARDS were stationed at Thembang to guard the E approach from Poshing la axis.
2 Inf Div was re-raised in the Digboi-Tinsukia area in Oct 1962 fwg the fall of Tawang. It was placed under 4
Corps and was to be resp for the whole of NEFA, except for Kameng Frontier Div. Maj Gen MS Pathania was its first
GOC. Gen Pathania arr at Walong on 26 Oct 1962.
181 Inf Bde was placed under the Div. But, Gen Pathania preferred to have Brig NC Rawlley and his 11 Inf Bde under
his comd. 11 Bde was moved under 2 Div from Manipur to Lohit Frontier Div and 181 Bde moved to the India–Burma
border. On 29 Oct, Brig NC Rawley took over comd of 11 Inf Bde at Walong.
To bring the Bde to full str, 2/8 GR was ordered to move to Walong.
Half way through the move, they were replaced by 3/3 GR. Even 3/3
GR was shuttled up and down till it was finally brought into Walong.
Meanwhile, PLA had conc a div worth of tps between the Border and
Yellow and Green Pimples and were sending out small parties to
infiltrate into Walong to harass by frequent firing, raid and ambush – a
well-known PLA tactics.
Fwg the fmn of 2 Inf Div, Subansiri and Siang Frontier Divs were placed
under the op resp of 5 Inf Bde. 192 Inf Bde was later inducted in this
sect and took over the Siang Div on 12 Nov 1962.
Chinese Build-Up
Between 22-24 Oct, PLA had captured Kibithoo, and were occupying Ashi Hill, separated from Indian tps by Namti
Nala. By aggressive ptlling, Chinese had also gained cont of Green Pimple (12500), Tri Jn (13250) and, were operating
on the W Ridge and the Avalanche Ridge; posing a threat to the W flk of Indian posns in Walong. Chinese ptls were
also operating in Satti Valley, posing a threat to the E flk.
Subsequent to the raising of Indian 2 Inf Div and induction of 11 Inf Bde into Walong Sect, PLA ordered the move of
130 Inf Div (Cdr Dang Zhanlin) loc at various places in Sichuan province for offensive in the Walong Sect. On 28 Oct,
GHQ PLA nominated Ding HQ under Cdr Ding Cheng for overall comd and cont of ops in the Walong Sect. Ten days
were given with effect from 29 Oct, to complete all prep for the offensive. 130 Inf Div had the fwg tps avlb to it :–
• 388, 389,390 Inf Regts.
• Engineer Regt.
• Composite Arty Bn of 134 Inf Div.
• Anti-aircraft Bn of 135 Inf Div.
23
The PLA high comd carried out detailed appre of the task. Op instrs issued to lower fmns emphasised the fwg :–
• As Indian defences were expected to be well prep and held in str, the op plans were to be based on
encirclement and outflking movs. The break-in pts were to be selected with due deliberation.
• Superior fire power, both of arty and sp wpns was an essential prerequisite. Anti ac wpns were to be org to
interfere with the adversary’s air sups as also for security of own tps.
• For effective comd and cont, line and radio comns were to be ensured.
• Chengdu Mil Sub Area and Tibet Mil Comd were assigned the resp of lgs sp for the offensive. Adequate
resources were to be earmarked for constr rd up to Walong.
Chinese Lgs Build-Up
• The lgs chain involved a move of nearly 1300 km to a rd H at Shugden which was approx 90 km from Rima, the
launch area for the offensive. Rima was 4-5 days of marching dist from the rd H.
• Chengdu Mil Region org 17 and 20 Motor Tpt Regts for bldg-up the lgs for the op.
• Chengdu Mil Sub Area mob 7169 civ workers, 835 livestk, 634 mules and horses; and to further augment the
effort 130 Div dply five inf bns (altogether 1800 pers) to ferry the stks for impending ops.
• The total str for lgs build-up exceeded that of the comb tps; such was the magnitude of the lgs effort.
Chinese Plan of Attk
The plan for capture of Walong was finalised on 7 Nov at Ding HQ and fwd to the Central Mil Commission (CMC) who
in turn comn their final approval of the plan on 9 Nov. Salient pts of the plan were as under :–
• Main attk was to devp from W of Lohit R with a subsidiary attk from the E.
• 388 and 390 Regts were to attk simultaneously from the W. After initial penetration into the Ladders – Maha
Plateau – Tri Jn localities, Walong was to be isolated, prelude to its subsequent capture.
• 389 Regt (less a bn) was to advance keeping E of the Lohit R. After clearing Dong Hts, it was to prog ops towards
Walong, in conjn with 388 Regt.
• I53 Regt already in contact was to provide firm base and subsequently complement ops of 388 and 390 Regts.
• 2nd Bn of 389 Regt alongwith the reinforced bn of Chengdu Mil Sub Area (less 3rd and 5th Coys) to act as res.
• 5th Coy of the reinforced bn to launch a feint attk initially and subsequently protect the W flk of the offensive.
• Arty Gp to sp the offensive: composite Arty Bn of 134 Div, 122 mm mor coy and 82 mm mor coy of 153 Regt.
• All preps were to be completed by 1800 h on 13 Nov. The date for the offensive was fixed as 18 Nov, which in
the event had to be advanced to 16 Nov.
• Lgs set-up and rear comd office were est by 12 Nov. One wk’s sups and amn were to be stked by 15 Nov.
Indian Disposns
By the first wk of Nov, 11 Inf Bde had est itself finally with its full complements. Due to cross attachments, the
homogeneity of the units was adversely affected. The profile of the Bde Defended Sect by 14 Nov was as under:–
• Bde Tac HQ was in gen area Tri Jn with adm echelons at Walong Camp.
• 4 SIKH was dply on both sides of the Lohit R with the Bn less ‘D’ Coy on the W and the ‘D’ Coy on the E in the
area of High Plateau, the latter under comd 3/3 GR. On the W, a coy each was dply at Ptl Base, Ladders and
Maha Plateau, with the Bn HQ in the Area W Ridge.
• 3/3 GR was also dply on either side of the Lohit R. Two of its coys were in the area of Lachman Ridge and
Ladders with other two in Dong Plateau and Dong Hill, and Bn HQ in the area of Dakota Hill on the E bank.
• 6 KUMAON had taken up defences in the area of Tri Jn and W Ridge, after withdrawing from Kibithoo.
• 4 DOGRA was dply in the depth astride the Avalanche Ridge, guarding the W apch to Walong.
From the above dply, two coys of 3/3 GR dply on W bank of Lohit R were under comd 4 SIKH; while two coys of 4 SIKH
on E bank were under comd 3/3 GR.
24
The Western (Ladakh Sect)
The Chinese, having seized all Indian outposts, needed to reorg. This gave India time for reorg of its own, and it
undertook what should have been done in the first place, a massive rft of Ladakh.
• With the newly raised HQ 3 Div arriving at Leh by mid Nov, (Maj Gen Budh Singh),
• 114 Bde (Brig TN Raina) was no longer indep and was now made solely resp for the Central Sect, an 80 km
stretch of the front between the Lunkung defile and the Taska La.
• The two Militia bns left the bde, to be replaced by 1 JAT Regt. The Central Sect was itself divided into two:
the N half [Lukung sub-sect] held by one bn, and the remaining three bns plus the Bde HQ were at Chushul.
• Meanwhile, 70 Inf Bde took over Demchok, and 163 Bde went into res at Leh.
It is hard to tell if this rft caused the Chinese to modify their plans, but certainly the fierce resistance they
encountered during the battle of the outposts must have imposed some degree of caution. When their next ph
opened on 18 Nov, only 114 Bde was attked.
The Battle of Chushul is more accurately referred to as the Battles of Gurung Hill and Rezang La.
25
PH 2 OF THE WAR
Western Sect
The pd between 24 Oct and 18 Nov allowed time for the rft of 114 Inf Bde. Tps to task were:
• the Northern appch with 1 J&K Militia,
• Southern with 5 JAT,
• Gurung Hill with 1/8 GORKHA Rifles and
• the Maggar Hill-Rezang La complex with 13 KUMAON.
The bde was sp by two tps of AMX-1 tks of 20 Lancers which had been airlifted by AN-12 ac to Chushul on 26 Oct.
• Six AMX-13 tks (two tpss) of the 20 Lancers were airlifted to Chushul using Antonov An-12 tpt ac.
• The first batch of tks were loaded in Chandigarh on the intervening ni of 24 and 25 Oct and landed in Chushul
– 15,000 feet above the MSL – on the morning of 25 Oct.
• The second batch was loaded the fwg ni and airlifted to Chushul on 26 Oct.
• They were dply at the base of Gurung Hill, a towering feature on one side of the Spanggur Gap to deny the
apch of the advancing PLA and secure the crucial apches leading to Chushul and Leh.
• The tks prevented the Chinese advance towards Chushul airfd, loc between Chushul vill and Gurung Hill.
26
Chushul was protected by the lt tks, RCL guns of the Bde, a bty of 13 Fd Regt and a tp of 32 Hy Mor Regt, as also many
camou dummies made of abandoned dozers and other unserviceable vehs. The Bde HQ was on the hi grnd overlooking
the airstrip, protected by the Bn HQ of 1/8 GORKHA Rifles and a sec of MMG's from the MAHAR Regt.
To capture the Chushul complex, Chinese first needed to capture Gurung Hill, Maggar hill and, most imp Rezang La,
which provided the flking and most dangerous appch to cut off the sole Indian life-line to Leh around Tsaka La.
The Chinese started closing in for an asslt on Gurung Hill and
Rezang La around 7 AM on 18 Nov. As they neared the obj, their
guns and mors brought a hail of shells on the Chushul airfd. One
tk tp moved closer to Gurung Hill. The tgt was top of Gurung Hill
at an alt of 18,000 ft and 4000 yards away from the firing posn.
As the en descended down the fwd slopes, three tks pumped in
accurate fire and stalled the attk causing hy cas.
Rezang la was 13 KUMAON Coy locality comd by Maj Shaitan
Singh isolated from the main defended area. It was defended
by 5 Pls incl two contingencies. Maj Shaitan Singh, mov from
one pl to the other motivating his men to fight on till the last
man and last bullet. While moving from bunker to bunker, he
was hit in the chest by a LMG burst which wounded him
seriously. The coy fought gallantly blunting many en attks. Of
the 118 men at Rezang La, 109 men were martyred, 5 were
captured and only 4 returned alive. The Chinese attked in
waves and 1000s were killed.
Maj Shaitan Singh was awarded the PVC (Posthumous).
After the fall of Rezang La, there was a possibility of Chinese est a rdblock on rd Chushul-Tsaka La, the only exit route
to Leh. To counter it, one tp of tks was detailed to set up an ambush in a narrow re-entrant. This op never happened.
PLA resumed attk on remaining defences on Gurung Hill at 10 AM on 19 Nov and were engaged by Indian arty. Tks
were moved to a pre-selected firing posns and started pounding the en causing hy losses. Eventually, around 2 PM
under cover of mist, the Chinese launched their attk in such overwhelming str that Gurung Hill finally fell at 4.30 PM.
The tks helped in covering the withdrawal of tps from the fwd posns to their second line of def, which was occupied
by the Bde by first lt 20 Nov. After the fall of Gurung Hill, the Chinese adv towards the airfd from Gurung Hill was
prevented entirely by tks of 20 LANCERS and arty fire.
Peking radio admitted to having suffered its worst cas at Chushul Valley. The Chinese could not capture their obj;
Chushul. 114 Bde was not defeated.
The PLA did not win this Battle, albeit they captured a few fwd coy localities. The Bde Cdr, Brig TN Raina was decorated
with the MVC, later became the Chief of Army Staff.
On 21 Nov the Chinese declared cease-fire. It was lgs difficulties and overstretch that made the Chinese withdraw
after declaring ceasefire.
27
Kameng Frontier Div; Ph 2 of the Chinese attk commenced at first lt on 17 Nov 1962 after a lull of 23 days.
The Chinese Plan
After Nam Ka Chu, the Chinese had rather effortlessly pushed Indian tps back to S of Tawang Chu. Their Int was well
aware of all changes in the Indian side incl their dply.
The head of the Central Mil Affairs Commission (CMAC), Gen Liu Bocheng, was determined to avoid a face-to-face
confrontation with the Indian tps.
The Chinese plan for Ph 2 of the ops (started on 17 Nov) hinged on the Indians deciding to dig in at Se-la.
On 23 Oct, when the decision to abandon Tawang had been taken, both the Eastern Army Cdr Bogey Sen and BGS
IV Corps Brig KK Singh had ordered the tps to fall back on Bomdila as per the Thorat Plan.
At this stg when much had been lost it was not
a good idea. To expect that Se-la to hold out for
even two wks was wishful thinking, especially
since infilt routes on either flk had not been
studied. Se-la certainly would have been a
formidable obst had it been selected six months
back and the Chinese had attked only along the
rd axis.
The Chinese did not chase the Tawang garrison
across Mago/Tawang Chu imdt was to make the
Indian cdrs think that they were happy with
capture of Tawang and would not prog further.
The Indian cdrs were indeed complacent.
The plan by Chinese, Gen Liu Bocheng’s plan
was bold. To outflk Se-la and push his tps
behind the garrison onto the Se-la-Dirang-
Bomdila rd meant that the Chinese tps would
have to be self-contained. Should the Se-la bde
actually dig it would actually be difficult for the Chinese to prog their ops. And if 65 Inf Bde also dug in at Dirang Dzong,
then 48 and 67 Inf Bde could mop up the Chinese. Indian cdrs were not capable of take such bold decisions.
On 29 Oct, orders were issued by the CMAC to the Tibet Mil Region that outlined the attk plans for the battle of Se-la,
Dirang Dzong and Bomdila. The maj guidelines were to cut off Br 1 and Br 2 between Dirang and Senge Dzong;
concentrate forces and strike at the five bns holding Se-la from multiple directions; and attk Dirang Dzong and then
push towards Thembang and Bomdila.
Lt Gen Zhang Gua Hua, Cdr Tibet Mil Region, formulated his op plans, he emphasised four key aspects.
• Carry out multiple attks on Indian tps ruthlessly.
• Dply the forces after a careful study of the trn.
• Iden the comd ele at Dirang Dzong and dest them so that the entire Indian force would be headless and unable
to reinforce Se-la.
• Even if Dirang Dzong held out, he would get behind the Indian tps with three regts to cut off their escape
towards the S.
This plan was not without its risks and drawbacks. Since some of the routes that the tps would have to take to outflk
the Indian posns were long, devp and maint eff sup lines would be difficult. Chinese inf could carry seven days’ dry
rations themselves while a Tibetan labour force could est a base with another three days’ dry rations.
28
The Chinese Mil Comd appreciated that the IA’s main defences lay at Se La and Bomdi La. The concept of ops that
was evolved by the Tibetan Mil District Comd was to advance along different routes, encircle these two posns and
reduce them subsequently. The plan was approved by Marshal Liu Bocheng, Head of a Core Gp of the Central Mil
Affairs Commission. He outlined the strat of concerted attks by converging columns. Under this strat, Indian posns
were to be split into numerous segments and these were to be destroyed piecemeal. Marshal Liu compared the IA
disposns with an analogy – ‘a copper head with the tail made of tin, a stiff back and a soft under belly’. After some
debate, the opal concept that was evolved entailed : ‘smashing the head (Se La), cutting-off the tail (Bomdi La),
snapping at the waist (Road Se La – Dirang Dzong) and dissecting the belly (Dirang Dzong).
Before 'smashing' the head, the PLA needed the Bumla-Tawang road. This explains the three-week's 'lull' after the
first Chinese attk at the end of October 1962.
IA was estimated to have seven bns dply in Dirang and Bomdila area. Getting behind Se-la with 10,800 Chinese tps
meant that ratio of Indian to Chinese would be barely 1.5:1, disastrous for attking tps. If they could overrun Se-la, then
the sit could be salvaged but if it held out for even a wk, the Chinese campaign would collapse.
Assault on the Indian 62 Inf Bde at Se-la would be launched using four Inf Regts (equivalent to four Indian bdes), sp by
three arty regts. This was a ratio of 3:1, not the ideal ratio for an attking force against well-entrenched tps. Outflking
tps moving along the W side of Se-la would have to take care to stay away from the Bhutan border. Though maint sup
lines along this axis was expected to be easier, there would be less room to mvre.
Chinese Dply
• 419 Tibetan Unit (Div),
• 11 Div (32 and 33 Regts),
• 55 Div (154, 155, 157, 163 and 165 Regts),
• the Shan Naan Army with four coys,
• Arty (306, 308 and 504 Regts),
• five coys of 136 Engineer Regt plus other service elements bringing the total Chinese str to approx 22,000
comb tps.
419 Tibetan Unit with 55 Div was to execute the main thrust against Se-la.
11 Div was to advance along the Tse-la–Poshing-la axis and cut off Dirang from Bomdila while part of the force would
attk Dirang and cut off the Southern escape routes.
On 15 Nov, the CMAC appted Marshal Mi Liu as the cdr of the attking force. Speaking to his subordinates, Mi Liu pted
out that victory could be achieved only by determined and relentless pursuit of the stated objs. The Indians in front
were well coordinated – “the head,” he said, “is like copper and the tail like tin”.
Pting to the Indian defence posture at Se-la and Senge Dzong he said, “the right side is like the backbone while the left
side deployment is like the stomach. The main thrust towards Se-la and Senge Dzong would be like hitting the Indians
in the stomach, which should be comparatively easier than trying to break the backbone.”
IA
4 Inf Div was tasked to hold Se La and prevent the en adv further. However, Maj Gen MS Pathania, GOC was also auth
by 4 Corps to withdraw from Se La to Bomdi La and hold the PLA, in case they attked Se La before the fmn was ready.
After a detailed recce, Maj Gen AS Pathania felt that a force of nearly 17 bns was reqd to ensure a coord defence of
the area allotted to 4 Inf Div. However, only 12 bns were mad avlb and only 10 bns could be inducted before the ops
commenced. Of these, five were deply at Se La as part of 62 Bde; two at Dirang Dzong under 48 Inf Bde and three at
Bomdila under 65 Inf Bde.
Of the three bde defended sects, Se La was the strongest, being a natural fortress difficult to storm.
29
62 Inf Bde was defending Sela. Brig Hoshiar Singh, had taken over on 29 Oct 1962. By mid-nov, all five bns
earmarked for defence of Se La had occupied their defences. A few anti-pers mines were laid around the covering
defensive posns of the bns and Bde HQ. The Bde was being maint almost completely by air. It had about two first–
line scales of SA amn and ten days rations stked with the units. However, only one and a half scale of first line arty
amn was held. The bns allotted to the Bde were:
• 4 GARHWAL Rifles, dply as covering tps between Nuranang and Jang.
• 2 SIKH LI (ex 65 Inf Bde),
• 4 SIKH LI (ex 48 Inf Bde),
• 1 SIKH,
• 13 DOGRA (ex 11 Inf Bde).
For fire sp, the Bde had:

• 5 Fd Regt,
• a bty of 22 Mtn Regt
• and a tp of hy mors of 36 (Maratha) Light Regt (Towed).
• It also had a pl of MMG of 7 MAHAR (MG) and a sec of 6 MAHAR (MG).
• Engr sp was to be provided by 19 Fd Coy.
The Dirang Dzong Sect was held by 65 Inf Bde (Brig AS Cheema) comprising:
• 19 MARATHA LI (Dirang)
• 4 RAJPUT (Sappers’ Camp).
HQ 4 Inf Div and HQ 4 Arty Bde were also loc in Dirang. One coy of 1 MADRAS from Bomdila and two coys of 13
DOGRA from Senge Dzong were mov to Dirang for the defence of Div HQ. For fire sp, it had:
• 6 Fd Regt, a tp of 22 Mtn Regt and a pl of MMGs of 7 MAHAR (MG).
• The Bde was also allotted a sqn less one tp of armour, from 7 CAV.
The Bomdila Sect was held by 48 Inf Gp (Brig Gurbax Singh) comprising:
• 1 SIKH LI,
• 5 GUARDS
• 1 MADRAS.
• For fire sp, it had been allotted a bty each of
o 22 Mtn Regt and 6 Fd Regt, bty less a tp of hy mors and a pl of MMGs.
o It also had a tp (three tks) of 7 CAV. Engr sp was to be given by 15 Fd Coy.
30
Withdrawal from Se La • Sela as selected as next line of defence
without serious trn analysis.
• It could be easily bypassed.
• It was difficult to stk.
• Maj Gen Pathania, GOC wanted his HQ lower
at Dirang Dzong.
• Bombila nominated the Corps ‘Vital Grnd’,
held by 48 Inf Bde.
• Kaul appre China would not attk till Spring
1963!
• Even when attk eminent, the threat of SELA
being outflk neglected and main attak
assessed to come down Jang – Nuranang tr.
• There were no prep for def at Dirang Dzong.
• 15 Nov, 4 RAJPUT was celebrating Zojila Day
with Cdr and GOC attending.
Trn • When battle joined, two coys of 13 DOGRA
Se La Ridge cultural and geog bdy between Tawang and mov from Senge back to Dirang Zong for def
Dirang Dzong region runs W to E from Bhutan border to of Div HQ – completely upset Sela defences
Kangto (23,260 ft), highest pt on India – Tibet watershed. All making it easier for the Chinese to attk.
passes along the ridge are over 13000 Feet: Tse La, Kye La, • Pulling back of tps to Dirang Zong split Indian
Chebra La, Orka La and Se La. resources between Sela, Dirang Zong and
Chinese Plan Bomdilla.
Out flk Sela by moving self-contained colns in depth in
conjunction with multidirectional attks on Sela. Outflk colns to interdict Sela – Dirang Zong – Bomdilla Rd.
Reports of Chinese infilt on both flks reached HQ 62 Inf Bde.
• On 16 Nov, tps of 4 SIKH LI posn in Twin-Lake area reported mov of more than 1,000 Chinese along
the Bhutan border (left flk). Discounted by Bde and Div who apre that not more than a coy could do so.
• A strong ptl under the 2IC of 2 SIKH LI had been attked on the morn of 16 Nov which clearly confirmed the
conc of Chinese tps in Luguthang area, on the right flk of the Bde defences.
• On 17 Nov, the en secured a foot-hold on the main rd axis by pushing back 14 GARHWAL covering posn,
which was ordered to fall back to Se La.
Dply of 62 Inf Bde (Brig Hoshiar Singh)

• 1 SIKH Sela Top, 2 SIKH LI Kye La
• 4 GARHWAL at Nuranang, as Covering posn.
• One coy 4 SIKH LI delaying posn behind 4 GARH. Two Coys in Twin Lakes guarding NW apch (Nuranang to
Sela)
• 13 DOGRA to the S at Senge Dzong with HQ 62 Inf Bde.
• Pl of 7 MAHAR (MG) under comd 2 SIKH LI, one sec covering Kye La apch and other the Nuranang rd.
This indicated that the bde sect would be attked from three sides and lines of comn might be cut. The Bde Cdr stuck
to his decision to fight the Chinese at Se La.
PLA reportedly pushed more than a div through Kye La and Poshingla axis using numerous tracks to bypass defended
localities on main rd axis. On 15 Nov they captured Poshingla, overwhelming two AR pls and pl of 5 GUARDS sent to
reinforce them. 48 Inf Bde was ordered to send a bn to Thembang to stop the Chinese and if possible, recapture
Poshingla. 5 GUARDS left Bomdila on 16 Nov and reached Thembang the same evening.
On 17 Nov the Chinese attked Thembang and overwhelmed 5 GUARDS, which retreated in small parties for the
plains. By even 17 Nov, Chinese had cut the rd Bomdila – Dirang.
31
The Div Cdr spoke on tele with Cdr 62 Bde, who felt that he would be able to hold out for 5 to 6 days. The GOC told
the Cdr to formulate plans for withdrawal to Bomdila on ni 19/20 Nov, but not comn it below bn cdrs. Bde Cdr info
the GOC about his earlier orders to 4 GARHWAL and two coys of 4 SIKH LI dply in Twin-Lake area to withdraw to Se
La, GOC approved, he also auth Cdr 62 Inf Bde to dem Brs 2 and 1 when withdrawal from Se La. It was also agreed
that 4 RAJPUT, loc at Br 1 and E of Nyukmadong Ridge, would come under comd of 62 Inf Bde to cover its withdrawal
to Bomdila. On orders of the GOC, two coys of 13 DOGRA were sent to Dirang on ni 17/18 Nov for defence of the Div
HQ. Cdr 62 Inf Bde chalked out the plan of withdrawal as follows: -
• 4 GARHWAL withdraw from Nuranang and occupy a delaying posn at Senge, cover withdrawal of the Bde.
• 13 DOGRA less two coys with 4 GARHWAL to cover the withdrawal of the rest of the Bde from Se La.
• 2 SIKH LI to abandon Kye La at 1630 h on 18 Nov and take up a delaying posn at Nyukmadong to cover the
withdrawal of rest of the Bde.
• 4 SIKH LI would abandon its defences at 2100h and concentrate at Br 1.
• 1 SIKH would abandon its defences at 2300 h on 18 Nov.
• The Bde HQ would move in two parts. The non-essentials would leave at 2130 h with 4 SIKH LI and the rest
would withdraw at 2300 h with 1 SIKH LI.
Later, at ni, Bde Cdr advanced moving out of 2 SIKH LI from Kye La from 1630 h/ 18 Nov to 2230 h / 17 Nov. The Bn
less one coy was asked to take up covering posn at Nyukmadong, with one coy being left to cover Nuranang rd. The
Cdr info GOC and bn cdrs the change on tele. Though there was no change in withdrawal timings of 1 SIKH, the CO,
ordered his bn to withdraw on ni of 17 Nov, a day earlier. It is likely that info about redply of 2 SIKH LI was not
passed on to 1 SIKH. Consequently, when tps of 2 SIKH LI were passing through 1 SIKH defences at ni, they got jittery
and began leaving their posts. This triggered a panic and led to premature abandonment of Se La.
At 0400 h on 18 Nov, when the Cdr went to Se La to watch the prog of withdrawal, he saw tps of 2 SIKH LI and 1 SIKH
mixed up and disorg. All comns from Bde HQ to the bns had been cut. Rearward comns on line and wireless was
disrupted after 0550 h and prog of the withdrawal could not be comn to Div HQ. Realizing that the rt side of Se La
was completely devoid of tps, at about 0545 h the Bde Cdr ordered all tps to withdraw imdt, and conc at Senge.
These orders could not be comn to 4 SIKH LI, no comn to the bn and routes blocked by Chinese. The Cdr left Se La
and reached loc of 13 DOGRA at Senge. At 0800, the BM of 62 Bde info GSO 1 of 4 Corps that Bde was on its way to
Dirang. Also info BM 48 Bde that they expected to reach Bomdila 19 Nov after clearing the en on Dirang - Bomdila rd.
When withdrawing tps reached Senge, Bde Cdr divided them into three colns. Veh coln was asked to move imdt to
Dirang Dzong. One marching coln consisting of two coys of 4 GARHWAL under their CO ordered to reach Dirang
Dzong by Nyukmadong – Dirang mule track to protect the left flk of the Bde Coln, which consisted of all the other
tps, i.e. the Bde HQ, 2 SIKH LI, 1 SIKH, and the remaining two coys of 4 GARHWAL.
4 SIKH LI and sec of 7 MAHAR (MMG) were still at Se La, they had not been communicated the withdrawal orders.
Chinese began occupying defences of Se La even as they were being vacated. 4 SIKH LI faced repeated attks and the
CO finally ordered a withdrawal. 4 SIKH LI parties were repeatedly ambushed and a large number killed (incl CO and
2 IC) or wounded, others escaped to Bhutan. The section of 7 MAHAR continued to occupy its loc until it was attked,
suffering hy cas before being overwhelmed.
The veh coln was ambushed. More than 30 all rks were killed and many made prisoner. 4 GARHWAL coln cleared en
delaying posns of about one pl str in the area of Nyukmadong and a series of en stops, suffering many cas. Just after
midni on 18/19 Nov when the coln reached Dirang Dzong, it ran into an ambush, most of them being killed or
captured (incl the CO and 2 IC)
The Bde coln too came under fire, 2 SIKH LI tried to clear the en on high features but failed. 13 DOGRA in the rear
was attked twice and could not be brought fwd to assist 2 SIKH LI or 4 GARHWAL. The lack of radio comn between
Bde HQ and units led to loss of comd and cont and the coln was disorg and tps began dispersing in ones and twos.
Some of these parties were again ambushed that ni while trying to escape. Brig Hoshiar Singh’s party was ambushed
near Phudung on 27 Nov and killed, four days after the ceasefire on 23 Nov.
32
Dirang Dzong is Abandoned
After GOC 4 Inf Div left Dirang Dzong, some young offrs made attempts to rally the tps into a scratch force to fight
their way to Bomdila. But in face of Chinese pressure, these efforts did not succeed. The men divided themselves
into small parties and made for the plains. Like his GOC, Cdr 65 Inf Bde also left imdt without giving any withdrawal
plan. Later, Gen Prasad and a few offrs of HQ 4 Inf Div were picked up by the Corps Cdr on 22 Nov 1962 in his hptr.
The disorder resulted in: on 1 Dec, after 14 days of withdrawal, 2291 pers of 62 Inf Bde were still missing.
‘B’ Sqn of 7 CAV had only four serviceable Stuart tks at Dirang. Morn 18 Nov, GOC ordered the Sqn to break through
to Bomdila. In case they failed, abandon tks and withdraw on foot. Starting at 0800 h, the coln encountered a rd
block covered by hy auto fire by the Chinese. Brushing aside the en, the tp reached a wooden br which had been
damaged by the en, making it impossible for the tks to adv further.
The halted coln, soft vehs, came under hy auto and mor fire and several were destroyed. The Sqn Cdr ordered the
men to abandon the soft vehs and re-deply his tks as well as rifle tps, engaging the en who was forced to withdraw
to the hills in the N. In the AN, the en attked Dirang vill sp by auto wpns and mors. The sqn held grnd and brought
down hy fire, halting the en. A similar attempt by the en was made further to the NW, in area vacated by Div HQ,
where Sqn HQ was in posn with a rifle coy and two tks. The action continued till last light. Having been badly
mauled in their earlier attempts, the Chinese did not come down from the hills again during the day. After last light
on 18 Nov, the Sqn withdrew abandoning the tks.
The two inf bns at Dirang 19 MARATHA LI and 2 RAJPUT also withdrew at the same time. The coln of 300 men
crossed Rupa Chu on 22 Nov. The next morn, on 23 Nov, the coln was engaged by MMGs and mors, even though the
en had declared a unilateral ceasefire. Being caught unawares, the coln tried to extricate itself and in the process
killed more than a hundred Chinese, suffering hy cas. Reasons for panicked abandonment of Dirang Dzong:
• No def prepared around Dirang Dzong for def of Div HQ.
• Debacle at Sela.
• 4 RAJPUT and 19 MLI piece meal dply.
• Dirang Dzong – Bomdila cut off.
• Report of Chinese outflk move on both flks.
The Battle of Bomdila
With defeat of 5 GUARDS at Thembang on 17 Nov, Chinese crossed the R and occupied Mandala Ridge. 5 GUARDS
withdrew to Assam. 48 Inf Bde (Brig Gurbax Singh) was one bn less at Bomdilla creating a serious sit.
On the ni 17/18 Nov, 48 Inf Bde had only six rifle coys, three of 1 MADRAS (the fourth had been sent to Dirang
Dzong) and three of 1 SIKH LI (the fourth was at Phudung).
Same evening the en est a rd-block on rd Bomdila-Dirang Dzong. When the Corps Cdr was apprised, he ordered Cdr
48 Inf Bde to send a mob coln of two coys and two tks to open the rd. The Cdr protested that he had no extra
force. The Div Cdr again discussed the issue with Bde Cdr and it was decided that he would make an attempt to clear
rd Bomdila – Dirang on arr of rfts on 18 Nov.
At 1040 h on 18 Nov, the Corps Cdr directed 48 Inf Bde to send a mob coln to Dirang to link up with HQ 4 Inf Div. The
coln, comprising two coys of 1 SIKH LI, two tks and a sec of mtn guns, moved at 1115 h, leaving the Bn Defended
Area held by only one coy and Bn HQ pers. At 1230 h the Chinese launched an attk from the dir of Old Bomdila Pass;
only one pl of A Coy and one sec of MMGs were in the defences. After severe fighting, the attk was beaten back and
en withdrew. Meanwhile a ptl of C Coy returned and was rushed to their vacant locality. At about 1330 h the en
launched another attk, which was also repulsed with the help of arty, 3-inch mors and MMGs. After this there was a
lull in the battle for about half an hour, during which all the cas were evac. Some pers of 3 J&K Rifles and 377 Fd Coy
had arrived by then, and they were ordered to occupy the vacant posn of B Coy defended locality.
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The mob coln started its advance at midday on 18 Nov to clear the rd-block. 4 kms out the en opened auto fire from
the ridge on the left of the rd. The Inf tps returned fire, but the tks could not as the en was not visible. The mobile
coln was ordered back, as it appeared held up by en fire, it returned without suffering any cas. When they were
trying to get back into their defences, the en put in a massive attk. At this stg a thick fog set in. Taking advantage of
the poor visibility, the en surrounded the bn defences from three sides. All attempts to restore the sit failed and 1
SIKH LI fell back to the school building at Bomdila, where it remained there till 0300 h on 19 Nov.
The two tks which returned to Bomdila along with the mob coln were positioned to guard all apphs from the W. As
the two tks got in posn, hy en fire came from the ridge. The tks opened up on the en posns and prevented any
further advance. The tk cdr of the off-rd tk put two LMGs under his tk, one each guarding the front and the
rear. The Chinese, who had thought Bomdila as virtually captured were taken by surprise when subjected to firing
from the MGs of the tk and withdrew into the hills, leaving behind several dead.
Having failed to advance towards Bomdila town because of the tks on that side, the en assaulted 1 MADRAS posn at
1645 h and dislodged the extreme left pl. A ptl was sent to the Bde HQ since comns had broken down. The ptl
reported that there was no one in the Bde HQ, the CO gave orders for withdrawal. The bn started thinning and the
defences were finally abandoned at 0200 h on 19 Nov. When the bn was near Tenga Valley on 21 Nov, it was
surrounded by the Chinese. About 125 personnel were made prisoners while about 120 were reported missing.
Along with the attk on left and right flks of 48 Inf Bde, the Chinese launched a massive attk on Bomdila at 1500 h on
18 Nov. After fall of 1 SIKH LI loc, the Bde Cdr found it difficult to hold on to Bomdila. The two bns - 6/8 GORKHA
Rifles and 3 J & K Rifles, promised by the Corps Cdr as replacement for 5 GUARDS and mobile coln, had not reached.
At about 1630 h Brig Gurbax Singh decided to pull back to Rupa.
At about 9 pm, the Bde Cdr returned to Bomdila. He met the COs of the 3 J & K Rifles and 22 Mtn Regt at 2.30 pm on
19 Nov. It was felt that unless the new tps had reconnoitered the area, an imdt attk on the en was inadvisable. The
Bde Cdr again ordered all tps to withdraw from Bomdila. He left for Rupa, reaching there at dawn on 19 Nov. The
tps finally left Bomdila at 5.15 am on 19 Nov.
The two bns - 6/8 GORKHA Rifles and 3 J & K Rifles, promised by the Corps Cdr as replacement for 5 GUARDS and
the mobile coln, had not reached Bomdila by 1600 h on 18 Nov.
At about 1630 h, Brig Gurbax Singh decided to pull back to Rupa, reaching there at 1900 h. When the CO of 22 Mtn
Regt arrived at the Bde HQ Comd post at about 1630 h he found it deserted. Neither the Bde Cdr nor his staff was
there. He heard the tele ring and on picking up the instrument, found himself connected to Brig KK Singh, the BGS of
HQ 4 Corps, who asked him of the whereabouts of the Bde Cdr. Shortly after this, Maj Gen DK Palit, DMO at Army
HQ who was then at HQ 4 Corps came on the line. On being told that Brig Gurbax Singh was not present, Palit
ordered the CO of 22 Mtn Regt to take over comd of 48 Bde in the Cdr’s absence and org resistance in Bomdila or
in Tenga Valley to the best of his ability.
At about 2100 h, the Bde Cdr returned to Bomdila. He met the COs of the 3 J & K Rifles and 22 Mtn Regt at 1430 h
on 19 Nov. It was felt that unless the new tps had reconnoitered the area, an imdt attk on the en was
inadvisable. The Bde Cdr again ordered all tps to withdraw from Bomdila. He left for Rupa, reaching there at dawn
on 19 Nov. The tps finally left Bomdila at 0515 h on 19 Nov.
When the Corps Cdr came to know of the withdrawal of tps he ordered Cdr 48 Inf bde, to occupy the defences at
Rupa. The Bde Cdr ordered 1 SIKH LI to occupy a high grnd near Rupa. At about 0800 h, when the bn was getting
ready to move, the Chinese opened up with autos from all the features around the Rupa defile. By that time, tps of
6/8 GORKHA Rifles, which had returned to Tenga Valley in the early morning in vehs, were on their way back to
Rupa. They were caught in the en fire in the Rupa gap and became disorganized. At this stg, Brig Gurbax Singh again
ordered withdrawal along the high grnd on either side of the Rupa valley.
The CO of 6/8 GORKHA Rifles was ordered to posn his tps in a narrow defile, approx 2 km south of Rupa gap, until all
units of the Bde had passed through. The bn held the gap until midday on 19 Nov, when the Bde Cdr ordered that
34
the tps should withdraw from Rupa to Chako to foil a possible Chinese attempt to cutoff the entire force
there. However, the en continued following the withdrawing tps. 3 J&K Rifles, which had withdrawn from Bomdila
directly to Tenga Valley, came under hy en fire from the opposite ridge at about 0900 h. The bn suffered hy cas and
broke up, some elements withdrawing to Chako, while the rest moved directly to Tezpur.
When 48 Inf bde reached Chako at last light on 19 Nov, it was already growing dark. Brig Gurbax Singh sent for amn,
digging tools and rations which started arriving. The tps were still busy prep their trenches when at about 0245 h on
20 Nov, they came under hy en fire from the surrounding hts. Soon afterwards, the posn was attked at different
places along the perimeter. Meanwhile, the stores continued to arrive. Unfortunately, at 0315 h a veh carrying amn
overturned and blocked the rd. The SIKH LI tps, who were on the hi grnd astride the Chako Check post, had to pull
back as their amn got exhausted. After this the Chinese surrounded the 6/8 GORKHA Rifles posns. By 0330 h, two
attempts by the en to break into their defences had been thwarted. But the Bn HQ was overrun by the en at about
0345 h. Although they continued to suffer cas, the GORKHAs held on to their respective posns tenaciously till 0530 h,
when the CO ordered them to withdraw to Foot Hills. Till 1 Dec 1962, more than 150 all ranks were still missing.
On the last day of the war, 4 RAJPUT while withdrawing from Dirang fought a pitched battle at Mandiala Ridge
with the Chinese in which 175 tps incl the CO made the supreme sacrifice after inflicting hy cas on PLA.
Battle of Walong
6 KUMAON Attk – Prelude to the Main Battle : 14-15 Nov 1962
As part of consolidation and extension of the
Firm Base, the Chinese secured the Green
Pimple spur on 6 Nov, posing a threat to
Walong from the W. Despite repeated
attempts by 6 KUMAON to retake it, the
Chinese held firm. Similarly, en attempts to
adv along W Ridge had been blocked by 6
KUMAON.
Green Pimple was dominated by Yellow
Pimple and Yellow Pimple by Tri Jn. Tri Jn
thus became a grnd of great tac imp as it
opened several apchs to the en, besides
providing an apch to own tps to the en posns
on Ashi Hill. By 10 Nov the Chinese preps for their offensive were nearing completion.
After carrying out an assessment of the sit the Bde Cdr (Brig Rawlley) came to the conclusion that it was essential to
secure Green Pimple through Tri Jn and Yellow Pimple. At this stg he was ordered to relieve 2/8 GR, while its
replacement 3/3 GR had still not been fully inducted. Keeping in view the urgency of the sit the Bde Cdr decided to
readjust posns within the bde defended sect and relieve two coys of 6 KUMAON to join the parent unit at Firm Base
thus concentrating the whole of 6 KUMAON on the W flk. 6 KUMAON was then tasked to capture Green Pimple and
thereafter to occupy a bn defended area from Green Pimple to Tri Jn.
“6 KUMAON commenced their adv from Firm Base on the morning of 14 Nov, the leading pl headed for Yellow Pimple.
Tri Junc was secured and formed the base for Ph 2, i.e. the attk on Yellow Pimple.
6 KUMAON continued their attk and made slow but steady prog. By mid-day, however, they began to suffer fairly hy
cas and one coy of 4 DOGRA who were conc on the ALG were ordered to mov up.
By approx 1430 h, 6 KUMAON cas incr considerably, the whole of 4 DOGRA who were still in the process of
concentrating on the ALG were ordered to move upto Tri Jn.
35
By last lt, inspite of suffering hy cas 6 KUMAON managed to reach within 50 yards of the top of Yellow Pimple. During
the ni, at approx 2200 h, the en opened up with auto wpns and CA with a regt plus.
• The right coy of 6 KUMAON was overrun almost imdt.

• The second coy 6 KUMAON on the spine between Yellow Pimple and Tri Jn fell back slowly under continuous
pressure. After continuous fighting of over seven hours up to less than 50 yards of the top of Tri Jn, 6 KUMAON
suffered hy cas.
Thus ended the brave but ill-conceived spoiling attk by 6 KUMAON. 6 KUMAON suffered very hy cas and needed to be
relieved. 4 DOGRA who were just arr at the ALG were also fed into the battle piecemeal without any tac gains. The
result was that Bde’s left flk was almost open and the Bde had no res.
The Main Battle: 16 Nov 1962
PLA 130 Div, tasked to capture Walong commenced its move from the assy areas across the IB on 13 Nov and got into
battle posns by last lt 15 Nov. Ding Tac HQ dply itself in the area of Green Pimple. In order to exploit initial success and
deny IA an opportunity to regain balance, the Chinese higher comd advanced D Day for the main offensive to 16 Nov.
The Chinese launched the main attk on 16 morning, engaging all fwd localities, sp by arty, mors and MG fire. 6
KUMAON localities in the area of Tr Jn and a portion of 4 DOGRA Defended Area were attked by 390 Regt which divided
itself into three echelons. The tps of both the units put
up stiff resistance. They succeeded in stalling the initial
Chinese attk, inflicting hy cas.
Simultaneously, 388 Regt attked A Coy of 4 SIKH which was dply at Maha Plateau. By 0530 h, the posn had been
overrun. Next, Delta Coy of 3/3 GR came under attk. It beat back two successive Chinese attks. By 1500 h, the locality
had been surrounded. The remnants decided to breakthrough and fall back, they suffered hy cas.
The Chinese were able to penetrate the fwd line of defences and drive a wedge between 6 KUMAON and 4 SIKH
Defended As. By the AN, two Chinese regts had linked-up to tackle the depth localities of 6 KUMAON and 4 DOGRA.
On 15 Nov, 3/3 GR Coy dply at Ladders Post inflicted hy cas when the Chinese attked it. This loc was mutually sp with
A Coy of 4 SIKH at Dong Hill, on E bank of the R. On 16 Nov morning, Chinese 389 Regt attked Dong Plateau, crossing
the R using rubber dinghies. The Coy posn fell but not before it took a hy toll of the en. Due to the loss of this locality,
Ladders posn lay exposed. It held on till 1630 h, and was ordered to withdraw thereafter, as the posn had become
untenable. While most of its pers were able to escape, the Coy Cdr was taken prisoner.
Meanwhile on the E flk, A and B Coys of 3/3 GR were under intense pressure. By 1430 h 16 Nov, orders were given for
them to withdraw. These tps suffered hy cas and many were captured, as they were ambushed by the Chinese who
had cut-off the routes of withdrawal. C Coy of 4 SIKH dply on High Plateau which by now was isolated was attked on
36
16/17 Nov and was overrun. By the evening of 16 Nov, 11 Bde Sect had crumbled. 390 Regt had seized Walong airFd
by the last lt. Chinese 153 Regt cleared left-over pockets of resistance.
The overall sit as it prevailed in Walong at around 1100 h on 16 Nov.
On the W Bank
• Defended localities of Tri Jn, Ptl Base, Lachman Ridge, Mithun Track, Maha Plateau and W Ridge had fallen.
Occupation of W Ridge gave the en capb to obs and bring down SA and arty fire over the DZ, ALG and Bde HQ
at Walong.
• Ladders posn held by C Coy of 3/3 GR had been weakened in str and was low on amn but was holding on in
stubborn resistance.
• Firm Base held by the two coys of 4 DOGRA, stood surrounded by the en. There was no contact between them
and the Bde HQ.
• 71 Hy Mor Bty was left with few rounds of faulty amn and was under en obsn.
On the E Bank
• High Plateau held by D Coy of 4 SIKH had fallen.
• 3/3 GR less two coys along with a coy of 4 SIKH holding Dong Plateau, Dong Hill and Dakota Hill stood encircled.
There were only two coys of 4 DOGRA at the Bde HQ avlb to the Bde cdr, which had so far not come in contact with
the en. The sit all along the front was grave, tps had been in action since 21 Oct, i.e. for 26 days and were now
exhausted. Having had to fight a most unequal battle, under most unfavourable condns without comb air sp, they
were hungry, cold, many were wounded, low on amn, had no winter clo and on starvation diet for many days.
The posn of 11 Bde on the morning of 16 Nov was truly untenable. Lt Gen BM Kaul, GOC IV Corps had been in Walong
since 15 Nov and had seen the sit first-hand. The Bde cdr recommended withdrawal to the Corps Cdr. The Corps Cdr
was reluctant. Tac logic of the Bde cdr and hopelessness of the sit were of no avail. Thereupon, the Bde cdr accepted
his directions of continuing the fruitless struggle, provided the Corps Cdr stayed on. He told him in no uncertain words
that he would not allow him to take off in his ac. Thereupon the Corps Cdr agreed to permit a withdrawal and offered
Brig Rawlley a lift back to safety. The offer was politely refused by the Bde cdr who then put into motion the process
of withdrawal of his Bde or what was left of it to Hayuliang, a dist of 105 km from Walong.
The orders for withdrawal were issued at 1200 h on 16 Nov. Due to the prevailing tac sit (all units and sub-units were
not in comn and en tps were swarming all around), the plan of withdrawal could not percolate to all sub-units.
The move of the Bde coln from the Bde RV to Hayuliang was covered by tps holding successive delaying posns. It is
creditable that each of the withdrawing bns, inspite of the cas suffered and trauma of defeat, managed to occupy
successive covering posns to facilitate the withdrawal. Comd and cont was maint throughout. One can say that this
withdrawal which is the most difficult of the ops of war was carried out in the best tradition of the IA. The remnants
of the bns held series of delaying posns. The Chinese followed-up closely as far as Chingwinty. The tail of the Bde coln
cleared the covering tps provided by 82 Inf Bde at Hayuling by 1030 h on 21 Nov 1962.
The Pursuit
By about 1600 h on 16 Nov it was quite clear to PLA that they had broken through the Indian 11 Inf Bde defences and
that the withdrawal had commenced. Ding HQ then ordered the tps to switch over to pursuit and search op.
130 Div in turn tasked 389 Regt and two bns (1st and 2nd) less a coy of 390 Regt to undertake pursuit, commencing
first lt of 17 Nov. Indian 11 Inf Bde tps got 16 Nov (AN) and Night 16/17 Nov to get away almost unhindered, except
for observed SA and arty fire on Indian posns and small gps of Chinese tps who had managed to infilt during the ni.
During the withdrawal, especially on the E bank of Lohit R there were a number of ambushes and skirmishes in which
3/3 GR and 4 SIKH tps withdrawing along the E bank without the sp of any fall back posns suffered considerable losses.
Chinese tps maint continuous pressure till they reached the designated line by about 1200 h on 21 Nov. There they
received orders to stop the pursuit and switch over to search ops in the areas captured by them.
37
It is worth mentioning that Chinese tps engaged in pursuit and search ops also faced tremendous hardships on account
of lgs. Chinese account mentions that some units ran out of food and water. Tps had to sustain themselves by eating
wild plants to satisfy their hunger and used grass to protect themselves from cold at night.
The Div commenced retreat from the Indian territory on 01 Dec 1962.
Cas
The killed and wounded of both sides (Indians – 642, Chinese – 752) are comparable. Out of an Indian garrison of 2191,
one third of the force was either killed or wounded and over 300 taken PsW. The Chinese too paid an exorbitant price
for their victory as they too suffered colossal losses. Eventually of course, the numerical superiority and tac advantage
that the Chinese had gained the initial stgs (failure of 6 KUMAON attk) decided the outcome.
An Assessment
Although Walong was a subsidiary thrust, it turned out to be the bloodiest battle of the War. Initially, Chinese had
catered for only one Indian bn (6 KUMAON) plus some AR tps to be defending this Sect and accordingly built up a Regt
plus a reinforced bn to launch the offensive. However, after Ph I (20-24 Oct) it became known to them that India had
reinforced this Sect by another bn and subsequently built it up to a Bde. Chinese reacted quickly and moved another
Div (130 Div) with addl arty and AD tps from Chengdu, a dist of nearly 1300 km across high mtn rgs and three maj Rs,
and conc this force around Rima by 07 Nov, in a matter of 10-12 days. It was a remarkable lgs feat.
Indian cdrs seem to have been oblivious to the above devps as no int on Chinese moves, str, disposns and intentions
was forthcoming from the IB or the MI. To recapitulate some of the Indian actions at the tac level during this pd :–
• Initially, the Sect was defended by one bn (6 KUMAON) and ‘A’ Wing (6 pls) of 2 AR. They were holding Kibithoo
and areas to the W and E of it, gen on the McMahon Line.
• By 18 Oct, another bn (4 SIKH) was inducted but without a bde HQ to cont or dply the tps.
• After the Chinese attk and captured Kibithoo and surrounding areas on 22 Oct, 6 KUMAON was withdrawn
and ordered to defend Walong.
• On 29 Oct, it was decided that HQ 181 Inf Bde would be resp for this Sect. This was changed to 11 Inf Bde by
31 Oct, i.e. the day the new Cdr reached this Sect with his rover gp to assume comd of this Sect.
• While the Chinese were almost ready to launch their offensive with a Div plus, 6 KUMAON (the only res) was
launched into an attk to capture Green Pimple on 14 Nov which was a failure. 4 DOGRA who were just arriving
at the ALG by air were also fed into this attk. The Chinese not only foiled this attk but followed it up by their
main offensive by advancing their D Day by two days to 16 Nov.
• The bde having launched all its res in this attk was totally unbalanced and unprep to face a Div plus size well-
coord offensive.
• Use of Comb AF could have had a big impact.
Notwithstanding the above, 11 Inf Bde put up a tough and a determined fight but the odds were heavily weighed
against them. The decision of withdrawal was a timely decision. Had it been delayed by a few hours, the fate of this
bde would have been the same, if not worse, as that of 7 Inf Bde on the Namka Chu.
The battle of Walong also proved that man to man, Indian soldiers were more than a match against the Chinese, even
under most adverse circumstances.
38
Ops in Subansiri and Siang Frontier Divs
Fwg the Longju incident in 1959, Subansiri Frontier Div was manned by 9 AR and Siang Frontier Div by 11 AR.
On 27 Oct 1962, the Chinese ordered the launch of ops towards Limeking (Subansiri Frontier
Div), Mechuka and Tuting (both in Siang Frontier Div).
An ad hoc force of 2200 tps from different units were earmarked for this offensive. The Chinese carried out prep ops
between 21 and 30 Oct to secure posns along the border before the main attk. The main attk was planned for 18 Nov.
This sect was of secy imp and ops were to be coord with the main offensive being launched in the Kameng (Tawang)
Frontier Div.
It was only on 27 Oct 1962 that the GHQ ordered the launch of offensives towards Limeking in the Subansiri Frontier
Div, and towards Menchuka and Tuting in the Siang Frontier Div. The overall Chinese aim was to annihilate the Indian
tps deply in the Central Area of NEFA.
The Chinese captured Mechuka on 19 Nov, Gelling and Limeking on 21 Nov.
Radio Peking announced the ceasefire at dawn of 21 Nov 1962 with China withdrawing to the McMahon Line.
Notably, by first crossing the McMahon Line and then retreating N beyond the McMahon Line on the conclusion of
hostilities, the Chinese only served to further reinforce the validity of the McMahon Line as the international
frontier between India and China. It also indicated that the Chinese tacitly accepted the McMahon alignment.
As a result of the conflict, the United States recognized, on 26 October 1962, the McMahon Line as the
International Bdy line. This was a huge political gain for India.
The British, apart from re-confirming the validity of the McMahon Line, took a step further than even the US posn
by accepting the view of the Govt of India that the present frontiers and the disputed territories belong to India.
Chinese aggression on the border had paid no political dividends. All the three major powers of the world at that
point in time – the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain – openly supported the Indian cause. On the other
hand, China lost a sincere friend in Jawaharlal Nehru.
39
A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF SOME GREAT BATTLES FOUGHT BY THE IA IN THE WAR
Namka Chu R valley, NEFA: 20 Oct 1962
Chinese Dply
• A Fwd HQ of Tibet Mil Comd to comd all ops in the E Sect was formed, designated as Z 419 (Force 419 –
equivalent of a Div) and est at Lhasa on 11 June 1962.
o It had under its comd 154, 155 and 157 Inf Regts, and some other comb sp ele.
o Their designated task was to prevent any further Indian encroachments in Tawang Sect.
Another Force under Huo Guang, Deputy Political Commissar of the Chengdu Mil Region was tasked to prevent any
Indian ingress from Sikkim towards Gyantse and Yatung (Chumbi Valley).
• 11 Inf Div was indep made resp for E part of Arunachal Pradesh, i.e. less Kameng Sect.
In response to the setting up of Dhola Post by India in early Jun 1962. On 06 Sep 1962, 3 Coy of 2 Inf Regt entered
the Namka Chu area (probably the force that was reported by Dhola Post Cdr to have surrounded the Post on 8
Sep). Later they set up posts along the N bank of the Namka Chu face to face with the Indian tps at Dhola.
The Fwd HQ of Tibet Mil Comd and HQ Force 419 moved to Mama on 14 Oct 1962. Mama is loc in Nyam Jang Chu
Valley, approx 15 kms N of Khenzamane.
Chinese ORBAT. The fwd HQ of Tibet Mil Region resp to conduct ops in Tawang Sect had the fwg tps:-
• Force 419 (154, 155 and 157 Inf Regts).
• 11 Inf Div (31, 32 and 33 Inf Regts). It seems that only one bn of 31 Inf Regt was avlb for this op.
• 2 Inf Regt ex Shannan Mil Sub-district (SMS).
• 308 Arty Regt (two coys).
• A part of 136 Engr Regt.
Concept of Ops
Attk from both flks with main thrust being delivered from the left flk. Simultaneously Indian posns were to be
outflked from the E flk to cut off routes of withdrawal, while pinning them down from the front. Indian forces were
to be split into many pockets and destroyed in detail.
40
The Plan.
• 155 Inf Regt and one bn of 157 Inf Regt of Force 419 were to launch the main attk from the left flk of the Indian
forces between Br IV and Br V and roll up the left flk; namely, 2 RAJPUT posns on the Namka Chu.
• The main body of 157 Inf Regt less one bn was to outflk Indian posns from the W and attk Tsangdar directly
which was the DZ as also the fwd lgss base for 7 Inf Bde.
• 154 Inf Regt of Force 419 was to attk the right flk and destroy Indian forces dply at Khinzemane and Dhola.
• 2nd Bn of 32 Inf Regt ex 11 Inf Div along with elements of SMS were to pin down Indian forces from the front.
The main force of 32 Inf Regt (less one bn) along with 2nd Bn of 31 Inf Regt ex 11 Inf Div were to be loc as res in
the Area Le – Cuona (15-20 Km N of Bumla).
Sp Ops.
• Chengdu Sub Com ordered to launch feint attks by two bns towards Bumla, Longju and the areas E of it to
confuse the Indian Forces.
• In addn, HQ 11 Inf Div with its 33 Inf Regt was ordered to be a res in the area of Cuona and await further orders.
• Simultaneously, Xinjiang Mil Comd ordered to undertake offensive ops to eliminate Indian posts in the W Sect in
coord with the main attk in the E Sect (Tawang Sect).
The Battle
The attk on the Namka Chu posns
commenced in the early hours of 20 Oct
at 0545 H. It was preceded by 15 mins
of intense bombardment.
The Chinese had infilt through Indian
posns on the Namka Chu during the ni
as there were large gaps, occupied
higher grnd behind Indian defences and
were attking downhill. The Indian
defenders were thus forced to turn
around and face the attk. As the Indian
telephone lines ran along the Namka
Chu these had also been cut during the
night. The only comn avlb between the
bns being attked and HQ 7 Inf Bde was
the B1 Net. Soon the B1 dets of the bns were either killed or taken prisoner and HQ 7 Inf Bde itself overrun. By
about 0800 H, the Bde HQ was not in comn with any of its bns.
Ops on the W Flk
The main force of the attk by 1st and 2nd Bns plus 8th Coy of 155 Inf Regt was borne by the left flk of Indian posns
held by 2 RAJPUT in area of Log Br, Temp Br and Br IV which found themselves being attked from many directions.
The Chinese had infilt to SE of Indian posns, dividing the defences of 2 RAJPUT in two halves and prog their attk
Nwards (downhill), tackling Indian posns piecemeal.
Third Bn of the Regt less 8th Coy was held in res. There was considerable hand to hand fighting. Chinese also used
flame throwers to neutralise the MG. 2 RAJPUT fought valiantly but were not able to give a coordinated battle
because comd and cont had been lost and their defences had been penetrated.
Cas suffered by 2 RAJPUT bear testimony to the heroic fight put up by them against overwhelming odds.
Against their overall str of 513 all ranks dply on the Namka Chu, they suffered 282 killed, 171 taken prisoner which
included 81 wounded – there were only 60 survivors.
41
The Chinese bn (2nd Bn 155 Inf Regt) which had attked in the first ph suffered 21 killed and 34 wounded. 1st Bn 155
Inf Regt which had attked in the second ph suffered 59 killed and 79 wounded. The Chinese cas also indicate tough
resistance put up by the defenders. The battle had lasted for about three hours.
Ops on the Eastern Flk
Simultaneously with the ops on the W flk, 154 Inf Regt of Task Force 419 was given the task of attking the E flk of 7
Inf Bde at Khenzemane (est in 1959), advance along Nyam Jang Chu, destroy Drokung Samba Br and cut off the route
of withdrawal of Indian forces to Ziminthaung.
• 3rd Bn was tasked for the main attk on Khenzemane.
• 2nd Bn was tasked to bypass and go straight for Drokung Samba Br.
• 1st Bn was to roll up the E flk of Indian posns on the Namka Chu in the area of Brs I and II.
This attk too commenced at 0545 H preceded by 15 mins intense shelling. 3rd Bn attked Khenzemane Post from NW
in echelons, simultaneously encircling the post. The attk continued till the Drokung Samba Br where 2nd Bn was
already in posn on the hts, eff dominating the br by fire. The br was subsequently dest by the Chinese, cutting off
the route of withdrawal. The attk was sp by conc fire of the Arty Gp consisting of 21 X 82 mm mors, 3 X 75 mm RCL
guns and 2 X 120 mm mors ex 11 Inf Div.
For some reason (possibly over cautiousness by bn cdr), the attk by the 1st Bn against the E flk on the Namka Chu got
delayed till 1800 H on 20 Oct, hence Indian tps deply in the area of Brs I and II, and jn of Namka Chu and Nyam Jang
Chu i.e 9 PUNJAB (minus) and 4 GRENs could withdraw in reasonably good order.
Capture of Tsangdhar
As per Chinese perceptions, Tsangdhar which lay about six km S of Namka Chu was loc N of McMahon Line.
It was a fwd lgs base for 7 Inf Bde and also a DZ held by one coy of 1/9 GR. On the morn of 20 Oct, 1/9 GR less two
coys were prep for move to Tsangle on orders of Lt Genl BM Kaul. So, in effect, on the morn of the attk (20 Oct),
Tsangdhar was defended by one coy of 1/9 GR which was deply on a hill top W of Tsangdhar. Chinese appre that
outflking and capture of Tsangdhar would not only make the Indian defences on the Namka Chu untenable but
would also eff block any rfts coming from Lumpu.
Task for capture and outflking of Tsangdhar - 157 Inf Regt of Force 419. 1st Bn reinforced by No. 8 Coy was detailed
for capture of Tsangdhar by outflking move from W. The bn crossed Namka Chu in its upper reaches, advanced cross
country in a single file for about 12 hours and reached assigned posns for attk NW of Tsangdhar by first lt 20 Oct.
The bn outflked the Indian posns from the S by a coy and attk from the W with two coys while holding a coy in res.
Guns dply 500 m to NW of Tsangdhar provided eff fire sp. By 1300 H, the battle of Tsangdhar was over. Menawhile,
the main body of 157 Inf Regt crossed Namka Chu and adv quickly towards Tsangdhar and occupied the mtn passes
leading out from this area. Lt Col Ahluwalia, CO 1/9 GORKHA RIFLES and 492 ORs of the bn were taken prisoners.
Simultaneously 32 Inf Regt of 11 Inf Div along with ele of SMS who were providing the firm base on N bank of Namka
Chu adv and relieved the tps of Force 419 on the Namka Chu to enable them to carry out mopping up ops. Later, 32
Inf Regt attked Hathungla Ridge and occupied it by first lt 21 Oct. By the morning of 21 Oct, the battles of Namka
Chu, Tsangdhar and Hathungla were over and the Indian 7 Inf Bde had ceased to be an effective fighting force. Two
of the COs had been taken prisoners. LtColonel Rattan Singh CO 5 AR was also taken a prisoner.
7 Inf Bde stood firm against an overwhelming Chinese asslt, in posns that were tac disadvantageous, as ordered.
That is exactly why the bde was wiped out. The exact Chinese cas will never be known, however there are indications
that it was the first battle on 20 Oct that the Chinese Army suffered the max cas of all the fighting in NEFA, mostly by
2 RAJPUT.
42
Galwan Valley, Ladakh: 19/20 Oct
5 JAT (Galwan-Chang Chenmo Sect). Galwan, Hot Spring, Kongma area with one coy S of DBO.
China has eyed the Galwan valley since 1950s. The Galwan R was one of the battle-fronts during 1962 war through
which China enforced a new status quo in Ladakh.
• In its 1956 claim line, China defined LAC to the east of Galwan R.
• In 1960 following upheaval in Tibet, China shifted its stand on Galwan.
• In 1962 war, China pushed the LAC to the west of Galwan.
A pl-sized post was est at Galwan on 5 July 1962. It cut the line of
comns to a Chinese outpost further down the valley. The face-off
became tenser when Indian soldiers blocked Chinese sup party.
Chinese surrounded the Galwan post outnumbering Indian tps
by five-to-one. The significance of the Galwan post was such that
the Indian tps, virtually under siege, were given instrs to open
fire if the Chinese came any closer. The Chinese pulled back
some dist on 14 Jul allowing air sup to Indian post. But this came
only after India threatened wider retaliation if China attked
Galwan.
It was during these months - May to July 1962 - that India made
a unique offer to the Chinese allowing them to use Aksai Chin rd
for civ tfc if China withdrew from Ladakh. China rejected.
On the ni of 19/20 Oct all the 14th J & K Militias posts as well as
the Galwan FDL held by 5 JAT was attked.
N of DBO at Chandini the post was held by Sub Sonam Stobdan
and 29 men. Attk by 500 Chinese the men held out for a whole day. Only one man survived seriously wounded. Sub
Sonam was awarded the MVC and Sepoys Chiring, Wangchuk and Phunchok were awarded VrCs.
Galwan post held by Sub Jang Bahadur Thapa’s men since July was reinforced by a coy of 5 JAT led by Maj Hasabnis.
The Chinese pounded this post with arty for a full day before overrunning it. Sub Thapa was amongst those killed.
Post Parmodak at 17,000 feet, was held by a sec of one NCO and 5 Ors. Soon the others were dead leaving only Hav
Tulsi Ram. Undaunted he continued to pepper the advancing Chinese with LMG fire till he was gunned down.
Likewise at Post Bishan at 18,645 feet, CHM Anand Ram and 12 men of the J & K militia were pounded by the
Chinese for 45 mins. The Chinese made two asslts but were beaten back. Surrounded Anand Ram found a gap along
a steep precipice and extracted his men out one by one.
So did Sub Amar Singh and his pl at Post Ptl Base S of the Galwan R. Although tasked with observing the Chinese and
asked to withdraw if contact was made he stood his grnd. He and most of his sec was wiped out.
Alpha Coy of 5 JAT, 68 soldiers, were attk by a bn-sized force of Chinese tps. The post had been surrounded by
Chinese forces since its est in July, and heptrs bringing in sup would be fired upon regularly. Food and amn were
hence in short sup. The coy had no fire sp, while the Chinese hit the post with arty and mors. Of the 68, 36 were
killed in action and 32 were captured.
China had altered the status quo of "1956 claim line" in Aksai Chin which identified the line of control to the east of
Galwan R. Now, China claimed the LAC west of the Galwan R, a posn it had shifted to in 1960.
43
Sirijap, Pangong Tso, Ladakh: 21 Oct 1962
1/8 GORKHA Rifles (GR) (Chushul Sect). Dply in area Sirijap, Yula, Spanggur Gap and around Chushul.
Going ahead with the ‘Fwd Policy’ the plan,
as far as Ladakh was concerned, was to “ptl
as fwd as possible...with the view of est
addl posts...to prevent any further ingress
by the Chinese i.e secure all apchs from
Tibet to Ladakh. One such apch was from
Khurnak Fort, near the N bank of the
Pangong Lake, where the Chinese had a maj
base, to Thakung in the SW, and towards
Chushul to the S. Sirijap, which lies W of the
Khurnak Fort on the N bank of Pangong Tso,
dominates this apch.
N of Pangong Lake lies the Chang Chenmo
rg. Spurs which jut out from this rg, running mostly perpendicular towards the N bank of the Pangong Tso, are called
‘fingers’ by the IA. These fingers are labelled 1 to 8.
Current Posn: While India holds area up to the W side of Finger 4, which is also called Foxhole Pt or Foxhole Ridge,
and claims that the LAC runs through Finger 8, China claims that the LAC is close to Finger 2. India has been sending
ptls up to Finger 8 for years while the Chinese ptl up to the E side of Finger 4.
By Oct 1962, Chushul had an active airfd capable of taking An-12s and Packet ac: critical for maint sup. Moreover,
just before the start of the war, Chushul had been linked to Leh in the N with a jeepable rd over Taska La pass and
along the Indus. Therefore, for India, securing Khurnak Fort-Thakung apch was imp for the def of Chushul and Leh.
IA built three posts for this before the war — Sirijap, Sirijap 1 and Sirijap 2, together called the Sirijap Complex.
In the second wk of Oct 1962, just days before the beginning of the war, a coy less one pl of the 1/8 GORKHA Rifles
was dply at the three posts of Sirijap Complex. These posts had no land link with the Indian base E of the Pangong
Tso and had to be sup by boats from across the lake.
The Chinese had surrounded the Sirijap Complex as early as Sep of 1962. Unlike the Sirijap Complex, the Chinese
posns in the region — named Kong-9 and 10 loc N and E of the Indian posts — were linked to their HQ at Khurnak
Fort by rd. Sirijap-1, was loc on the ridge-line overlooking the Pangong Lake. It was being defended by a coy less two
pls, around 30 men, under the comd of Maj Dhan Singh Thapa.
The Battle at Sirijap-1
Htened activity on the Chinese side on 19 Oct alarmed Maj Thapa, and he ordered his men to dig deep. The att came
in the wee hours on 20 Oct, when the PLA conc a barrage of arty and mor fire on Sirijap-1 for nearly 2 ½ H. Some
shells fell on the comd post, damaging the RS, cutting off the besieged post from the rest of the bn.
Under the cover of the arty and mor shelling, PLA forces adv towards Sirijap-1. When shelling lifted, the Chinese
forces had reached very close to the post. The shelling had not only damaged the defences, but had also killed and
wounded many soldiers.
Sec Cdr Nk Krishnabaduhar Thapa, who was “hit by a splinter that severed his leg”, took over a LMG and started
firing towards the advancing Chinese. A large number of Chinese were shot and the attk was broken up 100 yards
from the post. Maj Thapa, meanwhile, adjusted the depleted defences and encouraged the soldiers, dogging en fire
as he moved from one place to the other. “If we have to die we’ll all die together, but kill a few before you die. he
told soldiers. Soon, the Chinese started arty and mor bombardment again, and it was more intense this time.
44
Under cover the shelling, the Chinese managed to come within 50 yards of the post and used incendiary bombs to
set the post on fire and smk out the defenders. The GORKHAs responded with hand-grenades and SA fire.
Their .303 rifles and LMGs were no match to the PLA.
The GORKHAs lost most of their men, their defences were depleted, and the Chinese were closing in quickly. As
there was no comn between the base and the post, the bn decided to dispatch a party to find out what was
happening at Sirijap. Naik Rabilal Thapa, volunteered to go to Sirijap. With no rd connection to Sirijap, he was sent in
two storm boats to bring back the latest report from the tps posted there.
However, when the boats were around a Km from Sirijap, the Chinese fired from three sides and capsized one,
drowning all men. The other boat, with Nk Thapa on board, managed to return to the base, where he reported that
Sirijap-1, engulfed in smoke and fire, had been lost, and all men defending it, incl Maj Thapa, had died in the attk.
However, Sirijap-1 hadn’t been lost yet. Some GORKHAs, along with Maj Thapa, were still holding the post.
Meanwhile, the Chinese, having been repulsed twice, came back the third time, this time with lt tks. The
outnumbered GORKHAs were now outgunned — they had no wpn against the Chinese tks.
The post had been reduced to smk and rubble. With amn running out, three surviving GORKHAs, along with Maj
Thapa, pulled out their Khukris and charged on the Chinese before being overpowered.
Sirijap-1 fell and Maj Thapa was taken prisoner, but the war hadn’t ended for him.
Presumed dead by the IA and awarded PVC posthumously, it would be months before Maj Thapa’s family and the
Indian state would find out that he was alive in Chinese captivity in Xinjiang, where he was tortured, put in solitary
confinement, and subjected to aggressive and relentless Communist propaganda.
By 22 Oct the Chinese had cleared all posts N of Chushul. On 27 Oct they turned to the S apchs. The posts Chang La
and Jara La were attked. For four hours its outnumbered defenders fought bravely. Jemadar Ishe Thundup comding
the Chang La post asked his men to withdraw and covered it himself and killed in action. He was awarded the MVC.
The men at Jara La were surrounded but managed to break through in the night.
Chushul stood isolated with only Bn HQ of 1/8 GORKHA Rifles and a MMG sec to defend it. However, the Chinese
also needed a break to regp from the severe losses they had suffered. For eight days they had thrown everything
from masses of tps sp by hy arty. IA had some SA and 2 in mors with very little amn. Still they had caused hy cas. Blue
uniformed porters were seen carrying truckloads of wounded and dead at the end of each day’s battle.
Yula complex of posts had begun the process of consolidating all the persons at Yula 2 and 3 by evening of 21 Oct. By
22 Oct the Chinese were in complete cont of the N bank of Pangong Tso lake and maint Yula posts by boats became
difficult as Chinese were firing with MMGs on boats. Decision was taken on 22 Oct to withdraw tps from Yula
complex to a hi grnd N of Gurung Hill.
On 21 Oct, Indian transport aircraft flying in the area reported seeing a two miles long coln of Chinese vehs
proceeding towards Spanggur Gap. The tps dply in the area also confirmed move of vehs that alarmed the Bde HQ,
who thought that threat to Chushul was imminent. The entire front of nearly 60 Kms from Chang Chenmo to Dungti
had only one weak bn. 13 KUMAON loc in Leh was ordered to move to Chushul on 21 Oct. 15 Corps airlifted one bty
(eight guns) of 25 pounder to Chushul. The Chushul def were now strened and the airlift of stores and amn
continued. The Chinese did not launch an imdt attk and the lull pd set in 22 Oct in the Chushul Sect.
In Demchok Sect, Chinese secured the Demchok funnel and all passes on the Kailash Rg, thereby precluding any
Indian offensive towards Rudok and Tashingong.
45
Kibithu, NEFA: 22 Oct 1962
Kibithu lay almost on the McMohan Line a mule track linked
this thinly populated region, primarily used for trading
purposes and linked up to Rima, a prosperous settlement
across border under Yunnan province.
In the first wk of Sep 1962, 6 KUMAON had been mov up and

loc a few km short of the IB.
• A Coy was dply fwd at Dichu. Remainder three coys

occupied defended localities;
• B Coy at E Ridge,
• C Coy at Kibithoo
• D Coy at Ladders.
By end Sep, 4 SIKH was also in the process of induction. Two
of its coys had been air lifted into Walong.
Meanwhile, Chinese activities had incr across the IB. Tac HQs
of Chengdu Sub Area with 153 Regt and one reinforced bn
had stgd fwd. On 18 Oct, a recce ptl of 6 KUMAON reported
presence of two Chinese offrs and about 50 men in the area
of Hill 100 (on McMahon Line). On 21 Oct, lt sigs were observed on the Chinese side.
At 0015 h 22 Oct, the Chinese launched an attk on Kibithoo held by a Coy of 6 KUMAON, with a bn size force, duly sp
by mors and MGs. The battle lasted four hours before the posn became indefensible and could not be reinforced.
The Chinese had amassed huge numbers opposite Kibithu, and yet their first attk complete with arty sp failed to
dislodge 6 KUMAON. In the second attk, Chinese forces suffered hy cas, as opposed to 4 Indian tps KIA, 2 missing and
4 wounded. Since the posn could not be defended further, 6 KUMAON withdrew to occupy a defensive posn at
Walong, leaving behind a screen posn at Ashi Hill ex D Coy.
In the early hours of 23 Oct, the Chinese attked the screen posn. At 0400 h, the same day, screen posn was ordered
to withdraw. The Chinese began the rapid advancing S by proceeding along the W bank of the Lohit R.
A pl of 4 SIKH—who were flown by Otter aircraft to Walong from 26 Sep onwards—took posns on dominating pts on
the surrounding mtns of the Namti valley while D Coy of 6 KUMAON had taken up posns at Ashi Hill.
On 25 Oct, a coln of 600-700 Chinese had descended on the
plains and massed around the wire obsts, the SIKHs opened fire
inflicting huge cas. Even as a coy of 2/8 GORKHA Rifles relieved
the SIKHS, the Chinese began attking the Namti defences of the
Indian forces from the evening of 25 Oct.
Wave after wave of attks had continued for two nights, but the
Indians could not be dislodged. Because of its impregnability and
the inability to be broken into, the Chinese named this place
‘Tiger’s Mouth’. The KUMAONis, SIKHs and GORKHAs had
successfully staved off the Chinese offensive at the gates of
Walong for the time being.
46
IB Ridge, Bum La, NEFA: 23 Oct 1962
11th Pl of 1 SIKH (around 20 soldiers) was posn at this ridge
ahead of Tawang, comd by Sub Joginder Singh.
Bum La Pass, 37 km from Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, at
around 15,200 ft above sea level, was part of an old trade
route that went from Tawang to Tsona Dzong in Tibet.
By Oct 23, China had occupied the entire Dhola- Thang La area.
China’s main obj was the capture of Tawang, in Arunachal
Pradesh, that would give it total cont over the NE. And the
fastest route to Tawang, was the 26 km track from the border
via Bum La Pass, one of the few motorable ones in that region.
The 1st SIKH bn was given the task of defending this place, and
cut off the Chinese adv to Tawang. Delta Coy comded by Lt
Haripal Kaushik, was given the task of defending Bum La Pass.
The 11th pl headed by Sub Joginder Singh deply at the IB Ridge,
had the job of setting up the defense to halt the Chinese. Capt
th
Gurcharan Singh Gosal was the arty OP: 7 Bengal Mtn Bty was In Sp to the SIKH Regt.
20 Oct 1962
JCO of the AR notices thousands of Chinese advancing and imdt alerts the SIKH Pl at Bum La. Joginder Singh imdt
sends a sec under Hav Sucha Singh, to reinforce Bum La, while requesting 2nd line amn from the HQ. One of the
bloodiest battles of the ’62 war would begin which went on till the wee hours of 23 Oct.
After pounding Bum La with mors, to dest the bunkers, around 600 Chinese swarmed in to attk the AR post.
However Sucha Singh fought back hard, killing several of the en soldiers, before retreating back to the IB Ridge. Just
like in Rezang La, the Indian pl at Bum La Pass was badly under equipped, just four days rations, ill fitting jungle
boots, no proper winter clothing. It was under such odds, that Joginder Singh rallied his men against the PLA.
What Joginder lacked in resources, he more than made it up with his tactics. He asked his men to hold their amn and
fire only when the en was in rg, this avoided wastg. He also put the pl on a steep ridge that was not easy to climb. In
the meantime another Chinese unit attked from the right flk, the firing was even more intense. Hit by a burst of MG
fire in his thigh, Joginder Singh however refused evac, and kept on comd his men.
The battle began, one of the bloodiest ones ever, Indian soldiers fired back with arty guns at the advancing Chinese,
inflicting hy cas on them. However half of the pl was gone, only 17 managed to survive. Though a large number of
Chinese were dead, Joginder Singh’s unit by now was down, most of the men either killed or badly wounded. He
himself had killed around 50 Chinese, but by now he was exhausted, and on top of it the injury in his thigh.
By now down to a handful of survivors, Joginder charged the Chinese with bayonets, with cries of “Jo Bole So Nihal,
Sat Sri Akal”. The Chinese were taken aback with the resistance, and many of them were killed by the bayonets,
sheer courage under fire. At this time sensing a loss of the posn, the Coy Cdr, as a final resort, radioed Joginder if he
could direct SOS fire on own. This last ditch effort caused great confusion amongst the en rks and Joginder readied
the remnant of his pl for a head-on, final attk. A score of Chinese soldiers were killed in the bayonet charge.
The heroic resistance however ended when Joginder Singh was surrounded and captured by the Chinese, taken as a
POW. 3 of the 4 survivors who escaped, went on to narrate Joginder’s tale of raw courage and defiance.
Sub Joginder Singh passed away in Chinese captivity on the same date itself, he was awarded the PVC for his heroics,
and tactics against a much larger en force. When the Chinese learnt that Joginder Singh, was given the PVC, they
repatriated his ashes with full mil honors on May 17, 1963.
47
Walong Sect, NEFA: 14 Nov 1962
As the clashes at Walong had proged since 20-21 Oct, the resistance by
Indian tps had been so stiff that the Chinese moved a res div they’d
kept for Tawang, to Walong.
Walong, a small mil station, was a hamlet of 25 huts, 6000 feet high,
East of Lohit R (the Easternmost tributary of Brahmputra.) It is about 35
Kms S of the McMahon line. Connected to Kibithu and beyond by a
mule track W of the R and a game track on the E. Lohit R cuts Walong
into two halves.
HQs of Lohit District was at Tezu. From Tezu to Walong, there existed a
foot track which took 14 days for a load-carrying person to traverse.
The railheads to Tezu were Tinsukia and Dibrugarh, at a dist of 195 and
275 Kms resp.
On the Chinese side, the nearest rd was just 35 km behind them. They
were well-connected, had better infra and firepower. They were able
to build up an entire Div, complete with Arty and AD assets at the gates
of Walong. This they did in 10-12 days, bringing in assets from as far
back as Chengdu (1300 km away).
Lohit R has banks almost 40 feet high, its bed width about 200 yards,
water width 80 yards during the winter, swelling during summers. The
R was not fordable. It was crossable by rubber boats at selected places.
There existed two twine ropeway brs at Walong -Dong and Thapa Ridge -Kahlo. A twine br had a hanging pulley with
a ‘Doli’ that could carry two persons, pulled manually by pioneers, helped by Mishmis of doubtful loyalty. For the last
bit of the twine, men in the ‘Doli’ also had to apply force with a second rope to move the ‘Doli’ to reach the end. A
Section of 8 to 10 personnel would take over an hour to cross, thus a Company well over a day.
From the lowest areas, the hills on both sides rose to ht 15,000 – 16,000 feet, over a horizontal dist of 5 Kms. On the
Eastern side of Lohit is a large mtn tract with Sati Nullah flowing into Lohit, dividing the massif in two, there exist
defensible knolls and spurs of 200 to 400 by 100 to 200 yards, from higher to lower altitudes, which were named
High Plateau, Dong, Dong Hills and East Ridge. On the West were Ashi Hill, Ladders, Maha Plateau, Spur, Walong
Tekri and West Ridge.
From a high feature called Tri Junction, emanated three spurs that descended into Lohit R; North – Eastern Spur,
leading to two miles North of Walong, Center Spur to Walong and South-Eastern Spur five miles behind Walong. It is
the area of Tri junction and Center Spur that saw the maximum fight. The Spur also leads to Ladders, a formidable
defensive posn. The ht difference between Lohit R and Tri Junction is 10,000 feet, 16 Km long stretch, requiring two
days of march by a person carrying loads.
Ladders and Lachhman Ridge were dominated by Tri Junction (13,250 feet), Yellow Pimple (12,750 feet) and Green
Pimple (12,500 feet). The ridge from Tri Junction towards South-East had features West Ridge and Avalanch Ridge
which dominated Walong Camp/Base, DZ Ridge and ALG. Another ridge called Yepak Ridge, five miles South of
Walong, also lead to Lohit R.
The Bde Cdr decided to go offensive and ordered 6 KUMAON to attk and capture Yellow and Green Pimple areas on
14 Nov. D Coy of 4 SIKH and Two Coys of 6 KUMAON attked without any arty fire sp. The Chinese retaliated with hy
volume of fire. The fierce attk continued the whole day against very stiff resistance and at the end of the day, a
foothold was est by the KUMAONis. This was the only attk, an IA Unit launched during the entire War. It was a
partial success. Hand to hand fight ensued with both sides suffering hy cas. Amn was running low. Strict fire cont
measures had to be enforced.
48
To reclaim the lost grnd, the Chinese counter attked Green and Yellow Pimples with greater ferocity. They pressed
their attk against the tenacious hold of the gallant KUMAONis, which was later reinforced with 4 SIKH and 4 DOGRAs.
Eventually, the numerically superior PLA succeeded in pushing the IA units back to their bases.
With the capture of Green and Yellow
Pimples, the Chinese commenced their
multi-pronged attks on the main defenses
of Walong from three dirs on 16 Nov. It was
estimated to be more than a Div attk. Both
sides suffered hy cas. A Regt of PLA
bypassed the Bde Def Sect and est a
blockade about five Kms S of Walong in the
rear, thus cutting off the route of
withdrawal.
The SIKHs, KUMAONIES, GORKHAs and
DOGRAs fought shoulder to shoulder and
many of them sacrificed their life for the defense of Walong. The Chinese poured in arty and MG fire. At the end of
the day, the sit became militarily futile for the IA to fight any longer and orders were issued to withdraw. The
leftover elements of the Bde managed to march back and moved to another Sect in the S.
Then came the unilateral cease-fire declared by the Chinese on 23 Nov. But many sub-units in Walong Sect did not
get the orders to cease fire due to lack of comns and in many isolated places fighting continued for a few more days.
The Chinese did inflict hy causality on the Indian tps, but the sentinels of Walong did not allow the PLA to have a
free run. At Walong, a near perfect defensive battle was fought against the numerically superior PLA force. The
battle of Walong also proved that man to man, Indian soldiers were more than a match against the Chinese, even
under the most adverse circumstances.
The withdrawal would take whatever was left of the Bde to Hayuliang, 150km away. Along the way, withdrawing tps
were constantly ambushed and harassed by Chinese units. At Walong, out of 2191 Indian tps, 987 were killed - 44%.
During the war, 6 KUMAON lost 2 offr, 6 JCOs and 118 OR, 113 were wounded and 172 taken prisoner; 4 DOGRA lost
one offr, 2 JCOs and 107 OR; 4 SIKH lost 2 offr, 4 JCOs and 76 OR and had 98 wounded, whereas Delta Coy of 3/3
GORKHA Rifles was completely wiped out.
Reasons for Debacle at Walong.
• Premature and piecemeal mov of 6 KUMAON from Walong to Kibithu.
• Not exploiting ambush at Namti Nala.
• Not occupying or dominating high grnds west of def held at Walong.
• Unorganised and unplanned changes in comd structure.
• Piecemeal build up at Walong.
• Tps always moving on pouch amn and hard scale ration with no sustainable lgs plan.
• Scattered Def at Walong.
• Mov of tps from 1st stg to 3rd stg w/o accln reducing their efficiency.
• Climate condition & wx at Walong allowing ltd sorties, insufficient for sustenance of force level at Walong.
• Def not mut sp, Bn & Coy Cdrs had to fight isolated & indep def battle.
• Presence of senior Cdrs at Bde HQ reducing decision making & battle coord ability of Bde Cdr.
• Insufficient Arty & mor sp. (k) Unrealistic timeline for recapture of Tri-jn 14 Nov.
• Two Bns out of four avbl (4 DOGRA & 6 KUMAON) committed to Tri jn.
49
Rezang La, Chushul, Ladakh: 18 Nov 1962 – 13 KUMAON – CO Lt Col HA Dhingra
13 KUMAON moved from its peace loc Ambala to Baramula in June 1962 and by 2 Oct to Leh on orbat of 114 Inf Bde.
The fmn had then just two inf bns and was scheduled to move to Chushul in March 1963.There were no int inputs of
any Chinese build up opposite this sect. But the events moved quickly and the Chinese threat was perceived in
Chushul valley that had an all-weather landing grnd. 3 Inf Div was hurriedly raised under Maj Gen Budh Singh, MC.
• On 13 Oct, B and C Coys of 13 KUMAON moved to Chushul and rushed to Mugger Hill and Rezang La
feature loc 30 km S – E of Chushul.
• The Bn reached Chushul on 24 Oct and D Coy occupied the Spanngur Gap. Bn HQ was loc in Hi Grnd with A
coy as Bde res.
On 26 Oct the Tac HQs of 114 Inf Bde under Brig TN Raina arrived in Chushul.
• Tac features Gurung Hill, Gun

Hill and the Spanggur Gap
were held by 1/8 GR with Bn
HQs and adhoc Coy at the
airFd.
• The flk of 13 KUMAON
towards strat un-mettled
Chushul- Leh rd at Tsakla was
manned by Coy less a pl with
sec 3 inch Mor of 5 JAT while
rest of the Bn was deply at
Lukung.
• 1 JAK (LI) was dply in Thakung
Hts, N of Chushul. The RCL
guns of the inf bns less 1 JAK
(LI) were Bded and loc in the
Spanggur Gap.
• Two tps ex B Sqn 20 Lancers (6
AMX-13 tks), a bty of 13 Fd
Regt, a tp of 32 Hy Mor Regt, 1
JAK (LI) less a Coy and a Coy of
1 MAHAR (MMG) joined as
meagre rft.
The AMX tks in the mtn trn were
not very eff and the arty resources
not only meager but mostly crested but they played a maj role in dest and destabilizing the en in Spanggur Gap.
Routes of Ingress (Appchs) to Chushul
• Khurnak Fort- Dungra Ford- Yula- Thakung-Lukung- Darbuk - Leh. A difficult circuitous mtnous track only good for
a bn with AT sp.
• Rudok- Shinghang- Chushul. Maint by class 9 rd that could sustain div str thrust.
• Rudok-Rezang La-Chushul. Shorter appch that had rd devp up to Spanggur Gap - could sustain force more than
the first but less than the second.
50
Tasks Allotted to 114 Inf Bde (Rather ambitious with paucity of tps, fire power and wide gaps in defended localities.)
• Defend Chushul for as long as possible and to withdraw only when continuation of the battle was impossible.
• To inflict max cas on the en.
• To save as much stores and eqpt as possible.
Dply of 13 KUMAON
• B and D Coys less a pl plus Sec 3 inch Mor - Mugger Hill.
• C Coy plus Sec 3 inch Mor - Rezang La.
• A Coy plus four RCL guns as Bde res, poised for CA with Bn HQs at Hi Grnd
Rezang La
• Pass on the SE apch to Chushul valley.
• 3 km long and 2 km wide, avg alt 16000 feet above MSL.
• Digging defences in the rocky boulders, due to paucity
of oxygen and cold was extremely tiring.
• Hours to boil kettle of water, fresh rations frozen hard.
• Rezang La had a serious flaw. The high crests of mtn-
tops interfered with the flt of arty shells and adversely
affected arty fire, thus, denying Rezang La the much
needed fire sp.
• 13 KUMAON, equipped with poor antiquated .303
single shot bolt action rifles of the WW II vintage,
paucity of woollen clo, digging tools and old RS that did
not comn due to frozen btys.
• Chinese had 7.62 SLRs and acclimatized tps. Enough,
amn, rations, hy engg eqpt, vehs, arty and tks could
come right up to the Spanggur Gap as they had built a rd up to their terminal post. During ni their boats were
obs plying men and stores in Spanggur Lake.
• Chinese tps - locals from Singkiang region were hardened to climatic and trn conditions whereas many the Ahirs
hailing from the plains of N India were dply in HAA environment for the very first time in their service.
Maj Shaitan Singh deply C Coy over 2 km frontage on the massive 5 km long Rezang La feature as under:-
• 7 Pl under Jemadar Surja 3 Km N of the pass on fwd slopes.
• 8 Pl under Jemadar Hari Ram in pass area.
• 9 Pl under Jemadar Ram Chander 1 km S of 7 Pl posn.
• Coy HQs behind 9 Pl along with sec of 3 inch Mor under Nk
Ram Kumar Yadav 150 meters W of Coy HQs.
No time to stk, mines and prep defences adequately. As per
policy, no ptlling along the IB was permitted. As per Battle
procedure, during day OPs and in the ni LPs were sent to
provide EW.
Due to wide frontages, there was no mutual sp with in the sub-
units, not many mines could be laid, arty fire across Rezang La was crested. Thus, Rezang La had no arty sp and
paucity of anti-pers mines to halt the advancing en.
In spite of all inadequacies, Bn Op Order issued on 24 Oct tasked all sub-units to fight to ‘last man and last round’.
To cover the numerous gullies which were expected apchs for the en to attk, three addl LMGs were provided to C
Coy. The defs were wired and stked with six first line scales of amn along with 1000 bombs for the 3 inch Mor Sec.
51
The Battle of Rezang La
• On ni 17-18 Nov around 2200 hrs, a hy snowstorm continued for nearly two hours. At 0200 hrs, LP ahead of
8 Pl obs a large body of en soldiers swarming through the gullies at a dist of about 700-800 m.
• The LP cdr ran back to Pl HQs to report. He, with his Sec Cdr Hukam Chand and one LMG were rushed as rft
to the post. By then the Chinese had advanced with in firing rg of SA from the post.
• The LP fired a pre-determined red Varey Lt sig along with long bursts of LMG fire, warning the C Coy to
‘stand to’. Similarly, 7 Pl’s LP on the fwd slopes also saw Chinese forming up and entire C Coy was alerted.
• Though, the Chinese had brought their assaulting tps to their FAA under cover of inclement weather, their
intensions to shock the defenders with silent surprise attk had failed.
All rks of the C Coy waited patiently for the impending frontal attk. Around 0500 hrs, the first wave was spotted and
hail of LMGs, MMGs and mors fire greeted the en. Scores of en died, many were wounded but rest duly reinforced
continued to advance. Soon all gullies leading to Rezang La were full of Chinese corpses. Constant wave after wave of
the Chinese launched four more attks that were beaten back that also dwindled the defenders str and amn.
There were some skirmishes with the Chinese ptls that too were beaten back but one such ptl had severed the tele
line leading to the Bn HQs. By about 0545 hrs, the Chinese frontal attk was beaten back and failed. The Chinese
realized Rezang La was not a cake walk and changed their op plan resorting to hy arty shelling, and, to destroy fd
fortifications conc fire of 75 mm RCL guns from flks.
Maj Shaitan Singh re gped his dwindling assets to charge the advancing Chinese. Since all the pl posns had been
overrun with no survivors, the en was re-gping to assault the C Coy HQs after hy pounding. While moving from one
gun posn to other, motivating his depleted comd, Maj Shaitan Singh was hit by the en LMG.
His CHM kept persuading him to move to safer place with few survivors who could walk. Maj Shaitan Singh was hit
again severely in the abdomen. Grievously injured and bleeding profusely he was pulled to a safer place behind a
boulder. Since there was no line or radio comn, he ordered the CHM and one more to leave him and rush to Bn HQs.
Five soldiers were taken prisoners of war by the en. Silence engulfed Rezang La as the last round had been fired and
the last soldier bled to martyrdom. Neither any help or rfts were asked for nor could any be provided to C Coy.
In the Spanggur Gap, 1/8 GR fought bravely with arty sp by Lt Goswami and tps of tks comd by 2 Lt Baswani firing
and destroying the en. While the Chinese kept swarming to capture Gurung Hill, held by the coy of 1/8 GR under
comd Capt PL Kher, Goswami to give closest sp, ordered to fire on his own OP that killed 3 OR and severely
wounding Goswami whose frost-bitten legs had to be amputated later. He was decorated with a MVC.
The Chinese massive two-pronged advance and offensive embarked to secure Chushul succeeded with hy cas on
both sides. The remoteness of Mugger Hill, Gurung Hill, both the Bde and Bn HQs and A Coy as bde res, negated the
possibility of any rft or counter attk at Rezang La.
On 21 Nov 1962, without any further offensivesthe Chinese declared unilateral cease fire. 13 KUMAON regped after
the ceasefire less the C Coy that had ceased to exist.
In Jan 1963, a local Ladakhi shepherd wandered over Rezang La. He was amazed by an awesome spectacle of soldiers
frozen to death but still clinging to their damaged wpns mostly with empty magazines and bulged barrels due to
excessive firing. A month later in Feb 1963, the first Indian party under the aegis of International Red Cross visited
Rezang La found 96 bodies with multiple splinters and gun shot wounds frozen to death with wpns in their hands in
the shattered trenches. While the OR were cremated with full mil honours in Chushul, the body of Maj Shaitan Singh
draped in national flag was flown to Jodhpur and cremated in his vill with state honours.
13 KUMAON was awarded Battle Honour Rezangla, the only for ops in Ladakh. The second battle honour of 1962
was awarded to 4 GARH Rifles, at Nuranang, now called Jaswantgarh, on 17 Nov 1962.
52
Battle of Nuranang
Three offrs, four JCOs, 147 OR and seven non-combant tdsmen were martyred at the Battle of Nuranang.
In Sep 1962, 4 GARH Rifles received its mob orders and moved to Chardwar, near Rangia, Assam. As the Chinese
threat incr, the unit moved up from Tezpur and was dply NW of the Tawang Chu R.
The first ph of the Chinese ops ceased with
the fall of Tawang. 4 GARH Rif was not
involved in any of the serious fighting till
then. It had reinforced Bumla with a coy for
a short while before ops commenced, but it
withdrew on orders well before.
With the IA pushed back behind the Tawang
Chu, HQ 4 Inf Div under Maj Gen MS
Pathania issued orders for the occupation of
Sela as a VG. To do this, it was neccy to keep
the Chinese recce parties at bay and
prevent them from Xg the Tawang Chu.
4 GARH Rif was tasked to occupy
Nuranang, between Sela and Jang, as a
covering posn and perform the role of
covering tps.
After the fall of Tawang, as the unit withdrew through Jang, almost the last unit to do so, the iron br over the R
Tawang Chu was finally destroyed as a res demolition.
Alfa coy was dply towards the rd going down to Jang. The bn HQ, a coy and the three-inch mors were dply approx 1.5
km towards Sela, along the track. One coy occupied the high grnd to the N across the rd and beyond the deep
depression through which the Nuranang R flows. The fourth coy was towards the S covering the Southern apch.
By 16 Nov 1962, the defences were in reasonable state although there was little overhead protection. The defences
were being constantly shelled by the Chinese who had good obsn from across the Tawang Chu. Our arty OPs also did
likewise against PLA dply.
On the night of 16/17 Nov, the Chinese commenced ph 2 of their offensive. Probing actions against Alfa coy were
made by Chinese dressed as Monpa women but the tps responded in time. Through 17 Nov and till the night of
17/18 Nov the loc came under five hy attks and all were beaten back.
After the third attempt, the Chinese managed to deploy an HMG on the left (Southern flk of Alfa coy, its fire war
proving effective). A party of three volunteers was formed, the party moved first by stealth and then under covering
fire. In a hand-to-hand melee lasting several mins, the HMG was silenced, and the crew was killed.
The fourth and fifth PLA attks were equally ferocious virtually fwg the tactics of human waves. However, Number 3
Pl of Alfa coy held on tenaciously. As the battle was enjoined and the GARHis were creating history, the Chinese
probed the flks from a wide arc infiltrating self-contained tps into the depth areas N and S of Sela.
As reports of Chinese infilt came into HQ 4 Inf Div there was panic, orders to withdraw from Nuranang were issued
even as 4 GARH Rif was ready for more. It had sustained very few cas, just three killed and a few wounded. Three
remaining coys were largely untouched. Through 18-19 Nov the unit withdrew as ordered and reached Sela.
There, the Cdr 62 Inf Bde, Brig Hoshiar Singh, briefed Lt Col Bhattacharjee. Two colns for the withdrawal to Bomdila
were formed one each under the Cdr and the CO. Two coys each of 4 GARH Rif formed the protection of each coln,
which had many HQ pers and stragglers withdrawing in panic.
53
The two colns ran into a series of Chinese ambushes as they tried cross country movs. In one of the ambushes, Brig
Hoshiar Singh is reputed to have been wounded and captured. His refusal to submit to his captors is reputed to have
enraged them leading to him being killed in cold blood.
The Chinese str of infiltrators far outnumbered the str of the withdrawing colns. The attrition on the ambushes was
intense and the tps dispersed in small gps many crossing into Bhutan on the W and made their way towards the rear,
suffering intense cold with many cases of frost bite.
The unit was awarded two MVC, seven VrC, six SMs.
The unit was awarded the battle honour Nuranang which is colloquially called Jaswantgarh.
Order to withdraw 4 GARH even after fighting a successful def battle reflected major shortcoming in 4 Div plg.
• A successful def battle should have been reinforced.
• Nurarang posn was not bypassable, strengthen the def potential of Sela.
• No defs area earmarked area for def by 4 GARH at Sela.
• Only one Coy of 4 GARH had been contacted by en & with two cas only.
• 4 SIKH LI at Twin lake would have acted as res for 4 GARH.
• Rehearsal and plan for withdrawal not carried out hence order for withdrawal at short notice needed detail
coord at ni time.
• Chances of Chinese pursuing the withdrawing tps all the way upto main def of Sela.
Unfortunately, the local people have created a myth around the battle of Jaswantgarh, crediting the resistance and
heroic action only to Jaswant Singh and two young girls, Nura and Sela, who allegedly helped him resist the Chinese.
Local folklore has it that the Chinese finally captured Jaswant Singh and beheaded him, taking his head away as
trophy. These tales have their own place and have been written about and romanticised by media; even a film is
being made about the myth of Jaswant Singh.
China declared a unilateral ceasefire on 21 Nov, 1962. And yet, one last story:
Lhagyala Gompa, NEFA: 23 Nov 1962

The war was over, and what remained of 4 RAJPUT was returning to base, 126 soldiers navigating the challenging trn
of NEFA. Lhagyala Gompa was a monastery on top of a hill, where about 500 Chinese tps had entrenched
themselves.
4 RAJPUT was in the valley, and stopped to check the monastery out when the Chinese opened fire – two days after
the end of the war. The tps of 4 RAJPUT were fatigued, outnumbered and outgunned, and the Chinese began
bombarding them with mors. Lt Col Brahmanand Avasthy, the CO, ordered a two-pronged counter-attk. Three hours
later, over a hundred Indian soldiers lay dead – along with nearly 200 Chinese tps. Chinese soldiers then descended
upon the valley, killing wounded Indian soldiers. Less than a month later when the army went looking for 4 RAJPUT,
they found their bodies stuffed into a mass grave.
54
SINO INDIAN WAR: Ques and Ans
Discuss the Genesis of the Indo China Border Dispute?

Dispute is over the sovereignty of two relatively large, and several smaller, separated pieces of territory.
• Aksai Chin, admin by China as part of Xinjiang Uygur and Tibet Autonomous Regions. Claimed by India as part of
Ladakh. Mostly uninhabited HAA wasteland. Strat significance is Xinjiang-Tibet Hwy built by China 1954-57.
• Territory S of the McMahon Line, formerly NEFA, now Arunachal Pradesh admin by India. McMahon Line was
part of 1914 Simla Convention signed between British India and Tibet. China disowns the agreement, stating that
Tibet was never independent when it signed the Simla Convention.
Border dispute came to the fore in 1958, when Chinese
Premier Zhou Enlai, responding to Nehru’s protests against
the Aksai Chin Rd – 179 KMs, Enlai denied for the first time
presence of any formalised border between China and
India.
Aksai Chin. The SIKHs annexed Ladakh in 1834. In 1841,
invaded Tibet. Chinese defeated the SIKH army entered
Ladakh and besieged Leh. The Chinese and SIKHs then
signed a treaty in Sep 1842, which stipulated no
transgressions or interference in the other country's
frontiers.
British defeated SIKHs in 1846, tfr of sovereignty of
Ladakh to British. British commissioners attempted to
meet Chinese officials to discuss border issues. However,
both sides were sufficiently satisfied that a traditional
border was recognised and defined by natural elements
and was not demarcated.
The bdys at the two extremities, Pangong
Tso and Karakoram Pass, were reasonably well-defined,
but the Aksai Chin area in between lay largely undefined.
W. H. Johnson, Svy of India proposed "Johnson Line" in
1865, which put Aksai Chin in Jammu & Kashmir. China did
not cont Xinjiang, so this line was never presented to the
Chinese.
In 1899, Britain proposed a revised bdy, suggested by Macartney. This bdy placed the Lingzi Tang plains, S of the
Laktsang rg, in India, and Aksai Chin, N of the Laktsang rg, in China. This border, along the Karakoram Mtns, was
proposed and sp by British officials for a number of reasons. Karakoram Mtns formed a natural bdy, taking the
British borders up to the Indus R watershed leaving the Tarim R watershed in Chinese cont, presenting a further obst
to Russian advance in Central Asia.
The British presented this line: Macartney-MacDonald Line, to the Chinese in 1899 in a note by Sir Claude
MacDonald. The Qing govt did not respond. Perhaps, China believed that this had been the accepted bdy.
Both the Johnson-Ardagh and the Macartney-MacDonald lines were used on British maps of India.
• Until 1908, the British took the Macdonald line to be the bdy,
• in 1911, the Xinhai Revolution resulted in the collapse of central power in China, and by the end of World
War I, the British officially used the Johnson Line.
55
However, they took no steps to est outposts or assert actual cont on grnd. In 1927, the line was adjusted again as the
govt of British India abandoned the Johnson line in favour of a line along the Karakoram rg further S. However, maps
were not updated and still showed the Johnson Line.
From 1917 to 1933, "Postal Atlas of China", published by Govt of China showed bdy in Aksai Chin as per Johnson
line, along the Kunlun mtns. The "Peking University Atlas", published in 1925, also put Aksai Chin in India.
When British learned of Soviet officials surveying Aksai Chin for Sheng Shicai, warlord of Xinjiang in 1940–41, they
again advocated the Johnson Line. At this pt the British had still made no attempts to est outposts or cont Aksai Chin,
nor was it discussed with govts of China or Tibet, the bdy remained un-demarcated at India's independence.
On independence in 1947, Govt of India fixed its official bdy in the W, which incl Aksai Chin, in a manner that
resembled the Ardagh–Johnson Line. India's basis for defining the border was "chiefly by long usage and custom".
India did not claim the N areas near Shahidulla and Khotan. From Karakoram Pass (not under dispute), Indian claim
line extends NE of Karakoram Mtns N of the salt flats of Aksai Chin, to set a bdy at Kunlun Mtns, incorporating part of
the Karakash R and Yarkand R watersheds. From there, it runs E along the Kunlun Mtns, before turning SW through
Aksai Chin salt flats, through the Karakoram Mtns, to Pangong Lake.
On 1 July 1954 PM Nehru wrote a memo directing that the maps of India be revised to show definite bdys on all
frontiers. Up to this pt, the bdy in Aksai Chin, based on the Johnson Line, had been described as "undemarcated."
During 1950s, PRC built a 1,200 KMs rd connecting Xinjiang and W Tibet, of which 179 KMs ran S of Johnson Line
through Aksai Chin region claimed by India. Aksai Chin was easily accessible from China, than India. India did not
learn about the rd till 1957, which was confirmed when shown in Chinese maps published in 1958.
The Indian posn, as stated by PM Jawaharlal Nehru, was that Aksai Chin was "part of the Ladakh region of India for
centuries" and this N border was "firm and definite one which was not open to discussion with anybody".
Chinese minister, Zhou Enlai argued that W borders had never been delimited, that the Macartney-MacDonald Line,
which left Aksai Chin within Chinese borders was the only line ever proposed to a Chinese govt, and that Aksai Chin
was already under Chinese jurisdiction, and that negotiations should take into account the status quo.
In 1960, based on an agreement between Nehru and Zhou Enlai, officials from India and China held discussions in
order to settle the bdy dispute. China and India disagreed on the maj watershed that defined the bdy in the W
sect. The Chinese statements with respect to their border claims often misrepresented the cited sources.
The McMahon Line
In 1913–14, reps of Britain, China, and Tibet attended a conf in Simla and drew up an agreement concerning Tibet's
status and borders. The McMahon Line, a proposed bdy between Tibet and India for the E sect, was drawn by British
negotiator Henry McMahon on a map att to the agreement. All three representatives initialled the agreement, but
Peking soon objected to the proposed Sino-Tibet bdy and repudiated the agreement, refusing to sign the final, more
detailed map. After approving a note which stated that China could not enjoy rights under the agreement unless she
ratified it, the British and Tibetan negotiators signed the Simla Convention and more detailed map as a bilateral
accord. Neville Maxwell states that McMahon had been instructed not to sign bilaterally with Tibetans if China
refused, but he did so without the Chinese representative present and kept the declaration secret.
India’s belief - Historical bdys of India were Himalayas and areas S of Himalayas were traditionally associated with
India. The high watershed of the Himalayas was proposed as border between India and its N neighbours.
By signing the Simla Agreement with Tibet, the British had violated the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, which
bound the British govt "not to annex Tibetan territory." Because of doubts concerning the legal status of the accord,
British did not put the McMahon Line on their maps until 1937, nor publish the Simla Convention in the treaty record
until 1938. Rejecting Tibet's 1913 declaration of independence, China argued that the Simla Convention and
McMahon Line were illegal and that Tibetan govt was merely a local govt without treaty-making powers.
56
British records show that Tibetan govt's acceptance of the new border in 1914 was conditional on China accepting
the Simla Convention. Since British were not able to get an acceptance from China, Tibetans considered McMahon
line invalid. Tibetan officials continued to administer Tawang and refused to concede territory during negotiations in
1938. The governor of Assam asserted that Tawang was "undoubtedly British" but noted that it was "cont by Tibet,
and none of its inhabitants have any idea that they are not Tibetan." During World War II, with India's E threatened
by Japanese tps and with threat of Chinese expansionism, British tps secured Tawang for extra defence.
India claims that intent of the treaty was to follow the main watershed ridge divide of the Himalayas. Territory S of
the high ridges should be Indian and N Chinese.
During and after 1950s, India began ptl this area and mapping in greater detail, they confirmed what the 1914 Simla
agreement map depicted: six R crossings that interrupted Himalayan watershed ridge. At the W most loc near
Bhutan N of Tawang, they mod their maps to extend the claim line N wards to incl features such as Thag La ridge,
Longju, and Khinzemane as Indian territory. Thus, the Indian version of McMahon Line moves the Bhutan-China-India
trijunction N to 27°51’30"N from 27°45’40"N. India would claim that the treaty map ran along features such as Thag
La ridge, though the actual treaty map itself is topographically vague.
After India’s independence, factors contributing to the growth of the border dispute.
• Reluctance of both India and China to broach the subject in initial ph from 1950 to 1957, when Sino-Indian
ties were peaceful and amicable.
• India annexed Tawang in 1951; and published new maps reflecting India’s unilateral demarcation,
interpreted China’s silence as tacit consent.
• PRC followed a delaying strat, with China deciding to refrain from formally protesting against India’s
unilateral moves until they had consolidated their adm and mil posn in Tibet, as China had begun bldg the
Xinjiang National Highway in 1951 – a rd that would not be completed until 1957.
• During 1954 negotiations on Tibet, China chose not to raise the issue of border alignment despite having the
opportunity, and in 1956, when Nehru for the first time referred to the bdy issue, Zhou Enlai suggested that
the Chinese govt would be willing to recognize the McMahon Line in exch for Aksai Chin.
Both Zhou Enlai and the Indian ldrs were insistent on securing ack of their victimhood and acceptance of the
disputed territories as historically significant and integral to their respective countries.
• Chinese premier emphasised that Tibet – has been a part of China since the Manchu dynasty – was made a
protectorate by the British through signing of the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty in 1904 and the Simla Convention,
where McMahon Line was determined. This, Zhou maint, was essentially a humiliation imposed on China.
• With regard to Aksai Chin, Zhou asserted that the region was under the jurisdiction of Xinjiang province, and
therefore indisputably part of China. One of the maj national goals of the CCP was to restore China’s former
glory, and therefore regaining cont of Xinjiang and Tibet was seen as essential to this restoration.
• Indian ldrs argued that the British merely formalised bdys that had been in place for centuries.
o Ladakh-Tibet bdy was historically accepted and recognised, and did not require any formal delimitation.
o In NEFA, the McMahon Line est a bdy that had been admin by Indian rulers even before the Christian era.
• GOI therefore proclaimed that the timeless borders were only concretised during colonial rule.
Following the logic of post-imperial ideology, the 1960 border talks failed on two accounts;
• first, neither party made any new territorial claims but simply reiterated what was rightfully theirs;
• second, both were eager to est that they had been victimised in the past and were being victimised again.
Divergent Posns on the Border Dispute
Negotiations between Zhou and Nehru continued for five days and ended in failure. Nehru rejected Zhou’s deal that
offered Peking’s acceptance of Indian posn in the E sect in return for New Delhi’s acceptance of the Chinese in the W
sect. The Chinese returned to Beijing believing Indians were not interested in negotiating. Tensions escalated over
next two years: IA pushing N wards via the Fwd Policy, and PLA responding tit-for-tat, resulting in skirmishes.
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Suggest a Solution to Resolve the Border Issue?
• Under no circumstance, should either side fire in the air or at each other.
• Must reduce frontline dply of tps.
• There has to be an incr in coord at the LAC to avoid confrontation, by auth them to resolve tensions.
• Setting up hotline between the two countries and between neighbouring Mil Fmn HQs.
• It must be ensured that border flareups do not hold up the ongoing wider bilateral ties hostg.
• Further, it is imp to respect the previous agreements of 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013 and to ensure
disengagement and tranquillity along the border’.
• The LAC must be clarified without further delay, and both countries must exhibit the neccy maturity to
resolve border disputes in exchange of peace and tranquillity.
• It is neccy to have new Confidence Building Measures.
o Maint peace and tranquillity along the LAC.
o Maint sanctity of the LAC at all times.
o Reduce presence of the Mil pers and eqpt close to the LAC.
o Avoid large scale Exs close the the LAC. Keep the other side info of conc of tps more than those dply.
o No air space violation/intrusions or threatening flts.
o No live amn firing within 10 Kms of the LAC.
o No incr in the number of mil buildings and bunkers without mutual consultation.
o Comns between local cdrs.
• Both countries should not abet horizontal or vertical escalation of the confrontation and continue with
negotiations with emphasis on conflict management and lasting solution.
• Ultimately, India and China must take a fwd-looking step towards sustainable peace. It is imp to understand
the situation from both countries’ pt-of-view, rather than being stuck in one-sided analysis.
On 7 Nov 1950, a month after China invaded Tibet, India’s Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel wrote
to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Discuss the Key Takeaways?
Patel’s letter described in detail the sit along the N border and warned against the possibility of invasion.
• He pointed out that while India regarded China as friends, they did not. Their actions are deceit. The Chinese
take India as stooges of Anglo-American strat. They do not spk like a friend but as a potential en.
• Communist mentality advocates that whoever is not with them is against them, During the last several months,
outside the Russian camp, India has been practically alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into UNO,
and in securing assurances on the ques of Formosa. In spite, China continues to regard India with suspicion,
scepticism, mixed with a little hostility.
• ‘Communism Is No Shield against Imperialism’. India faces a new sit with the disappearance of Tibet, expansion
of China almost up to our gates. Throughout history the Himalayas have been an impenetrable barrier against
any threat from the N. Recent and bitter history also tells us that communism is no shield against imperialism
and that Communists are as good or as bad imperialists as any other. Chinese ambitions in this respect not only
cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include imp parts of Assam. While our W and NW threat
remains, a new threat has devp from the N and NE. For the first time ever India’s defence has to concentrate
itself on two fronts simultaneously.
• ‘Unlimited Scope for Infilt’, Continuous defensive lines do not exist on our frontiers. There is almost an unltd
scope for infilt. I am sure the Chinese and their source of inspiration, Soviet Russia, would not miss any
opportunity of expl these weak spots, partly in sp of their ideology and partly in sp of their ambitions. In my
judgement, the sit is one in which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be vacillating.
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• ‘Communist Threats to Our Internal Security’. So far Communist Party of India has found difficulty in contacting
Communists abroad, or in getting sup of arms, literature, etc. They had to content with difficult Burmese and E
Pakistan frontiers or the sea. Infilt of spies, fifth columnists and Communists would now be easier.
• ‘Problems That Need to be Addressed’
• A mil and int appre of the Chinese threat to India both on the frontier and to internal security.
• An exam of our mil posn and such redisposn of our forces as might be neccy, particularly with the idea of
guarding imp routes or areas which are likely to be the subject of dispute.
• An appraisement of the str of our forces and, if neccy, reconsideration of our retrenchment plans.
• A long-term consideration of our defence needs. Unless we assure our supplies of arms, amn and armour,
we will remain weak and not be able to stand up to the double threat both from W and NW and N and NE.
• The ques of Chinese entry into UNO. In view of the rebuff which China has given us and the method which it
has followed in dealing with Tibet, we should not advocate its claim.
• The political and adm steps which we should take to strengthen our N and NE frontiers. This would incl the
whole of the border, i.e. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal territory in Assam.
• Measures of IS in the border areas as well as States flking those areas, such as U.P., Bihar, Bengal and Assam.
• Improvement of our comns, rd, rail, air and wireless, in these areas and with the frontier outposts.
• The future of our msn at Lhasa and the trade posts at Gyangtse and Yatung and the forces which we have in
op in Tibet to guard the trade routes.
• The policy in regard to the McMahon Line.
Key takeaways from his letter:

• China does not consider India as a friend. Its ideological façade hides its ambitions and historical claims.
• A peaceful Tibet, for centuries, was a buffer between India and China. India’s betrayal of Tibet brought
China to our doorstep and compelled us to defend on two fronts.
• Border contiguity, arising from disappearance of Tibet, would also create internal security problems from
Indian Communists. We may have to deal with Communist threats to our security along our N and N-E
frontiers where they can safely depend on Communists arsenals in China.
Recommendations:
• a mil and int appre of Chinese threat;
• re-disposn of army in the N;
• devp of infra in the border areas- rd, rail, air, comn;
• re-consider retrenchment of Army;
• increase sup of arms and amn;
• incr internal security in Bengal, Bihar, UP;
• reconsider sp to China’s entry to U.N.O.
• Finally, he was observed that our diplomats had been lulled into a false sense of confidence and were at great
pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions.
Patel passed away a little over a month after writing this letter.
How was Tawang brought under India’s Cont?
17 Jan, 1951 – Maj Bob Khating on orders of the Assam Governor Jairam Daulatram marched with 200 tps of AR
and 600 porters to Tawang to bring it under Indian Cont. Just in time before the Chinese annexation of Tibet.
The entire Tawang Tract was within Indian territory by virtue of the Simla Convention of 1914. It was however not
published. To retrieve the mistake, a new Vol. XIV to the Aitchison’s Treaties (A collection of treaties, engagements
and sanads relating to India and neighbouring countries Compiled by C.U. Aitchison, B.C.S., Under-Secretary to GOI in
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the Foreign dept) was published in 1937 with relevant docu. New maps showing the revised frontier were printed,
partly in response to Chinese maps showing the foothills as border of Sikang Province. During various dialogues,
Tibet accepted McMohan line but continued to cont and collect taxes from the Tawang tract.
In 1936 Governor of Assam , Sir Robert Reid, wanted cont of areas S of the McMahon Line as Tibetan presence in the
Tawang Tract could in future enable China to lay claim to the area by virtue of it’s suzerainty over Tibet. Under Reid’s
prodding, action was initiated at last in 1938. A small coln led by Capt. G. S. Lightfoot reached Tawang on 30 Apr,
with the objs of gathering int, showing the flag, and gauging the reaction of the Tibetans.
In response to incursions by Tibetan tax-collectors in Upper Siang Valley, cold-weather posts manned by AR were set
up at Karko and Riga in 1940 and 1941. In 1944, under threat of Japanese adv into Burma and beyond, cold-weather
posts at Karko and Riga were converted to permt AR Posts, Other posts came up at Walong and Dirang Dzong. Tibetan
tax collectors at Dirang were firmly told to leave, Tawang Tract lying S of Se La came under nominal British cont.
British did not take over N portion of Tawang Tract to avoid hurting Tibetan feelings. Once India became indep, Tibet
refused to ack India as successor state till June 1948, but did not withdraw their territorial claims on Tawang.
On 5 Oct 1950 Tibet was forced to capitulate to the Chinese and signing of the 17-pt Agreement on 23 May 1951
marked the end of Tibetan autonomy. Governor Jairamdas appreciated that once Tibet fell Tawang would be under
risk of occupation by the Chinese. He also knew PM Jawharlal Nehru – would not auth any act that could cause a
diplomatic furore. In late 1950, as Chinese advanced in Tibet, Jairamdas summoned an Assistant Political Offr Maj
Bob Khathing and explained possession of Tawang was vital for safety of the NE. He asked him to read a secret file
and go take Tawang for India, no help could be expected from GOI and the msn must remain secret.
Ralengnao Khathing was a Tangkhul Naga. He joined the Army when World War broke out, and was commissioned
in May 1941 in the 19th Hyderabad Regt (later the Kumaon Regt).
After studying the file Bob asked for two month’s time; Jairamdas gave him 45 days, and Rs. 25000/- as expenses.
Bob put together a coln of about 200 men from 2 AR and 5 AR, Capt Hem Bahadur Limbu of 5 AR and Capt Modiero
of the AMC. Tps would operate at high altitude in deep winter he needed a lot of winter clo and camping gear ; he
found it in the boxes of stores of US Air Force at the air bases of Chabua and Dinjan (they opr here in WW 2).
At Tezpur he hired 200 mules, 400 plains and 200 hill porters, and took his men to Lokra, 26 kms. N of Tezpur for
intensive trg for three wks. Scouts were sent out to recce trails and gather int, and porter teams desp to make fwd
dumps. The coln left Lokra on 17 Jan 1951.
His activity attracted attention of Maj T.C. Allen, the last British political and int offr in Assam. When Allen caught up
with the coln on 19 Jan and confronted Bob, the latter told Allen he had two choices : either join the expedition, or
be kept under arrest till the obj was attained. Allen gladly joined the coln as Khathing’s 2IC.
The coln reached Dirang Dzong on 25 Jan. The AR post
set up at Dirang Dzong in 1944 had been withdrawn,
and the area allowed to fall back under Tibetan cont.
On 26 Jan Khating raised the Indian flag and invited
locals to a barakhana, his men fired volleys into the air
and Governor’s Dakota, sent to monitor the coln’s prog,
circled above. Katuk Lama, the ruler of Dirang gave in
and sent runners out towards Tawang with warning
messages.
The coln mov out on 1 Feb, crossed Se La on 3rd and
reached Jang on 4th. Khating sent invitations for a feast
and welcomed the headmen and elders of surrounding
vills. Bob explained that they were now free citizens of India, and should stop paying taxes to Lhasa.
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The coln reached Tawang on 7 Feb. The Dzongpen, a man called Nyertsang, did not respond to Khathing’s invitation
for a mtg. O ni of 10 Feb Bob fired off 20 rds of 2-inch mor and 1000 rounds of .303 – the thunderous reverberations
from surrounding hills struck terror. Next morning the Indian tricolour was hoisted in front of the monastery and tps
marched through the town for four hours with fixed bayonets. The nervous Dzongpen sent emissaries and Bob set
Maj Allen the job of drafting a formal instrument of accession to India.
The talks made little headway, so on 13 Feb the Dzong officials were rounded up and wined and dined for a wk. Bob
then ordered them not to obey the Dzongpen. By now it was 20 Feb and Governor’s time limit was nearly up. Bob
and Allen marched into the Dzong with a hundred soldiers to make the Dzongpen understand that Tibet had ceded
Tawang to India by 1914 treaty. Nyertsang wanted Dalai Lama’s approval: “What approval?” asked Bob. “The Chinese
have taken over Tibet”. Nyertsang signed the instrument of accession drafted by Allen transferring Tawang to India.
Bob Khathing signed for GOI, appt Allen the Lt. Governor of Tawang, answerable only to Governor of Assam.
Jairamdas and Bob flew to Delhi to report what they had accomplished to Nehru. Far from praising them, a livid
Nehru ordered a complete blackout on the affair out of fear of adverse diplomatic fallout.
What is the Strat Imp of Aksai Chin?
Aksai Chin: SW extension of Tibetan plateau, one of the two large, disputed
border areas between India and China. China had occupied most parts of Aksai
Chin after the conflict of 1962.
• India claims Aksai Chin as the E most part of Ladakh.
• China claims Aksai Chin is part of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region and Tibet.
With an avg elevation of 17,000 feet, Aksai Chin consists largely of a hi, isolated,
inhospitable, and uninhabitable plain bordered to the W and SW by Karakoram Rg and to N and NE by Kunlun Mtns.
Its trn is more rugged to the NW, and there is internal drainage into small alkaline lakes in the E. The climate is cold
and dry. Because of its remoteness and isolation, Aksai Chin was long an ignored corner of the subcontinent, but the
Chinese built a mil rd (G – 219) through it in 1950s in order to connect Tibet with Xinjiang.
The Indian discovery of the rd and objection to Chinese presence was one of the factors leading to the 1962 Sino India
War. China captured and retained cont of about 14,700 sq miles (38,000 sq km) of territory in Aksai Chin.
G – 219
• Commenced in 1953-54, completed in 1957-58.
• Along existing caravan tr through Haji Langar (Aksai Chin) to Tibet. The rd enters Indian Teritory just E of Sarigh
Jilgnang, runs NW to Amtogar- striking W bank of Amtogar lake-runs NW through Yangpa, Khitai Dhawan and
Haji langar- all of them were in Indisputable Indian territory.
• Effort in Constr - Existing caravan tr. Not a major engr feet. No culvert or br reqd. Only blasting of rocks and
clearing obsts.
Security Concerns to G219 from India.
• North. DBO. Lay west of G219 and east of Karakoram pass had a dirt strip to enable speedy build up, posed
threat to G219 and also the area under Chinese claim.
• South. Brackish water lakes; Pang gong Tso and Spanggur Tso imdt west of G219. Chusul was equipped with
an airfd on west bank of Spanggur Tso. Landing of Tps at Chusul and ferry them on boats upto the rd, a
viable security concern.
Chinese wanted to provide depth to the G 219 from India.
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What Were the Principal Reasons for the War?
Dispute over the sovereignty of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh border regions led to aggressive ptlling and clashes.
• Historical legacy:
o McMahon Line drawn in 1914 without even a svy and taking China into confidence.
o India claimed Aksai Chin to be part of Ladakh whereas China claimed it as part of Xinjiang.
• Int failure: India remained unaware that Aksai Chin was already in use by China. The Chinese built a 220-km-long
rd with India being unaware about it till its completion was announced in 1957.
• Failure at ldrship:
o Tibet agreement in 1954: India consciously avoided discn about the border, leaving the bdy ques open.
o The mtg between Nehru and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai failed to br their differences.
o Misguided optimism about the ‘moral’ superiority and peaceful intentions of the Chinese ldrship: It
resulted in a weak IA that was ill-prep and ill-equipped to face realities of hard power.
• Political interference in mil affairs and excessive cont from the top.
• Adoption of by Fwd Policy by India, brainchild of IB chief BN Mullik and politicians, whose assessment was that
Chinese will not react with hostility to India constr outposts along the border; an assessment that was very wrong.
• 1950 to late 1959 marked by Chinese mil superiority, combined with cunning and diplomatic deceit, and, New
Delhi’s reluctance to change its policy towards them for nine years.
What Events Led Up to The War?

• 1947 - India independence. 1949 - Fmn of People’s Republic of China. Indian policy; maint cordial relations.
• China asserted its sovereignty over Tibet on 1 Jan 1950. India sent a letter of protest proposing negotiations.
• Chinese tps entered Tibet on 7 Oct 1950, captured town of Qamdo (Chamdo) on 19 Oct.
• Tibet requested mil assistance from India.
• Chinese and Tibetan rep signed Agreement for Peaceful Liberation of Tibet in Beijing on 23 May, 1951.
• Various Tibetan rebellions between 1951 and 59.
• 1954, China & India agreed to ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’. India tacitly accepted Chinese occupation
of Tibet but failed to obtain any quid pro quo on border issues. (A maj faux pas)
• Hub of the conflict was Aksai Chin. Although it had no strat imp for India, only national sentiments were hurt over
territorial loss. For China, it was a vital link between Tibet and Sinkiang. The media and vociferous opposn forced
Nehru to confront the Chinese on the Aksai Chin issue.
• China launched massive counter offensive and dissolved Tibetan govt headed by Dalai Lama on 28 Mar, 1959,
Panchen Lama assumed cont of the Tibetan govt on 5 Apr 1959.
• China released map showing 120,000 sq KM of Indian Territory as Chinese. When India questioned, the first
premier of PRC, Zhou Enlai responded that there were errors in the map.
• Dalai Lama fled to India in Mar 1959, China unhappy with reception by India.
• Chinese created a perception that India can be a threat to Chinese rule in Tibet and it was one of the most
prominent reasons of the Sino-India war. Further, Mao made a statement that the Lhasa rebellion in Tibet was
caused by India. Such instances catalyzed various conflicts and mil actions between India and China.
• Since India did not negotiate Aksai Chin border issue to Chinese satisfaction, China thought to teach India a lesson.
• On 20 Oct, 1962, People’s Liberation Army of China invaded India in Ladakh and Arunachal.
• China emerged victorious and retained cont of about 38,000 sq km territory in Aksai Chin.
• Misc
o Chinese ldrs were veterans of a long Civil War and easily understood Mil Issues.
o The war was not a big world event, only 2 ½ Indian and 4-5 Chinese Divs were involved.
o USA and USSR were busy in the Cuba Crisis.
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Sino Indian Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibetan region of China and India. Its Brief, what did
India lose and gain?
• Chinese moved into Tibet in 1950.

• India expressed that Tibetans would have the last voice, but like rest of the world accepted the annexation.
• Dec 1953 GOI initiated discussion in Peking between India and Tibet in the hope of settling all issues inherited
from the past and further friendship and coop.
• 29 Apr – Sino Indian Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibetan Region of China was signed.
• The GOI of India then surrendered all extra territorial rights and privileges in Tibet it had inherited from the
British and recognised Tibet as a region of China.
o Right to posn an Indian political agent at Lhasa.
o Right to main trade agencies at Gyantse, Gantok, and Yatunk as well as P&T offices alon the route to
Gyantse and Mil escorts at Gantok and Yatunk.
• China gained much from this agreement and started expanding into Tibet.
• No discns took place on bdy issues and India assumed that China accepted India’s view regarding the issue.
• The 1954 also enunciated the five principles of coexistence, Panchsheel.
What was the Panchsheel Treaty?

• With growing mil pacts between US and Pakistan in the early 1950s, India was perhaps “impelled to enter into a
somewhat asymmetrical agreement with China in April 1954 on ‘Trade and Intercourse between India and the
Tibet Region of China,’ also known as the “Panchsheel Agreement.”
• Due to this, India had to renounce its British India inherited extraterritorial rights in Tibet and recognize the ‘Tibet
region of China’ as a part of China.
• This negated the principle of reciprocity since China did not correspondingly recognize India’s sovereignty over
Kashmir. The agreement called for five principles of peaceful coexistence between India and China - mutual
respect, mutual non-interference, mutual non-aggression, equality and coop, and peaceful coexistence.
• Five Principle of Panchsheel
o Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
o Mutual non-aggression.
o Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.
o Equality and mutual benefit; and
o Peaceful co-existence.
What was the Barahoti (Bara Hoti, Hoti Plain) Issue?

Plain also called Wu-Je or Wure by the Chinese. It is a 3.9 Sq KM sloping
plain loc in the Indian state of Uttarakhand, Chamoli district. Disputed
by China, which also disputes a 750 sq KM area surrounding it. The
entire disputed area also goes by the name "Barahoti", or sometimes
"Barahoti–Sangchamalla–Lapthal disputed area".
The entire area is on the Ganges side of the Sutlej–Ganges water divide,
which is also the current LAC between India and China.
Barahoti was the first loc in Indian territory claimed by China in 1954. In
1960, China added Lapthal and Sangchamalla to the dispute stating that
three places formed one composite area.
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On 17 July 1954, China lodged an official complaint about thirty Indian tps invading into "Wu-je area of the Tibet
region of China". It claimed that they had crossed Niti Pass, which was said to be in violation of the Panchsheel.
China requested India to withdraw all tps from the area. India responded that tps were stationed at Barahoti plain,
which is "S-E of the Niti Pass and in Indian territory". India also pted out that some Tibetan officials had attempted to
enter Barahoti without proper docu; Accusations and counteraccusations would proliferate over next three years.
Barahoti remains a forgotten non-state space and is hardly visible in local discourse — it is primarily used by the
Bhotiya tribesmen and their Tibetan counterparts as a grazing grnd.
Discuss the Geography of the Sino Indian Border?
The root cause of all differences lie in an ill-defined, 3,440 km

border that both countries dispute. It covers Ladakh, Himachal
Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh. The Sino-Indian
border is divided into three sects: W sect, Middle sect, and E sect.
W Sect
India shares about 2152 km border with China between
union territory of Ladakh and Xinjiang province of China.
Starts from Tri Jn of India, China and Afghanistan, runs E
through the Kilik Pass, Mintaka Pass, Kharchanai Pass,
Parpik Pass and the Khunjerab Pass. Thne along a spur on
the NW bend of Shaksam R. Crosses and follows the crest
of Aghil mtns watershed. Through Aghil, Marpo and
Karakoram passes. To the watershed between Shyok and
Yarkhand Rs. Cross Qara Qash R and ascend to Kun Lun
Mtns then descend to Lanal Pass to Kone Pass, Kepsang
Pass in the watershed along Chag Chenmo and
Chumesang watershed. Skirts the W extremity of the E
half of Pengong so cuts across the E Part of Spanggur.
Follow Indus Valley watershed through Chang and Jara
Passes. Turn S Wwards cross Indus 8 KM SE of Demchok.
Follow water shed between Hanle R and tributaries of Sutlej R passing through Charding, Imiss and Kyungzing passes.
Cross Pare R 8 KM S of Chumar and reach the Gya Peak.
The dispute is over Aksai Chin. India claims it as part of erstwhile Kashmir, while China claims it is part of Xinjiang.
In 1847, British wrote to China and Tibet to appt a jt bdy commission. China replied, that border was well defined and
there was no need for such ex. An agreement signed in 1858 between Kashmir and Tibet confirmed the traditional
border. Even the official maps of China of 1873, 1917, and 1919 exactly replicated the Indian maps. During British rule
in India two borderlines were proposed – Johnson’s line and McDonald line in 1865 and 1893 resp.
• The Johnson’s line shows Aksai Chin in Ladakh under India’s cont, McDonald Line places it under China’s cont.
• India considers Johnson Line as a rightful border with China, while China considers the McDonald Line.
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Different claims and perceptions of LAC have led to an overlapping area, within that area lies a small zone which both
the sides ptl causing clashes. At present, LAC is the line separating Indian areas of Ladakh from Aksai Chin. It is
concurrent with the Chinese Aksai Chin claim line.
Central Sect
From Gya Peak to the trijn of Tibet, India and Bhutan. 625 km from Ladakh to Nepal. The states of Himachal Pradesh
and Uttarakhand touch the border with Tibet in this sect. 225 KM in the state of Sikkim. The border here is well defined
and follows geographical features and water sheds.
Eastern Sect
India shares 1140 km bdy with China. The bdy line is
called McMahon Line runs from E limit of Bhutan to a pt
near Talu Pass at trijn of Tibet, India, and Myanmar.
It is defined by the principal of the watershed line. N is
Tibet and S NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh).
Five frontier divs in NEFA from W to E – Kameng,
Subansiri, Siang, Lohit and Tirap (S of Brahmaputra,
bordering Burma (Myanmar).
Majority of the territory of Arunachal Pradesh is claimed by China as a part of Southern Tibet. China considers
McMahon line illegal. McMahon proposed the line in the Simla Accord in 1914 to settle the bdy between Tibet and
India, and Tibet and China. Though Chinese rep initialled the agreement, they subsequently refused to accept it.
Beijing remains committed to Arunachal Pradesh largely because of the sensitivity to its claim on Tibet. If China
concedes Arunachal Pradesh as a part of India, they could be forced to recognize other, historically Tibetan regions as
also beyond her sovereignty.
Why in the 1950s did India not Protest to China about the wrong depiction of the Maps?
• India believed that our bdys with Tibet were historical and there was no need for any debate.
• In 1950 some Chinese maps showed 93,240 KMs in NEFA and 31,080 Km in NE Ladakh with China. In 1954
when PM Nehru vis China, brought to their notice. China replied that maps were old Koumintang maps and
the govt had no time to revise them. In 1956 during his vis to India. Chou en Lai repeated his assurance
which India accepted in good faith.
• On 20 Nov 1950 PM Nehru in Parliament: Our maps show that our bdy with Tibet is defined by the McMohan
line. This policy not ques by the PRC.
• Did not come up for discussion in signing of the Sino Indian Agreement on Tibet in 1954. Once the
agreement had concluded and India accepted Tibet as a region of China and given up all rights in Tibet
inherited from the British, the Chinese could manipulate the bdy issue.
• Within wks of Chou en Li’s vis to India, on 17 Jul 1954, PRC lodged a protest against presence of Indian tps in
Barahoti (They call it Wu Je) three KMs S of the border pass Tun Jun La in Uttar Pradesh. This was the first
time that the Chinese questioned any border alignment with India.
• In Jul 1958, a Chinese official publication showed whole of NEFA except Tirap Frontier Div, large areas of
Ladakh and areas in Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and even Bhutan in China. To India’s polite protest,
they repeated that these were reprints of pre 1949 maps. However, they added that they had not surveyed
these areas yet and nor consulted the countries concerned; hinting at the bdy as an open issue.
• 14 Dec 1958 PM Nehru in a letter pointed out that no svy could fix these well known bdys and there was no
ques of a discn.
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• Chou en Li replied on 23 Jan 1959 and emphasised on the svy and a need to maint status quo till then. About
not raising the border issue during the 1954 agreement, he smartly replied, that the time at that time was
not ripe for the settlement and that the Chinese side had no time to study the ques.
• While extending these excuses, the Chinese Army kept on incr their intrusion into the Indian territory.
• In a letter of 8 Sep 1959, Chou el Li brazenly declared that that the Chinese Govt does not accept the
McMohan line and laid claim to 90,000 sq Kms of territory S of it and some large areas in the W and Central
sects, he suggested status quo and discussions. Status Quo by the Chinese meant that both the armies
withdraw 20 Kms from the McMohan Line in the E and from the line that each exercises cont in the W. This
implied that for the Chinese to withdraw from Longju the only area occupied by them S of the McMohan
line, IA would withdraw 20 Kms into its own territory. In Ladakh China had penetrated more than 20 Kms
into Indian territory, IA would have to withdraw further into its own territory. China wanted to consolidate
its hold over areas it had nibbled into India.
• Nehru replied on 26 Sep and blamed the Chinese for the incursion. Status quo he claimed must be return to
the traditional bdys.
• Chinese replied with a bloody incident in Kongka pass in Oct 1959.
Mao’s simile, Tibet was a Palm consisting of Five Fingers: Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Assam, the whole of
which had to be liberated.
After various incidents of Border Violations by the PLA and the brutal Kongka La incident, what steps were taken
to protect the Northern Borders with Tibet?
• With the fall of Sinkiang in 1949, the Indian borders had become contiguous with communist China.
• A jt Army – IB post was set up Panamik/Shyok to cover the route from Karakorum.
• Ptls were sent to the Karakorum in summers to check for any transgression.
• In 1951, 21 Checkposts were set up on the Indo Tibetian border: 1 in Ladakh, 3 in HP, 6 in UP, 5 in N Bengal,
3 in Sikkim and 3 in NEFA.
• In 1951 China invaded Tibet. India had no Mil option to defend Tibet due a weak Army and lgs issues.
• A small committee and later a large committee in Nov 1950 under Dy Def Minister Maj Gen Himmatsinhji
was set up to: study problems created by the Chinese aggression in Tibet and to make recommendations
about measures that should be taken to improve, adm, def and comns etc in all frontier areas.
• Its ‘Recommendation’ incl that of devp rds was not pursued with any urgency.
Briefly discuss the Himmatsinhji Report (N and NE Border Def Committee)

Besides Maj Gen Himmatsinghji, Dy Minister of Def (Chairman), committee incl Lt Gen Kulwant Singh, K. Zakaria,
Head Historical Div of MEA, S.N. Haksar, Jt Secy, MEA, Gp Capt MS Chaturvedi from IAF and Waryam Singh, Dy Dir IB.
Comprehensive recommendations to suggest improvements in the fd of devp, adm, def and security incl the Army
and AF, the CAPF incl the AR and other Police units comns and int.
For NEFA
• Reorg of Adm units and extension of services till the Borders.
• Fmn of a Frontiers Service for tribal welfare.
• Reorg and Remp of Mil Services in the area. Incr in Inf and Sp arms.
• Devp of airfds and xtn of Rdrs network into the E frontiers. Extensive use of air tptn.
• Extension of rds to connect all AR border posts and administrative units.
• Similar R for others sects i.e W and central.
66
What was the Thorat Plan? What were the Mistakes in Dply in the Kameng Sect in Early Sep 1962 onwards.
In 1957 Lt Gen SPP Thorat took over E Comd with its HQ at Lucknow. His area of resp stretched to the E end of
India’s borders — but NEFA was not incl until 1959. After he had gone around his comd, Gen Thorat was asked by
Gen Thimayya, the COAS to make an appre for the def of NEFA. The report prep by him in 1959 stated that:
• Previously, the only real threat against India was from Pakistan. Now China has been added.
• China has refused to recognise the McMahon Line as IB and has made incursions into our territory in Ladakh,
Uttar Pradesh and NEFA.
Gen Thorat, made a very careful analysis of possible options for Chinese Offensives. He appre that:
• There were at six maj ingress routes through passes into NEFA by which large org en forces with hy eqpt and
tpt could enter India.
• The imp thrusts were likely to be along the lines Tawang-Bomdi La possibly sp by minor thrusts from the flks,
Longru-Dumporijo-Ziro and along Rima-Kibithoo-Teju.
• The trn favoured the Chinese because on their side was a plateau and posed no problems for China to bring
in tps, guns, hy eqpt, amn and sups needed for the maint of a large attking force.
• However once in Indian territory they would have to make rds and trs for maint of the forces. Winter would
restrict time avlb for ops. While the en will have initiative and will initially succeed in making some
penetrations, as the en advs farther from his main bases, he will face problems of sp and maint his forces.
Once the en reaches such a sit, Thorat felt that the Indians would be on an equal footing with the en as far as sp and
maint problems were concerned and would be able to give the en a tough battle and hold him there.
• He called it the ‘Defence Line’, comprising a number of vital pts, along different valleys of the NEFA. This line
would be about halfway between the McMohan Line and the Foothills.
• Thorat recommended that N of this line, he would utilise AR, whose tasks would be to give early warning, to
put up maximum possible resistance, fight delaying actions and ultimately withdraw to the Defence Line.
• Once the en reaches the Defence Line, he would be halted, destroyed/driven back.
He also assessed: A min of 70 pls, with 20 in res, were needed for the def of Northern Sect of NEFA. AR then had
only 36 pls. (Three pls per coy would mean some 30 plus coys or 10 bns needed to man what he called ‘screens’ or
small bodies of tps to provide advance warning of a Chinese attk. The need for addl sp tps, eqpt, sigs comn, mors,
arty and the like was also listed. Additional tps were obviously needed for the main defences.
Based on his appre, Thorat recommended a three tier defence plan for NEFA (Reiterated during Ex Lal Kila):
• A fwd line of outposts close to the McMohan Line meant for svl and EW, str and dir of apch with a mandate
to fall back before the Chinese could move fwd and over run them.
• The second line of defence was designed to delay the en by forcing him to dply and clear the posn before
further adv. Suitability of the grnd was decisive to compel the en to pause, step up his lgs and fire sp ele thus
imposing delay. Delay would help assess en’s thrust lines and enable stg fwd the res.
• The third layer of defence was to be at a line lgs maintainable. The dist and the topo of the posn would
facilitate the protection of own axis of maint from en interference. This would auto extend en’s lines of
comn and make them vulnerable. That would force the en to give up under pressure which could then be
exploited to destroy the
force. The decisive last
man last round battle
was to be fought at this
loc. Main defs are
chosen on the basis of
suitable trn, comns and
lgsl potential.
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Gen Thorat made detailed studies of IB reports, the trn, time taken by Chinese tps to cover dists and their preps to
accurately predict a Chinese attk. He also underscored the urgent need to devp rds and surface infra in the area to sp
mov of large bodies of own tps. Earlier, in 1950-51, a committee led by Dy Defence Minister Maj Gen
Himmatsinghji had toured the area extensively and submitted a similar rqmt for the devp of the surface infra.
By the time the war started, a jeep-able rd linking Tezpur to Tawang had come up but beyond that the 30 odd kms to
the border was still a hard slogging march. A helipad and some lgs areas were also est in the Tawang area.
After further study and lessons learnt from a high level mil ex ‘Ex Sheel’ he recommended a spl Mtn Div be raised for
Indo – Tibet border. The Defence Minister considered it ‘too much’ since only minor border clashes were involved.
On 8 Oct 1959, the Thorat plan was sent to Army HQs where Gen Thimayya approved it and personally showed it to
Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon. Menon dismissed it as ‘alarmist and unnecessary and boasted that he was
confident of stopping the Chinese on his own with diplomacy’. Another reason for rejection was that Nehru had
boasted in Parliament that he would defend every inch of Indian Territory. So how could India defend every inch of
her sacred land against the en if the army envisaged siting its main def half way back from the Border.
Unfortunately, the sane mil logic could not be comprehended by the political ldrship and bureaucracy.
Gen Thorat retired in May 1961 but was called to Delhi by Nehru after the 1962 debacle. Nehru asked as to why he
was not shown the Thorat Plan?
On 17 Mar, 1960, Lt Gen SPP Thorat, conducted a Wargame called “Exc Lal Quila” that accurately predicted the
timing and nature of a possible Chinese attk. It was attended by all Principal Staff Offrs from the Army HQ. It was
clearly brought out that, with the tps, wpns and eqpt avlb at that time, a Chinese attk could not be contained or
defeated, and the ‘fwd policy’, advocated by the Defence Minister and Lt Gen BM Kaul, was not practical.
What were the Salient Pts of the Thorat Plan for the Defence of NFEA?
In early stgs of war attkers has advantage; he can choose the time and place for attk and apply all his str at any given
pt. The defender once he has loc the main thrust moves his res on a grnd of his own choosing to defeat the thrust.
The salient pts of Gen Thorat's Plan was that our main forces must not be stretched thin along the length of the
border where every mil advantage would lie with the en. Instead, the def plan must allow for an initial en
penetration, while our main forces prepare to defeat the invader in a depth area, on grnd of our own choosing and
where we could bring superior resources to bear on the battleFd.
Thorat envisaged manning the border with AR, whose task would be to give Early Warning, delay the en, and either
harass the en's line of comn as stay behind guerrillas or fall back to the S sect to thicken its defences. Regular forces
would hold the S sect which unlike the N sect would be accessible by rd and thus lgs feasible.
As the en comes farther away from his bases across the Mcmohan line, his comns would get stretched; he will find it
difficult to maint his forces, the sit will get worse day by day. A stg will come when his maint difficulties would be
same as the IA which had a very weak infra close to the Tibetan border. This defence line was proposed by Thorat to
be running E – W through the middle of NEFA.
• The defence line will consist of a succession of vital pts. Their choice will depend not only on their tac value
but also on our ability to maint and sp them. This presupposes that there should be a rdhead or an airhead
at each of these pts.
• Likely Strong Pts on the Def Line recommended by Thorat were Tawang (Kameng Divison) - Ziro-Daporigo
(Subansiri Div) - Along (Siang Div) - Roing - Tezu - Lohitpur Hayuliang (Lohit Div) - Jairampur (Tirap divison).
• Beyond this no penetration would be acceptable and en would be pushed back beyond the McMohan Line.
• This line will divide NEFA into two halves North and South.
• Had the plan been taken into stride on time, a large number of cas and a massive defeat could have been
prevented.
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What was the Kongka La Incident? What was its fallout
Elevation 16,965 ft, Kongka La is a high mtn pass in the
Chang-Chemno Rg. China considers the Kongka Pass as its
bdy with India, whereas India regards Lanak Pass further E
as the bdy.
• In Oct 1959, Indian police party sent to set up
posts in three locs — Tsogtsalu, Hot
Springs and Shamal Lungpa — in undisputed
Indian territory per the recent Chinese maps. The
party was led by an IB offr Dy Supdt, Karam Singh.
• As late as June 1958, Singh had led ptls to Lanak La
without incidents. Singh states that they had est a
post at Hot Springs and were about to head to
Shamal Lungpa when, on 20 Oct, two men sent out
for recce went missing.
• The same evening, Singh dispatched a 10-men-strong party to investigate the disappearance, who returned
late ni and reported extensive hoofmarks in the region suggesting the presence of Chinese cavalry.
• Morn 21 Oct, a fwd search party of 20 men set out on ponies under Singh; the rest followed on foot.
• Singh encountered Chinese soldiers on top of a hill, who belonged to the 6th Cavalry Regt and were well-
entrenched in their posn. A firefight ensued after negotiations failed. Nine Indian policemen were killed
during the engagement, one died later of his injuries, and seven were taken prisoner.
• One Chinese soldier of the rank of "Deputy Sqn Ldr" was killed too.
• Tyagi leading the foot coln was info of the firefight by one of Singh's constables but they were under
simultaneous attk and failed to be of any help; however, his team incurred no fatalities despite injuries on
several men. On 22 Oct, Tyagi retreated to Tsogtsalu and four severely injured men were evacuated by air.
• Imdt after this incident the border in the W Sect was handed over to the Army on 24 Oct 1959.
What was the Fwd Policy. What did it aim to achieve? Discuss the Dhola Post Incidence?
Chinese aggressive activities had been continuing and incr since 1959. In Sep 1959, the DMI had prep an appre on
the threat by China on the Northern Borders which deduced:
• With the present state of devp, it was unlikely that the Chinese could launch any kind of an incursion.
• Or, create a sit where there is likelihood of a maj op taking place. Yet it added
• The intention of the Chinese coming over the Himalayas is apparent.
Based on a detailed appre of the Chinese dply R were made for posning of Indian tps in threatened areas.
Constraints for Imdt Implementation
• No grave threat was envisaged militarily and politically.
• Instead of rattling swords, it was felt that the issue can be resolved diplomatically.
• For various reasons, expansion and modernisation of the Indian Mil had not taken place since independence.
Doing so now would be an economic burden and at the cost of development.
• Lgs imposed numerous problems, there were no rds in the border areas. In Jan 1960 a Border Rds Org was
set up – Gen Engg Res Force (GREF).
• To start with the Police str was incr in Border areas.
The Fwd Policy consisted of an innovative mix of diplomatic and mil pressure. It represented something qualitatively
new in Indian China policy, which had thus far been driven by a diplomatic effort to cultivate pan-Asian friendship.
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Triggers:
• In Sep 1957, Chinese announced the rd from Xinjiang through Aksai Chin to Tibet was nearly completed.
• After the Tibetan revolt of Mar 1959, two border clashes in autumn of 1959 and failed negotiations in Apr
1960, diplomatic deadlock and increasing public pressure forced the adoption a new policy from Nov 1961.
By spring 1962, small gps of Indian soldiers est series of largely symbolic ‘fwd posts’, in unoccupied but disputed
border areas. Addl, Indian tps filled vacuums close to or surrounding Chinese mil posns, and even penetrated behind
them, to frustrate their vital lines of sup and comn. Chinese protested, Indian conceived it as defensive measures.
Army HQs gave impetus to setting up of new posts under Op ONKAR (launched in 1960) in areas as near to the
Border as practicable. According to this plan, there was to be large scale expansion of the AR, their units were to dply
all along the frontier and areas not occupied so far. Manned by AR but est under guidance of the IA. Loc to be
decided primarily by the IB, although the AHQ had auth Eastern Comd to dply as they deemed fit. By 20 July 1962 a
total of thirty four posts (8 in Kameng, 7 in Siang and 11 in Lohit Frontier) were est in NEFA along the Borders with
Tibet. The newly est posts, manned largely by AR, incl one at Dhola, which was est little S of Namka Chu on 04 Jun
1962, under the guidance of Capt Mahabir Prasad of 1 SIKH, who had accompanied the AR Party.
Dhola post was ab initio required to be sited at the jn of Tibet, Bhutan, and India, however excessive snowfall
rendered it inaccessible, and was loc on S bank of Namka Chu on 4 Jun 1962, named after the Dhola ridge loc a few
miles to S. It was sited largely for adm and had little defence potential. Further, it was loc in territory, which was
disputed and in lt of contradictory claims, clarifications were sought by GOC 4 Inf Div. The post would become the
centre stg of the Sino-Indian war of 1962.
Dhola was surrounded by hi features of Tsangdhar and ThagLa and lay on
banks of Namka Chu R; good avlb of water and ease of maint. While the
post was being est, Capt Prasad had sent a ptl to the crest of Thag La;
most dominating feature in the area and was unoccupied. In retrospect,
if Tag La was indeed our territory, and if Prasad had decided to hold it,
the course of history may have been different!
On 8 Sep 1962, 0800 H approx 60 Chinese tps crossed Namka Chu and
surrounded Dhola post, they dest two log brs close to the post. The post
cdr an AR JCO exaggerated the str to 600 in his report. He was ordered to
hold grnd and rfts ex 9 PUNJAB at Lumpu were moved to Dhola. On 20
Sep, two Chinese threw hand grenades and consequently three Indian
soldiers were wounded. Firing from both sides continued intermittently till 29 Sep 1962.
What was Op Leghorn? How did it prog?
On 22 Sep, MoD issued written orders to the COAS to evict the Chinese in the Kameng Div as soon as he was ready.
Op was codenamed Op LEGHORN. 7 Inf Bde was tasked, it was ill prep, since it lacked arty and lgs sp. Cdrs in chain
postponed the date of completion of built up for offensive from 21 Sep to 29 Sep and later to 1 Oct and 5 Oct. This
was due to challenges in air drop of vital stores incl amn; failure to anticipate rqmts. Meanwhile, Gen Umrao Singh,
GOC 33 Corps was divested of the resp of NEFA and task was handed over to newly raised 4 Corps under Lt Gen BM
Kaul, he assumed charge on 4 Oct with the resolve of commencing Op LEGHORN by 10 Oct. He rushed to Dhola Post
and ordered 7 Inf Bde to conc at Tsangdhar. He also signalled to Eastern Comd to hasten the Air Drops and push fwd
amn, sups and mors. Inaccurate Airdrops and non avlb of porters delayed the buildup. 8 Oct, the Corps Cdr ordered 2
RAJPUT and 1/9 GORKHA Rif down from Tsanghar to join tps along the R line.
The bns were in place on 9 Oct. The Corps Cdr decided to make a ‘positional warfare’ mvre, since it was difficult for
7 Inf Bde to evict the Chinese from Thag La. The plan included occupation of Yumtso La, W of Thag La, where they
would take dominating posns behind the Chinese, as Yumtso La was still unoccupied. Gen Kaul chose the apch via
Tseng-jong and the task was assigned to the RAJPUTs.
70
On 8 Oct one pl of ‘D’ Coy 9 PUNJAB (Maj
Chaudhary), left for Tseng-jong to est a br h on
N bank Namka Chu, occupied loc at 1500 h.
One sec of the pl occupied Karpola II hts next
morn. One pl of A Coy 9 PUNJAB left for Tseng-
jong on 9 Oct at 1000 h to reinforce the pl.
The Chinese did not react; they only threw a
gren at at Br IV at about 2030 h. However, at
dawn of 10 Oct, when tps from 2 RAJPUT were
mov up the S bank of the Namka Chu, making
for the planned Xg pt to Yumtso La – a PLA Bn moved down the ridge, to form up for an attk on Tseng-jong.
Indian posn at Tseng-jong came under fire of hy mors at 0800 h approx 800 Chinese attked the PUNJABIs at Tseng-
jong from E and NE. After a hy exch of fire for 45 mins, the attk was repulsed. As Indian tps had only pouch amn, Maj
Chaudhary requested for MG and mor fire from Br IV posn, rqst was not accepted. A little later, the en reformed for
a second time, and started assaulting the posn at 0930 h.
By then, the PUNJABIs sec, on Karpola II mov close to the flk of the Chinese. While the latter were bunched together
and opened fire. The Chinese were caught in the cross-fire of LMG and suffered hy cas. They reacted by opening up
hy mors. The Sec under Hav Malkiat Singh was asked to withdraw to Tseng-jong.
Maj Chaudhary contacted his Bn Cdr Lt Col RN Mishra, on radio and info him that as the en was forming up again, it
would be difficult for his men to hold the grnd unless sp by MMGs and mors from Br IV. Col Misra agreed, but it was
turned down by Brig Dalvi after consultations with Div and Corps Cdrs. Brig Dalvi was of the opinion that the fire sp
would attract a response which may have been catastrophic for the RAJPUTs who were on the mov at that time.
The en assaulted the posn a third time at 1200 hours from three sides – N, E and W – with 82 mm Mors, 2-in Mors,
grens and auto wpns. Hand to hand fighting devp. Orders were issued at 1230 h by the Bde Cdr to withdraw.
Consequently, tps at Tseng-jong reached S of Namka Chu at around 1530 h. Peking Radio and Press announced their
cas as 77 dead and 100 wounded. In Tseng-jong, three MVC and two Vir Chakras were awarded to 9 PUNJAB.
Sep Kanshi Ram overpowered a Chinese soldier and snatched his auto rifle and brought it with him, for which he was
decorated with MVC. Naik Chain Singh was awarded MVC posthumously for bravery. Maj Chaudhary died of his
wounds and was awarded MVC posthumously for “display of remarkable ldrship and courage in extricating whatever
was left of the pls.” Besides Hav Malkiat Singh, Sep Suram Chand was another recipient of VrC
They fought a well prep, equipped and sp en, who outnumbered them 1:10, with almost nothing. Corps Cdr
witnessed the serious sit in which Indian tps were placed in the Dhola area. The fact that Chinese could counter-attk
in a big way was also evident. Gen Kaul sent a message to E Comd and AHQ that “a grave sit had developed” that day
at Tseng-jong, and sought permission to personally present the case before them to seek further orders. AHQ called
him to Delhi, before leaving, Gen Kaul told GOC 4 Div that instrs to drive the en back were in abeyance till he
returned and present posns were to be held. By 16 Oct, HQ 7 Inf Bde had been est at Rongla, close to Dhola Post.
The dply of the Bde was as under:-
• 4 GREN less two coys at Br I; one coy at Serkhim , pl at Hathungla; one coy at Drokung Samba under HQ 4 Inf Div.
• 9 PUNJAB less one coy was holding Br II; the fourth coy was dply at Br V/ Tsangle.
• 2 RAJPUT less three coys was at Br IV; the remaining three coys were at Br III, Temp Br and Log Br resp.
• 1/9 GR less a coy was in Chauri Hut above Dhola; one coy covering the gap between Br III and Br II ahead of
Rongla, with pl at Tsangdhar.
• A bty of 34 Hy Mor Regt and a tp of 77 Para Fd Regt were at Tsangdhar
• A pl each of C Coy of 6 MAHAR (MG) was loc with 1/9 GR and 2 RAJPUT, the third pl still at Tawang.
• 100 Fd Coy less a pl was at Rongla, the third pl being at Tawang.
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Although wpns of sp arms were in posn,
amn was low. Only two guns of the tp of
Para Fd Regt were able to fire, other two
damaged in the air drop. The total arty of
the Bde consisted of four 4.2 inch mors
and two para-fd guns. The amn avlb at
dump at Tsangdhar was approx 500
rounds of fd and 450 rounds of 4.2 inch
mor amn. Gun amn had been placed at
the gun posn but mor amn had still not
reached mor posns. Due to short rg,
mors had to be sited about 2.5 Km N of
Tsangdhar DZ. All pers were emp in prep
mor posn and no addl MP was avlb to
shift the mor amn. One subsdy SA
amn dump was est along side 1/9 GR to facilitate ferry fwd amn, but this dump had still to be stked. Chinese
launched their main offensive along the entire front on 20 Oct 1962 and termed their action as self-defence.
Discuss the Mistakes made in the Kameng Sect?
Tawang should have been the main centre of str, it however lacked tps; the bulk having been dply to a flk in the NAMKA
CHU Valley, without adequate lgs sp and in tac unsound posns.
Sending 7 Inf Bde into the Valley was a hurried, tac and lgs unsound decision by Corps Cdr - Lt Gen BM Kaul.
• 7 Inf Bde rushed in without adequate wpns, amn, fire sp and sups. They were in their summer uniform.
• Dply too far fwd along the Namkachu R bank in posns dominated by the en from the Thagla ridge.
• Dply extended and not tac leading to ease of the en infilt and encircling of the fwd IA posts.
• Comns were not adequate and were easily cut by the en.
The Mistakes
• In the Tawang Sect, despite resistance at Bumla post, other well prep posns at Tawang, Sela and Bomdila were
fairly fwd and the en could infiltrate in large nos and adequate sp to defeat these posns in quick time.
• Lines of comns Bomdila to Tawang were vulnerable and cut at many places, the en also laid ambushes.
• Once Bomdila fell, there was no res avlb to destroy the extended en.
• Holding of SELA was accepted by Army Cdr [Sen], presumably, on orders of GS of AHQ. That SELA was a strong
natural tac posn is fine, but it reqd extra tps and lgs sp to hold it. Neither of these were planned/provided.
• Lull between Chinese offensives brought about complacency and 4 Corps were given tps haphazardly.
• Interference at Tac levels. While the NEFA battles were resp 4 Corps. Overall defensive plg and provn of lgs
sp was the comd and AHQ. Unfortunately, there was interference at tac level and overall plg and lgs sp was
conspicuous by its absence.
• Dispersal of Forces in Penny-Packets. Complacency in allotting of defence sects to bdes, and lack of urgency
in devp defenses during the lull pd.
• Poor ldrship of 4 Corps [Kaul] who could have stopped dispersal and energized prep of defences.
• There was frenzied reaction to the Chinese apch to BOMDILA (between Sela pass and the foothills).
o 5 GUARDS was hurriedly ordered up from the main defenses of BOMDILA with inadequate amn and
fire sp, and rushed to THEMBANG to meet the en half-way.
o Sending of the bn to fight it out by itself in hurriedly prep defences against an en regt (equal to a Bde)
or more was a mistake. Even if the bn had to be sent, this should have been planned and org earlier.
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o Inspite of these handicaps the Bn fought well till its amn was spent. That it had to withdraw and then
get disintegrated is neither the fault of the Bn nor of the Bde. The loss of 5 GUARDS, lies on 4 Div.
• Fall of THEMBANG possibility of Rd BOMDILA–DIRANG DZONG being cut and DIRANG DZONG being infested
made Div HQs panic. Tps from Bdes were rushed for protection. Stories concocted to make the withdrawal
case strong - 62 Bde led to believe it was in danger, withdrawal forced so that Div HQs could withdraw.
• The Div committed the Bde to withdraw within a matter of hours on ni 17/18 Nov the bn holding KAILA Pass.
The withdrawal led to panic in 1 SIKH and abandonment of SELA and eventual disintegration of 62 Inf Bde.
• The last role of the Div HQs was its flt. A strong force of all arms of over 2500 vanished in a matter of mins.
This was NOT the fault of the tps nor of units but of lack of centralized ldrship and cont in the face of the en.
• The Div dissolved and the last of its bdes was broken up by the Army Cdr [Sen], the Corps Cdr [Kaul], and the
Dir of Mil Ops [Maj. Gen. D.K. Palit]. Ignorant of the tac layout, out of touch with the sit in BOMDILA, they
planned an ordered the moving OUT of a sizeable force from the already bare BOMDILA defences to open the
Rd BOMDILA – DIRANG DZONG. For what purpose and for whom on the morn of 18 Nov is NOT clear.
• This order was directly respe for fall of BOMDILA. There were four coys left in the BOMDILA. On the flk where
the Chinese attked, there was one pl, where there should have been a bn. This sealed the fate of BOMDILA.
• Once BOMDILA fell, the Corps Cdr gave orders and counter-orders as to where the Chinese should be held. It
was first BOMDILA, then right back to FOOT HILLS, then fwd to RUPA, and, finally midway to CHAKU.
Similar was the case in Walong, once the en had reached Walong.
Discuss the Suitability of Tawang as Defensive Posn? What was its Dply?
Tawang valley wedged between Tibet and Bhutan is connected with the mainland through Se La pass, ht of 13,700 ft,
and marks the entry pt for the administrative jurisdiction of Tawang.
Tawang - Elevation 10,000 ft. N of Tawang Chu R, roughly 16 km S of the LAC. It is the site of a
famous Gelugpa Buddhist Monastery. Inhabited by the Monpa people. It is loc. It lies at the jn of three imp tracks
that led to Tibet. Though tac not as defensible as Bomdila or Se la, Tawang had been nominated as the Div
Vital Grnd, which implied that its loss would render the defences of the Kameng sect untenable.
The resp of defending Tawang, earlier with 7 Inf Bde, had been given to 4 Arty Bde after the former moved to the
Namka Chu sect. The tps avlb for this task were two inf bns and six pls of ARs. Dply 21 Oct 1962 was as under:-
• 1 SIKH on Bum La axis. Bn HQ, A & C coys in area
Milaktong La; B Coy at Pamdir with a pl at
Sumatso; D Coy at Tongpeng La with a pl at IB
Ridge, two km S of Bum La.
• 4 GARH Rifles Defence of Tawang, with A Coy at
Tawang, overlooking the track to Bum La; C Coy
at Landa Vill on tr and D Coy at Pankentang, with
a pl at Gyshie La for ptlling. B Coy at Ziminthang,
looking after defence of Div Tac HQ.
• One coy of 13 DOGRA was avlb, having arr at
Tawang on 21 Oct. Cdr 62 Inf Bde with his HQs
also reached Tawang by 22 Oct.
• HQ ‘A’ wing 5 AR with two pls was at Tawang; with one pl at Bum La and one at Sumatsu. Two other pls were in
area Chuna and Dhola.
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Tawang’s is strategic and culturally significant to China.
• Houses the Tawang monastery, 2nd largest Tibetan Buddhist monastery in the world only after Potala Palace.
• Tawang is birthplace of sixth Dalai Lama Tsangyang Gyatso, who was reincarnation of fifth Dalai Lama Ngawang
Lobsang Gyatso or Great Fifth, the first Dalai Lama to become the spiritual and temporal head of Tibet.
• Tawang monastery is where the present Dalai Lama (14th) stayed for wks after escaping China in 1959. Hence,
from China’s perspective it becomes an imp site in the history of Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule; if Tibet
was to rise up against China, Tawang would, emerge as an imp centre of resistance.
• Strategically and Tacly: Provides a strat entry into India’s NE region. To N of Tawang lies the imp Bum La Pass,
which is a border pass between India’s Tawang district and Chinese-occupied Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).
Do you think the decision to abandon Tawang was well thought of?
NO
• ‘D’ Coy ex 1 SIKH fought a successful def battle, already thwarted three Chinese attacks at Bumla.
• Chinese could not by pass Tongpeng La, further rft would have strengthened the def capb of Bum La.
• Two Bn (4 GARH & 13 DOGRA) were dply around Tawang, and adequately prep to defend Tawang.
• Had DMO not stopped fwd mov of tps of 62 & 48 Bde, three more Bns would be avlb for def of Tawang and Br 4.
• En was fwg remnants of 7 Bde & 4 Div along Zimithang-Shakti-LumLa-Tawang axis: Lines of Comn extended.
• 13 DOGRA guarding Lum La-Tawang apch would have effectively disorganised en advance.
• Even if en rushed to Br 4 by 24 Oct morn, en would have been engaged by own tps on either bank of Tawang Chu.
• Tac Advantages of Tawang
o Def Prep & Stocking of Tawang.
o Best stocked posn in the region.
o Only after Dhola incident on 8 Sep, stocking and dropping effect shifted its Lumpu and then to Tsangdhar.
o Tawang def were prep as VG in Last two yrs.
• Subsequently VG chosen as Se La – No adequate recce, hts unfavourable for dply, easily by passable via multiple
existing routes, No def existed for withdrawing tps who were closely being followed by advancing en, No stocking,
No suitable DZ to cater for eventuality on being cut off.
• Fall Back to ‘Jang’ from Tawang. provided no addl advantage vis-s-vis Tawang. - Not a defensible dominating grnd,
under obsn and en arty rg from Tawang and even further North, no prep of def or stocking.
• Impact on Def of Kameng Frontier Div - Opened a Gateway Directly to Assam Plains, no well prep and held def
south of Tawang, Se La nominated as VG which was by passable via multiple existing routes, defs and withdrawl
plans for Se La were not prep, Dirang Dzong, BomdiLa not coordinated and rehearsed, no adequate stocking, in
adequate arty sp, disorganised withdrawl, en closely following, rapid and indiscriminate re grouping of Bn.
• Multiple changes in comd structure.
o 4 Div GOC – Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad – Maj Gen Anant Pathania.
o 4 Arty Bde – Brig Kalyan Singh – Brig G S Gill. 78
o 62 Inf Bde – Brig Nandi Lal – Brig Hoshiar Singh.
o Led to Decision Making Vacuum, in appropriate selection of new cdrs, remote cont by Kaul from Delhi.
A three coy ptl composed of 1 SIKH LI and 2 SIKH LI were sent to Lunathang on 15 Nov. What was the aim of the ptl?
How was the ptl composed and what was its fate? Implications of its fate on subsequent events at Se La.
• Str. 2 x Coy ex 2 SIKH LI, Coy Plus 1 SIKH. Cdr - Maj SS Jaspal, 2IC 2 SIKH LI. Gp FOO accompanied. Bty on call.
• Task. Set off on 15 Nov for Lungu thang. Engage Chinese tps in area. Code name - Kaua (Crow)
• Flaws of Ptl.
o En Assessment. En was in process of infilt unlikely to present static tgt south of Tawang/ Mago Chu. On
contrary, en forced IA to draw tps from prep def.
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o Composn of Ptl. Mix of SIKH & SIKH LI tps. Separately both had proven to be outstanding tps. The
composite ptl proved to be disastrous recipe.
o Progress of Ptl and its Fate. Raiding party left Bn HQ at 0430h on 15 Nov 62. By evening reached Dzalung
La 1 SIKH coy started est firmbase below Dzalung La pass. 2 SIKH LI coy continued probing towards
Lunguthang. Close to Lunguthang, 2 SIKH LI est a ni harb.
o Chinese Action. Aware of the trn. Shadowing the composite force since it commenced. Assembled 500-
600 men, simult aslt on SIKH LI ni harbour and SIKH firm base posn at 0200H on 16 Nov. 1 SIKH Firm Base.
During Stand To, Chinese attacked. Driven out and abandoned firm base. 2 SIKH LI Ni Harbour. Fought
valiantly for two hrs. Due to trn config, radio sets were useless, couldn’t get Arty sp. Orderly retreat to
Sikh FB. Suffered hy cas by Chinese already occupying FB. Badly mauled, scattered, exhausted reached Bn
HQ by 1100 hrs. Overall Op ‘Kaua’ was a massive disaster.
o Implications. Mistrust created bad blood betn two units (neighbouring Bns at Se La). The mistrust caused
panic and premature withdrawal on order of planned withdrawal from Se La subsequently.
Discuss the Poshing La incident and its aftereffects?
5 GUARDs Pl was ordered to be dply at Poshing La. Route. Bomdila – Thembang – Tungri – Poshingla (11950) – Pang
La (12950) – Kya La (12500) – Tse La (15600).
Dply at Poshing La. Tungari (5000 ft S of Poshing La) Pl plus of AR gave a firm base for Poshing La which was not held.
The Pl est contact with AR pl at Tungri on 9 Nov. Def prep commenced astride the pass on 11 Nov.
On 14 Nov, Capt Amarjeet, Pl Cdr proceeded for recce to Tse La. While climbing Tse La on 15 Nov, the ptl walked into
an ambush. Four survivors made back to Poshing La. Chinese pursued and assaulted Poshing La, the pl fought hard and
later fell back to Tungri and then to Lagam where they were joined by two more coys of 5 GUARDs.
News of fall of Poshing La recd at 48 Bde at 1800h on 16 Nov. Fwg orders were given.
• Strengthen RAJPUT Coy loc at Pt 3466. Mov 5 GUARDs to Thembang and recapture Poshing La.
• Send 3 x coys of 19 MLI to assist 5 GUARDs.
• Mov fwg tps to Dirang Dzong for Div HQ prot:
o 1 x coy ex 1 MADRAS from Bomdila .
o 2 x coy ex 13 DOGRA from Senge Dzong.
o Two Colns of 19 MLI - 3 Coys. Dispatch from Evang on 16 Nov
▪ Coln 1. Cdr – Maj S D Parab. Compsn C coy, FOO
• Route. To Tungri via Sangti and Rungza.
• No contact with Chinese. Asked to fall back to Bn HQ on 17 Nav at 1645h.
• Chinese had est rd block betn Dirang Dzong and Bomdila.
▪ Coln 2. Cdr – Maj A M Shaikh. Composn. D coy(-), Pl ex B coy, Arty OP.
• Route. Dirang – Munna camp Namshu trn.
• Visual contact est with Chinese at Changdor. Brought arty fire on en. Fell back contrary
to tasked with digging in and denying Chinese infilt.
o Implication of Fall of Poshing La.
▪ Outflk mov of en on eastern flk of Se La - Bomdila effected by en.
▪ Rd block est betn Bomdila - Dirang Dzong.
▪ Dirang Dzong & Bomdila threatened from multiple dirns.
▪ Mov of 5 GUARDS and 19 MLI coys weakened Thembang & Dirang Dzong def.
▪ Mov of 2 x coys ex 13 DOGRA from Senge Dzong to Dirang Dzong & one coy of 1 MADRAS from
Bomdila weakened the def of Se La & Bomdila.
▪ Peace meal Mov did not impact Chinese adv.
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Describe an exemplary ambush laid & executed by Lt Bikram Singh of D Coy of 6 KUMAON at Namti Nala during the
withdrawal to Walong on 23 Oct.
D Coy of 6 KUMAON was tasked to act as rear gd during Bn withdrawal from Kibithu to Walong. It was tasked to halt
at Ashi Hill, occupy a screen posn.
Ambush Site.
• Small stream, Namti Nala b/w Ashi hill and Maha Plateau on the way from Kibithu to Walong.
• Across Namti Nala a suspension br of wooden plank.
• Only one man could traverse at a time.
Siting of Ambush.
• Lt Bikram personally sited each men and wpn.
• Removed wooden planks of the br, ensured strict fire cont order, restd fd of fire, concentrated entire fire
power at Northern end of Br.
• Coord fire of MMG, Mor & SA.
Springing of Ambush.
• Chinese reached br at 0300h, 25 Oct. Scout started xg, due to missing plank fell into torrent half way, sought
for help. Chinese switched on flash lt, exposing their posn. On Lt Bikram’s sig hy vol of coord fire brought down
on en. 70 en killed or wounded, own three killed. At 0500h, CO ordered the coy to break contact and fall back
to Walong. Chinese stuck at Ashi hill bottle neck for very long time.
Even After occupying Tawang, the Chinese did not pursue the Indians and stopped their push north of Tawang
Chu. Reasons?
There was a lull in the fighting in Kameng which lasted a little over three weeks. This was necessitated by
• The need to replenish sups and amn and induct fresh tps before undertaking any further thrust.
• The Chinese had suffered hy cas and already extended their lines of comns.
• They needed time to construct a rd up to Tawang to bring up their guns and hy eqpt.
• The br over Tawang Chu at Jang had been blown up by the IA and had to be re-constructed.
To gain time for making prep before commencing fresh attks, China issued a statement suggesting a ‘friendly
settlement’ of the bdy ques, a copy of which was sent by Premier Chou En-Lai to Prime Minister Nehru, through
the Chinese Charge d’Affairs in Delhi on the even of 24 Oct. The conditions stipulated by China were such that
the offer was bound to be rejected by India. Apart from its propaganda value, the statement was a ploy to gain
time for the Chinese to complete their preparations for a further offensive.
Briefly Discuss the Prep Made by PLA Prior to Ops in the Eastern Theatre?
• The fmns and units of the PLA selected for the ops were put through focused trg commencing in Jun 1962.
• On 05 Jun, the Tibet Mil Comd issued detailed instrs regarding trg to be carried out.
o Units were reqd to practice quick mob and rapid mov to designated op areas.
o Priority to skills requiring defensive and offensive ops in the mtn and jungle trn.
o Spl attn to providing fire sp in mtns, to meet a CA, dem of bunkers, breaching obsts, assy and adv under fire.
o A large number of pers in units were also trained in handling of explosives.
• Trg of cdrs by Unit and Regt level trg ex.
• Force 419 and 32 Inf Regt were given an in-depth exposure about Indian str, org, dply and tacs.
• Emphasis on acclimatisation and familiarising with the mtn environ.
• Tps were trained in first aid, cas evac and treating frostbite cases.
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• Each unit was tasked to carry out grnd recce and conduct sand model discussions of their op tasks, and only
thereafter formulate their concrete plans.
• Op plans were rehearsed at unit and sub-unit level so that every soldier had a clear idea of his role in the battle.
• Emphasis was on ‘winning the first battle of the war’.
• Key appts were specially selected and a proportion of offrs, NCOs and soldiers with comb experience in previous
wars (War of Liberation, Korean War, suppression of Tibetan rebellion etc.) were inducted into units. (32.4 % of
the overall str. Such adjustments were carried out in all bns and regts creating an elite core of experienced tps
which would prove to be a stabilising influence in times of crisis.)
• All the units were instr to carry out battleFd recce to understand the topo and disposns of Indian tps.
Beginning Oct, Dy C-in-C of Tibet Mil Comd Zhao Wesijin, leading Cdrs Force 419 above regt level went to mtn passes
to carry out detailed recce of grnd and dply of Indian forces in Namka Chu valley before formulating their final plans.
Lgs
• As ops were to be conducted in difficult trn, far removed from the mainland, lgs prep given htened imp.
• Tibet Mil Comd had built stks of upto 445 tons of various war like stores at their fwd bases, like Cuona, Longzi
and Chayu before the war.
• Food stks were built up to sustain a force of one div for upto 40 days of active ops.
• Devp rd comns to the border areas given imp. Rd H was devp right up to Le Camp just N of Bumla.
Comns
• Powerful tx set-up close to the border.
• Each BP equipped with RS of 200 Watt.
• Some imp locs equipped with RS of 1000 watt to comn directly with the GHQ of the PLA during battle.
Int Security
CMC concerned about internal disturbances in Tibet, ordered the move of 130 Inf Div of the 54th Army from Sichuan
Province to Tibet and await further orders. Similarly, 134 Inf Div, also of the 54th Army stationed in Nanchong Region
was to remain in readiness and await orders for move into Tibet.
Together with the Decision to Vacate Tawang, Changes in Dply of Forces were Ordered by HQ 4 Corps. Discuss?
Defence of Se La was assigned to 62 Inf Bde. Bomdila was to be held by 65 Inf Bde.
There were imp changes in the comd structure of 4 Corps:
• Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh appt GOC 4 Corps, replacing Gen Kaul, lying sick in Delhi.
• Maj Gen AS Pathania, MVC, MC, replaced Gen Prasad as GOC 4 Inf Div on 25 Oct.
• Maj Gen MS Pathania appointed the GOC of the newly created 2 Inf Div which was to look after the ops in all the
NEFA other than Kameng Frontier Div.
• Along with the Corps and Div Cdrs, most of the Bde Cdrs were also changed.
o Brig GS Gill replaced Brig Kalyan Singh as Cdr 4 Arty Bde;
o Brig Hoshiar Singh replaced Brig N.K. Lal as Cdr 62 Inf Bde,
o Brig AS Cheema succeeded Brig G.M. Sayeed as Cdr 65 Inf Bde.
GOC 4 Inf Div, Maj Gen AS Pathania arr at Tezpur, with the Corps Cdr, Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh on 24 Oct. Army Cdr
briefed them about defence of Se La- Dirang- Bomdila, code named Op ‘Olympus’, eff from 10 Nov.
With its four bns - 9 PUNJAB, 2 RAJPUT, 1/9 GR, 4 GREN - completely disintegrated, 7 Inf Bde ceased to exist. Only
tps avlb to 4 Inf Div were scattered ele of three bns - 1 SIKH, 4 GARH Rifles and 13 DOGRA. While new tps were
being inducted, the new Div Cdr shifted his Main Div HQ from Tezpur to Dirang. After handing over its addl resp of
comd inf elements to 62 Inf Bde, HQ 4 Arty Bde joined the Main Div HQ at Dirang.
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Five days after his appt as Corps Cdr, Gen Harbakhsh Singh, replaced by Gen Kaul, who returned from Delhi 29 Oct.
During the lull in the battle, extensive ptlling by Indian tps along with ae photography revealed considerable veh
tfc from Shao (Tibet) to Tawang through Bum La.
• Rapid rd constr by the Chinese made clear their intention to complete stking before snowfall.
• They also improved rd from Tawang to Jang, constr a large br over Tawang Chu and repaired Br 4.
• By mid Nov 1962, they had conc two divs in the Tawang area. An estimated one complete Chinese div
crossed the Tawang Chu for ops against Indian posns in Kameng Frontier Div in the second ph.
• Of this force, approx one regt (= Indian bde) was pushed through Mukto Br by even 15 Nov. Ele of this force
mov down to Senge Dzong and Dirang Dzong to cut lines of comn of 4 Inf Div at various places from SW of
the main rd.
• Simultaneously, two Chinese bdes crossed Tawang Chu near Br 4 and Mago for ops from N and E of the main
rd axis. Of these, one bn was tasked to attk the Covering tps (4 GARH Rifles) and the other two bns crossed
Se La Ridge via Kya La to bypass Indian defensive posns at Se La and harass Indian tps in the area. Ele from
this Chinese coln infiltrated into Dirang valley in E of Nyukmadong Ridge and took up posns on a dominating
feature N of the vill, Nyukmadong. Of the other bde, two bns reached vicinity of Poshung La via Tse La.
After a detailed recce, Maj Gen Pathania felt that a force of 17 bns was reqd to ensure a coord defence of 4 Inf Div
AOR. However, tps made avlb were 12 Inf bns, only 10 bns could be inducted before ops commenced:
• Five were dply at Se La/62 Bde; two at Dirang Dzong/48 Bde and three at Bomdila/65 Bde.
Of the three bde defended sects, Se La (62 Inf Bde, Brig Hoshiar Singh) was strongest, being a natural fortress,
difficult to storm even by a stronger force. By mid-nov, all the five bns earmarked for the defence of Se La had
occupied defences. Few anti-pers mines were laid around the covering defensive posns of the bns and the Bde HQ.
The Bde was being maintained almost completely by air. It had about two first–line scales of SA amn and ten days
rations stked with the units. However, only one and a half scale of first line arty amn was held.
• The bns allotted to the Bde were 4 GARH Rrifles, 2 SIKH LI (ex 65 Inf Bde), 4 SIKH LI (ex 48 Inf Bde), 1 SIKH,
and 13 Dogra (ex 11 Inf Bde). Of these, 4 GARH Rifles was dply as covering tps between Nuranang and Jang.
• For fire sp, the Bde had 5 Fd Regt, a bty of 22 Mtn Regt and tp of hy mors of 36 (Maratha) Light Regt
(Towed). It also had a pl of MMGs of 7 MAHAR (MG) and sec of 6 MAHAR (MG). Engr sp : 19 Fd Coy.
The Dirang Dzong Sect was held by 65 Inf Bde comprising:
• 19 MARATHA LI (Dirang) and 4 RAJPUT (Sappers’ Camp). HQ 4 Inf Div and HQ 4 Arty Bde also loc in Dirang.
• One coy of 1 MADRAS from Bomdila and two coys of 13 DOGRA from Senge Dzong were mov to Dirang for
the defence of Div HQ.
• For fire sp, it had 6 Fd Regt, a tp of 22 Mtn Regt and a pl of MMGs of 7 Mahar (MG). The Bde was also
allotted a squadron less one tp of armour, from 7 Cavalry.
The Bomdila Sect was held by 48 Inf Gp, comprising:
• 1 SIKH LI, 5 GUARDS and 1 MADRAS.

• For fire sp, it had been allotted a bty each of 22 Mtn Regt and 6 Fd Regt, bty less a tp of hy mors and a pl of
MMGs. It also had a tp (three tks) of 7 Cavalry. Engineer sp was to be given by 15 Fd Coy.
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What is the Strat Imp of Chushul?
Running N to S, 40 km long and 5.6 km at its widest, Chushul is a narrow, sparsely populated, barren sandy valley
across the water shed at altitude of 14,230 feet with towering mtns, high passes, where only the best of friends or
worst of enemies may desire to meet.
• It is bounded in N by deep 160 km long clear salt water Pangong Tso (lake) running parallel to Indus R, the E
and W by higher rgs rising over 19,000 feet and all weather airFd in the S.
• Pangaso changes colour with the phs of sun and moon.
• The Spanggur Gap is the opening in the E side that leads to the Spanggur Tso (lake). Like the Pangong Tso, it
extends well into Chinese territory.
• Before the war commenced, the Chinese had built a rd from Rudok in Tibet right up to the Spanggur Gap
capable of carrying tks.
• Chushul could be apched from Leh by going over the Chang La pass skirting the Pangkong Lake, while
another route crossed the Chang La pass and took a deep turn to the E.
• For all Indian out posts in this sect from Daulat Beg Oldi to Damchok, Chushul was the nodal rallying pt.
Loss of Chushul would not have jeopardized defence of Ladakh region, but in those days its imp caught up with
Indian psyche and pride. The trn and climatic condns favoured the Chinese and they made most of these in 1962 ops.
What Were Some Grave Tac Weaknesses of the IA?
• HQ Eastern Comd was mostly a Passive Onlooker and acted only as a Post Office
• No recce and trn familiarisation by Cdrs. No study of Chinese tactics. All dply on whims and fancies of Cdrs.
• Unbalancing of the 4 Corps
o HQs was raised on --- with only the GOC, no staff.
o Chain of Comd ignored frequently.
o Lt Gen BM Kaul continued to Comd from his Hosp bed in Delhi.
o Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh who was appted GOC 4 Corps after the Ph 1 was re-replaced by Gen BM Kaul
so that he could retrieve his reputation.
• The Chinese had recruited many spies from the tribals. IA had very little.
• Unplanned Induction of Bns and Breaking of Fmns
o 2 RAJPUT was deinducting from Walong to the plains, they were suddenly diverted to the Kameng, if
they were to be held back they should have been to their previous AOR.
• Mov of many Bns and HQs was done at short notice with even the destination not known.
• Chopping and pruning of units was done frequently. In some places a part of a Bn was placed under comd
another CO.
• No cord between the Army and Air Force.
• Indifference continued even after Ph 1
o Corps Cdr vis Sela, prep for the winter.
o Casually, no urgency. 16 Nov while the en was building up, 2 RAJPUT celebrating Zojila Day, even the
GOC was attending.
• No semi – auto, short of amn, no winter clo, need to defrost water to drink.
• Complete ignorance about PLA dply and mov in NEFA. Withdrew the moment threatened.
• Credible performance Bumla and Nuranang.
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Discuss Tac Mistakes Made on Grnd During the War?
• Linear dply of the 7 Inf bde in Namka Chu, they were not even well dug in.
• After withdrawal from Tawang, 4 Corps should have conc all defences at Bomdila which could be well sp lgs.
The fmn was instead strung along the axis/rd. Strong nowhere except Sela
• Sela was well defended. Four bns, sufficient amn and stks – a fortress. GOC 4 Inf Div was too sensitive to flk
mov by the PLA and frantically sent out small gps in insufficient str to eliminate the en rd blocks. Failed and
also depleted the str at Sela. Similar depletion at Bomdila.
• In Walong an over eagerness to execute offensive-defence on 14 Nov without analysing the str of the en led
to the collapse of the defence. Hurriedly exec Spoiling attk by 6 KUMAON with even est a firm base. 4
DOGRA was rushed in as they arr in peace meal.
• Interference by Snr Cdrs in tac dply. 7 Inf Bde forced to dply in a linear manner on orders of AHQ. Fd cdrs
failed to protest / rectify.
• Large scale change of cdrs based on likes and dislikes and cross dply of sub units with other units.
• Non utilisation of the Air Force.
Cdrs Changed During the War
• Lt Gen Sen, the GOC in C E Comd was unhappy with 33 Corps Cdr Lt Gen Umrao Singh (who was cautious in
dply for Op Longhorn). 4 Corps was raised to replace HQ 33 Corps with Lt Gen BM Kaul in Comd. Maj Gen
SAM Manekshaw was a candidate, but the RM did not like him. Kaul had no battle experience. This was a
decision that is unparalleled in the annals of mil history due to its arbitrariness and suddenness.
• After the fall of Tawang, GOC 4 Inf Div, Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad was removed from comd and replaced by
Maj Gen AS Pathania.
• Cdrs 62 Inf Bde and 65 Inf Bde were replaced.
• 2 Inf Div was newly raised for entire NEFA (Less Kameng Sub Div). Maj Gen MS Pathania appted as GOC. He
did not want Brig JC Hartley, MC of 181 Inf bde as his Bde Cdr. HQ 181 Inf Bde was replaced by 11 Inf Bde
with Brig Rawlley as Cdr, No change of constituent bns.
• Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh who was appt GOC 4 Corps after the Ph 1 was re-replaced by Gen BM Kaul so that he
could retrieve his reputation.
Discuss the Lgs Challenges (IA) in the Western Sect Leading up to the War?
• Red Tapism. Lack of funds, proposal blocked by MOD bureaucrats. Funds allocated post earmarking funds for
3rd five yr plan.
• Uncertainty on Imported Acqns. BRO rd constr eqpt awaited no certainty. IAF desperately defi on ac, hoping
indn from abroad.
• Indifference of QMG. Lt Gen Kaul – QMG. Did not pay heed to lgs buildup of warlike stores to compensate
for fresh border resp. Allocated quotas w/o any real understanding of grnd realities.
• Air Supply.
o Only Leh & Chushul had functional air fds. Fukche & DBo lgs strips difficult to op.
o IAF already short of ac leading to inadequate allotment of sorties for buildup of warlike stores.
• Misc Lgs Challenges: Unavbl of worthwhile rds, most mov by foot or air. No accn for tps.
• Cas evac: No fd Hosp , Only evac by heptr which was in short sup.
• Implications.
o Impossible for XV Corps to have any strat or tac plan.
o Fwd policy executed by merely setting up lightly armed air sup posts, then somehow keep them alive.
o Few posts, massive frontage, large gaps, hardly defensible.
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How Chinese gradually prep in western sector even before the actual hostilities had set in?
Devp of Lines of Comn.
• Constr of G219 Hwy. Connecting Sinkiang and W Tibet through Aksai Chin. Completion announced in Sept
1957. Surreptitiously claimed entire Aksai chin region.
• Chinese estimated reqmt of one Inf Div to counter any threat emanating from India. Mains rds were linked
with fwd posts through small rds. Ensured fwg for fwd posts: Well supplied fwd post. Rapid mob & build up.
Connected to HQ in rear by rds.
• Bringing Border popln in own favour.
o Sinkiang. Historical bdy dispute of Tibet and Sinkiang. Large tract of Tibet territory N of Kongka La -
Lanka in line granted to appease them. Pol offrs vis Sinkiang Muslim popln and created anti Indians.
o Tibet. Historical hostilities b/w Tibet and Ladakh. Tibetan youth conscripted into PLA. Dply along
border from Kongka pass southwards to Demchok, where they had known Ladakhi tps were dply.
o Est of Posts. After completion of constr of G-219, est series of outposts connected by rds. These
posts manned by Chinese frontier gd - tasked to probe ahead and occu dominating features. If reqd
to cross the border inform cdrs in Sinkiang and Gartok. Shifting claim lines.
o Int Nw. Extremely efficient Int nw. Fully aware about all Indian dply and moves. Agents infilt in form
of Ladakhi Porters.
o Div of Area in Sects. Chinese dply opposite Nubra and Ladakh was divided into four sectors. Tps
allocation based on Indian tps ethnically dply in area. Fwd posts connected to rear HQ by small rds.
Why Did the PLA Win the War?
• Use of the Trn.

o Folds of the mtns along with low vis and thick vegetation will favour the side that uses high foot mobility.
The Chinese Army mov cross country at ni and turned the IA defences in Namkachu and Tawang.
o In mtnous trn, war is an aggregate of battles to dominate the hts. Irrespective of the quantum of tps
employed, mtn warfare is all about capturing and consolidating the dominating hts. In Namka Chu IA 7
Inf Bde was dply in the valley, allowing the PLA to dominate its posns.
o Defences in the mtns can be turned around in many ways: by capturing features in the rear of the
defensive posn; capturing the second tier of defences; dominating the axis of maint by laying ambushes
etc. Chinese achieved it with a high foot mobility and a high degree of sustainability.
o Eqpt mob such as of mors enabled the Chinese to conc fire with greater ease. Mors - best for mob by
pack animals.
o Even if enough rd infra is devp, ops cannot be planned along these axes, although maint will perforce
have to be based on them; after crossing into Indian Territory, PLA quickly got down to Rd constr.
o The axes of maint in en territory will be dominated and denied by the en and cannot be used. Thus,
any op in these areas will involve moving in a less-devp sect with most of the tps moving cross
country. This will especially be true once the Line of Actual Cont (LAC) is crossed.
• Self-Containment
o The Infilt Chinese forces were self-contained for a number of days.
o The load-carrying capacity of men gets restd at high altitudes, mules and porters will be essential when
fighting wars in the Himalayas.
o Two maj issues become apparent in this scenario: one, soldiers need to be physically tough as per trn
reqmt; and two, there will be a reqmt for well trained and battle inoculated AT in large numbers. These
will become even more critical for ops across the LAC. The Chinese trained their soldiers well and also
selected fit and tough mtn tps for the task.
• This showed that regular trg and acclimatization is an unending process which needs to be mastered gradually.
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Why did India Lose the War?
• India never expected an attk from China, believed in maint cordial relation and healthy diplomacy.
• Top Political ldrship was not prep for War. India dply only two divs in the region of conflict.
• The standoff was between 10,000-20,000 Indian soldiers and 80,000 Chinese tps.
• The Chinese cut Indian telephone lines which didn’t allow fwd tps to contact their HQs.
• India did not get any help from Western superpowers like U.S.A, U.K and hence was left alone to fight the battle.
• India could not put its forces swiftly to the battlegrnd due to poor infra.
• Competent and professionally sound mil ldrs were removed or superseded and favourites were upgraded.
• 4 Corps Cdr was changed on 24 Oct and again on 30 Oct. Div and Bde cdrs were changed during mid battle.
• There was lack of faith and comn in chain of comd.
• Mil equipment was obsolete, tps were neither acclimatised nor properly equipped.
• Air force carried out no offensive action.
• Arty was seldom used.
• The defence minister interfered with mil ldrs and mil plans. He blocked procurements.
• All int agencies were found wanting. Overall, India as a nation was not prep for war.
• Basic trg teaches that a second line is meant to beat back atleast one attk.
• In most cases, the defenders withdrew before attks were launched. This was a maj tac weakness and ldrship failure.
India gained many benefits from the 1962 conflict, discuss?

• This war united the country as never before.
• India got 83,000 Sq kms of disputed territory even if it felt that NEFA was hers all along.
• The new Indian republic had avoided international alignments; by asking for help during the war, India
demonstrated its willingness to accept mil aid from several sects.
• India recognised the serious weaknesses in its army. It would more than double its mil manpower in the next two
years and work hard to resolve the mil's trg and lgs problems to later become the second-largest army in the world.
• India's efforts to improve its mil posture significantly enhanced its army's capb and preparedness.
How was Deception used by the Chinese?

• Chinese infiltrators, wearing tribal dress or captured Indian uniforms, penetrated Indian posns close enough to
open deadly fire with concealed wpns.
• The Chinese intercepted Indian radio comns and issued orders in local dialects.
• Chinese used tactics of attk by infilt with foot and animal pack mobility. They would appear behind Indian posns
and turn the defences/ambush retreating colns.
List out Imp Lessons Learnt from the War?
• Diplomacy and mil power goes together.

• Defence prepness is mandatory if nation aspires to be a superpower.
• War is not just about wpns and amn, a better mil infra is neccy to fight the battle.
• The nation needs to build strong foreign alliances so that it could get help during difficult times.
• The govt needs to invest more on the nation’s mil forces to become a superpower.
India’s Security Policy during this Pd

• Despite Sardar Patel’s prophetic advice to Nehru on Tibet, China and Indian security issues on 7 Nov 1950, the
Indian Govt showed no strat foresight or plg.
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• When Chinese forces reached Changtu on their way to Lhasa, the Indian delegation in the United Nations
blocked consideration of a proposal to censure China.
• In Dec 1950, Nehru publicly sp the Chinese posn on the grnds that Tibet should be handled only by the parties
concerned i.e. Beijing and Lhasa.
• In Sep 1952, India agreed with Chinese authorities to withdraw its mil-cum-diplomatic mission in Tibet.
• In the decade preceding 1962, the Indian ruling elite was convinced that having woven China into the Panchsheel
Agreement, it had managed to craft a sound ‘China policy’.
• It was neither alert to Chinese mil devps in Tibet nor to the constr of Sinkiang-Tibet rd which began in Mar 1956.
• Primarily due to ideological and emotional reasons, the Chinese geostrat challenges and threats were either not
accepted or underplayed till the Parliament and public opinion forced the govt to adopt a mil posture against
China for which it was never prep.
Mil Strat
• By early Sep 1962, China started warning that if India ‘played with fire’; it would be ‘consumed by fire’.
• On 8 Sep 1962, 800 Chinese soldiers surrounded Indian post at Dhola. Neither side opened fire for 12 days. The
dice was cast for a showdown. Chinese had conveyed their intention but we still thought that they were bluffing.
• 6 Oct 1962 Chinese laid down the brd strat for the projected offensive. The main asslt was to be in the E sect but
forces in the W sect would ‘coordinate’ with the E sect.
• The Chinese Mil Comd apred that the IA’s main defences lay at Se La and Bomdi La. The concept of ops was to
adv along different routes, encircle these two posns and then reduce them.
• Indian posns were split into numerous segments and then destroyed piecemeal.
• The speed and ferocity of the attks unhinged Indian defences and pulverised the comd, resulting in panic and
contradictory decisions. Politico-mil decision not to use comb air power was an unforgivable error of judgement.
• China took India by surprise by mounting large-scale attks on two fronts, almost 2,500 km apart, and caught
India off guard. The Indian debacle was primarily the result of a failure of strat foresight, and mil capb.
Strat Thinking
• Chinese statecraft wherein ‘deterrent coexistence’ and ‘offensive-deterrence’, defined as ‘luring in the
opponents and then dealing them a sharp and stunning blow’, are imp components.
• Political realism is fine but Wishful ideological thinking is not.
• Interlacing of the grand and mil strat is inescable.
India’s Mil Capb
• Prior to the 1962 war, steep erosion of India’s mil capb: civil-mil relations, mil ldrship and morale, force levels
and armaments.
• The armed forces were not in any maj strat consultations and decision-making loop.
• With bureaucracy ensconced in between, there was hardly any discourse between political and mil ldrs on
geopolitical and security-related environment, defence plg and service conditions of the armed forces.
• By 1959 Nehru had realised that his past trust of China was a blunder and decided on the controversial ‘Fwd
Policy’, without any enhancement of armament, resources and infra.
Monumental failure of Indian int in assessing that China was plg a maj attk on the country.
• Assessment in 1959 was that a “maj incursion” by the Chinese was unlikely, given the fact that at that time
India’s pace of industrialization was much better.
• Chinese mil was not capable enough “to sustain any maj drive across the ‘great land barrier’”.
• The IB totally identified itself with the view emanating from the S Block bureaucracy (Ministries of Defence and
External Affairs) that a limited and high intensity war with China was “structurally impossible” in a nuclearised
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bipolar system; because any misadventure by China would lead to global nuclear escalation, a spectre that
would deter a conflict on the Himalayan border.
Def Minister Krishna Menon ignored pleas of the Army for funds to improve the manpwr and wpn sys.
• In 1962, “the IA of 280,000 was short by 60,000 rifles, 700 anti-tk guns, 5,000 radio fd sets, thousands of miles of
fd cable, 36,000 wrls btys, 10,000 one-ton trucks and 10,000 three-ton trucks! Two regts of tks were not opal
due to lack of spares. Indian tps were using .303 rifles which had seen action even before World War I (not II). In
contrast, Chinese tps were equipped with MGs/ hy mors/ auto rifles”.
Indian Air Force (IAF) was not used for offensive action and only confined to air dropping supplies to the tps.
• The outcome of the 1962 war would have been different had the Air Force been used in an offensive role.
• The then IB Director B N Mullick can be blamed for exaggerated assessment of attk by Chinese bombers on
Indian cities if India had used the air force.
The best lesson that we can learn from our 1962 debacle is that India must never lower its guard and must dply
sufficient mil and lgss capb to respond to any surprise from the Chinese side. This is particularly so when China is
rapidly upgrading its own capb and lgs in Tibet. But then war prep can never can never remain static in this age of
fast-changing technologies. It is a constant process, which we can ignore only at our peril. And for determining this
process, we must give our mil the neccy freedom, something that was denied in 1962, leading to disaster.
In what way could the IAF have helped defeat the Chinese?
• In 1962, the IAF had 25 Squadrons consisting of

o 100 each of Hunter, Mystere fighters and Canberra medium bombers,
o a squadron of photo-reconnaissance Canberra,
o some 75 each of relatively old slow speed and less capable Toofani and Vampire fighters and
o about 30 Gnat Mk.1 fighters in its inventory.
• The photo- reconnaissance Canberra had mapped the Chinese Rd in Aksai Chin and provided a mosaic to Menon
before Nehru made his statement on the issue in Parliament.
• A Canberra had also flown over NEFA but could not photograph the borders due to clouding. The pilot then flew
below the clouds and visually confirmed the well-entrenched posns, Nissan Huts, arty and transport of the
Chinese PLA and reported this to the Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal AM Engineer, who was personally present at
Jorhat airFd to brief and debrief the pilot on landing.
• Before the war, a Hunter had been asked to fly over Ladakh. Hunters based at Ambala were capb of engaging the
Chinese in Ladakh especially when Chushul was threatened. Rezangla would have seen a very different outcome.
• Some experienced fighter pilots were already dply at fwd bases such as DBO and Chushul for FAC duties..
• The IAF was already familiar with Machuka, Tezu, Heleluyang, Tri-Jn, Walong, Tawang, Sela and Bomdila in the E
and DBO, Chushul, Rezangla, Chip Chap Valley in the W, since all of these areas were after all being air supplied
for many years prior to the conflict.
• The use of IAF comb power would have in all probability prevented the second wave of Chinese attks that came
on 18 Nov. The Indian political ldrship was apparently fearful of escalation into an all-out war!
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Why did China suddenly withdraw from captured Indian Territory?
• Chinese Lines of Comn (L of C) became extremely stretched and they realized that they could not sustain it
further beyond Bomdi La and Walong in NEFA and beyond Chushul (Daulat Beg Oldi) the W.
• China feared thatif India brings in the Airforce, their stretched lines of comns would seriously threatened.
• IA would not be a mere pushover beyond Bomdi La and Chushul. Chinese got adequate proof about this during
the Battle of Sirijap and the Battle of Chushul.
• They were also informed that Lt Gen Harbaux Singh (an extremely able Cdr) had been sent to take charge of 33
Corps to confront them. They also knew that Gen Thapar and Lt Gen Kaul were going to resign.
• The Chinese purpose of curbing the diplomatic influence of Nehru was served. Further aggression would create
diplomatic alienation for China.
• The US and Britain became very anxious about the intent of Communist China and these two countries started
supplying arms, amn and ac to India to tackle further Chinese aggression.
• The USSR threatened China to stop the aggression and called for a ceasefire in no uncertain terms.
While India adhered to Panchsheel as a code of International Behaviour, China treated them merely as a Temp
Device of Diplomacy, Explain?
While India viewed the signing of the five principles and ceding of its extra-territorial rights over Tibet inherited from
the British as an opportunity to promulgate its anti-colonial posture, China saw in this expression of Asian solidarity
a means to check the growing anti-communist sentiments in the West.
Within a few months of agreeing to the five principles, China made its first attempt to infringe upon it.
• The first notable incident was its territorial claim over Bara Hoti, traditionally Indian Territory. The traditional
bdy between India and China in Barahoti (Wu-Je in Chinese) is Tunjun La Pass; N of the Pass is Chinese and S
is Indian. Significantly whenever India expressed readiness to recognize the disputed character of the bdy
and suggested a resolution through talks, China blocked such efforts. For instance, during the discns on
Barahoti at Delhi in April 1958, India proposed that “the civ auth of either country should not attempt to ex
jurisdiction over the Barahoti area until the dispute is finally settled.” This was, however, rejected by China,
who sent its officials to Barahoti on 29 June 1958. Moreover, in the course of the talks, India also proposed
that neither side should send tps to the region in dispute. This time around, China accepted the Indian
proposal in principle but violated it in practice by sending tps to the region after just two months.
• Throughout the latter half of the 1950s, Chinese intrusions, claims over territory and constr of roads
continued and sp by the fwd mov of the PLA. E.g
o Incursions in Aksai Chin and constr of a rd to connect Sinkiang with Tibet, followed by intrusions in
Damzan, Nilang, Shipki, Khurnak, Migyitun, Spanggur, and Khinzemane.When Premier Chou Enlai
raised the issue of the eastern border in his talk with Nehru in 1956, he did not mention the dispute
over the Western bdy with India.
o After 1958, Chinese territorial claims become more assertive: mil attks in Longju and Kangla Pass in
1959 and killing of Indian frontier guards. These calculated and aggressive moves also exposed the
element of hypocrisy in Beijing's interaction with New Delhi.
o The initiation of the 1962 War was violation of the principles of peaceful co-existence.
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SHORT NOTES
The Great Leap Fwd

One of the greatest crimes against humanity has been the ’Great Leap Fwd’ which began in China in Feb 1958, and
resulted in the largest man-made starvation in human history. By initiating his Great Leap Fwd, Mao Zedong’s obj
was to surpass Great Britain in industrial production within 15 years. For this purpose, every Chinese household had
to start producing steel at home with a backyard furnace. In agriculture, Mao thought that very large communes
would cater for a manifold incr in the cereal production to make China into a paradise of abundance. Intro and
managed with frantic fanaticism, it did not take much time before the pgme collapsed. However, the more the plan
failed the more the party cadres provided inflated production figures to Mao and yet more people died of starvation.
The Great Leap Fwd was to continue till 1961 – 1962 and it is today estimated that between 40 and 50 million died of
hunger in China. By the end of 1961, Mao was practically out of power. By the summer of 1962, Mao would return
with a bang. The conflict with India would be closely linked with his comeback.
Armed Coexistence, Jigsaw Pattern

The policy of Chinese govt early in 1962 followed the motto Armed Coexistence, Jigsaw Pattern. Practically, for
India’s borders, it meant that while PLA continued to build its posn on the Tibetan plateau, Beijing would keep
‘coexisting’ with New Delhi, exchanging voluminous correspondence, sometimes bitter, sometimes conciliatory. This
jigsaw policy (str the prep and offering negotiations) could have continued longer, till the winter, but this would be
without taking into account the ‘return of Mao’. It is in this context that the new PLA div was created.
McMahon Line
The McMahon Line is the bdy between Tibet and British India as agreed in the maps and notes exchanged on 24–25
Mar 1914 at Delhi, as part of the 1914 Simla Convention. The line delimited the respective spheres of influence of
the two countries in the eastern Himalayan region along northeast India and northern Burma (Myanmar).
China was not a party to the McMahon Line agreement, but the line was part of the overall bdy of Tibet defined in
the Simla Convention, initialled by all three parties and later repudiated by the government of China. The Indian part
of the Line currently serves as the de facto bdy between China and India, although its legal status is disputed by the
PRC. The Burmese part of the Line was renegotiated by China and Myanmar.
The line is named after Henry McMahon, foreign secry of British India and the chief British negotiator of the
conference at Simla. The bilateral agreement between Tibet and Britain was signed by McMahon on behalf of the
British government and Lonchen Shatra on behalf of the Tibetan government. It spans 890 Kms from the corner
of Bhutan to the Isu Razi Pass on the Burma border, largely along the crest of the Himalayas.
Johnson Line
Upon independence in 1947, the GOI used the Johnson Line as the basis for its official bdy in the west, which incl the
Aksai Chin. From the Karakoram Pass (which is not under dispute), the Indian claim line extends NE of the Karakoram
Mtns through the salt flats of the Aksai Chin, to set a bdy at the Kunlun Mtns, and incorporating part of the Karakash
R and Yarkand R watersheds. From there, it runs east along the Kunlun Mtns, before turning SW through the Aksai
Chin salt flats, through the Karakoram Mtns, and then to Panggong Lake.
William Johnson, of Svy of India proposed the "Johnson Line" in 1865, which put Aksai Chin in Kashmir. This was the
time of Dungan revolt, when China did not cont most of Xinjiang, so this line was never presented to the Chinese.
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Johnson presented this line to the Maharaja of Kashmir, who then claimed the 18,000 sq Kms contained within, and
by some accounts territory further north as far as the Sanju Pass in the Kun Lun Mtns. The Maharajah of Kashmir
constructed a fort at Shahidulla (modern-day Xaidulla) and had tps stationed there for some years to protect
caravans. Eventually, most sources placed Shahidulla and the upper Karakash R firmly within the territory of
Xinjiang. According to Francis Younghusband, who explored the region in the late 1880s, there was only an
abandoned fort and not one inhabited house at Shahidulla when he was there – it was just a convenient staging post
and a convenient HQs for the nomadic Kirghiz. The abandoned fort had apparently been built a few years earlier by
the Kashmiris. In 1878 the Chinese had reconquered Xinjiang, and by 1890 they already had Shahidulla before the
issue was decided. By 1892, China had erected bdy markers at Karakoram Pass.
Barahoti (called Wu-Je or Wure by the Chinese)

In July 1952, IB stated that the
Garh-Tibet border can only be
crossed through Mana and Niti
Valleys where there are open
places and habitation, while rest
of the border area consists of
snow-covered mtns and glaciers.
…There are four Passes between
Niti Valley and Tibet.
A couple of years earlier, some
Tibetans officials had entered the
tiny plain of Barahoti. The IB
explained the backgrnd of the so-
called dispute: “About the end of
last century the Tibetans had est a
Customs Post at Hoti Plain. To
stop this practice, the British Govt send out a det of Gurkhas along with the Deputy Collector in 1890; the Tibetans
removed their post. It appears that for some time past the Tibetans have again been est a Police-cum-Customs post
at Hoti during the during the trading season.
As in most areas in the Himalaya, the access is far easier from the Tibetan side than from the Indian. Over the
years, this greatly facilitated the Chinese intrusions.
The IB recommended: “It is, therefore, essential that the Govt. of India should make it clear to the Govt. of Tibet and
its Dzongpon that the Hoti Plain is Indian territory, and the Tibetans have no right to est any Customs post there.
During negotiations for the Panchsheel Agreement, (which only deals with trade and pilgrimage between Tibet and
India) were completed with no border discussions; only six passes were incl. Aa result of India not insisting on all the
passes, China started claiming several areas south of the watershed, in particular the area south of the Tunjun-la
pass, where the plain of Barahoti is loc.
It took only two months for the first Chinese incursion in the Barahoti area of Uttar Pradesh, it occurred in June
1954. Correspondence went on for four years and in 1958 a conference was held to sort out the issue. China refused
to admit that the watershed marked the frontier and that Tunjun-la pass had been for centuries been the traditional
border. The McMahon line runs North of Barahoti Bowl but China claims this grassland. The Indian Government, in a
1958 agreement with China, had declared this area as a No-Man's land, which was forbidden to be ptlled and
occupied by two armies.
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The Fwd Policy
In Sep 1959 China laid formal claim to 80,000 sq kms of territory in Ladakh and NEFA India believed was hers. The
Chinese, even though they did not accept the McMahon Line, kept their border posts on own side of their
interpretation. The Indian interpretation however, differed from that of the Chinese in some areas, notably in the
Kameng Sub Div; the Indian interpretation was further ‘forward’ than the Chinese.
‘Forward Policy’; est small, non-tac mil posts ‘to show the flag’ along the Indian interpretation of IB in Ladakh, and
McMahon Line in NEFA. This new policy, directed by PM Nehru, was decided at a high-level review mtg held 2 Nov
1961. Chinese ldrship viewed it as India ‘nibbling away’ and gradually occupying more and more Chinese territory.
On 27 Aug 1959, IA was ordered to take-over security of NEFA-Tibet border, and on 24 Oct 1959, the Ladakh-Tibet
border. Due to difference in perception, there were small confrontations with Chinese in several areas. Two imp
ones at Longju in NEFA and Kongka La in Ladakh in 1959. One of India’s policy responses to the incr of mil issues
with China was to send 4 Inf Div, the Western Comd Res Div, based at Ambala, to NEFA. With its three integral Inf
Bdes, 5, 7, 11 Inf Bdes.
This was despite absence of any lgs set-up for dply the Div in NEFA; a roadless wilderness. 11 Bde was sent to Sikkim,
7 Bde made resp for Kameng Frontier Div, and 5 Bde assigned the resp for rest of NEFA. 4 Div est its HQ at Tezpur to
func under 33 Corps, HQ at Shillong, and resp for entire NE: Sikkim, NEFA, the India-Burma border, the India-East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh) border, and Nagaland.
The Fwd Policy (‘Op ONKAR’) was militarily unsound. The appropriate dply had already been spelt out after a war-
game at HQ Eastern Comd (‘Ex LAL QILA’ conducted in 1960 to study the Chinese threat) as appre by Lt Gen SPP.
Thorat, GOC-in-C EC. Gen Thorat had earlier been Cdr 33 Corps and was familiar with the grnd. The current GOC 33
Corps in 1962, Lt Gen K Umrao Singh, was completely against ‘Op ONKAR’, and had indicated that a forward dply
would require a proper adm build-up, and thus time.
‘Op ONKAR’ was originally conceived by MEA as a means of est Indian claim to the McMahon Line and Indian
interpretation of Ladakh-Tibet and Ladakh-Sinkiang borders. (NEFA) was actually administered by the MEA through
the offrs of the erstwhile Indian Frontier Administrative Service (IFAS) and the units of the AR. Theoretically, in the
NE the Indian Army’s role in Op ONKAR was to assist the Assam Rifles in setting up these fwd posts.
This was inconvenient for the PM, probably due to his wish to announce in Parliament on 20 Nov 1962, that a
successful mil check to Chinese ‘encroachments’ had been accomplished. Lt Gen Umrao’s resp for the area of resp
was truncated and NEFA, Assam and Nagaland sect was given to a new, suddenly created 4 Corps, leaving 33 Corps
resp only for Sikkim and Bhutan (no dply but only a security treaty obligation).
Army HQs gave impetus to setting up the new posts under Op Onkar in areas as near to the Border as practicable. By
20 July, 34 posts (8 in Kameng, 7 in Siang and 11 in Lohit Frontier were est in NEFA). The newly est posts, manned
largely by AR, incl one at Dhola, which was est a little S of Namka Chu on 04 Jun, under the guidance of Capt Mahabir
Prasad of 1 SIKH, who had accompanied the AR Party. Siting of this post was cause of much debate and many have
gone to the extent of saying that it provided the convenient and plausible casus belli for the war that followed.
Indian ldrs believed that Chinese would not react with force.
In Ladakh, it became op when the Army was inducted into Ladakh in April 1960, with initially just a bde HQ and two
bns of local militia, later joined by a regular inf bn in Apr 1961. Orders to HQ Western Comd from Army HQ regarding
the method of implementation of this policy have already been given earlier. 114 Inf Bde was then tasked as under:
• 14 J&K Militia to look after the area north of the Galwan River.
• 1/8 G.R. to hold the area between the Galwan river and Chushul.
• 7 J&K Militia to hold the area south of Chushul down to the trijunction of Tibet-J&K (Ladakh)-Himachal
Pradesh tri-junction.
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Z 419 Force
Chinese records call it ‘the Tibetan Z-419 Army’ (“Z” standing for ‘Xizang’ or Tibet); equivalent to a Div, it is also
known as ‘Advance Comd Post’. It is called ‘Tibetan’ because it was mainly composed of tps and offrs having served
in Tibet during the previous five years; the Tibetans themselves were not directly involved. The meaning of ‘419’ is
not clear, but it probably means ‘April 19’, the date the Force might have been conceived.
154, 155 and 157 Regts along other sp units; altogether, it would have some 8,000 tps. According to some sources, in
Oct 1962, mil pers belonging to 11 Inf Div, 308 Arty Regt and 136 Engr Regt joined Z-419 ‘Comd Post’; practically, it
meant that some 10,300 men were assigned to fight 7 Inf Bde in the Namkha chu and Tawang sects.
Based on the lessons learned from fighting the Tibetan resistance, Z-419 replaced physically unfit offrs and soldiers.
A gp of well-trained rocket launcher operators were dispatched to Tibet from Wuhan, and arty pers were sent from
several mil comds. Beijing Mil Comd sent comns eqpt and oprs. Over one hundred English, Hindi and Tibetan
interpreters from different areas were sent to Tibet.
Z-419 built a rd between Tawang and Bumla in 18 days.
Z-419 Force adopted “tactics of nocturnal attk and dawn attk, interspersed under the cover of the night, detoured to
the eny’s flks and behind, and stood in standby at the attk departure place.
Longju Incident
India had a border post manned by AR at Longju until Aug 1959,
when it was attked by Chinese border tps and forced to
withdraw. After discussion the two sides agreed to leave the
post unoccupied. India ested a new post at Maja, three miles to
the S of Longju, but continued to ptl up to Longju. After the
1962 Sino-Indian War, the Chinese reoccupied Longju and
brushed off Indian protests.
Zhau en Lie Letter to Nehru
By 24 Oct, the PLA had entered territory previously administered by India to give the PRC a diplomatically strong
posn over India. The majority of Chinese forces had advanced 16 Km south of the cont line prior to the conflict. Four
days of fighting were followed by a three-week lull. Zhou ordered the tps to stop advancing as he attempted to
negotiate with Nehru. The Indian forces had retreated into more heavily fortified posns around Se La and Bomdi La
which would be difficult to assault. Zhou sent Nehru a letter, proposing:
• A negotiated settlement of the bdy.

• That both sides disengage and withdraw 20 Km from present LAC.
• A Chinese withdrawal north in NEFA.
• That China and India not cross lines of present control in Aksai Chin.
Nehru's 27 Oct reply expressed interest in the restoration of peace and friendly relations and suggested a return to
the "bdy prior to 8 Sep 1962". He was categorically concerned about a mutual 20 Km withdrawal after "40 or 60 Km
of blatant mil aggression". He wanted the creation of a larger imdt buffer zone and thus resist the possibility of a
repeat offensive.
Zhou's 4 Nov reply repeated his 1959 offer to return to the McMahon Line in NEFA and the Chinese traditionally
claimed MacDonald Line in Aksai Chin.
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Op Leghorn
800 Chinese soldiers encircled Dhola Post after having occupied the Thagla ridge above between Aug
and Sep 1962. A mtg chaired by the defence minister Krishna Menon 10-11 Sep — decided to expel the Chinese from
the ridge, if neccy by force. 4 Inf Div was ordered to “carry out the decision”. The op to evict the Chinese from Thagla
ridge was code-named “Op Leghorn”, who further detailed 7 Inf Bde.
As the IA was coord its plan to offset the Chinese, around 1100 h on 20 Sep, Chinese tps hurled hand grens into one
of the Indian bunkers at the Dhola Post, wounding three Indian soldiers. The incident triggered hostilities, with
Indians and Chinese exchanging fire intermittently till 29 Sep.
According to the plan prep by Brig John Dalvi, Cdr, 7 Inf Bde, Indian forces were to launch “Op Leghorn” on 10 Oct.
On D-Day, 2 RAJPUT was making its way up the southern bank of the R Namka Chu, towards Yumtso La west of the
Thagla Ridge when they came under fire from a Chinese bn. Also, soldiers of 9 PUNJAB, posted ahead at Tseng-Jong,
were attked by Chinese mor shelling.
No sooner was the fire lifted, and at 0800 h, approx 800 Chinese attked the PUNJABies at Tseng-Jong from the East
and North-East. After a hy exch of fire for about 45 mins, the attk was repulsed. The Chinese then continued attking
9 PUNJAB from the N, E, W with 88mm mors, grens, and auto wpns. IA lost six jawans in those attks, while 11 were
wounded and five were reported missing. Given the continuous onslaught and untenable sit, a withdrawal was
ordered and the Chinese occupied Tseng-Jong.
However, this wasn’t the last of the skirmishes that served as a prelude to the Chinese blitz across the Namka Chu on
20 Oct. On the intervening night of 15 and 16 Oct, China began to probe Indian posns at Tsangle before opening fire
at them the next day. Over the next two days, the Chinese repeatedly hurled grens at Indian tps at Tsangle.
On 19 Oct, a day before the outbreak of war, an Indian ptl clashed with the Chinese.
Thagla Ridge
In 1962, China claimed the Thag La ridge line while India, going by the watershed principle, called it its own territory.
Thag La was imp for Chinese because on its northern slopes it had a large Tibetan vill called Le, which was the
Chinese fwd base for any ops against India in this sect. Opposite them, a solitary overstretched 7 Inf Bde was resp
for the defence of Tawang and to ensure sanctity of the nearly 150 km McMahon Line in Kameng sect.
Indian int assessed that Chinese could bring a regt (equivalent of Indian bde) worth of tps in the Kameng sec,
whereas they actually brought more than two divs. Considering that all IA posts beyond Tawang were maint by air, it
made them dependent on weather and thus untenable during war.
In short, besides complete comd breakdown, the 1962 war highlighted the need for better op and tac int, adequate
forces-in-being, good road comns, and the imp of op lgs. Once Chinese declared the unilateral ceasefire, they held
the Thag La ridge, which started the war, with them.
The Chinese had started preps for war well before they joined it. Cdr 7 Inf Bde, Brig JP Dalvi who was in Chinese
captivity for seven months wrote that they had prep accn for 3,000 PsW.
Kaua (Crow) Coln Raid
Brig Hoshiar Singh Cdr 62 Bde, in an effort to gain moral ascendency over the en and build morale of his tps decided
on a raid on the en. The Raiding party consisted of:
• 2 IC as cdr, 2 Coys of 2 SIKH LI.
• One Coy plus a Pl of 1 SIKH.
• An FOO.
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Coln called Kaua (crow) would raid en posns in area Lunguthang and cause cas and destruction. Such a large coln
would easily picked up by the en.
The party moved on 15 Nov, crossed ridge line Lunguthang – Kye La moving NE and reached Dzalung – la by the
even. 1 SIKH coy est a Firm Base below the pass, while the SILH LI coys probed towards Lunguthang and est a ni harb.
The Chinese had been shadowing the coln and on 16 Nov at about 0200 h attked both locs with about a Bn str. 1
SIKH ele were driven out early. SIKH LI coys fought a valiant battle for about two hours and then attempted to fall
back to the firm base found it occupied by the Chinese.
The FOO was also not in comns so no fire sp was avlb.
Sikh LI tps fell back in small gps. There was a lot of bad blood between the bns as a consequence.
Daulat Beg Oldie
Loc just S of the Karakoram Pass, the Daulat Beg Oldie airstrip holds
immense strat imp for India in the crucial axis in central Asia. Loc at an
altitude of at 16614 feet, DBO is an imp Army fwd area post which was
built during the Indo-China conflict in 1962. It was abandoned after an
earthquake in 1968 only to be revived in 2008 with the landing of the An-
32.
It assists fast dply of men and material to the region and can potentially
block the Karakoram highway between China and Pakistan.
China has taken over Gilgit-Baltistan area on lease from Pakistan for 50
years, DBO presents a real challenge to Chinese plans. China has linked the Karakoram hwy to the Gwadar port in
Pakistan – giving it a strat exit to Arabian Sea.
Also, the airstrip is imp to help India safeguard the Siachen Glacier as essential sups can be airlifted in times of
emergency or when roads get blocked due to inclement weather.
China has a sophisticated mil infr in Tibet that incls five fully opal air bases and an extensive rail network.
The landing of C-130J Super Hercules tpt ac, which is capable of lifting upto 20 tonnes of load, is being hailed as a big
leap in augmenting India’s posn as it gives a six-fold incr in dply capb over the An-32 and Mi-17s so far deply to DBO.
Chushul
• Chushul enjoys strat and tac imp because of its loc

and trn.
• Has an Airstrip at a ht of over 13,000 feet close to

the LAC, played an imp role during the war.
• Hi Mtn Rgs give strat vantage pt. The Chushul sub-

sect lies S of Pangong Tso in eastern Ladakh. It
comprises high, broken mtns and hts of Thatung,
Black Top, Helmet Top, Gurung Hill, and Magger Hill
besides passes such as Rezang La and Rechin La, the
Spanggur Gap, and the Chushul valley.
• This sect has plains that are a couple of km wide,

where mech forces, incl tks, can be dply. Its airstrip and connectivity by road to Leh adds to its op advantages.
91
How is Chushul imp to China?
• Simply put, Chushul is the gateway to Leh. If China enters the Chushul, it can launch its ops for Leh.
• After the initial attks, incl on the Galwan valley by the Chinese in October 1962, the PLA tps prepared to attk
Chushul airfd and the valley to get direct access to Leh.
• However, just before the attks were launched, the area was reinforced by the 114 Bde in Nov 1962, which also
had under its comd two tps of armr and some arty.
The Galwan Valley
Loc about 17,000 feet above sea-level, Galwan Valley is mired by extreme weather conditions and sub-zero temp.
The area also ensconces Galwan R, which originates from Aksai Chin and meets Shyok R, an imp tributary of Indus R.
Interestingly, the 80-km long Galwan R is named after an adventurer from Ladakh, who helped many European
explorers in the 19th century. He was a crucial figure in the Great Game, the name given to Britain and Russia's mil
and diplomatic confrontation. Ghulam is believed to have helped Britishers navigate the tough trn at a time when
Russia was keen for expansion towards Tibet.
Chinese built a hwy in Aksai Chin G - 219. After bldg. the road, they lay a claim to the area, first in 1959, and then in
1962.The second claim incl parts of Eastern Ladakh. Anticipating trouble, Nehru wanted to fortify Galwan Valley.
The strat significance of Galwan R Valley (GRV), the hts on either side that dominate it and the Shyok R that Galwan
R flows into was exemplified in 1961, when India first occupied it and est an Army post which would become the first
post the Chinese People’s Liberation Army overwhelmed in the 1962 war in the west.
In Sep 1961, after a CRPF ptl was ambushed by the PLA at Kongka La, the IB issued an alert to hold unoccupied areas
between Spanggur and Pangong Lakes. Galwan was occupied on 5 July 1962 by moving 4/8 GORKHA Rifles from Hot
Springs along GRV to occupy a post overlooking the Galwan R. On 8 July, the Chinese issued a protest note, followed
on 10 July with mil action.
In response, China took to force. On 6 July 1962, China surrounded a GORKHA Regt in the area, cutting their ties with
Samzungling posts in the lower altitudes. After the end of the war, China occupied more land than its earlier claims.
Displeased with India's actions, China also played victim card
Diplomatic comns notwithstanding, the tensions continued. On 4 Oct, 5 Jat's Alpha coy under Major SS Hasabnis
were flown to the post, to relieve the GORKHAs, stationed there for weeks. On 20 Oct, the Chinese opened fire
indiscriminately, killing more than 36 Indians, and taking an injured Hasabnis prisoner.
Chang Chenmo R or Changchenmo R
A tributary of the Shyok R, part of the Indus R system. It is at the southern edge of the disputed Aksai Chin region
and N of the Pangong Lake basin.
The source of Chang Chenmo is near the Lanak Pass in the Chinese-administered region of Kashmir (as part of
the Rutog County in Tibet). The R flows west from Lanak La. At the middle of its course lies the Kongka Pass, part of
the LAC between India and China passes. Continuing west, the R enters a deep gorge in the Karakoram Rg until it
joins the Shyok R in Ladakh.
Since the 1950s, the R is in the disputed territory between China and India. As such, it hosts numerous border
outposts from both sides, such as Kongka Pass, Hot Springs, and Tsogstsalu. The region was also the site of numerous
tensions in the past, such as the 1959 Kongka Pass incident.
92
Imp of Pangong Tso
Pangong Tso literally translates into a “conclave lake”. Pangong means conclave in Ladakhi and Tso means a lake in
Tibetan language. Sit at over 14,000 feet, Pangong Tso or Pangong Lake is about 135 km long. It is a saltwater lake.
India conts about 45 km stretch of the Pangong Tso and China the rest.
The current site of confrontation is spurs jutting out of Chang Chenmo, an eastern extension of the Karakoram
Rg. These spurs are called fingers.
• Pangong Tso is strategically crucial as it is very close to Chusul Valley, which was one of the battlefronts
between India and China during the 1962 war.
• China appears to keep India constricted in the region by taking strategic advantage of looking over the
Chusul Valley, which it can do if it advances along Pangong Tso.
• China also does not want India to boost its infra anywhere near the LAC. China fears it threatens
its occupation of Aksai Chin and Lhasa-Kashgar highway.
• Any threat to this highway also puts Chinese rather imperialist plans in Pakistan-occupied territories in
Ladakh and Jammu and Kashmir, and beyond in Pakistan.
Strategic Imp of Karakoram Pass
Strategically Karakorum Pass is the easiest route connecting Ladakh

with the Tarim Basin (Xinjiang). In the past, Karakoram Pass played a
very imp role in the flourishing trade along the Silk Route.
The trade route became obsolete as China grabbed Tibet and East
Turkestan (Xinjiang) in the 1940s and 50s.
DBO is the Easternmost point of the Karakoram Rg loc about 8 KMs
S of Chinese border and 9 KMs NW of Aksai Chin LAC. The
Karakoram Pass lies to the NW of DBO at a dist of approx 17 to 18
KMs. This area is contiguous to POK and adjacent to the portion of
POK comprising Shaksgam Valley, illegally ceded by Pakistan to
China in 1963.
The Hwy linking Gilgit (later extended to Skardu) in POK with
Sinkiang Province in China passes through this area. Though this
hwy is gen called as Karakoram Hwy, it does not pass through
Karakoram Pass but through Khunjerab Pass lying further North.
In strategic terms, this highway provides greater security to POK; particularly the Baltistan area, and to Sinkiang
Province of China which is a restive province with predominantly Muslim population. When viewed in this
perspective, the area between Karakorum Rg and Kunlun Rg incl the area of Aksai Chin is very vital to China. China
mostly views Aksai Chin as part of Sinkiang Province and not of Tibet signifying its importance.
DBO and Depsang is strategically imp to both China and India for both defensive and offensive ops.
• The greatest mil threat to Ladakh, particularly N and E of Ladakh Rg incl Siachen Glacier emanates from N
Aksai Chin. DBO and Depsang plains offers options for a credible collusive Sino-Pak mil effort against India.
• An offensive by China through Depsang plains into Shyok and Nubra valleys across Saser La and by Pak from
W towards Thoise and Pratapur will envelop all areas N and E of Kardungla incl Siachen. S
• Such a course can certainly not be ruled, India should be extremely cautious about such a course and put in
place a strong defence network in the area towards thwarting such an eventuality.
• The Dapsang valley should also be viewed by India as a launching pad for ingress into China. The Chinese are
equally sensitive to any Indian thrust through Depsang area towards Karakoram Pass, N Aksai Chin and
Sinkiang; the only opening avlb to India to Central Asia and Pamirs.
93
Dissuasive Conventional Measures that can be adopted by India to Prevent a War with China
▪ Acquiring offensive capb for trans-LAC ops.
▪ Enhance grnd, air, and helicopter firepower punch.
▪ Invest in modern ISR technologies for border mgt.
▪ Upgrade mil infra in border areas.
▪ Devp robust comd and cont sys combined with safeguards for cyber and EW.
▪ Enhance own Cyber and EW reach and punch.
Since 1962, our thinking and actions were defensive and reactive. It is time to shed inhibitions and think & act big.
Instead of resorting to kneejerk reactions every time Chinese intrude into our area, we should per se deter such
attempts with a credible force posture and capb in areas sensitive to them. The str of a nation lies in its capb to
proactively without outside interference.
A strong Indian posture coupled with capb and determination may also force China to expedite border settlement
which they have been delaying since long.
The Colombo Proposals
Six non-aligned countries led by Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, took initiative to bring about
a lasting ceasefire and enable the start of bilateral talks to end the border dispute. The NAM move was made with
the express consent of India and China. Both needed an excuse to end the hot war. The six-member non-aligned gp
comprised Ceylon (SriLanka), United Arab Republic Egypt), Ghana, Indonesia, Burma (Myanmar) and Cambodia.
The Chinese Premier Chou-En-Lai proposed a three point peace plan. It envisaged:
• 20 km withdrawal by both sides from the Line of Actual Control (LAC),
• mil disengagement,
• and talks between himself and Indian Prime Minister Nehru.
Nehru rejected the offer and insisted that the withdrawal should be to positions held before 8 Sep 1962 when the
Chinese first attked triggering the war.
On 21 Nov, China unilaterally declared a ceasefire and said that it would withdraw its troops 20 km from the LAC by
which it meant the LAC as of 7 Nov. China stipulated that
• India should not go up to the ‘illegal’ McMahon Line and keep a clear 20 km dist from the line.
• India should also not reoccupy Walong.
• In the Western Sect, China wanted India to withdraw 20 km and not try to get back to the Chip Chap R
Valley, the Galwan R Valley and Pangong Lake.
• India was told not to re-est any of the 43 ‘strong points’ it had set up in the Western Sect prior to the war.
Beijing said that Chinese troops would begin withdrawing from 1 Dec but would ‘hit back’ if the Indians failed to
observe any of the stipulations. India insisted both forces go back to LAC which exists before 8 Sep 1962; China felt it
would stand to lose 6000 sq km of territory. There was always possibility of resumption of hostilities and could
involve the US and West.
Ceylon’s PM Bandaranaike called for an ‘informal’ mtg of Non-Aligned countries to assist in influencing India and
China should, if possible, meet and consult one another and decide upon an imdt appeal to India and China. The gp
of six agreed to meet in Colombo from 10 – 12 Dec. On 12 Dec, the six-non-aligned gp came out with the Colombo
Conference Proposals (CCP), CCP said that:
• The Western Sect (namely Ladakh), the Chinese mil should go back by 20 km while India could keep its posts
up to the LAC as of 7 Nov 1959.
• The demilitarized zone of 20 km created by Chinese mil withdrawals will be administered by civ posts of both
China and India.
• With regard to ‘Eastern Sect’, the Indian Forces can move up to the McMahon Line , except in two areas.
94
While India accepted the proposals in toto, China rejected them. On 6 Jan 1963, China said:
• Since the conflict occurred in both the Eastern and Western Sects, the same principle of withdrawal should
apply to all sects.
• In no case should one side be called upon to withdraw, and the other allowed to advance.
• Disengagement should be along the entire Sino-Indian Boundary and not just in one of the sects.
The Colombo proposals allowed India to adv up to the McMahon Line, a line which China had not accepted as
legitimate. It wanted the line to be renegotiated. Despite disagreement on the CCP hostilities did not resume. This
was partly due to the threat of US involvement on the Indian side, and the moral pressure exerted on both China and
India by the non-aligned gp led by Mrs. Bandaranaike.
95

The 1962 Sino India War - Maj Gen Harvijay Singh SM

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The 1962 Sino India War - Maj Gen Harvijay Singh SM

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INDO CHINA WAR: 1962

Maj Gen Harvijay Singh, SM

harvijay@hotmail.com Degh Tegh Fateh

• Le in Tibet lay N of the McMahon Line, and,

Battle of NamkaChu • Completely tac unviable def line.

En reached Lumla early hours 23 Oct. With the tps at his

A subsidy was launched in the

• Contrary to Thorat def line.

• Initial Ops: 18 – 24 Oct.

Initial Ops: 18 – 24 Oct

Subansiri and Siang Frontier Divs

International Response During The Conflict:

For fire sp, the Bde had:

Dply of 62 Inf Bde (Brig Hoshiar Singh)

The Battle of Bomdila

At about 1630 h Brig Gurbax Singh decided to pull back to Rupa.

• The right coy of 6 KUMAON was overrun almost imdt.

Namka Chu R valley, NEFA: 20 Oct 1962

In the first wk of Sep 1962, 6 KUMAON had been mov up and

• A Coy was dply fwd at Dichu. Remainder three coys

• Tac features Gurung Hill, Gun

Lhagyala Gompa, NEFA: 23 Nov 1962

Discuss the Genesis of the Indo China Border Dispute?

Key takeaways from his letter:

How was Tawang brought under India’s Cont?

What is the Strat Imp of Aksai Chin?

Chinese wanted to provide depth to the G 219 from India.

What Events Led Up to The War?

• Chinese moved into Tibet in 1950.

What was the Panchsheel Treaty?

What was the Barahoti (Bara Hoti, Hoti Plain) Issue?

Discuss the Geography of the Sino Indian Border?

The root cause of all differences lie in an ill-defined, 3,440 km

Briefly discuss the Himmatsinhji Report (N and NE Border Def Committee)

Discuss the Mistakes made in the Kameng Sect?

Discuss the Poshing La incident and its aftereffects?

• 1 SIKH LI, 5 GUARDS and 1 MADRAS.

What Were Some Grave Tac Weaknesses of the IA?

Why Did the PLA Win the War?

• Use of the Trn.

India gained many benefits from the 1962 conflict, discuss?

How was Deception used by the Chinese?

List out Imp Lessons Learnt from the War?

• Diplomacy and mil power goes together.

India’s Security Policy during this Pd

• In 1962, the IAF had 25 Squadrons consisting of

The Great Leap Fwd

Armed Coexistence, Jigsaw Pattern

Barahoti (called Wu-Je or Wure by the Chinese)

Zhau en Lie Letter to Nehru

• A negotiated settlement of the bdy.

Kaua (Crow) Coln Raid

Daulat Beg Oldie

• Chushul enjoys strat and tac imp because of its loc

• Has an Airstrip at a ht of over 13,000 feet close to

• Hi Mtn Rgs give strat vantage pt. The Chushul sub-

• This sect has plains that are a couple of km wide,

The Galwan Valley

Displeased with India's actions, China also played victim card