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ZARA: THE EVOLVING FAST-FASHION INDUSTRY1

Dan Doiron wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The author does not intend to illustrate either effective or
ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The author may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to
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Copyright © 2023, Ivey Business School Foundation Version: 2023-12-11

In March 2023, Zara, one of the primary leaders and the most profitable global competitor in the fast-
fashion industry, found itself increasingly under attack on several fronts. The industry had a growing poor
reputation regarding the negative human and environmental impacts associated with its supply chains. The
industry was also experiencing a significant prevalence and growth of online shopping, which had taken
the women’s apparel industry by storm. This had the effect of enabling the entrance of many new online
competitors that were not burdened with large and expensive bricks-and-mortar retail networks, unlike Zara
with its 5,815 high-end stores.2 Last, the evolution of artificial intelligence (AI) technology in the industry,
supporting retail purchasing decisions, had progressed in ways not envisioned ten years prior.

All of these factors were putting enormous pressure on the industry-leading, fast-fashion business and profit
model of Zara and its holding company Industria de Diseño Textil SA (Inditex). What would the future look like
for Zara as the fundamental fast-fashion business model evolved and changed? Would it be an evolutionary step
down the fast-fashion curve or perhaps something entirely different and more revolutionary?

ZARA’S INDUSTRY LEADING BUSINESS MODEL

Over the previous twenty years, Inditex’s business model had propelled it to the top of the fashion
manufacturing and retail industry, with 2022 industry-leading sales of US$32.6 billion3 (up 17.5 per cent
over 2021) and extraordinary after-tax profits equalling $4.47 billion or 13.7 per cent of sales (see Exhibit
1).4 Online sales of $8.4 billion in 2022 commanded a full 25.8 per cent of Inditex sales, growing by 4 per
cent year-over-year.5 Zara’s business model appeared to be relatively simple: spend time with its customers,
who were primarily younger inner-city women, with an eye to identifying current fashion desires and
trends; use its superior design and manufacturing capability to bring these new ideas to stores (and websites)
in as little as two weeks; and drive industry-leading per-customer store visits and sales at full price through
policies of scarcity and near zero replenishment of popular styles. The success of this business model was
indisputable—it worked! Among other things, it allowed Inditex and Zara to avoid costly markdowns
associated with undesirable or off-trend fashion, which in many ways represented the evil underbelly of the
fashion retail business. For Zara this risk was minimized, with as little as 15 per cent of its inventory sold
at markdown prices, versus over 35 per cent for the industry.6 Inditex aptly described its approach as:
“Nurturing a highly intimate relationship with its customers, Zara’s designers respond instinctively to their
changing needs, reacting to the latest trends and constant feedback to deliver new ideas for everyone in the
right place and at the right moment.”7
Page 2 W34418

Zara’s shareholders were rewarded for this innovative approach with years of solid growth and an
extraordinary market capitalization of $97.9 billion by March 2023.8 To put this in perspective, traditional
competitor Hennes & Mauritz Inc. (H&M) was valued at $19.2 billion, while The Gap, Inc. (Gap) only
recognized $3.66 billion in value.9 Zara had not only led the fashion industry but, in many ways, created
the fast-fashion business model that had successfully disrupted traditional fashion retailing. It was truly a
force to be reckoned with in the fashion industry.

THE GLOBAL FASHION INDUSTRY

The global apparel market was estimated to be worth $1.7 trillion in 2022, representing 2 per cent of global
gross domestic product (GDP). Employing approximately 430 million people, or 12.6 per cent of the global
workforce, the industry was one of the largest in the world and was expected to grow at a compounded
annual growth rate (CAGR) of 2.8 per cent between 2023 and 2027.10

The growth in the apparel industry was influenced by several factors, including changing demographics and
urbanization of the global population. Urbanization was not a new trend—this phenomenon had been
occurring for centuries, with people drawn to urban centres by the promise of economic opportunities and
access to services and amenities, along with environmental and social factors. This had accelerated in recent
times, with over half of the world’s population (55 per cent) living in urban centres by 2022. This trend was
expected to continue; projections were that by 2050, 80 per cent of the global population would live in urban
centres (see Exhibit 2) with the total global population expected to reach 9.7 billion in that timeframe.11

The global women’s apparel market was predicted to grow by a CAGR of 3.8 per cent from 2022 to 2028.
In 2022, it was valued at $965 billion.12 Growth was traditionally driven by several factors, including rising
disposable income, increasing fashion consciousness, and changing lifestyles, particularly in the large urban
centres of the world. The fast-fashion industry had no small part in driving this growth by meeting the
demands of these fast-changing fashion trends and desires. The United States and Asia Pacific were the
largest markets globally for women’s apparel. Trends toward sustainability and ethical fashion were also
expected to impact growth in this segment, with an increasing number of consumers becoming aware of
the environmental and social impact of the fashion industry—thus, the “slow fashion” movement was
created. However, the early days for this segment of the industry only garnered an estimated value of $6.5
billion by early 2023.13 The extent to which these consumers would vote with their conscience versus the
buying power afforded by fast fashion remained to be seen.

Industry growth opportunities, specifically in developed countries, were being led by changing
demographics, including the plus-size segment. The global plus-size women’s clothing market was valued
at $193 billion in 2021 and predicted to grow at a CAGR of 4.3 per cent through 2030.14 This category was
growing for several reasons, including an increased awareness of body positivity and size inclusivity. In
response to this opportunity, many fashion brands expanded their size ranges to include more plus sizes,
with some launching dedicated plus-size collections. E-commerce made it easier for women in this category
to find and purchase clothing. Growth in this market was expected to continue due to demographic factors,
such as the aging of the population and increasing rates of obesity, with 41.9 per cent of the US population
registering as obese at the time.15

Global online fashion sales reached $744 billion in 2022, up from $668 billion in 2021 and were projected
to reach $821 billion in 2023, a 10.3 per cent annual growth rate. Women’s apparel was predicted to
dominate this market segment, given that it represented 68.5 per cent of 2021 global online revenue.16 With
the overall fashion industry having achieved a growth rate of 4.5 per cent in 2022, the dominance of this
Page 3 W34418

segment and this retail channel needed to be considered. 17 Asia Pacific was the world’s largest market for
online apparel sales with a projected annual growth of 11 per cent through 2025, driven by countries like
China and India.18 The rapid growth in mobile commerce was also contributing to the growth in this
category, as more consumers in developing countries gained access to the Internet via mobile devices.

A CHANGING LANDSCAPE

The global fast-fashion industry was seeing material change, driven by three primary factors: the growing
environmental impact and social costs created by the industry; the shift to online shopping preferences; and
the related emergence of new AI technology.

The Real Cost of Fast Fashion

In 2018, shoppers purchased up to five times more clothing than they had in 1980. This amounted to an
average of sixty-eight garments per consumer in 2018, equating to a staggering eighty billion garments
annually. If the global population grew to 8.5 billion by 2030, as experts believed, with an accompanying
growth in global GDP, global fashion would grow by 63 per cent from sixty-two million to 102 million
tons produced annually.19 Clearly, this would not be sustainable for the planet.

Consumers were increasingly becoming agitated by the environmental impacts of throwaway fashion.
Landfills were filling up with recent out-of-style fashion and Zara’s strategy of designing clothes to only
be worn seven to ten times to keep pace with the rate of change in fashion trends could be viewed as
contributing to the issue.20 Ninety-two million tons of garments made their way into landfills in 2022 alone,
foreshadowing a trend that could lead to 134 million tons per year by 2030.21 Fashionable clothes also
consumed a large quantity of natural resources to manufacture and transport. Water, which in many
countries was moving from a commodity to a scarce resource, was used in abundance to manufacture
clothes. Up to 2,700 litres of water were required for each new cotton blouse or pair of stylish tights. As of
2020, 79 trillion litres of water were consumed by the fashion industry annually, equating to 20 per cent of
global industrial water pollution.22 Carbon emissions from the industry topped 2.1 billion tons in 2022,
roughly 10 per cent of world greenhouse gas emissions (GHG).23 At current growth rates, that could
increase by 50 per cent by 2030. One kilogram of material generated 23 kilograms of greenhouse gases.24
Nike, Inc. and Inditex both reported 2022 emissions of approximately 10 million tons of carbon dioxide
equivalent (CO2e), which equated to over two million gas-powered cars. The industry also used 25 per cent
of chemicals produced worldwide.25 The fast-fashion industry was one of the worst polluters on the planet,
coming in as the sixth-largest industrial source of greenhouse gases (GHGs).26

When washed, fashion produced with synthetic fabrics released microfibres into the water system which
then made their way into oceans, lakes, and rivers, were ingested by fish and other marine life, and
ultimately made their way into the human food chain. In 2023, microfibres were omnipresent in over 90
per cent of fresh and seawater samples, including, surprisingly, the waters of Antarctica.27

Of the one hundred billion items of clothing produced in 2019, 20 per cent went unsold. This was not
particularly surprising given the nature of fast-changing fashion trends. These unwanted garments were
ultimately shredded, buried, or burned. In a shocking acknowledgement in 2018, the British fashion house
Burberry admitted in its annual report to incinerating $38 million worth of its stock, up 43 per cent from
the previous year. In 2017, a Danish TV show, Operation X, exposed H&M for burning twelve tons of
unsellable clothing since 2013.28
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The global fashion industry employed one out of six people in 2019, making it the world’s largest labor-
intensive industry. However, fewer than 2 per cent of these employees earned a living wage. The industry
employed more than 57 million people, the majority of whom were from underdeveloped regions. The
enormity of this global employment was driven by the insatiable desire for fashion in the developed world.
In 2017, the United States imported $82.7 billion in apparel, while exporting only $5.7 billion. In that same
year, Britain imported 92.4 per cent of its clothing.29

The fashion industry, for all intents and purposes, presented as an environmental and human catastrophe
proceeding on an ever-worsening trajectory.

Shift to Online Shopping

With the growth of online apparel sales, large e-commerce companies were taking stock. In 2021,
Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) and Shein were the top-visited websites for purchasing apparel.30 Amazon
alone sold over $41 billion in its fashion business in 2021.31 ASOS PLC, a relatively new UK-based online
fashion retailer, sold $4.85 billion in its fiscal year ended August 2022, with a 43.6 per cent gross margin.32
Online purchasing was being driven, for the most part, by the increasing use of mobile commerce. In 2021,
67.2 per cent of all e-commerce sales globally were mobile.33

Online shopping represented 19.6 per cent of fashion retail sales in 2021 and was expected to reach 25 per
cent by 2025.34 This trend, among other things, had opened the market for online-only retailers, many of
whom were emulating Zara’s fast-fashion manufacturing capabilities without the burden associated with
running expensive stores. The relevance of the physical store was being called into question. That
inclination, in many ways, would shake up one of Zara’s key competitive advantages as it depended on its
customers to give it new ideas for future products; the store was the perfect place to gather this insight. Not
surprisingly, Inditex responded to the growing e-commerce trend by closing or consolidating retail floor
space, with the number of stores as of January 2023 at 5,815, down 10.2 per cent from 6,477 in January
2022.35 Previously, it had been on a roll, opening 2,425 new stores from a total of 5,044 in 2010 to a peak
of 7,469 stores in 2019.36 That trend was now in reverse.

Not surprisingly, the rise of e-commerce led to business and store closures by what many considered to be
strong traditional clothing retailers. Victoria’s Secret & Co. announced in May 2020 the closure of 250
stores in the United States and Canada. Macy’s, Inc. confirmed it would be closing thirty-seven more of its
stores in 2021. Lord & Taylor LLC filed for bankruptcy and liquidated thirty-eight stores. Gap was planning
to close 350 stores by 2024, primarily those in shopping malls and an additional 130 North American
Banana Republic stores over a three-year period. American Eagle Outfitters, Inc. planned to shutter up to
five hundred stores over a two-year period. Iconic retailer Penney OpCo LLC (JCPenney) filed for
bankruptcy in May 2020 under the weight of $4 billion in massive debt, forcing the closure of 242 stores.37
Even Zara announced in June of 2020 that it would be closing 1,200 of its 7,412 stores as part of a
restructuring plan, with a focus on the continued growth of e-commerce sales.38

It became clear that many fashion retailers, including Zara, were struggling to get out from under the weight
of their retail networks while growing their online sales.

Emerging New Competitive Technology in Fashion Retail

New online fast-fashion retailers, like UK-based Boohoo.com UK Limited, were emerging as not only
contenders, but perhaps leaders in the growing fast-fashion industry. These retailers had an advantage in
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that they did not have to support a legacy bricks-and-mortar network of stores (and their related costs) but
faced the disadvantage that they were, in many cases, relatively unknown brands to consumers. They also
did not have that intimate in-person relationship with their customers that retail stores often offered, which
retailers like Zara used to their advantage in spotting and identifying the latest fashion trends and desires.

However, newer technology like AI was starting to replace the individual customer relationship. AI allowed
fashion firms to get to know their customers in a very personal way. Products and shopping experiences
could be personalized to the individual with minimal time interaction, with sizes that fit and, importantly,
products could be pushed to the customer driven by recent customer search history and natural language
processing engines. Trends would be easier to predict given the breadth of AI and its ability to identify
customer behaviour with predictive analytics. It would even be able to predict if customers were planning
to make a purchase soon, driving direct marketing efforts related to that future purchase decision. AI would
drive demand forecasting back into supply chains against upcoming trends, minimizing the number of
fashion misses and related markdowns retailers experienced.39 This would make fashion retailers more
competitive and profitable.

Augmented reality and virtual reality were also evolving to provide a more immersive shopping experience
for customers. Customers could try on clothing virtually prior to purchasing, driving informed decisions
and reducing costly returns. More personalized decisions and experiences using this technology could offer
recommendations based on body shape, style preference, and past purchasing behaviour. Virtual prototypes
of clothing could be tested and modified prior to production, driving a more efficient and effective design
and distribution process.

ZARA’S TRADITIONAL APPROACH

Inditex (and Zara), one of the world’s leading fast-fashion retailers, with 2022 sales of $32.6 billion, was
credited with inventing the fast-fashion business model.40 Amancio Ortega, Zara’s founder, understood that
its target customers, who were primarily younger women living in large urban centres, exhibited three key
behaviours which Zara would have to adapt to and leverage to succeed . . . and succeed it did.

Hard to Predict and Influence

From the very beginning, it was well understood that fashion apparel customers were a fickle group that
could be extremely hard to predict and influence. They could be easily swayed by unpredictable factors,
such as celebrity fashion, friends’ fashion choices, or the need to differentiate themselves in a crowded
urban environment. These variables made it challenging to predict the next fashion hit, which drove the
single largest risk in the fashion retail apparel business: a fashion miss. Fashion misses resulted in the
requirement to remove or discount stock to make room for new inventory. Firms in this industry, on average,
discounted more than one-third of their stock, while another third was never sold, meaning over half of
their clothing did not sell at full price.41

To mitigate the risk of a fashion miss, many apparel retailers spent an exorbitant amount of money on
advertising, with a focus on building brand awareness and consumer loyalty. This worked—to a degree.
For example, in 2022, Gap spent $1.04 billion on advertising, against $16.67 billion in sales, up from a high
advertising spend of $816 million in 2020.42 This represented 6.7 per cent of sales or, importantly, 16.8 per
cent of gross profit margins.43 Zara, by contrast, spent very little on advertising, at just 0.3 per cent of sales
in 2022.44 In the highly competitive fashion industry this was certainly a defining driver of profitability.
Page 6 W34418

Tastes Changed Often

Fashion cycles could also be notoriously short, especially in the urban womenswear segment. Trends came
and went, which drove fashion retailers to introduce new fashions more often and avoid replenishing items
where “old” stock might necessitate potential discounts. Fast fashion had approximately fifty-two “micro-
seasons” per year, driving new style releases weekly.45 This contrasted significantly with traditional fashion
retailers that orchestrated two main fashion seasons per year.46

In the world of ever-changing consumer tastes, replenishment rates should ideally have been low, reflecting
a strong tie to consumers’ needs or desires. This impacted both inventory turnover ratios and the ability to
sell items at or near full price. Introducing new fashions frequently could have the positive desired effect
of enticing customers back to the store more often. A fashion retailer’s ability to react quickly to shifting
fashion preferences was a defining factor of success in this market segment.

Zara enabled success by leveraging its ability to adapt to its target customer behaviours. It maintained
several key company policies to enable success, one of which was its replenishment policy. Essentially,
Zara rarely replenished store inventory, even for items that sold well.47 Instead, it chose to fill that shelf
space with new items. This created two important, and relatively unique to Zara, customer behaviours. First,
customers came back to its stores more often in search of these new fashion items, at a rate of seventeen
times per year (versus an average of 3–4 times for competitors).48 Second, if customers saw a product they
liked, they would typically purchase it on the spot, as they knew (or rather, had been trained by Zara) that
this item would not likely be there the next time they visited the store. This had the desired effect of driving
higher inventory turn ratios for Inditex and Zara (5.9 times in 2022 versus the industry average of 3.4) and
lower markdowns (only 15 per cent of inventory was marked down to sale prices versus 35 per cent for the
industry.)49 This strategic approach to offering customers on-trend and on-time fashion helped Zara derive
an industry-leading 57 per cent gross profit margin for 2022 versus 40 per cent for the retail apparel
industry.50 Clearly these policies were having their desired effect on Zara’s bottom line.

Much of Zara’s success was attributable to its big, beautiful stores located in chic shopping districts in the
world’s large urban centres. These stores were central to understanding customers’ changing fashion
desires. Zara’s key employees, whom it called “commercials,” were adept at spotting and understanding
new fashion trends, which Zara then manufactured and delivered to its stores in as little as two weeks.51

WOULD CUSTOMERS CARE?

One of the big questions shaping the future of the fast-fashion industry became, Would fashion consumers,
particularly those Zara targeted, adjust their buying behaviour based on the growing negative environmental
footprint of the industry? Fast fashion, in many ways, democratized luxury fashion trends for everyday shoppers
by allowing them to purchase and wear fashion that was otherwise perceived to be only available to the wealthy.
Did customers understand the real cost of this fashion—that which was not reflected in the price tag? A 2018
report that surveyed seven hundred shoppers aged eighteen to thirty-seven found, understandably, that people
prioritized ease of purchase and price over sustainability. The survey found that consumers ranked ease of
purchase (95 per cent of those surveyed), price (95 per cent), uniqueness of product (92 per cent), and brand
name (60 per cent) over sustainability (35 per cent).52 It would seem that only some consumers cared.

A 2019 Harvard Business Review article pointed out that “a frustrating paradox stubbornly remains at the
heart of green business: Few consumers who report positive attitudes toward eco-friendly products and
services follow through with their wallets. In one recent survey 65 per cent said they want to buy purpose-
driven brands that advocate sustainability, yet only about 26 per cent actually do so.”53
Page 7 W34418

The fashion industry, like others, was not highly motivated to drive and support ethical and environmentally
sensitive fashion if consumers were not voting with their purses and wallets. Even simple changes like
environmental labelling were slow to emerge. Members of the Sustainability Apparel Coalition (SAC), of
which Zara was one, were slow to push for and adopt simple changes related to transparent labelling.
Baptiste Carriere-Pradal, SAC vice president of transparency, set aside the notion of regulated or
compulsory labelling, preferring less effective voluntary labelling. It would seem this was not coming to a
store near you anytime soon.54

WHAT WAS NEXT FOR INDITEX AND ZARA?

Where did Zara’s approach fit in a world where customers were shopping more and more online, while
increasingly adopting a slow(er) fashion approach in the face of the ever-increasing and disastrous environmental
impacts of the fast-fashion industry, all coupled with a growing (online) competitive environment?

The fast-fashion landscape was changing. The world which Zara invented—and dominated—was changing.
These changes threatened the very foundation of Zara’s business model, while at the same time opening
the door to many new competitors, most of whom were not burdened with expensive global retail networks.
AI was enabling key insights into changing fashion trends and desires, which previously had been primarily
drawn directly from personal interaction with consumers in-store. Influentially, online apparel shopping
was now a material part of the business. Importantly, how would regulatory frameworks focused on
reducing environmental impacts influence these changes, and perhaps the speed of change?

One thing was certain—the three big trends driving change were accelerating and virtually unstoppable:
the industry’s growing environmental impact and social costs; the shift to online shopping; and the related
emergence of new AI technology. Adapting to these changes was a growing necessity for success in the
fast-paced fashion apparel industry.
Page 8 W34418

EXHIBIT 1: INDITEX 2018–2022 SELECT FINANCIAL DATA IN € BILLIONS

2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 CAGR

2018–2022
Revenues
Net sales 32.6 27.7 20.4 28.2 26.1 5%
Profits and cash flow
EBITDA 8.6 7.2 4.6 7.6 5.4 10%
EBIT 5.5 4.3 1.5 4.8 4.3 5%
Net income 4.1 3.2 1.1 3.6 3.4 4%
Cash flow 7.3 6.5 3.9 6.7 4.4 11%
Financial structure
Group equity 17.0 15.7 14.5 14.9 14.7 3%
Net financial debt (cash) −10.1 −9.5 −7.6 −8.1 −6.7 9%
Store selling space (m²)
Zara (including Zara
3,027,914 3,141,790
Home)
Total Inditex 4,473,358 4,762,157
Stores
Zara 1,885 2,007
Total Inditex 5,815 6,477 6,829 7,469 7,490 −5%

Note: € = EUR = euro—€1 = US $1.07 effective March 01, 2023; CAGR = compounded annual growth rate; EBITDA = earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization; EBIT = earnings before interest and taxes; m2 = square metres.
Source: Created by the case author based on “Inditex Group Annual Report 2022”, Inditex, accessed April 24, 2023,
https://static.inditex.com/annual_report_2022/pdf/Inditex-group-annual-report-2022.pdf, pg 113, 86.
Page 9 W34418

EXHIBIT 2: THE GROWING IMPACT OF URBANIZATION, 2022

Source: Bruno Venditti with graphics/design by Chrstina Kostandi, “Visualizing the Material Impact of Global Urbanization,”
April 20, 2022, https://www.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-the-material-impact-of-global-urbanization/. Image used with
permission from Visual Capitalist.
Page 10 W34418

ENDNOTES
1
This case has been written on the basis of published sources only. Consequently, the interpretation and perspectives
presented in this case are not necessarily those of Industria de Diseño Textil SA (Inditex), Zara, or any of their employees.
2
Inditex, Inditex Group Annual Report 2022, March 14, 2023, 29, https://static.inditex.com/annual_report_2022/pdf/Inditex-
group-annual-report-2022.pdf.
3
All currency amounts are in US dollars (USD).
4
Inditex, Inditex Group Annual Report 2022, 18.
5
“FY2022 Results,” Inditex, March 15, 2023, https://www.inditex.com/itxcomweb/en/press/news-detail?contentId=3dbc9f5d-
2f00-46d2-bd45-8bb2ab945261.
6
Milos Djordjevic, “20 Amazing Zara Statistics That Show the Brand’s Value,” Fashion Discounts, April 8, 2022,
https://fashiondiscounts.uk/zara-statistics/.
7
“Brands—ZARA,” Inditex, accessed March 21, 2023, https://www.inditex.com/itxcomweb/en/brands.
8
Inditex, “Market Capitalization of Inditex (IDEXY),” Companiesmaretcap.com, accessed March 21, 2023,
https://companiesmarketcap.com/inditex/marketcap/.
9
H&M, “Market Capitalization of H&M (HM-B.ST),” Companiesmarketcap.com, accessed March 21, 2023,
https://companiesmarketcap.com/h-m/marketcap/; Gap Inc., “Market Capitalization of Gap Inc.
(GPS),”Companiesmarketcap.com, accessed March 21, 2023, https://companiesmarketcap.com/gap-inc/marketcap/.
10
Sky Ariella, “28 Dazzling Fashion Industry Statistics [2023]: How Much Is the Fashion Industry Worth,” Zippia, March 6,
2023, https://www.zippia.com/advice/fashion-industry-statistics/; “Apparel—Worldwide,” Statista, accessed March 21, 2023,
https://www.statista.com/outlook/cmo/apparel/worldwide.
11
Bruno Venditti, “ This Chart Shows the Impact Rising Urbanization Will Have on the World,” World Economic Forum, April
26, 2022, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/04/global-urbanization-material-
consumption/#:~:text=Today%2C%20more%20than%204.3%20billion,rise%20to%2080%25%20by%202050; Neil Ruiz, Luis
Noe-Bustamante, and Nadya Saber, “Coming of Age,” International Monetary Fund, March 2020, accessed March 21, 2023,
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2020/03/infographic-global-population-trends-
picture#:~:text=In%20just%2030%20years%2C%20the,to%20reach%20just%209.7%20billion.
12
“Women Apparel Market: Global Industry Trends, Share, Size, Growth, Opportunity and Forecast 2023–2028,” Research
and Markets, accessed March 21, 2023, https://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/5742971/women-apparel-market-
global-industry-trends#:~:text=The%20global%20women%20apparel%20market,3.8%25%20during%202022%2D2028.
13
Arabella Ruiz, “47 Official Sustainable Fashion Statistics,” TheRoundUp.org, accessed March 22, 2023,
https://theroundup.org/sustainable-fashion-
statistics/#:~:text=The%20sustainable%20fashion%20industry%20is,expected%20to%20hit%20%2415%20Billion.
14
Research and Markets, “Global Plus Size Women’s Clothing Market Report 2022–2030: 25–45 Years Segment Dominated
the Market and Is Expected to Continue,” GlobeNewswire, September 21, 2022, https://www.globenewswire.com/en/news-
release/2022/09/21/2519850/28124/en/Global-Plus-Size-Women-s-Clothing-Market-Report-2022-2030-25-45-Years-
Segment-Dominated-the-Market-and-is-Expected-to-Continue.html.
15
Molly Warren, Stacy Beck, and Madison West, “The State of Obesity 2022: Better Policies for a Healthier America,”
TFAH.org, September 2022, https://www.tfah.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/2022ObesityReport_FINAL3923.pdf.
16
“Global Fashion Industry Statistics,” FashionUnited, accessed March 22, 2023, https://fashionunited.com/global-fashion-
industry-statistics; ReportLinker, “Fashion E-Commerce Global Market Report 2023,” GlobeNewswire, February 17, 2023,
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2023/02/17/2610646/0/en/Fashion-E-Commerce-Global-Market-Report-
2023.html.
17
“US Fashion Industry Growth Rate (2019–2023),” Oberlo, accessed March 22, 2023,
https://www.oberlo.ca/statistics/fashion-industry-growth-rate.
18
GlobalData Plc, “APAC to Dominate the Global Online Apparel Market by 2025 ❘ GlobalData Plc,” GlobeNewswire, June 9,
2022, https://www.globenewswire.com/en/news-release/2022/06/09/2459994/0/en/APAC-to-Dominate-the-Global-Online-
Apparel-Market-by-2025-GlobalData-Plc.html.
19
Dana Thomas, Fashionopolis—The Price of Fast Fashion and The Future of Clothes (London, United Kingdom: Head of
Zeus Ltd., 2019), 3.
20
Elizabeth Segran, “Zara Built a $20B Empire on Fast Fashion. Now It Needs to Slow Down,” Fast Company, July 7, 2019,
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