A.

Whether all or any of the Accused is entitled to acquittal, lowering of

offence, or reduction of the sentence?
In the wake of procedural lapses and inconclusive evidences which do not prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, it has been established by courts that
benefit of doubt serves as a prominent measure for the courts to acquit the accused. 1
It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the accused are entitled to
acquittal through the stance of multiple lapses in investigation along with non-conclusive
chain of circumstantial evidence. Therefore, the multiplicity of procedural lapses during
various instances in the investigation along with the court’s clear disregard towards the
non-admissibility of evidences provided, serve as proper basis for demand of acquittal.

1. Lapses During investigation necessitates acquittal.

Slackness in conducting investigation amounts to a clear violation of criminal

jurisprudence and is not expected out of the police forces 2; it leads to creation of benefit
of doubt since the whole process becomes tainted from the start.

The established principle of “deficiency in investigation” elucidated in Bharti Tamang v.

Union of India & Ors.3, holds that, “if there is presence of deficiency in investigation
which can be observed upon lifting the veil of reality or covering the obvious deficiency,
courts have to deal the same with an iron hand appropriately with the framework of
law.” Hence, it is responsibility of the courts to take note of and rigorously address such
inadequacies.

It has been established in the case of Dr. Mrs. Nupur Talwar v. State of U.P. And Anr 4,
that half-hearted investigations and rushing towards conclusions are a valid ground of
acquittal. The ratio decidendi in the case was based on creation of doubts at various
occurrences due to lapse in following procedure established by law in collecting
evidences and corroborating testimonies. Thus, a disrespect for legal procedure directly
impacts the court's decision to acquit the defendant.

1
Rishi Kesh Singh and Ors. v. The State, AIR 1970 All 51
2
Bharti Tamang v. Union of India & Ors., 2013 15 SCC 578
3
ibid
4
Dr. Mrs. Nupur Talwar Respondents: State of U.P. And Anr., 2017 SCC OnLine All 2222, (2018) 102 ACC 524
 It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that failure to adhere to legal procedure
is a serious flaw in any criminal investigation and should not be treated lightly.

In the present compromis, lapses in conduct of TIP (Test Identification Parade) and
recording of confession produces flagrant violations and clear disregard for law.

i) The test Identification parade is not in accordance with procedure established

by law.

The counsel humbly pleads that the presence of Police during the Test Identification Parade
does not comply with prescribed procedure for conducting TIP. This constitutes as a severe
error due to non-compliance with provisions of Section 54A of CrPC. Section 54 A of the
CrPC substantiates on the conduct of the TIP as a part of investigation; it is needed by courts
for the identification of a suspect by another person.5
However, it does not transcribe any form of formal written procedure that is needed to
conduct the TIP. It has been explicitly acknowledged that presence of police during Test
Identification parade vitiate the whole process of it.6 Consequently, it has been observed
that it disturbs the sanctity of the identification process as it should only be performed by a
judicial magistrate to make it admissible in the court of law.7 In the case of Gireesan Nair
and Ors. vs. State of Kerala8, it has been maintained that presence of Investigation officer
during the TIP cannot be ruled out in scrutinizing the investigation process. In furtherance of
the conduct, the court held in Chunthuram vs The State of Chhattisgarh9 that hovering
presence of a police officer makes the TIP inadmissible in the court since it falls within the
ban of section 16210 of CrPC. The evidentiary value of Test Identification Parade was duly
deliberated upon in Mohanan Nair vs. State of Kerala11, wherein it was held that Test
Identification parades are not regarded as substantial evidences. If the test identification
parade was not properly and regularly conducted, it cannot operate as a reliable
corroboration regarding identification in court.

5
The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §54A, No.2, Acts of Parliament, 1974, (India).
6
Smt. L.Devi Rathna Kumari(Judicial Magistrate 1st Class), Test Identification Parade, DISTRICTS ECOURT ,
https://districts.ecourts.gov.in/sites/default/files/Third%20Topic_1.pdf
7
Sri G. Prabhakar, Addl. Judicial Magistrate of First Class,
8
Gireesan Nair and Ors. vs. State of Kerala, (2023) 1 SCC 180
9
Chunthuram v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2020) 10 SCC 733
10
The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §162, No.2, Acts of Parliament, 1974, (India).
11
Mohanan Nair vs. State of Kerala, 1989 CriLJ 2106
In the present case, the test identification process was conducted by the police and violates
due procedure established by law.12 The presence of a magistrate which vitiates the entire
process and makes TIP inadmissible.

ii) Confession not duly signed by the accused is inadmissible.

The counsel on behalf of Jaspal Singh submits the non-signing of the confession by the
accused tony violates the procedure made under section 164(4) 13 and 281(5)14 of CrPC.

Sec.164(4) of CrPC discusses the process of signing of confession by the accused subject to
the manner provided in section 281 of CrPC. Sec.281(5) discusses the manner of recording
of statement wherein it is observed that recording should be signed by the accused and by
the Magistrate or presiding Judge after certifying that the examination was taken in his
presence and hearing; the record contains a full and true account of the statement made by
the accused.

The landmark case of Taylor v. Taylor15 explicitly acknowledged that, "if a statue has
conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which power has to be
exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which
has been prescribed." To this regard, it is submitted the magistrate cannot in the course of
investigation record a confession except in the manner laid down in s. 164.

In the case of Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor16, it was held by the court that the dealing with
provisions of confession in any other manner than the prescribed mode under CrPC renders
the confession invalid. In the case of Dhanajaya Reddy vs. State of Karnataka17, it was
regarded that a non-signed confession by the accused would be rendered inadmissible. The
judges contented that omission to comply with mandatory provisions like Section 164
renders it inadmissible and the magistrate does not have any option when it comes to
signing of the confession; position of law states that exclusion of a part of confession
excludes the whole of confession.

12
¶5 of the Moot proposition
13
The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §164(4), No.2, Acts of Parliament, 1974, (India).
14
The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §281(5), No.2, Acts of Parliament, 1974, (India).
15
Taylor v. Taylor, [1875] 1 Ch. D. 426
16
Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor 1936, 38 BOMLR 987
17
Dhanajaya Reddy vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2001 SC 1512
In the instant case, the accused Tony did not sign the confession statement 18 which is
violative of the provisions of Section 164(4) and 281(5) of CrPC; rendering the confession
inadmissible.

2. The evidence is not conclusive beyond a reasonable doubt.

i) Fingerprint analysis provides disputable circumstantial evidence, not direct
evidence.

Fingerprints are circumstantial evidences and all the incriminating facts and circumstances
should be fully established by cogent and reliable evidence facts.19 The circumstantial
evidence should unmistakably point to only one conclusion of guilt of accused. 20 In the
recent judgement of State of Mizoram vs. Lalrempuia21, it was noted that expert evidence is
a weak type of evidence and not substantive in nature; it may not be safe to solely rely upon
such evidence. The court deliberated that matched fingerprints of the suspect do not
indicate that the suspect was present in the deceased's bedroom.22 Thus, it was established
that it is not conclusive proof of the fact that the accused was present in the house of the
deceased and the evidence was circumstantial in nature. The ratio decidendi of not taking
the evidence of fingerprint expert as substantive evidence was also pinned in Musheer Khan
v. State of M.P 23 .

It is well established that suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot be a substitute for a
proof and the courts shall take utmost precaution in finding an accused guilty only on the
basis of the circumstantial evidence.24 The prosecution must establish all the pieces of
incriminating circumstances by reliable and clinching evidence and the circumstances so
proved must form such a chain of events as would permit no conclusion other than one of
guilt of the accused.25Absence of convincing circumstantial evidence entitles the accused to
benefit of doubt.26 In the present case, the expert evidences do not point towards any one
conclusive hypothesis of guilt which forms a golden principle of criminal jurisprudence 27;
18
¶14 of the Moot proposition
19
Hukam Singh vs. State of Rajasthan(1977) 2 SCC 99
20
ibid
21

22
ibid
23
Musheer Khan v. State of M.P. (2010) 2 SCC 748
24
Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy vs. State of A.P, (2006) 10 SCC 172
25
Madhu v. state of Kerala, (2012) 2 SCC 399
26
ibid
27
Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda vs State Of Maharashtra, 1984 AIR 1622
since expert witnesses have also relied upon the same argument of finding of fingerprints of
the accused in the car to corroborate their presence. The high court has committed a grave
error to rely on such evidence for conviction of the accused in the present case. 28 The chain
of events permits multiple conclusions rather than one single conclusive hypothesis of guilt
by the accused.

To this regard, it is submitted that the expert analysis is non-conclusive in nature and
provide for a reasonable benefit of doubt.

ii) The accused's distance from the crime scene indicates their innocence.

“Law must be conscious at the speed of change in society and accordingly adapt” 29

Section2(i)30 of Information technology act 2000 defines a computer as, “any electronic,
magnetic, optical or other high-speed data processing device or system which performs
logical, arithmetic and memory functions by manipulations of electronic, magnetic or optical
impulses, and includes all input, output, processing, storage, computer software or
communication facilities which are connected or related to the computer in a computer
system or computer network”. GPS is an electronic device which fulfils the requirements of a
computer laid down as per Section 2(i) of Information Technology Act 2000.

GPS also fulfils the essentials of admissibility of electronic evidence under Section 65B 31 of
Indian Evidence Act since the electronic records of data sent and received by GPS meets the
requirements of data under the information technology act32.

The case of Syed Asifuddin v/s State of Andhra Pradesh33 explicitly held that several
computer chips programmed to convert analog to digital signals constitute as a computer
which constitutes as the core functionality of a GPS.

In the case of Tomaso Bruno & Anr vs State Of U.P34, the court established that the
advancement of information technology should be incorporated in investigation. To
28
¶17 of the Moot proposition
29
A. SARAVANA KUMAR.(District Judge), Admissibility and Proof of Electronic Records, E DISTRICT COURTS,
https://districts.ecourts.gov.in/sites/default/files/Webinar%20on%20Admissibility%20of%20Electronic
%20Evidence%20By%20Sri%20A%20Venkateshwara%20Rao.pdf
30
Information Technology Act, §2(i), No.21, Acts of Parliament, 2000, (India).
31
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, §65B, No.1, Acts of Parliament, 1872, (India)
32
Information Technology Act, §2(t), No.21, Acts of Parliament, 2000, (India).
33
Syed Asifuddin v/s State of Andhra Pradesh 2006 (1) ALD Cri 96
34
Tomaso Bruno & Anr vs State Of U.P
establish the guilt of the accused or the liability of the defendant, the production of
electronic evidence has become necessary due to the growing influence of technology on
daily life.

The plea of alibi postulates the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the
scene of offence by reason of his presence at another place which can succeed only if it is
shown that the accused was so far away at the relevant time that he could not be present at
the place where the crime was committed.35 The GPS location data shows in the present
case that the accused were 50 kms away from the location of the incident of crime. 36 Hence
it breaks the hypothetical circumstantial chain of events to show that the accused were not
involved in the commission of crime. Furthermore, the recognized principle of certification
laid down by precedents for electronic evidences under section 64(B) has been complied 37
with in the present case.

Therefore, GPS acts as a relevant circumstantial evidence which proves the innocence of
accused in the present case.

3. The testimonies provided by Witnesses during the trial are unreliable in nature
i) Denial of contents of Recovery Memo by independent witness leads to benefit
of doubt.

Section 155(3)38 of CrPC validates that the credit worthiness of a witness may be impeached
if it can be proved that former statements of the witness are inconsistent with any part of
the current contradictory statement.

The mode of impeaching the credit worthiness of parties’ rests on direct discrediting of the
witness by reference to previous statements made by him inconsistent with his evidence. 39

The Recovery Memo signed by Hiralal (the independent Panch witness) 40 affirmed for the
recovery of evidences by the accused Sonu upon the conduct of Police. However, Hira Lal’s
contradictory statement as opposed to his signature on the confession deems him as an

35
Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of UP, 1981 AIR 911
36
¶15 of the Moot Proposition
37
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal,
38
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §155(3), No.2, Acts of Parliament, 1974, (India).
39
Greenleaf Simon, Wigmore et al, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, (3)614(Little Brown, Boston, 16th
edn.,1899)- citation theek kar dena.
40
Supra n.42
unreliable witness. In the case of Govinda vs State41, the Court doubted the recovery of
weapons and also the manner in which the recovery was made, as all the recovery
witnesses had turned hostile and had bluntly denied their presence during the recovery of
knives. Thereafter, acquittal was granted.

The contents of the Panchama are not the substantive evidence but statements by panchas
in the witness box is substantive in nature.42 It has been observed that denial of
independent seizure of weapons and vehicles act as mitigating factor for acquitting the
accused in murder cases due to substantial evidence of word of mouth in witness box. 43 The
turning of Panch witness who signed the recovery memos is fatal in nature and helps in
leading to acquittal of the accused.44

Furthermore, Section 2745 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that when any fact is deposed
to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any
offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts
to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.

The appellant’s discovery of the weapon and cars only proves his knowledge as to where the
weapon and cars were kept and not a proof if appellant was the one who wielded it. 46 The
acquittal in the case of Nirmal Kumar vs State of U.P.47 agrees with the ratio decidendi that
mere discovery of the weapon at the instance of the accused by itself does not prove that
he had concealed or used it. The mere act of discovery cannot be used to infer that the
person who discovered the weapon was responsible for its concealment.48 He could have
learned of the weapon's presence at the location from another source as well. 49

In the present case, there is a glaring omission of correct application of section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act in concluding that the discovery of weapons by the accused
corroborates to the murder of Harmanpreet Singh. It is humbly pleaded before this court

41

42
Murli and another v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 9 SCC 417
43
Madhu vs State Of Karnataka,(Citation)
44
Mohan v. State of Karnatka, (citation).
45
Indian Evidence Act,1872, §27, No.1, Acts of Parliament,
46
Supra n.34
47
Nirmal Kumar vs State of U.P., AIR 1992 SC 1131
48
Shahaja v. state of Maharashtra, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 596
49
ibid
that the discovery of weapon by Sonu50 cannot be said to be attributed to commission of
offence by all the accused. It only proposes an approach in which the accused has only
knowledge of the weapon and not on whether or not the accused actually wielded the
weapon for commission of offence.

ii) The informant Jaspal Singh is an unreliable witness

It is humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that Jaspal Singh had previously attested to
having weak eyesight and not wearing glasses for correct vision during the incident of
crime.51 Weak eyesight has been proved to be a valid pre-requisite for proving
unreliableness of an eyewitness during the incident of crime in Chunthuram v. State of
Chhattisgarh.52 In the following case, the eyewitness Bhagat Ram’s testimony was deemed
to be unreliable in nature due to his weak vision and hearing capabilities and thereafter lead
to acquittal of the accused.

The courts have always held the principle of quality of testimonies rather than quantity of
them assures the evidentiary value present in criminal jurisprudence.53 The time-honoured
principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted and the test is whether the
evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy.54 It has also been a well
settled proposition that the accused can be acquitted if the appreciation of evidence in the
prosecution story is highly improbable and inconsistent in ordinary course of human
nature.55 In the present case, the testimonies of bodyguards too are insufficient in nature
and only stand as corollary to the testimony made by Jaspal Singh, since neither the faces
nor the number plates were recognized by them.56 This is highly inconsistent and
improbable since a person with weak eyesight was able to witness faces along with number
plates clearly while the gunmen, (who are required by their duties to be attentive and
observant in relation to such facts) have testified to not remembering important details like
faces and number plates. Since the corollary statements are made in respect to a statement
made by an unreliable witness, it cannot be said to be substantive in nature by the virtue of

50
¶4 of the Moot Proposition
51
¶8 of the Moot Proposition
52
Supra n.9
53
Amar Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 19 SCC 165
54
Sunil Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367
55
Selveraj v. State of T.N., (1976) 4 SCC 343 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 620]
56
¶9of the Moot Proposition
logic. 57Furthermore, in the case of Ramanand v. State of U.P 58,it was established that the
presence of motive in the facts and circumstances of the case creates a strong suspicion.
However, strong suspicion cannot be a substitute for proof of the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, the testimonies of witnesses do not produce
any such strong suspicion beyond reasonable doubt to act as a proof of guilt.

Therefore, it is humbly contended before this court that the eyewitnesses are unreliable in
nature and their statements do not prove the commission of crime by the accused.

57
Nasir Mohd. vs. State
58
Ramanand v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1396