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EN BANC

DR. STELLA MARIE P. A.M. No. P-23-111

MABANAG, [Formerly OCA IPI No. 20-
Complainant, 5019-P]

Present:

GESMUNDO, C.J.,
LEONEN,
CAGUIOA,
HERNANDO, ·
- versus - LAZARO-JAVIER,
INTING,
ZALAMEDA,
LOPEZ, M.,
GAERLAN,
ROSARIO,
LOPEZ, J.,
DIMAAMPAO,
MARQUEZ,*
Mi\RVIN A. RAMOS, Sheriff IV, KHO, JR., and
Branch 34, Regional Trial Court, SINGH, JJ.
Balaoan, La Union,
Respondent. Promulgated:
Janu
2024
ar~3
x------------------------------------ ·· I C : : ~ - - O . .x

DECISION ___ /

LAZARQ.'..JAVIER, J.:

The Case

. This case arose from a Letter-Complaint I dated July 4, 2020, with

• No part due to prior participation as Court Administrator.

1
Rollo, p. 3.

rl
'" :o~Qis.ion 2 A.M: No. P-23-111
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 20-5019-P]

attached Affidavit 2 of Dr. Stella Marie P. Mabanag, M.D. (Dr. Mabanag)

. addressed to then Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta. In her letter, Dr.
Mabanag accused Marvin A. Ramos (Ramos), Sheriff IV, Branch 34, Regional
Trial Court of Balaoan, La Union (RTC), with misappropriating PHP
50,000.00, which the latter received for safekeeping.

Antecedents

Dr. Mabanag averred that in Civil Case No. 705 entitled "Heirs of Luz
Mabanag, et al. v. Ignacio Nerona," the RTC rendered its Decision3 dated
September 14, 2010 based on a compromise agreement, declaring her and her
co-plaintiffs as co-owners of a 13,770-square meter lot in Agdeppa, Bangar,
La Union. 4

Since the case got filed in 1998 and onward, the tenants of the subject
lot had not been able to remit their rental payments to her and her co-owners.
The tenants were instead instructed to deposit their payments in a designated
bank account. 5 Meantime, following the finality of the aforesaid decision, she
initiated the corresponding execution proceedings thereon. It was in 2019
when she met SheriffRamos. 6

In March 2019, one of the tenants remitted to her brother, Dante Luis
Leoncini (Leoncini), rental payments in the amount of PHP 50,000.00. It was
made in the presence of Ramos of Barangay Oaqui I, Luna, La Union.
Leoncini entrusted the payment to Ramos for safekeeping. 7 ,

After her brother's death and in the aftermath of the COVID-19

pandemic, she infonned Ramos that she needed the money to pay the taxes on
the property. Specifically, she relayed her request in the morning of June 24,
2020 through a text message. By 8:06 a.m., Ramos replied that he was on
leave of absence. She was about to go to Ramos' s house in Luna, La Union,
but he called around 8:31 a.m., informing her that he was already on the road.
By 5 :20 p.m., she received a message from Ramos, confessing th.at he used
the money during the COVID-19 lockdown. Ramos nonetheless promised to
pay it back. Ramos claimed that he had an arrangement with Leoncini.
Regarding the payment of the subject amount. Yet, her brother never
mentioned to her such an arrangement. On July 2, 2020, by 9:02 a.m., she sent
Ramos another text message, giving him 10 days or until July 4, 2020 within

2
Id. at 4-6.
3
Id. at 36-38. Penned by Judge Manuel R. Aquino of Branch 34, Regional Trial Court of Balaoan, La
Union.
4
Id. at 36.
5
Id. at 4.
6
Id.
7 Id.
 Decision 3 A.M. No. P-23-111
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 20-5019-P]

which to return the money. Ramos insisted though that she must honor the
agreement he had with Leoncini. 8

In his Comment9 dated October 2, 2020, Ramos asserted that on March

29, 2009, he was appointed as Sheriff IV of Branch 34, RTC for Balaoan, La
Union. On November 14, 2014, Atty. Hanzel Guerrero, then branch clerk of
court, handed him a photocopy of the September 14, 20 l 0 Decision in Civil
Case No. 705 for its eventual execution. He kept it in one of his folders. 10

On May 2017, a certain BJ Roldan (Roldan) invited him for dinner at

the latter's house in Salcedo, Luna, La Union. During said dinner, a certain
Adonis Delmendo (Delmendo) invited him and Roldan to his (Delmendo)
house nearby. Roldan asked Delmendo if he could bring with him another
friend named Leoncini. Later they had a drinking spree in the house of
Delmendo:., While they were drinking, Leoncini mentioned Civil Case No. 705
and asked for his assistance for the execution of the final decision render~d in
said case. Leoncini told him that he was acting as the representative of his
half-sister, Dr. :Mabanag. 11

A week later, he (Ramos) and Leoncini met again at Delmendo's house.

Leoncini also visited him at the R TC and sought his assistance anew in the
execution of the subject decision. He (Ramos) checked the case folder bearing
the trial court's order for issuance of a writ of execution and the writ of
execution itself. He thus informed Leoncini of this development. Upon advice
by the branch clerk of court of the RTC, Balaoan, he reminded Leoncini of
the need for Dr . Mabanag, including her co-plaintiffs, to coordinate with their
lawyer. 12

Acting Leoncini' s request, he (Ramos) went to Barangay Oaqui I, Luna,

La Union,, to inform the agricultural tenants concerned about the intended
implementation of the writ of execution. He also introduced Leoncini to one
of the tenants of the subject property named Frederick Fernandez (Fernandez),
whose father was involved in the case. While he and Fernandez were talking,
Leoncini suddenly butted in and demanded that the accumulated rent owed by
Fernandez's father over the past 22 years be paid. Fernandez protested,
arguing that Leoncini cannot make such demands without first securing a final
computation from the Department of Agrarian Reform. Eventually though,
Fernandez and the other tenants expressed their willingness to vacate the
farmland they were occupying in Rissing. He later on left Leoncini and the
tenants talk among themselves. 13

8
Id. at 5.
9
Jd.at31-35.
10
Id. at 32.
11
Id. at 32.
,2 Id.
13 Id. at 33. ,
 Decision 4 A.M . .No. P-23-111
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 20-5019-P]

On March 5, 2019, he went back to Barangay Oaqui I to talk to the

remaining agricultural tenants. Fernandez informed him that the agricultural
tenants already agreed to pool PHP 50,000.00 to pay off their arrears to
Leoncini. Since: there was no one to accept the money at that time, the tenants
decided to entrust the money to him for safekeeping. He agreed to receive the
amount and so they went to the barangay hall of Oaqui I where Fernandez
handed him the amount in the presence of barangay officials, Domingo
Maynes and Victor Narcise. He signed an acknowledgement receipt to serve
as proof that he received the amount involved. 14

When he (Ramos) arrived home, he immediately called Leoncini and

told the latter about the PHP 50,000.00. Leoncini replied that he was in Metro
Manila and that he had instructed Fernandez to leave the money with him
(Ramos). During said occasion, he expressed his misgivings to Leoncini for
making him a messenger, which was annoying as it was not even part of his
official duties as sheriff. Leoncini ·apologized and promised to pick up the
money from him. 15

In the afternoon of March 9, 2020, while he and his driver Wilfredo

Rillorta (Rillorta) were in his residence cleaning his car, Leoncini dropped by
and demanded for the money. He handed the money to Leoncini, as
supposedly evidenced by an Acknowledgment Receipt signed by Leoncini,
and witnessed by Rillorta. 16 (It appears that the so-called second
"Acknowledgment Receipt, 3-9-19, l :00 p.m." was a mere annotation inserted
at the bottom portion of the first acknowledgment receipt). 17

He (Ramos) did not think too much of the incident until he-received a
copy of Dr. Mabanag's complaint. Throughout his career, it was the first time
that he heard of Dr. Mabanag's name. He never exchanged text messages with
Dr. Mabanag nor even met with her in relation to Civil Case No. 705. The
cellphone number shown on the screenshots attached to the complaint did not
belong to him. He never admitted through text messages that he
misappropriated the amount in question. 18 He never had any intention to
misappropriate someone else's funds, much less, defraud anyone. 19

In his Urgent Motion for Early Resolution20 dated January 25, 2021,
Ramos emphasized that he had already filed his Comment on the complaint
and begged the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for the early
resolution of the administrative case, because he wanted to have peace of mind
while reviewing for the 2021 bar examinations.

14 Id.
15
Id. at 34.
16
Id. at 43.
17
Id. at 34.
1s Id.
19 Id.
20
Id. at 69-70.
 Decision 5 A.M. No. P-23-111
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 20-5019-P]

Through their undated Entry of Appearance and Manifestation, 21 Attys.

Jake 0. Leoncini and James Andrew D. Dy, on behalf of Dr. Mabanag, stated
that they had received Ramos' s urgent motion for early resolution, but
stressed that Dr. Mabanag never received a copy of Ramos' s Comment, thus,
Dr. Mabanag was deprived the opportunity to file an appropriate reply thereto.
Dr. Mabanag' s counsel likewise manifested their intent to secure copies of the
case records. 22

Eventually, through her subsequent Manifestation with Motion to

Dismiss 23 dated February 4, 2022, Dr. Mabanag sought to withdraw her
complaint. She stated that on December 23, 2021, Ramos came to her house
and asked for forgiveness. He also brought the full amount of PHP 50,000.00
and requested that the complaint against him be dropped. Dr. Mabanag, thus,
executed an Affidavit of Desistance 24 dated January l 0, 2022. She is aware
though that an affidavit of desistance will not automatically result in the
dismissal of the complaint.

By Letier25 dated October 5, 2022, the OCA referred the complaint to

the Judicial Integrity Board (JIB).

Report and Recommendation

of the JIB

By its Report26 dated September 6, 2023, the JIB recommended that

Ramos be found guilty of simple misconduct for receiving the PHP 50,000.00
from the tenants, sans any judicial approval; and gross misconduct for
misappropriating the same, thus:

ACCORDINGLY, the Judicial Integrity Board respectfully

RECOMMENDS to the Honorable Supreme Court:

(1) the instant administrative case against Sheriff IV Marvin

A. Ramos, Branch 34, Regional Trial Court, Bolaoan, La
Union, ... , be RE-DOCKETED as a regular
administrative matter;

(2) Sheriff IV Marvin A. Ramos be found GUILTY of

Simple Misconduct constituting violations of the Code
of Conduct for Court Personnel and be FINED in the
amount of P60,000.00, payable within three (3) months
from the time the decision or resolution is promulgated.

21
Id. at 50-53.
22
ld.at5I.
23
Id. at 60-62.
24
Id. at 63-64.
25
Id. at 58.
26
Id. at 74-90.
 Decision 6 A.M: No. P-23-111
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 20-5019-P]

(3) Sheriff IV Marvin A. Ramos be found GUILTY of

Gross Misconduct constituting violations of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel, and meted with the penalty
of forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Supreme
Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in
no case include accrued leave credits. 27 (Emphasis in the
original)

At the outset, the JIB emphasized that the Court retains its disciplinary
authority over erring court employees notwithstanding the complainant's
desistance. The JIB made the following evaluation: •

Accepting money from litigants for safekeeping

The material allegations in the Administrative Complaint essentially

accuse the Respondent Sheriff of misappropriating P50,000.00 that was
turned over to him by virtue of his office. However, another material issue
in the instant case is whether the Respondent Sheriff was, at the outset,
authorized to receive money from litigants without approval from the Court.

In the Writ of Execution dated January 16, 2012, the Respondent

Sheriff was directed, by the Court to cause the execution of the Compromise
Agreement previously executed by the parties, relevant portions of which
are reflected in the Decision dated September 14, 2010, as follows:

1. That the defendant hereby acknowledges the ownership

and possession of the plaintiffs Stella Marie P. Mabanag,
Oliver Nicolas P. Mabanag and Therese Geraldine P.
Mabanag-Corpus over that certain parcel of land co:vered
by TD No. 23414 in the name of Francisca Morales (now
Tax Declaration No. 9344 in the name of Jaco be Ramirez)
with 2m area of 13,770 square meters located at Agdeppa,
Bangar, La Union.

Thus he hereby WAIVES, REPUDIATES and

RENOUNCES his claim and interest over the said parcel
of land in favor of the said Plaintiffs.

2. The plaintiffs Mabanags on the other hand, hereby

WITHDRAW their complaint against the defendant;

3. The plaintiffs Mabanags shall

relocate/segregate/subdivide their land from the property
of their defendant. The basis of the relocation/ segregation
shall be the sketch plans of both parties (sketch for the
plaintiffs based on Bangar Cadastre, Cad. 620 D. Case 27
and Subdivision Plan of Psu-1-004730 as surveyed for
Ignacio 0. Nerona, Psd-1-011255) plus actual/ground
survey in the presence of both parties or "their
representatives.

27
Id. at 89.
Decision 7 A.M. No. P-23-111
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 20-50"19-P]

4. Both parties hereby waive all claims for damages they

have against each other.

From the foregoing, it is clear that no authority was given by the

Court to the Respondent Sheriff, to collect rental payments from the
agricultural tenants in Barangay Rissing, Bangar, La Union. While the
records show that there exists an Acknowledgment Receipt for the
purported transaction, fact remains that he had no authority, by virtue of the
January 16, 2012 Writ of Execution, to receive P 50,000.00 on behalf of the
parties in the civil case. In the Respondent Sheriffs Comment, he declared
that the basis for his implementation of the said Writ was the Decision dated
September 14, 2010 and Order dated December 16, 2011. No other Writ of
Execution or Order commanding him to liaison for the parties, was
subsequently issued by the Court.

Parenthetically, under the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court,

the following are the duties and functions of a Sheriff IV:

2.2.4.1. serves and/or executes writs and processes

addressed and/or assigned to him by the Court and prepares
and submits returns of his proceedings;

2.2.4.2. keeps custody of attached properties or

goods;

2.2.4.3. maintains his own record books on writs of

execution, writs of attachment, writs of replevin, writs of
injunction, and all other processes executed by him; and

2.2.4.4. performs such other duties as may be assigned

by the Executive Judge, Presiding Judge and/or Branch
Clerk of Court.

From the foregoing, it is evident that the Respondent Sheriff was not
authorized to receive money from the litigants in Civil Case No. 705, albeit
for safekeeping purposes. He was merely required to perform a ministerial
duty to execute the January 16, 2012 Writ of Execution, which was to
"relocate/segregate/subdivide their land from the property of the
defendant."

As provided in the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, a "court

personnel shall not be required to perform any work or duty outside the
scope of their assigned job description." Thus, his sole act of receiving
rn:oney from litigants, even for safekeeping purposes, without authority
from the Court, constitutes Simple Misconduct constituting violations of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.

Using P50,000.00 for his own personal gain

', Anent the allegation that the Respondent Sheriff appropriated the
P50,000.00, which he received from the agricultural tenants of Barangay
 Decision 8 A.M: No. P-23-111
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 20-5019-P]

Rissing, Bangar, La Union, on behalf of the Complainant, for his own

personal use, he must be held liabfe for Gross Misconduct.

The word "misappropriate" connotes the act of using ·or disposing

of another's property as if it were one's own or of devoting it to a purpose
or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own use
includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every
attempt to dispose of the property of another without right.

... The delivery or return of the Respondent Sheriff of the amount

of PS0,000.00 to the Complainant, corroborates the allegation that he indeed
used the money turned over to him for safekeeping, for a different purpose.
Corollary, the fact that the Respondent Sheriff asked for forgiveness yvhen
he returned the amount of P50,000.00 to the Complainant, and that his act
did not cause damage or prejudice to the government, do not absolve him
of any liability. These instances, coupled with the series of screenshots of
alleged text message exchanges between the parties, where the Respondent
Sheriff himself admitted that he used the money during the quarantine
period, already constitutes substantial evidence that warrants the imposition
of a disciplinary action against him. These acts of the Respondent Sheriff
prove the presence of the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law or flagrant disregard of established rules, that constitute Gross
Misconduct. 28

As for the appropriate sanctions, the JIB noted that Ramos had been
previously been fined PHP 10,000.00 for simple misconduct in A.M. No. P-
14-3 225. 29 Due to this aggravating circumstance and there being no mi ti gating
circumstances, the JIB recommended a fine of PHP 60,000.00 for simple
misconduct and the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of benefits and
perpetual disqualification for gross misconduct. 30 The JIB further observed:

Worth stressing is that the Respondent Sheriff has shown a

propensity to commit the same acts if given the opportunity. The instant
case, and A.M. No. P-14-3225, the previous administrative case where he
was found liable, exist with another pending administrative case filed
against him by no other than the Office of the Court Administrator, docketed
as OCA IPI No. 23-235-P, for Gross Misconduct constituting violations of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, Gross Dishonesty;. and Neglect

28
Id. at 82-86.
29
Linda G. Nelmida v. Marvin A. Ramos, A.M. No. P-14-3225 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3804-P], July
2, 2014:

The Court ft!rth1~r resolves to ADOPT and APPROVE the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator in the attached Report dated April 7, 2014
(Annex A). Accordingly:
(1) the complaint against Sheriff IV Marvin Ramos is RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative
matter; and
(2) Sheriff Ramos is found GUILTY of simple misconduct and is FINED in the ~mount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P 10,000.00) payable to this Court within thirty (30) days from notice, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
30
Rollo, p. 87.

If
 Decision 9 A.M. No. P-23-111
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 20-5019-P]

of Duty in the Performance of Official Duty. In addition, albeit already

dismissed, the Respondent Sheriff was also previously charged in two (2)
other administrative cases: A.M. No. MTJ -13-1826 (Formerly OCA IPI
No. 11-2368-MTJ, for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Misconduct,
Grave Abuse of Authority, Neglect in the Performance of Duty, violation
ofR.A. 3019, and Manifest Partiality and Bias, and OCA IPI No. 17-4662-
RT J, for Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave Misconduct, and Gross
Ignorance of the Law. 31

Lastly, the JIB noted that Ramos had already been separated from the
service on December 20, 2021 due to voluntary resignation. 32

Our Ruling

The Court adopts the factual findings, legal conclusions, and

recommended sanctions of the JIB, with modification.

At the outset, let it be underscored that the withdrawal of the complaint

or desistance by a complainant does not warrant the dismissal of an
administrative complaint. The Court has an interest in the conduct and
behavior of its officials and employees to ensure that justice is properly
delivered to the people at all times. An affidavit of desistance will not divest
the Court of its jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution
to investigate and resolve complaints against erring officials and employees
of the judiciary. It bears stressing"that the issue in an administrative case is
not whether the complainant has a cause of action against the respondent, but
whether the employee has breached the norms and standards of the courts.
The disciplinary power of the Court cannot be made to depend on the whims
oftb.e complainant. To rule otherwise would undermine the discipline of court
officials and personnel. The people's faith and confidence in their government
and its instrumentalities must be maintained, hence, the outcome of an
administrative complaint should not be subject to the whims and caprices of
complainants·· who, in the real sense, are only witnesses. Indeed,
administrative actions are not made to depend on the will of every
complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act.
Such unilateral act does not bind the Court on a matter relating to its
disciplinary power. 33 Here, the Court will not dismiss the complaint simply
because Dr. Mabanag had filed an affidavit of desistance in the administrative
case filed against Ramos.

There are two distinct acts which Ramos is administratively liable for:
(l) taking the FHP 50,000.00 for safekeeping, sans any judicial approval; and
(2) misappropria~ing the money for his personal use.

31
Id. at 88.
32 Id.
33 Escalona v. Padillo, 645 Phil. 263, 267-268 (2010) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
 Decision 10 A.M. No. P-23-111
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 20-5019-P]

Misconduct can either be simple or grave. Domingo v. CSC 34 is

apropos:

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule

of action, particularly, as a result of a public officer's unlawful behavior,
recklessness, or gross negligence. This type of misconduct is characterized
for purposes of gravity and penalty as simple misconduct.

The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements

of corruption, clear willful intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
established rules, supported by sub.~tantial evidence. 35

Here, Ramos committed simple misconduct when he allowed himself

to be a liaison officer of sorts between Leoncini and the agricultural tenants,
specifically when he received money on behalf of one of the·parties, sans any
judicial approval, aside from the fact that it was not among his official duties
per the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, viz.:

2.2.4.1. serves and/or executes writs and processes addressed and/or

assigned to him by the Court and prepares and submits returns of his
proceedings;

2.2.4.2. keeps custody of attached properties or goods;

2.2.4.3. maintains his own record books on writs of execution, writs

of attachment, writs of replevin, writs of injunction, and all other processes
executed by him; and

2.2.4.4. performs such otl'ier duties as may be assigned by the

Executive Judge, Presiding Judge and/or Branch Clerk of Court.

The pronouncement in Ressurreccion v. Ibuna, Jr. 36 is apropos:

Respondent's act constituted misconduct which was not a light

offense. Indeed, respondent sheriff went way beyond the scope of his
authority when he prepared the demand letter and served it personally on
complainant. The preparation of a demand letter is not one of the sheriff's
duties and functions set forth in the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of
Court ... 37

On whether Ramos is guilty of gross misconduct for his·· supposed

misappropriation of the PHP 50,000.00 he received in trust sans any judicial
approval, we reckon with his defenses, to wit: a) he never exchanged text
messages with Dr. Mabanag prior to her filing the complaint against him; and
b) he had turned over the money to ~eoncini on March 9, 2019, as supposedly
witnessed by his driver, Rillorta.

34
874 Phil. 587 (2020) [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, First Division].
35
Id. at 602-603.
36
529 Phil. 659 (2006) [Per J. Corona, Second Division].
37
Id. at 662.
 Decision 11 A.M. No. P-23-111
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 20-5019-P]

We are not persuaded.

Text messages are admissible as electronic evidence. On this score,

Asuncion v. Salvado 38 illuminates:"

Text messages are classified as ephemeral electronic

communications under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence; thus:

SECTION 1. Definition ofTerms. -For purposes of

these Rules, the following terms are defined, as follows:

xxxx

(k) "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to

telephone conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions,
streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms
of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or
retained.

In Bartolome v. Maranan (Bartolome), the Court held that

ephemeral electronic communications are admissible evidence subject to
the conditions set forth in Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence; thus:

SECTION 2. Ephemeral electronic communications.

- Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge thereof. In the absence or unavailability
of such witnesses, other competent evidence may be
admitted[.]

xxxx

Here, complainant's testimony as a party to the exchange of text

messages is sufficient to prove the contents thereof. 39 ( citation omitted)

Here, Dr. Mabanag attached screenshots 40 to her verified complaint

showing the thread of messages between her and Ramos. She declared 4nder
oath that "Sheriff' referred to no other than Ramos, whose messages to her
included an admission that he us~d the money due to COVID-19 and the
difficult life back then; and promised to return the money to her, thus:

Sheriff: Doc nun kc covid ngamit ko dhil hrap buhay fas nun buhay pa c
uncle dandito my usapan kmi nun kya pasenxa plitan ko nlng doc. 41

Against this positive assertion of Dr. Mabanag under oath, together

with the subject electronic evidence, Ramos's general denial must fail. More
38
A.C. No. 13242 (Formerly CBD Case No. 15-4692), July 05, 2022 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
39
Rollo, pp. 12-13. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded in the Supreme Court
website.
40
Id. at 7.
41 Id.

A
Decision 12 A.M.,No. P-23-111
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 20-5019-P]

so considering that the supposed Acknowledgment Receipt42 he produced,

bearing the signatures of Leoncini and Ramos' s driver named Riilorta has not
been properly authenticated as it" even appears to be equivocal, if not
altogether suspect.

For one, it was merely inserted at the bottom portion of the first
acknowledgment receipt executed by the tenants concerned when they
entrusted the subject amount to Ramos.

For another, the supposed second acknowledgment receipt did not even
indicate its subject matter and the name of the person from whom it was
received.

Still another, the supposed recipient Leoncini whose alleged signature

was affixed to the so-called second acknowledgment is long dead. The Dead
Man's Statute 43 ordains that "[i]f one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the
other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction." 44

Further, Rillorta, Ramos's driver whose alleged sign,ature was affixed

to the second acknowledgment receipt as a witness did not even identify, let
alone, confirm through a sworn statement, that such signature really belonged
to him.

Too, despite receipt of Dr. Mabanag's Affidavit of Desistance dated

January 10, 2022 and Motion to Dismiss dated February 4, 2022, Ramos did
not bother to refute the damaging statements borne therein, viz.:

1. I filed a Complaint against Mr. Marvin A. Ramos, who worked as Court

Sheriff in Balaoan Regional Trial Court Branch 34, La Union. (Dr.
Stella .Marie P. Mabanag vs. Marvin A. Ramos, Sheriff IV Branch 34,
Regional Trial Court Balaoan La Union, OCA IPI NO. 20-5019-P)I
filed a Complaint against Mr. Marvin A. Ramos, who worked as Court
Sheriff in Balaoan Regional Trial Court Branch 34, La Union. (Dr.
Stella .Marie P. Mabanag vs. Marvin A. Ramos, Sheriff IV Branch 34,
Regional Trial Court Balaoan La Union, OCA IPI NO. 20'-5019-P)

42
Id. at 43.
43
RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 23 provides that:
Sec. 23. Disqualiification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. - Parties or assignors of parties
to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against
the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any
matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind.
44
Garcia v. Vda. De Caparas, 709 Phil. 619,632 (2013) [Per J. Castillo, Second Division].
 Decision 13 A.M. No. P-23-111
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 20-5019-P]

2. I sent my Affidavit dated 06 July 2020 and attached a cover letter to

. Honorable Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta through Justice Midas
Marquez dated 04 July 2020,

3. In the Affidavit, I explained that Mr. Ramos received the amount of

Fifty Thousand Pesos (PHP 50,000.00) from my family's land tenants
last March 2019 for safekeeping. However, we had difficulty retrieving
the money because he said he used it for his personal needs and would
just later pay us back.

4. On 23 December 2021, Mr. Marvin A. Ramos went to my home and

asked for forgiveness. He brought with him the subject amount owed
and requested to have the problem fixed.

5. Thus, I would like to respectfully inform this Honorable Office that the
problem has already been solved, and I am filing this affidavit of
Desistance to withdraw my complaint against Mr. Marvin A. Ramos

Surely, Ramos cannot benefit from Dr. Mabanag's motion to dismiss

and affidavit of desistance without fully accepting the averments therein,
which Raq1os was deemed to have admitted by silence. Indeed, failure to
comment on a charge despite the opportunity to do so amounts to admission
by silence. 45

Verily, therefore, there exists substantial evidence to prove that Ramos

diverted the subject amount for his personal use. albeit he should not have
even accepted it in the first place. In Judge Platil v. Mondano, 46 a clerk of
court was found guilty of gross misconduct for misappropriating funds he
coHected from litigants.

In sum, Ramos must be separately penalized for each of the two subject
infractions in accord with Section 21 of A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC, 47 thus:

SECTION 21. Penalty for Multiple Offenses. -lfthe respondent

is found liable for more than one (1) offense arising from separate acts or
omissions in a single administrative proceeding, the Court shall impose
separate penalties for each offense. Should the aggregate of the imposed
penalties exceed five (5) years of suspension or Pl,000,000.00 in fines, the
respondent may, in the discretion of the Supreme Court, be meted with the
penalty of dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as
may be determined, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations. Provided, howewr, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no
·case include accrued leave credits.

On the other hand, if a single act/omission constitutes more than one

( 1) offense, the respondent shall still be found liable for all such offenses,

45
See Tan v. Alvarico, 888 Phil. 345, :363-364 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
46
887 Phil. 1025, 1037 (2020) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
47
Further Amendments to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, February 22, 2022.
 Decision 14 A.M, No. P-23-111
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 20-5019-P]

but shall, nonetheless, only be meted with the appropriate penalty for the
most serious offense. (Emphasis supplied)

Simple misconduct bears the following penalties: 1) suspension from

office without salary and other benefits for not less than one month nor more
than six months; or 2) a fine of more than PHP 35,000.00 but not exceeding
PHP 100,000.00. 48

On the other hand, gross misconduct carries the following penalties: 1)

dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the ben~fits as the
Supreme Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations; 2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
more than six months but not exceeding one year; or 3) a fine of more than
PHP l 00,000.00 but not exceeding PHP 200,000.00. 49 -

The Court notes that Ramos had voluntarily resigned effective

December 20, 2021, yet, the present administrative complaint against him has
not been rendered moot. OCA v. Amor50 teaches:

Finally, even with Judge Amor's resignation, it does not preclude

the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be
answerable. Moreso, as his administrative liability was by virtue of his
eventual conviction before the Sandiganbayan. It must be emphasized anew
that cessation from office of respondent by resignation or retirement neither
warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him
while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case
moot and academic. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce
the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof.
A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful
and dangerous implications. 51

Despite his voluntary resignation, he may still be fined and/or meted

the accessory penalties. Section 18 "of A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC ordains:

SECTION 18. Penalty in Lieu of Dismissal on Account of

Supervening Resignation, Retirement, or other Modes of Separation of
Service. - If the respondent is found liable for an offense which merits the
imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service but the same can no
longer be imposed due to the respondent's supervening resignation,
retirement, or other modes of separation from service except for death, he
or she may be meted with the following penalties in lieu of dismissal:

(a) Forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Supreme Court may
determine, a::id disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporations.

48
A.M. No. 21 08-09-SC, sec. 17 (2).
49
A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC, sec. 17 (!).
50
889 Phil. 605 (2020) [Per Curiam, En Banc]
51
Id. at 620.
 Decision 15 A.M. No. P-23-111
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 20-5019-P]

Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include

accrued leave credits; and/or

(b) Fine as stated in Section 17 (1) (c) of this Rule.

For simple misconduct, Ramos should be fined PHP 60,000.00. As for

gross misconduct, however, since the penalty of dismissal can no longer be
imposed on him in view of his voluntary resignation, he should be fined PHP
110,000.00, with perpetual disqualification from reinstatement or
employment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations.

On the payment of fines, Section 22 of A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC

enunciates:

SECTION 22. Payment of Fines. - When the penalty imposed is a

fine, the respondent shall pay it within a period not exceeding three (3)
months from the time the decision or resolution is promulgated. If unpaid,
such amount may be deducted from the salaries and benefits, including
accrued leave credits, due to the respondent. The deduction of unpaid fines
from accrued leave credit, which is considered as a form of compensation,
is not tantamount to the imposition of the accessory penalty of forfeiture
covered under the provisions of this Rule.

The annotation to this provision reads:

NOTES: In Flores v. Interino (A.M. My. P-18-3873, January 11,

2021 ), the Court imposed a fine on respondent because he could no longer
serve the penalty of suspension previously meted on him. The Court ordered
the amount of the fine (i.e., prevailing rate on her last day of work) to be
"deducted from her accrued leave credits, if any, or paid directly to the
Court if she does not have sufficient leave credits to cover the amount of
the fine."

To avoid confusion with the subsisting prohibition of forfeiting

accrued leave credits, the provision also makes clear that the deduction of
unpaid fines from accrued leave credits is considered as a form of
compensation which is not tantamount to the imposition of the accessory
penalty of forfeiture covered under the provisions of this Rule. 52

As worded, Section 22 now allows the deduction of fine from the

respondent's salaries and benefits, including accrued leave credits, if the same
is not paid within the prescribed three-month period from promulgation of the
decision or resolution. To clarify, however, this deduction is in the nature of
compensation, i.e., it is merely a manner of payment to extinguish to the
concurrent amount the obligations of persons who are reciprocal debtors and
creditors of each other. 53 It is not tantamount to forfeiture of accrued leave
credits, which is prohibited. The rule remains that despite their dismissal from

52 See https://s.c.judiciary.gov. ph/21-08-09-sc-further-amendments-to-rule- l 40-of-the-rules-of-court/

(Last accessed: November 27, 2023).
53
See Madecor v. Uy. 415 Phil. 348 (2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
Decision 16 A.M.,No. P-23-111
[Formerly OCA IPI No .• 20-5019-P]

service, government employees are entitled to the leave credits that they have
earned during the period of their employment, and may not be deprived of
such remuneration which they have already earned prior to their dismissal. 54
Only, so as not to leave the penalty of fine unpaid, such amount may be
recovered from the remuneration due to erring respondent's equivalent to the
accrued leave credits they earned during their service.

In several cases, the Court applied Section 22 of A.M. No. 21-08-09-

SC on the collection of fine, especially where the court personnel has already
resigned, retired, or separated from service. Consider:

In Tabao v. Cabcabin, 55 Sheriff Cabcabin was found guilty of simple

misconduct andl suspended for one month and one day. Since SheriffCabcabin
had already optionally retired, he was meted a fine instead, chargeable against
his retirement benefits. The Court explained:

Under Section 47 of the RRACS, payment of fine in place of

suspension is allowed when the respondent committed the offense _without
abusing the powers of his position or office. The same provision adds that
payment of fine in lieu of suspension shall be available in less grave
offenses where the penalty imposed is less than 6 months or less at the ratio
of 1 day of suspension from the service to 1 day fine. In this case, the Court
adopts the PS,000.00 fine recommended by the Investigating Judge, there
being no showing that Sheriff Cabcabin abused his authority w9-en he issued
the questioned certification of voluntary surrender, and considering that he
was very sorry and apologetic for not having been extra careful in the
performance of his duties. However, since he has filed an application for
optional retirement effective at the end of December 2015, it is no longer
viable to indicate that he should be sternly warned for repetition of the same
act. 56

In Flores v. Interino, 57 Interino, a clerk, was originally suspended for

neglect of duty. Since Interino had already resigned before the penalty was
meted, the penalty of suspension was converted to a fine to be deducted from
her accrued leave credits:

Considering that it is indeed no longer possible for respondent to

serve the penalty of suspension meted out upon her in the Resolution dated
September 17, 2018, the Cm.irt adopts and approves the OCA's
recommendation to impose instead a Fine equivalent to her salary for one
( l) month and one ( 1) day to be computed based on the prevailing rate on
her last day at work and to be deducted from her accrued leave credits, if
any, or paid directly to the Court if she does not have sufficient leave credits
to cover the amount of the fine ....

54
Paredes v. Padua, 471 Phil. 31, 32 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
55
785 Phil. 335 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
56
Id. at 348-349.
57
A.M. No. P-18-3873 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 18-4858-P). January 11, 2021 [Per J. Inting, Third
Division].
Decision 17 A.M. No. P-23-111
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 20-5019-P]

Meanwhile, in the January 2023 case of Santiago v. Fernando, 58 the

Court En !Jane adjudged utility worker Romelito G. Fernando (Fernando),
guilty of two counts of gross insubordination and one count of gross
misconduct. Considering, however, that Fernando had already been dropped
from the rolls due to AWOL in 201 7, the Court, applying Section 18 of the
Revised Rule 140, meted the following penalties, in lieu of dismissal: (1) for
the first charge of gross insubordination, forfeiture of all benefits, except
accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations;
(2) for the second charge of gross insubordination, fine of PHP 150,000.00;
and(3) for the third charge of gross misconduct, fine of PHP 150,000.00. Per
Section 22 of Revised Rule 140, if the fines remain unpaid after three months
from promulgation of the Resolution, the amount shall be deducted from
Fernando's salaries and benefits, including accrued leave credits.

Further, in the more recent case of Usama v. Tomarong5 9 (March 2023),

Judge Tomarong was fined a total of PHP 220,000.00, for two counts of gross
ignorance of the law and two counts of gross misconduct, in lieu of suspension
in view ofhis optional retirement. The Court En Banc, again ordered that in
case of Judge Tomarong failure to pay the fine within three months _from
promulgation of the judgment, the same shall be deducted from his
retirementet benefits, including ac9rued leave credits.

Here, the Court adopts the approach in Santiago and Usama, that is,
Ramos shall be first directed to pay the total fine of PHP 170,000.00 within
three months from promulgation of this Decision. If he is unable to pay, the
fine shall be deducted from his monetary benefits, including accrued leave
credits, which he has earned by reason of his government service.

ACCORDINGLY, MARVIN A. RAMOS, Sheriff IV, Branch 34,

Regional Trial Court, Balaoan, La Union, is found GUILTY of SIMPLE
MISCONDUCT, for which he is FINED PHP 60,000.00. Further, he is found
GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, for which he is FINED PHP
110,000.0Q, in lieu of dismissal from the service, with perpetual
disqualification from reinstatement or employment to any public office,
including government-owned or-controlled corporations.

MARVIN A. RAMOS is DIRECTED to PAY the total sum of PHP

170,000.00 directly to the Court within a period not exceeding three months
from promulgation of this Decision. Should he fail to do so, such amount shall
be deducted from his salaries and benefits, including his accrued leave credits
which he has earned by reason of his government service.

This Decision is immediately executory.

58 A.M. No. P-22-053 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 15-4466-P), January 17, 2023 [Per J. Rosario, En Banc].
59 A.M. No. RTJ-21-017 [FormerlyOCA IPI No. 19-4935-RTJ]. March 08, 2023 [Per J. Rosario, En Banc].
 • Decision A.M•. No. P-23-111
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 20-'5019-P]

SO ORDERED.

AM
'A9,~ i'1
• !_✓ \
LAz._( O-JAVIER.
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

• . ------
G. GESMUNDO
-·

-~
.--- MARVIC .V.F. LEONEN.
Senior Associate Justice

. INTING
Associate Justice
Decision 19 A.M. No. P-23-111
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 20-5019-P]

;AM~- . ROSARIO
Associate Justice

• JHOSE~OPEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice