Colonel v. Constantino
Colonel v. Constantino
Colonel v. Constantino
97
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 121069, February 07, 2003
DE CIS ION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This refers to the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated March 27, 1995, in CA-G.R. CV No. 44023[1] which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 8, dated
April 12, 1993 in Civil Case No. 105-M-91[2]; and the resolution of said
appellate court, dated July 4, 1995, denying the motion for reconsideration of
its decision.
The subject property consists of two parcels of land situated in Sta. Monica,
Hagonoy, Bulacan, designated as Cadastral Lots Nos. 5737 and 5738. The
property is originally owned by Honoria Aguinaldo. One-half (1/2) of it was
inherited by Emilia Meking Vda. de Coronel together with her sons Benjamin,
Catalino and Ceferino, all surnamed Coronel. The other half was inherited by
Florentino Constantino and Aurea Buensuceso.
After defendants filed their Answer, pre-trial ensued wherein the parties
stipulated that: (1) the property in question was previously owned by Honoria
Aguinaldo, one-half (1/2) of which was inherited by the defendants while the
other half was inherited by the plaintiffs from the same predecessor; (2) it
was admitted by counsel for the defendants that there was a sale between
Jess Santos and the plaintiffs covering the subject property; and (3) that there
was no evidence presented in Civil Case No. 8289-M by either of the parties
and that the decision therein was based on a compromise agreement. [3]
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiffs, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
“SO ORDERED.”[4]
“I.
“II.
“III.
“IV.
The third issue was raised by the petitioners for the first time with the Court
of Appeals. They claim that the complaint should have been dismissed
because private respondents failed to implead the heirs of Ceferino and
Catalino who died in 1983 and 1990, [6] respectively, in their complaint as
indispensable parties. We do not agree.
“PANIWALAAN NG LAHAT:
“P I N A T U T U N A Y A N
“x x x xxx xxx
(Signed) (Signed)
EMILIA MICKING Vda. CORONEL JESS C. SANTOS
Nagbili Nagbili
(Unsigned) (Signed)
BENJAMIN M. CORONEL PRISCILLA BERNARDO
Nagbili Nakabili”[7]
Thus, it is clear, as already stated, that petitioner Benjamin did not sign the
document and that the shares of Catalino and Ceferino in the subject property
were not sold by them.
Since the shares of Catalino and Ceferino were not sold, plaintiffs
Constantino and Buensuceso have no cause of action against them or against
any of their heirs. Under Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, indispensable parties are parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action. In the present case, the heirs of
Catalino and Ceferino are not indispensable parties because a complete
determination of the rights of herein petitioners and respondents can be had
even if the said heirs are not impleaded.
Besides, it is undisputed that petitioners never raised before the trial court the
issue of the private respondents’ failure to implead said heirs in their
complaint. Instead, petitioners actively participated in the proceedings in the
lower court and raised only the said issue on appeal with the Court of
Appeals. It is a settled rule that jurisdictional questions may be raised at any
time unless an exception arises where estoppel has supervened. [8] In the
present case, petitioners’ participation in all stages of the case during trial,
without raising the issue of the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over
indispensable parties, estops them from challenging the validity of the
proceedings therein.
Further, the deed of sale is not a competent proof that petitioner Benjamin
had sold his own share of the subject property. It cannot be disputed that
Benjamin did not sign the document and therefore, it is unenforceable against
him.
Emilia executed the instrument in her own behalf and not in representation of
her three children.
“Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person
in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.”
As to the first, second and fourth issues – it has been established that at the
time of execution of the “Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan” on April 23,
1981[9], the subject property was co-owned, pro-indiviso, by petitioner
Emilia together with her petitioner son Benjamin, and her two other sons,
Catalino and Ceferino. No proof was presented to show that the co-
ownership that existed among the heirs of Ceferino and Catalino and herein
petitioners has ever been terminated.
Applying Articles 1317 and 1403 of the Civil Code, the Court of Appeals
ruled that through their inaction and silence, the three sons of Emilia are
considered to have ratified the aforesaid sale of the subject property by their
mother.
“(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who
has been given no authority or legal representation, or who has
acted beyond his powers.
xxx xxx x x x”
We do not agree with the appellate court. The three sons of Emilia did not
ratify the sale. In Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot[10] we held that:
No evidence was presented to show that the three brothers were aware of the
sale made by their mother. Unaware of such sale, Catalino, Ceferino and
Benjamin could not be considered as having voluntarily remained silent and
knowingly chose not to file an action for the annulment of the sale. Their
alleged silence and inaction may not be interpreted as an act of ratification on
their part.
Hence, Jess C. Santos and Priscilla Bernardo, who purchased the share of
Emilia, became co-owners of the subject property together with Benjamin
and the heirs of Ceferino and Catalino. As such, Santos and Bernardo could
validly dispose of that portion of the subject property pertaining to Emilia in
favor of herein private respondents Constantino and Buensuceso.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
[11] Manzano vs. Perez, Sr., 362 SCRA 430, 439 (2001).