C.7.

Opinion Rule

C.7.a. General Rule: Opinion Not Admissible (Rule 130, Section 51)

C.7.b. Exceptions to the Opinion Rule

C.7.b.i. Expert Opinion (Rule 130, Section 52; Rule on DNA

Evidence)

Cases:

1. Dela Llana v. Biong, G.R. No. 182356, December

4, 2013, 711 SCRA 522

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: SANTOS, EUNICE DANIELLE

CASE TITLE: Dela Llana v. Biong

DRA. LEILA A. DELA LLANA, petitioner, vs. REBECCA BIONG, doing business under the
name and style of Pongkay Trading, respondent.

RULE: Expert Opinion (Rule 130, Section 52)

Section 52. Opinion of expert witness. – The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring
special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, which he or she is shown to
possess, may be received in evidence. (49a)

DOCTRINE: The probative value of an expert testimony does not lie in a simple exposition
of the expert’s opinion. Rather, its weight lies in the assistance that the expert witness may
afford the courts by demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his opinion and the
reasons on which the logic of his conclusions is founded.

FACTS: Juan dela Llana (Juan) was driving a car along North Avenue, Quezon City with
his sister, Dra. Leila dela Llana (Dra. dela Llana) at the front passenger seat and Calimlim
at the backseat. While stopped across Veterans Hospital, a dump drunk driven by Joel
suddenly rammed the car from the rear, violently pushing it forward. The car’s rear
collapsed and its rear windshield shattered. Apart from a few minor wounds caused
by the glass splinters, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered other visible
physical injuries.

After a few weeks, Dra. dela Llana started to feel pain on the left side of her neck and
shoulder, which eventually became unbearable to the point that she could no longer move
her arm. Upon consultation with Dr. Milla, she was diagnosed as having suffered from a
whiplash injury. Extensive physical therapy proved to be futile and she had to undergo
cervical spine surgery after consultation with other doctors. As a result of the surgery, Dra.
dela Llana was incapacitated from the practice of her profession.

She sued Rebecca (owner of the dump truck) for damages after the latter refused to
compensate her for the injuries she sustained.
At trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a hostile
witness. She testified that she lost the mobility of her arm due to the vehicular accident.
She identified and authenticated a medical certificate issued by Dr. Milla which stated that
she suffered from a whiplash injury. In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was
physically fit when they met days after the accident, and that she exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel (truck driver).

The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana. It held that the proximate cause of the whiplash
injury was Joel’s reckless driving. It declared that Joel’s negligence gave rise to the
presumption that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of Joel. Accordingly, it found Rebecca vicariously liable, and
awarded Dra. dela Llana damages and the cost of the suit.

The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the RTC. It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to
establish a reasonable connection between the accident and her whiplash injury by
preponderance of evidence. It ruled that courts will not hesitate to rule in favor of the other
party if there is no evidence or the evidence is too slight to warrant an inference
establishing the fact in issue. (Nutrimix Feeds Corp. v. CA). It also declared that Dra. dela
Llana’s failure to present an expert witness was fatal to her claim. No weight was given to
the medical certificate as it had no explanation on how and why the accident caused the
injury.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dra. dela Llana’s opinion has probative value.

RULING/RATIONALE: Dra. dela Llana’s opinion that Joel’s negligence caused her
whiplash injury has no probative value.

Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a physician and even assuming that she is an
expert in neurology, the Court cannot give weight to her opinion that Joel’s reckless driving
caused her whiplash injury without violating the rules on evidence.

Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference between an ordinary witness
and expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in evidence
regarding:
(a) identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
Furthermore, the witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior,
condition or appearance of a person. On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness
may be received in evidence on a matter requiring special knowledge,skill, experience or
training which he is shown to possess.

Courts do not immediately accord probative value to an admitted expert testimony, much
less to an unobjected ordinary testimony respecting special knowledge. The reason is that
the probative value of an expert testimony does not lie in a simple exposition of the
expert’s opinion. Rather, its weight lies in the assistance that the expert witness may afford
the courts by demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his opinion and the
reasons on which the logic of his conclusions is founded.
Dra. Leila’s medical opinion cannot be given probative value. As an ordinary witness, she
was not competent to testify on the nature, and cause and effects of
whiplash injury.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision

dated February 11, 2008 and Resolution dated March 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
are hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

2. Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro, Jr., G.R. No. 198240,

July 3, 2013

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Michael Vincent P. Dizon

CASE TITLE:

LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS*, Petitioner, vs. THE HEIRS OF THE LATE

DR. ANDES NAVARRO, JR., namely NO HIT ANA V ARRO, FRANCISCA
NAVARRO MALAPITAN, SOLEDAD NAVARRO BROCHLER, NONITA
BARRUN NAVARRO, JR., IMELDA NAVARRO, ANDRES NAVARRO III,
MILAGROS NAVARRO YAP, PILAR NAVARRO, TERESA
NAVARRO-TABITA, and LOURDES BARRUN-REJUSO, Respondents.

2013-07-03 | G.R 148220

RULE:

Opinion Rule – Section 51. General Rule. – The opinion of a witness is

not admissible, except as indicated in the following items sections.

Section 52. Opinion of expert witness. – The opinion of expert witness

on a matter requring special knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education, which he or she is shown to posses, may be received in
evidence.

DOCTRINE:

A witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. A qualified witness are all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others. While what disqualifies a witness are by: 1) by reason
of mental incapacity or immaturity; 2) by reason of marriage; 3) by reason of
privileged communication.
The opinion of a witness is generally not admissible except as per Section
52 of rule 130:

The opinion of an expert witness on a matter requiring special knowledge,

skills, experience, training or education, in which he or she is shown to
possess maybe receive in evidence.

FACTS:

Spouses Andres Navarro Sr and Concepcion Navarro (both deceased) left

behind parcels of land in Masbate. They were survived by their daughters
Luisa Navarro Marcos (Luisa), petitioner herein, and Lydia Navarro Grageda
(Lydia) and their only son Andres Navarro Jr (Andres Jr). The heirs of
Andres Jr. are the respondents
Petitioner Luisa and her sister Lydia found out that respondents are claiming
exclusive ownership over said land based on an Affidavit of Transfer of Real
Property where Andres Sr donated the lot to Andres Jr.

Believing there was forgery, the sisters requested a handwriting

examination of the affidavit PNP handwriting expert PO2 Grace Alvarez
found that Andres Sr's signature on the affidavit and the submitted
signatures of Andres Jr were not written by one and the same person.

The sisters sued respondents for annulment of the deed before RTC
Masbate (Civil Case No 5215). After pre-trial, respondents moved to
disqualify PO2 Alvarez as witness arguing that RTC did not authorize such
examination of the affidavit. They added that PO2 Alvarez violated their
constitutional right to due process since no notice was given to them before
the examination occurred. Thus, PO2 Alvarez report was a worthless piece
of paper and was irrelevant.

RTC granted respondents' motion and excluded PO2 Alvarez as witness

holding that her supposed testimony would be hearsay as she has no
personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres Sr, that there was
no need for her to be presented since her testimony is not yet needed as
expert witness.

Before the CA, the sisters petition assailing the RTC order was dismissed
on the ground that the dismissal of the Civil Case has mooted the issue of
PO2 Alvarez disqualification as witness. Hence, this appeal. Petitioner
argues that CA erred in not ruling that RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as witness that the latter will be
presented as expert witness to render an opinion whether or not there was
forgery regarding the subject affidavit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, PO2 Alvarez can qualify as a witness in the case?

RULING/RATIONALE:

Yes, Po2 Alvarez qualifies as a witness in the case because she

possesses all the qualifications (perceiving and can make known
his/her perceptions to others) and none of the disqualifications
provided for in the Rules of Court. These disqualifications are
enumerated in Section 21 to 24 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence.
Among these disqualifications are mental incapacity or immaturity, reason of
marriage, reason of death or insanity of the adverse party and by reason of
privilege communication. The rules should not be interpreted to include an
exception not embodied in it, according to the case.

The technical expertise of the hand writing expert of the PNP,Po2 Alvarez,
can very well qualify as a witness as she can perceive and be able to make
known her perception to others. She is not burdened by the disqualifications
set forth by the rules. As a technical expert, Po2 Alvarez, is considered as
an expert witness,

Section 49 of Rule 130 states that an opinion of an expert witness can be

received as evidence as it’s states

Section 52. Opinion of expert witness. – The opinion of expert witness

on a matter requring special knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education, which he or she is shown to possess, may be received in
evidence.

In this regard, the case of Tamani vs. Salvador bares similar contentions
about the consideration of a PNP document examiner not to determine the
genuineness or falsity of the said documents but expert opinion can give
assistance in regards to distinguishing marks, characteristics, discrepancies
between documents which would ordinarily escape the notice of an
unpracticed observer.
The contention that Po2 Alvarez’s testimony being “hearsay” has no bearing
in court because Section 49 (now 52) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Po2
Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion regarding the matter. The use
of “may” in this section maybe considered as permissive and not mandatory
yet in consideration about experts in hand writing as expert witnesses
is permitted because of the technical nature of the procedures in
examining forge documents. Moreover, the opinion of the expert is
crucial in the resolution of the case.

The court in this case said that the RTC should have not disqualified Po2
Alvarez because she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications of being a witness in a case and for it to be receive as
evidence.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the (1) Decision

dated February 28, 2011 and Resolution dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92460, and (2) Orders dated August 19, 2004
and October II, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 5215. We
DENY respondents' motion to disqualify P02 Mary Grace Alvarez as a
witness

3. Tabao v. People, G.R. No. 187246, July 20, 2011,

654 SCRA 216

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Burgos, Beatriz Francheska

CASE TITLE: Tabao v. People, G.R. No. 187246, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA 216

RULE: Expert Opinion (Rule 130, Section 52)

DOCTRINE:
The use of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of
the courts. Hence, courts are not bound to receive expert testimonies in evidence.

FACTS:
● Petitioner was driving when his car suddenly ramped on an island divider, bumping
one Rochelle Lanete who was crossing the street. As a result, she was thrown into the
middle of the road on her back. Then, a speeding Mendez ran over her body.
● A certain Cielo, a bystander, went inside Mendez’ car, sat beside him, got his driver’s
 license, and ordered him to move the car backwards. Mendez followed his order, but
his car hit the center island twice while backing up.
● Cielo got out of the car and approached the sprawled body of Rochelle. Then, the
three of them (petitioner, Cielo and Mendez) brought Rochelle to UST Hospital where
she died.
● Dr. Alteza, the attending physician, testified that the victim suffered multiple injuries.
His medical report shows that the victim suffered injuries both on the left and right
sides of her body. Also, one Dr. Arizala, the NBI medico-legal officer who conducted
an autopsy on Rochelle’s body, confirmed that the victim suffered injuries on various
parts of her lower right & left extremities as a result of the initial or primary impact.
However, on trial Dr. Alteza’s statement allegedly declaring that the victim’s injuries on
her lower left leg and left thigh were the “primary impact” injuries, to w/c the petitioner
relies on.
● Petitioner insists that his car could not have bumped Rochelle because his car was
coming from the right side, while the victim was hit on the left side of her body.
However, the doctors’ statement was not based on the actual incident but on his
presumptions, stating on trial: “If I would be allowed to make some presumptions, if
the patient was standing up at that time he was hit by a vehicle, I would presume that
the primary impact injuries, injuries hit first by the vehicle are the injuries of the lower
leg and the left thigh”.
● Another witness, a Police Senior Inspector testified that the petitioner’s car could not
have bumped the victim because the latters body was not thrown in line with the car,
but on its side.
● RTC & CA disregarded both testimonies & held petitioner. guilty.

ISSUE: W/N THE CA VIOLATED SEC. 49 (NOW SEC. 52) RULE 130 WHEN IT
DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONY OF THE POLICE INSPECTOR.

RULING/RATIONALE: NO.

● No. Section 49 (Now Sec. 52), Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court states that the
opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or
training, which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence. The use of the
word may signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is permissive
and not mandatory on the part of the courts. Allowing the testimony does not
mean, too, that courts are bound by the testimony of the expert witness. The
testimony of an expert witness must be construed to have been presented not to sway
the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court in the determination of
the issue before it, and is for the court to adopt or not to adopt depending on its
appreciation of the attendant facts and the applicable law.

● Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place
whatever weight they may choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts
of the case.

● The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province
of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his
 actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he
has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies,
the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and observation
of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which deserve to
illuminate his statements.

● The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the
court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common
knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect. The
problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is
left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the
absence of abuse of discretion

● Here, P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio was not an eyewitness to the incident; his testimony was
merely based on the Traffic Accident Report prepared by SPO4 Edgar Reyes who
himself did not witness the incident. At any rate, nowhere in P/Sr. Insp. Cornelios
testimony did he conclusively state that the petitioner could not have been involved in
the incident.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to DENY

the motion with FINALITY, no substantial argument having been adduced to warrant the
reconsideration sought. Costs against the petitioner.

4. People v. Adoviso, 309 SRA 1 (1999)

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: DIZON, ANALYN C.

CASE TITLE:
People v. Adoviso, 309 SCRA, (1999)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

PABLO ADOVISO, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 116196, June 23, 1999

RULE:

Expert Opinion (Rule 130, Section 52)

Section 52. Opinion of expert witness. – The opinion of a witness on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, which he or
she is shown to possess, may be received in evidence. (49a)

DOCTRINE:
Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive. When faced with conflicting expert
opinions, courts give weight and credence to that which is more complete,
thorough and scientific.

Polygraph has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate
means of ascertaining truth or deception. Likewise, much faith and credit should
not be vested upon a lie detector test as it is not conclusive.

FACTS:

Pablo Adoviso, allegedly a member of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical

Unit (CAFGU) was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of murder.
The crime occurred on the night of February 18, 1990, when Adoviso shot Rufino
Agunos and Emeterio Vasquez multiple times with a firearm inside their "camalig."
Eyewitnesses were present during the crime and were able to identify Adoviso as
one of the perpetrators. He was positively identified by Bonifacio Agunos, the son
of one of the victims, because the former did not wear a mask in the perpetration of
the crime.

Aside from denial and alibi, the defense also offered in evidence the testimony of
Ernesto A. Lucena, Polygraph Examiner II of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) in Manila, who conducted a polygraph test on Adoviso. In Polygraph Report
No. 900175, Lucena opined that Adoviso’s “polygrams revealed that there were no
specific reactions indicative of deception to pertinent questions relevant” to the
investigation of the crimes.

In rebuttal, Bonifacio Vasquez revealed that when he reported the incident to the
police, he did not identify appellant as one of the culprits because he was afraid of
appellant who was a member of the CAFGU.

The RTC of Camarines Sur found Adoviso guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two
(2) counts of murder.

On the premise that the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction on the basis
of “mere conjectures and speculations,” appellant argues that the negative result of
the polygraph test should be given weight to tilt the scales of justice in his favor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the result of the polygraph test should be given weight and be
admitted as evidence? NO.

RULING/RATIONALE:

A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously

measures and records certain physiological changes in the human body that
are believed to be involuntarily caused by an examinee’s conscious attempt
to deceive the questioner.
- The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test is that a person who lies
deliberately will have a rising blood pressure and a subconscious block in
breathing, which will be recorded on the graph.
However, American courts almost uniformly reject the results of polygraph
tests when offered in evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt or
innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the accused or the prosecution
seeks its introduction, for the reason that polygraph has not as yet attained
scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or
deception. The rule is no different in this jurisdiction.
- Thus, in People v. Daniel, stating that much faith and credit should not
be vested upon a lie detector test as it is not conclusive. Appellant, in
this case, has not advanced any reason why this rule should not apply to
him.

Appellant was therefore correctly adjudged guilty of two counts of Murder.

Treachery qualified the killings to murder.
- There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
- In other words, there is treachery when the attack on an unarmed victim
who has not given the slightest provocation is sudden, unexpected and
without warning.
- The victims in this case were totally unaware of an impending assault –
Rufino was sleeping and Emeterio was going down the stairs when they
were shot.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Joint Judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.

5. Herrera v. Alba, G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Liwag, Eleanor

CASE TITLE: Herrera v. Alba, G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005

Rosendo Herrera, petitioner, vs. Rosendo Alba, minor, represented by his mother
Armi A. Alba, and Hon. Nimfa Cuesta-Vilches, Presiding Judge, Branch 48,
Regional Trial Court, Manila, respondents.

RULE: Expert Opinion (Rule 130, Section 52; Rule on DNA Evidence)

DOCTRINE: Section 49 of Rule 130 (now Section 52 of Rule 130) does not pose
any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed, even
evidence on collateral matters is allowed “when it tends in any reasonable degree
to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.”
FACTS:
Thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (respondent), represented by his mother Armi
Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and
damages against petitioner.

Petitioner denied that he is the biological father of respondent and also denied
physical contact with respondent’s mother.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to

abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the
testimony of Dr. Halos describing the process for DNA paternity testing and
asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.

Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained
acceptability.

The trial court granted respondents motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on
petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
and he asserted that under the present circumstances, the DNA test [he] is
compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to
obtain the requisite specimen, unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether DNA analysis may be admitted as evidence to prove paternity.

RULING/RATIONALE:
Yes. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not
otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of Court.

Evidence is relevant when it has such relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence.

Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony,

provides as follows:

The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience

or training which he is shown to possess may be received in evidence.

This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as
evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allowed “when it tends in
any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in
issue.”

Trial courts should be cautious in giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence.

We reiterate our statement in Vallejo:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, among
other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted
the tests.
DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive
proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA
analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is
99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity. This refutable
presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. We also AFFIRM the
Orders dated 3 February 2000 and 8 June 2000 issued by Branch 48 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. SP-98-88759.

6. People v. Umanito, G.R. No. 172607, October 26,

2007

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

CASE TITLE: People v. Umanito, G.R. No. 172607, October 26, 2007

RULE:
Opinion Rule - Exceptions to the Opinion Rule - Expert Opinion (Rule on DNA
Evidence)

DOCTRINE:
DNA print or identification technology is now recognized as a uniquely effective means to
link a suspect to a crime, or to absolve one erroneously accused, where biological evidence
is available. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can aid immensely in determining a more accurate
account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the
acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.

FACTS:
The appellant of this case, Rufino Umanito, was charged with the crime of rape. However,it was
only five (5) years later, or sometime in 1995, that appellant was arrested. Upon arraignment, the
appellant pleaded not guilty.

The appellate court’s findings are as follows: It was around 9 in the evening, while on her way to
her grandmother’s home, when the private complainant [AAA] was accosted by a young male. It
was only later when she learned the name of accused-appellant UMANITO. She recounted that
UMANITO waited for her by the creek, and then with a knife pointed at [AAA]’s left side of the
abdomen, he forced her to give in to his kisses, to his holding her breasts and stomach, and to his
pulling her by the arm to be dragged to the Home Economics Building inside the premises of the
Daramuangan Elementary School where UMANITO first undressed her [AAA] and himself with his
right hand while he still clutched the knife menacingly on his left hand. Private complainant [AAA]
recounted that she could not shout because she was afraid. She further recounted that UMANITO
laid her down on a bench, set the knife down, then mounted her, inserting his penis into her [AAA’s]
vagina and shortly thereafter, UMANITO dressed up and threatened [AAA] while poking the knife at
her neck, not to report the incident to the police or else he said he would kill her. UMANITO then
left, while the victim [AAA] went on to her grandmother’s house and she noticed that it was already
around 1:00 o’clock in the morning when she reached there. 6 months after the incident, [AAA’s]
mother, noticed the prominence on [AAA]’s stomach. It was only then when the victim, [AAA],
divulged to her mother the alleged rape and told her the details of what had happened. After
hearing [AAA]’s story, her mother brought her to the police station.

Umanito, on the other hand, denied the accusation and raised the defense of alibi: He claimed the
on the day of the alleged rape, he was home the whole day helping his family complete rush work
on picture frames ordered from Baguio. He further alleged that he did not step out of their house on
the evening in question. Concerning his relationship with AAA, appellant admitted that he had
courted her but she spurned him. He conjectured, though, that it was AAA who had a crush on him
since she frequently visited him at his house.

RTC: Finding that the prosecution had proven appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
CA: Appellate court affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: WON DNA analysis is admissible as evidence

RULING/RATIONALE: YES. The Court found that amidst the slew of assertions and
counter-assertions, a happenstance may provide the definitive key to the absolution of the
appellant. This is the fact that AAA bore a child as a result of the purported rape. With the
advance in genetics and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with
reasonable certainty whether the appellant is the father of AAA’s child. If he is not, his acquittal may
be ordained. The Court further reiterated that it had pronounced that if it can be conclusively
determined that the accused did not sire the alleged victim’s child, this may cast the shadow of
reasonable doubt and allow his acquittal on this basis. If he is found not to be the father, the finding
will at least weigh heavily in the ultimate decision in this case.

Thus, the Court directed the appellant, AAA and AAA’s child to submit themselves to
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence (the Rules),
which took effect on 15 October 2007.

The Court further discussed that DNA print or identification technology is now recognized as a
uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to absolve one erroneously
accused, where biological evidence is available. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA
identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can aid
immensely in determining a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating
the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper
administration of justice in every case.

Furthermore, the Court cited multiple Jurisprudence on the subject of DNA testing and analysis.

● In People v. Yatar, the process of obtaining such vital evidence has become less arduous:

“With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially
within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it
became possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.”

● In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, the groundwork for acknowledging the strong weight of DNA
testing was first laid out:

“Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern
and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using
DNA test for identification and parentage testing…. Of course, being a novel scientific
technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA
evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.
Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful
to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues”
 ● Herrera v. Alba, where the validity of a DNA test as a probative tool to determine filiation in
our jurisdiction was put in issue, discussed DNA analysis as evidence and traced the
development of its admissibility in our jurisdiction.

● People v. Vallejo, discussed DNA analysis as evidence and was considered a 180 degree
turn from the Court’s wary attitude towards DNA testing in the 1997 Pe Lim case, where the
Court stated that "DNA, being a relatively new science, x x x has not yet been accorded
official recognition by our courts." In Vallejo, however, the DNA profile from the vaginal
swabs taken from the rape victim matched the accused’s DNA profile. The Court thus
affirmed the accused’s conviction of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death.
Furthermore, Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA evidence. By
2002, there was no longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as
evidence. The Court moved from the issue of according "official recognition" to DNA
analysis as evidence to the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA
analysis.

● Thus, in People v. Yatar, where a match existed between the DNA profile of the semen
found in the victim and the DNA profile of the blood sample given by appellant in open
court. The Court, following Vallejo’s footsteps, affirmed the conviction of appellant because
the physical evidence, corroborated by circumstantial evidence, showed appellant guilty of
rape with homicide.

● In the case of In re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa, the convict-petitioner
presented DNA test results to prove that he is not the father of the child conceived at the
time of commission of the rape. The Court ruled that a difference between the DNA profile
of the convict-petitioner and the DNA profile of the victim’s child does not preclude the
convict-petitioner’s commission of rape.

● The case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections, reiterated the acceptance of DNA

testing in our jurisdiction in this wise: "[i]n case proof of filiation or paternity would be
unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which
examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical
residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to.

Thus, the Court held that the determination of whether appellant is the father of AAA’s child, which
may be accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair and correct adjudication of the
instant appeal. It further reiterated that under Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are authorized, after
due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. As a result of this, the Court
remanded the case to the RTC.

The Court, in this case, also reiterated the procedures to be observed in conducting DNA analysis
as provided in the rules. Section 4 of the Rules spells out the matters which the trial court
must determine, thus:

SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order.–The appropriate court may, at any time,
either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the
parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant
to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.

The Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the
 behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
commenced.

As such, the Court stated that should the RTC find the DNA testing feasible in the case at
bar, it shall order the same, in conformity with Section 5 of the Rules. It is also the RTC which
shall determine the institution to undertake the DNA testing and the parties are free to manifest
their comments on the choice of DNA testing center.
After the DNA analysis is obtained, it shall be incumbent upon the parties who wish to avail of the
same to offer the results in accordance with the rules of evidence. The RTC, in evaluating the
DNA results upon presentation, shall assess the same as evidence in keeping with Sections
7 and 8 of the Rules, to wit:

SEC. 7. Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence. – In assessing the probative

value of the DNA evidence presented, the court shall consider the following:
(a) The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were collected, how they
were handled, and the possibility of contamination of the samples;
(b) The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure, and compliance with the
scientifically valid standards in conducting the tests;
(c) The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable standards-setting
institution and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the laboratory is
not accredited, the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic casework and
credibility shall be properly established; and
(d) The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided.
The provisions of the Rules of Court concerning the appreciation of evidence shall apply
suppletorily.

SEC. 8. Reliability of DNA testing methodology.–In evaluating whether the DNA testing
methodology is reliable, the court shall consider the following:
(a) The falsifiability of the principles or methods used, that is, whether the theory or
technique can be and has been tested;
(b) The subjection to peer review and publication of the principles or methods;
(c) The general acceptance of the principles or methods by the relevant scientific
community;
(d) The existence and maintenance of standards and controls to ensure the correctness of
data gathered;
(e) The existence of an appropriate reference population database; and
(f) The general degree of confidence attributed to mathematical calculations used in
comparing DNA profiles and the significance and limitation of statistical calculations used in
comparing DNA profiles.

The trial court is further enjoined to observe the requirements of confidentiality and
preservation of the DNA evidence in accordance with Sections 11 and 12 of the Rules.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, the RTC shall consider, among other things, the
following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests. The Court also highlighted that the proper chain of custody in the
handling of the samples submitted by the parties must be adequately borne in the records, i.e.: that
the samples are collected by a neutral third party; that the tested parties are appropriately identified
at their sample collection appointments; that the samples are protected with tamper tape at the
collection site; that all persons in possession thereof at each stage of testing thoroughly inspected
the samples for tampering and explained his role in the custody of the samples and the acts he
performed in relation thereto.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is remanded to the RTC for reception of DNA evidence in
accordance with the terms of this Resolution. The RTC is further directed to report to the Court the
results of the proceedings below within sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.

7. People v. Umanito, GR No. 172607, 16 April 2009

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

CASE TITLE:

People v. Umanito, GR No. 172607, 16 April 2009

RULE:
Opinion Rule - Exceptions to the Opinion Rule - Expert Opinion (Rule on DNA
Evidence)

FACTS:
In the Court’s Resolution dated 26 October 2007, the Court resolved, for the very first time, to
apply the then recently promulgated New Rules on DNA Evidence (DNA Rules). The case was
remanded to the RTC for reception of DNA evidence and in light of the fact that the impending
exercise would be the first application of the procedure, directed Deputy Court Administrator
Reuben Dela Cruz to: (a) monitor the manner in which the court a quo carries out the DNA Rules;
and (b) assess and submit periodic reports on the implementation of the DNA Rules in the case to
the Court.

The case involved a charge of rape. The accused Umanito (Umanito) was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. Umanito was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. On appeal, the Court of Appeals offered the judgment of the trial court. Umanito
appealed the decision of the appellate court.

The Court acknowledged that the alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted
in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, a girl hereinafter identified as "BBB." In view of that fact, a
well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court deemed uncovering of whether or not
Umanito is the father of BBB greatly determinative of the resolution of the appeal. The Court then
observed:

x x x With the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined
with reasonable certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA's child. If he is not, his acquittal
may be ordained. We have pronounced that if it can be conclusively determined that the accused
did not sire the alleged victim's child, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt and allow his
acquittal on this basis. If he is found not to be the father, the finding will at least weigh heavily in the
ultimate decision in this case. Thus, we are directing appellant, AAA and her child to submit
themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA
Evidence (the Rules), which took effect on 15 October 2007, subject to guidelines prescribed
herein.

Thus, the RTC upon receiving the Resolution of the Court, set the case for hearing to ascertain the
feasibility of DNA testing with due regard to the standards set in Sections 4(a), (b), (c) and (e) of the
DNA Rules. Both AAA and BBB (now 17 years old) testified during the hearing. They also
manifested their willingness to undergo DNA examination to determine whether Umanito is the
father of BBB. A hearing was conducted where the public prosecutor and the counsel for Umanito
manifested their concurrence to the selection of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) as the
institution that would conduct the DNA testing. The RTC issued an Order directing that biological
samples be taken from AAA, BBB and Umanito at the courtroom. Present at the hearing were AAA,
BBB, counsel for Umanito, and two representatives from the NBI. DNA samples were thus
extracted from AAA and BBB in the presence of Judge Fe, the prosecutor, the counsel for the
defense, and DCA De la Cruz. DNA samples were extracted from Umanito at the New Bilibid
Prisons by NBI chemist Aranas, as witnessed by Judge Fe, the prosecutor, the defense counsel,
DCA De la Cruz, and other personnel of the Court and the New Bilibid Prisons. The RTC ordered
the NBI to submit the result of the DNA examination within thirty (30) days after the extraction of
biological samples of Umanito, and directed its duly authorized representatives to attend a hearing
on the admissibility of such DNA evidence.

At the hearing, the Provincial Prosecutor presented Mary Ann T. Aranas, a Forensic Chemist of the
National Bureau of Investigation who testified on the examination she conducted, outlining the
procedure she adopted and the result thereof. She further declared that using the Powerplex 16
System, Deoxyribonuncleic acid analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper
taken from [AAA], [BBB], and Rufino Umanito y Millares, to determine whether or not Rufino
Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a Complete Match in all
of the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of Rufino Umanito y Milalres and [BBB];
That based on the above findings, there is a 99.9999% probability of paternity that Rufino
Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB] (Exhibits "A" and series and "B" and
series).

After the cross-examination of the witness by the defense counsel, the Public Prosecutor offered in
evidence Exhibits "A" and sub-markings, referring to the Report of the Chemistry Division of the
National Bureau of Investigation on the DNA analysis to determine whether or not Rufino Umanito
y Millares is the biological father of [BBB] and Exhibit "B" and sub-markings, referring to the
enlarged version of the table of Exhibit "A," to establish that on the DNA examination conducted on
[AAA], [BBB] and the accused Rufino Umanito for the purpose of establishing paternity, the result
is 99.9999% probable. Highly probable.

The defense did not interpose any objection, hence, the exhibits were admitted.

Thus, considering that under Section 9, A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, if the value of the Probability of
Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity, the instant case
was set for reception of evidence for the accused to controvert the presumption that he is the
biological father of [BBB].

During the hearing, the accused who was in court manifested through his counsel that he will not
present evidence to dispute the findings of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the National Bureau
of Investigation.

It was further found that the DNA samples were collected by the forensic chemist of the National
Bureau of Investigation whose qualifications as an expert were properly established and that the
Standard Operating Procedure was adopted. Citing Section 6. A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC which provides
that: "If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable
presumption of paternity.” and since the disputable presumption that was established as a result of
the DNA testing was not contradicted and overcome by other evidence considering that the
accused did not object to the admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits "A" and "B"
inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented evidence to rebut the same, the trial court ruled that t
based on the result of the DNA analysis conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation,
Forensic Division, RUFINO UMANITO y MILLARES is the biological father of [BBB].

However, it was found that Umanito had filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal dated 16 February
2009.

ISSUE:
WON the Motion to Withdraw Appeal filed by Umanito should be granted

RULING/RATIONALE:

Umanito’s defense of alibi, together with his specific assertion that while he had courted AAA they
were not sweethearts, lead to a general theory on his part that he did not engage in sexual relations
with the complainant. The DNA testing has evinced a contrary conclusion, and that as
testified to by AAA, Umanito had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine
months after the day she said she was raped by Umanito.

Still, Umanito filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal dated 16 February 2009. By filing such motion,
Umanito is deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and the indemnification of the private complainant in the sum of ₱50,000.00. Given that
the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing conforms with the conclusions of the lower courts, and
that no cause is presented for us to deviate from the penalties imposed below, the Court saw no
reason to deny Umanito’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Consequently, the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 15 February 2006 would otherwise be deemed final if the appeal is not
withdrawn.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Withdraw Appeal dated 16 February 2009 is GRANTED. The
instant case is now CLOSED and TERMINATED.

C.7.b.ii. Ordinary Witness Opinion (Rule 130, Section 53; Rule

132, Section 22)

Cases:

1. Dela Llana v. Biong, G.R. No. 182356, December

4, 2013, 711 SCRA 522

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Michael Vincent P. Dizon

CASE TITLE:

DRA. LEILA DELA LLANO, Petitioner, vs. REBECCA BIONG, doing

business under the name and style of Pongkay Trading, Respondent.

2013-12-04 I G.R. No. 182356

RULE:

Opinion Rule – Section 51. General Rule. – The opinion of a witness is

not admissible, except as indicated in the following items sections.

SEC. 53. Opinion of ordinary witnesses.

The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be
received in evidence regarding
(a)The identity of a person about whom he or
she has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he or she has sufficient familiarity; and
(c)The mental sanity of a person with whom heor she is sufficiently
acquainted.

The witness may also testify on his or her impressions of the emotion,
behavior, condition or appearance of a person.

DOCTRINE:

In quasi-delict cases, the burden of proving the proximate causation

between one’s negligence and the injury rests upon the party claiming the
said injury. In arriving at this, the party may present witnesses to bolster
their claim. He may either present an expert witness or an ordinary witness.
Under the opinion rule, the opinion of a witness is generally inadmissible
except in instances allowed by law like Section 53 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court in regards to opinion of an ordinary witness :

SEC. 53. Opinion of ordinary witnesses.

The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be
received in evidence regarding
(a)The identity of a person about whom he or
she has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he or she has sufficient familiarity; and
(c)The mental sanity of a person with whom heor she is sufficiently
acquainted.

The witness may also testify on his or her impressions of the emotion,
behavior, condition or appearance of a person.

FACTS:

On 30 March 2000, Juan dela Llana was driving a Toyota Corolla car along
North Avenue, Quezon City. His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the
front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat. Juan
stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal
turned. red. However, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly
rammed the car's rear end. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. Leila dela
Llana. Apart from minor wounds, Dra. Dela Llana did not appear to have
suffered from any other visible physical injuries. The traffic investigation
revealed that the truck driver was Joel Primero and his employer was the
respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under the name and style of
"Pongkay Trading".

In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to
moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. The pain became
more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more severe. Her
health deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move her left arm.
Her condition did not improve despite undergoing physical therapy by a
rehabilitation medicine specialist: Dra. Rosalinda Milla. Upon consultation
with Dr. Flores who is a neuro-surgeon, it was suggested that she must
undergo cervical spine surgery to release compression of her nerve. The
operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra,
dela Llana from the practice of her profession since June 2000 despite the
surgery.

This prompted Dra. de Llana to demand from Rebecca compensation for

her injuries, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, Dra. de Llana sued Rebecca
for damages before the RTC of Quezon City for damages: medical
expenses, deprived monthly income, actual, moral and exemplary damages
as well as attorney's fees.

In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action
against her as no reasonable relation existed between the vehicular
accident and Dra. dela Llana's injury. She pointed out that Dra. dela Llana's
illness became manifest one month and one week from the date of the
vehicular accident.

At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and
Joel as a hostile witness. Dra, dela Llana, to prove her claim, identified and
authenticated a medical certificate dated Nov. 29, 2000 issued by Dr. Milla
which states that Dra. dela Lina suffered from a whiplash injury.

Rebecca on the defense contended that she observed diligence of a good

father in the selection and supervision of Joel.

The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. de Llana and held that the proximate cause
of Dra. dela Llana's whiplash injury to be Joel's reckless driving.

The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and held that Dra. dela Llana
failed to establish a reasonable connection between the vehicular accident
and her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence. It declared that
courts will not hesitate to rule in favor of the other party if there is no
evidence or the evidence is too slight to warrant an inference establishing
the fact in issue.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dra. Llano as an ordinary witness has proven that the
reckless driving of Joel Primero (making Rebecca Biong vicariously liable)
liable for her whiplash injury?

RULING/RATIONALE:

In ruling this the court explained that a quasi-delict that is defined in Art.
2176 of the Civil Code, should be proven through the existence of three (3)
requisites; namely damages to the plaintiff, negligence of the defendant and
their connection. These requisites if the parties do not have any contractual
relationship is called quasi-delict. If this quasi-delict is proven then by Article
2180 of the Civil Code, the owner (Biong) is vicariously liable for the acts of
its employee (Primero).

In the case, most especially in civil cases, a fact is proven by

preponderance of evidence, not mere allegation. In the present case,
doctor Dela Llano relied on three pieces of evidence to prove the
quasi-delict or whiplash injury. These pieces of evidence were a) picture of a
damage car, b) Medical Certificate c) her testimonial evidence. .However,
none of these pieces of evidence showed the causal relationship between
vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In summary, Dra. Della Llano
was not able to adduce the factum probans or evidentiary facts by which
the factum probandum or the ultimate facts can be established.

Among the three (3) pieces of evidence that Dela llano presented, the
probative value of each is questionable. The picture of the car only
demonstrated the impact, while the medical certificate, which was not
admitted in evidence and thus not considered by the courts in arriving at
their judgement, only chronicled her medical history and physical
examinations.. However, granting, that the court should consider the
medical certificate, it can still be considered as mere hearsay, as it is not
attested to by the one who issued it and no cross-examination was afforded
to the defendant disprove such.

Section 53 gives the definition of the opinion of an ordinary witness which

state:

SEC. 53. Opinion of ordinary witnesses.

The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be
received in evidence regarding
(a)The identity of a person about whom he or
she has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he or she has sufficient familiarity; and
(c)The mental sanity of a person with whom heor she is sufficiently
acquainted.

The witness may also testify on his or her impressions of the emotion,
behavior, condition or appearance of a person.

In the case, Dra Dela Llano’s medical opinion cannot be given probative
value because she was not presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary
witness, her competence in testifying on the nature, cause and effect of a
whiplash injury is put into question. Despite her being a physician, Dr. Dela
Llano’s testimony lacked the explanation regarding the nature, cause and
effects of whiplash injury medically and its connection with the quasi-delict.

Dr. Dela Llano in this case failed miserably to establish her cause by
preponderance of evidence and her allegations are considered by the court
as mere assertions that have no leg to stand on.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated

February 11, 2008 and Resolution dated March 31, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.

2. People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 186533, August 9,

2010, 627 SCRA 452

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: NOVERAS, CHARLES MICHAEL

CASE TITLE: People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 186533, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 452

RULE: Ordinary Witness Opinion (Rule 130, Section 53; Rule 132, Section 22)

DOCTRINE:
It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental
condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe
the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question. Commonly, it is
required that the witness details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his
opinion before he can testify as to what it is.

FACTS:
● On March 2000, AAA approached the appellant, Efren Castillo, in order to collect his
debt for the rice cake he bought from her mother.

● Instead of settling his account, the appellant cuddled AAA made her lie down on the
bed and removed her short pants and panty. The appellant subsequently removed his
pants and underwear and inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. AAA’s experience was
repeated when she was on her way to visit her aunt’s house. The appellant, who was
then standing by the mango grove, approached AAA, walked along with her and led
her to a nearby chapel, undressed AAA and successfully had sexual intercourse with
her. Thereafter, AAA told her mother, BBB, what the appellant did to her.

● Efren Castillo was charged by AAA, assisted by her mother, BBB, with the crime of
rape.

● At the pre-trial, both the prosecution and the defense failed to make any stipulation of
facts.

● The prosecution presented the following witnesses: AAA, the private offended party;
Dr. Thessa Marie Antillon-Malimas (Dr. Antillon-Malimas), the doctor in Gingoog
District Hospital who examined AAA. BBB, the mother of AAA, was also presented as
rebuttal witness and Myrna delos Reyes-Villanueva, the Guidance Psychologist at the
Northern Mindanao Medical Center who conducted psychological tests on AAA to
determine her mental capacity.

● Based on testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution established that AAA was 18
years old when she was raped by the appellant. She was not able to finish Grade 1
because of her epileptic seizures which started when she was nine years old. AAA
also had difficulty following instructions given to her at home and in school.

● Dr. Antillon-Malimas examined AAA and discovered that she was actually raped.
Subsequently, AAA executed her sworn statement before Senior Police Officer 4
Myrna Z. Palad (SPO4 Palad), the investigator at Gingoog City Police Station.

● AAA was also subjected to psychological tests to determine her mental capacity.
Myrna Delos Reyes-Villanueva concluded that AAA is suffering from mild to moderate
mental retardation with a mental age of 8 to 12 years old and can be educated up to
Grade VI level. She also noted that AAA lacked personal hygiene and has a vague
concept of big numbers and time, like days of the week. She further declared that
AAA’s instinct to resist any sexual assault is always there, however, with her low-level
mental functioning she could easily be deceived or persuaded by a man to engage
into sexual intercourse. The result of AAA’s psychological tests was also reduced into
writing as evidenced by a Psychological Report.
 ● The appellant denied having raped AAA, however RTC still convicted him and CA
affirmed.

● On appeal, appellant contended that the records are bereft of any evidence that would
conclusively show that AAA was suffering from mental retardation.

● BBB’s declaration that AAA is a slow thinker does not sufficiently establish AAA’s
mental retardation. Further, the expert witness qualification of the prosecution’s
supposed expert witness is highly questionable because she had not acquired any
doctorate degree in the field of psychology or psychiatry. More so, the psychological
tests administered by her on AAA were inadequate to establish AAA’s mental capacity.

● Appellant anchors his argument for acquittal on the alleged failure of the prosecution
to establish AAA’s mental retardation to make him guilty of rape under Article 266-A,
par. 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant concludes that his guilt has not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in finding that AAA is a mental retardate thus erred in
determining the guilt of the appellant.

RULING/RATIONALE: NO. Mental retardation can be proven by evidence other than

medical or clinical evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses and even the
observation by the trial court.

● Section 50, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence explicitly provides that the
opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence
regarding the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

● Accordingly, it is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity
or mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to
observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question.
Commonly, it is required that the witness details the factors and reasons upon which
he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is.

● The mother of an offended party in a rape case, though not a psychiatrist, if she
knows the physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is
suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter.
Even though the Guidance Psychologist who examined AAA may not qualify as an
expert witness, such circumstance is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause. It bears
stressing that the deprivation of reason contemplated by law need not be complete,
rather, mental abnormality or deficiency is sufficient.

● It is therefore clear from the foregoing that AAA’s impaired learning capacity, lack of
personal hygiene and difficulty in answering simple questions, as testified to by her
mother and the Guidance Psychologist who had an opportunity to observe her
appearance, manner, habits and behavior, are indicative that she is truly suffering from
 some degree of mental retardation.

● AAA’s straightforward testimony, as well as her unwavering and positive identification

of the appellant as her defiler and tormentor, corroborated by the medical findings
conducted by Dr. Antillon-Malimas, was sufficient to convict the appellant.

● The flimsy and self-serving defenses of denial and alibi of the appellant failed to
destroy the truthfulness and the credibility of AAA’s testimony. Hence, appellant is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00030-MIN dated 7 November 2008 finding herein appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is hereby AFFIRMED.

3. Hernandez v. San Juan-Santos, G.R. No. 166470 &

169217, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 464

C.7.b.iii. Weight to be given opinion of expert witness, how

determined (Rule 133, Sec. 5)

IV. Burden of Proof and Presumptions (Rule 131)

A. Burden of Proof (Rule 131. Sec. 1)

Concept

Case:

1. CIR v. Traders Royal Bank, G. R. No. 167134, March 18, 2015

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: DAYRIT, ROSSLYN A.

CASE TITLE:
G.R. No. 167134 March 18, 2015
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,
vs.
TRADERS ROYAL BANK, Respondent.

RULE: RULE 131, SECTION 1

Section 1. Burden of proof and burden of evidence. – Burden of proof is the duty of
a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his or her
claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Burden of proof never
shifts.

DOCTRINE:
In a tax assessment case, the burden of proof is upon the complaining party to
show clearly that the assessment was erroneous.

FACTS:
● The case involves a dispute between the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR) and Traders Royal Bank (TRB).
● The dispute is regarding the liability for deficiency documentary stamp
taxes (DST) on special savings deposits and trust indenture agreements.
● The BIR posits that the Agreements were deposits subject to DST, while
TRB proffers that the Agreements were trusts exempt from DST. At the crux
of the instant controversy are the Trust Indenture Agreements of TRB which
is at issue as to whether the said Trust Indenture Agreements constituted
deposits or trusts.
● TRB, in its Formal Offer of Evidence, submitted only one document, Exhibit
"A," which was page 10 of the 1993 MORB containing Section X407 on
Non-Trust, Non-Fiduciary and/or Non-Investment Management Activities.

ISSUE: WON the burden of proof is on the part of the taxpayer to prove that the
tax assessment was wrong.

RULING/RATIONALE: YES
● The burden fell upon TRB to produce the Trust Indenture Agreements, not
only because the said Agreements were in its possession, but more
importantly, because its protest against the DST assessments was entirely
grounded on the allegation that said Agreements were trusts.
● Therefore, it was still necessary for TRB to present the Trust Indenture
Agreements to test the terms and conditions thereof against the standards
set by Section X407 of the 1993 MORB. Without the actual Trust Indenture
Agreements, there would be no factual basis for concluding that the same
were trusts under Section X407 of the 1993 MORB. TRB called Mr.
Navarro, its Vice President, to the witness stand to testify on the terms and
conditions of the Trust Indenture Agreements. Mr. Navarro’s testimony,
though, cannot be accorded much weight and credence as it is in violation
of the parol evidence rule.
● TRB made no attempt to explain why it did not present the Trust Indenture
Agreements, The burden of proof is upon the complaining party to show
clearly that the assessment is erroneous. Given the failure of TRB to
present proof of error in the tax assessments of the BIR, the Court affirms
the same.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari

is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 14, 2005 of the CTA en bane
in C.T.A. EB No. 32, affirming the Decision dated April 28, 2004 and Resolution
dated September 10, 2004 of the CT A Division in C.T.A. Case No. 6392, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Traders Royal Bank is ORDERED to
pay the deficiency Documentary Stamp Taxes on its Trust Indenture Agreements
for the taxable years 1996 and 1997, in the amounts of Pl,064,064.38 and "1104,
595.00, respectively, plus 20% delinquency interest from February 14, 2002 until
full payment thereof. SO ORDERED

Relate to “Burden of Evidence”

Cases:

1. Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 (1985)

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Reinier P. Garcia

CASE TITLE: Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 (1985)

RULE: Section 1 Rule 131. Burden of proof and burden of evidence.

DOCTRINE:
When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, the
burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It remains throughout the trial with
the party upon whom it is imposed—the prosecution. It is the burden of evidence
which shifts from party to party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the
course of the trial. This burden of going forward with the evidence is met by
evidence which balances that introduced by the prosecution. Then the burden
shifts back.

FACTS:
● An information charging Bautista, Corpus and Vergere with estafa was filed
before the sala of Judge Sarmiento. Vergere was granted a separate trial.
● To prove its case, the prosecution presented during the trial the private
complainant Dr. Yap as its only witness. Thereafter, Bautista and Corpus,
believing the prosecution failed to prove their guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, moved to dismissal the case by way of demurrer to the evidence.

● The grounds alleged in the Motion to Dismiss:

o The information alleges that the two accused received jewelries from Dr.
Yap on consignment. The defense’s contention is that the jewelries were
received by the said accused by virtue of purchase and sale. The defense
overlooks the other allegation in the Information, such as:
o That these pieces of jewelries should be sold by the accused on
commission basis and to pay or to deliver the proceeds thereof to
Dr. Yap if sold, and if not sold to return said jewelries.
o The meaning of consignment is not a sale. It means that the goods
sent by one person to another, to be sold or disposed of by the latter
for and on account of the former.
o That the prosecution failed to establish the prior demand to prove
misappropriation on the part of the accused.
 ● The court believed that the prosecution established a prima facie case of
Estafa alleged in the Information against said accused on the evidence
presented so far on record.
● Judge Sarmiento then denied said motion to dismiss and orders trial of the
case for the reception of evidence of the accused. Accordingly, a motion for
reconsideration was duly filed but was likewise denied for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
W/N Judge Sarmiento lost jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of the case and was
duty bound to acquit the Bautista and Corpus considering his findings in denying
their motion to dismiss was that “the prosecution established a prima facie case of
estafa.”

RULING/RATIONALE:

A prima facie case is that amount of evidence which would be sufficient to

counterbalance the general presumption of innocence, and warrant a conviction, if
not encountered and controlled by evidence tending to contradict it, and render it
improbable, or to prove other facts inconsistent with it, and the establishment of a
prima facie case does not take away the presumption of innocence which may in
the opinion of the jury be such as to rebut and control it.

In a criminal case, unless the guilt of the accused is established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal. But when the trial court denies
petitioners' motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that
the prosecution had established a prima facie case against them, they assume a
definite burden. It becomes incumbent upon petitioners to adduce evidence to
meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie case against them. This is due to
the shift in the burden of evidence, and not of the burden of proof as petitioners
would seem to believe.

When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, as in

the case at bar, the burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It remains
throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposed — the prosecution. It is
the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party depending upon the
exigencies of the case in the course of the trial. This burden of going forward with
the evidence is met by evidence which balances that introduced by the
prosecution. Then the burden shifts back.

A prima facie case need not be countered by a preponderance of evidence nor by

evidence of greater weight. Defendant's evidence which equalizes the weight of
plaintiff's evidence or puts the case in equipoise is sufficient. As a result, plaintiff
will have to go forward with the proof. Should it happen that at the trial the weight
of evidence is equally balanced or at equilibrium and presumptions operate against
plaintiff who has the burden of proof, he cannot prevail.

In this case, the order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, required them to
present their evidence. They refused and or failed to do so. This justified an
inference of their guilt. The inevitable result was that the burden of evidence shifted
on them to prove their innocence, or at least, raises a reasonable doubt as to their
guilt.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, finding the order complained of to be well-taken and there being no
grave abuse of discretion that attended its issuance, the instant petition is
DISMISSED with costs against petitioners.

2. People v. Kinok, et al., G.R. No. 104629, November 13, 2001

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Allan Jay Evangelista

CASE TITLE: People v. Kinok, et al., G.R. No. 104629, November 13, 20017.

RULE: A. Burden of Proof (Rule 131. Sec. 1) Relate to “Burden of Evidence”

DOCTRINE:
In criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove beyond reasonable
doubt not only the commission of the crime but likewise to establish, with the same
quantum of proof, the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor. This
burden of proof does not shift to the defense but remains in the prosecution
throughout the trial. However, when the prosecution has succeeded in discharging
the burden of proof by presenting evidence sufficient to convince the court of the
truth of the allegations in the information or has established a prima facie case
against the accused, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused making it
incumbent upon him to adduce evidence in order to meet and nullify, if not to
overthrow, that prima facie case.

FACTS:

● Kinok and Saligan were charged of murder with treachery and evident
premeditation for the killing William Aguipo by a gunshot wound
● Prosecution presented 2 witnesses:
○ Luz (wife) stated that around 12:30 o’clock past midnight, Luz was
awakened by a muffled gunburst. She immediately got up, looked
over the window and saw the two accused both holding guns which
were pointed at where her husband, William, was later found dead.
She was able to identify the two as the moon and stars were
shinning brightly and besides there was a pile of woods and
bamboos (‘bagacay’) which were burning around eight (8) meters
 away from where the two accused were. Not long after, the two
accused ran away (id.). Thereafter, Luz went back to lie down on her
bed. She could not go back to sleep because she was scared that the
two would come back to strafe their house and kill them all
○ Ronel Mande (13-year old nephew) was sleeping in the first floor
with the other child, Rommel Aguipo (on the other side of the wall
of split bamboos from where William was sleeping), was himself
awakened by the noise coming from the horse and pigs. When he
tried to look at the place where the horse and pigs were, he saw the
two accused both holding firearms which were directed and poked
at the walling of the store where William was sleeping . He saw both
accused clearly since the moon was shining brightly and the pile of
woods he had previously set fire earlier in the evening was burning
just around eight (8) meters away from where the accused were.
Upon noticing that both accused had pointed their guns toward the
store where his uncle William was sleeping, he tried to look at the
wooden railings. As he was looking, he heard a muffled gunburst.
Thereupon, he ducked and lay down on the floor. Feeling very much
scared, he covered himself with a blanket .
● Neither of the two accused took the witness stand.
● RTC convicted the accused of the crime charged
● Upon appeal, appellants ascribe to the trial court ten interrelated errors
which may be summed up as follows:
○ (1) in finding that the evidence for the prosecution has established
the identity of the killers;
○ (2) in concluding that delay on the part of Luz Aguipo in naming the
assailants did not weaken her testimony;
○ (3) in holding that Ronel Mande, although the victim’s nephew, is a
credible witness; and
○ (4) in convicting the appellants despite the fact that no ill motive on
their part has been established by the prosecution.

ISSUE:
Whether the accused discharged the burden of proof as it shifts to them

RULING/RATIONALE:

NO, Appellants’ unexplainable silence, in the midst of the overwhelming evidence

established by the prosecution against them, leads to no other conclusion than that they
are guilty as charged.
Instead of controverting the above testimonies and defending themselves, appellants
merely chose to remain silent. They relied solely on the testimonies of their barriomates
who claimed that Luz Aguipo and Ronel Mande did not inform them of the names of the
perpetrators.

In criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove beyond reasonable doubt not
only the commission of the crime but likewise to establish, with the same quantum of proof,
the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor. This burden of proof does not
shift to the defense but remains in the prosecution throughout the trial. However, when the
prosecution has succeeded in discharging the burden of proof by presenting evidence
sufficient to convince the court of the truth of the allegations in the information or has
established a prima facie case against the accused, the burden of evidence shifts to the
accused making it incumbent upon him to adduce evidence in order to meet and nullify, if
not to overthrow, that prima facie case.

As we held in People v. Resano:

"x x x [The witness], of course, has a right not to do so and his failure and/or refusal to
testify shall not in any manner prejudice or be taken against him. But when the prosecution
has already established a prima facie case, more so when the offense charged is grave
and sufficient enough to send the accused behind bars for life or may even warrant the
imposition of the supreme penalty of death, then in order to meet and destroy the effects of
said prima facie case and so as to shift the burden of producing further evidence to the
prosecution, the party making the denial must produce evidence tending to negate the
blame asserted to such a point that, if no more evidence is given, his adversary cannot win
the case beyond reasonable doubt. In such a situation, it may be necessary for the
accused to have a complete destruction of the prosecution’s prima facie case, that he take
the stand since no hardship will in any way be imposed upon him nor advantage be taken
of him."

Appellants’ unexplainable silence, in the midst of the overwhelming evidence established

by the prosecution against them, leads to no other conclusion than that they are guilty as
charged.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED, subject to the

MODIFICATION that appellant Julius Kinok alias "Yos Bla-an" is ORDERED to pay the
heirs of the victim P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Cost against appellant Julius Kinok alyas "Yos
Bla-an".

3. Asian Construction v. Tulabut, 457 SCRA 317 (2005)

 EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: CHRISTOPHER P. LAVISTE

CASE TITLE: ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

Petitioners, v. NOEL T. TULABUT, doing business under the name and style of N.T.
TULABUT CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, Respondents. G.R. NO. 161904. April 26,
2005

RULE:

(Rule 131) Section 1. Burden of proof and burden of evidence. – Burden of proof is
the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish
his or her claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Burden of
proof never shifts.

Burden of evidence is the duty of a party to present evidence sufficient to establish

or rebut a fact in issue to establish a prima facie case. Burden of evidence may
shift from one party to the other in the course of the proceedings, depending on the
exigencies of the case.

DOCTRINE: He who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof,
and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in
the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his
favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's
prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff.
Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of
his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's. The concept of
"preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more
convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability
of truth.

FACTS:
● Asian Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC) was awarded
the development of the Philippine Centennial Exposition (Theme Park
Project) at Clarkfield, Pampanga.
● ACDC contracted twice the services of Noel T. Tulabut, doing business
under the name and style of N.T. Tulabut Construction Supply. In their latest
contract, Tulabut was to supply labor, materials, tools, equipment and
supervision for other necessary works for the construction of two additional
cafeterias via a Purchase Order, the net cost of which amounted to
P400,000.75.
● Tulabut was able to complete the project and turned the same over to the
ACDC. The total amount due as of the final billing was P486,409.45.
● ACDC failed to settle the balance of its obligation despite written demand.
● In a complaint for collection, Tulabut adduced testimonial and documentary
evidence. On the other hand, the ACDC opted not to adduce any evidence
in its behalf.
● RTC ruled in favor of Tulabut. Such Decision, upon appeal, was affirmed by
CA.
 ● The ACDC asserts that the doctrine of estoppel must not be applied
because although its officers irrefutably approved the purchase orders and
billings of the Tulabut, the same had nothing to do with the actual
completion of the works which the latter was obliged to accomplish. The
ACDC avers that such approval did not amount to prove that the projects
had been completed. In fact, Tulabut failed to adduce proof that the projects
had actually been completed.

ISSUE: WON ACDC is barred by estoppel from denying liability for the Tulabut’s
claims since its officers had approved the pertinent purchase orders and billings.

RULING/RATIONALE: Yes. ACDC is barred by estoppel from denying liability for

the Tulabut’s claims since its officers had approved the pertinent purchase orders
and billings. The petitioner failed to adduce a morsel of evidence to controvert that
of the respondent, which evidence proved that the project had been completed and
turned over to the petitioner, and that it had accepted the same. The respondent,
as the plaintiff, was obliged to establish the material averments of his complaint by
a preponderance of evidence. The petitioner as the defendant was burdened to
prove its defenses that the respondent had failed to complete the project. While the
respondent, as the plaintiff, adduced testimonial and documentary evidence to
prove his claim that he had completed the projects and that the petitioner had
approved and accepted the same but failed to pay the balance of its account
despite demands, the petitioner opted not to adduce a morsel of evidence in its
behalf. Conformably, the petitioner must bear the consequence.

Thus, the terms and conditions of the contract between the petitioner and the
respondent unequivocally expressed in the purchase orders and progress billings
must govern the contractual relation of the parties, for these serve as the terms of
the agreement, which are binding and conclusive between them. With the
signatures of its duly authorized representatives on the subject documents, the
genuineness and due execution of which have not been contested, the petitioner,
in effect, freely and voluntarily affirmed all the concurrent rights and obligations
flowing therefrom. Viewed in this light, it is barred from claiming the contrary
without transgressing the principle of estoppel and mutuality of contracts. Needless
to state, contracts must bind both contracting parties; their validity or compliance
cannot be left to the will of one of them.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

4. Republic of the Philippines v. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, G.R.

No. 237428. May 11, 2018

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024
PREPARED BY: BATALON, FRANK ROSS GENE

CASE TITLE: Republic of the Philippines v. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, G.R.

No. 237428. May 11, 2018

RULE: Rule 131 Section 1 – Burden of proof and burden of evidence. – Burden of
proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his or her claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
Burden of proof never shifts.

Burden of evidence is the duty of a party to present evidence sufficient to establish

or rebut a fact in issue to establish a prima facie case. Burden of evidence may
shift from one party to the other in the course of the proceedings, depending on the
exigencies of the case.

DOCTRINE: The burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when it

is filed by the State. When the respondent is called upon at the suit of the State to
show by what warrant he assumes to exercise the functions of a public office, the
burden of proving his title rests upon the respondent. When, however, the
respondent has made out a prima facie right to the office, it is only at that time that
the burden of evidence shifts to the State.

FACTS: Chief Justice Sereno was removed from her position via a quo warranto
petition for failing to file her complete SALN.

Sereno argues that the burden of proof in quo warranto proceedings falls on the
party who brings the action and that based on Doblada, the Republic failed to
discharge this burden. Respondent claims that the records of the U.P. HRDO are
incomplete and unreliable and there was no categorical statement in its
Certification that she failed to file her SALNs for the years 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989,
1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. Further, she avers that the
records of the Office of the Ombudsman are even more incomplete and unreliable,
thus, any certification from said office would likewise be insufficient to prove that
she failed to file 11 of her SALNs while she was a U.P. Professor.

ISSUE: WON the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof.

RULING/RATIONALE: Yes, The Court held that the Republic was able to
discharge its burden of proof, and thus it became incumbent upon respondent to
discharge her burden of evidence.

Distinction between burden of proof and burden of evidence: Section 1, Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court defines "burden of proof' as "the duty of a party to present evidence on the
facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law. "In civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, who is required
to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Once the plaintiff has established his
case, the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant, who, in turn, has the burden to
establish his defense.

Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when it is filed
by the State. Floyd Mechem in his book, entitled A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices
and Officers, explains that when the respondent is called upon at the suit of the State
to show by what warrant he assumes to exercise the functions of a public office, the
burden of proving his title rests upon the respondent. When, however, the
respondent has made out a prima facie right to the office, it is only at that time that
the burden of evidence shifts to the State.

Montgomery H. Throop adopted the same view as Mechem. Throop, in his book, entitled A
Treatise on the Law relating to Public Officers and Sureties in Official Bonds, states that
upon the trial of an information in the nature of a quo warranto, the prosecutor is not
required, in the first instance, to show want of title in the person, against whom the
information is exhibited. The burden is upon the respondent to establish a good title;
he must establish the continued existence of every qualification, necessary to the
continued holding of the office, if any such qualifications exist. But where the
respondent has shown a good prima facie title, the burden of proof is shifted to the
prosecutor. 274

In this jurisdiction, Vicente J. Francisco wrote in his book the Revised Rules of Court in the
Philippines, that in a quo warranto proceeding, the burden rests on the defendant or
respondent, as against the State at least, to show his right to the office from which it
is sought to oust him.

Moreover, since the object of such proceedings is to test the actual right to the
office, and not merely a use color of right, it is incumbent upon the respondent to
show a good legal title, and not merely a colorable one, for he must rely wholly on
the strength of his own title. With the submission of its evidence, including the
Certifications from the U.P. College of Law and the Ombudsman showing that respondent
did not file all her SALNs, the Republic has made out a prima facie case that
respondent failed to comply with the SALN law. The duty or burden of evidence thus
shifted to respondent to controvert the Republic's prima facie case, otherwise, a
verdict must be returned in favor of the Republic. However, what respondent merely
offered in response to the Republic's evidence is an unsubstantiated claim that she had
filed all her SALNs. Without admissible documentary and testimonial support, this bare
and uncorroborated assertion scarcely overcomes the Republic's case.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, respondent Maria Lourdes P. A.

Sereno's Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY for lack
of merit. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made
immediately.
The Court REITERATES its order to the Judicial and Bar Council to commence the
application and nomination process for the position of the Chief Justice without delay.
The ninety-day (90) period for filling the vacancy shall be reckoned from the date of
83

the promulgation of this Resolution.

Equipoise Doctrine

Cases:

1. Marubeni v. Lirag, 362 SCRA 620 (2001)

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: MARIMLA, JELLO M.

CASE TITLE:
G.R. No. 130998 August 10, 2001
MARUBENI CORPORATION, RYOICHI TANAKA, RYOHEI KIMURA and SHOICHI
ONE, petitioners, vs. FELIX LIRAG, respondent.

RULE:
Burden of Proof (Rule 131. Sec. 1) - Equipoise Doctrine

DOCTRINE:
A party who has the burden of proof in a civil case must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. When the evidence of the parties is in equipoise, or
when there is a doubt as to where the preponderance of evidence lies, the party
with the burden of proof fails and the petition must thus be denied.

FACTS:
● Marubeni is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of
Japan. It was doing business in the Philippines through its duly licensed,
wholly owned subsidiary, Marubeni Philippines Corporation.
● Lirag filed a complaint for specific performance claiming that petitioners
owed him the sum of P6,000,000.00 representing commission pursuant to
an oral consultancy agreement with Marubeni.
● The consultancy agreement was not reduced into writing because of the
mutual trust between Marubeni and the Lirag family.
● One of the projects handled by respondent Lirag, the Bureau of Post
project, amounting to P100,000,000.00 was awarded to the
"Marubeni-Sanritsu tandem."
● Pursuant to the consultancy agreement, respondent claimed a commission
of six percent (6%) of the total contract price, or a total of P6,000,000.00
● In their answer, petitioners denied the consultancy agreement. Petitioner
Ryohei Kimura did not have the authority to enter into such agreement in
behalf of Marubeni.
● Moreover, Marubeni did not participate in the bidding for the Bureau of
Post project, nor benefited from the supposed project. Thus, petitioners
moved for the dismissal of the complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a consultancy agreement between petitioners and
respondent (NO)

RULING/RATIONALE:
● A party who has the burden of proof in a civil case must establish his case
by a preponderance of evidence. When the evidence of the parties is in
equipoise, or when there is a doubt as to where the preponderance of
evidence lies, the party with the burden of proof fails and the petition must
thus be denied.
● In civil cases, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; a mere
allegation is not evidence.24 He must establish his cause by a
 preponderance of evidence,25 which respondent failed to establish in the
instant case.
● Assuming for the sake of argument that an oral consultancy agreement has
been perfected between the parties, respondent Lirag could not still claim
fees on the project that has not been awarded to Marubeni.
● If respondent's contentions were to be taken as truth, he would be entitled
to 6% consulting fee based on the total cost of the projects obtained,26 or
on success basis.27 However, even respondent admitted that the Bureau of
Post project was not awarded to Marubeni, but to Sanritsu.28 Marubeni
did not even join the bidding for the Bureau of Post project.
● Respondent could not claim from Sanritsu because of the absence of any
agreement between him and the latter.
● How could he be entitled to the 6% commission, when it was not his client
who won in the bidding?

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals 42
is hereby SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 89-3037 filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 143, Makati City is hereby DISMISSED.

2. Malana v. People, 549 SCRA 451 (2008)

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: CALMA, Christiana Jade Aguilar

CASE TITLE: Malana v. People, 549 SCRA 451 (2008)

RULE:
Equipoise Doctrine

DOCTRINE:

The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence of the parties in a criminal case is evenly
balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the
accused—it is not applicable where the evidence presented is not equally weighty, such as
where the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming.

FACTS:
The petitioners Dominador Malana and Rodel Tiaga, together with their acquitted co-accused
Elenito Malana, were charged with the crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder before
the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.

The charges stemmed from an incident that left Betty Capsa Roxas dead, and her daughter
and granddaughter injured.

The appellants pleaded not guilty during the arraignment.

The prosecution presented the two adult survivors: Vicente Roxas, Jr. and his daughter
Suzette Roxas as its main witnesses.

Appellants proffered the defenses of denial and alibi.

The RTC found Dominador and Rodel guilty of 2 separate crimes of murder and frustrated
murder, and acquitted Elenito on the ground of reasonable doubt.

○ The trial court gave credence to the eyewitness accounts of Vicente and
Suzette who positively identified the appellants as two of the three perpetrators
of the crime.

○ However, the trial court acquitted Elenito as he was not positively identified by
Suzette as the third man and his physical appearance does not fit the
description of the tall fat man seen by Suzette.

The appellate court affirmed the guilt of appellants but modified their sentences such that
each of them is liable for the complex crime of murder with frustrated murder and attempted
murder; hence, it sentenced each of the appellants to suffer the penalty prescribed for the
most serious crime which is death.

ISSUE:
Whether the appellants should be acquitted under the equipoise rule in view of what to them
are doubts as to their guilt. - NO

RULING/RATIONALE:

There is no merit in appellants' assiduous assertion that they should be acquitted under the
equipoise rule in view of what to them are doubts as to their guilt.

This rule provides that where the evidence of the parties in a criminal case is evenly
balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the
accused. There is, therefore, no equipoise if the evidence is not evenly balanced.

The equipoise rule is not applicable in the case before us because the evidence here
presented is not equally weighty. The equipoise rule cannot be invoked where the evidence of
the prosecution is overwhelming.

Against the direct, positive and convincing evidence for the prosecution, appellants could only
offer denials and uncorroborated alibi. It is elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed by
positive identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part
of the eyewitness testifying on the matter.

Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and
self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.
The prosecution witnesses positively identified appellants as two of the perpetrators of the
crime. It is incumbent upon appellants to prove that they were at another place when the
felony was committed, and that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time it was committed. This they failed to prove.

Appellants tried to sow reasonable doubt on their guilt by harping on minor factual matters
and engaging in semantics. Their effort is futile. This Court cannot be led to a different result.
The Court of Appeals correctly resolved all the issues raised by the appellants.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00138 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellants are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole.

SO ORDERED.

In Civil Cases

Cases:

1. Pornellosa v. Land Tenure Admin., 1 SCRA 375 (1961)

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Buan, Jasmine D.

CASE TITLE:

Pormellosa vs. Land Tenure Administration 1 SCRA 375

RULE:

Equipoise Doctrine in Civil Cases

DOCTRINE:

A party claiming a right granted or created by law must prove his claim by
competent evidence. A plaintiff is duty bound to prove his allegations in the
complaint. He must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness
of that of his opponent.

FACTS:

The lot in controversy is a part of the Santa Clara Estate on which many families
have settled through the consent of its owner, each paid a rental. In May 1941, the
said Estate was acquired by the Government & was entrusted to an office known
as the Rural Progress Admin., which was later abolished & its functions was
transferred to the Bureau of Lands. Recently, such duties was given to the Land
Tenure Administration.

The plaintiff acquired by purchase the right of occupation of the lot in question from
Vicente San Jose, predecessor-in-interest. After the purchase of the Santa Clara
Estate by the Government, the plaintiffs were allowed to make payments on
account of the purchase price of the lot, as fenced, included two hundred (200)
sq.m. Thereafter, the plaintiffs found out that the lot had been subdivided into two
(2) smaller lots, No. 44 and 78. Lot No. 44 had been sold to Hermino Guzman.
The plaintiffs then filed a complaint to compel the Director of Lands to execute a
Deed of Sale in their favor & declare null and void the Deed of Sale of Lot No. 44,
executed in favor of respondent Hemino. The trial court rendered judgment in
favor of plaintiff, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals, dismissing the
petitioner’s complaint. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to purchase from the Government the lot,
allegedly includes 200 sq.m?
RULING/RATIONALE:

The judgment under review was affirmed.

The lot on which San Jose’s house stood had not been specified, nor had the
boundaries thereof been mentioned. Significantly, the plaintiff cannot show a
contract whereby the Rural Progress Admin., has sold or promised to sell them a
lot of 200 sq.m. A party claiming a right granted or created by law must prove his
claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his evidence and not
on the weakness of that of his opponent.

Moreover the Deed of Sale allegedly executed by Vicente San Jose in favor of
Pornellosa is a mere private document and does not conclusively establish their
right to the parcel of land. Acts and contracts which have for their subject the
creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over
immovable property must appear in a public document.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

The judgment under review is affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.

2. IFC v. Tobias, 78 SCRA 28 (1977)

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Buan, Jasmine D.

CASE TITLE:

IFC v. Tobias, 78 SCRA 28 (1977)

RULE:

Equipoise Doctrine in Civil Cases

DOCTRINE:

A negative allegation, not being an essential part of the statement of the right on
which the cause of action is founded, needs no evidence to support it.
FACTS:

Tobias bought on installment 1 Dodge truck from Leelin Motors, Inc. To answer for
his obligation he executed a promissory note in favor of the latter, for the sum of
P29.070.28 payable in 36 equal installments with interest at the rate of 12% per
annum payable in the amounts and dates indicated in said promissory note. To
secure payment of the promissory note, respondent Tobias executed in favor of
Leelin Motors, Inc. a chattel mortgage on the Dodge truck. Leelin Motors, Inc.
indorsed the promissory note and assigned the chattel mortgage to Industrial
Finance Corporation. As a consequence respondent Tobias paid 6 installments on
the promissory note directly to the petitioner Industrial Finance Corporation.

IFC’S counsel wrote to Tobias stating that IFC has referred Tobia’s account for
appropriate legal action which is in arrears in the amount of P4,254.65 and a
balance of P25,249.65. In view of his default in the payment of his installments
due demand was made to pay the amount of P25,249.65 or to surrender within the
same period the Dodge truck which was a security for the loan. Tobias replied
saying that he was willing to surrender the truck and the truck has been with Leelin
motors ever since it met an accident and that he is not satisfied with the repair of
the finished portions.

Upon learning that the truck had been in an accident, IFC decided not to get the
truck anymore and instituted this action to recover the unpaid balance on the
promissory note.

ISSUE:

Whether or not IFC can still choose to exact payment for the obligation, instead of
foreclosing the truck (because Tobias insists that IFC is now estopped from
claiming balance when it demanded the surrender of the truck securing the
obligation)?
RULING/RATIONALE:

To hold the petitioner in estoppel, it must be shown that when it gave the
respondent the choice of either paying the balance of the purchase price or of
surrendering the truck, it had already knowledge of the accident and the
consequent damage to the truck.

Petitioner claims it had no knowledge of the accident when it gave the respondent
the choice of either paying the balance of the promissory note or of surrendering
the truck.

Besides the allegation of petitioner that it had no knowledge of the accident is a

negative allegation and needs no evidence to support it, not being an essential
part of the statement of the right on which the cause of action is founded. It is
therefore the respondent Tobias who has the burden of disproving the claim of
petitioner that he has no knowledge of the accident when it made the offer to
respondent either to pay the balance on the promissory note or to surrender the
truck. Respondent failed in this.

Aside from the fact that the truck being surrendered met an accident petitioner was
not satisfied with the repair of the finished portion of the truck in question.
Petitioner therefore was justified refusing to accept such surrender and in bringing
suit to recover the balance of the purchase price.

ANALYSIS:

The ruling of this case is correct and in accordance with our current rules on
evidence. A negative averment only needs to be proved by the party alleging it if it
is an element of a criminal offense charged. Averment of having no knowledge in
civil cases need not be proved by the party asserting it. Under the proposed
revised rules, the burden of going forward with the evidence will still fall on the
party alleging the positive of a fact, in this case, one asserting presence of
knowledge.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the respondent Court of Appeals

and of the lower court are hereby set aside and a new one rendered ordering
respondent Tobias to pay petitioner the balance of the purchase price of the truck
in question in the amount of P27,210.77 plus legal rate of interest from the time of
the filing of the complaint. Costs against the respondent.
 3. Sambar v. Levi Strauss, 378 SCRA 364 (2002)

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: CALMA, Christiana Jade Aguilar

CASE TITLE: Sambar v. Levi Strauss, 378 SCRA 364 (2002)

RULE:
Equipoise Doctrine: In Civil Cases

DOCTRINE:

In civil cases, the burden of proof may be on either the plaintiff or the defendant. It is on the
latter, if in his answer he alleges an affirmative defense, which is not a denial of an essential
ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but is one which, if established, will be a good
defense – i.e., an "avoidance" of the claim, which prima facie, the plaintiff already has
because of the defendant’s own admissions in the pleadings

FACTS:

Levi Strauss & Co., (LS&Co.) and Levi Strauss Phll, Inc., (LSPI) demanded that CVS
Garment Enterprises (CVSGE) desist from using their stitched arcuate design on the
Europress jeans which CVSGE advertised in the Manila Bulletin. Atty. Benjamin Gruba,
counsel of CVSGE, replied that the arcuate design on the back pockets of Europress jeans
was different from the design on the back pockets of Levis jeans. He further asserted that his
client had a copyright on the design it was using.

Private respondents filed a complaint against Sambar, doing business under the name and
style of CVSGE alleging that LS&Co., an internationally known clothing manufacturer,:

1. owns the arcuate design trademark which was registered under the U.S. Trademark
Registration and in the Principal Register of trademarks with the Philippine Patent;

2. that through a Trademark Technical Data and Technical Assistance Agreement with LSPI,
LS&Co. granted LSPI a non-exclusive license to use the arcuate trademark in its manufacture
and sale of Levis pants, jackets and shirts in the Philippines;

3. that LS&Co. also appointed LSPI as its agent and attorney-in-fact to protect its trademark in
the Philippines; and

4. that CVSGIC and Venancio Sambar, without the consent and authority of private
respondents and in infringement and unfair competition, sold and advertised, and despite
demands to cease and desist, continued to manufacture, sell and advertise denim pants
under the brand name Europress with back pockets bearing a design similar to the arcuate
trademark of private respondents, thereby causing confusion on the buying public, prejudicial
to private respondents goodwill and property right.
In its answer, CVSGIC admitted it manufactured, sold and advertised and was still
manufacturing and selling denim pants under the brand name of Europress, bearing a back
pocket design of two double arcs meeting in the middle. However, it denied that there was
infringement or unfair competition because the display rooms of department stores where
Levis and Europress jeans were sold, were distinctively segregated by billboards and other
modes of advertisement. Also, CVSGIC claimed that it had its own original arcuate design, as
evidenced by Copyright Registration No. 1-1998, which was very different and distinct from
Levis design.

Petitioner Venancio Sambar filed a separate answer. He denied he was connected with
CVSGIC. He admitted that Copyright Registration No. 1-1998 was issued to him, but he
denied using it. He also said he did not authorize anyone to use the copyrighted design.

RTC ruled in favor of Private Respondents and issued a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining CVSGIC and petitioner from manufacturing, advertising and selling pants with the
arcuate design on their back pockets and ordered CVS Garment and Industrial Company
(CVSGIC) and petitioner Venancio Sambar to pay private respondents solidarily. RTC also
granted private respondents prayer for the cancellation of petitioner's copyright registration.
CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is solidarily liable with CVS Garments Industrial Corporation - YES

RULING/RATIONALE:

On the second issue, petitioner claims that private respondents did not show that he was
connected with CVSGIC, nor did they prove his specific acts of infringement to make him
liable for damages. Again, this is a factual matter and factual findings of the trial court,
concurred in by the Court of Appeals, are final and binding on this Court. 6 Both the courts
below found that petitioner had a copyright over Europress’ arcuate design and that he
consented to the use of said design by CVSGIC. We are bound by this finding, especially in
the absence of a showing that it was tainted with arbitrariness or palpable error. 7 It must be
stressed that it was immaterial whether or not petitioner was connected with CVSGIC. What is
relevant is that petitioner had a copyright over the design and that he allowed the use of the
same by CVSGIC.

Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred when it said that he had the burden
to prove that he was not connected with CVSGIC and that he did not authorize anyone to use
his copyrighted design. According to petitioner, these are important elements of private
respondents’ cause of action against him, hence, private respondents had the ultimate burden
of proof.

Pertinent is Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which provides that the burden of proof
is the duty of a party to prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the
amount of evidence required by law. In civil cases, the burden of proof may be on either the
plaintiff or the defendant. It is on the latter, if in his answer he alleges an affirmative defense,
which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but is one
which, if established, will be a good defense – i.e., an "avoidance" of the claim, which prima
facie, the plaintiff already has because of the defendant’s own admissions in the pleadings.

Petitioner’s defense in this case was an affirmative defense.1âwphi1 He did not deny that
private respondents owned the arcuate trademark nor that CVSGIC used on its products a
similar arcuate design. What he averred was that although he owned the copyright on the
Europress arcuate design, he did not allow CVSGIC to use it. He also said he was not
connected with CVSGIC. These were not alleged by private respondents in their pleadings,
and petitioner therefore had the burden to prove these.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated January 30, 1998, of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 51553 AFFIRMING the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 66, dated
July 14, 1995, is hereby MODIFIED so that nominal damages are deleted but the amount of
P50,000 is hereby awarded only as TEMPERATE DAMAGES. In all other respects, said
judgment is hereby AFFIRMED, to wit:

a) the writ of preliminary injunction is made permanent;

b) the defendants CVS Garment and Industrial Company and Venancio Sambar are ordered
also to pay the plaintiffs jointly and solidarily the sum of ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and the sum of ₱25,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, and to pay the costs;
and

c) the Director of the National Library is ordered to cancel the Copyright Registration No.
1-1998 issued in the name of Venancio Sambar.

SO ORDERED.

4. Prudential Guarantee v. TransAsia Shipping, 491 SCRA 411

(2006)

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Allan Jay Evangelista

CASE TITLE: Prudential Guarantee v. TransAsia Shipping, 491 SCRA 411 (2006)

RULE: A. Burden of Proof (Rule 131. Sec. 1) In Civil Cases

DOCTRINE:

In the rule on evidence, the plaintiff necessarily has the burden of proof to show
proof of loss, and the coverage thereof, in the subject insurance policy. However, in
the course of trial in a civil case, once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in
his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant to controvert
plaintiff’s prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of the
plaintiff.

FACTS:
● TRANS-ASIA (Plaintiff) is the owner of the vessel M/V Asia Korea. In
consideration of payment of premiums, PRUDENTIAL (defendant) insured
M/V Asia Korea for loss/damage of the hull and machinery arising from
perils, inter alia, of fire and explosion for P40 Million, evidenced by a
Marine Policy..
● While the policy was in force, a fire broke out while M/V Asia Korea was
undergoing repairs. TRANS-ASIA filed its notice of claim for damage
sustained by the vessel, which PRUDENTIAL.
● TRANS-ASIA filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against PRUDENTIAL.
TRANS-ASIA sought the amount of the balance of the indemnity due upon
the insurance policy.
● PRUDENTIAL denied the material allegations and interposed the defense
that TRANS-ASIA breached insurance policy conditions, in particular:
"WARRANTED VESSEL CLASSED AND CLASS MAINTAINED."
● RTC ruled in favor of PRUDENTIAL. It ruled that a determination of the
parties’ liabilities hinged on whether TRANS-ASIA violated and breached
the policy conditions on WARRANTED VESSEL CLASSED AND CLASS
MAINTAINED. It interpreted the provision to mean that TRANS-ASIA is
required to maintain the vessel at a certain class at all times pertinent
during the life of the policy. TRANS-ASIA failed to prove compliance of the
terms of the warranty, the violation thereof entitled PRUDENTIAL, the
insured party, to rescind the contract.
● CA reversed RTC. PRUDENTIAL, as the party asserting the
non-compensability of the loss had the burden of proof to show that
TRANS-ASIA breached the warranty, which burden it failed to discharge.
● In resisting the claim of TRANS-ASIA, PRUDENTIAL posits that TRANS-ASIA
violated an express and material warranty in the subject insurance contract,
i.e., Marine Insurance Policy No. MH93/1363, specifically Warranty Clause
No. 5 thereof, which stipulates that the insured vessel, "M/V ASIA KOREA"
is required to be CLASSED AND CLASS MAINTAINED. According to
PRUDENTIAL, at the time of the occurrence of the fire, "M/V ASIA KOREA"
was in violation of the warranty as it was not CLASSED AND CLASS
MAINTAINED. PRUDENTIAL submits that Warranty Clause No. 5 was a
condition precedent to the recovery of TRANS-ASIA under the policy, the
 violation of which entitled PRUDENTIAL to rescind the contract under Sec.
74 of the Insurance Code.

ISSUE:

Whether PRUDENTIAL failed to establish that TRANS-ASIA violated and breached

the policy condition on WARRANTED VESSEL CLASSED AND CLASS MAINTAINED, as
contained in the subject insurance contract

RULING/RATIONALE:

YES

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the party which alleges a fact as a matter of
defense has the burden of proving it. PRUDENTIAL, as the party which asserted the claim
that TRANS-ASIA breached the warranty in the policy, has the burden of evidence to
establish the same. Hence, on the part of PRUDENTIAL lies the initiative to show proof in
support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving.
Clearly, if no evidence on the alleged breach of TRANS-ASIA of the subject warranty is
shown, a fortiori, TRANS-ASIA would be successful in claiming on the policy. It follows that
PRUDENTIAL bears the burden of evidence to establish the fact of breach.

In our rule on evidence, TRANS-ASIA, as the plaintiff below, necessarily has the burden of
proof to show proof of loss, and the coverage thereof, in the subject insurance policy.
However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in
his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff’s
prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff.

TRANS-ASIA was able to establish proof of loss and the coverage of the loss, i.e., 25
October 1993: Fire on Board. Thereafter, the burden of evidence shifted to PRUDENTIAL
to counter TRANS-ASIA’s case, and to prove its special and affirmative defense that
TRANS-ASIA was in violation of the particular condition on CLASSED AND CLASS
MAINTAINED.
PRUDENTIAL was not successful in discharging the burden of evidence that TRANS-ASIA
breached the subject policy condition on CLASSED AND CLASS MAINTAINED.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 151890 is DENIED. However, the Petition in
G.R. No. 151991 is GRANTED, thus, we award the grant of attorney’s fees and make
a clarification that the term "double interest" as used in the 6 November 2001
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 68278 should be construed to
mean interest at the rate of 24% per annum, with a further clarification, that the
same should be computed from 13 September 1996 until fully paid. The Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68278, dated 6
November 2001 and 29 January 2002, respectively, are, thus, MODIFIED in the
following manner, to wit:

1. PRUDENTIAL is DIRECTED to PAY TRANS-ASIA the amount of P8,395,072.26,

representing the balance of the loss suffered by TRANS-ASIA and covered by
Marine Policy No. MH93/1363;

2. PRUDENTIAL is DIRECTED further to PAY TRANS-ASIA damages in the form of

attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the amount of P8,395,072.26;

3. The aggregate amount (P8,395,072.26 plus 10% thereof as attorney’s fees) shall
be imposed double interest at the rate of 24% per annum to be computed from 13
September 1996 until fully paid; and

4. An interest of 12% per annum is similarly imposed on the TOTAL amount of

liability adjudged as abovestated in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) herein, computed
from the time of finality of judgment until the full satisfaction thereof.

In Criminal Cases

Cases:

1. People v. Pajenado, 31 SCRA 812 (1970)

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Manio, Marc Sam Stephen D.

CASE TITLE:
People v. Pajenado, 31 SCRA 812 (1970)

RULE:
Burden of Proof (Rule 131. Sec. 1) - EQUIPOISE Doctrine in Criminal Cases

DOCTRINE:
It is true that it is incumbent upon a person charged with illegal possession of a
firearm, to prove the issuance to him of a license to possess the firearm, but we
are, of the considered opinion that under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court which, provide that in criminal cases the burden of proof as to
the offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact alleged by the
prosecution must be proven if "it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged",
the burden of proof was with the prosecution in this case to prove that the firearm
used by appellant in committing the offense charged was not properly licensed.

The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the better means of proof
of the fact alleged, should not relieve the party making the averment of the burden
of proving it. This is so, because a party who alleges a fact must be assumed to
have acquired some knowledge thereof, otherwise he could not have alleged it.

FACTS:
Openiano Pajenado was charged with murder and with illegal possession of a
firearm. Upon arraignment he pleaded not guilty in both cases, and after a joint trial
thereof he was convicted.

The appellant was seen by a prosecution witness holding Carlos Tapong by the
neck while he was walking along a street. The appellant, along with his cousin
Carlito Pajenado, threw Tapong to the ground and held him down. The appellant
then shot Tapong while Carlito ran away. The appellant was apprehended by a
policeman who arrived at the scene and took his gun. Tapong was carried home by
his father and other relatives and was fatally wounded.

It is not denied that Carlos Tapong died as a result of the gun-shot wound inflicted
upon him on that occasion.

ISSUE:
1. Whether, upon the evidence of record, he should also be found guilty of the
crime of illegal possession of a firearm [NO]

RULING/RATIONALE:
NO.

We agree with both appellant's counsel and the Solicitor General that the appealed
decision should be reversed.

It is true that it is incumbent upon a person charged with illegal possession

of a firearm, to prove the issuance to him of a license to possess the
firearm, but we are, of the considered opinion that under the provisions of
Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which, provide that in criminal
cases the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the
 prosecution and that a negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be
proven if "it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged", the burden
of proof was with the prosecution in this case to prove that the firearm
used by appellant in committing the offense charged was not properly
licensed.

It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential

ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The information
filed against appellant in Criminal Case No. 3558 of the lower court
specifically alleged that he had no "license or permit to possess" the .45
caliber pistol mentioned therein. Thus it seems clear that it was the
prosecution's duty not merely to allege that negative fact but to prove it. In
the case before Us, both appellant and the Solicitor General agree that there
was not even a prima facie case upon which to hold appellant guilty of the
illegal possession of a firearm. Former Chief Justice Moran upholds this
view as follows:

The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the better means of proof
of the fact alleged, should not relieve the party making the averment of the
burden of proving it. This is so, because a party who alleges a fact must be
assumed to have acquired some knowledge thereof, otherwise he could not have
alleged it. Familiar instance of this is the case of a person prosecuted for doing an
act or carrying on a business, such as, the sale of liquor without a license. How
could the prosecution aver the want of a license if it had acquired no knowledge of
that fact? Accordingly, although proof of the existence or non-existence of such
license can, with more facility, be adduced by the defendant, it is, nevertheless,
incumbent upon the party alleging the want of the license to prove the allegation.
Naturally, as the subject matter of the averment is one which lies peculiarly within
the control or knowledge of the accused prima facie evidence thereof on the part
of the prosecution shall suffice to cast the onus upon him

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: (1) Appellant is found guilty
of murder, with the aggravating circumstance of use of superior strength, without
any mitigating circumstance to offset the same; (2) The appealed decision is
reversed and set aside in so far as it finds appellant guilty of illegal possession of
a firearm, with the result that he is hereby acquitted of said charge.

2. People v. Verzola, 80 SCRA 600 (1977)

 EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Lazatin, Nissah Grace

CASE TITLE: People v. Verzola, 80 SCRA 600 (1977)

RULE: RULE 131, SEC 1

Section 1. Burden of proof and burden of evidence. — Burden of proof is the duty of a
party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his or her claim
or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Burden of proof never shifts.

Burden of evidence is the duty of a party to present evidence sufficient to establish or

rebut a fact in issue to establish a prima facie case. Burden of evidence may shift from
one party to the other in the course of the proceedings, depending on the exigencies of
the case. (1a)

DOCTRINE:
There can be no question that once an accused has admitted the killing of a human
being, the burden is on him to establish the existence of any circumstance which may
justify the killing or at least attenuate the offense committed. To establish his
exculpation, or the justification for the act, he must prove such affirmative allegation by
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.

FACTS:
Appeal by Ricardo Verzola and Josefina Molina from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Abra, finding them guilty of the crime of Murder and sentencing them,
respectively, viz.:
● Verzola, as principal, and
● Molina, as an accessory

The incident occured on September 28, 1969, when Bernando Molina was clubbed to
death with a piece of wood by Ricardo Verzola in the presence of appellant Josefina
Molina inside Molina's house. The body of the victim was subsequently carried by the
two appellants to the ground and left at the foot of the stairs.

Appellant Verzola then went to his house, changed his clothes and threw his
bloodstained sweater, undershirt and underwear, including the piece of wood he used
in clubbing the deceased, inside their toilet. Afterwards, he went to the municipal
building and reported to the police authorities that Bernardo had died in an accident.

The police authorities, together with the Municipal Health Officer, the Municipal Judge
and a photographer went to Lipcan to conduct the investigation. When questioned by
the police, Josefina revealed that the assailant of her husband was Ricardo Verzola.

She gave a written extrajudicial statement narrating the circumstances surrounding the
incident in question and pointing to appellant Verzola as the assailant of her husband.
She stated:

● that Verzola went to their house after 10PM, entered the room where she and
her husband were sleeping, had carnal knowledge with her and started hitting
Bernando several times with a piece of wood when he woke up.
 ● that afterwards, she heard the sound of a body being dragged downstairs and
the voice of Verzola saying that he was leaving and warning her not to say
anything about the incident
● that she looked out of the door and saw her husband already lying prostrate at
the foot of the stairs.

On the other hand, appellant Verzola alleged in his extra-judicial confession that
Josefina was his paramour and she told him that her husband was planning to kill him.
Because of it, he went up the spouses’ room, saw Bernado Molina sleeping and
clubbed him three times at the nape. When he didn't move anymore, Verzola and
Josephina threw him downstairs.

This extrajudicial confession, he later impugned and now claims the killing was in
self-defense as he saw Bernardo maltreating Josefina. Verzola struck him twice with
the piece of wood, hitting the head of the victim, causing him to fall. After he had fallen,
he tried to revive the victim.

When Josefina asked him what happened, he replied that Bernardo met an accident.
At his suggestion, they both carried the body of the victim down the stairs because
according to him they wanted to bring the body to the hospital. As the hospital was too
far it was too dark, they left the body on the ground. After instructing Josefina to go and
summon persons to help the victim, he went home, changed his clothes and threw his
bloodstained clothing inside their toilet. Then, he went to the municipal building in
Bangued Abra, and reported to the guard that there was a person who met an accident
in Barrio Lipcan.

Josefina claimed that out of fear, she assisted Verzola in carrying the body of the
deceased at the foot of the stars where Verzola left her.

Both claimed that they were not aware of the contents of their extra-judicial statements
as they were made to sign them by the police authorities without being able to read
their contents.

CFI:

- found both appellants guilty of Murder

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt Verzola’s guilt
2. Whether or not Josefina Molina could be held criminally responsible as an
accessory.

RULING/RATIONALE:

1. YES
There can be no question that once an accused has admitted the killing of a human
being, the burden is on him to establish the existence of any circumstance which may
justify the killing or at least attenuate the offense committed. To establish his
exculpation, or the justification for the act, he must prove such affirmative allegation by
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of that for the prosecution, for even if that were
weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing. It is
evident that no such proof was adduced by appellant Verzola.

The court determined that Verzola's behavior, as well as the physical evidence,
contradicted his claim of self-defense. More significant, however, are the undisputed
physical facts of the case, such as nature, character and location of the wounds
sustained by the deceased and the presence of the bloodstains on the beddings of the
victim. These facts and circumstances belie the claim of the appellant that he clubbed
the victim in self-defense. On the contrary, they sufficiently indicate that the fatal
injuries were inflicted upon the victim when the latter was lying defenseless on the
floor, as he was either sleeping or was just beginning to wake up.

2. NO
Although appellant Josefina Molina admitted in her extra-judicial statement that she
was the paramour of her co-appellant for over a year, there is no proof that she had
knowledge of the criminal design of her co-appellant. Neither has she cooperated with
him by previous or simultaneous acts, much less is there any showing that she
supplied the principal with material or moral aid. Her only participation was in assisting
her co-appellant in bringing the body of the deceased to the ground. The question,
therefore, is whether or not by said overt act she could be held criminally responsible
as an accessory.

An accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor cooperate in the
commission of the felony, but, with knows of the commission of the crime, he
subsequently takes part in three (3) ways:
(a) by profiting from the effects of the crime;
(b) by concealing the body, effects or instruments of the crime in order to prevent
its discovery; and
(c) by assisting in the escape or concealment of the principal of the crime, provided
he acts with abuse of his public functions or the principal is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive or is
known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
The main difference separating accessories after the fact the responsibility of the
accessories is subsequent to the consummation of the crime and subordinate to that of
the principal.

There is no iota of proof that Josefina Molina ever attempted "to destroy the body of the
crime" or to make it appear that death of the victim was accidental. It must be noted
that Josefina testified that she helped her co-appellant bring the body of the deceased
down the stairs because of fear.

Even if she assisted her co-appellant without duress, simply Verzola in bringing the
body down the house to the foot of the stairs and leaving said body for anyone to see,
cannot be classified as an attempt to or destroy the body of the crime the effects or
instruments thereof, must be done to prevent the discovery of the crime.
In the case at bar, the body was left at the foot of the stairs at a place where it was
easily visible to the public. Under such circumstances there could not have been any
attempt on the part of Josefina to conceal or destroy the body of the crime

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment, insofar as appellant Verzola is
concerned, is hereby AFFIRMED. The judgment against Josefina Molina is, however,
reversed and said appellant is ACQUITTED with proportionate costs de oficio.

3. People v. Macalaba, 395 SCRA 461 (2003)

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Madlambayan, Joyce Ann V.

CASE TITLE: People v. Macalaba, 395 SCRA 461 (2003)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ABDUL MACALABA y DIGAYON, appellant.

RULE: A. Burden of Proof (Rule 131. Sec. 1)

Criminal Cases

DOCTRINE: Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or
where the facts are more immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the
onus probandi rests upon him. Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the
prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth
of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if untrue, could
readily be disproved by the production of documents or other evidence within the
defendant’s knowledge or control.

FACTS:
1. Appellant Abdul was charged before the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, with
violations of the Presidential Decree No. 1866; Article 168 of the Revised
Penal Code; and Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1236,
1237 and 1238, respectively.
2. At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses SPO1 Generoso
Pandez, PO3 Ernani Mendez, Police Inspector Anacleta Cultura and Police
Inspector Lorna Tria. ABDUL was the sole witness for the defense.
3. SPO1 Pandez, a PNP member of the Laguna Criminal CIDG, testified that
on 12 April 1999, at 5:15 p.m., Major R’ Win Pagkalinawan ordered the
search of ABDUL, alias "Boy Muslim," based on a verified information that
the latter was driving a carnapped Mitsubishi olive green car with Plate No.
UPV 511 and was a drug-pusher in San Pedro, Laguna. Two teams were
formed for the search.
4. Between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., the two groups proceeded to Barangay
 Nueva, San Pedro, Laguna, on board a car and a van. They went to
ABDUL’s apartment where he was reportedly selling shabu, but they
learned that ABDUL had already left. While looking for ABDUL, they saw
the suspected carnapped car somewhere at Pacita Complex I, San Pedro,
Laguna, going towards the Poblacion. When it stopped due to the red traffic
light, the CIDG officers alighted from their vehicles. Capt. Rumbaoa
positioned himself at the passenger side of the suspected carnapped car,
while Major Pagkalinawan stood in front of the car. SPO1 Pandez, with PO3
Mendez beside him, went straight to the driver and knocked at the driver’s
window. ABDUL, who was driving the car, lowered the glass window. SPO1
Pandez introduced himself as a member of the Laguna CIDG and asked
ABDUL to turn on the light and show them the car’s certificate of
registration.
5. When the light was already on, SPO1 Pandez saw a black Norinco .45
caliber gun inside an open black clutch/belt bag placed on the right side of
the driver’s seat near the gear. He asked ABDUL for the supporting papers
of the gun, apart from the car’s certificate of registration, but the latter failed
to show them any.9 When ABDUL opened the zipper of the clutch/belt bag,
the CIDG officers saw inside it four plastic sachets of what appeared to be
shabu. They likewise found a self-sealing plastic bag which contained the
following items: two fake P1,000 bills, a list of names of persons, a
magazine and five ammunitions for a .45 caliber gun. They confiscated the
gun, the shabu, and the fake P1,000 bills and thereafter brought ABDUL to
the CIDG office.
6. As expected, ABDUL had a different story to tell.
7. After the trial, the trial court acquitted ABDUL in Criminal Cases Nos. 1236
and 1237 for violations of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and Article 168 of
the Revised Penal Code, respectively, due to insufficiency of evidence.
However, it convicted him in Criminal Case No. 1238 for violation of Section
16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425),
as amended, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay a fine of P500,000, as well as the costs of the suit.
8. Dissatisfied with the judgment, ABDUL interposed the present appeal,
alleging that the trial court erred in, among others, convicting him for
violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, despite insufficiency of evidence.
9. In the Appellee’s Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains
that ABDUL had the burden of proving that he was authorized to possess
shabu, but he failed to discharge such burden. Therefore, it is presumed
that he had no authority; consequently, he is liable for violation of Section
16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court is correct in convicting Abdul for violation of Section
16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 based on the evidence
presented by the prosecution.

RULING/RATIONALE: YES
The general rule is that if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative
allegation, or that a negative averment is an essential element of a crime, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the charge. However, this rule is not
without an exception. Thus, we have held:

Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or

where the facts are more immediately within the knowledge of the
 accused, the onus probandi rests upon him. Stated otherwise, it is not
incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to
support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by
established circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily be
disproved by the production of documents or other evidence within
the defendant’s knowledge or control. For example, where a charge is
made that a defendant carried on a certain business without a license (as in
the case at bar, where the accused is charged with the selling of a
regulated drug without authority), the fact that he has a license is a matter
which is peculiarly within his knowledge and he must establish that fact or
suffer conviction.

In the instant case, the negative averment that ABDUL had no license or
authority to possess methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated
drug, has been fairly indicated by the following facts proven by the
testimonies of the CIDG officers and the forensic chemist: (a) ABDUL was
driving the suspected carnapped vehicle when he was caught, and he
appeared to be healthy and not indisposed as to require the use of shabu as
medicine; (b) the contents of the sachets found in ABDUL’s open clutch bag
inside the car were prima facie determined by the CIDG officers to be shabu;
and (c) the said contents were conclusively found to be shabu by the
forensic chemist. With these established facts, the burden of evidence was
shifted to ABDUL. He could have easily disproved the damning
circumstances by presenting a doctor’s prescription for said drug or a copy
of his license or authority to possess the regulated drug. Yet, he offered
nothing.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional

Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, in Criminal Case No. 1238 convicting appellant
ABDUL MACALABA y DIGAYON of the violation of Section 16 of Article III of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000 and the costs
of the suit, is hereby affirmed in toto.

4. People v. Florendo, 413 SCRA 132 (2003)

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Reinier P. Garcia

CASE TITLE: People v. Florendo, 413 SCRA 132 (2003)

RULE: Section 1 Rule 131. Burden of proof and burden of evidence.

DOCTRINE:
Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code exists when there is a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., appellant is deprived
of reason; he acts without the least discernment because of complete absence of
the power to discern; or, there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will. The onus
probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance, and
he must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.
Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be
given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with appellant, or who has rational
basis to conclude that appellant was insane based on the witness’ own perception
of appellant, or who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.

FACTS:
On 28 August 1996 at around 2:30 in the afternoon, appellant Imong and his wife
Erlinda were inside their house engaged in an animated conversation. Living with
them in the same house was appellant’s father Agustin Florendo. After Erlinda was
heard to have told Imong to go to sleep, the latter all of a sudden and without any
provocation hacked Erlinda with a bolo in the head and other parts of her body. The
victim could only exclaim, "Patayennak met ni Imong ngen (Imong is going to kill
me)!"

Agustin witnessed this incident. He sought help from his immediate neighbor,
Ernesto Anical, and told him, "Kasano Erning, patayen yen met ni Imong ni
baketnan (How is this Erning, Imong is killing his wife)!"

On 2 September 1996, appellant was committed at the Abra Provincial Jail. During
his confinement, he was observed to be having difficulty in sleeping. He could not
eat during meal times. Most of the time he would stand in his cell without talking to
anyone. The Provincial Warden then requested a psychiatric examination of
appellant to determine whether he was fit to be arraigned.

On 17 October 1996, appellant was supposed to be arraigned but he appeared

without counsel and remained unresponsive to the questions propounded to him.
The trial court referred appellant to the Baguio General Hospital and Medical
Center (BGHMC) for psychiatric evaluation. He was admitted and managed as a
case of schizophrenic psychosis, paranoid type (schizophreniform disorder).

At the pre-trial conference, appellant admitted killing his wife but put up the
defense of insanity to claim exemption from criminal liability.

Agustin attested that his son was not in his proper senses on the day of the
incident and repeated on cross-examination that appellant was crazy and had been
behaving strangely for one (1) year before the incident.

Barangay Captain Apuya, on the other hand, stated that he already knew that
appellant was mentally ill because in two (2) instances, three. (3) months prior to
the incident, he saw him singing, dancing and clapping his hands in their yard.
Witness Ernesto Anical stated further that on the day of the incident appellant was
not in his right senses as he saw him sharpening his bolo with his eyes red and
looking very sharp. Barangay Tanod Felipe also testified that appellant had been
behaving oddly and was somewhat crazy as he saw him ten (10) days before the
incident singing and talking to himself.

But before the trial could prosper, the presiding judge received a letter from the
provincial warden asking for the recommitment of appellant to the BGHMC
because of his unstable mental condition. Upon the assurance of Dr. Caducoy he
was eventually allowed to testify.

In his testimony he claimed he did not recall the hacking incident but recalled
seeing his children days before the incident; that he was brought by the authorities
to jail; he thumb marked a form given in jail; and came to know of his wife's death
when his father told him while he was in jail and that he did not know the Brgy.
Capt when he was asked about his wife's affair.

Trial Court: held that the crime committed was parricide it did not consider insanity
as a defense and held that witnesses’ testimony indicated a mental abnormality
and no expert witness was presented to testify on his insanity.

Appellant Florendo now contends that the trial court erred in not acquitting him on
the ground of insanity; for appreciating cruelty instead as an aggravating
circumstance in the commission of the crime.

ISSUE:
W/N Imong should be acquitted based on Insanity

RULING/RATIONALE:
The Court rejects the plea of insanity. Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1, of The
Revised Penal Code exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, i.e., appellant is deprived of reason; he acts without the least
discernment because of complete absence of the power to discern; or, there is a
total deprivation of freedom of the will. The onus probandi rests upon him who
invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance, and he must prove it by clear and
convincing evidence

The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not
susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man would know what goes on in
the mind of another, the state or condition of a person’s mind can only be
measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused
requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately
acquainted with appellant, or who has rational basis to conclude that appellant was
insane based on the witness’ own perception of appellant, or who is qualified as an
expert, such as a psychiatrist.

The first four (4) witnesses of the prosecution were one in alleging that appellant
was crazy and had lost his mind as they noticed him to be behaving oddly, i.e.,
singing, dancing and talking to himself. The fact that a person behaves crazily is
not conclusive that he is insane. he prevalent meaning of the word "crazy" is not
synonymous with the legal terms "insane," "non compos mentis," "unsound mind,"
"idiot," or "lunatic." The popular conception of the word "crazy" is being used to
describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary. A man may behave in
a crazy manner but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally
so.

The evidence adduced consisting of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses

that appellant was insane immediately before or on the day the crime was
committed consisted merely of assumptions, and is too speculative, presumptive
and conjectural to be convincing. Their observation that appellant manifested
unusual behavior does not constitute sufficient proof of his insanity because not
every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity hence
exempting.
Well-settled is the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should
relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is
committed.

The medical findings of the BGHMC, which diagnosed appellant’s mental disorder
as schizophrenic psychosis, paranoid type, refer to appellant’s treatment after the
incident happened. It is bereft of any proof that appellant was completely deprived
of intelligence or discernment at the time or at the very moment he killed his wife. It
is inconclusive as to whether he was insane at the time immediately preceding or
at the very moment of the killing.

In compliance with this Court’s Resolution of 15 August 2000, an evaluation of the

psychological and psychiatric condition of appellant was conducted by the
Supreme Court Clinic Services at the National Penitentiary on 22 August 2000.
The neuro-psychiatric evaluation report disclosed that appellant was suffering from
psychosis or insanity, classified as chronic schizophrenia, paranoid type. It divulged
further that "prior to the onset of the overt psychotic symptoms, appellant
manifested unusual behavior prior to the commission of the crime of parricide
described as fearfulness, irritability, suspiciousness and jealousy or preoccupation
with the fidelity of his wife. In retrospect, this group of symptoms could have
possibly been the prodromal phase heralding the onset of the psychotic illness."
The report revealed that symptoms of appellant’s mental illness were conceivably
manifested prior to the date of the crime and that substantial evidence was lacking
to conclude that his abnormal behavior was due to the use of drugs or any
prohibited substance.

As can be gleaned from the reports, appellant could only be undergoing the
percursory stages of a disease prior to and at the time of the killing. It is, therefore,
beyond cavil that assuming that he had some form of mental illness by virtue of the
premonitory symptoms of schizophrenia, it did not totally deprive him of
intelligence. The presence of his reasoning faculties, which enabled him to
exercise sound judgment and satisfactorily articulate certain matters such as his
jealousy over the supposed infidelity of his wife, sufficiently discounts any
intimation of insanity when he committed the dastardly crime.

At any rate, even if cruelty is proved, it cannot be appreciated against appellant to

raise the penalty to death as this was not alleged in the Information. Under Sec. 9,
Rule 110, of The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on 1
December 2000, aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information or
complaint, otherwise, they cannot be properly appreciated. Being favorable to
appellant, this procedural rule must be given retroactive application.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the conviction of accused-appellant GUILLERMO FLORENDO
alias IMONG of parricide under Art. 246 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Sec. 5, of RA 7659, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he should
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, instead of death. He is further ordered to
pay the heirs of his wife, the deceased Erlinda Ragudo Florendo, the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death, and to pay the costs.
 B. Presumptions (Rule 131, Sections 2 to 6; Child Witness Examination Rule,
Sec. 6; REE, Rule 2, Sec. 1(j) in re Rule 6, Sec. 3, and Rule 2, Sec. 1(e) in re
Rule 6, Sec. 4; DNA Evidence Rule, Sec. 9)

B.1. Conclusive Presumption (Rule 131, Sec. 2)

Cases:

1. Midway Maritime and Technological Foundation v. Castro, G.R.

No. 189061, August 6, 2014

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Manio, Marc Sam Stephen D.

CASE TITLE:
Midway Maritime and Technological Foundation v. Castro, G.R. No. 189061, August
6, 2014

RULE:
Rule 131, Sec. 2

DOCTRINE:
Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court prohibits a tenant from denying the
title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord
and tenant between them.

It is settled that once a contract of lease is shown to exist between the parties, the
lessee cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption
that the lessor has a valid title to or a better right of possession to the subject
premises than the lessee.

FACTS:
The petitioner Midway Maritime Foundation is the lessee of two parcels of land. Its
president, Dr. Manglicmot is married to Adoracion, who is the registered owner of
the property.

Inside said property stands a residential building owned by the respondents.

The respondents alleged that Manglicmot, who was the President of the petitioner,
leased the building from the mother of the respondents. The respondents prayed
that they be declared as the owners of the residential building, and that the
petitioner be ordered to vacate the same and pay rent arrearages and damages.

Petitioner disputes and denies the ownership of the respondents.

According to the petitioner, it is Adoracion who actually owns the residential
building having bought the same from her father Tomas, who, in turn, bought it in
an auction sale.

ISSUE:
1. Whether petitioner lessee may deny he ownership of the respondents lessor

RULING/RATIONALE:
No.

It is settled that once a contract of lease is shown to exist between the parties, the
lessee cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption
that the lessor has a valid title to or a better right of possession to the subject
premises than the lessee.

Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court prohibits a tenant from denying the
title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord
and tenant between them.

In his case, the petitioner's basis for insisting on Adoracion’s ownership dates back
to the latter’s purchase of the two parcels of land from her father, Tomas. It was
Tomas who bought the property in an auction sale by Union Bank in 1993 and
leased the same to the petitioner in the same year. Note must be made that the
petitioner's president, Manglicmot, is the husband of Adoracion and son-in-law of
Tomas.

It is not improbable that at the time the petitioner leased the residential building
from the respondents’ mother in 1993, it was aware of the circumstances
surrounding the sale of he wo parcels of land and the nature of the respondents’
claim over the residential house

Yet, the petitioner still chose to lease the building. Consequently, the petitioner is
now estopped from denying the respondents’ title over the residential building.

More importantly, the respondents’ ownership of the residential building is already

an established fact.

“Nemo dat quod non habet. One can sell only what one owns or is authorized to
sell, and the buyer can acquire no more right than what the seller can transfer
legally.
It must be pointed out that what Tomas bought from Union Bank in the auction
sale were the two parcels of land originally owned and mortgaged by CCC to
Bancom, and which mortgage was later assigned by Bancom to Union Bank.

Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, the property subject of the mortgage and
consequently the auction sale pertains only to these two parcels of land and did
not include the residential house.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Bersamin,* Villarama, Jr., and Mendoza,** JJ., concur.

2. Spouses Manzanilla v. Waterfields Industries Corp., G.R. No.

177484, July 18, 2014

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Davelyn Camille C. Rosales

CASE TITLE: Spouses Manzanilla v. Waterfields Industries Corp., G.R. No.

177484, July 18, 2014

RULE:
RULE 131
Section 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following are instances of
conclusive presumptions:

Whenever a party has, by his or her own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally
and deliberately led to another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon
such belief, he or she cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or
omission, be permitted to falsify it; and

The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his or her landlord at the time of
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (2a)

DOCTRINE:

Under the doctrine of estoppel, an admission or representation is

rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon. A party may not go back on
his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party who
relied upon them. In the law of evidence, whenever a party has, by his own
declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to
believe a particular thing [to be] true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot,
in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted
to falsify it.

FACTS:

The Spouses Manzanilla are the owners of a parcel of land in Batangas. On May
24, 1994, they leased a portion of their property to Waterfields, as represented by
its President Aliza R. Ma.

On June 6, 1994, the parties executed an amendment to the Contract. However,

beginning April 1997, Waterfields failed to pay the monthly rental so President Ma
sent the spouses a letter dated July 7, 1997, indicating that she promise to pay
rentals in arrears and agreed to pay advance rental and shall pay rentals on or
before the 10th day of each month and that the deposit stipulated in their lease
contract shall be used exclusively for the payment of unpaid utilities, if any, and
other incidental expenses only and applied at the termination of lease.

On July 30, 1998, the spouses filed before the MTC a Complaint for Ejectment
against Waterfields. They alleged that they entered into a Contract of Lease with
Waterfields on May 24, 1994 (paragraph 4) and that the same was amended on
June 6, 1994 and July 9, 1997.

Waterfields admitted paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Complaint. It claimed that it did not
fail or refuse to pay the monthly rentals but was just utilizing the rental deposit in
the amount of P216,000 (equivalent to one year rentals) as rental payment. It
argued that the spouses have no cause of action against it.

Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) ruled in favor of the spouses, ordering Waterfields
to vacate the property and pay the unpaid rentals.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MTC's decision.

However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision, ruling that the rental
deposit should have been used to cover the unpaid rentals, resulting in
compensation between the parties. The CA held that the spouses had no cause of
action against Waterfields.

The spouses filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Waterfields can contradict its judicial admission that the Contract
was amended on July 9, 1997.

RULING/RATIONALE:

No. Waterfields cannot now contradict its judicial admission that the Contract of Lease
was amended on July 9, 1997; the doctrine of estoppel likewise bars it from falsifying
Ma’s July 9,1997 letter in this litigation.

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission
may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made. "A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the
pleadings, (b) during trial, either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or
(c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding."

Here, paragraph 5 of the Complaint alleges:

5. That, subsequently, the said Contract of Lease was amended on 06 June

1994 and on 09 July 1997x x x.
Whereas, paragraph 2 of Waterfields’ Answer reads:
2. Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the Complaint are admitted.

Clearly, Waterfields admitted in its Answer the truth of the material allegation that the
Contract of Lease was amended on July 9, 1997. "It is well settled that judicial
admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party [itself] and binds
the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru
palpable mistake (as in this case), no amount of rationalization can offset it." Moreover,
"[u]nder the doctrine of estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against
the person relying thereon. A party may not go back on his own acts and
representations to the prejudice of the other party who relied upon them. In the law of
evidence, whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally
and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing [to be] true, and to act upon
such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission,
be permitted to falsify it."

In view of these, any effort on the part of Waterfields to impugn the July 9, 1997 letter
is futile.

Even without the above-mentioned admission of Waterfields, the contemporaneous

and subsequent acts of the parties reveal their intention to amend the original Contract
of Lease.

Article 1371 of the Civil Code provides that "to judge the intention of the contracting
parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered."
"[I]n doing so, the courts may consider the relations existing between the parties and
the purpose of the contract."

As aptly opined by the MTC, the intention of Waterfields in coming up with the July 9,
1997 letter is to repress its violation of the contract since at that time it was already in
default in the payment of rent since April 1997. Hence, aside from promising to pay its
rental arrears from April 1997 to July 1997, Waterfields, in order to assuage the
spouses Manzanilla, likewise pledged to pay rent in advance starting August 1997.
More significantly, it undertook to amend the original contract by stating that the rental
deposit shall be used exclusively for payment of unpaid utilities and incidental
expenses. Clearly, Waterfields intended to give the spouses Manzanilla extra
advantage by virtue of the said letter amendment. This is considering that during those
times, the said spouses may at any time opt to enforce their right to eject Waterfields
from the premises since Waterfields was then admittedly in default. Obviously,
Waterfields got what it wanted as it was not ejected from the premises and instead, its
payment in arrears was accepted by the spouses Manzanilla. On the other hand, the
spouses Manzanilla, by so doing, agreed to the amendment as contained in the July 9,
1997 letter and was supposed to enjoy the advantage of receiving advanced rental
payment and of applying the rental deposit only against the unpaid utilities and
incidental expenses. Plainly, both parties expected to benefit from the July 9, 1997
letter such that their intention to give effect to the same, including the part that amends
the original contract which is the one in issue in this case, is evident.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 15, 2006
and Resolution dated April 12, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60010
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated July 14, 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 in Civil Case No. 00-96228, which affinned the
Decision dated May 7, 1999 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 in Civil
Case No. 160443-CV granting the Complaint, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

3. NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association v. NAPOCOR, G.R.

No. 156208, June 30, 2014

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: BATALON, FRANK ROSS GENE

CASE TITLE: NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association v. NAPOCOR, G.R. No.
156208, June 30, 2014

RULE: Rule 131 Section 2 – Conclusive presumptions. – The following are

instances of conclusive presumption:
a) Whenever a party has, by his or her own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally
and deliberately led to another to believe a particular thing is true, and to act upon
such belief, he or she cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or
omission, be permitted to falsify it; and

b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his or her landlord at the time of
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (2a)

DOCTRINE: In estoppel, a party creating an appearance of fact, which is false, is

bound by that appearance as against another person who acted in good faith on
[the representation made]. Estoppel is based on public policy, fair dealing, good
faith and justice. Its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act,
representations, or commitments to the injury of one who reasonably relied
thereon. It springs from equity, and is designed to aid the law in the administration
of justice where without its aid, injustice might result.

FACTS: The Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) was enacted to ordain
reforms in the electric power industry, including the privatization of the assets and
liabilities of the NPC. Pursuant to this objective, the said law created the National
Power Board (NPB) consisting of nine (9) heads of agencies as members.

When the EPIRA mandated the NPC's privatization and subsequent restructuring,
the law, when it took effect on June 26, 2001, had already contemplated the
termination of all NPC employees as a logical effect of its mandate. The resolutions
on the termination of employees occurred in the following manner:

November 2002 - The NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125 were issued
directing the termination from service of all NPC employees effective January 31,
2003.
December 2002 - The petitioners filed a petition for injunction78 with the Court
assailing NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125.

January and March 2003 - The NPC issued NPB Resolution No. 2003-1179 and
2003-09 amending the date of termination from employment of NPC employees
wherein it was included that all NPC personnel shall be at the close of office
hours/shift schedule of February 28, 2003.

August 2003 - The NPC filed its Comment82 to the petition acknowledging that the
petitioners filed the injunction to prevent massive unemployment resulting in the
implementation of the assailed NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125.

April 2005 - The NPC filed a Memorandum84 admitting that all NPC employees are
covered by the nullified NPB Resolutions.

September 2006 - These resolutions were declared void by the Court as they were
not passed by majority of NPB’s members, 6 out of 9 are not the secretaries but
only representatives. It was ordered that petitioners are entitled to separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement, plus back wages and other wage adjustments, less
separation pay already received by virtue of the restructuring plan because they
were illegally dismissed.

November 2006 and March 2007- The NPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the September 26, 2006 Decision alleging that the nullified NPB Resolutions would
entail a financial liability (P4,701,354,073.00), representing the backwages and
wage adjustments of employees stating the huge financial liability it would shoulder
because of the nullified NPB resolutions.

The NPC insists that only 16 employees (all belonging to the executive/VP levels
and above) were actually separated from their employment on January 31, 2003
pursuant to NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125, which were nullified by
the Court in its September 26, 2006 Decision.

ISSUE: WON the NPC is estopped from claiming that not all NPC employees are
covered by the Court’s final rulings

RULING/RATIONALE: Yes, NPC is estopped from claiming that not all NPC
employees were covered by the Court’s final rulings.

The NPC having represented that all NPC employees were affected by the nullified
NPB resolutions, and aware of NPB resolutions amending the date of actual
termination from employment of the majority of NPC employees which it omitted to
disclose, is now estopped from assailing the implementation of our final rulings.
The representations of the NPC, as embodied in its pleadings, necessarily bind it
under the principle of estoppel.

In estoppel, a party creating an appearance of fact, which is false, is bound by that

appearance as against another person who acted in good faith on [the
representation made]. Estoppel is based on public policy, fair dealing, good faith
and justice. Its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act,
representations, or commitments to the injury of one who reasonably relied
thereon. It springs from equity, and is designed to aid the law in the administration
of justice where without its aid, injustice might result.
(1) After the filing of the petition on December 16, 2002, the NPC issued NPB
Resolution No. 2003-11 (dated January 22, 2003) and NPC Circular No.
2003-09 (dated March 24, 2003) amending the date of actual termination from
employment of NPC employees;
(2) The NPC did not deny the petitioners allegation in their petition that the
nullified NPB resolutions affected about 5,648 employees and officials of the
NPC, 2,370 of whom would be displaced due to NPC restructuring;95
(3) The NPC represented in its Comment and Memorandum that the nullified
NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125 affected all NPC employees;
(4) The NPC, in its first and second motions for reconsideration, represented
that it would shoulder financial liability amounting to P4,701,354,073.00,
representing the backwages and wage adjustments of employees;
(5) The NPC did not file a motion for reconsideration or otherwise inform the
Court of its change in position despite its receipt of the September 17, 2008
Resolution; and
(6) The NPC allowed to lapse into finality our final rulings that we rendered
based on the consideration that all NPC employees were separated from
employment under the nullified NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves

to: GRANT the petitioners� Manifestation with Ex-Parte Very Urgent Motion to
Summarily Cite Respondents and their Counsels in Contempt of Court dated
January 5, 2010. The National Power Corporation and the Office of the Solicitor
General are separately found guilty of INDIRECT CONTEMPT and are hereby
ORDERED to each pay a FINE in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00).

DENY the National Power Corporation�s Motion for Reconsideration (of the
Resolution dated 2 December 2009) with Motion to Refer Case en consulta to the
Court en banc dated 18 December 2009 (Pending Reconsideration of NPC�s
Motion for Reconsideration);

DENY the National Power Corporation�s Very Urgent Plea to Defer Execution of
Resolution dated 2 December 2009 (Pending Resolution of NPC�s Motion for
Reconsideration) and for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (To Enjoin
Implementation of the Ex-Officio Sheriff�s Garnishment of NPC Funds) dated 5
January 2010;

DENY the National Power Corporation�s Very Urgent Motion to Direct the
Ex-Officio Sheriff Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele and Sheriffs Rolando G. Acal, Pedro L.
Borja and Edgar R. Lucas to Show Cause as to Why They Should Not Be Cited in
Contempt dated December 29, 2009.

DENY the PSALM�s Motion for Reconsideration of the December 2, 2009

Resolution (with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or to hold in abeyance the Implementation of the Decision dated 26 September
2006) dated December 4, 2009.

Costs against respondent National Power Corporation.

4. Ermitaño v. Paglas, G.R. No. 174436, January 23, 2013, 689

SCRA 158
 EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: DAYRIT, ROSSLYN A.

CASE TITLE:
G.R. No. 174436 January 23, 2013
JUANITA ERMITAÑO, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, ISABELO
ERMITAÑO, Petitioner,
vs.
LAILANIE M. PAGLAS, Respondent.

RULE:
RULE 131, SECTION 2 (b)
Section 2. Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive
presumptions:
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his or her landlord at the time of
the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.

DOCTRINE:
What a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is
alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation,
the presumption will not apply. Hence, the tenant may show that the landlord's title
has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to
deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount. In the
present case, what respondent is claiming is her supposed title to the subject
property which she acquired subsequent to the commencement of the
landlord-tenant relation between her and petitioner. Hence, the presumption under
Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply.

FACTS:
● Petitioner Juanita Ermitaño leased a residential lot and house to
respondent Lailanie Paglas for one year.
● The property was later discovered to have been mortgaged by the
petitioner and subsequently foreclosed by Charlie Yap.
● The respondent bought the property from Yap, but it was still subject to the
petitioner's right of redemption.
● The petitioner demanded payment of unpaid rentals and vacation of the
premises, but the respondent ignored the letters.
● The petitioner filed an unlawful detainer case against the respondent in the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Davao City.
● The MTCC dismissed the case and awarded the respondent attorney's fees
and appearance fee. RTC and CA affirmed the dismissal of the case.
● In the instant petition, petitioner's basic postulate in her first and second
assigned errors is that she remains the owner of the subject property.
Based on her contract of lease with respondent, petitioner insists that
respondent is not permitted to deny her title over the said property in
accordance with the provisions of Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE: WON the tenant can deny the title of her landlord in this case.
RULING/RATIONALE: YES
It is clear from the abovequoted provision that what a tenant is estopped from
denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the
landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been
acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the presumption will
not apply. Hence, the tenant may show that the landlord's title has expired or been
conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if
he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount. In the present case, what
respondent is claiming is her supposed title to the subject property which she
acquired subsequent to the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation between
her and petitioner. Hence, the presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court does not apply. The foregoing notwithstanding, even if respondent is
not estopped from denying petitioner's claim for rent, her basis for such denial,
which is her subsequent acquisition of ownership of the disputed property, is
nonetheless, an insufficient excuse from refusing to pay the rentals due to
petitioner.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 77617, dated September 8, 2004 and August 16, 2006, respectively, are
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) respondent is ORDERED to
pay petitioner ₱108,000.00 as and for unpaid rentals; (2) the award of attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses to respondent is DELETED. SO ORDERED.

5. PNB v. Sps. Reblando, G.R. No. 194014, September 12, 2012

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Reinier P. Garcia

CASE TITLE: PNB v. Sps. Reblando, G.R. 194014, September 12, 2012

RULE: Section 2 Rule 131. Conclusive presumptions.

DOCTRINE:
The real estate mortgage (REM), it bears to stress, having been notarized, is a
public document, thus accorded the benefit of certain presumptions. Being a public
document, it enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the
truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and
due execution. To overcome this presumption, there must be clear and convincing
evidence. Absent such evidence, as in this case, the presumption must be upheld.

FACTS:
On January 28, 1992, respondents, spouses Alejandro and Myrna Reblando
(collectively, the Reblandos), obtained a one hundred and fifty thousand-peso (PhP
150,000) loan from PNB. To secure the payment of the loan, the Reblandos
executed a real estate mortgage (REM) over two (2) parcels of land, the first
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-40839 and the second by Tax
Declaration (TD) No. 59006 and designated as Cadastral Lot No. 10 (Lot No. 10).
TCT No. T-40839 was then registered in the name of Letecia Reblando-Bartolome,
who earlier executed a Special Power of Attorney, authorizing Alejandro, her
brother, to utilize the lot covered by the title as collateral to secure a loan not
exceeding PhP 150,000.

A few years later, the parties agreed to up the loan value from PhP 150,000 to PhP
260,000. They then executed an "Amendment to Real Estate Mortgage" on
January 4, 1995, reflecting the increase in the loan accommodation.

Barely two weeks after, or on January 26, 1995, the parties again agreed to
another increase, this time to PhP 312,000 and executed for the purpose a second
"Amendment to Real Estate Mortgage."

Later developments saw the Reblandos defaulting in the payment of their loan
obligation, prompting the PNB to commence extra-judicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. At the foreclosure sale, the PNB, as lone bidder, was awarded the lots
for its bid.

Subsequently, the RTC, acting on PNB s ex parte petition, issued an Order

granting a writ of possession.

On May 10, 2000, the Reblandos filed a complaint before the RTC, seeking, as
their main prayer, the declaration of nullity of the mortgage over Lot No. 10
allegedly constituted on January 13, 1995 when PNB and the Reblandos executed
the "Amendment to Real Estate Mortgage." According to them, they could not have
validly created a mortgage over Lot No. 10, not being the owner when the
mortgage was constituted.

PNB countered and contended that, on February (should be January) 28, 1992, the
Reblandos, via a contract of REM of even date, already conveyed by way of
mortgage Lot No. 10 covered by TD No. 59006, inclusive of the Reblandos
possessory and other rights. As an affirmative defense, PNB raised the issue of
estoppel.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Reblandos. CA affirmed the appealed Decision of the
RTC. The CA also rejected the PNB's posture on estoppel. Inasmuch as PNB
knew from the very beginning that the Reblandos were not the absolute owners of
Lot No. 10, it cannot, according to the appellate court, set up the defense of
estoppel against them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not both parcels of land were mortgage simultaneously.

RULING/RATIONALE:
First, on its face, the REM shows that it was executed on January 28, 1992.
Second, the January 28, 1992 REM contract specifically covered, as collaterals,
two parcels of land, albeit the second collateral was reflected in the supplemental
page of the contract, which page respondents neglected or indeed omitted to
attach to their basic complaint, whether purposely or not. That respondents did not
include said supplemental page is buttressed by a simple annotation at the bottom
of the last page of their Annex “A” (pertaining to the REM), reading: “ADDITIONAL
COLLATERAL AT THE SUPPLEMENTAL PAGE.” Without explanation,
respondents cannot plausibly deny that it referred to Lot No. 10. The “Amendment
to REM,” executed and signed by the parties on January 26, 1995, made a
cross-reference to the January 28, 1992 REM contract and the properties
mortgaged.

And lest it be overlooked, the mortgage over Lot No. 10 is reflected in TD No.
59006 filed by Alejandro for tax purposes, through an annotation by stamp-mark,
signed by City Assessor Angel S. Daproza, dated January 29, 1992, the day after
the execution of the REM contract.

When the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, as in this case, it
is, under the rules on evidence, considered as containing all the terms agreed
upon. Respondents have not presented evidence to contradict the stipulations in
the contract.

The REM, it bears to stress, having been notarized, is a public document, thus
accorded the benefit of certain presumptions. Being a public document, it enjoys
the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts
stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution. To
overcome this presumption, there must be clear and convincing evidence. Absent
such evidence, as in this case, the presumption must be upheld.

Given the above perspective, the Court accords full credence to the proposition
that both parcels of land in question were simultaneously mortgaged on January
28, 1992.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition Is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the appealed Decision and Resolution dated June 24, 2010 and
August 24, 2010, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 79987 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Real Estate Mortgage constituted over Lot No. 10 is hereby
declared VALID. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately vacate the property
and to surrender its possession to petitioner PNB.

B.2. Disputable Presumptions (Rule 131, Sec. 3)

Cases:

(a)
1. People v. Lagahit, G.R. No. 200877, November 12, 2014

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: BATALON, FRANK ROSS GENE

CASE TITLE: People v. Lagahit, G.R. No. 200877, November 12, 2014

RULE: Rule 131, Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following

presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;

DOCTRINE: The right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
is guaranteed under Section 14(2), Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. This fundamental right of the accused is also embodied under Section
2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,17 which specifically states that "in a criminal
case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree
of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral
certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.

FACTS: Two criminal charges were filed against Charve John Lagahit, one for
selling to a poseur-buyer 0.49 grams of marijuana (4 handrolled sticks) and
another for possession of 0.88 grams of marijuana (8 handrolled sticks). He
pleaded not guilty to both informations.

Prosecution witness PO3 Lawas Jr testified that they conducted a buy-bust

operation against Lagahit after reports in Brgy Lahug in Cebu about the Lagahit's
selling of illegal drugs near the stairway of the flyover. Most of his customers were
students of the night high school of Brgy Lahug. They used marked money and a
trusted informant acted as poseur buyer who took down his bull cap as signal of
the consummation of the sale.

Appellant Lagahit testified that he was waiting for a friend and 3 persons out of
nowhere and for no reason arrested him. He resisted arrest but a gun was pointed
at the back of his head. When he was brought to the barangay hall, the arresting
officers told him they found the sticks inside his pocket. He denied owning them.

Lagahit contends that the sole witness (PO3 Lawas Jr) never testified as to
how he was able to recover the 4 sticks of marijuana and so the prosecution
failed to prove the identity of the corpus delicti.

RTC convicted him and sentenced him to life imprisonment. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: WON Lagahit's guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING/RATIONALE: No, Guilt not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Lagahit is presumed innocent until proven guilty under Article III Section
14(2) of constitution and Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which
states: In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his
guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error,
produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that degree
of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

Elements for prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs like marijuana:

1. identities of buyer and seller, the object, and consideration
2. delivery of the thing sold and payment for it

Elements for prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs like

marijuana:
1. accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified
as a prohibited drug
2. possession is not authorized by law
3. accused freely and consciously possessed the drug

Since the drug is the corpus delicti of the crime, it must be identified and the
chain of custody must be observed. Chain of custody is defined in Section
1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, that
implements the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002:

"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt
in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity
and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the
date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

In People v. Gatlabayan citing People v. Kamad, this Court enumerated the links
that the prosecution must establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
situation to be as follows: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second,
the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic
chemist to the court.
In this case, prosecution evidence failed to show the essential links in the chain
of custody (even though prosecution proved the identities of the seller and
buyer). In particular, prosecution failed to show how the 4 sticks came into the
hands of PO3 Lawas Jr from the trusted informant/poseur-buyer. (After the
exchange of money and the bull cap signal from the informant, another person
approached Lagahit and they walked towards opposite side of road. PO3 Lawas
and the brgy tanods followed them until they apprehended Lagahit and
searched him which led to the recovery of 8 more sticks, the mared 20peso bill,
and cash (90pesos). Thereafter Lagahit was brought to the brgy hall and then
to the police station. All the seized items remained with PO3 Lawas until they
reached the police stations where the items were marked.

There was no mention how the four sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes,
which were the subject of the sale transaction, came into the hands ofPO3
Lawas, Jr. from the trusted informant. PO3 Lawas, Jr.’s testimony was lacking as
to when, where and how the said four sticks of handrolled marijuanacigarettes
sold by the appellant to the trusted informant were turned over to him by the
latter. In the same manner, PO3 Lawas,Jr. failed to state that he actually
seized the sold four sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes.
Considering that PO3 Lawas, Jr. was not the poseur-buyer and he was not even
with the poseur buyer during the sale transaction as he was on the opposite
side of the road, the turning over to him by the trusted informant of the four
sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes sold by the appellant was the
supposed first link in the chain of custody. Given this missing link, reasonable
doubt arises as to the first charge (selling of marijuana).

As for the possession case, prosecution satisfied the elements of the crime but
they failed to show that the apprehending team complied with the required
procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered dangerous drugs set forth in Section 21, ArticleII of Republic Act
No. 9165. The specific procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs
have been laid down under the Implementing Rules and Regulations for
Republic Act No. 9165, particularly Section 21(a), Article II thereof, and it is the
prosecution’s burden to adduce evidence that these procedures have
been complied with in proving the elements of the offense.

In this case, records don't show any physical inventory or photograph of

confiscated items. Even the marking wasn't shown to have been done in his
presence. While non-compliance with Section 21 may not be fatal as long as
there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team, these conditions, however, were not met in the present
case.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated 17 March 2011 in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC. No. 000867, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant CHARVE JOHN LAGAHIT is hereby
ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt, and is ordered to be immediately
RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.

(b)
2. Recuerdo v. People, G.R. No. 168217, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA
517

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Liwag, Eleanor

CASE TITLE: Recuerdo v. People, G.R. No. 168217, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA
517

Joy Lee Recuerdo, Petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines, Respondent.

RULE: Disputable Presumptions (Rule 131, Sec. 3)

DOCTRINE:
Estafa is a felony committed by dolo (with malice). For one to be criminally liable
for estafa under paragraph (2)(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, malice
and specific intent to defraud are required.

General criminal intent is an element of all crimes but malice is properly applied
only to deliberate acts done on purpose and with design. Evil intent must unite with
an unlawful act for there to be a felony. A deliberate and unlawful act gives rise to a
presumption of malice by intent. On the other hand, specific intent is a definite and
actual purpose to accomplish some particular thing.

The general criminal intent is presumed from the criminal act and in the absence of
any general intent is relied upon as a defense, such absence must be proved by
the accused. Generally, a specific intent is not presumed. Its existence, as a matter
of fact, must be proved by the State just as any other essential element. This may
be shown, however, by the nature of the act, the circumstances under which it was
committed, the means employed and the motive of the accused.

FACTS:
Petitioner Recuerdo was charged with the crime of Estafa under Art. 315 of
Revised Penal Code.

The said accused, with intent to gain and by means of deceit, false pretenses and
fraudulent manifestations, and pretending to have sufficient funds with the Unitrust,
PCI Bank, and Prudential Bank, make and issue checks amounting to P132,000,
P78,000, and P600,000, to complaining witness Yolanda G. Floro, who is engaged
in the business of buying and selling of jewelry, as payment for jewelry she
obtained from the said complainant.

Upon presentment of the said checks with the said bank for encashment, the same
were dishonored and refused payment for having been drawn against an “Account
Closed”, and in spite of repeated demands to deposit with the said bank, the said
accused failed and refused to do so.

Petitioner argues that she acted in good faith when she made monthly cash
payments to lessen her civil liability, and continued to make payments even during
the pendency of the case in CA. She also contends that her failure to comply with
obligations does not suggest deceit but at best only financial hardship, thus there is
no factual and legal basis to convict her of estafa. And that there can be no
embezzlement if the mind of the person doing the act is innocent or if there is no
wrongful purpose.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is guilty of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the
RPC

RULING/RATIONALE:
Yes, Recuerdo committed the crime of estafa.

Elements of estafa were concretely established through convincing evidence:

Postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted
simultaneously at the time the check was issued; the postdating or issuance was done
when the offender had no funds in the bank, or that his funds deposited therein were
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and damage to the payee thereof.

Estafa is a felony committed by dolo (with malice). For one to be criminally liable
for estafa under paragraph (2)(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, malice
and specific intent to defraud are required.

General criminal intent is an element of all crimes but malice is properly applied
only to deliberate acts done on purpose and with design. Evil intent must unite with
an unlawful act for there to be a felony. A deliberate and unlawful act gives rise to a
presumption of malice by intent. On the other hand, specific intent is a definite and
actual purpose to accomplish some particular thing.

The general criminal intent is presumed from the criminal act and in the absence of
any general intent is relied upon as a defense, such absence must be proved by
the accused. Generally, a specific intent is not presumed. Its existence, as a matter
of fact, must be proved by the State just as any other essential element. This may
be shown, however, by the nature of the act, the circumstances under which it was
committed, the means employed and the motive of the accused.

The law provides that, in estafa, prima facie evidence of deceit is established upon
proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover
his check within three (3) days from receipt of the notice of dishonor for lack or
insufficiency of funds. A prima facie evidence need not be rebutted by a
preponderance of evidence, nor by evidence of greater weight. The evidence of the
accused which equalizes the weight of the People’s evidence or puts the case in
equipoise is sufficient. As a result, the People will have to go forward with the
proof. Should it happen that, at the trial the weight of evidence is equally balanced
or at equilibrium and the presumption operates against the People who has the
burden of proof, it cannot prevail.

While it is true that nine of the 17 postdated checks petitioner issued and delivered
to the private complainant were honored by the drawee banks, such a
circumstance is not a justification for her acquittal of the charges relative to the
dishonored checks. The reimbursement or restitution to the offended party of the
sums swindled by the petitioner does not extinguish the criminal liability of the
latter. It only extinguishes pro tanto the civil liability.

Deceit was evident; burn checks were issued to Floro in order to induce here to
part with the pieces of jewelry in favor of the petitioner.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the

Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs.

(c)
3. Racines v. Morallos, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1698, March 3, 2008, 547
SCRA 295

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Madlambayan, Joyce Ann V.

CASE TITLE: Racines v. Morallos, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1698, March 3, 2008, 547
SCRA 295
JAIME RACINES, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE P. MORALLOS and SHERIFF III BENJAMIN CABUSAO, JR.,
Respondents.

RULE: B.2. Disputable Presumptions (Rule 131, Sec. 3)

(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his or her voluntary act;

DOCTRINE: It is presumed that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his

voluntary act and unless the requirements for proper substitution were made, a
lawyer enjoys the presumption of authority given him by his client.

FACTS:
1. Racines filed a Complaint against Judge Morallos and Sheriff Cabusao of
the MTC Branch 68 of Pasig City, for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, other deceits, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, violation of Article 32 of the New Civil Code, Section 1, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
2. The Court, finding the evaluation of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) to be in accord with law and the facts on record, affirmed its
recommendation and dismissed Racines’s complaint in the Resolution
dated November 22, 2004. The Court held that there was nothing in the
records to show that Judge Morallos was moved by improper motive when
he rendered the decision in Civil Case No. 9681; neither was there anything
to show that Sheriff Cabusao used his position to influence the outcome of
the decision; and in any event, the proper recourse was to elevate the case
to a higher court for review, and not through an administrative case.
3. The Court, in the said resolution also directed Racines to show cause within
10 days from receipt thereof, why he should not be held in contempt of
court for filing an utterly baseless and unfounded administrative case.
4. Racines through counsel, Atty. Manalad, filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which the Court denied with finality in the Resolution for lack of substantial
argument. The Resolution likewise admonished Racines and his counsel to
desist from initiating baseless complaints.
5. Racines by himself, filed a Pagpapaliwanag claiming: the complaint and the
other documents which Atty. Manalad prepared were all written in English
and because he fully trusted Atty. Manalad, he immediately signed the
same even though Atty. Manalad did not explain it to him. Had Atty.
Manalad fully explained the documents to him, he would not have signed
the same, as he had no intention of filing a baseless administrative case
against respondents. If there was anyone who should be punished, it was
Atty. Manalad because he deceived him into filing a baseless administrative
case.

ISSUE: Whether Racines should be guilty of filing baseless administrative case

against the respondents based on what he stated in his Pagpapaliwanag.

RULING/RATIONALE: YES
It is presumed that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act and unless the requirements for proper substitution were
made, a lawyer enjoys the presumption of authority given him by his client.
Racines does not deny that the signatures in the pleadings were his. He also
does not claim that he was prevented by Atty. Manalad from reading the
contents thereof. He only said that since he fully trusted Atty. Manalad
immediately signed the documents. From the foregoing, it is clear that
Racines acquiesced and gave his stamp of approval to the pleadings filed in
court. Considering however that he is not learned in the intricacies of law,
the Court finds the penalty of reprimand with warning to be sufficient in his
case.

As to Atty. Manalad, the Court finds that a greater penalty is in order. As a member
of the bar, he should know better than to file an unfounded administrative
complaint. He is bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Rule 11.04
thereof states that a lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by
the records. Canon 11 also enjoins lawyers to observe and maintain the respect
due to courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
His claim that he filed the charges against respondent at the instance of Racines
cannot free him from liability. As the Court has pronounced, a client’s cause does
not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must
always keep in perspective that since they are administrators of justice, oath-bound
servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to
the administration of justice. As a lawyer, he is an officer of the court with the duty
to uphold its dignity and authority and not promote distrust in the administration of
justice. For violating Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court finds that a fine of five thousand pesos is proper in his case.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Court finds Jaime Racines and Atty.
Onofre D. Manalad guilty of Indirect Contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Atty. Onofre D. Manalad is ordered to pay a FINE of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS within ten (10) days from finality of herein Resolution,
while Jaime Racines is REPRIMANDED. Both are STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of a similar act may warrant a more severe action by this Court.

(d)
4. Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 208113, December 2, 2015

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: DIMARUCUT, KYLE MARCHEN

CASE TITLE:
Magdayao v. People, G.R. No. 152881, August 17, 2004, 436 SCRA 677

RULE:
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his or her concerns;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;

DOCTRINE:
● Under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the legal presumption
is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law
dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document
without first informing himself of its contents and consequences.
● Further, under Section 3 (p) of the same Rule, it is equally presumed that
private transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves every
 contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he
signs and delivers it.
● The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need
of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby
which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail.

FACTS:
Diaz faced an estafa charge for allegedly failing to return or remit the proceeds
from merchandise worth P32K received on consignment from Arcilla. Arcilla
testified that Diaz, acting as her agent, was entrusted with merchandise but only
remitted a fraction of the proceeds and ignored demands to remit the rest or return
the unsold items. Diaz, however, claimed she was a client who bought goods on
installment basis, signing blank documents as a precaution. RTC acquitted Diaz,
citing lack of evidence of intent to defraud. However, the CA ruled in favor of
Arcilla, finding that she proved her transaction with Diaz and her failure to remit the
proceeds, supported by an acknowledgment receipt. CA rejected Diaz's claim that
she signed blank documents, stating it was a precaution by Arcilla against potential
breach of obligation.

ISSUE:
Whether Diaz is civilly liable. - YES.

RULING/RATIONALE:

Under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the legal presumption is that a person
takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law dictates that the natural presumption
is that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents and
consequences.

Further, under Section 3 (p) of the same Rule, it is equally presumed that private
transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves every contracting party to learn and
know the contents of a document before he signs and delivers it.

The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting
evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is
offered, will prevail.

In this case, petitioner failed to present any evidence to controvert these presumptions.
Also, respondent's possession of the document pertaining to the obligation strongly
buttresses her claim that the same has not been extinguished. Preponderance of evidence
only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing evidence. All
things considered, the evidence in this case clearly preponderates in respondent's favor.

In upholding the civil liability of petitioner, the CA did not dwell into the purported admission
of petitioner anent her receipt of GCs in the amount of P32,000.00 as found by the RTC.
Instead, the CA hinged its ruling on the acknowledgment receipt dated February 20, 1996,
the documentary evidence that respondent had duly identified and formally offered in the
course of these proceedings.

Petitioner's claim that she was required to sign two (2) one-half sheets of paper and a trust
receipt in blank during her transactions with respondent, which she allegedly failed to
retrieve after paying her obligations, is a bare allegation that cannot be given credence. It is
well-settled that "he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is
not evidence."

Respondent was able to prove by preponderance of evidence the fact of the transaction, as
well as petitioner's failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise worth
P32,000.00, or to return the same to respondent in case such merchandise were not sold.
This was established through the presentation of the acknowledgment receipt dated
February 20, 1996, which, as the document's name connotes, shows that petitioner
acknowledged receipt from respondent of the listed items with their corresponding values,
and assumed the obligation to return the same on March 20, 1996 if not sold.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Petition is DENIED. Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

5. Sps. Manuel v. Ong, G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Siron, Kyla Marie

CASE TITLE: Sps. Manuel v. Ong, G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014

RULE: Rule 131, sec. 3(m):

SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if

uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxx

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

DOCTRINE: A sheriff’s return, if complete on its face, must be accorded the presumption
of regularity and, hence, taken to be an accurate and exhaustive recital of the
circumstances relating to the steps undertaken by a sheriff.

FACTS:
● Ong filed a complaint for accion reivindicatoria against Spouses Manuel on the
ground that petitioner constructed improvements through force, intimidation,
strategy, threats, and stealth on his property. Ong then filed An amended
complaint.
● On 3 February 2010: Summons was issued to Spouses Manuel by the Sheriff.
● The sheriff served the summons in two instances:
■ o During the first service of summons, Spouses Manuel requested
that service be made at another time due to their mother’s
condition;
■ o Second service of summons, Sandra refused to sign and receive
the summons and complaint, and was advised to file her answer
 within 15 days, but the same did not file an answer.
● In this petition, the Sps Manuel are now asserting that there was no valid service
of summons because they do not reside in the address where the summons were
served. Rather, it was Sandra’s siblings who reside there.

ISSUE: WoN there’s a valid personal service of summons by the sheriff?

RULING/RATIONALE: In this case, the sheriff's return on summons indicated that Sheriff
Joselito Sales endeavored to personally hand the summons and a copy of the complaint to
the Spouses Manuel on two (2) separate occasions. He relented from doing so on the first
occasion in deference to the medical condition of petitioner Sandra Manuel's mother. On
the second occasion, he was constrained to tender the summons and copy of the
complaint as petitioner Sandra Manuel refused to accept them.
A sheriff's return, if complete on its face, must be accorded the presumption of regularity
and, hence, taken to be an accurate and exhaustive recital of the circumstances relating to
the steps undertaken by a sheriff. In this case, the Spouses Manuel have harped on their
(self­serving) claim of maintaining residence elsewhere but failed to even allege that there
was anything irregular about the sheriff's return or that it was otherwise incomplete.

Having alleged irregularities in the service of summons, it was incumbent upon the
Spouses Manuel to adduce proof of their claims. All they mustered was their self­serving
allegation of an alternative address. If at all, this claim of maintaining residence elsewhere
should not even be lent an iota of credibility considering that, as respondent Ramon Ong
pointed out, the barangay clearances, which the Spouses Manuel themselves attached to
one of their pleadings (as proof of their identities), actually indicated that they were
residents of Bacong Loacan, Itogon, Benguet. Their lie is, thus, revealed by their own
pleading.

As the Spouses Manuel not only failed in discharging the burden of proving their
allegation but even succeeded in contradicting themselves, Sheriff Joselito Sales'
recollection of events must be taken to be true. Thus, valid personal service of summons,
via tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel, was made. From this, it follows that jurisdiction
over the persons of petitioners Benedict and Sandra Manuel was acquired by the Regional
Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet, in Civil Case No. 09­CV­2582.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

The June 28, 2012 decision and the December 19, 2012 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 119270 are AFFIRMED.

(e)
6. MCMP Construction Corp. v. Monark Equipment Corp., G.R.
No. 201001, November 10, 2014.Tarapen v. People, G.R. No.
173824, August 28, 2008, 563 SCRA 577
 EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: GUBAT, AMERAH

CASE TITLE:

MCMP Construction Corp. v. Monark Equipment Corp., G.R. No. 201001,

November 10, 2014

RULE: Section 3 (e) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court

DOCTRINE:

Failure of MCMP to present the original contract and even explain its failure, not
only justifies the presentation by a party of secondary evidence in accordance with
Section 6 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, but it also gives rise to the disputable
presumption adverse to MCMP under Section 3 (e) of Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.

FACTS: MCMP Construction Corporation (MCMP) leased heavy equipment from

Monark Equipment Corporation (Monark) for various periods in 2000. Thus,
Monark delivered five (5) pieces of heavy equipment to the project site of MCMP
evidenced by invoices as well as Documents Acknowledgment Receips, received
and signed by representatives of MCMP, namely, Jorge Samonte on December 5,
2000 and Rose Takahashi on January 29, 2001.

MCMP failed to pay the rental fees. Monark filed a suit for a Sum of Money with the
RTC. Monark presented as one of its witnesses, Reynaldo Peregrino (Peregrino),
its Senior Account Manager. Peregrino testified that there were two (2) original
copies of the Contract, one retained by Monark, while the other was given to
MCMP.

He further testified that Monark's copy had been lost and that diligent efforts to
recover the copy proved futile. Instead, Peregrino presented a photocopy of the
Contract which he personally had on file. MCMP objected to the presentation of
secondary evidence to prove the contents of the Contract arguing that there were
no diligent efforts to search for the original copy. Notably, MCMP did not present its
copy of the Contract notwithstanding the directive of the trial court to produce the
same.

The RTC issued its Decision finding for Monark, which was affirmed by the CA.

MCMP challenges the ruling of the CA arguing that the appellate court should have
disallowed the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the existence of the
Contract, following the Best Evidence Rule.

ISSUE: WON MCMP’s contention is meritorious (NO)

RULING/RATIONALE: Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:

"Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the

subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be

produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other

documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time
and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer
or is recorded in a public office. (Emphasis supplied)"

In order to prove, in Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman, the Court

set down the requirements before a party may present secondary evidence to
prove the contents of the original document whenever the original copy has been
lost:

Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of

the original, the offeror must prove the following:

(1) the existence or due execution of the original;

(2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in
court; and

(3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of
the original can be attributed.

The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.

In the case, the above requisites are present.

MCMP, has failed to present a copy of the Contract even despite the request of the
trial court for it to produce its copy of the Contract. Normal business practice
dictates that MCMP should have asked for and retained a copy of their agreement.
Thus, MCMP's failure to present the same and even explain its failure, not only
justifies the presentation by Monark of secondary evidence in accordance with
Section 6 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, but it also gives rise to the disputable
presumption adverse to MCMP under Section 3 (e) of Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced."

7. Tarapen v. People, G.R. No. 173824, August 28, 2008, 563

SCRA 577

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Almandares, Maria Ferome P.

CASE TITLE: Tarapen v. People, G.R. No. 173824, August 28, 2008, 563 SCRA 577

RULE: Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are

satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx (e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced

DOCTRINE: The adverse presumption of suppression of evidence is not applicable when

(1) the suppression is not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely
corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4) the
suppression is an exercise of a privilege.

FACTS:
At around 7AM in June 8, 2000, a dump truck driven by Jimmy Pugoy arrived at Zandueta
St., Baguio City to collect garbage. He was accompanied by petitioner and Edmon Ferrer.
During this time, vendors, including the victim James Pangoden, Molly J. Linglingen,
Silmana Linglingen, and Virginia Costales were peddling their wares along said street.
Petitioner alighted from the truck and signaled to the driver to move slowly. Despite
guiding the truck, said vehicle ran over the eggplants being sold by Virginia Costales.
Petitioner picked up the vegetables and threw them towards the place where James was.
This angered James because the flowers he was selling were soiled. An exchange of
words ensued between petitioner and James. Petitioner went to the back of the dump
truck and got a shovel. While James was facing downwards, petitioner, coming from
behind and holding the shovel with two hands, struck James on the head with the same,
causing him to fall to the ground in a squatting position. As soon as James raised his
head, petitioner hit the former’s head again with the shovel.15 Petitioner then ran away.
James was brought to the Baguio General Hospital & Medical Center (BGHMC) in a taxi.
The wife of James, Patricia Pangoden, arrived at the BGHMC and saw her husband in the
Emergency Room. Dr. Cala refused to operate on her husband, saying that it was already
hopeless. She then requested for the transfer of her husband to the Saint Louis University
(SLU) Hospital. The request was approved, and her husband was transferred to SLU.
James was operated on, and Patricia was told that her husband had no more chance to
live. She was advised to bring home James; otherwise, they would just be spending so
much. Patricia brought her husband to his hometown in La Union, where he expired on
June 10 2000.
The trial court convicted the petitioner of homicide. CA affirmed the decision with
modification.
On appeal to the SC, the defense accuses the prosecution witnesses of deliberately
suppressing material evidence favorable to the petitioner. It thus argues that it may be
safely presumed that such evidence, having been willfully suppressed, would be adverse if
produced.

ISSUE: : W/N the prosecution deliberately suppressed material evidence favorable to the
petitioner – NO

RULING/RATIONALE: The defense failed to specify which evidence was suppressed. It

simply made a general statement that the prosecution witnesses allegedly did not tell the
truth and thus deliberately suppressed material evidence favorable to the petitioner. The
adverse presumption of suppression of evidence is not applicable when (1) the
suppression is not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative
or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4) the suppression
is an exercise of a privilege. In the case at bar, the prosecution witnesses who allegedly
suppressed material evidence were presented in court and were cross-examined by the
defense counsel. How then can the defense claim there was suppression? The defense
counsel was able to question these witnesses, but failed to elicit the answer he wanted or
needed to hear for the exoneration of his client.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26636, dated 31 January 2006, is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the petitioner.

(f)
8. Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation v. Titan-Ikeda
Construction and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 126619,
December 20, 2006, 511 SCRA 335

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Cristel B. Liwanag

CASE TITLE: Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation v. Titan-Ikeda

Construction and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 126619, December 20,
2006, 511 SCRA 335

RULE: Rule 131

Section 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory
if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;

DOCTRINE: Uniwide, as the owner who did pay the contractor for such additional
works even if they had not been authorized in writing, has to establish its own right
to reimbursement not under Art. 1724, but under a different provision of law.
Uniwide’s burden of establishing its legal right to reimbursement becomes even
more crucial in the light of the general presumption in Section 3(f), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court that money paid by one to another was due to the latter.

FACTS: Three construction contracts, Project 1, Project 2, and Project 3, were

entered into by Titan and Uniwide. Titan filed an action against Uniwide with the
RTC for the non-payment of certain claims billed by Titan after completion of 3
projects covered by the said agreements. Uniwide moved for the
dismissal/suspension of the proceeding in order for them to proceed with
arbitration. Titan’s complaint was thus re-filed with the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (CIAC). Before the CIAC, Uniwide filed an answer where it
asserted that it overpaid Titan for unauthorized additional works in Project 1.

An Arbitral Tribunal was created in accordance with the CIAC Rules. The tribunal
then promulgated a Decision, declaring the following:
a. In Project 1, Uniwide is absolved of any liability.
b. In Project 2, Uniwide is absolved of any liability for VAT payment and for the
account of Titan, and Titan is absolved from liability for defective
construction.
c. In Project 3, Uniwide is held liable for unpaid balance of P5,158,364.63 plus
12% interest per annum and to pay the full VAT for the additional work
where no written authorization was presented.

Uniwide filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CIAC.
Uniwide accordingly filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which was
likewise denied by the Court of Appeals.

Hence, the current petition for review before the Supreme Court where Uniwide
alleges that it is entitled to a return of the amount it allegedly paid by mistake to
Titan for additional works done on Project 1. This refers to the P5,823,481.75 paid
by Uniwide for additional works done on Project 1 and Uniwide asserts that Titan
was not entitled to be paid this amount because the additional works were without
any written authorization.

ISSUE: Whether or not Uniwide is entitled to a return of the amount it allegedly

paid by mistake to Titan for additional works done on Project 1

RULING/RATIONALE: No. Following the general presumption in Section 3(f), Rule

131 of the Rules of Court that money paid by one to another was due to the latter,
Uniwide has the burden to establish its legal right to reimbursement. In this case,
Uniwide failed to do so. Hence, Uniwide is not entitled to a return of the amount it
allegedly paid by mistake to Titan for additional works done on Project 1

Uniwide cites Article 1724 of the New Civil Code as basis for its claim that it is not
liable to pay for additional works it did not authorize or agree upon in writing.
However, the Court explains that Article 1724 is inapplicable because Uniwide had
already paid for the additional works. The provision would have been operative had
Uniwide refused to pay for the costs of the additional works. Instead, the CA
applied Article 1423, which characterized Uniwide’s payment of the said amount as
a voluntary fulfillment of a natural obligation. The situation was characterized as
being akin to Uniwide being a debtor who paid a debt even while it knew that it was
not legally compelled to do so. As such debtor, Uniwide could no longer demand
the refund of the amount already paid.

Art. 1724 does not ipso facto accord Uniwide the right to be reimbursed for
payments already made. Therefore, Uniwide, as the owner who did pay the
contractor for such additional works even if they had not been authorized in writing,
has to establish its own right to reimbursement not under Art. 1724, but under a
different provision of law. Uniwide’s burden of establishing its legal right to
reimbursement becomes even more crucial in the light of the general
presumption in Section 3(f), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that money paid
by one to another was due to the latter.

Uniwide undertakes such a task before this Court, citing the provisions on solutio
indebiti under Arts. 2154 and 2156 of the Civil Code. However, it is not enough to
prove that the payments made by Uniwide to Titan were "not due" because there
was no prior authorization or agreement with respect to additional works. There is
a further requirement that the payment by the debtor was made either through
mistake or under a cloud of doubt. In short, for the provisions on solutio indebiti to
apply, Uniwide must be able to establish that these payments were made through
mistake. However, Uniwide is unable to direct attention to any pertinent part of the
record that would indeed establish that the payments were made by reason of
mistake.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21 February 1996 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 37957 is hereby AFFIRMED.

(g) - (kk)
9. Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 208113, December 2, 2015

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: DIMARUCUT, KYLE MARCHEN

CASE TITLE:
Magdayao v. People, G.R. No. 152881, August 17, 2004, 436 SCRA 677

RULE:
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his or her concerns;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;

DOCTRINE:
● Under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the legal presumption
is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law
dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document
without first informing himself of its contents and consequences.
● Further, under Section 3 (p) of the same Rule, it is equally presumed that
private transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves every
contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he
signs and delivers it.
● The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need
of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby
which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail.

FACTS:
Diaz faced an estafa charge for allegedly failing to return or remit the proceeds
from merchandise worth P32K received on consignment from Arcilla. Arcilla
testified that Diaz, acting as her agent, was entrusted with merchandise but only
remitted a fraction of the proceeds and ignored demands to remit the rest or return
the unsold items. Diaz, however, claimed she was a client who bought goods on
installment basis, signing blank documents as a precaution. RTC acquitted Diaz,
citing lack of evidence of intent to defraud. However, the CA ruled in favor of
Arcilla, finding that she proved her transaction with Diaz and her failure to remit the
proceeds, supported by an acknowledgment receipt. CA rejected Diaz's claim that
she signed blank documents, stating it was a precaution by Arcilla against potential
breach of obligation.

ISSUE:
Whether Diaz is civilly liable. - YES.

RULING/RATIONALE:

Under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the legal presumption is that a person
takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law dictates that the natural presumption
is that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents and
consequences.

Further, under Section 3 (p) of the same Rule, it is equally presumed that private
transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves every contracting party to learn and
know the contents of a document before he signs and delivers it.

The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting
evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is
offered, will prevail.

In this case, petitioner failed to present any evidence to controvert these presumptions.
Also, respondent's possession of the document pertaining to the obligation strongly
buttresses her claim that the same has not been extinguished. Preponderance of evidence
only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing evidence. All
things considered, the evidence in this case clearly preponderates in respondent's favor.

In upholding the civil liability of petitioner, the CA did not dwell into the purported admission
of petitioner anent her receipt of GCs in the amount of P32,000.00 as found by the RTC.
Instead, the CA hinged its ruling on the acknowledgment receipt dated February 20, 1996,
the documentary evidence that respondent had duly identified and formally offered in the
course of these proceedings.

Petitioner's claim that she was required to sign two (2) one-half sheets of paper and a trust
receipt in blank during her transactions with respondent, which she allegedly failed to
retrieve after paying her obligations, is a bare allegation that cannot be given credence. It is
well-settled that "he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is
not evidence."

Respondent was able to prove by preponderance of evidence the fact of the transaction, as
well as petitioner's failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise worth
P32,000.00, or to return the same to respondent in case such merchandise were not sold.
This was established through the presentation of the acknowledgment receipt dated
February 20, 1996, which, as the document's name connotes, shows that petitioner
acknowledged receipt from respondent of the listed items with their corresponding values,
and assumed the obligation to return the same on March 20, 1996 if not sold.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Petition is DENIED. Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

10. Celedenio v. People, G.R. No. 209137, July 1, 2015

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: CHRISTINE JOYCE S. BANAL

CASE TITLE: Celedenio v. People, G.R. No. 209137, July 1, 2015

RULE: 131 Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are

satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

10. That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which
a person possess, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him or her ;

DOCTRINE: There is a disputable presumption that if a person is found in possession of a

thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker or the doer of the act unless
the person exercises ownership over the thing.

FACTS: On April 22, 2007, in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila, Philippines
Adriano Marquez witnessed the robbery in the house of Carmencita De Guzman. By
means of force Celedonio entered by destroying the back door of De Guzman house.
Marquez's house is opposite to the house of Carmencita De Guzman while Celedonio’s
house is adjacent to Carmencita. At that time, De Guzman is on her way to attend the
wake of her deceased husband.
Upon learning, De Guzman went to the police station accompanied by Marquez. A
follow-up operation was conducted by PO1 Roque and SPO2 Sugui and proceeded to
Raja Humabon St. Navotas. On their way, Marquez pointed to a man on a motorcycle and
identified him as Celedonio. The police asked him if he was Celedenio but the man did not
respond. Also, when the police asked “where the stolen items” is? He opened the
compartment and PO1 Roque saw some of the stolen items and he was subsequently
arrested.

On the other hand, Celedonio claimed that at the time of the incident, he was sleeping
with his wife.

RTC ruled Celedonio is guilty of Robbery with Force Upon Things. The trial court was
convinced that the prosecution clearly established that: 1) a robbery had been committed;
2) it was committed recently; 3) several of the stolen items including cash were found in
Celedonio’s possession; and 4) Celedonio had no valid explanation for his possession of
the stolen goods.
Celedonio appealed to CA, arguing that the RTC erred: 1) in convicting him of the crime
despite the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence; 2) in not finding that the search
was illegal, rendering the articles recovered inadmissible; and 3) in not finding that the
prosecution witness Marquez was ill-motivated in testifying against him.

CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON the Court found that the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution was credible and sufficient to establish Celedonio's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

RULING/RATIONALE: Yes.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
1) there is more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court denied Celedonio's appeal and affirmed his conviction for robbery
with force upon things.

The court found that the prosecution had proven the commission of the robbery, the recent
possession of stolen items by Celedonio, and his lack of a valid explanation for his
possession of the stolen goods. Under Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that there is a disputable presumption in a person found in possession of a
thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act;
otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, is
owned by him.

In this case, Celedonio never claimed ownership of the stolen items. He could have
overcome the presumption but he failed to give a justifiable and logical explanation.

The court also addressed Celedonio's argument regarding the legality of the search.

It determined that no illegal search was conducted as Celedonio voluntarily opened the
compartment of his motorcycle where the stolen items were found. The police officers only
made a general inquiry, and there was no evidence of force or intimidation. Celedonio's
confirmation that the items were stolen further justified his arrest and the seizure of the
items.

Regarding the credibility of the witness, the court found no evidence of ill motive on the
part of Adriano Marquez.
Celedonio's claim of a previous quarrel with Marquez was deemed insignificant and
insufficient to discredit his testimony.

Overall, the court concluded that the prosecution's evidence was sufficient, and
Celedonio's defenses of alibi and denial were not strong enough to overcome the
circumstantial evidence presented.

Therefore, the court upheld Celedonio's conviction for robbery with force upon things.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

11. People v. Chavez, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: CHRISTOPHER P. LAVISTE

CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARK

JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR alias "NOY", Accused-appellant. G.R. No. 207950,
September 22, 2014

RULE:

(Rule 131) Section 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are

satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:

(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which
a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him or her;

DOCTRINE: There is a disputable presumption that "a person found in possession

of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the
whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of
ownership over, are owned by him." Thus, when a person has possession of a
stolen property, he can be disputably presumed as the author of the theft.

FACTS:
● Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor (Chavez) was charged with the crime of
robbery with homicide over the death of Elmer Duque y Oros (Barbie).
● One night Chavez was spotted leaving the parlor of Barbie at about 1am.
The following day, the lobby and the parlor were found in disarray, and
Barbie’s dead body was found inside. The following belongings were
alleged to have been stolen:
 ● One (1) Unit Nokia Cellphone
● One (1) Unit Motorola Cellphone
● Six (6) pcs. Ladies Ring
● Two (2) pcs. Necklace
● An autopsy on the body found that the time of death was approximately 12
hours prior. There were 22 injuries on Barbie’s body — 21 were stab
wounds in various parts of the body caused by a sharp bladed instrument,
and one incised wound was caused by a sharp object.
● About 7 days later, accompanied by his mother, Chavez voluntarily
surrendered. His mother surrendered two cellular phones owned by Barbie.
● RTC and CA found Chavez beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide.

ISSUE: WON Chavez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery
with homicide.

RULING/RATIONALE: No. But Chavez was guilty of the crime of homicide.

Barbie’s missing cellular phones were turned over to the police by Chavez’s
mother, and this was never denied by the defense. Chavez failed to explain his
possession of these cellular phones. The Court of Appeals discussed that "a
cellular phone has become a necessary accessory, no person would part with the
same for a long period of time, especially in this case as it involves an expensive
cellular phone unit, as testified by Barbie’s kababayan, witness Raymond
Seno[f]a."

However, with Chavez and Barbie’s close relationship having been established,
there is still a possibility that these cellphones were lent to Chavez by Barbie.

The integrity of these cellphones was also compromised when SPO3 Casimiro
testified during cross-examination that the police made no markings on the
cellphones, and their SIM cards were removed.

These circumstances create reasonable doubt on the allegation that Chavez stole
the missing personal properties of Barbie.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant

Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor alias "Noy" is hereby declared GUILTYbeyond
reasonable doubt of the separate and distinct crime of HOMICIDE. Inasmuch as
the commission of the crime was not attended by any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, accused-appellant Chavez is hereby SENTENCEDto suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

Accused-appellant Chavez's period of detention shall be deducted if consistent

with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. SO ORDERED.
 12. Adiong v. CA, G.R. No. 136480, December 4, 2001, 371 SCRA
373
Adiong v. CA, G.R. No. 136480, December 4, 2001, 371 SCRA 373

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: JHUNEL CALMA HERRERA

CASE TITLE: Adiong v. CA, G.R. No. 136480, December 4, 2001, 371 SCRA 373

RULE: Disputable Presumptions (Rule 131, Sec. 3)

Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(12) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it;
(13) That official duty has been regularly performed;

DOCTRINE: When the Constitution mandated that a government official or employee

may not be removed or suspended without due process of law, the law presumes, in
protecting such rights, that "a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or
elected to it," and that "official duty has been regularly performed."
Until after final determination of respondent Nuska's guilt in the administrative case, she
cannot be made to suffer the extreme penalty of termination of her employment.

FACTS:
Nasiba Nuska was permanently appointed to the position of Municipal Local Civil
Registrar. On June 3, 1995, the new mayor, Adiong, issued a memorandum requiring all
municipal employees to submit the copies of their appointments. Respondent Nuska, failed to
submit her appointment papers and did not make a courtesy call to the new mayor. As a result,
the petitioner terminated her employment.
Nuska wrote to Mayor Adiong requesting for her reinstatement but he latter failed to act
on her request. Nuska appealed to the CSC. CSC found that the termination was not in order.
There was an administrative case filed against Nuska on May 14, 1999 for dishonesty,
grave misconduct and prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

ISSUE: WON the administrative case against Nuska Validated her termination

RULING/RATIONALE: No.
The court ruled that the charge was filed only on May 14, 1999, whereas the illegal
termination of respondent Nuska occurred in the year 1995. It is apparent that it was only an
afterthought on the part of petitioner to use the charge as an excuse to terminate respondent
Nuska's employment. The evidence that he would be using in the administrative case were
only gathered after the termination in July 1995.
When the Constitution mandated that a government official or employee may not be
removed or suspended without due process of law, the law presumes, in protecting such rights,
that "a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it," and that
"official duty has been regularly performed."
Until after final determination of respondent Nuska's guilt in the administrative case,
she cannot be made to suffer the extreme penalty of termination of her employment.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE the Court DENIES the petition. The Court
AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals and the resolution denying reconsideration
thereof.

13. People v. Casabuena, G.R. No. 186455, November 19, 2014

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: MARIMLA, JELLO M.

CASE TITLE:
G.R. No. 186455 November 19, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. ROSALINDA CASABUENA, Respondent.

RULE:
Disputable Presumptions (Rule 131, Sec. 3 (g-kk))

DOCTRINE:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty obtains only when
there is no deviation from the regular performance of duty. Where the official act in
question is irregular on its face, no presumption of regularity can arise.

FACTS:
● The prosecution charged the appellant with illegal sale of shabu under
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165: That on or about the 4th day of
February, 2004, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell in a buy bust operation to Armando
Joaquin acting as the poseur-buyer 0.0139 gram of shabu, a dangerous
drug, contained in one plastic sachet.
 ● Armando entered the appellant’s house when he arrived; he went out after
two (2) minutes and made the pre-arranged signal to the other members of
the buy-bust team.
● Once inside, Armando handed the sachet of shabu to SPO1 Balolong.
Armando then led the police to the bathroom, and there, Armando
grabbed the left hand of the appellant. SPO1 Balolong, for his part, "forced
open" the appellant’s right hand and took two ₱100 bills from her.6 SPO1
Balolong informed the appellant of her constitutional rights, and then
ordered PO1 Mangapit to arrest her.
● On cross examination, SPO1 Balolong stated that Armando was just a
"walk-in" informant.8 SPO1 Balolong also admitted that he did not witness
the transaction between Armando and the appellant since he was outside
the latter’s house.
● The RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official
Duties of SPO1 Balolong. (NO)

RULING/RATIONALE:
● The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty obtains
only when there is no deviation from the regular performance of duty.28
Where the official act in question is irregular on its face, no presumption of
regularity can arise.
● The presumption, in other words, obtains only where nothing in the
records is suggestive of the fact that the law enforcers involved deviated
from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law.
Otherwise, where the official act in question is irregular on its face, an
adverse presumption arises as a matter of course. There is indeed merit in
the contention that where no ill motives to make false charges was
successfully attributed to the members of the buy-bust team, the
presumption prevails that said police operatives had regularly performed
their duty, but the theory is correct only where there is no showing that the
conduct of police duty was irregular.
● We also find it highly unusual that the police would allow a civilian walk-in
informant like Armando to transact with the appellant on his own. During
the sale, all the police officers were positioned outside appellant’s house,
such that Armando even had to step out of the house in order to give the
pre-arranged signal to them. SPO1 Balolong also admitted that he did not
witness the appellant hand the shabu to the poseur buyer. While police are
given wide leeway in the manner of conducting their entrapment
 operations, the ideal scenario would have been to have a member of the
police act as a poseur buyer, so that a member of the police could be part
of, and be a witness to, the transaction.
● While buy-bust operations deserve judicial sanction if carried out with due
regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, we remind the courts to be
extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer
the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses. Consequently, courts are
required to put the prosecution evidence through the crucible of a severe
testing, and the presumption of innocence requires them to take a more
than casual consideration of every circumstance or doubt favoring the
innocence of the accused.
● In sum, we hold that the appellant's acquittal for failure of the prosecution
to prove her guilt with moral certainty.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the June 25,
2008 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02575. Appellant
Rosalinda Casabuena is hereby ACQUITTED for the failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She is ordered immediately RELEASED
from detention unless she is confined for another lawful cause.

14. Baculi v. Belen, A.M. Nos. RTJ-09-2179 & RTJ-102234,

September 24, 2012

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Acosta, Joanna Nilda D.

CASE TITLE:
Baculi v. Belen, A.M. Nos. RTJ-09-2179 & RTJ-102234, September 24, 2012

RULE:
Rule 131, Section 3: Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was
acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;

DOCTRINE:
As the proponent of these allegations, the complainant should have adduced the
necessary evidence to prove the claim of bad faith. This he failed to do. In the absence of
any evidence to the contrary, the following presumptions stand: (1) that official duty
has been regularly performed; and (2) that a judge, acting as such, was acting in the
lawful exercise of jurisdiction.
FACTS: ​
1. These 2 cases stemmed from 2 separate administrative complaints filed by Baculi
charging Judge Belen with gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, grave abuse of authority,
violation of Republic Act No. 6713, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the public
service, oppressive conduct, harassment, issuance of fraudulent and unjust order/s
and decisions, among other offenses.
2. In the first complaint, Baculi filed an Information for Qualified Theft against one
Azucena Capacete. However, Judge Belen ruled that the crime committed was not
Qualified Theft but Estafa, thus, he dismissed the case. Thereafter, Baculi filed a
Motion for Reconsideration to reverse the dismissal order, but the said motion was
denied. Judge Belen then issued an Order directing Baculi to explain why he
should not be cited in contempt of court, which, to Judge Belen attacked the
integrity of the Court. Judge Belen issued a Decision finding Baculi guilty of direct
contempt of court for violating the decency and propriety of the judicial system in
using unethical language in his motion. The second complaint also involves the
same parties, and similar direct and indirect contempt proceedings, albeit related
to a different case, wherein Judge Belen found Baculi guilty of direct and indirect
contempt.
3. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that Baculi’s complaint was
partially meritorious. The OCA stated the observation that the complaint infringes
on the judicial prerogatives of Judge Belen which may only be questioned through
judicial remedies under the Rules of Court.
4. In this case, Baculi tags that all contempt proceedings against him as sham, and
were taken, so he claims as a direct result of a prior incident between him and
Judge Belen where he issued a Resolution recommending that Judge Belen be
charged for libel. As he pointed out in his complaint and supplemental complaint,
Judge Belen has deep-seated hatred for him and is bent on repeatedly citing him
in contempt.

ISSUE:
Whether Baculi presented credible evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity
against Judge Belen. No.

RULING/RATIONALE:

The Supreme Court ruled that aside from Baculi’s bare allegations, he has not presented
any credible evidence to support his allegations against Judge Belen. The fact that Judge
Belen had initiated contempt proceedings against him, and in fact convicted him in such
contempt proceedings, does not by itself amount to ill motives on the part of Judge Belen.
The initiation of the contempt proceedings stemmed from the acts of the complainant
himself. His unsupported claim that the prior libel case he filed against Judge Belen
created animosity between them is not sufficient to prove his claim of evil motives on the
part of Judge Belen.

Further, as the proponent of these allegations, the complainant should have adduced the
necessary evidence to prove the claim of bad faith. This he failed to do. In the absence of
any evidence to the contrary, the following presumptions stand: (1) that official duty has
been regularly performed; and (2) that a judge, acting as such, was acting in the lawful
exercise of jurisdiction.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES these two administrative complaints against Judge
Medel Arnaldo B. Belen for lack of merit.

15. Sps. Carpo v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. No. 166577, February 3,
2010, 611 SCRA 436

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: MERYANN FRANCES F. DIZON

CASE TITLE: Sps. Carpo v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. No. 166577, February 3, 2010, 611
SCRA 436

RULE: Rule 131, Sec. 3 - Disputable Presumptions

DOCTRINE: The presumption of regularity enjoyed by the registration decree includes the
presumption that all requisites for the issuance of a valid title has been complied with.

FACTS:

This is a case of Quieting of Title of Sps Carpo against Ayala Corp. They alleged that the
Ayalas were claiming to have titles over their land.

In Ayala’s defense, they said that they derived their titles from an Original Certificate of
Title issued in 1950 while the Carpo’s title was derived from an OCT issued only in 1970

The Court of Appeals decided that the prior registration rule of the Ayala cannot be applied
in the present case because the Plan that has been submitted by the Ayala does not bear
the approval of the Director of Land. In such a case, it is obvious that there has been a
previous survey already and Ayala’s documents are dubious in character.

ISSUE:
Was there a need for Ayala to prove the approved survey plan coming from the Director of
Lands despite showing a valid title? [No]

RULING/RATIONALE:

On the matter of disputable presumptions, Rule 131 sec 3 provides: Presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence
 ● That official duty has been regularly performed
● That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was
acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
● That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and
passed upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a
dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon
by them; x x x.

The presumption of regularity enjoyed by the registration decree includes the presumption
that all requisites for the issuance of a valid title has been complied with.

In the present case, Ayala need not allege or prove that a duly approved survey plan
accompanied the issuance of its title because it is presumed. It is the party who
challenges the presumption and has the burden to present adequate and convincing
evidence to the contrary.

In Realty Cases, the general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to
include the same land, the earlier in date prevails. The person claiming under the prior
certificate is entitled to the estate or interest and that person is deemed to hold under the
prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly from the person
who was the holder of the earliest certificate.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

In conclusion, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in setting
aside the patently erroneous Summary Judgment of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated December
22, 2003 and the Resolution dated December 16, 2004 are hereby AFFIRMED.

16. People v. Go, G.R. Nos. 130714, 139634, 139331, & 140845-46,
December 27, 2002

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: DIZON, ANALYN C.

CASE TITLE:
People v. Go, G.R. Nos. 130714, 139634, 139331, & 140845-46, December 27,
2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DONEL GO and VAL DE LOS REYES, accused.
DONEL GO, accused-appellant.
G.R. Nos. 130714 and 139634 December 27, 2002
-----------------------------
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VAL DE LOS REYES, accused-appellant.
G.R. Nos. 139331 and 140845–46 December 27, 2002

RULE:

Rule 131, Sec. 3

DOCTRINE:

A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer,

stenotypist or recorder and certified as correct by him shall be deemed prima facie
a correct statement of such proceedings. (Rule 131.)

FACTS:

Accused-appellants Go and De Los Reyes were charged with rape committed

against Imelda Brutas.
- Only Go was initially apprehended; de los Reyes remained at large.
- The trial of Go proceeded separately ahead of de los Reyes’

Go pleaded not guilty to the charges.

- Before the prosecution could finish presenting evidence, he jumped bail
and was tried in absentia.

The prosecution presented the following evidence in the course of Go’s trial
▪ Testimony of Imelda Brutas

▪ Testimony of Imelda’s mother, Adela

▪ Testimony of Imelda’s sister, Clara

▪ Testimony of Dr. Saguinsin of Rural Health Unit

▪ Testimony of SPO4 Bonavente
▪ Imelda’s panty; Imelda’s watch; certification about entry in police blotter of
Imelda’s complaint; medical certificate issued by Dr. Zenit of Ziga Memorial
District Hospital and Dr. Saguinsin; affidavit executed by Marivic after the
alleged incident; photographs of Go and de los Reyes; referral form of
ABS-CBN “Hoy Gising”

While defense offered 5 witnesses.

RTC Albay Branch 16 (GO Case): Go was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer the death penalty for each count.

When De Los Reyes was apprehended, Albay RTC, Branch 15 found

accused-appellant de los Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of
rape and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua in each.
The same prosecution witnesses who testified at the trial of accused-appellant Go
were availed of at the trial of accused-appellant de los Reyes. The Private
prosecutor adopted all the direct-examinations all the answers of the witness
appearing on the transcript.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, accused-appellant de los

Reyes appealed to this Court. His appeal, G. R. Nos. 139331 and 140845-46, and
that of accused-appellant Go, G. R. Nos. 130714 and 139634, were consolidated.

Accused-appellant de los Reyes questions the regularity of the procedure adopted

by the trial court by allowing prosecution witnesses Adela, Clara, Imelda, and Dr.
Saguinsin to merely affirm on direct examination their previous testimonies taken
during the trial of accused-appellant Go. Such proceeding, he contends, violated
his right to confront and cross-examine said witnesses.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred for allowing witnesses to merely asked to confirm
their testimonies given at the trial of Go. YES

RULING/RATIONALE:

In People v. Estenzo, after the therein accused had testified, the defense counsel
manifested that for the subsequent witnesses, he was filing only their affidavits
subject to cross-examination by the prosecution on matters therein and on all
matters pertinent and material thereto. The trial court acceded to the manifestation
over the objection of one of the private prosecutors.

This Court held that such procedure violated Sections 1 and 2, Rule 132 and
Section 1, Rule 133 of the then Revised Rules of Court, which required that the
testimonies of witnesses be given orally. Those provisions are substantially
reproduced in the Revised Rules of Court as follows:

SECTION 1. Examination to be done in open court. – The examination of

witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under
oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question
calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given
orally.
SEC. 2. Proceedings to be recorded. – The entire proceedings of a trial or
hearing, including the questions propounded to a witness and his answers thereto,
the statements made by the judge or any of the parties, counsel, or witnesses with
reference to the case, shall be recorded by means of shorthand or stenotype or by
other means of recording found suitable by the court.

A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer,

stenotypist or recorder and certified as correct by him shall be deemed prima facie
a correct statement of such proceedings. (Rule 131.)

The ruling in Estenzo was reiterated in Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan where, at the
close of her direct examination, a witness was asked to confirm the truth of the
contents of her sworn statement. This Court held that the witness "should have
been examined directly on the statements in her affidavit."
- The same rule applies in the present cases against accused-appellant de
los Reyes where the prosecution witnesses were merely asked to confirm
their testimonies given at the trial of another in which he took no part.

The apprehensions of the prosecution that the lapse of time may have
compromised the memory of the witnesses are understandable. But following this
line of thought, would not the witnesses have just the same gone over the
transcripts of their testimonies during the trial of accused-appellant Go to refresh
them to thereby enable them to answer the questions of accused-appellant de los
Reyes’ counsel on cross-examination?

In any event, lapse of time is a matter that the trial court would consider in
weighing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies; it does not justify the
abbreviated procedure adopted by the trial court, especially considering that the
case against accused-appellant Go was tried before another branch of the RTC.

As irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused were committed

during the trial, the accused is entitled to a new trial. All the proceedings and
evidence affected by such irregularities must thus be set aside and taken anew.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to VACATE the judgment of Branch 15 of the

Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay in Criminal Case Nos. T-2639-41, "People v.
Val de los Reyes", and to SET ASIDE Exhibits "A," "B," "C," "D," "E-2," "E-2-A" to
"E-2-I," "F," "G" and "H." Said criminal cases are REMANDED to Branch 15 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay for the immediate rehearing of the
testimonies of witnesses Adela Brutas, Imelda Brutas, Clara Brutas and Dr.
Marissa Saguinsin, in accordance with this Court’s above disquisition. The trial
court is further directed to conduct said proceedings and render a decision thereon
within 90 days from receipt of this Resolution. Following Section 6 (a), Rule 121 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the trial court may, in the interest of justice, allow the
introduction of additional evidence.

Pending these rehearing proceedings in the trial court, the automatic review of the
cases against Donel Go in G. R. Nos. 130714 and 139634 is held in abeyance.

17. Rosaroso v. Soria, G.R. No. 194846, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA
232

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: MENDOZA, GEMMA MARIA R.

CASE TITLE:
HOSPICIO D. ROSAROSO, ANTONIO D. ROSAROSO, MANUEL D. ROSAROSO,
ALGERICA D. ROSAROSO, and CLEOFE R. LABINDAO, Petitioners, vs.
LUCILA LABORTE SORIA, SPOUSES HAM SOLUTAN and **LAILA SOLUTAN, and
MERIDIAN REALTY CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 194846 June 19, 2013

RULE: RULE 131, Section 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions

are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;

DOCTRINE:
Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable
presumptions:
(1) private transactions have been fair and regular;
(2) the ordinary course of business has been followed; and
(3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract.

These presumptions operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut
them. They create the necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie case
they created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail.
The burden of proof remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one who has that
burden is relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the
averment, because the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted.

FACTS:
● Sps. Luis and Honorata acquired the subject properties among others. They have 9
children.
● Luis filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages against
his daughter, Lucila, Lucila’s daughter, Laila and Meridian Realty Corp., and was
later amended, which included Laila’s spouse, Ham and Lourdes, Luis’ second wife,
due to Luis’ untimely death.
● Petitioners alleged that Luis, with Lourdes' knowledge and consent, executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale (First Sale) in their favor in 1991, covering several properties.
They claimed that despite this sale, Lucila and Laila obtained a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) from Luis, enabling them to engage in transactions involving the
same properties. They further alleged a second sale to Meridian Realty Corporation
(Second Sale) in 1994, which they deemed invalid.
● Respondents contested the validity of the First Sale and argued that petitioners
failed to provide consideration for the properties. They also defended the validity of
the Second Sale, citing notarization and the presumption of regularity. They claimed
that Luis was of sound mind when he executed the relevant documents.
● The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners, declaring the SPA null and void, and the
Second Sale ineffective. It affirmed the validity of the First Sale in favor of
petitioners.
● The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It declared the First Sale
void due to lack of consideration. However, it upheld the validity of the Second Sale,
 considering it notarized and finding insufficient evidence of manipulation regarding
Luis's execution of the relevant documents.
● The Court of Appeals declared the First SPA valid, but nullified the First Sale and
validated the Second Sale. It ordered petitioners to pay damages to Meridian Realty
Corporation and Laila Solutan et al.

ISSUE: Whether or not the first sale was valid? (YES)

RULING/RATIONALE: The First Deed Of Sale Was Valid

The fact that the first deed of sale was executed, conveying the subject properties in
favor of petitioners, was never contested by the respondents. What they vehemently
insist, though, is that the said sale was simulated because the purported sale was made
without a valid consideration.

Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable
presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary
course of business has been followed; and (3) there was sufficient consideration for a
contract. These presumptions operate against an adversary who has not introduced
proof to rebut them. They create the necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima
facie case they created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered,
will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one
who has that burden is relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support
of the averment, because the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless
rebutted.

In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said presumption. Aside from their
bare allegation that the sale was made without a consideration, they failed to supply
clear and convincing evidence to back up this claim. It is elementary in procedural law
that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the
Rules of Court.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The December 4, 2009 Decision and the
November 18, 201 0 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 00351, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 30, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8, 7th Judicial Region, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-16957, is hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

18. Conjuangco, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 180705, November 27,

2012, 686 SCRA 472

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024
PREPARED BY: Liwag, Eleanor

CASE TITLE: Siain Enterprises v. Cupertino Realty Corp., G.R. No. 170782, June
22, 2009

Siain Enterprises, Inc., Petitioner, vs. Cupertino Realty Corp. and Edwin R.
Catacutan, Respondents.

RULE: Disputable Presumptions (Rule 131, Sec. 3)

DOCTRINE:
Sec. 24. Presumption of consideration.— Every negotiable instrument is deemed
prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person
whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value.

A presumption has arisen that the loan documents were supported by

consideration as presented by the defendant.

Petitioner has not been able to establish its claim of non-receipt by a

preponderance of evidence.

FACTS:
Siain Enterprises, Inc. (Siain) is engaged in the manufacturing and
retailing/wholesaling business. On the other hand, Cupertino Realty Corp.
(Cupertino) is engaged in the realty business.

Petitioner Siain obtained a loan of P37,000,000 from respondent Cupertino

covered by a promissory note signed by both petitioner’s and respondent’s
respective presidents.

To secure the loan, petitioner, on the same date, executed a real estate mortgage.

Two days later, the promissory note was amended to include a 17% interest per
annum on the note. This was again signed by each of the presidents of the parties.

The president of Siain signed a second promissory note in favor of Cupertino for
P160,000,000. On the same date, the parties executed an amendment on the real
estate mortgage. It now indicated that the total loan to be secured by the mortgage
is P197,000,000.

Subsequently, petitioner, through counsel, sent a letter to respondent demanding

the release of the P160,000,000 loan. Petitioner alleges that respondent had yet to
release the proceeds of the loan.

Cupertino refuted the accusations and maintained that Siain had long obtained the
proceeds. Cupertino declared petitioner’s demand as made to "abscond from a just
and valid obligation," a mere afterthought, following Cupertino’s letter demanding
payment of the P37,000,000 loan covered by the first promissory note.

Not surprisingly, Cupertino instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings over the

properties subject of the amended real estate mortgage. This prompted petitioner
to file a complaint with a prayer for a restraining order on the grounds that the real
estate mortgage was void for lack of consideration.
RTC upheld the validity of the real estate mortgage. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner overcome the presumption of consideration in their

loan agreement.

RULING/RATIONALE:

No. Unmistakably, from the foregoing chain of transactions, a presumption has

arisen that the loan documents were supported by a consideration.

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court specifies that a disputable presumption is
satisfactory if uncontradicted and not overcome by other evidence. Corollary
thereto, paragraphs (r) and (s) thereof and Section 24 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law read:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions.— The following presumptions are satisfactory if

uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx

(r) That there was sufficient consideration for a contract;

(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient
consideration;
xxx

Sec. 24. Presumption of consideration.— Every negotiable instrument is deemed

prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person
whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value.

Petitioner’s assertion that the Amended Real Estate Mortgage was not supported
by a consideration, asserting non-receipt of the ₱160,000,000.00 loan increase,
does not even dent, much less, overcome the aforesaid presumptions on
consideration for a contract.

A presumption has arisen that the loan documents were supported by

consideration as presented by Cupertino.

As deftly pointed out by the trial court:

x x x In this case, this Court finds that the [petitioner] has not been able to establish
its claim of non-receipt by a preponderance of evidence. Rather, the Court is
inclined to give more weight and credence to the affirmative and straightforward
testimony of [Cupertino] explaining in plain and categorical words that the
Php197,000,000.00 loan represented by the amended REM was the total sum of
the debit memo, the checks, the real estate mortgage and the amended real estate
mortgage, the pledges of jewelries, the trucks and the condominiums plus the
interests that will be incurred which all in all amounted to Php197,000,000.00.

It is a basic axiom in this jurisdiction that as between the plaintiff’s negative

evidence of denial and the defendant’s affirmative evidence on the existence of the
consideration, the latter must be given more weight and value.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71424 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

19. Siain Enterprises v. Cupertino Realty Corp., G.R. No. 170782,

June 22, 2009

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Liwag, Eleanor

CASE TITLE: Siain Enterprises v. Cupertino Realty Corp., G.R. No. 170782, June
22, 2009

Siain Enterprises, Inc., Petitioner, vs. Cupertino Realty Corp. and Edwin R.
Catacutan, Respondents.

RULE: Disputable Presumptions (Rule 131, Sec. 3)

DOCTRINE:
Sec. 24. Presumption of consideration.— Every negotiable instrument is deemed
prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person
whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value.

A presumption has arisen that the loan documents were supported by

consideration as presented by the defendant.

Petitioner has not been able to establish its claim of non-receipt by a

preponderance of evidence.

FACTS:
Siain Enterprises, Inc. (Siain) is engaged in the manufacturing and
retailing/wholesaling business. On the other hand, Cupertino Realty Corp.
(Cupertino) is engaged in the realty business.

Petitioner Siain obtained a loan of P37,000,000 from respondent Cupertino

covered by a promissory note signed by both petitioner’s and respondent’s
respective presidents.

To secure the loan, petitioner, on the same date, executed a real estate mortgage.

Two days later, the promissory note was amended to include a 17% interest per
annum on the note. This was again signed by each of the presidents of the parties.

The president of Siain signed a second promissory note in favor of Cupertino for
P160,000,000. On the same date, the parties executed an amendment on the real
estate mortgage. It now indicated that the total loan to be secured by the mortgage
is P197,000,000.

Subsequently, petitioner, through counsel, sent a letter to respondent demanding

the release of the P160,000,000 loan. Petitioner alleges that respondent had yet to
release the proceeds of the loan.

Cupertino refuted the accusations and maintained that Siain had long obtained the
proceeds. Cupertino declared petitioner’s demand as made to "abscond from a just
and valid obligation," a mere afterthought, following Cupertino’s letter demanding
payment of the P37,000,000 loan covered by the first promissory note.

Not surprisingly, Cupertino instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings over the

properties subject of the amended real estate mortgage. This prompted petitioner
to file a complaint with a prayer for a restraining order on the grounds that the real
estate mortgage was void for lack of consideration.

RTC upheld the validity of the real estate mortgage. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner overcome the presumption of consideration in their

loan agreement.

RULING/RATIONALE:

No. Unmistakably, from the foregoing chain of transactions, a presumption has

arisen that the loan documents were supported by a consideration.

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court specifies that a disputable presumption is
satisfactory if uncontradicted and not overcome by other evidence. Corollary
thereto, paragraphs (r) and (s) thereof and Section 24 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law read:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions.— The following presumptions are satisfactory if

uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx

(r) That there was sufficient consideration for a contract;

(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient
consideration;
xxx

Sec. 24. Presumption of consideration.— Every negotiable instrument is deemed

prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person
whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value.

Petitioner’s assertion that the Amended Real Estate Mortgage was not supported
by a consideration, asserting non-receipt of the ₱160,000,000.00 loan increase,
does not even dent, much less, overcome the aforesaid presumptions on
consideration for a contract.

A presumption has arisen that the loan documents were supported by

consideration as presented by Cupertino.

As deftly pointed out by the trial court:

x x x In this case, this Court finds that the [petitioner] has not been able to establish
its claim of non-receipt by a preponderance of evidence. Rather, the Court is
inclined to give more weight and credence to the affirmative and straightforward
testimony of [Cupertino] explaining in plain and categorical words that the
Php197,000,000.00 loan represented by the amended REM was the total sum of
the debit memo, the checks, the real estate mortgage and the amended real estate
mortgage, the pledges of jewelries, the trucks and the condominiums plus the
interests that will be incurred which all in all amounted to Php197,000,000.00.

It is a basic axiom in this jurisdiction that as between the plaintiff’s negative

evidence of denial and the defendant’s affirmative evidence on the existence of the
consideration, the latter must be given more weight and value.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71424 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

20. Duarte v. Duran, G.R. No. 173038, September 14, 2011

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: UMLAS, JOYCE DANIELLE C.

CASE TITLE:

ELENA JANE DUARTE, petitioner, vs. MIGUEL SAMUEL A.E. DURAN, respondent.

RULE:

Disputable Presumptions (Rule 131, Sec. 3)

DOCTRINE:

Bare denial of receipt of a mail cannot prevail over the certification of the postmaster,
whose official duty is to send notices of registered mail.

FACTS:

Respondent Duran, with the help of Dy, offered to sell to petitioner Duarte, a laptop
computer. Petitioner was undecided so Duran left the laptop with the petitioner for two
days. Petitioner told respondent that she was willing to buy the laptop on installment basis
for a total of P15k. Petitioner gave ₱5,000.00 as initial payment and promised to pay
₱3,000.00 on February 18, 2002 and ₱7,000.00 on March 15, 2002.

On February 18, 2002, petitioner gave her second installment of ₱3,000.00 to Dy, who
signed the handwritten receipt allegedly made by petitioner as proof of payment. But when
Dy returned to get the remaining balance on March 15, 2002, petitioner offered to pay only
₱2,000.00 claiming that the laptop was only worth ₱10,000.00. Due to the refusal of
petitioner to pay the remaining balance, respondent thru counsel sent petitioner a demand
letter dated July 29, 2002.

Petitioner, denied writing the receipt dated February 18, 2002, and receiving the demand
letter. Petitioner claimed that there was no contract of sale. Petitioner said that
respondent loaned P5k and left the laptop with petitioner as security. When the petitioner
refused to give it back, Dy then asked the petitioner to lend an additional P3k to the
respondent. Petitioner gave the money under agreement that the amounts she lent to
respondent would be considered as partial payments for the laptop in case she decides to
buy it. Sometime in March 2002, the petitioner decided not to buy the laptop. Respondent,
however, refused to pay and insisted that the petitioner purchase the laptop instead.

MTCC ruled in favor of the respondent. The receipt and the testimonies of the respondent
and his witness, Dy, were sufficient to prove that there was a contract of sale between the
parties.

RTC: reversed the MTCC Decision. Alleged receipt issued by Dy was a mere product of
machination, trickery and self-serving. Shows no proof of conformity or acknowledgment
on the part of the defendant that indeed she agreed on the stipulations. Thus, it cannot be
given any credence and ultimately, did not bind her.

The CA reversed the RTC Decision and reinstated the Decision of the MTCC. The CA
said that the RTC erred in not giving weight and credence to the demand letter dated July
29, 2002 and the receipt dated February 18, 2002. The CA pointed out that petitioner
failed to overturn the presumption that the demand letter dated July 29, 2002 sent by
respondent’s counsel by registered mail was received by her.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave error in holding that the denial by the
petitioner of a receipt of the demand letter, sent through registered mail has not overturned
the principal presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. NO

RULING/RATIONALE:

With regard to petitioner’s denial of the receipt of the demand letter dated July 29, 2002,
the Court believe that this did not overturn the presumption of regularity that the letter was
delivered and received by the addressee in the regular course of the mail considering that
respondent was able to present the postmaster’s certification stating that the letter was
indeed sent to the address of petitioner. Bare denial of receipt of a mail cannot prevail over
the certification of the postmaster, whose official duty is to send notices of registered mail.

The evidence submitted by the respondent weighs more than the petitioner's bare denials.
Other than her denials, no other evidence was submitted by petitioner to prove that the
laptop was not sold but was only given as security for respondent’s loan.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 26, 2005 Decision
and May 22, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84461 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the legal interest imposed on the principal
amount claimed. The legal interest shall be at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
July 29, 2002 and at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time the
judgment of this Court becomes final and executory until the obligation is fully satisfied.
 21. Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005, 476
SCRA 461

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: MICAELLA NOELLE B. VELEZ

CASE TITLE: Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 461

RULE: Disputable Presumptions (Rule 131, Sec. 3)

DOCTRINE: With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the
first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years.
Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must
institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee
spouse.

FACTS:
● Eduardo Manuel was found by the trial court guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of bigamy after contracting a second marriage with complainant Tina
Gandalera in 1996 when he already got married with Rubylus Gaña in 1975.
● In its petition to the SC, Eduardo asserted that the prosecution failed to prove the
second element of the felony, i.e., in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when
he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaña had been "absent" for 21 years since 1975;
under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of law and
that he was able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and
that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was still alive;
● Hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaña had
arisen by operation of law. The petitioner concludes that he should thus be
acquitted of the crime of bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether Eduardo is not guilty for the prosecution failed to prove the second
element of the felony, i.e., in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code - NO

RULING/RATIONALE:
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide –
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of
seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs:
 (1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing
for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years.

However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on
presumptive death, reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.

With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the first paragraph
of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the
spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary
proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without
prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse.

The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely
to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal
of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law and
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the
rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition

is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against
the petitioner.

22. Villanueva v. Belaguer, G.R. No. 180197, June 23, 2009, 590
SCRA 661

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: MICAELLA NOELLE BE. VELEZ

CASE TITLE: Villanueva v. Balaguer, G.R. No. 180197, June 23, 2009, 590 SCRA 661

RULE: Disputable Presumptions (Rule 131, Sec. 3)

DOCTRINE:
Among the disputable presumptions provided for under Rule 131, Section 3 is “that
acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the
law or fact.

One cannot prove his claim by placing the burden of proof on the other party. Indeed, "(a)
man cannot make evidence for himself by writing a letter containing the statements that he
wishes to prove. He does not make the letter evidence by sending it to the party against
whom he wishes to prove the facts [stated therein]. He no more can impose a duty to
answer a charge than he can impose a duty to pay by sending goods. Therefore a failure
to answer such adverse assertions in the absence of further circumstances making an
answer requisite or natural has no effect as an admission".

FACTS:
● Petitioner Francisco N. Villanueva, then Assistant Manager for Operations of
Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation-Channel 13 (IBC-13) was dismissed
from employment on the ground of loss of confidence for purportedly selling forged
certificates of performance. Contesting his termination, petitioner filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission.
● During the pendency of the labor case, news articles about irregularities in IBC-13
were published in the July 18, 1992 issue of the Manila Times and the Philippine
Star, and in the July 19, 1992 issue of the Manila Bulletin.
● In these news articles, respondent Virgilio P. Balaguer, then President of IBC-13,
was quoted to have said that he uncovered various anomalies in IBC-13 during his
tenure which led to the dismissal of an operations executive for selling forged
certificates of performance.
● In a letter dated July 20, 1992, petitioner urged respondents to confirm or deny if
he was the person alluded to in the news article as the operations executive of
IBC-13 who was dismissed for selling forged certificates of performance. None of
the respondents replied to the letter.
● Petitioner claimed that respondents caused the publication of the subject news
articles which defamed him by falsely and maliciously referring to him as the
IBC-13 operations executive who sold forged certificates of performance.
● Balaguer denied that he had anything to do with the publications. However, he
argued that the publications are not actionable because they are true and without
malice; are of legitimate public concern and interest because IBC-13 is under
sequestration, among others.
● The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding petitioner's dismissal as illegal,
which was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission. The
Commission, however, declared respondents to be acting in good faith, hence, it
deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages.
● The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City held that petitioner is entitled to an award
of damages.
● Respondents moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, they appealed
to the Court of Appeals which granted the appeal.
● Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether the failure of the addressee to respond to a letter containing statements
attributing to him commission of acts constituting actionable wrong, hence, adverse to his
interest, and of such nature as would call for his reaction, reply, or comment if untrue,
constitute his admission of said statements, consequently, may be used in evidence
against him - NO

RULING/RATIONALE:

As early as 1905, this Court has declared that it is the duty of the party seeking to enforce
a right to prove that their right actually exists. In varying language, our Rules of Court, in
speaking of burden of proof in civil cases, states that each party must prove his own
affirmative allegations and that the burden of proof lies on the party who would be
defeated if no evidence were given on either side. Thus, in civil cases, the burden of proof
is generally on the plaintiff, with respect to his complaint.

In proving his claim, petitioner relied on the July 20, 1992 letter, the newspaper articles,
and the alleged admission of respondents. Based on the above pieces of evidence, the
Court finds that petitioner was unable to discharge his burden of proof. As such, the Court
of Appeals properly dismissed the complaint for damages.

Petitioner argues that by not responding to the above letter which expressly urged them to
reply if the statements therein contained are untrue, respondents in effect admitted the
matters stated therein, pursuant to the rule on admission by silence in Sec. 32, Rule 130,
and the disputable presumption that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing
acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact.

Petitioner's argument lacks merit. One cannot prove his claim by placing the burden of
proof on the other party. Indeed, "(a) man cannot make evidence for himself by writing a
letter containing the statements that he wishes to prove. He does not make the letter
evidence by sending it to the party against whom he wishes to prove the facts [stated
therein]. He no more can impose a duty to answer a charge than he can impose a duty to
pay by sending goods. Therefore a failure to answer such adverse assertions in the
absence of further circumstances making an answer requisite or natural has no effect as
an admission".

In the same manner, the Court cannot assume an admission by silence on the part of
Balaguer by virtue of his failure to protest or disclaim the attribution to him by the
newspapers that he is the source of the articles. As explained above, the rule on
admission by silence is relaxed when the statement is not made orally in one's presence
or when one still has to resort to a written reply, or when there is no mutual
correspondence between the parties.

As for the publications themselves, newspaper articles purporting to state what the
defendant said are inadmissible against him, since he cannot be held responsible for the
writings of third persons. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, "while the subject
news items indicated that Balaguer was the source of the columnists, proving that he truly
made such statements is another matter". Petitioner failed to prove that Balaguer did
make such statements.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 10, 2007
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81657 reversing the October 29,
2003 Decision and February 2, 2004 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 89, finding petitioner entitled to damages, as well as the October 16, 2007
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

23. Atienza v. Board of Medicine, G.R. No. 177407, February 9,

2011, 642 SCRA 523

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: PINEDA, HARVEY JUSTINE M.

CASE TITLE:

Atienza v. Board of Medicine, G.R. No. 177407, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 523

RULE:

B.2. Disputable Presumptions (Rule 131, Sec. 3, Y)

(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life.

DOCTRINE:

One of the disputable presumptions under the Rules on Evidence provides that
things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life. The fact that the two kidneys of the complainant were in their proper
anatomical position at the time of the operation is presumed under the said rule.

FACTS:

Editha had lumbar pains. She went to the Rizal Medical Center and was referred to
Dr. Lantin III. She underwent several laboratory tests. It was revealed that her left
kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. She underwent kidney operation.
However, the right kidney was removed instead of the left kidney. This prompted
the husband of Editha to the complaint for gross negligence against the doctors
before the Board of Medicine (BOM)

The complaint was heard by BOM. The husband presented Editha as the
complainant. They also introduced certified photo copies of the X-Ray Request to
prove that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical position at the time of
the operation. The presentation of evidence was opposed by petitioner on the
ground that the evidence are mere photocopies and intended to establish matters
that are hearsay. That the exhibits are incompetent. BOM admitted the evidence of
Editha.

Petitioner elevated the case to the SC claiming that exhibits violated his
substantive rights leading to the loss of his medical license.
ISSUE:

W/N the evidence presented by Editha should be admitted

RULING/RATIONALE:

Yes. The court ruled that there is no violation of the substantive rights of the
petitioner. The fact that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical
location at the time of operation is presumed under Sec 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court:

(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life.

Editha introduced the evidence to prove that her kidneys are in their proper
position. This is not required to be proved because it is also covered by mandatory
judicial notice. Falls under Laws of Nature involving physical sciences (biology).

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. SP No. 87755 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

24. Vda. de Avenido v. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014,
714 SCRA 447
24.Vda. de Avenido v. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014, 714 SCRA 447

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: JHUNEL CALMA HERRERA

CASE TITLE: 24.Vda. de Avenido v. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014, 714
SCRA 447

RULE: Disputable Presumptions (Rule 131, Sec. 3)

DOCTRINE: A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man

and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always
presume marriage.

FACTS:
This case involves a contract between two women claiming to have been validly married
to the same man, Eustaquio.
Respondent Tecla instituted a complaint of Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Peregrina. She claims that she is the lawful wife of Eustaquio and that Peregrina’s marriage is
bigamous. She was not able to produce the marriage certificate because it was destroyed by
World War II. Tecla presented testimonial evidence and documentary evidence to support her
claim.
On the other hand, Peregrina claimed that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio.
She presented a marriage contract and affidavit of Eustaquio declaring that he was single when
he married Peregrina.
RTC denied the petition and counterclaim. CA reversed the decision Tecla's marriage to
Eustaquio as valid and Peregrina's marriage as null and void.

ISSUE: WON Tecla's marriage to Eustaquio is valid and whether Peregrina's marriage
to Eustaquio is null and void.

RULING/RATIONALE: Yes.
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), ruling that
Tecla's marriage to Eustaquio is valid and Peregrina's marriage to Eustaquio is null and void.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it
is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the
fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the
marriage between his parents.
In Pugeda v. Trias, the Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any
competent and relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one
of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.
The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to
the fact of marriage.
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies
of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the
wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at
Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his
mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the
documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and
the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for the
introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial
court has disregarded.
 In the case of Adong v, Cheong Seng Gee, the court elucidated the reason behind
the presumption of marriage. The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that
of marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.
A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
(Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies
of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the
parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage
between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby
declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.

25. Barrido v. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Almandares, Maria Ferome P.

CASE TITLE: ​Barrido v. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014

RULE: Rule 131, Section 3 (g-kk)

DOCTRINE:
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall
be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.

FACTS:
In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N.
Barrido, they were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting
of a house and lot. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership
over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for a partition, but the latter refused.
Thus, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Bacolod City. Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject
property had already been sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She
likewise moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction,
the partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision, applying Article 129 of the Family Code. It ruled
that the conjugal property of the spouses be adjudicated to the defendant Marietta Nonato,
the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Nonato
appealed the MTCC Decision.
The Bacolod RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC. It found that even though the MTCC
aptly applied Article 129 of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a reversible error in
adjudicating the subject property to Barrido.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. It held that since the property’s assessed
value was only ₱8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC’s jurisdiction. Also, although the
RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 147, the
dispositive portion of its decision still correctly ordered the equitable partition of the
property. Barrido filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for lack
of merit.

ISSUE: W/N Article 129 should be applied - NO

RULING/RATIONALE:
Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the
spouses’ property relations.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall
be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case
of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such shares shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture
shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a
void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to
operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit
of marriage or their marriage is void.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated November 16, 2006, as well as its Resolution dated January 24, 2007 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 00235, are hereby AFFIRMED.
 26. Estate of Ong v. Diaz, G.R. No.171713, December 17, 2007,
540 SCRA 480

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Allan Jay Evangelista

CASE TITLE: Estate of Ong v. Diaz, G.R. No.171713, December 17, 2007, 540
SCRA 480

RULE: Disputable Presumptions (Rule 131, Sec. 3)

DOCTRINE:
That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage
within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these
rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:

(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage,
even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the
former marriage.

(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage,
even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the
former marriage.

FACTS:

● A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending

litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by
her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong
(Rogelio) before the RTC
● Jinky alleged in her complaint:
○ Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and
Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the
baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor Joanne’s needs –
recognizing the child as his.
○ Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting
minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.
○ Rogelio, despite Jinky’s remonstrance, failed and refused and
continued failing and refusing to give support for the child and to
 acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the
heretofore adverted complaint.
● RTC order that Ong should give support
● During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Rogelio’s
counsel filed a manifestation informing the Court that Rogelio died.
● Estate of Ong substituted the deceased
● CA - remanded the case to RTC to receive evidence on DNA testing
● Petitioner prays that the CA ruling be modified, by setting aside the
judgment remanding the case to the trial court for DNA testing analysis, by
dismissing the complaint of minor Joanne for compulsory recognition, and
by declaring the minor as the legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa
Katsuo.

ISSUE:
1. Whether DNA testing could prove the paternity
2. Whether Ong is the father

RULING/RATIONALE:

1. YES
2. Not ruled, remanded the case to RTC for reception of evidence for DNA testing

Even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above
as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not
shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can
be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.

And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. In People v.
Umanito,30 citing Tecson v. Commission on Elections, this Court held:

The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 161434, 3 March
2004, 424 SCRA 277] likewise reiterated the acceptance of DNA testing in our
jurisdiction in this wise: "[i]n case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely
to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which
examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any
physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to.

It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether appellant is the father
of AAA’s child, which may be accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the
fair and correct adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules,
the courts are authorized, after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a
DNA testing. However, while this Court retains jurisdiction over the case at bar,
capacitated as it is to receive and act on the matter in controversy, the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts and does not, in the course of daily routine, conduct
hearings. Hence, it would be more appropriate that the case be remanded to the
RTC for reception of evidence in appropriate hearings, with due notice to the
parties.

As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of Appeals:

x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who
choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing
technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and
abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have
repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when
DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of
evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our
stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and its Resolution dated 1 March 2006
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

27. Garcia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 170256, January 25, 2010

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Cristel B. Liwanag

CASE TITLE: Garcia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 170256, January 25, 2010

RULE: Rule 131

Section 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory
if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;

(ff) That the law has been obeyed;

DOCTRINE: Election law states that print advertisements donated to the candidate
or political party shall not be printed, published, broadcasted, or exhibited without
the written acceptance of the said candidate.

In this case, the presumption arises that there was written acceptance by the
petitioner of the advertisement paid for or donated by his friends in absence of
evidence to the contrary because it was published by Sun Star. Under the Rules on
Evidence, it is presumed that the law has been obeyed, and that private
transactions have been fair and regular.

FACTS: Respondent Tomas Osmenia, then mayoral candidate in the 2004 national
and local elections in Cebu city, filed an election offense against his rival, petitioner
Alvin Garcia, for the publication of political advertisements that allegedly violated
the thrice-a-week publication requirement and failed to indicate the name and
address of the party or candidate for whose benefit the advertisements were
published.

Garcia denied Osmenia’s allegations.

The Office of the Regional Investigation and Prosecution Committee recommended

the dismissal of the complaint. The COMELEC en banc disagreed with the
recommendation of the investigating officer and directed the filing of the
appropriate information against respondent Garcia.

The case reached the Supreme Court. Petitioner Garcia argues that there is no
probable cause that he violated the thrice-a-week publication requirement and
failed to indicate the name and address of the party or candidate for whose benefit
the advertisements were published because he did not author or cause the
publication of the advertisement in question. The affidavit executed by the General
Manager of Sun Star Publishing, Inc. stated that the organization named Friends of
Alvin Garcia paid for the political advertisement.

Garcia admits that he and his family own stocks in Sun Star Publishing, Inc. He
claims, however, that Sun Star is independently operated by its News, Editorial and
Marketing Departments.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC was correct to presume that there is
probable cause against Garcia despite the presence of evidence that he did not
cause the publication of the political advertisement in question

RULING/RATIONALE: Yes. Section 4 of R.A. No. 9006 provides that:

Print, broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated to the candidate or
political party shall not be printed, published, broadcast or exhibited without
the written acceptance by the said candidate or political party. Such written
acceptance shall be attached to the advertising contract and shall be
submitted to the COMELEC as provided in Subsection 6.3 hereof.

To emphasize, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9006 requires that print advertisements

donated to a candidate shall not be published without the written acceptance of the
said candidate, which written acceptance shall be attached to the advertising
contract and submitted to the COMELEC.

In this case, the COMELEC did not question petitioner’s averment that the
advertisement in question was paid for by the organization named Friends of Alvin
Garcia. The advertisement may be considered as a donation to petitioner.
Petitioner Garcia also admits that he and his family own stocks in Sun Star
Publishing, Inc. Since the advertisement in question was published by the Sun
Star, there arises a presumption that there was written acceptance by petitioner
Garcia of the advertisement paid for or donated by his friends in the absence of
evidence to the contrary. Under the Rules on Evidence, it is presumed that the law
has been obeyed, and that private transactions have been fair and regular.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby

DISMISSED. The Resolutions of the COMELEC en banc dated April 28, 2005 and
October 5, 2005 are AFFIRMED.

B.3. No Presumption of Legitimacy or Illegitimacy (Rule 131, Sec. 4)

Cases:

1. Estate of Ong v. Diaz, G.R. No.171713, December 17, 2007, 540

SCRA 480

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: Davelyn Camille C. Rosales

CASE TITLE: Estate of Ong v. Diaz, G.R. No.171713, December 17, 2007, 540
SCRA 480

RULE:
RULE 131
Section 4. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. — There is no
presumption of legitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the
dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the spouses. Whoever alleges the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of such child must prove his or her allegation. (4a)

DOCTRINE:
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and
consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary.

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution
or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
physical impossibility of the husband’s having access to his wife within the first one
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the
child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a
way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.

FACTS:

This case involves a petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the Estate of Rogelio
G. Ong against minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, represented by her mother and
guardian, Jinky C. Diaz. The case was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Tarlac City and involves a complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for
support pending litigation. Jinky Diaz, the mother of Joanne, alleged that she and
Rogelio Ong had a relationship and that Joanne is their child. At this time,
however, Jinky was already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo.
Rogelio denied paternity and stopped supporting Joanne.

The RTC initially ruled in favor of Joanne, ordering Rogelio to recognize her as his
daughter and provide monthly support. Rogelio filed a motion for new trial, which
was granted by the RTC. RTC ruled that Joanne Rodjin is the child of Jinky and
defendant Rogelio. The lower court noted the law presumes that Joanne is a
legitimate child of the spouses Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz even if the
mother denies legitimacy.

However, the legitimacy may be impugned pursuant to Article 166 of the FC if there
must be a physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with
the wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days following the birth of the child
because of
a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
b) husband and wife were living separately in
such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible;
c) serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual intercourse.

In this case, the husband is a Japanese national and that he was living
outside of the country and he comes home only once a year. No evidence
was shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997 preceding the birth
of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.

The defendant admitted having been the one who shouldered the hospital bills for
the birth of plaintiff. It is an evidence of admission that he is the real father of
plaintiff. Defendant also admitted that he and Jinky used to go to motels even after
1996 and on some instances used to see Jinky after the birth of Joanne Rodjin.
Defendant was even the one who fetched Jinky after she gave birth to Joanne.

Rogelio Ong died.

The case was then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which remanded the case to
the RTC for DNA testing to determine paternity. The Estate of Rogelio Ong filed a
petition for review with the Supreme Court, questioning the remand for DNA
testing.

ISSUE:
Whether presumption of legitimacy is conclusive.
RULING/RATIONALE:

No, as a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor
Joanne for purposes of support in favor of the said minor.

Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to
secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the
present case), or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who
alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to
face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and child.

A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate.
As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167
of the Family Code provides:

Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.
We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of
Appeals:

The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute
but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of
the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent
offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and

consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255
of the New Civil Code provides:

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution
or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
physical impossibility of the husband’s having access to his wife within the first one
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the
child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

1) By the impotence of the husband;

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a
way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.

The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the

following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be

proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and its Resolution dated 1 March 2006
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

2. SSS v. Aguas, G.R. No. 165546, February 27, 2006, 483 SCRA
383e6

EVIDENCE
SY 2023-2024

PREPARED BY: PAULA FRAYNA

CASE TITLE: SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H. AGUAS, represented
by her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS, Respondents.

RULE: B.3. No Presumption of Legitimacy or Illegitimacy (Rule 131, Sec. 4)

DOCTRINE: It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

In this case, the presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth
certificate bearing Pablo’s signature, which was verified from his specimen signature
on file with petitioner. A birth certificate signed by the father is competent evidence of
paternity.

FACTS:
Pablo Aguas was a member of SSS and a pensioner who died on December 8, 1996. Pablo’s
surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits on
December 13, 1996.

In her claim, she indicated that Pablo was survived by his minor child, Jeylnn, who was born
on October 29, 1991. The claim was settled on February 13, 1997.
After two months, the sister of Pablo, Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac contested Rosanna’s claim
for death benefits alleging that Rosanna abandoned the family abode more than six years
before and lived with another man on whom she had been dependent for support.

She also alleges that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna but had children with Romeo
Dela Pena, to support her claim she submitted a copy of the original birth certificate of Jefren
H. Dela Pena born on November 15, 1996, to Rosanna Y. Hernandez and Romeo C. Dela
Pena.

SSS then suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn’s monthly pension in September
1997. SSS also investigated to verify Leticia’s allegation. During the investigation, it was
found out that Jenelyn and Jefren were Rosanna’s children with Romeo and left Pablo six
years before his death and lived with Romeo. At the same time, she was still pregnant with
Jenelyn, who was born on October 29, 1991. Mariquita D. Dizon, Pablo’s first cousin
confirmed that Pablo was incapable of having a child as he was under treatment.

Based on the report and an alleged confirmation by a certain Dr. Manuel Macapinlac that
Pablo was infertile, the SSS denied Rosanna’s request to resume the payment of their
pensions. She was advised to refund to the SSS within 30 days the amount of ₱10,350.00
representing the total death benefits released to her and Jenelyn from December 1996 to
August 1997 at ₱1,150.00 per month

Rosanna and Jeylnn, through counsel, requested a reconsideration of the said decision.
However, in its Letter dated February 6, 1998, the SSS denied the claim.

This prompted Rosanna and Jeylnn to file a claim/petition for the Restoration/Payment of
Pensions with the Social Security Commission (SSC) on February 20, 1998.11 Janet H.
Aguas, who also claimed to be the child of the deceased and Rosanna, now joined them as a
claimant. The case was docketed as SSC Case No. 3-14769-98.

The claimants appended to their petition, among others, photocopies of the following:
(1) Pablo and Rosanna’s marriage certificate;
(2) Janet’s certificate of live birth;
(3) Jeylnn’s certificate of live birth; and
(4) Pablo’s certificate of death.
The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as a primary beneficiary, it appeared
that she has contracted marriage during the subsistence of her marriage with Pablo. SSC
gave credence to the testimonies of Leticia and Mariquita that Jeylynn was the child of
Rosanna and Romeo dela Pena. As for Janet, the SSC relied on Leticia’s declaration that she
was only adopted by Pablo and Rosanna. The claimants then elevated the case to the CA, to
which CA reversed the SSC decision and favored the respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosanna, Jeylynn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing
from the death of Pablo - ONLY JEYLYNN

RULING/RATIONALE:
The Court has reviewed the records of the case and finds that only Jeylnn has sufficiently
established her right to a monthly pension.

Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature of
Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry showing that
she was born on October 29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were
married on December 4, 1977 and the marriage subsisted until the latter’s death on
December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablo’s
marriage.

It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during
the marriage of the parents are legitimate. This Court, in De Jesus v. Estate of Decedent Juan
Gamboa Dizon,43 extensively discussed this presumption –

“There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born
in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of
proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical
incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the
husband and wife are living separately in such way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170,44 and in proper cases
Article 171,45 of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn
the legitimacy of the child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the
presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.”

Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs. In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the
legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnn’s status as a legitimate child of
Pablo can no longer be contested.

The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth certificate bearing
Pablo’s signature, which was verified from his specimen signature on file with petitioner. A
birth certificate signed by the father is a competent evidence of paternity.

The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, can not extend to Janet because
her date of birth was not substantially proven. Such presumption may be availed only upon
convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married
and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. It should
be noted that respondents likewise submitted a photocopy of Janet’s alleged birth certificate.
However, the Court cannot give said birth certificate the same probative weight as Jeylnn’s
because it was not verified in any way by the civil register. It stands as a mere photocopy,
without probative weight. Unlike Jeylnn, there was no confirmation by the civil register of
the fact of Janet’s birth on the date stated in the certificate.

In any case, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.
Here, the witnesses were unanimous in saying that Janet was not the real child but merely
adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. Leticia also testified that Janet’s adoption did not undergo
any legal proceedings; hence, there were no papers to prove it. Under Section 8(e) of
Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, only "legally adopted" children are considered
dependent children. Absent any proof that the family has legally adopted Janet, the Court
cannot consider her a dependent child of Pablo, hence, not a primary beneficiary.
It appears from the records that Jeylnn Aguas and Jenelyn H. dela Peña are one and the
same person. Jeylnn Aguas, born on October 29, 1991 was baptized at the Metropolitan
Cathedral of San Fernando, Pampanga, on November 24, 1991 as the child of Pablo Aguas
and Rosanna Hernandez. Jenelyn H dela Peña, on the other hand, was born on January 29,
1992 to spouses Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Peña and baptized on February 9,
1992. It will be noted that Jenelyn dela Peña was born approximately three months after the
birth of Jeylnn Aguas. It is physically impossible for Rosanna to have given birth successively
to two children in so short a time. x x x The testimony of Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac that
Rosanna was driven away by Pablo after the baptism of Jeylnn because of the commotion
that was created by Romeo dela Peña who wanted Jeylnn to be baptized using his name
explains why Jeylnn was again baptized in the Parish of Sto. Niño in San Fernando using the
name Jenelyn dela Peña. They changed her date of birth also to make it appear in the record
of the parish that she is another child of Rosanna

On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a primary beneficiary,
she must prove that she was "the legitimate spouse dependent for support from the
employee." The claimant-spouse must therefore establish two qualifying factors: (1)
that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member for
support. In this case, Rosanna presented proof to show that she is the legitimate
spouse of Pablo, that is, a copy of their marriage certificate which was verified with the
civil register by petitioner. But whether or not Rosanna has sufficiently established that she
was still dependent on Pablo at the time of his death remains to be resolved. Indeed, a
husband and wife are obliged to support each other, but whether one is actually dependent
for support upon the other is something that has to be shown; it cannot be presumed from the
fact of marriage alone.

The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her
husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any
showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living
together at the time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the
husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself.

Rosanna had the burden to prove that all the statutory requirements have been complied
with, particularly her dependency on her husband for support at the time of his death. Aside
from her own testimony, the only evidence adduced by Rosanna to prove that she and Pablo
lived together as husband and wife until his death were the affidavits of Vivencia Turla and
Carmelita Yangu where they made such declaration.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
Only Jeylnn H. Aguas is declared entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the
death of Pablo Aguas.

SO ORDERED.