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Title-1 Obligations1

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Title-1 Obligations1

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erehhhh
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TITLE I — OBLIGATIONS

CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do.

Obligation
- “The juridical necessity to comply with a prestation” (benefit) (Sanchez Roman)
- “Legal relation established between one person and another, whereby the latter is bound to the
fulfillment of a prestation which the former may demand of him.” (Manresa)

a. Civil
o Has a binding force in law, and which gives to the obligee or creditor the right of enforcing it
against the obligor or debtor in a court of justice.
o Obligation which is defined in Art. 1156 of the Code.
o
b. Natural
o Cannot be enforced by action, but which is binding on the party who makes it in conscience
and according to the natural law.
o Thus, when an action has prescribed in accordance with the statute of limitations, a natural
obligation still subsists, although the civil obligation is extinguished.

Civil Obligation Natural Obligation


Based on positive law Based on equity and natural law
Enforceable in courts of justice Not enforceable in courts of justice

Essential Requisites of Obligations


1. Juridical or legal tie
o Binds the parties to the obligation
o May arise from either bilateral or unilateral acts of persons;
2. An active subject (obligee or creditor)
o Who can demand the fulfillment of the obligation
3. A passive subject (obligor or debtor)
o Against whom the obligation is juridically demandable
4. The fact, prestation or service
o Constitutes the object of the obligation.

* 5. Form which the obligation is manifested. (cannot be considered essential)


- Obligations arising from law, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts do
not require any form whatsoever, yet there can be no question regarding their validity or binding force.
- It is only in obligations arising from certain contracts that it becomes essential.

a. Thus, in a contract involving a donation of personal property whose value exceeds P5,000.00, the law
requires that the donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing;
b. in a contract of sale of a piece of land or any interest therein through an agent, the law requires that
the authority of the latter shall be in writing;
c. in a contract of simple loan or mutuum, the law requires that any agreement with respect to interest
shall be expressly stipulated in writing;
d. in a contract of antichresis, the law requires that the amount of the principal and of the interest shall
be specified in writing;
e. in a contract involving a donation of immovable property, the law requires that the donation shall be
made in a public document, while the acceptance shall be made either in the same deed of donation
or in a separate public document;
f. in a contract of partnership where immovable property or real rights are contributed to the common
fund, the law requires that the contract shall be in a public instrument to which an inventory of the
property or real rights, signed by the partners, must be attached;

Art. 1156-1162
g. in a contract of chattel mortgage, the law requires that the personal property which is the subject
matter of the contract shall be recorded in the Chattel Mortgage Register as a security for the
performance of an obligation; and
h. in a contract involving the sale or transfer of large cattle, the law requires that the sale or transfer shall
be registered.
Non-compliance with such formalities would have the effect of rendering the contract or agreement void or
inexistent.

Primary Classifications of Obligations


1. Pure and conditional (Arts. 1179-1192).
2. With a period (Arts. 1193-1198).
3. Alternative and facultative (Arts. 1199-1206).
4. Joint and solidary (Arts. 1207-1222).
5. Divisible and indivisible (Arts. 1223-1225).
6. With a penal clause (Arts. 1226-1230).

Secondary Classifications of Obligations


1. Legal, conventional and penal;
2. Real and personal;
3. Determinate and generic;
4. Positive and negative;
5. Unilateral and bilateral;
6. Individual and collective;
7. Accessory and principal.

Classification of Obligations according to Sanchez Roman


1. As to juridical quality:
(a) Natural — when the obligation is in accordance with natural law.
(b) Civil — when the obligation is in accordance with positive law.
(c) Mixed — when the obligation is in accordance with both natural and positive law.

2. As to parties:
(a) Unilateral and bilateral — unilateral, where only one party is bound, and bilateral, where both
parties are mutually or reciprocally bound.
(b) Individual and collective — individual, where there is only one obligor, and collective, where there
are several obligors. The latter may be joint, when each obligor is liable only for his proportionate
share of the obligation, or solidary, when each obligor may be held liable for the entire obligation.

3. As to object:
(a) Determinate and generic — determinate, when the object is specific; generic, when the object is
designated by its class or genus.
(b) Simple and multiple — simple, when there is only one undertaking; multiple, when there are several
undertakings. Multiple obligations may be conjunctive, when all of the undertakings are
demandable at the same time, or distributive, when only one undertaking out of several is
demandable. Distributive obligations, on the other hand, may be alternative, when the obligor is
allowed to choose one out of several obligations which may be due and demandable, or facultative,
when the obligor is allowed to substitute another obligation for one which is due and demandable.
(c) Positive and negative — positive, when the obligor is obliged to give or do something; negative,
when the obligor must refrain from giving or doing something.
(d) Real and personal — real, when the obligation consists in giving something; personal, when the
obligation consists in doing or not doing something.
(e) Possible and impossible — possible, when the obligation is capable of fulfillment in nature as well as
in law; impossible, when the obligation is not capable of fulfillment either in nature or in law.
(f) Divisible and indivisible — divisible, when the obligation is susceptible of partial performance;
indivisible, when the obligation is not susceptible of partial performance.
(g) Principal and accessory — principal, when it is the main undertaking; accessory, when it is merely an
undertaking to guarantee the fulfillment of the principal obligation.

Art. 1156-1162
4. As to perfection and extinguishment:
(a) Pure — when the obligation is not subject to any condition or term and is immediately demandable.
(b) Conditional — when the obligation is subject to a condition which may be suspensive, in which case
the happening or fulfillment of the condition results in the birth of the obligation, or resolutory, in
which case the happening or fulfillment of the condition results in the extinguishment of the
obligation.
(c) With a term or period (a plazo) — when the obligation is subject to a term or period which may be
suspensive or from a day certain, in which case the obligation is demandable only upon the
expiration of the term, or resolutory or to a day certain, in which case the obligation terminates
upon the expiration of the term.

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from: Law; Contracts; Quasi-contracts; Acts or omissions punished by law; and
Quasi-delicts
Sources of Obligations
In Roman law, the sources of obligations are:
(1) contractu;
(2) quasi-contractu;
(3) maleficio; and
(4) quasi-maleficio.
These sources are preserved in the Civil Code with the addition of law or lege. The addition of lege as an
independent source of obligations, however, has been criticized as theoretically erroneous.

Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in
special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them; and
as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.

Obligations Arising from Law


- Unlike other obligations, those derived from law can never be presumed.
- Consequently, only those expressly determined in the Civil Code or in special laws are demandable.
- These obligations shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them, and as to what
has not been foreseen, by the provisions of Book IV of the Civil Code.

How can we determine whether an obligation arises from law or from some other source, such as a contract,
quasi-contract, criminal offense or quasi-delict?
- It must be noted that in the birth or generation of an obligation, there is always a concurrence between
the law which establishes or recognizes it and an act or condition upon which the obligation is based or
predicated.
- According to Manresa, when the law establishes the obligation and the act or condition upon which it
is based is nothing more than a factor for determining the moment when it becomes demandable, then
the law itself is the source of the obligation; however, when the law merely recognizes or acknowledges
the existence of an obligation generated by an act which may constitute a contract, quasi-contract,
criminal offense or quasi-delict and its only purpose is to regulate such obligation, then the act itself is
the source of the obligation and not the law.

Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should
be complied with in good faith

Obligations Arising from Contracts.


- A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the
other, to give something or to render some service.
o As a rule, contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the parties are
bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all of the
consequences which according to their nature may be in keeping with good faith, usage and
law.These contracts are commonly called consensual contracts. Once the contract is
perfected, the valid contract has the force of law binding the parties to comply therewith in
good faith, where neither one may renege therefrom without the consent of the other.

Art. 1156-1162
o There are certain contracts, however, called real contracts, such as deposit, pledge and
commodatum, which are not perfected until the delivery of the object of the obligation.
- Whether the contract is consensual or real, the rule is that from the moment it is perfected, obligations
which may be either reciprocal or unilateral arise.
o Reciprocal obligations are those where the parties are mutually or reciprocally obliged to do
or to give something;
o Unilateral obligations are those where only one of the parties, the obligor, is obliged to do or
to give something.

Art. 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contracts shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter 1, Title XVII,
of this Book.

Obligations Arising from Quasi-Contracts.


- Quasi-contracts are those juridical relations arising from lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts, by virtue
of which the parties become bound to each other, based on the principle that no one shall be unjustly
enriched or benefi ted at the expense of another.
- The most important of these juridical relations which are recognized and regulated by the Civil Code
are negotiorum gestio and solutio indebiti.
o Negotiorum gestio is the juridical relation which arises whenever a person voluntarily takes
charge of the agency or management of the business or property of another without any
power or authority from the latter. In this type of quasi-contract, once the gestor or officious
manager has assumed the agency or management of the business or property, he shall be
obliged to continue such agency or management until the termination of the affair and its
incidents exercising such rights and complying with such obligations as provided for in the
Code.
o Solutio indebiti, is the juridical relation which arises whenever a person unduly delivers a thing
through mistake to another who has no right to demand it. In this type of quasi-contract, once
the delivery has been made, the person to whom the delivery is unduly made shall have the
obligation to return the property delivered or the money paid.

Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising from offenses shall be governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions
of Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of
Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages.

Obligations Arising from Criminal Offenses.


- As a rule, every person liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
- This principle is based on the fact that, generally, a crime has a dual aspect — the criminal aspect and
the civil aspect.
- Although these two aspects are separate and distinct from each other in the sense that one affects the
social order and the other, private rights, so that the purpose of the first is to punish or correct the
offender, while the purpose of the second is to repair the damages suffered by the aggrieved party, it
is evident that the basis of the civil liability is the criminal liability itself.

Please note, however, that there are offenses and special crimes without civil liability. Examples are crimes
of treason, rebellion, illegal possession of fi rearm and gambling. But a person who is not criminally liable may
still be civilly liable.

Enforcement of civil liability. — In general and prior to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000, the
following rules are observed in the enforcement or prosecution of civil liability arising from criminal offenses:
1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party (i) expressly waives the civil action, or (ii) reserves his right to institute it
separately, or (iii) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may
be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved.

Art. 1156-1162
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.

3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in the preceding rules, the following
rules are observed:

(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced, the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action;

(b) If the civil action has been fi led ahead of the criminal action, and the criminal action is subsequently
commenced, the civil action shall be suspended in whatever stage before final judgment it may be found,
until final judgment in criminal action has been rendered. However, if no final judgment has been rendered
by the trial court in the civil action, the same may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application
with the court trying the criminal action. If the application is granted, the evidence prevented and
admitted in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action, without
prejudice to the admission of additional evidence that any party may wish to present. In case of
consolidation, both the criminal and the civil action shall be tried and decided jointly;

(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a fi nal judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other
cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided
by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for
the damage suffered.

4. Judgment in civil action not a bar. — A fi nal judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant
from civil liability is no bar to a criminal action.

5. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition for suspension of the criminal action based
upon the pendency of a prejudicial

Effect of acquittal.
- If the acquittal of the accused is based on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action to recover damages based on the same act or omission may still be
instituted.
- In such case, mere preponderance of evidence shall be sufficient in order that the plaintiff will be able
to recover from the defendant.
- On the other hand, if the acquittal is based on the ground that he did not commit the offense charged,
or what amounts to the same thing, if the acquittal proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the subsequent institution of a civil action
to recover damages is, as a general rule, no longer possible.

Effect of independent civil actions.


- As a rule, the civil action to recover damages from the person criminally liable is not independent from
the criminal action.
- This is true even where it has, to a certain extent, been separated by the injured party from the criminal
proceedings either by reserving his right to fi le a separate civil action or by commencing the action to
recover damages ahead of the criminal action.
- In the first, the right to file a civil action shall depend upon the result of the criminal action, while in the
second, once the criminal action is instituted, the action to recover damages shall be suspended.
- There are, however, certain exceptional cases or instances under the Civil Code where the civil action
to recover damages is entirely separate and independent from the criminal action, although the act or
omission which is the basis thereof may be a criminal offense. They are: first, where the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a criminal offense or
felony; and second, where the law grants to the injured party the right to institute a civil action which
is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action

Art. 1156-1162
Effect of failure to make reservation.
- Section 2 of Rule 111 of the New Rules of Court states: “In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33,
34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case, provided that the right is reserved as required in the preceding section.’’
- The insertion in the foregoing provision of the phrase provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section, resulted in a debate among academicians which lasted for more than twenty years.

Removal of Reservation Requirement For Independent Civil Actions


- Accordingly, Section 2 of the New Rules of Court was likewise amended to read as:
“SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. — In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.’’ (Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000).

Under the former rule, the foregoing actions may only be allowed if there is a reservation, or were fi led ahead
of the criminal action. (Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Treatise on Criminal Procedure, February 2001).

Art. 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII
of the Book, and by special laws.

Obligations Arising from Quasi-Delicts.


- As it is used in this part of the Civil Code, the term “quasi-delicts” refers to all of those obligations which
do not arise from law, contracts, quasicontracts, or criminal offenses.
- Thus, using Art. 2176 of the Civil Code and decided cases as bases or anchors, it may be defined as the
fault or negligence of a person, who, by his act or omission, connected or unconnected with, but
independent from, any contractual relation, causes damage to another person. It is, therefore, the
equivalent of the term “tort” in Anglo-American law.

Persons liable. — Obligations arising from quasi-delicts are demandable not only from the person directly
responsible for the damage incurred, but also against the following:
1. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, with respect to damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company;
2. Guardians, with respect to damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and who live in their company;
3. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise, with respect to damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions;
4. Employers with respect to damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry;
5. The State, when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains; and
6. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades, with respect to damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

It must be noted, however, that the responsibility of the above persons or entities shall cease if they can prove
that they have observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Requisites of liability. — In actions based on quasidelicts, before the person injured can recover damages from
the defendant, it is necessary that he must be able to prove the following facts:
1. The fault or negligence of the defendant;
2. The damage suffered or incurred by the plaintiff; and
3. The relation of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage
incurred by the plaintiff

Art. 1156-1162
Quasi-delicts and crimes. — Quasi-delicts and criminal offenses are sometimes difficult to distinguish from each
other. However, they may be distinguished from each other in the following ways:
1. Crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delicts are only of private concern;
2. The Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification,
merely repairs the damages incurred;
3. Generally, there are two liabilities in crime: criminal and civil. In quasi-delict, there is only civil liability;
4. Crimes are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a law clearly
covering them, while the latter include all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.

Scope of quasi-delicts.
- In Elcano vs. Hill (G.R. No. L-24303, May 26, 1977), the Supreme Court held that quasi-delicts include
acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent.
- Using the exact language of the Court, “it is ‘more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice,
and more in harmony with modern progress,’ to hold, as we do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers
to fault or negligence, covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional or voluntary or negligent.’’

Character of remedy.
- In Padua vs. Robles,84 in his concurring opinion, Justice Barredo declared: “It is by now beyond all cavil,
as to dispense with the citation of jurisprudence, that a negligent act, such as that committed in this
case, gives rise to at least two separate and independent liabilities, namely (1) the civil liability arising
from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising from civil negligence or the so-called culpa
aquiliana.
- These two concepts of faults are so distinct from each other that exoneration from one does not result
in exoneration from the other.
- Adjectively and substantively, they can be prosecuted separately and independently of each other,
although Article 2177 of the Civil Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act
or omission, which means that should there be varying amounts awarded in two separate cases, the
plaintiff may recover, in effect, only the bigger amount.
- That is to say, if the plaintiff had already been ordered paid an amount in one case and in the other
case the amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled in the second case only to the excess over the
one fixed in the first case, but if he had already been paid a bigger amount in the first case, he may not
recover anymore in the second case.’’

Death of Accused on Appeal


- “The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall
extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict.
- The original proposal of the Committee was to require the criminal court to proceed with the
determination of the civil liability that is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action
other than the civil liability arising from the crime to modify the ruling in Bayotas vs. Court of
Appeals, which then held that since death extinguished the civil liability of the accused and the
corresponding civil liability arising from a crime, the offended party should fi le a separate civil
action to recover civil liability arising from other sources of civil liability.
- The ruling was then criticized. Since the civil liability arising from other sources were deemed
impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless there is a waiver, reservation or separate civil,
then the same should be resolved in the same proceedings despite the death of the accused.
- Since, however, The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure limited the civil liability to what is
deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action to civil liability arising from crime, there
would have been no need for the amendment as death of the accused would only extinguish such
civil liability.
- The rule was, however, retained by the court to apply to the civil actions under Section 3 of the
Rule. The rule would, however, apply only if any of the civil actions under Section 3 is consolidated
with the criminal action, otherwise, since the actions under Section 3 are purely civil actions, the
effects of death of a party are to be governed by the Rules on Civil Procedure.’’ (Rule 3, Secs. 16,
17 and 20, 1997 RCP

Art. 1156-1162

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