 TMWBPS/2022

 The protection of whistle-blowers in

the public service sector

Technical meeting on the protection of whistle-blowers in the public service sector

(Geneva, 26–30 September 2022)

Sectoral Policies Department

Geneva, 2022
 TMWBPS/2022 3

 Preface

This report was prepared by the International Labour Office as a basis for discussions at the
technical meeting on the protection of whistle-blowers in the public service sector, to be held in Geneva
from 26 to 30 September 2022.
The technical meeting stems from a series of proposals made by constituents following the Global
Dialogue Forum on Challenges in Collective Bargaining in the Public Service (Geneva, 2–3 April 2014). 1
The conclusions of that Forum included references to the role of legislation, social dialogue and
collective bargaining in the independence and protection of public servants, including anti-corruption
legislation. The Workers’ group highlighted this issue at a meeting of the Sectoral Advisory Bodies held
in October 2014. The Governing Body was informed in October 2015 that a proposal from Public Services
International had been received for an item to be placed on the International Labour Conference
agenda with a view to standard-setting to ensure the independence, impartiality and protection of
certain categories of public service workers, notably through the fight against corruption. 2
As this was considered an emerging topic, the document submitted to the Governing Body in
October 2016 suggested that the topic be examined first by a meeting of experts. At their meeting held
from 11 to 13 January 2017, the Sectoral Advisory Bodies recommended that the Office undertake
research on the topic as part of the sectoral programme 2018–019. As a result, the Office published a
working paper on national law and practice on protecting whistle-blowers in the public and financial
services sectors. 3
The topic was then considered sufficiently mature for examination by a meeting of experts. At
their meeting held in January 2021, the Sectoral Advisory Bodies decided to propose to the Governing
Body that a technical meeting on the protection of whistle-blowers in the public service sector be
convened during the 2022–23 biennium. The Governing Body endorsed this proposal at its
341st Session (March 2021). 4 At its 343rd Session, the Governing Body set the dates of the meeting for
26–30 September 2022, with a composition of interested governments, eight Employer representatives
and eight Worker representatives; advisers and observers; and official international organizations and
non-governmental international organizations as observers. 5

1
ILO, Final Report of the Discussion: Global Dialogue Forum on Challenges to Collective Bargaining in the Public Service , GDFPS/2014/11,
2014.
2
Agenda of the International Labour Conference, 325th Session, GB.325/INS/2, 2015, para. 31.
3
Iheb Chalouat, Carlos Carrión-Crespo and Margherita Licata, Law and Practice on Protecting Whistle-blowers in the Public and
Financial Services Sectors, ILO Sectoral Policies Working Paper No. 328 (ILO, 2019).
4
Minutes of the 341st Session of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, GB.341/PV, 2021, paras 653–662.
5
Sectoral meetings held in 2021 and proposals for sectoral work in 2022–23, GB.343/POL/2(Rev.2), 2021, Appendix I.
 TMWBPS/2022 5

 Contents

Page

Preface ....................................................................................................................................................... 3
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................................ 7
I. Background and context ............................................................................................................... 9
II. Defining corruption and whistle-blowing ................................................................................... 10
Corruption and its impact on decent work ................................................................................. 11
Whistle-blowing .............................................................................................................................. 12
III. Whistle-blowing and public service workers .............................................................................. 13
Public servants with a duty to report on corrupt practices ...................................................... 14
Independence of the public service and public servants ................................................. 14
Workers of public sector oversight institutions ......................................................................... 16
IV. Protection of whistle-blowers ....................................................................................................... 17
From freedom of expression to anti-corruption ........................................................................ 17
International and regional instruments, agreements and guidelines ................................... 18
National legislation on whistle-blower protection .................................................................... 20
Scope of issues subject to whistle-blowing protection ..................................................... 23
Requirement of good faith .................................................................................................... 24
Institutions and practices .............................................................................................................. 25
Reporting channels and anonymity ..................................................................................... 26
Protection against retaliation ............................................................................................... 29
Incentives to report irregularities ........................................................................................ 32
Enforcement mechanisms..................................................................................................... 33
V. Protection of whistle-blowers in practice .................................................................................... 33
Successes through the protection of whistle-blowers .............................................................. 33
Continued challenges in the protection of whistle-blowers .................................................... 34
Cultural dimensions of whistle-blower protection .................................................................... 37
VI. Social dialogue related to the protection of whistle-blowers .................................................. 38
VII. Concluding remarks ....................................................................................................................... 41
 TMWBPS/2022 7

 Abbreviations

CEACR Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EU European Union

GRECO Group of States against Corruption

IACHR Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

ILO International Labour Organization

INTOSAI International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions

OAS Organization of American States

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OSC Office of Special Counsel

SADC Southern African Development Community

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

 TMWBPS/2022 9

 I. Background and context

1. The COVID-19 pandemic underlined the critical importance of a well-functioning and independent
public service. Among other functions, public services had to deliver emergency and health
services to those sickened by the virus, administer vaccines and process relief funds to those
whose livelihoods had been impacted by containment measures. The ILO’s Global Call to Action
for a human-centred recovery from the COVID-19 crisis that is inclusive, sustainable and resilient
recognized this essential role of the public service and called on the ILO constituents to “reinforce
the essential role of the public sector in supporting well-functioning economies and societies”. In
addition, evidence suggests that countries with strong public governance institutions and
practices are recovering better and in a more inclusive manner. 6
2. While public services were critical to the COVID-19 pandemic response and recovery, the
pandemic also exposed the vulnerability of the public services (among other sectors) to
corruption. 7 As billions of dollars flowed through public services to provide health services or
release relief funds, several cases of fraud and corruption became apparent. 8 Therefore, it is
evident that future resilience in emergency situations will require greater safeguards to ensure
integrity of public services.
3. This paper examines one critical strategy for ensuring integrity in the public services: the
protection of whistle-blowers in the public service sector. It will examine national, regional and
international policies and practices on whistle-blower protection, and will assess to what degree
international labour standards have addressed elements of this challenge.
4. An ILO perspective on this issue is timely. In recent discussions on COVID-19 vaccines, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have called on governments to increase the levels of trust of their
citizens by improving, among other things, the protection of whistle-blowers and the capacity and
effectiveness of regulatory agencies in handling issues and communicating consistently as events
arise, thereby building public confidence in their review processes.
5. Such initiatives draw on the increased attention paid to ethics and decent work for public servants
following the 2008 economic and financial crisis. Following that crisis, the pace of ratification of
the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151), has increased (57 ratifications to
date) and calls have increased for greater transparency in public administration. Public servants
themselves have played an increasing role in promoting and enforcing ethics and transparency
standards around the world, often through their organizations.
6. Public sector whistle-blowers play a pivotal role in supporting transparency and accountability.
They bring to light illegal activities, such as tax evasion, gross mismanagement, corruption and
collusion, that are contrary to the public interest. They provide “early-warning signs” of potential
liabilities for government agencies, which can prevent and limit the damage to their respective

6
OECD, Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions in Finland, 2021.
7
UNODC, Speak up for Health! Guidelines to Enable Whistle-Blower Protection in the Health-Care Sector, 2021.
8
UNODC, “Accountability and the Prevention of Corruption in the Allocation and Distribution of Emergency Economic Rescue
Packages in the Context and Aftermath of the COVID-19 Pandemic“, 2020; UNODC, Corruption and COVID-19: Challenges in Crisis
Response and Recovery, 2020.
 TMWBPS/2022 10

missions. 9 Evidence suggests that the percentage of employees (public, private and not-for-profit
workers) who report misconduct has been increasing since 2015 (see figure 1). A survey of more
than 14,000 workers in the private, public and not-for-profit sectors in ten countries showed that
33 per cent of workers had witnessed misconduct, 81 per cent of whom had reported it. 10

 Figure 1. Percentage of employees who reported misconduct in selected countries,

2015, 2019, 2020

97%
92%
87%
85%
83% 82% 81%
79% 78% 78%
76% 77%
74%
71%

63% 64%64% 63% 64% 63%

60%
58% 58%
53% 53% 53%
50% 50%
46%

37%

Mexico Brazil France Germany Spain United China India Russian Global
Kingdom Federation median
2015 2019 2020

Source: ECI, 2021 Global Business Ethics Survey Report – The State of Ethics & Compliance in the Workplace: A Look at Global Trends,
2021, 21.

7. The actions of these workers help save billions of dollars in public funds, which could instead be
channelled to productive sectors that grow the economy, improve the working conditions of
public service workers and ensure the efficient delivery of public services. Where misconduct
impacts health, safety and the environment, public sector whistle-blowing can also save lives.
However, in disclosing relevant information, whistle-blowers often risk their jobs, their freedom
or even their own lives. About 61 per cent of workers who report misconduct are retaliated
against. 11 Their protection has emerged as an essential element in the fight against corruption,
fraud, financial mismanagement and other malpractices that can compromise the delivery of
public services. Moreover, the protection of whistle-blowers has proven to be intrinsically linked

9
David Banisar, “Whistleblowing: International Standards and Developments“, Corruption and Transparency: Debating the Frontiers
between State, Market and Society, ed. I. Sandoval (World Bank Institute for Social Research, 2011).
10
Ethics and Compliance Initiative (ECI), 2021 Global Business Ethics Survey Report – The State of Ethics & Compliance in the Workplace:
A Look at Global Trends, 2021.
11
ECI.
 TMWBPS/2022 11

to protecting the environment, sustainable growth, human rights and employment. Most
importantly in this context, it has emerged as fundamental in advancing decent work for public
service workers.

 II. Defining corruption and whistle-blowing

Corruption and its impact on decent work

8. Laws and academic discussions 12 have defined corruption in a myriad of ways, ranging from the
very broad to the exceedingly narrow. 13 Corruption therefore lacks a universal definition.
National, regional and international legal instruments have included exhaustive lists of
criminalized conduct instead of defining corruption. For example, section 4(1) of Liberia’s
Executive Order No. 62 (2014) criminalizes “abuse of power by a governmental body or an official”
and “improper or unauthorized use of the funds or other assets of the state or a governmental
body”.
9. Where corruption is defined, most definitions have adopted the principal–agent–client model.
Under this model, the public servant is an agent, the government employer is the principal and
the public is the client:
[C]orruption occurs when an agent betrays the principal’s interest in pursuit of his own by
accepting or seeking a benefit from the service seeker, the client (C). The conditions for
corruption present themselves when the principal (P) is in a powerful position and the agent (A),
whom P has entrusted to carry out the services, has an element of discretion in administering
the services, and there is a lack or near lack of accountability. If P is in a monopolistic position,
... and the decision of how, when, where and to whom connections are to be allocated is left to
A’s judgement with no clear and accessible procedures and checks in respect of the decision-
making process, the situation easily lends itself to corruption. 14

10. Corruption causes decent work deficits in multiple ways that detract from the human-centred
future of work envisioned in the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work, 2019. Such
deficits can include:

• loss of public investments in infrastructure, which have a high multiplier value in terms of
indirect and induced employment; 15
• loss of social services, which aggravates poverty, hinders enterprise development and reduces
educational opportunities; 16
• reduction of human capital accumulation, “because more time is invested in political capital to
improve the bureaucratic power of individuals than on the productive education sector”; 17

12
Indira Carr, “Corruption, the Southern African Development Community Anti-Corruption Protocol and the Principal–Agent–
Client Model”, International Journal of Law in Context 5, No. 2 (2009): 148–149.
13
Guoping Jiang, Corruption Control in Post-Reform China: A Social Censure Perspective (Singapore: Springer Nature, 2017); Carr.
14
Carr, 151–152. For an equivalent description under civil law doctrine, see Maria Fe Blanes Soliva and Fabiola Meco Tébar, “La
protección de datos de las personas denunciantes en casos de corrupción en el sistema español”, Cuadernos de Política Criminal
129, No. III (2019): 156–157.
15
OECD, “Curbing Corruption: Investing in Growth“, background document, 3rd OECD Integrity Forum, 2015.
16
UNODC and UNDP, “Corruption and Development“, 2016.
17
Spyridon Boikos, “Corruption, Public Expenditure and Human Capital Accumulation”, Review of Economic Analysis 8, No. 1 (2016), 19.
 TMWBPS/2022 12

• degradation of organizational culture, which tolerates corruption and divests the services of
staff working time; 18 and
• weakening of oversight institutions, which reduces transparency and exposes those workers to
retaliation. 19
11. Corruption has also emerged as a critical impediment to efforts to contain the spread of COVID-19
by diverting funds from essential services and weakening both the efficiency of crisis responses
and respect for human rights. 20
12. Overall, such consequences disproportionately affect poor and vulnerable groups such as
informal workers and those affected by conflict. 21 The International Labour Conference has
recognized the need to address corruption. For example, Paragraph 23 of the Transition from the
Informal to the Formal Economy Recommendation, 2015 (No. 204), calls on ILO Member States to
“take measures to promote anti-corruption efforts and good governance”. 22 Paragraph 7(c) of the
Employment and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience Recommendation, 2017 (No. 205), advises
that in “taking measures on employment and decent work in response to crisis situations arising
from conflicts and disasters, and with a view to prevention, Members should take into account ...
the importance of good governance and combating corruption and clientelism”. 23 Furthermore,
Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) calls on all United Nations Member States
to “build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”, while SDG target 16.5 aims
to “[s]ubstantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms”. In this regard, whistle-blowers
are key stakeholders in the delivery of quality public services; securing full, productive and freely
chosen employment and decent work opportunities for all; protection of the environment;
sustainable growth; human rights; and the attainment of the SDGs by 2030.

Whistle-blowing
13. Discussions about the definition and nature of whistle-blowing are very diverse since national and
organizational culture can influence the appreciation of acceptable behaviour or what is in the
public interest. 24 ILO Member States have no uniform definition of whistle-blowing. One widely
accepted definition is “the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal,
immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations

18
Marlen Jamie-Lee Campbell, “Organizational Cultures’ Impact on Employees’ Corruption“ (dissertation, Julius-Maximilians-
Universität Würzburg, 2015); Alison Taylor, “What Do Corrupt Firms Have in Common? Red Flags of Corruption in Organizational
Culture“, Columbia University Center for the Advancement of Public Integrity, 2016.
19
International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Corruption: Costs and Mitigating Strategies“, Staff Discussion Note, 2016.
20
Jon Vrushi and Roberto Martínez B. Kukutschka, “Why Fighting Corruption Matters in Times of COVID-19“, Transparency
International, 28 January 2021.
21
UNDP and Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI), Women and Corruption in the Water Sector: Theories and Experiences
from Johannesburg and Bogotá, Water Governance Facility Report No. 8, 2017, 18.
22
This text had been proposed at the Tripartite Meeting of Experts held in September 2013 by the Employers’ group, which
requested that anti-corruption measures be included to fight the causes of informality. ILO, Report of the Director-General: Sixth
Supplementary Report – Report of the Tripartite Meeting of Experts on Facilitating Transitions from the Informal Economy to the
Formal Economy, GB.319/INS/14/6, 2013.
23
This text had been proposed by the Government member of the Netherlands at the first discussion of the proposed instrument
held in 2016. ILO, Provisional Record No. 15-2(Rev.), ILC.105/PR15-2(Rev.), 2016.
24
Jiang, 2017; Indira Carr and David Lewis, “Combating Corruption through Employment Law and Whistleblower Protection“,
Industrial Law Journal 39, No. 1 (2010): 52–81; Gedion Onyango, “Whistleblower Protection in Developing Countries: A Review of
Challenges and Prospects“, paper presented at an International Anti-Corruption Academy webinar on the theme “Corruption,
conflict of interest and whistleblowing in public administration”, 2 September 2021.
 TMWBPS/2022 13

that may be able to effect action”. 25 Another common element in many definitions is that the
disclosure is made to agents who have the authority to address the irregularity. 26 The European
Union (EU) Directive 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of EU law refers
to whistle-blowers as “persons who report breaches of Union law” or “persons who report evasive
and/or abusive arrangements.” 27
14. One academic source describes whistle-blowing as a four-step process:

• the triggering event involves questionable, unethical or illegal activities;

• an employee who witnesses or is aware of the questionable activity assesses the activity and
evaluates whether it involves wrongdoing;
• the employee reveals the wrongful event; and
• superiors, colleagues or other persons react to the revelation. 28

 III. Whistle-blowing and public service workers

15. Although there are whistle-blowers in many sectors, public servants “have more information
about the institutional mechanisms for receiving and processing complaints of corruption, but at
the same time are most vulnerable in the absence of appropriate protection systems for reporting
acts of corruption”. 29 Their position inside government entities exposes them to internal
wrongdoing, 30 “which may damage an organization’s reputation and/or performance” 31 and
allows them to report irregularities. However, it can also “expose them to unfair outcomes if they
speak up”. 32

25
Ruggero Scaturro, Defining Whistleblowing, International Anti-Corruption Academy Research Paper Series No. 05, May 2018,
citing J.P. Near and M.P. Miceli, “Organizational Dissidence: The Case of Whistle-Blowing”, Journal of Business Ethics 4 (1985): 1–16
and 4. The ILO Thesaurus defines whistle-blowing as “the reporting by employees or former employees of illegal, irregular,
dangerous or unethical practices by employers”.
26
For example, Łucja Kobroń-Gasiorowska, “The COVID-19 Pandemic and the Whistleblower Protection in Poland”, in The Global
Labour Rights Reporter: Access to Labour Justice, ILaw Network 1, No. 1 (2021): 36–38; Wim Vandekerckhove, “Is it Freedom? The
Coming About of the EU Directive on Whistleblower Protection“, Journal of Business Ethics (2021); Transparency International,
“Whistleblowing: An Effective Tool in the Fight against Corruption“, 2010; and John McLaren, Wesley Kendall and Laura Rook,
“Would the Singaporean Approach to Whistleblower Protection Laws Work in Australia?“, Australasian Accounting, Business and
Finance Journal 13, No. 1 (2019): 91–108.
27
European Parliament and European Council, Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law.
28
Banisar, 24.
29
Franz Chevarría and Martha Silvestre, Sistemas de denuncias y de protección de denunciantes de corrupción en América Latina y
Europa (Madrid: Programa EUROsociAL, 2013).
30
A.J. Brown, “Towards ‘Ideal’ Whistleblowing Legislation? Some Lessons from Recent Australian Experience“, E-Journal of
International and Comparative Labour Studies 2, No. 3 (2013): 153–182.
31
Schona Jolly and Dee Masters, “In the Matter of Whistleblowing Protection for Workers at the Centre of the COVID-19 Pandemic:
Joint Opinion“ (The Good Law Project, 2020), 6.
32
Brown, 11.
 TMWBPS/2022 14

Public servants with a duty to report on corrupt practices

16. Public servants have the duty to respect the confidentiality of the information they receive. They
also generally owe a duty to report irregularities that they witness in the course of their work. 33
This is a fiduciary duty, as they act on behalf of taxpayers who finance public services rather than
the government entity that employs them. 34 Under this duty, often set out in codes of ethics, they
must report unethical conduct that harms the purpose of the organization. Public employers, in
turn, have a duty to respect the public servant’s human rights. 35 In the context of corruption, “this
might include an obligation to allow workers to speak out about perceived wrongdoing.” 36 The
1996 United Nations Code of Conduct for Public Officials draws an exception to the duty of
confidentiality when “national legislation, the performance of duty or the needs of justice strictly
require otherwise”. 37 In India, the Indian Law Reform Commission emphasized in 2005 that the
duty of confidentiality “does not extend to remaining silent regarding corruption of other public
servants”. 38 Similarly, in both the Republic of Korea and Uganda, eligible whistle-blowers who
disclose confidential information are not considered to be violating any confidentiality
obligation. 39

Independence of the public service and public servants

17. Fundamentally, the fight against corruption and the protection of whistle-blowers require an
independent judiciary, prosecution and law enforcement bodies with adequate financial and
human resources, technical capacity and professionalism. 40 It has been argued that professional
and independent public institutions offer the best possible strategy against corruption and has
led others to suggest that independent institutions and their agents should enjoy immunity from
reprisals with regard to the “decisions they take as part of their mandate; a concept similar to
parliamentary immunity”. 41

33
For example, Lithuania, Law of 29 June 2021 No. XIV-471, Amendments to the Law of 28 May 2002 No. IX-904 on the Prevention
of Corruption.
34
For example, Senegal, Code de transparence, Loi No. 2012/22 du 27 décembre 2012; and Côte d’Ivoire, Ordonnance No. 2013–
660 du 20 septembre 2013 relative à la prévention et à la lutte contre la corruption et les infractions assimilées, arts 61–62.
35
Jos Leys and Wim Vandekerckhove, “Whistleblowing Duties”, International Handbook of Whistleblowing Research, eds A.J. Brown
et al. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014), 115–132; David Cabrelli, “The Implied Duty of Trust and Confidence: An Emerging
Overarching Principle?”, Industrial Law Journal 34, No. 4 (2005): 284–307; and Bob Hepple, “Human Rights – Human Rights and
Employment Law”, Amicus Curiae – Journal of the Society for Advanced Legal Studies, Issue 8 (1998).
36
Carr and Lewis.
37
UN General Assembly, resolution 51/59, Action against corruption, A/RES/51/59 (1996), para. 10.
India, Law Commission of India, One Hundred and Seventy Ninth Report on the Public Interest Disclosure and Protection of Informers,
38

December 2001, 44.

39
Republic of Korea, Whistleblower Protection Act, art. 14.3; Uganda, The Whistleblowers Protection Act, 2010, section 10.
40
Jonathan Murphy and Franklin De Vrieze, Parliaments and Independent Oversight Institutions: Global and Country-Specific Analysis
of Parliaments’ Relationships with Supreme Audit, Anti-Corruption and Human Rights Institutions (Westminster Foundation for
Democracy, 2020); European Commission, “European Semester Thematic Factsheet: Fight against corruption“, 8.
41
Carlos Cubillo Rodríguez, Aspectos jurídicos del despilfarro en la gestión de los fondos públicos (Madrid: Ed. Dykinson, 2019), 45;
Jonathan Murphy and Franklin De Vrieze, Parliaments and Independent Oversight Institutions, 17.
 TMWBPS/2022 15

18. The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) issued in 2017 the following
recommendations to Member States: 42
(i) Protect justice operators when their lives and personal integrity are at risk …;
(ii) Conduct thorough and independent investigations into attacks on justice operators that
work on cases related to corruption and effectively punish the material and intellectual
perpetrators of such attacks …;
(iii) Adopt measures to strengthen the independence, impartiality and autonomy of justice
systems, through the enactment of rules governing selection … and designation criteria;
predictable requirements and procedures for anyone who wishes to participate; and
transparency mechanisms in the selection and appointment processes for justice
operators, including those of the high courts;
…
(v) Guarantee the exercise of freedom of expression and association of justice operators by
ensuring that disciplinary regimes do not illegitimately sanction such rights;
(vi) Strengthen both judicial and administrative oversight institutions to ensure accountability
within management; [and]
(vii) Generate more efficient and transparent oversight in institutions where corruption most
frequently occurs, such as prison guards, police officers, immigration officers, entities that
provide public services and those that supervise infrastructure projects.

19. The recommendation to strengthen independence calls attention to the fact that whistle-blowers
are required to protect the independence of the public service and the judiciary. This principle of
independence is in alignment with what the UNODC, the IACHR and the parties to the United
Nations Convention against Corruption of 2003 expect from those dealing with reports of
irregularities. 43
20. While the ILO has not dealt with this topic in general, several instruments on labour inspectors, a
public service, set out principles on independence that could apply to all public services. The
Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81), and the Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention,
1969 (No. 129), both require that labour inspectors be public officials that are “independent of
changes of government and of improper external influences”. The General Survey on these and
other labour inspection instruments (2006) 44 identifies a number of measures that may protect
labour inspectors against outside influences, which could be adopted to protect workers in other
oversight institutions:
(a) ring-fencing their budgets during periods of austerity (paragraph 209);
(b) ensuring that they are treated with the respect their everyday responsibilities entitle them
to, with due regard to the social importance of their duties (paragraph 219) and guaranteeing
their physical safety in field work (paragraph 222);

42
IACHR, Resolution 1/18: Corruption and Human Rights, March 2018.
43
UNODC, Corruption: Compendium of International Legal Instruments on Corruption, Second edition, 2005, 3; Resolutions 7/2, 7/5
and 7/6 adopted by the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, November 2017;
and IACHR, Resolution 1/17: Human Rights and the Fight Against Impunity and Corruption, September 2017.
44
ILO, General Survey of the Reports concerning the Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81), and the Protocol of 1995 to the Labour
Inspection Convention, 1947, and the Labour Inspection Recommendation, 1947 (No. 81), the Labour Inspection (Mining and Transport)
Recommendation, 1947 (No. 82), the Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention, 1969 (No. 129), and the Labour Inspection (Agriculture)
Recommendation, 1969 (No. 133), ILC.95/III(1B), 2006.
 TMWBPS/2022 16

(c) recognizing, reinforcing and rationally using employees’ skills through performance-related
incentives for teams or individuals and through opportunities for professional and career
development (paragraph 221);
(d) defining in specific terms, with their participation, the concepts of interest, secrecy and
confidentiality and, where appropriate, the exceptional circumstances under which they may
or should be exempted from the obligations and prohibitions established, or under which
[the obligations] could be attenuated to maintain the objectives of labour inspection
(paragraph 223); and
(e) providing the ability to require the production of any books, registers, documents or
electronic information, when national laws or regulations prescribe that person must keep
them (paragraph 276).

Workers of public sector oversight institutions

21. Workers of public sector oversight institutions whose duties are to investigate and report on illicit
activities, such as maladministration, tax evasion, corruption, money-laundering and drug
trafficking, can be described as “role-prescribed whistle blowers”. 45 Like all public servants, these
workers have inside knowledge about the wrongdoing they are disclosing. Given their particular
role, they also limit the discretion of public officials, including by enforcing strict guidelines and
procedures for procurement and accounting for the use of public monies. 46 They can report
wrongdoing in relation to the transgression of applicable norms, neglect of purpose or pursuit of
wrong purpose, or negligent or intentional causing of unpermitted consequences. 47 Such
occupations include:

• comptrollers, auditors and auditors-general, including any audit agent or specialist consultant
authorized by comptrollers, auditors or auditors-general;
• internal and external auditors;
• bank inspectors;
• accounting officers (heads of department, heads of procurement and procurement officers) in
various ministries and government departments;
• accountants-general;
• controlling officers;
• accounting officers;
• controllers of internal audit;
• fiscal and judicial agents;
• stock verifiers;
• employees of specialized state institutions such as anti-corruption commissions; and
• prosecutors. 48
22. These workers are a distinct group because (a) they are liable to disciplinary measures if they do
not report wrongdoing and (b) their job is to establish evidence of compliance with laws and
regulations that can later be monitored. However, their sensitive placement within the public

45
Kim Loyens and Jeroen Maesschalck, “Whistleblowing and Power: New Avenues for Research”, in Brown et al., 154–173.
46
Leonce Ndikumana, “Corruption and Pro-Poor Growth Outcomes: Evidence and Lessons for African Countries“, Political
Economy Research Institute Working Paper Series No. 120, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, December 2006, 26.
47
Leys and Vandekerckhove.
48
Chalouat, Carrión-Crespo and Licata.
 TMWBPS/2022 17

service often calls for similar compensatory measures, such as legal protection against dismissals
or direct reporting to the highest authority. Although they are not always referred to as “whistle-
blowers”, they participate in the four-step process described earlier. Therefore, they share the
same concerns and require similar protections. However, their protections in law are not always
covered by the same legislation. For example, Zambia’s Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of
Whistleblowers) Act, 2010 protects disclosures made by a public officer in compliance with a code
of conduct; however, auditors are protected by the immunity clause of the Public Audit Act, 2016.

 IV. Protection of whistle-blowers

23. The laws and policies on the protection of whistle-blowers differ from those enacted to protect
witnesses and complainants, in that whistle-blower protection focuses on the information
disclosed and the different forms of retaliation, rather than on the person who made the
disclosure. 49 Another difference between whistle-blowers and complainants is that whistle-
blowers are inside the organization where the irregularity occurs and the irregularity does not
affect them directly or personally. 50 Much of the difficulty in protecting persons who report
irregularities lies in the conflict between their duty to report irregularities (not necessarily
criminal) and their duty to preserve the confidentiality of the information to which they have
access. Many countries limit the protection to “witnesses”, which may be limited to persons who
testify in court. 51

From freedom of expression to anti-corruption

24. Between 1978 and 1999, most legislative proposals worldwide framed the protection of whistle-
blowers as measures to protect freedom of expression and its corollary, the access to public
information. 52 In the United States of America, this was partly a response to increased court action
in enforcing secrecy agreements against whistle-blowers. 53 Since then, the European Court of
Human Rights, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and the Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression have also focused on freedom of expression. 54 The EU
Directive 2019/1937 also states that “[p]ersons who report information about threats or harm to
the public interest obtained in the context of their work-related activities make use of their right

49
Banisar; Marie Terracol, A Best Practice Guide for Whistleblowing Legislation (Transparency International, 2018), 15.
50
David Lewis, “The Council of Europe Resolution and Recommendation on the Protection of Whistleblowers“, Industrial Law
Journal 39, No. 4 (2010): 432–435.
51
For example, Bitra Suyatno, “Predictors of Employees’ Intention to Whistleblow Using Theory of Planned Behaviour: A Case
Study of an Indonesian Government Department“ (PhD thesis, College of Law and Justice, Victoria University, 2018), 55–56.
52
Vandekerckhove, 1–3; see also Arturo Miguel Chípuli Castillo, “El Derecho Humano de Protección de Denunciantes de
Corrupción a través de la Política Pública en México (2013-2019)“, Revista Española de la Transparencia 11 (2020): 157–187.
53
Vandekerckhove, 1–3.
54
European Court of Human Rights, Guja v. Moldova, Application No. 14277/04 (judgment of 12 February 2008); Heinish v. Germany,
Application No. 28274/08 (judgment of 21 July 2011); Sosinowska v. Poland, Application No. 10247/09 (judgment of 18 October
2011); Matúz v. Hungary, Application No. 73571/10 (judgment of 21 October 2014), cited in Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), Human Rights of Armed Forces Personnel: Compendium of Standards, Good Practices and
Recommendations, 2021, 97; Organization of American States (OAS), Model Law Protecting Freedom of Expression against Corruption,
2002; IACHR, Resolution 1/17; and UN, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and the Protection of the Right to Freedom
of Opinion and Expression, A/70/361 (2015), para. 64.
 TMWBPS/2022 18

to freedom of expression”. 55 Several governments adopted freedom of information acts, which

included provisions to protect public servants from the unauthorized release of personal
information, including the Republic of Moldova (2002), Antigua and Barbuda (2004),
Uganda (2005), North Macedonia (2006) and Montenegro (2006). 56
25. Other literature has considered that whistle-blowing is a right in and of itself since it protects the
individual’s physical and moral integrity and the public interest, all of which are protected by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 57 Article 9 of Convention No. 151 incorporates this
approach to whistle-blowing regarding violations of freedom of association. 58 Furthermore,
according to the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations
(CEACR), the “interrelationship between freedom of association and civil and political liberties was
highlighted in the resolution concerning trade union rights and their relation to civil liberties
adopted by the 54th Session (1970) of the International Labour Conference”. 59 The 1970
resolution protects the “freedom of opinion and expression and in particular freedom to hold
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers”. However, Convention No. 151 protects disclosures of
confidential information only if they are linked to trade union activities subject to the duties of
confidentiality and principles of good faith. 60
26. Although some initiatives have continued to focus on the freedom of expression, the trend from
2000 has been to protect whistle-blowers as part of strategies to combat corruption. For example,
the OAS adopted a new model law in 2013 that focused on corruption and omitted any references
to freedom of expression, whereas in 2002 the freedom of expression had been the focus. 61

International and regional instruments, agreements and guidelines

27. International conventions provide states the opportunity to confront cross-border corruption and
harmonize their efforts, particularly given the diversity of legal traditions and resulting
uncertainty. In fact, “there is a high degree of convergence of the standards expected of behaviour
in the affairs of business, public-sector administration and decision-making worldwide”. 62 The
United Nations Convention against Corruption aims to promote and strengthen measures to
prevent and combat corruption. Its Article 33 requires States parties to “provide protection
against any unjustified treatment for any person who reports in good faith and on reasonable
grounds to the competent authorities any facts concerning offences established in accordance
with [the] Convention”. To implement it, the UNODC issued in 2015 the Resource Guide on Good
Practices in the Protection of Reporting Persons and in 2021 the Guidelines to Enable Whistle-Blower
Protection in the Health-Care Sector. The G20 adopted its 2022–2024 Anti-Corruption Action Plan in
October 2021, which called on governments to establish or reinforce protection frameworks for
whistle-blowers.

55
EU Directive 2019/1937.
56
Banisar.
57
Chípuli Castillo, 169.
58
Article 9 reads: “Public employees shall have, as other workers, the civil and political rights which are essential for the normal
exercise of freedom of association, subject only to the obligations arising from their status and the nature of their functions”.
59
ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: A Way Forward, ILC.102/III(1B), 2013, para. 75.
60
ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, para. 81.
61
OAS, Model Law to Facilitate and Encourage the Reporting of Acts of Corruption and to Protect Whistleblowers and Witnesses, 2013.
62
Carr, 157.
 TMWBPS/2022 19

28. Recognizing the connection between decent work and corruption, paragraph 16(g) of the 2016
ILO resolution concerning decent work in global supply chains calls on governments to “[f]ight
corruption, including by protection of whistle-blowers.”
29. The 1998 OECD Recommendation of the Council on Improving Ethical Conduct in the Public Service
Including Principles for Managing Ethics in the Public Service states that “[p]ublic servants need to
know what their rights and obligations are in terms of exposing actual or suspected wrongdoing
within the public service. These should include clear rules and procedures for officials to follow,
and a formal chain of responsibility. Public servants also need to know the protections available
to them in cases of exposing wrongdoing.” 63 In addition to existing instruments, in 2021, the UN
High-Level Panel on International Financial Accountability, Transparency and Integrity for
Achieving the 2030 Agenda recommended that “[t]he international community should develop
minimum standards of protection for human right defenders, anticorruption advocates,
investigative journalists, and whistle-blowers. States should consider incorporating these
standards in a legally binding international instrument”. 64 The International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) issued Whistleblowing Management Systems – Guidelines to that effect in
2021. 65
30. Regarding workers of oversight institutions, the International Organization of Supreme Audit
Institutions (INTOSAI), a cross-border association of oversight institutions, has adopted several
codes of ethics that apply both to government agencies and staff, which have inspired national
legislation. 66 It requires supreme audit institutions to “implement an ethics control system to
identify and analyse ethical risks, to mitigate them, to support ethical behaviour, and to address
any breach of ethical values, including protection of those who report suspected wrongdoing”,
who are expected to report their concerns to ethical advisers or management personnel within
the supreme audit institutions. 67 It has also called attention to the need for stricter controls on
public procurement. 68 A similar organization is the Ibero-American Network of Anti-Corruption
Prosecutors, which is attached to the Ibero-American Association of Public Prosecutors, and calls
for leniency for officials who report acts of corruption in which they participated. 69
31. Several regional bodies have adopted anti-corruption measures that include protection of whistle-
blowers. These include the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, 1996, the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) Protocol Against Corruption, 2001, and the African Union
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, 2003. In 2020, the African Union Advisory
Board on Corruption issued a recommendation to “promote [the] existence of [a] friendly
environment that aims to protect the whistleblowers and promotes [the] flow of information” as
part of the effort to enhance transparency and accountability in response to the COVID-19

63
OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Improving Ethical Conduct in the Public Service including Principles for Managing Ethics in
the Public Service, OECD/LEGAL/0298, 2022.
64
UN, Financial Integrity for Sustainable Development: Report of the High Level Panel on International Financial Accountability,
Transparency and Integrity for Achieving the 2030 Agenda, 2021, recommendation 7A.
65
ISO, Whistleblowing Management Systems — Guidelines: ISO 37002:2021.
66
For example, Mexico, ACUERDO que reforma y adiciona el Código de Ética y el Código de Conducta de la Auditoría Superior de
la Federación, 9 December 2020.
67
INTOSAI, ISSAI 130: Code of Ethics, art. 12(e).
68
INTOSAI, ISSAI 1: The Lima Declaration, 1998, sections 21 and 23.
69
Ibero-American Network of Anti-Corruption Prosecutors, Contribuciones de la Red Iberoamericana de Fiscales Contra la
Corrupción a la Declaración Política que se Adoptará en Ocasión de la Sesión Especial de la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas
Contra La Corrupción (UNGASS/2021), October 2020, art. 3.
 TMWBPS/2022 20

pandemic. 70 Further examples are the Network of Anti-Corruption Institutions in West Africa
(NACIWA) General Assembly, which in July 2016 adopted the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) Whistle-blower protection strategy; 71 the Lima Commitment: Democratic
Governance against Corruption adopted by the OAS; and the 2017 Declaration of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Member States and China, which recognized the “important
role of witnesses in the identification and effective prosecution of corrupt individuals by
developing an effective protection system for witnesses in corruption cases, where
appropriate”. 72
32. The EU Directive 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law was
an important measure for European Union Member States, which provides protection for persons
reporting breaches of Union law, as well as other “democratic principles such as transparency and
accountability, and fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and the freedom and
pluralism of the media”. 73
33. While the number of international and regional instruments and agreements that offer whistle-
blower protection is growing, Fasterling and Lewis (2014) have argued that the piecemeal nature
of these instruments and the uneven protection granted to whistle-blowers should be addressed
with some urgency. They also suggest that whistle-blowing and the protection of whistle-blowers
should be addressed within the “broader context of fundamental rights of employees”. 74

National legislation on whistle-blower protection

34. The 2019 ILO working paper on the law and practice on protecting whistle-blowers in the public
and financial services sectors 75 found that many Member States have adopted different
approaches to whistle-blower protection. These include protection from retaliation, access to
reporting channels, assurance of anonymity, enforcement mechanisms, incentives and financial
awards, as well as the concept of “good faith.” These measures seek to strike a balance between
citizens’ right to information on government activities and public employees’ right to privacy
without compromising their expected loyalty.
35. In 2011, very few countries offered protection to whistle-blowers, 76 but by 2017 the number had
grown to 59 and many more have enacted such protections in the past five years. 77 Since 2019,

70
African Union Advisory Board on Corruption, “Outcomes of the 4th Edition of the Anti-Corruption Dialogue Fighting Corruption
through Effective and Efficient Judicial Systems“, 2–4 November 2019, 2.
71
ECOWAS, National Anti-Corruption Institutions in West Africa (NACIWA) General Assembly Resolutions, 2016, para. 11.
72
ASEAN, “ASEAN-China Joint Statement on Comprehensively Strengthening Effective Anti-Corruption Cooperation“, November
2017.
73
EU Directive 2019/1937, para. 33.
74
Björn Fasterling and David Lewis, “Leaks, Legislation and Freedom of Speech: How Can the Law Effectively Promote Public-
Interest Whistleblowing?“ International Labour Review 153, No. 1 (2014): 71–92.
75
Chalouat, Carrión-Crespo and Licata.
76
Banisar.
77
National Whistleblowers Center, “Whistleblower Laws Around the World“, 2019.
 TMWBPS/2022 21

Australia, 78 Japan, 79 the Republic of Korea, 80 Mexico, 81 Slovenia 82 and the United States 83 have
adopted whistle-blower protection measures for their civil servants. The Governments of Chile
and Colombia have submitted draft laws to their respective legislative bodies. 84 It has been
observed that most countries are moving away from a piecemeal approach to whistle-blower
protection towards overarching stand-alone legislation that covers different aspects of such
protection. 85 The OECD has pointed out that a “clear delineation of protection coverage enables
those working for an organisation, irrespective of their role, to recognise their positioning
concerning whistleblower protection”. 86 Some regional and international organizations have
developed tools and checklists of good practices to assist national governments in formulating
and strengthening whistle-blower protection laws. For example, Transparency International has
developed a checklist of 14 benchmarks for best practices in whistle-blower protection. 87 Table 1
indicates whether or not selected countries have legislation in place based on those benchmarks,
as well as overarching whistle-blower protection legislation.

78
Australia, Treasury Laws Amendment (Enhancing Whistleblower Protections) Act 2019.
79
Geoff Schweller, “Japan Amends Whistleblower Protection Act“, Whistleblower Network News, 12 September 2020.
80
Republic of Korea, ACRC Korea Annual Report, 2019, 12.
81
Mexico, Ley de protección a denunciantes y testigos de hechos de corrupción para el Estado de Hidalgo, Decree No. 704, 19 April
2021; Mexico, ACUERDO por el que se establecen Lineamientos para la Promoción y Operación del Sistema de Ciudadanos
Alertadores Internos y Externos de la Corrupción, 6 September 2019.
82
Slovenia’s Act No. 158/20 of 2 November 2020 adds a new chapter (Ch. III, arts 23–25) on the protection of whistle-blowers to
its Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act.
83
United States, Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Rewards Act, Title 31, United States Code, Ch. 97, January 2021.
84
Chile, Senate, “Protección a denunciantes de actos contra la probidad administrativa: comienzan debate del proyecto“, 26 June
2021; ACIEC, “Ley de protección al denunciante como política anticorrupción“, 31 May 2021.
85
Chalouat, Carrión-Crespo and Licata, 14.
86
OECD, Committing to Effective Whistleblower Protection, 2016, 68.
87
Simon Wolfe et al., Whistleblower Protection Laws in G20 Countries: Priorities for Action (Transparency International Australia, 2014), 3.
  TMWBPS/2022
 Table 1. Whistle-blower protection laws in selected countries against Transparency International benchmarks

Country or area Broad Broad Broad Overarching Broad External Established Provisions Protection of Internal Broad Comprehensive Sanctions Oversight Transparent
coverage of definition of definition whistle- range of reporting thresholds and confidentiality disclosure protections remedies for for authority use of
organizations reportable of whistle- blower internal/ channels for protections procedures against retaliation retaliators legislation
wrongdoing blowers protection regulatory (third protection for required retaliation
legislation * reporting party/ anonymous
channels public) reporting
Belgium Yes Yes Yes No No Yes ? Yes Yes Yes ? No No No Yes
Bosnia and
Herzegovina ? ? ? Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes ? ? Yes ? ?
Brazil ? ? No No ? Yes No ? Yes Yes ? No No No ?
Canada (Quebec) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ? ? Yes Yes ? ? ? Yes Yes
Canton of
Geneva ? No No ? ? No No No Yes Yes Yes ? ? No ?
France Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ? ? Yes Yes ? ? ? Yes Yes
Malaysia No ? Yes Yes Yes ? Yes No Yes No Yes ? Yes ? ?
Malta Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ? Yes No Yes Yes ? ? ? ? ?
Namibia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peru No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes ?
Serbia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ? ?
Singapore Yes Yes Yes No ? Yes ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ? No Yes
South Africa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ? ? Yes ? Yes ? No No Yes
Trinidad and
Tobago Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ? Yes No Yes Yes ? ? ? ? ?
Tunisia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ? No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No ?
United Kingdom Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ? No Yes Yes Yes Yes ? Yes Yes
United States Yes Yes Yes Yes ? Yes ? ? Yes ? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zambia Yes Yes ? Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ? Yes No ?

Note: A question mark (?) denotes “unclear” or “partially in place”.

* Additional benchmark identified for this paper.
Source: Classified in Iheb Chalouat, Carlos Carrión-Crespo and Margherita Licata, Law and Practice on Protecting Whistle-Blowers in the Public and Financial Services Sectors (ILO, 2019) and expanded for several countries.

22
 TMWBPS/2022 23

Scope of issues subject to whistle-blowing protection

36. Several countries have opted for listing the scope of issues in which disclosures will be protected.
For example, Antigua and Barbuda’s Freedom of Information Act, 2004 includes a list of events on
which individuals can disclose information to “any authority”:

• a serious threat to the health or safety of an individual or a serious threat to the public or the
environment;
• the commission of a criminal offence;
• failure to comply with a legal obligation;
• a miscarriage of justice;
• corruption, dishonesty or serious maladministration;
• abuse of authority or neglect in the performance of official duty;
• injustice to an individual; or
• unauthorized use of public funds.
37. Japan’s Whistle-blower Protection Act, 2004 includes food, health, safety and environmental law
violations. The EU Directive 2019/1937, in turn, defines the policy areas in which disclosures will
be protected, including:

• public procurement;
• financial services, products and markets, and prevention of money laundering and terrorist
financing;
• product safety and compliance;
• transport safety;
• protection of the environment;
• radiation protection and nuclear safety;
• food and feed safety, animal health and welfare;
• public health;
• consumer protection;
• protection of privacy and personal data, and security of network and information systems;
• breaches affecting the financial interests of the Union; and
• breaches relating to the internal market. 88
38. The Slovakian Act on Certain Measures Related to Reporting of Anti-social Activities and on
Amending and Supplementing Certain Acts, No. 54/2019 protects persons reporting not only on
corruption but also on criminal offences involving damage done to the European Community’s
financial interests, deceitful practices in public procurement and public auction, crimes committed
by public officials or that carry penalties of three years of imprisonment, or administrative
infractions which that penalties of €50,000. Viet Nam’s Law on Denunciations, 2012, covers any
“illegal act of any agency, organization or individual which causes damage or threatens to cause
damage to the interests of the State or rights and legitimate interests of citizens, agencies or
organizations”. 89

88
EU Directive 2019/1937.
89
Vietnam Law and Legal Forum, “Law on Denunciations“, 28 March 2012.
 TMWBPS/2022 24

Requirement of good faith

39. Most jurisdictions require that whistle-blowers act in “good faith”. 90 Some define good faith in
general terms, stipulating a “reasonable belief” that an act is either illegal or “against the public
interest”, or that criticism is based on “facts (with due diligence in checking them) and acts in the
legitimate interest of the employer”. 91 This requirement has been embedded in international law,
such as Article 33 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, Article 3 of the Inter-
American Convention against Corruption of 1996, the SADC Protocol Against Corruption of 2001,
and Article 9 of the Council of Europe’s Civil Law Convention on Corruption of 2003.
40. For example, section 43G of the Employment Rights Act of 1996 of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland establishes a systematic analysis of the elements that a whistle-
blower needs to satisfy to meet the requirement of good faith:
(a) she or he reasonably believes that the information disclosed, and any allegation contained
in it, are substantially true;
(b) she or he does not make the disclosure for the purposes of personal gain;
(c) in all the circumstances it was reasonable for the worker to make the disclosure; and
(d) one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(a) at the time the worker makes the disclosure she or he reasonably believes that she or
he will be subjected to a detriment by her employer if she or he discloses it to them or
to a prescribed organization; or
(b) there is no prescribed person and the worker reasonably believes that it is likely that
evidence relating to the relevant failure will be concealed/destroyed if the disclosure is
made to her or his employer; or
(c) the worker has previously made a disclosure of substantially the same information to
her or his employer or a prescribed person.
41. In addition, section 43B of the Employment Rights Act, 1996 defines a “qualifying disclosure” to
mean any disclosure of information which, in the “reasonable belief” of the worker making the
disclosure, is “made in the public interest” and tends to show one or more of the following:
(a) that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed,
(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to
which she or he is subject,
(c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur,
(d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered,
(e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or
(f) that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding
paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed.
42. Other countries or areas, such as France, Kosovo 92 and Zambia, have similar requirements. While
good faith requirements seek to guard against malicious reporting, there is a growing discussion

90
GRECO, Seventh General Activity Report of GRECO: Including a Section on the “Protection of Whistleblowers“, 2006, 13.
91
Kobroń-Gasiorowska.
92
As defined in UN Security Council resolution 1244 of 1999.
 TMWBPS/2022 25

on the convenience of this requirement. The dilemma that the good faith requirement poses is
that if whistle-blowers “decide to raise a concern based on the information they have ... [they]
should not lose their protection if it turns out that they were mistaken.” 93 A United Kingdom
investigation into the activities of general practitioner and serial killer Harold Shipman (the
Shipman Inquiry) found that the good faith requirement could be removed from the Public
Interest Disclosure Act 1998, stating that “[t]he public interest would be served, even in cases
where the motives of the messenger might not have been entirely altruistic”. 94 The United
Kingdom removed the good faith requirement from the Act in 2013. 95 Similarly, the South African
Law Reform Commission recommended in 2004 not to criminalize the filing of false information,
having found that none of the comparable legislation did so. 96
43. During the preparatory work towards the adoption of the Termination of Employment
Convention, 1982 (No. 158), the Conference Committee removed a good faith requirement from
the text of Article 5(c), as it was considered to be a subjective question. 97 The resulting Article
prohibits termination of a worker for “the filing of a complaint or the participation in proceedings
against an employer involving alleged violation of laws or regulations or recourse to competent
administrative authorities”. Article 6(1)(a) of EU Directive 2019/1937 requires Members States to
protect persons who “had reasonable grounds to believe that the information on breaches
reported was true at the time of reporting” rather than those having good faith. 98 The Seventh
General Activity Report of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), the Council of Europe’s
anti-corruption body, noted that “a good faith requirement is not consistent with the legal duty
on officials to blow the whistle ... If a true report is made in bad faith ... it will nevertheless be in
the employer’s or public interest that the report should be made.” 99 In fact, paragraph 32 of the
EU Directive 2019/1937 requires a “reasonable belief” that the disclosure is true, but “[the] motives
of the reporting persons in reporting should be irrelevant in deciding whether they should receive
protection”. 100

Institutions and practices

44. The UNODC has called for the “provision of adequate independence to competent authorities in
the prevention, detection and punishment of the corruption of public officials” and for “providing
such authorities with adequate independence to deter the exertion of inappropriate influence on
their actions”. 101 The 2019 INTOSAI-P10: Mexico Declaration on the Independence of the Supreme
Audit Institutions (SAI) 102 called for laws to protect the independence of supreme audit
institutions while ensuring that they audit the execution, not the adoption, of policies. Such
independence would be guaranteed through a broad mandate, unrestrained access to

93
Terracol, 15.
94
United Kingdom, Shipman Inquiry Fifth Report: Safeguarding Patients, Lessons from the Past – Proposals for the Future, 9 December
2004, para. 11.108.
95
Terracol, 15.
96
South Africa, South African Law Reform Commission, Project 123: Protected Disclosures, Discussion Paper 107, June 2004,
para. 4.94.
97
ILO, Protection against Unjustified Dismissal: General Survey on the Termination of Employment Convention (No. 158) and
Recommendation (No. 166), 1982, ILC.82/III(4B), para. 115.
98
EU Directive 2019/1937.
99
GRECO, 13.
100
EU Directive 2019/1937.
101
UNODC, Compendium of International Legal Instruments on Corruption, 3.
102
INTOSAI, INTOSAI-P 10: Mexico Declaration on SAI Independence, 2019.
 TMWBPS/2022 26

information, freedom to choose the contents and timing of their investigations, efficient follow-
up mechanisms, and financial and managerial autonomy.
45. Accordingly, a number of governments have created autonomous oversight institutions, such as
Chile’s Comptroller, India’s Central Vigilance Commission and Bangladesh’s Anti-Corruption
Commission. In 2013, Côte d’Ivoire created the High Authority for Good Governance. In Ecuador,
the Government adopted the 2019 Reform of the Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code and the
2021 Organic Reforming Law of the Integral Penal Organic Code on Anti-Corruption Matters,
which included the Executive Decree No. 665 of 20 February 2019, creating the Anti-Corruption
Secretariat of the Presidency. The Democratic Republic of the Congo established the Agency for
the Prevention and Combating of Corruption in March 2020, with the power to analyse, examine
and investigate any suspicion, act, information or report relating to corruption, money laundering
and/or similar offences, and to ensure the effective protection of witnesses and experts against
reprisals or acts of intimidation. 103 Where these laws do not establish dedicated whistle-blower
protection units, complaints of retaliation may be heard by labour tribunals or similar adjudicatory
bodies.
46. While Chile and Costa Rica have enshrined their comptrollers in their respective Constitutions, in
other countries the executive branch can influence the agencies and the scope of their
investigations can be limited. 104

Reporting channels and anonymity

47. Most of the legislation on whistle-blower protection provides several avenues in which to report
wrongdoing. The three most common are reporting in the workplace, to the authorities and to
external parties. 105 Many provide “reporting and response” whistle-blowing and communication
channels with top management, which are easy to access and provide anonymous and
confidential communication platforms. 106 These channels are not always run by the government.
For example, the Chilean chapter of Transparency International has its own reporting web
page. 107 The workers of oversight institutions who often receive and investigate the disclosures
are generally expected to disclose their own concerns only to their hierarchy and have no
expectation of anonymity because the disclosure is part of their duties. These traits place them in
the front line of the fight against corruption and expose them to adverse reactions from persons
suspected of misconduct.
48. The EU Directive 2019/1937 provides for Member States to establish internal reporting channels
and creates the figure of a facilitator “who assists a reporting person in the reporting process in
a work-related context, and whose assistance should be confidential”. 108 Botswana’s
Whistleblowing Act, 2016 authorizes the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime, the
Auditor-General, the Directorate of Intelligence and Security, the Botswana Police Service, the
Botswana United Revenue Service, the Financial Intelligence Centre and the Botswana Defence

Platform to Protect Whistleblowers in Africa or Plateforme de Protection des Lanceurs d’Alerte en Afrique (PPLAAF), “Democratic
103

Republic of the Congo“, July 2021.

104
Onyango, 15.
105
Terracol, 31–49.
106
Yelkal Mulualem Walle, “The Impact of Digital Government on Whistleblowing and Whistle-blower Protection: Explanatory
Study“, Journal of Information Technology Management 12, No. 1 (2020): 1–26.
107
Chile Transparente, “Haz tu denuncia“.
108
EU Directive 2019/1937.
 TMWBPS/2022 27

Force to receive and investigate disclosures of impropriety. 109 In 2020, the adoption of
Kazakhstan’s Law on Combating Corruption provided for those who learn facts about corruption
to report them to a superior, the administration of the body or competent public bodies.
Previously, only the administration of entities and law enforcement bodies could receive
reports. 110
49. In the United States, federal civilian whistle-blowers can report waste, fraud, abuse or other kinds
of misconduct, and may lodge complaints of retaliation with the Office of Special Counsel. 111
Zambia’s Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act, 2010 lists seven specific
investigating authorities to which reports will be referred after consulting the reporting person.
It allows the investigating authority to direct the referral to the Investigator-General if the normal
course of action could result in unlawful reprisals.
50. The January 2020 amendments to the Ukrainian Law on the Prevention of Corruption ordered all
public entities to establish protected anonymous channels for whistle-blower reports. Any reports
received through these channels must be reviewed and processed within specified time
periods. 112
51. One of the most controversial issues when adopting legislation has been whether to allow
reporting to external parties because government entities prefer to handle reports internally “in
order not to dent the image of the institution” 113 or to treat whistle-blowing as an internal
management dispute mechanism. 114 However, many laws allow external reporting if the
reporting person has a reasonable belief that internal mechanisms will not result in action or
simply do not exist. In terms of the choice of external actors, whistle-blowers often approach
lawyers, politicians and the media “because they are the bystanders most separate from the
organization”. 115
52. In the recommendations to the United Nations General Assembly, the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression stressed that
“internal institutional and external oversight mechanisms should provide effective and protective
channels for whistle-blowers to motivate remedial action. In the absence of channels that provide
protection and effective remediation, or that fail to do so in a timely manner, public disclosures
should be permitted”. 116
53. The United Kingdom’s Committee on Public Life, in its third report issued in 1995, stated that “staff
should be able to by-pass the direct management line, because that may well be the area about
which their concerns arise, and that they should be able to go outside the organization if they feel

109
Botswana, Whistleblowing Act, No. 9 of 2016, arts 2 and 8.
110
HSE University Anti-Corruption Center, “Kazakhstan Amends Anti-Corruption Legislation“, 26 October 2020.
Nick Schwellenbach, ed., Caught Between Conscience and Career: Expose Abuse without Exposing your Identity (Project on
111

Government Oversight, Government Accountability Project, and Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, 2019), 62–63.
112
Ukraine, Law of Ukraine on Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On Prevention of Corruption” to Regulate Certain Issues of
Protection of Whistleblowers No. 1502-IX of 1 June 2021.
Haruna Ndebugri and Emmanuel Tweneboah Senzu, Examining the Whistle Blowing Act of Ghana and its Effectiveness in Combating
113

Corporate Crime, Cape Coast Technical University, 2018, 50.

114
Banisar; Chípuli Castillo.
115
Kim R. Sawyer, Jackie Johnson and Mark Holub, “The Necessary Illegitimacy of the Whistleblower“, Business and Professional
Ethics Journal 29, Nos 1–4 (2010): 94.
116
UN, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and the Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, para. 64.
 TMWBPS/2022 28

the overall management is engaged in an improper course”. 117 On that occasion, the Committee
recommended allowing staff to report confidentially to external bodies such as independent
charities. The whistle-blower laws in Australia and Zambia protect disclosures made to legal
advisers. Japan and Australia amended their relevant whistle-blower laws in 2020 to protect the
use of external reporting mechanisms if the internal recipients take no remedial action within a
prescribed period. 118 The Lithuanian and Ukrainian laws allow whistle-blowers to report through
external channels (including the public) in the first instance. 119
54. The Law on Whistleblower Protection in the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013 120 allows
external reporting if:
(a) the procedure based on internal reporting/disclosure takes longer than 15 days;
(b) the whistle-blower has a reason to believe that the procedure, based on internal
reporting/disclosure has been irregular; or
(c) the whistle-blower has every reason to believe that the authorized person who is designated
by law to receive the reports or the manager of an institution is directly or indirectly
associated with the act of corruption.
55. It also allows reporting to the public when a whistle-blower has a reason to suspect that:
(a) he/she will be subjected to detrimental action by a certain person;
(b) in the event of protected reporting, there will be no appropriate action taken, or that the
evidence and information will be concealed or destroyed; or
(c) if the same information has been disclosed to internal reporting channels and no appropriate
action was undertaken within the legal timeline, provided that prior to making a special form
of protected disclosure, the whistle-blower is obliged to consider possible damage that may
be incurred as a result of his disclosure. 121
56. Legislation in Ghana, 122 Liberia 123 and Uganda 124 has similar provisions.
57. The Government of Spain at all levels has embraced artificial intelligence tools to protect whistle-
blowers’ identities and facilitate disclosures, including systems to filter out disclosures that are
unlikely to uncover irregularities. A recent study found that “the success of ICT interventions
against corruption hinges on their suitability for local contexts and needs, cultural backgrounds
and technology experience”. 125 In addition, ICT interventions may raise data privacy issues
regarding the personal data that may be collected from reporting persons.

117
United Kingdom, Standards of Conduct in Local Government in England, Scotland, and Wales: Third Report of the Committee on
Standards in Public Life, Vol. 1: Report (1997), para. 194.
Oh-Ebashi LPC & Partners, “Amendments to the Whistleblower Protection Act“, 22 June 2021; Australia, Treasury Laws
118

Amendment (Enhancing Whistleblower Protections) Act 2019 (No. 10, 2019) – Schedule 1.
Slovenia, Integrity and Protection of Corruption Act, No. 26/11 of 8 April 2011; Ukraine, art. 53; Lithuania, Law on Protection of
119

Whistleblowers, No. XIII-2017 of 28 November 804.

120
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette of BiH br. 100/13, 2013.
121
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette of BiH br. 100/13.
122
Ghana, Whistleblower Act, 2006 (Act 720).
123
Liberia, “Executive Order No. 62: Extension of Executive Order No. 43 – Protection of Whistleblower“, 2014, section 6(e).
124
Uganda, The Whistleblowers Protection Act.
125
Isabelle Adam and Mihály Fazekas, “Are Emerging Technologies Helping Win the Fight against Corruption? A Review of the
State of Evidence“, Information Economics and Policy 57 (2021): 12.
 TMWBPS/2022 29

Protection against retaliation

58. Retaliation has been defined as “undesirable action taken against a whistleblower – and in direct
response to the whistleblowing – who reported wrongdoing”. Retaliation can be formal or
informal. Informal reprisals include various forms of harassment, bullying, threats and assault, as
well as ostracism, while formal reprisals involve practices such as unfavourable job evaluations,
changed job conditions, denial of promotion, demotion, termination or loss of income. 126 In other
whistle-blower laws, victimization is used in the place of retaliation. For example, section 2 of the
Uganda Whistleblowers Protection Act, 2010 defines the following actions as victimization:
dismissal, suspension, denial of promotion, demotion, redundancy, harassment, negative
discrimination measures, intimidation and the threat of any of these actions. 127
59. Evidence also shows that public employers can set an employee up for failure; blacklist them so
that they cannot find gainful employment in their chosen field; conduct retaliatory investigations
for minor offences; or discredit or humiliate them by questioning their mental health, professional
competence, reliability or honesty. 128 They can also sue whistle-blowers for defamation or treat
them as enemies of the organization or state. 129 Many whistle-blower protection laws have
responded to specific events that resulted in the loss of life. 130 In 2008, a survey conducted with
9,900 employees in an Air Force unit in the United States found that 1,224 employees (37 per cent)
had witnessed wrongdoing in the previous 12 months. The 237 employees who had revealed their
identities reported suffering various acts of retaliation, as illustrated in table 2. 131

 Table 2. Acts of retaliation against whistle-blowers

Complaint Threatened Experienced

(%) (%)
Co-workers not socializing with me 0.4 11
Pressure from co-workers to stop 2 5
Tighter scrutiny of daily activities by management 2 14
Withholding of information needed to successfully perform job 1 10
Personnel/staff withdrawn 0 9
Verbal harassment or intimidation 5 12
Poor performance appraisal 2 15
Professional reputation was harmed 1 7
Charged with committing an unrelated offence 1 7
Denial of award 1 7

126
Rodney Smith, “Whistleblowers and Suffering”, in Brown et al., 230–249; Mogomotsi Magome, “South Africa Must Guard
Whistleblowers Says Security Expert“, Associated Press, 27 August 2021. In India, an estimated 65 whistle-blowers covered by the
Right-to-Information Law were killed between 2005 and 2018, see Geetanjali Krishna, “Whistle-Blowers Vulnerable to Threats and
Murder Four Years after WPB Act“, Business Standard, 24 April 2018; Paulo Mateus, “Lessons from South Africa’s State Capture
Commission: The Importance of Whistle-Blowers and their Protection“, Control Risks, May 2021; Loyens and Maesschalck.
127
Uganda, The Whistleblowers Protection Act.
128
Schwellenbach, 17.
129
Terracol, 1; Lewis; John K. Devitty, “Whistle-Blowing in the MENA Region“, Speaking Up Safely: Civil Society Guide to Whistleblowing
(Transparency International, 2015), 9–12, 10; Dayana León, “Protección a los denunciantes: tarea pendiente en la lucha
anticorrupción“, Opción S, 21 May 2021; Bitra Suyatno, “A Whistleblowing Culture“, Inside Indonesia, 24 March 2020.
130
Banisar, 20.
131
Rehg et al.
 TMWBPS/2022 30

Complaint Threatened Experienced

(%) (%)
Denial of promotion 2 7
Denial of opportunity for training 1 9
Relocation of desk or work area in office 0.4 5
Imposed access restrictions to areas necessary to perform job 1 7
Assignment to less desirable or less important duties 2 8
Reassignment to a different job with less desirable duties 1 7
Reassignment to a different geographical location 0 3
Security clearance withdrawn 0.4 1
Required to take a fitness-for-duty exam 1 2
Suspension from job 0 0.4
Grade level demotion 0 0.4
Fired from job 0.4 0.4
Other 3 3

Source: Michael T. Rehg, et al., “Antecedents and Outcomes of Retaliation Against Whistleblowers: Gender Differences and Power
Relationships”, Organization Science 19, No. 2 (2008): 221–240.

60. Evidence suggests that workers do not usually expect retaliatory actions when they disclose
irregularities, but the “more serious and systemic the wrongdoing, the more severe the
retaliation”. 132 A survey of 7,110 public sector patrol rangers from hundreds of sites across
28 countries found that while 89.2 per cent of them would report colleagues who engaged in
corrupt and illegal activities, 59.3 per cent would be concerned for their safety if they did so. 133
61. To protect against retaliatory actions, the G20 High-Level Principles for the Effective Protection of
Whistleblowers of June 2019 advised G20 countries to:
… define the scope of retaliation as comprehensively as possible … and to offer guidance and
in their legislation provide a not-exhaustive but comprehensive list of types of retaliation that
may trigger the protection of whistleblowers to provide more legal certainty and avoid limiting
unfavourably the scope of protection.

62. Several countries have also taken action to delineate the nature of retaliation. For example, the
Belgian law on the denunciation of a suspected breach of integrity within a federal administrative
authority by a member of its staff of 2013 lists the following adverse actions against public
servants who report acts of corruption as victimization:
1. Dismissing a staff member, except in the case of voluntary resignation.
2. Terminating early or not extending a temporary appointment.
3. Not converting an appointment on a temporary basis for a trial period into a permanent
appointment when this is possible.
4. Moving or transferring a staff member or refusing a request to this effect.

132
Sawyer, Johnson and Holub, 90.
Michael Belecky, Rohit Singh and William Moreto, eds, Life on the Frontline 2019: A Global Survey of the Working Conditions of
133

Rangers (World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF), 2019), 23.

 TMWBPS/2022 31

5. Taking disciplinary action.

6. Depriving a staff member of a normally accrued salary increase.
7. Depriving a staff member of promotional opportunities.
8. Depriving a staff member of facilities available to other employees.
9. Refusing leave to which a staff member would normally be entitled.
10. Providing an unfavourable evaluation. 134
63. In the Republic of Korea and Ghana, it is a crime to disclose the identity of anyone under special
protection. 135 In Australia, Hungary and the United States, it is a criminal offence to retaliate
against a whistle-blower or any person associated with him or her. Other countries that have
notable legislation on protection from retaliation include Benin, 136 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 137
China, 138 Côte d’Ivoire, 139 the Dominican Republic, 140 Ecuador, the Gambia, 141 Liberia, 142
Slovenia, 143 Ukraine 144 and Zambia. 145
64. Paragraph 42 of the 2017 resolution of the European Parliament on legitimate measures to
protect whistle-blowers acting in the public interest also called for the protection of family
members, which paragraph 37 of the EU Directive 2019/1937 reflected by stipulating that the
“need for protection is determined by reference to all the relevant circumstances and not merely
by reference to the nature of the relationship, so as to cover the whole range of persons
connected in a broad sense to the organisation where the breach has occurred”. In addition, many
countries have adopted a “reverse burden of proof”, which requires that once the reporting
person has established that they have suffered a detrimental impact, the employer must show
that that was for a valid reason other than the act of reporting. 146
65. For those that have already experienced retaliation, most legislation provides for post-retaliation
protection measures. For example, Ghana’s Whistleblower Act, 2006 provides legal assistance to
employees who report misconduct in the public interest. The Spanish province of Valencia
recognizes the right of whistle-blowers to medical and psychological assistance. 147 The Irish
Protected Disclosure Act, 2014 148 and the Law on Protection of Whistleblowers of the territory of

Belgium, Loi relative à la dénonciation d’une atteinte suspectée à l’intégrité au sein d’une autorité administrative fédérale par
134

un membre de son personnel, 15 September 2013, art. 15(2).

Republic of Korea, Act on the Protection of Public Interest Whistleblowers, No. 10472, March 2011, art. 30; Act No. 15023 of
135

October 2017 increased the maximum length of confinement. See also Ghana, Whistleblower Act, 2006 (Act 720), art. 6(3).
136
Benin, Decree 2013–122 of 6 March 2013.
137
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette of BiH br. 100/13, 2013.
138
China, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, art. 41.
139
Côte d’Ivoire, Ordonnance No. 2013–660.
140
Dominican Republic, Contralor General de la República, Código de Ética, 2012.
141
Gambia, Labour Act, 2007.
142
Liberia, Executive Order No. 62.
143
Slovenia, 2020 amendment to the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act, 2010.
144
Ukrainian Information Agency, “Corruption Whistleblower Law Enters into Force in Ukraine“, 1 January 2020.
145
Zambia, Public Interest Disclosure (Protection of Whistle-blowers) Act, 2010.
UNODC, The United Nations Convention against Corruption: Resource Guide on Good Practices in the Protection of Reporting Persons,
146

2015, 64.
147
Spain, Resolución de 27 de junio de 2019, del director de la Agencia de Prevención y Lucha contra el Fraude y la Corrupción de
la Comunitat Valenciana, art. 43.2(d).
148
Ireland, Protected Disclosures Act 2014.
 TMWBPS/2022 32

Kosovo 149 allow whistle-blowers to claim relief from the person who retaliates against them
because they or someone else made a protected disclosure.
66. The ILO has addressed protection from retaliation in a few instruments. Convention No. 158,
which prohibits dismissals for “participation in proceedings against an employer involving alleged
violation of laws or regulations or recourse to competent administrative authorities”, 150 and the
Violence and Harassment Convention (No. 190), and its accompanying Recommendation
(No. 206), 2019, protect witnesses and whistle-blowers against victimization or retaliation if their
disclosures concern acts covered by the Convention.

Incentives to report irregularities

67. Rewards, awards, honours or other forms of recognition for whistle-blowing can incentivize it;
however, incentives are distinct from measures to protect whistle-blowers against retaliation.
Incentives focus on the information rather than the motivation of the informer. 151
68. In the United States, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 152 provides that persons residing
in a country in which a bribe was paid can blow the whistle on illicit activity through an attorney
licensed in the United States and can receive a reward if the complaint resulted in a sanction of
US$1 million or more against the accused enterprise. The Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Rewards
Act 153 (KARRA) creates a three-year whistle-blower programme aimed at freezing funds that are
traceable to foreign government corruption and that are held by United States financial
institutions or United States persons in the United States. Under KARRA, the Treasury may award
up to US$5 million to anyone who provides information leading to the restraint, seizure, forfeiture,
or repatriation of such “stolen assets”.
69. The Liberian Executive Order No. 62 and Uganda’s Whistleblowers Protection Act, 2010 both
provide the whistle-blower a reward of 5 per cent of any amount of money recovered because of
their disclosure. In Ecuador, the reward can be between 10 and 20 per cent of the recovered funds.
The Ukrainian Law on Prevention of Corruption of 2014 also provides for a financial reward of
10 per cent to incentivize whistle-blower reports. In Indonesia, Presidential Decree 43/2018
rewards individuals or communities who report allegations of corruption to law enforcement with
up to 200 million Indonesian rupiah or 2 per cent of the amount recovered in case of bribes. 154
Other countries that have also adopted reward programmes include Canada, Ghana, the Republic
of Korea and Slovakia. 155
70. Another incentive is the right to know the progress of a whistle-blower report, which gives
ownership to the whistle-blower and allows them to anticipate any potential consequences. For
example, article 23 of Slovenia’s Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act allows the reporting
persons to request the competent authorities to notify them “of the measures or the course of

Territory of Kosovo (as defined in UN Security Council resolution 1244 of 1999), Law No. 06/L–085 on Protection of
149

Whistleblowers, 2018, art. 23.

150
The CEACR has applied this text as a means of protection from retaliation against workers for activities in defence of their
rights. ILO, Protection against Unjustified Dismissal, paras 115–117.
151
Terry Morehead Dworkin and Janet P. Near, “A Better Statutory Approach to Whistle-Blowing“, Business Ethics Quarterly 7, No. 1
(1997): 1–16, 8.
152
United States, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 1977.
153
United States, Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Rewards Act.
154
Suyatno, “A Whistleblowing Culture”.
155
National Whistleblowers Center.
 TMWBPS/2022 33

action taken in this respect”. Similarly, in Zambia and Ukraine, the reporting person and the
receiving authority are entitled to request a progress report from the authority in charge of the
investigation.

Enforcement mechanisms
71. In order to be effective, whistle-blower protection laws should impose consequences for those
who infringe them. Enforcing whistle-blower protection laws requires establishing procedures to
ensure that competent authorities act upon disclosures. In some cases, they also provide whistle-
blowers with an opportunity to participate in the procedures. 156 The G20 Anti-Corruption Action
Plan 157 of 2010 summarized enforcement mechanisms of whistle-blower protection to include:
(a) the existence of independent oversight and enforcement authorities with adequate financial
and human resources to investigate all complaints of retaliation, discrimination or
disciplinary action taken against whistle-blowers;
(b) the availability of judicial review mechanisms that guarantee the whistle-blower a fair
hearing before an impartial and competent body, with a full right of appeal; and
(c) the availability of remedies and sanctions for retaliation that should, among other remedial
actions, be able to allow the whistle-blower to “seek corrective action from the employer,
including interim relief pending a full hearing and appropriate financial compensation if the
effects of the retaliatory measures cannot reasonably be undone” 158 And should cover a
broad range of penalties, including fines, imprisonment and criminal sanctions against
employers who retaliate against whistle-blowers.

 V. Protection of whistle-blowers in practice

Successes through the protection of whistle-blowers

72. Most governments report the results of their whistle-blower protection laws in terms of the
number of cases received, outcomes of cases, compensation and assets recovered. 159 For
example, in 2018 the Minister of Information and Culture of Nigeria announced that the Economic
and Financial Crimes Commission had recovered more than 540 billion Nigerian naira
(US$1.5 billion at December 2018 exchange rate) through the Whistle-Blower Policy. 160 In the
Republic of Korea, the Government reported that in the period 2008–19, the Anti-Corruption and
Civil Rights Commission had recovered 200 billion Korean Republic won (US$117.7 million 2019
average exchange rate) based on 775 reports on corruption in the public sector and had paid
rewards of nearly 17,282 billion won (US$14.8 million) for corruption reporting. In addition, it had
recovered 113.5 billion won (US$97.4 million) as a result of 6,193 reports of public interest

156
Terracol, 31–49.
157
OECD, G20 Anticorruption Action Plan: Protection of Whistleblowers: Study on Whistleblower Protection Frameworks, Compendium of
Best Practices and Guiding Principles for Legislation, 2010, paras 32–35.
158
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1729: Protection of “whistle-blowers“, art. 6.2.5.
For example, Transparency International, “Whistleblower Protection in the European Union: Analysis of And Recommendations
159

on the proposed EU Directive“, Position Paper No. 1, 2018.

160
Emmanuel Elebeke, “We’ve Recovered N540bn through Whistle Blower Policy – Minister“, Vanguard, 27 November 2018; see
also University O. Edih, “Economic Gains of Whistle-Blowing Policy in Nigeria: Prospects and Challenges“, International Journal of
International Relations, Media and Mass Communication Studies 6, No. 2 (2020): 1–13, 9.
 TMWBPS/2022 34

violations received in the period 2011–19, paying rewards of nearly 8.4 billion won
(US$7.2 million). 161 The Government also reported that of 260 requests for guarantee of position
received between 2008 and 2019, 71 had been granted, as well as 22 of 26 requests for protecting
the physical safety of reporting persons. The responsible agency requested disciplinary actions or
filed criminal accusations in 14 cases of identity disclosures among the 55 requests received. 162
The Department of Justice of the United States reported in 2019 that it had obtained more than
US$3 billion in settlements and judgments from civil cases involving fraud and false claims against
the Government in the previous fiscal year. 163 In Peru, the disclosure of a video showing an
intelligence official organizing a bribery scheme resulted in the recovery of US$250 million in
hidden funds. 164
73. As a response to the high-profile murder of the journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia in Malta, the
European Commission launched an initiative to strengthen whistle-blower protections that led to
the adoption of Directive 2019/1937 shortly thereafter. 165 In Guatemala in 2006, the Government
and the United Nations established an International Commission against Impunity as an
independent body to support the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the National Civilian Police and other
state institutions in the investigation of corruption and other sensitive crimes, which had
previously gone unpunished. The agreement expired in 2019 after the Commission had
dismantled several criminal networks and promoted dozens of legal and constitutional
reforms. 166

Continued challenges in the protection of whistle-blowers

74. Despite their successes in stemming corruption, such efforts have faced challenges. For example,
according to a UNODC survey, the number of bribes collected by Nigerian public officials rose
from 82 million to 117 million bribes between 2016 and 2019. 167 According to the Australian
federal Government and state and territory governments, large government agencies face
challenges in detecting wrongdoing. 168 There is also a lack of political will in certain jurisdictions.
For example, Liberia’s president issued Executive Order No. 43 on the Protection of Whistle-
blowers in 2009 and had to extend it in 2014 as a temporary measure because the legislature had
not adopted a corresponding law. Moreover, other groups of workers are excluded from the
whistle-blower protection statutes in spite of governments’ search for no-loophole protections. 169
In the United States, employees at “hospitals, nursing homes, and community health clinics lack

161
Republic of Korea, ACRC Korea Annual Report 2019, 101–102.
162
Republic of Korea, ACRC Korea Annual Report 2019, 98–99.
United States, Department of Justice, “Justice Department Recovers over $3 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year
163

2019“, 9 January 2020.

164
Jean-Pierre Brun et al., Asset Recovery Handbook: A Guide for Practitioners, second edition, 2021, 23.
165
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Daphne Caruana Galizia’s
Assassination and the Rule of Law in Malta and Beyond: Ensuring that the Whole Truth Emerges: Report, 2019.
166
IACHR, Resolution 1/17; International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, El papel de la CICIG en la promoción de
reformas jurídicas contra la impunidad, June 2019.
167
UNODC, “Corruption in Nigeria: Patterns and trends“; UNODC, “Corruption in Nigeria: Bribery: public experience and response“.
168
McLaren, Kendall and Rook, 92.
169
”A no-loophole approach to the scope of coverage of protected persons would ensure that, in addition to public servants and
permanent employees, coverage also includes consultants, contractors, temporary employees, former employees and
volunteers”. OECD, G20 Anti-Corruption Plan: Protection of Whistleblowers, para. 19.
 TMWBPS/2022 35

federal whistleblower protections if they file complaints about patient safety or threats to the
public health”. 170
75. Figure 2 shows that informal whistle-blowers revealed six times as many instances of wrongdoing
than those who use formal procedures. Workers at oversight institutions conducting internal
audits report wrongdoing 50 per cent more frequently than those using formal whistle-blowing
procedures. The researchers of the study suggest that this may show “a lack of trust in formal
procedures within the public sector arising from the poor track record of some organisations in
dealing with whistleblowers”. 171

 Figure 2. Methods of occupational fraud detection

35%
Percentage of organizations reporting fraud

31%
30%

25%

20% 17%
16%
14% 14% 14%
15% 13%
11%
10% 8% 8%
7%
5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
4%
5% 3%
2%
3%

0%

Government organizations All industries

Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC), Fraud in the Public Sector, 2012, 13.

76. Research indicates that one key obstacle to effective whistle-blowing is the fear of retaliation 172
and the perception that the report will not be acted upon or that reporting is generally “too
risky”. 173 More recently, some staff in the United Kingdom expressed fear of undermining the
fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, 174 while others blamed poor legal knowledge and media

170
Stephen M. Kohn, “Fix the Gaping Hole in Whistleblower Protections: Public Health and Patient Safety”, The Hill, April 2020, 1.
171
PwC, Fraud in the Public Sector, 2012, 13.
172
For example, UN Joint Inspection Unit, Review of Whistleblower Policies and Practices in United Nations System Organizations,
JIU/REP/2018/4, 2018, para. 2; ICTUR, “Focus on Tax Justice“, International Union Rights 25, No. 1 (2018): 21–23; IMF; Terracol, 1;
Fasterling and Lewis, 71–73 and 75.
173
Rehg et al., 229; see also UN Joint Inspection Unit, para. 2.
174
Jolly and Masters, para. 2.
 TMWBPS/2022 36

coverage. 175 A 2011 study also indicated that workers might use code names, sarcasm, jokes and
gossip as alternatives to reporting irregularities to reduce risk of retaliation. 176 Furthermore,
silence may involve little risk since corruption is “generally a consensual crime, of which its victims
are often unaware ... [and] tend to stimulate secrecy”. 177 These situations suggest that “the
decision to report cannot be explained by simply reversing the explanations for the decision to
keep silent ... [D]ifferent causal pathways could lead to the decision to report and different causal
pathways could lead to the decision to keep silent”. 178
77. Whistle-blowers may also be discouraged from reporting illegal activities if “no advance
consultation procedure exists [in cases that] she/he has a doubt as to whether the wrongdoings
observed constitute a felony or a crime”. 179 There have also been several efforts to deprive public
servants of the protections granted to whistle-blowers. 180 An anti-corruption assessment of eight
Latin American countries found that “the lack or inadequacy of existing mechanisms for the
protection of whistleblowers hinders reporting of acts of corruption”. 181 For example, Argentina’s
Law 25.764 182 of 2003 created the National Programme for the Protection of Witnesses and
Accused Persons, which may extend to corruption offences only on an exceptional basis. 183
Argentina’s Act 27401 184 of 2018, in turn, promotes but does not compel the creation of integrity
programmes that may include whistle-blower protection.
78. Recent studies have questioned the sufficiency of anonymity and protection against retaliation in
whistle-blowing protection laws. A 2021 global study on whistle-blower protection argued that
employees have “risked retaliation thinking they had genuine protection, when in reality there
was no realistic chance they could maintain their careers [… therefore], reprisal victims have been
far more prejudiced than if no whistleblower protection law had been in place at all”. 185 The 2021
UN High-Level Panel on International Financial Accountability, Transparency and Integrity for
Achieving the 2030 Agenda added that “[g]reater transparency and information exchange are not
enough. In many countries, the details of serious corruption are public knowledge, but knowledge
does not translate into accountability”. 186
79. As such, there is a growing sense that protecting whistle-blowers against retaliation may not be
enough. There have been calls for “a new corporate culture in which ‘informants’ are more likely

175
Itojong Anthony Ayamba, “Whistleblowing in a Depraved Nigerian Economy: Challenges and Prospects“, International Journal
of Social Science Studies 7, No. 2 (2019): 1–11, 7.
176
Hayden Teo and Donella Caspersz, “Dissenting Discourse: Exploring Alternatives to the Whistleblowing/Silence Dichotomy”,
Journal of Business Ethics 104 (2011): 237–249, 244–246, cited in Loyens and Maesschalck.
Madelijne Gorsira, Adriaan Denkers and Wim Huisman, “Both Sides of the Coin: Motives for Corruption Among Public Officials
177

and Business Employees“, Journal of Business Ethics 151 (2018): 179–194, 181–184.
178
Loyens and Maesschalck, 2.
179
Nicole Stolowy and Luc Paugam, “The Protection of Whistleblowers: What Does the Law Say in France and in the US“, HEC Paris,
27 January 2021.
Armenia’s Law on Public Services of 25 March 2020, for example, removed the guarantee for the security of public servants
180

who conscientiously report on violations and illegal activities.

181
Jaime Chávez Alor, ed., Latin America Anti-Corruption Assessment 2020, Lawyers Council for Civil and Economic Rights, 2021, 34.
182
Argentina, Programa Nacional de Protección a Testigos e Imputados: Ley 25.764, 2003.
Diego Martínez, Mecanismos para la Denuncia de Hechos de Corrupción en Argentina, Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia,
183

2009, 19.
184
Argentina, Responsabilidad Penal: 27401, 2018.
Samantha Feinstein and Tom Devine, Are Whistleblowing Laws Working? A Global Study of Whistleblower Protection Litigation,
185

Government Accountability Project, 2021, 12.

186
UN, Financial Integrity for Sustainable Development, 14–15.
 TMWBPS/2022 37

to be valued than harassed”, 187 placing great emphasis on organizational support. 188 In 2013, the
United States National Business Ethics Survey found that “employees are much more likely to act
against misconduct and report wrongdoing when they feel good about where they work and
believe they have influence in the workplace”. 189 A study of Ghana’s Whistleblower Act, 2006 went
further by stating that a positive and protective organizational culture “sustains [the] interest [of
whistle-blowers] in the defence of the public purse since a nation that honours its heroes [by
protecting them] is worth dying for”. 190
80. Another major concern is the lack of adequate statutory protection for workers of oversight
institutions. As noted by one study on public sector auditors, “[t]he sad reality is that public sector
auditors can face retaliation – isolation, smear campaigns, diminution of duties, even suspension
and termination – just for doing their jobs. If the fruits of the audit function’s labours conflict with
an agency head’s political agenda, too often the political agenda wins and the auditor loses”. 191

Cultural dimensions of whistle-blower protection

81. Evidence suggests that culture – be it national, institutional and/or related to governance – is
closely linked to the ethical decision-making processes of employees contemplating reporting
acts of corruption and maladministration. 192 For example, a study 193 on whistle-blower protection
in Singapore found that 56 per cent of respondents would report acts of corruption without a
whistle-blower protection policy in place and that willingness to report would increase by 36 per
cent with a whistle-blower protection law in place. The study concluded that culture “plays a role
in the attitude of the Singaporean employee contemplating reporting unlawful activity and, more
importantly in how the disclosure is treated by the corporation or public institution”. In another
country, culture has been cited to be among the factors “preventing many citizens and public
officials from reporting on corruption”. 194 In some societies, reporting unlawful activity is seen as
an antagonistic act, which can influence both how an employee regards the possible disclosure
and how public institutions treat such disclosure. 195 In some cultures for example, good
relationships and protecting the superior’s image assume a higher priority than solving
problems. 196 These examples demonstrate how cultural norms interact with governance systems
to impact whistle-blowing practices. 197
82. Another challenge is the “institutionalization deficits” in countries that have inherited their public
administration systems from colonizing countries and have been confronting related challenges

187
Sawyer, Johnson and Holub, 86; see also Banisar.
188
OECD, Committing to Effective Whistleblower Protection, 68; Nurul Mustafida, “Determinants of Employee Whistleblowing
Intentions in Indonesia: Applying Theory of Planned Behavior”, The Indonesian Journal of Accounting Research 23, No. 2
(2020): 241–262.
189
Ethics Resource Center (ERC), National Business Ethics Survey of the U.S. Workforce, 2013, 38.
190
Ndebugri and Senzu, 50.
191
Russell A. Jackson, “Public Sector Auditors Can Face Intimidation, Isolation, Retaliation, Suspension – Even Termination – Just
for Doing their Job“, Internal Auditor 74, No. 3 (2017).
Masahisa K. Yamaguchi, “Three Essays on Culture and Whistleblowing: A Multimethod Comparative Study of the United States
192

and Japan“ (PhD thesis, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2015); Carr, 157; McLaren, Kendall and Rook.
193
McLaren, Kendall and Rook.
Maira Martini, “U4 Expert Answer: Overview of Corruption and Anti-corruption in Vietnam“ (Anti-Corruption Resource Centre,
194

2012).
195
McLaren, Kendall and Rook.
196
Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, third edition (John Wiley & Sons, 2004), 34.
197
Jiang; McLaren, Kendall and Rook.
 TMWBPS/2022 38

since independence. For example, former colonial powers have adopted civil service regulations
that address ethical issues based on long-term experience, which countries that have recently
attained independence do not have. These relatively new bureaucracies often compete with
“other more legitimate and viable informal public authorities”, both within institutions and in
societies, and have not become entrenched in people’s lives. 198
83. Regional bodies have recognized the need to adapt to different contexts. For example, when
declaring 2018 as the African Anti-Corruption year, the African Union recognized that the
challenge was to build “commitment to institutional approaches to combating corruption and
other governance challenges on one hand and bridging the gap between norm-setting and norm-
implementation through appropriate measures at local, national, regional and continental levels
on the other hand”. 199 The Council of Europe also recognized these challenges, stating in 2014
that “member States will need to do more than implement a law on whistleblower protection to
encourage employers to ensure their internal arrangements allow those working for them to raise
issues early and safely”. 200

 VI. Social dialogue related to the protection of whistle-blowers

84. Public servants in general — and workers of oversight institutions in particular — have a duty to
report illegal activity. This duty and the need to protect those who comply with it are part of the
working conditions of public servants and is therefore a proper subject of social dialogue and,
where established by law, collective bargaining. The points of consensus of the ILO Global
Dialogue Forum on Challenges to Collective Bargaining in the Public Service (Geneva, April 2014)
declared that “[s]ocial dialogue should aim at, among other things, creating transparent
conditions in which the public service develops an ethical culture that prevents corruption”. 201 The
same points of consensus also concluded that “[s]ocial dialogue, including collective bargaining
and the implementation of collective agreements, can be part of the infrastructure that protects
the independence and impartiality of the public service.” In 2013, the CEACR had also pointed out
that:
While collective bargaining yields benefits for public servants in terms of motivation, social
recognition and human dignity, it is also beneficial for administrations, as the commitments
made by unions support them in their efforts to implement the key principles of public
governance … and serve as an effective tool for sound human resource management, which in
turn enhances the quality of services provided. 202

85. The CEACR added that different forms of social dialogue such as collective bargaining and
freedom of association are “constructive means of promoting the protection of workers, often in
vulnerable situations”. 203 The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association has called for the
protection of leaders of public employees’ organizations who report irregularities or

198
Onyango, 4.
199
African Union, “30th AU Summit/Note to Editors: African Union to Launch 2018 as the African Anti-Corruption Year…“, 2018.
200
Council of Europe, Protection of Whistleblowers: Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7 and Explanatory Memorandum, 2014.
201
ILO, Final Report of the Discussion: Global Dialogue Forum on Challenges to Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, 19.
202
ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, para. 557.
203
ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, para. 226.
 TMWBPS/2022 39

corruption. 204 The literature suggests that corruption can be “a problem of collective action,
implying that in any solution the whole system must necessarily be upended, creating new rules
for a new game”. 205The UNODC has called for drafting laws in consultation with relevant
stakeholders to make them more effective and legitimate, which would lead to more public
engagement. The UNODC further advises that “[t]his is all the more important in cases where the
social and cultural environment is particularly hostile, for historical or other reasons, to the idea
of someone alerting the authorities about a problem that does not directly affect them”. 206 In this
regard, for example, Ghana’s Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice, Anti-
Corruption Agency and Ombuds Office collaborate with different stakeholders to implement
whistle-blower protection policies. 207
86. The Council of Europe stated in its 2014 report 208 that unions can be a valuable source of
confidential advice. In France, public service organizations have offered to play this role and
requested that the law incorporating the EU Directive 2019/1937 should include them in the
process of establishing protection mechanisms and that it should protect them as much as
whistle-blowers from reprisals and from revealing their sources. 209 In Spain, the Professional
Association of Judges and the Inter-Union Organization participated in the elaboration of anti-
corruption rules in Valencia and the Professional Association of Public Prosecutors initiated a
campaign that included the professionalization of judges. 210
87. The Council of European Professional and Managerial Staff (EUROCADRES) has also called for a
larger role to be played by public service organizations in protecting whistle-blowers, pointing out
that “trade unions are ideally placed to negotiate best practice[s] and hold organisations to
account”. 211 Public service workers’ organizations can represent whistle-blowers, inform them of
their rights and prevent them from feeling isolated or fearful. They can also raise collective
concerns before government employers, help protect the anonymity of informing employees,
encourage best practices, manage any conflicts of interest between competing claims and ensure
the best possible protection for whistle-blowers. The German Trade Union Confederation has also
called for the right of collective action for trade unions and the opportunity to participate in
pursuing “violations of the law, in particular in labour and social law, in court”. 212
88. In terms of protecting whistle-blowers, the Latin American Union of Workers of Oversight
institutions has advocated for immediate assistance, beginning at the stage prior to the complaint
(independent facilitator), including precautionary measures (these do not require that the
workers of oversight institutions prove the possible dangerous situation due to the nature of their

For example, ILO, Report in which the Committee requests to be kept informed of developments – Report No. 391, October
204

2019, Case No. 3314 (Zimbabwe); ILO, Definitive report – Report No. 388, March 2019, Case No. 3222 (Guatemala).
Michiel De Vries and Iwona Sobis, “Increasing Transparency is Not Always the Panacea: An Overview of Alternative Paths to
205

Curb Corruption in the Public Sector”, International Journal of Public Sector Management 29, No. 3 (2016): 261. See also Alfonso W.
Quiroz, Historia de la Corrupción en el Perú (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2019), 426.
206
UNODC, The United Nations Convention against Corruption: Resource Guide, 12.
207
Onyango, 16.
208
Council of Europe, “Protection of Whistleblowers: Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7”.
209
La Maison des Lanceurs d’Alerte, “Propositions“, 2021.
210
Spain, Agencia Valenciana Antifrau, “Approval and publication of the Regulation of operation and internal regime of the
Agency“, press release, 3 July 2019; “Flash Derecho: catálogo de 25 medidas de lucha contra la corrupción de la Asociación
Profesional de Fiscales“, Hay Derecho, (blog), 30 October 2016.
211
EUROCADRES, Whistleblowing Toolkit: EUROCADRES Best Practice Guide, 2020, 10–11.
German Trade Union Confederation, “Positionspapier: Die Umsetzung der Whistleblower-Richtlinie (Richtlinie (EU) 2019/1937
212

vom 23. Oktober 2019) in deutsches Recht – Anforderungen aus gewerkschaftlicher Sicht”, 7 December 2020.
 TMWBPS/2022 40

posts), research, guarantees of confidentiality, impartiality and independence of the facilitators,

and multilevel procedures. The latter includes alternative routes when direct facilitation is not
possible, or when the facilitator is in a situation of vulnerability and may experience possible
retaliation. 213
89. Social dialogue can also play an important role in changing the culture of an organization from
that of corruption (for example nepotism, bribery and patronage) to a culture of ethics and
integrity. A recent study on the impact of digital government on whistle-blowing recommended
that “an effective whistleblowing program needs to, inter alia, build a free and transparent
whistleblowing organizational culture”. 214 Organizational culture has been defined as “the pattern
of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered or developed, in learning to
cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration. These have worked well
enough to be considered valid and are therefore taught to new members as the correct way to
perceive, think and feel in relation to these problems”. 215 Research has shown that persons are
more prone to change their values in their first year of employment than at any other point in
their careers, and that “peer pressure, the role of social networks, social codes and culture seem
to be stronger factors [in corruption] than the inclination to maintain a positive self-concept”. 216
Therefore, it is important that they enter an environment in which corruption is not accepted and
peers are aware of those values. Social dialogue can support such an environment.
90. Furthermore, social dialogue and collective bargaining can help change the organizational culture
by bringing out workers’ interests, building trust in the change process itself between the parties,
and empowering workers to contribute to the goals of the organization. Central to a culture of
anti-corruption in an organization is ensuring the legitimacy of whistle-blowers within the
organizations in which they work. 217 Empowering those affected by irregularities is an integral
part of any effective anti-corruption campaign. This includes “efforts ... to overcome normative
constraints of social capital and civic culture and provide collective action networks so the
corruption fighters are not isolated” because “the willingness to engage in anti-corruption efforts
is highly sensitive to interpersonal trust, reciprocity and evidence that others will do the same”. 218
91. Social dialogue and collective bargaining can strengthen the efforts to promote a culture of
integrity and ethics among public employees by institutionalizing the bidirectional exchange of
information and mutual agreement to establish collaboration mechanisms for the improvement
of services, as well as through clauses for recruitment and selection, performance management,
career development and training, among other measures. Therefore, the guarantees established
by Convention No. 151 can be turned into tools for participation and empowerment that may
translate into an enduring commitment by workers and management to organizational
development.
92. Evidence exists in some countries of the involvement of workers’ and employers’ organizations in
the drafting process of whistle-blower protection laws, while in other countries social dialogue
approaches have been incorporated in their whistle-blower protection laws. For example:

Hugo Buisel Quintana, statement made at the 109th Session of the International Labour Conference on behalf of the Latin
213

American Union of Workers of Oversight Bodies, 8 June 2021.

214
Yelkal Mulualem Walle, “The Impact of Digital Government on Whistleblowing and Whistle-blower Protection: Exploratory
Study“, Journal of Information Technology Management (2020): 2.
215
Schein, 17.
216
De Vries and Sobis, 262.
217
Sawyer, Johnson and Holub, 88 and 92.
218
UNDP and SIWI, 18.
 TMWBPS/2022 41

• France: In 2018, 17 French organizations, including several public servant organizations,

created the “Whistleblowers Centre” to support persons who disclose harm in the public
interest. The association received 300 requests for support by December 2020 and has
supported more than 150 whistle-blowers. 219
• Namibia: In 2017, Namibia adopted the Whistleblower Protection Act 10 of 2017, under which
a representative employers’ organization and an organization representing registered trade
unions have the right to nominate two to four members each for the Whistle-blower Protection
Advisory Committee, and one member each for the Whistle-blower Protection Review
Tribunal. 220
• Serbia: In 2013, Serbia’s Ministry of Justice established a working group with representatives of
major unions and employers’ associations to draft a law on workplace whistle-blowing. 221
• Switzerland: In 2021, the Canton of Geneva in Switzerland adopted a new statute protecting
whistle-blowers. The Council of State sets up a “trusted group” to receive reports and protect
whistle-blowers. The Council appoints its manager after consulting with staff representative
organizations. Similarly, the collective bargaining agreement for the public health sector in the
Canton of Neuchâtel protects staff against reprisals for disclosing illegal acts. 222

 VII. Concluding remarks

93. In recent decades, there has been increased recognition of the importance of strengthening the
public service. This includes fortifying public sector integrity and whistle-blower protection is a
key labour strategy for achieving this goal. As this paper has shown, considerable efforts have
been made over the past two decades at international, regional and national levels to set out laws
and policies on the protection of whistle-blowers. Yet in practice, challenges remain. Despite
protection, whistle-blowers face fear of retaliation and work environments in which the reporting
of irregularities is discouraged. There are many aspects of the motivations and reasons behind
corruption and whistle-blowing that are not fully understood.
94. In this respect, social dialogue can play an important role in exploring and devising solutions to
the remaining challenges in whistle-blower protection. Social dialogue can provide public
servants, their organizations and governments with the necessary mechanisms to reflect the
cultural and political diversity of national public services, reform organizational cultures and
bridge existing gaps between legislation and policy on the one hand and international standards
on anti-corruption on the other. The decent work perspective and social dialogue can be helpful
for promoting a culture of accountability and transparency and honest public management at all
levels, through a comprehensive approach. For example, it can promote a thorough examination
of the requirements for the admission of reports; the protection of the identities of those who
report; the independence of reporting mechanisms and oversight institutions; the usefulness of
rewards; and the need for external reporting channels. The experiences examined show that
valuing the act of whistle-blowing promotes these values from both the institutional and
individual perspectives.

219
La Maison des Lanceurs d’Alerte, “Découvrir la MLA“.
220
Namibia, Whistleblower Protection Act 10 of 2017.
221
Council of Europe, Protection of Whistleblowers: A Brief Guide for Implementing a National Framework, 2016, 14.
222
Switzerland, Canton of Neuchâtel, Convention Collective de Travail du Secteur de la Santé du Canton de Neuchâtel, 2022–2025
edition, section 7.4.
 TMWBPS/2022 42

95. Social dialogue, including collective bargaining, can also:

• help define corruption and whistle-blowing in specific national contexts;

• encourage research into the causes of corruption and motivations for whistle-blowing;
• provide effective protections for whistle-blowers;
• create awareness among public servants of the value of whistle-blowers and the protections
afforded to them;
• strengthen integrity programmes;
• develop the specialized knowledge of public servants; and
• close the loopholes identified through consultations.
96. An international approach to social dialogue could help build global and comprehensive measures
to achieve those effects and identify gaps in international standards on public services, anti-
corruption and labour. Appropriately addressing such gaps could strengthen whistle-blowing
protection and promote a global culture of integrity in public services, especially in the area of
protection against retaliation.
97. Finally, it is important to note that whistle-blower protection is not the only element of ensuring
integrity in public services. There is a clear link between decent conditions of work and adequate
protections to enforce ethics and transparency standards. In 2013, the CEACR identified the link
between efficient public administration and decent work for public servants. 223 Strengthened
protection for whistle-blowers and investment in decent work in the public service sector are both
crucial for ensuring public service effectiveness, efficiency and integrity.

223
ILO, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, para. 556.