Ilocos Norte Electric Co. vs.

CA
G.R. No. 53401 (November 6, 1989)
Facts:

The case revolves around the tragic death of Isabel Lao Juan, who died due to electrocution during a typhoon named
"Gening" that struck Ilocos Norte on June 29, 1967. On that day, after the typhoon had subsided and floodwaters began
to recede, Isabel ventured out of her son-in-law's house to check on her store, the Five Sisters Emporium. She was
wading through waist-deep floodwaters, followed by two individuals, Aida Bulong and Linda Alonzo Estavillo, when she
suddenly screamed and sank into the water. The two witnesses observed a live electric wire dangling in the water, which
they believed was the cause of her electrocution.

Attempts to rescue Isabel were made by Ernesto dela Cruz, who also saw the live wire but was deterred by the danger.
After the incident, Isabel's body was recovered, and a medical examination revealed signs of electrocution, including
burn wounds on her palm. The cause of death was certified as "circulatory shock electrocution."

The Ilocos Norte Electric Company (INELCO), the defendant in the case, presented evidence to argue that their electric
service system was functioning properly and that they had taken necessary precautions to prevent accidents. They
claimed that the deceased might have been electrocuted due to a burglar alarm system she had installed, which was left
on without their knowledge.

The heirs of Isabel filed a complaint for damages against INELCO, which was initially dismissed by the Court of First
Instance (CFI). However, upon appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the CFI's decision, awarding damages to the
plaintiffs.

Legal Issues:
1. Whether Isabel Lao Juan died of electrocution.
2. Whether INELCO can be held liable for her death.
3. Whether the CA's reversal of the trial court's factual findings was appropriate.
Arguments:

 Petitioner's Arguments (INELCO):

 The deceased's death was not due to electrocution but could have been caused by drowning or her own
negligence related to the burglar alarm.

 The typhoon and flooding were fortuitous events that should exempt them from liability.

 The testimonies of witnesses regarding the incident were hearsay and should not have been considered
as part of the res gestae.

 The trial court's findings should not have been reversed as they were based on the evidence presented.

 Respondents' Arguments (Heirs of Isabel):

 The evidence, including medical findings and witness testimonies, clearly indicated that Isabel died from
electrocution caused by a live wire.

 INELCO failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in maintaining their electric lines during the typhoon,
which directly contributed to the incident.

 The CA's decision to reverse the trial court's findings was justified based on the weight of the evidence
presented.

Court's Decision and Legal Reasoning:

The Supreme Court upheld the CA's decision, affirming that Isabel died from electrocution. The Court found that the
evidence presented by the respondents, including the medical examination and witness testimonies, sufficiently
established that the cause of death was electrocution due to a live wire. The Court noted that the wounds on Isabel's
palm were consistent with electric burns, and the testimonies of witnesses were credible and part of the res
gestae(Things done) , thus admissible despite the absence of Ernesto dela Cruz's direct testimony.

The Court rejected INELCO's defense that the typhoon was a fortuitous event that absolved them of liability. It
emphasized that while natural disasters can be considered acts of God, the negligence of INELCO in failing to maintain
their electric lines during the emergency was a direct cause of the incident. The Court reiterated that when an act of God
combines with a defendant's negligence, the defendant can still be held liable for the resulting injury.

Furthermore, the Court found that the principle of "volenti non fit injuria" (to a willing person, no injury is done) did not
apply, as Isabel was acting to protect her property during an emergency, and her actions did not constitute an
assumption of risk.

The Court modified the damages awarded by the CA, increasing the actual damages to P48,229.45, while affirming the
other awards for compensatory and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.

Significant Legal Principles Established:

1. The admissibility of witness statements as part of the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.

2. The principle that a defendant can be held liable when negligence combines with a fortuitous event to cause
injury.

3. The application of extraordinary diligence required of public utility companies in maintaining safety during
emergencies.
AMADO PICART vs. FRANK SMITH, JR.
(37 Phil 809) G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918

FACTS:
Amado Picart was riding on his pony over Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union When Smith approached from the
opposite direction in an automobile with rate of speed of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the Smith neared the
bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he
had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him
was not observing the rule of the road.

Picart saw the automobile and heard the warning signals. Being perturbed by the rapid approach of the vehicle, he
pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. The bridge is
about 75 meters and a width of only 4.80 meters. The vehicle approached without slowing down. Smith quickly turned
his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but due to
the automobile’s close proximity to the animal, the animal became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with
its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb
was broken.

The horse fell and its rider was thrown off. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions
which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

ISSUE:
Whether Smith was guilty of negligence and liable for civil obligations

HELD:
Yes. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to
an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently
far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was
almost upon the horse.

A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he
was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable
consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the
threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in
planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in
such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

Test of Negligence:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then
he is guilty of negligence.

“last clear chance” rule is applicable. In other words, when a traveler has reached a point where he cannot extricate
himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the injury, his negligence in reaching that position becomes the condition
and not the proximate cause of the injury and will not preclude a recovery. (Note especially Aiken vs. Metcalf [1917], 102
Atl., 330.)
G.R. No. 130068. October 01, 1998

Title: Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals and Philippine Ports

Authority: Consolidated Cases on Solidary Liability and Pilotage

Facts:

The case originated from an incident on June 20, 1980, where the M/V PAVLODAR, owned by Far Eastern Shipping
Company (FESC) and flying under the USSR flag, was being maneuvered for docking at the Port of Manila’s Berth 4. The
vessel, under compulsory pilotage, was piloted by Senen Gavino of the Manila Pilots Association (MPA). Despite calm sea
conditions, the vessel failed to properly anchor and collided with the pier’s apron, causing significant damage to both the
vessel and the pier. The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) filed a complaint for damages against FESC, Capt. Gavino, and
MPA, claiming joint and several liabilities. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of PPA, ordering the defendants to pay
solidarily. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision with modifications concerning MPA’s liability basis, not on the
employer-employee relationship but on Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 provisions. Both FESC and MPA sought
review from the Supreme Court, contesting the decisions and their liabilities.

Issues:

1. Whether the pilot or the shipmaster is solely liable for damages caused during compulsory pilotage.

2. Whether both the pilot and the shipmaster can be held concurrently negligent and thus solidarily liable for damages.

3. The basis and extent of liability of Manila Pilots’ Association for the negligence of its member.

Court’s Decision:

The Supreme Court denied the consolidated petitions for review and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision in toto. It
held that both the pilot and the shipmaster were concurrently negligent, each failing to exercise the proper degree of
care required under the circumstances. The pilot was found negligent for failing to conduct proper docking maneuvers,
while the shipmaster was negligent for not intervening despite the impending danger, thus not absolving the shipowner
from liability. Regarding MPA’s liability, the Court upheld the appellate court’s application of Customs Administrative
Order No. 15-65, emphasizing that MPA’s liability is solidary up to 75% of its prescribed reserve fund for the damages
caused by its member, without an employer- employee relationship being necessary.

Doctrine:

This case reiterates that both the pilot under compulsory pilotage services and the shipmaster have distinct
responsibilities, and their concurrent negligence can lead to their solidary liability for damages caused during such
pilotage. Also, a pilots’ association can be held solidarily liable for its member’s negligence based on specific statutory
provisions, without needing an employer-employee relationship.

Notes:

– Compulsory pilotage does not completely relieve the shipmaster from the duty to ensure the safe navigation of the
vessel.
– Concurrent negligence of the pilot and shipmaster can result in their solidary liability for damages.
– Pilots’ associations have solidary liability for damages caused by their members’ negligence, based on statutory
provisions, up to a specified limit of their reserve fund.
– Key statutes and regulations: Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 and PPA Administrative Order No. 03-85.