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Erin K. Baldwin Post Office Box 3141 Beaumont, California 92223 (951) 367-4684 erinbaldwin@rocketmail.com Plaintiff, Pro Se

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, EASTERN DIVISION

ERIN K. BALDWIN, an Individual 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Defendants. THE STATE BAR of CALIFORNIA; BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION; UDR, INC; THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF REAL ESTATE; COUNTY OF ORANGE; COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, et al., and DOES 1-10, inclusive, v. Plaintiff,

Case No. 5:11-CV-01300-DMG MOTION TO DISQUALIFY AND/OR FOR THE RECUSAL OF THE HONORABLE DOLLY M. GEE AND ALL OTHER UNITED STATES CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA JUDGES AND REASSIGNMENT TO A JUDGE OF ANOTHER DISTRICT BY CHIEF JUDGE ALEX KOZINSKI AND PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS OF AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF THIS MOTION TO DISQUALIFY AND/OR FOR THE RECUSAL OF JUDGE DOLLY M. GEE AND ALL OTHER U.S. CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA JUDGES PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 455(a); 28 U.S.C. 455(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. 455(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. 455(b)(4) AND REFERRAL TO AN IMPARTIAL U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE FOR DETERMINATION PURSUANT TO GENERAL ORDER 08-05 AND DEMAND FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND DEPOSITION OF SARAH L.OVERTON TIME: TBD DATE: TBD COURTROOM: TBD

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COMES NOW Plaintiff Pro Se Erin K. Baldwin (Plaintiff) to file this Motion for recusal and/or disqualification of the Honorable Dolly M. Gee ("Judge Gee") pursuant to her court order dated February 15, 2012 taking under submission for ruling the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Franz E. Miller; and the recusal and/or disqualification of all other U.S. Central District of California Judges; and Reassignment to a Judge of Another District by Chief Judge Alex Kozinski. Plaintiff hereby requests that pursuant to General Order 08-05, Section 4.0, that this Motion be "randomly assigned to another judge for decision immediately upon filing and that the challenged judge [Judge Gee] may not proceed further until the recusal / disqualification motion is determined." Plaintiff hereby requests an Evidentiary Hearing and the opportunity to depose

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Defendant Sarah L. Overton prior to said hearing. MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 1. Plaintiff's primary arguments in this Motion to disqualify and/or recuse Judge
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Gee are in line with the Ninth Circuit rulings in Pesnell v. Arsenault

and United States v.

Sibla, 2 that held: "Both recusal statutes 3 employ the same substantive standard: "Whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Undoubtedly, after review of this Motion, the answer would be emphatically in the affirmative. 2. In the U.S Supreme Court action, Offutt v. United States
4

the High Court

found that the judge had become so personally embroiled with the case that he had to be replaced, as he had abandoned his role as a neutral arbiter due to personal animosity of one of the parties. Judge Gee's conduct exceeds "embroilment" and has become criminal obstruction of justice. 3. When U.S. District Court Judge David O. Carter ("Judge Carter") recused

himself from Plaintiff's case, the case was not randomly reassigned to Judge Gee via the
1

2 3 4

543 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2008); also Sibla, 624 F.2d at 867 (the substantive test for bias or prejudice is identical in sections 144 and 455)." 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980). 28 U.S.C. 455 and 28 U.S.C. 144. 348 U.S. 11 (1954).

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policies and procedures set forth in General Order 08-05. Judge Gee was personally chosen due to her personal relationship with several of Plaintiff's defendants and her allegiance to those that paid the necessary money to buy her a federal judgeship at the United States District Court, Central District of California, in 2010. 4. Judge Gee must recuse herself as she could not possibly judge the credibility of

her own friends and those that placed her on the bench. Judge Gee would not be a federal judge today if it were not for her personal relationships with Plaintiff's defendants, namely Thomas V. Girardi; Holly Fujie; Sarah L. Overton; Judge Franz E. Miller; Paul O'Brien; Thomas Layton; John Noonen; and non-defendants Senator Leahy (Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee) Eric George (son of retired Chief Justice Ronald George), and Senators Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer, inter alia.

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5.

Judge Gee must recuse herself because she will be a material witness to this

case as her federal judgeship was purchased, in part, by the $11 million Client Trust Account of Plaintiff's Defendants James Parsa and Alex Dastmalchi. This money was stolen from consumers that were defrauded by Defendants Parsa and Dastmalchi, as well as the attorneys for Defendants Parsa and Dastmalchi at Defendant law firm, Burkhalter, Kessler, Goodman & George LLP; and the attorneys at Defendant Century Law Group, Defendants Paul Virgo and Edward Lear. 6. Judge Gee must recuse herself because she has personal knowledge of the fact

that part of that $11 million Client Trust Account was used to pay Defendant Judge Miller a financial incentive in exchange for entering two permanent injunctions that represented unconstitutional prior restraint of Plaintiff's protected speech rights and which formed the basis of her First Amendment Writ of Mandate filed in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal on January 26, 2012. 7. Today, February 15, 2012, U.S. Ninth Circuit Judges Schroeder, Leavy, and
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Clifton, decided that the aforementioned deprivation of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights,

that causes ongoing irreparable harm to Plaintiff and comprises an ongoing federal controversy, was not sufficient to:
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Terminated on June 2, 2009 in the Parsa Law Group case and on December 11, 2009 in the UDR, Inc. case.

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"Demonstrate that this case warrants the intervention of this court by means of the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. See, Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977). Accordingly, the petition is denied [] emergency request to stay district court proceedings is denied as moot. No further filings shall be accepted in this closed case." 8. Judge Gee must recuse herself because of her personal involvement in the

occasion of this Order by U.S. Ninth Circuit Judges Schroeder, Leavy, and Clifton. First of all, this case is not closed because Plaintiff has a right to file a Motion for Rehearing En Banc within 7 days of said Order. 9. If the Ninth Circuit once again denies Plaintiff requests to reinstate her First

Amendment rights to protected speech, Plaintiff can and will appeal the decision within 90 days to the United States Supreme Court. It is despicable, first of all, that the Ninth Circuit would deny Plaintiff's request to reinstate her First Amendment rights taken from her by fraud; but seond, it's even worse that the motions attorney, Monica Fernandez, acting in concert with Defendant Sarah Overton, and other defendants named in Plaintiff's complaint would lie to a pro se litigant that she cannot file a motion for rehearing en banc and that the case is closed. 10. Plaintiff's First Amendment rights have been violated by two unconstitutional

permanent injunctions over the past three years because she tried to warn consumers in foreclosure about subprime mortgage and loan modification scams owned and operated by Defendants James Parsa and Arash "Alex" Dastamalchi including, but not limited to, Parsa Law Group, National Loan Modification, National Legal Alliance, HomeForeClosureFighter, Modify 1-2-3, 3-2-1 Forclosure, and many more. 11. The First Amendment requires the government to refrain from retaliating

against speakers because of their protected speech. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Hartman v. Moore, 6 held: As a general matter, the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions . . . for speaking out. Also in Crawford-El v. Britton,
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the U.S. Supreme Court undeniably stated: "The First Amendment bars retaliation

for protected speech. In Perry v. Sindermann, 8 in which the Court stated: " Interference with

547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006). 523 U.S. 574, 592 (1998). 408 U.S. 593 (1972).

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constitutional rights is impermissible." 12. Judge Gee must recuse herself because she has personal knowledge of

Defendant Tom Girardi's $72,000 contributions to Senator Leahy's purse, and perhaps more, that helped secure her federal judgeship. Defendant Tom Girardi is also the single largest political contributor to Senators Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer who had to give their approval of Judge Gee prior to her taking the appointment. 13. Judge Gee must recuse herself because Plaintiff is a co-complainant in an

investigation currently before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal where Judge Gee will be a material witness. The investigation will review the purchasing of judgeships by triumvirate Defendants Tom Girardi and Holly Fujie and non-defendant Eric George, son of retired California Supreme Court Chief Justice Ronald George, all of whom had a role in securing her

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federal judgeship. 14. In fact, Judge Gee was also helped by Defendant Holly Fujie in connection

with Defendant Fujie's participation in the National Asian Pacific American Bar Association ("NAPABA") similar to the September 2011 nomination of Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jacqueline Nguyen. Judge Gee has no prior judicial experience and was among the lowest ranked of judicial nominations. Nonetheless, she secured the judgeship based on her personal relationships with the aforementioned Triumvirate. 15. Judge Gee must recuse herself because she has engaged in improper ex parte

communications with Plaintiff's past judges that both recused themselves: U.S. District Court Judge David O. Carter ("Judge Carter") and U.S. Magistrate Judge Sheri N. Pym ("Judge Pym"). In addition, both Judge Carter and U.S. District Court Judge Josephine Staten Tucker ("Judge Tucker") shared with Judge Gee undisclosed personal knowledge of disputed facts through their courtroom deputy, Dwayne Roberts, who participated in depriving Plaintiff of her constitutionally-protected property interests on June 19, 2009 in connection with and unlawful and retaliatory eviction performed by Defendant UDR, Inc., Orange County Superior Court Commissioner Richard E. Pacheco and Judges Craig Robison and Derek Johnson.

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16.

Current Courtroom Deputy to Judge Carter and Judge Tucker, Dwayne Roberts,

participated in Defendant UDR's unlawful seizure of Plaintiff's property on June 19, 2009, which property was subsequently sold (according to Plaintiff's Orange County Public Defender, Martin F. Schwarz) to James Parsa to use against Plaintiff. Plaintiff pled: "On or about June 17, 2009, Judge Carter's (and Judge Tucker's) current Courtroom Deputy, Dwayne Roberts, jointly participated in a conspiracy to defraud Plaintiff while he was employed at the Harbor Justice Center branch of the Orange County Superior Court. These facts contribute to the foundation of Plaintiff's 1983 claim and Mr. Robert's personal knowledge and participation in same is prejducial to Plaintiff." 17. Judge Tucker intentionally omitted an entire legitimate cause of action from a This is judicial

Motion to Disqualify for which she was to act as an impartial judge.

misconduct made worse by the fact that Judge Tucker knew she was not an impartial judge, ab initio, because she had the "same personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding" as Judge Carter did. Both Judges Carter and Tucker intentionally sought to jeopardize Plaintiff's Complaint. Now it is Judge Gee's turn at bat. 18. Judge Gee must recuse herself because she has personal knowledge of disputed

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facts pertaining to another of Plaintiff's Defendants, Jon Streeter, currently the President of The State Bar of California. Defendant Streeter has been promised a federal judgeship at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal by "The Triumverate," (Defendants Girardi, Fujie and nondefendant, Eric George) who was also responsible for appointing Jon Streeter as President of the State Bar of California. Also responsible for Jon Streeter's appointment to the State Bar was past president and partner of Tom Girardi, Howard Miller, another of Plaintiff's defendants. Also promised a federal judgeship is Rory Little, prior to his acceptance of the position of special prosecutor for Defendant Tom Girardi in his Ninth Circuit discipline case which was not disclosed by "The Triumverate," to the Ninth Circuit or by Judge Gee. 19. Judge Gee must recuse herself because she has personal knowledge of disputed

facts pertaining to another of Plaintiff's Defendants, Sarah Overton, who has been promised a judgeship at the Riverside Superior Court by "The Triumverate." That is why Defendant Overton disqualified herself from the legal representation of Defendant Judge Miller and

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assigned another attorney in her office even though Defendant Overton knows that her disqualification is a disqualification of her entire law firm. 20. Judge Gee must recuse herself because she has personal knowledge of disputed

facts pertaining to another of Plaintiff's Defendants, U.S. District Court Judge Cormac J. Carney, who is also promised a federal judgeship on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal and non-defendant Chief Judge Audrey Collins desire for a Ninth Circuit federal judgeship is presently being planned. 21. Judge Gee must recuse herself because she has conducted extrajudicial ex parte

communication with several defendants named in Plaintiff's Complaint about matters specifically to do with Plaintiff and her case without including Plaintiff in, or notifying Plaintiff of, said communications.

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9

22.

Remarkably, Judge Gee, in her January 19, 2012 Order, admonished Plaintiff

about extrajudicial ex parte communications.9 Judge Gee only heard these false accusations about Plaintiff via her own extrajudicial ex parte communications with one of Plaintiff's defendants, Sarah L. Overton, Esq., who until February 15, 2012, maintained an unlawful engagement as attorney of record for another of Plaintiff's defendants, Judge Franz E. Miller. 23. Title 28 U.S.C. 455 requires a judge to disqualify himself in any proceeding

in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned and in any proceeding in which he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party . . . . 28 U.S.C. 455(a), (b)(1). 24. Please note that 28 U.S.C. 455 "requires a judge to disqualify himself" or in

this case "herself." This is because 28 U.S.C. 455 is "self-recusing" counting on the fact that United States judicial officers will act with integrity and honor to recuse themselves and not depend on a pro se litigant to demand their recusal or disqualification.

Judge Gee stated: "All parties, including Plaintiff, are required to comply with the Local Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 83-2.10.3. All matters shall be called to the Courts attention by appropriate notice, stipulation, application, or motion filed and served in compliance with the Local Rules. Local Rule 83-2.11 prohibits parties from directly communicating with a judge in a pending matter unless opposing counsel is present. Plaintiff shall refrain from ex parte communications via phone and e-mail unless the answers to Plaintiffs procedural questions cannot be found in the Federal Rules, the Local Rules or Judge Gees Standing Order and Procedures and Schedules. Any such ex parte communications shall be copied to opposing counsel. In addition, Plaintiff shall not submit documents for filing to the Courts deputy clerk as these documents will not be filed and are not part of the record.

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25.

"Where there are circumstances that cause doubts as to a judge's partiality, it is

the judge's duty to disqualify, nothwithstanding the judge's personal belief that she is impartial." Not only has Judge Gee not fulfilled her duty to recuse herself from the case on her own initiative, but she failed to disclose to Plaintiff the existence of her personal bias and prejudice of several defendants named in Plaintiff's Section 1983 Complaint. 26. The Ninth Circuit, in Pesnell v. Arsenault,
10

held that [u]nder both recusal

statutes, the substantive standard is whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 27. Plaintiff sets forth facts herein that not only corroborate that Judge Gee's

"impartiality might reasonably be questioned," but that Senator Leahy of the Senate Judiciary Committee should investigate Judges Gee, Carter, and Tucker for criminal obstruction of 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 justice under Article III of the Constitution that states "judges remain in office during good behavior," implying Congress can remove a judge for bad behavior via impeachment and conviction. 28. In fact all federal judicial officers assigned to Plaintiff's case to date (but most

egregiously Judge Gee) have committed criminal obstruction of justice governed by 18 U.S.C.A. 15011517, legislation written to protect the integrity of federal judicial proceedings. The Omnibus Clause of Section 1503 states: "WHOEVER corruptly [] influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice is guilty of the crime of obstruction of justice." 29. In the past few months, Plaintiff has been subjected to false accusations by

federal judges that she demonstrates a pattern of behavior wherein she "names as a defendant every judge who has ever ruled against her." There is absolutely no evidence with which to base these reckless and malicious defamatory statements. Quite the contrary actually. Here are the names of TWENTY-FIVE (25) judges who have ruled against Plaintiff in the past three years and none are named in Plaintiff's Complaint. Malicious and reckless defamation applies to federal judges as well as everyone else, particularly when their orders are published on PACER, a public forum. We can now put that myth to bed with the following list:
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543 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sibla, 624 F.2d at 867 (the substantive test for bias or prejudice is identical in sections 144 and 455)."

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a.

County Superior Court Commissioner Richard E. Pacheco, Harbor

Justice Center, Newport Beach; b. Orange County Superior Court Judge Craig E. Robison, Harbor Justice

Center, Newport Beach; c. Orange County Superior Court Judge Derek Johnson, Harbor Justice

Center, Newport Beach; d. Orange County Superior Court Judge Karen Robinson, Harbor Justice

Center, Newport Beach; e. Center, Santa Ana; f. San Bernardino Superior Court Judge Steven Malone, Victorville, Orange County Superior Court Judge Steven Perk, Central Justice

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California; g. California; h. California; i. California; j. California; k. San Bernardino Superior Court Judge Ronald Christiansen, San San Bernardino Superior Court Judge Michael Dest, San Bernardino, San Bernardino Superior Court Judge Kyle Brodie, San Bernardino, San Bernardino Superior Court Judge Kenneth Barr, San Bernardino, San Bernardino Superior Court Judge Gilbert Ochoa, Big Bear,

Bernardino, California; l. San Bernardino Superior Court Judge Donna Gunnell Garza, San

Bernardino, California; m. California; n. California; Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Carolyn Kuhl, Los Angeles, San Bernardino Superior Court Judge Thomas Garza, San Bernardino,

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o.

California Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal Fourth District, Division

Three, Associate Justice Kathleen E. OLeary; p. California Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal Fourth District, Division

Three, Associate Justice William F. Rylaarsdam; q. California Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal Fourth District, Division

Three, Associate Justice Richard M. Aronson; r. California Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal Fourth District, Division

Three, Associate Justice Richard D. Fybel; s. United States District Court, Central District of California, District

Judge David O. Carter; t. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 10 MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE HONORABLE JUDGE DOLLY M. GEE

United States District Court, Central District of California, District

Judge Josephine Staton Tucker; u. Judge Dolly M. Gee; v. Shaw; w. x. y. U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, Circuit Judge Mary Schroeder; U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, Circuit Judge Leavy; and U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, Circuit Judge Clifton. U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, Appellate Commissioner Peter L. United States District Court, Central District of California, District

30.

This motion is brought under 28 USC 455(a), 28 USC 455(b)(1), 28 USC

455(b)(2); 28 USC 455(b)(4); 28 U.S.C. The grounds for this motion are, without limitation: 31. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455(a), Judge Gee should recuse herself or be

disqualified because her impartiality might be reasonably questioned. Judge Gee maintains close personal relationships with defendants named in Plaintiff's case and should have disqualified herself, ab initio. 32. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455(b)(1), Judge Gee should recuse herself or be

disqualified because of personal bias or prejudice against Baldwin that was festered by the

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judges that came before her and the heightened sense of frustration caused by Plaintiff's ability to keep her case alive. 33. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455(b)(1), Judge Gee should recuse herself or be

disqualified because she has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts in the case that she learned prior to taking this case and from her days as a practicing attorney and as a board member of the Judicial Nominations and Evaluations ("JNE") Committee. 34. Because of fluid events that are taking place in these cases, Plaintiff reserves

the right to file supplemental points and authorities, declarations and exhibits in connection with this motion. 35. Plaintiff brought to Judge Gees attention certain of the facts upon which her

recusal and/or disqualification would be based in a February 3, 2012 pleading entitled, 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 11 MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE HONORABLE JUDGE DOLLY M. GEE

"Plaintiff's Notice Of Correction Of Document Discrepancy As Certified By U.S. District Court Judge Dolly M. Gee On February 1, 2012, Thereby Ordering Plaintiff's Timely Filed Supplemental Declaration In Opposition To Defendant Franz E. Miller's Motion To Dismiss Rejected Without Filing," in response to Judge Gee rejecting Plaintiff's Supplemental Declaration for the artificial reason that it failed to contain a proof of service. 36. Within said document, Plaintiff indicated to Judge Gee that she intends to move

for her impeachment for criminal obstruction of justice based on her removing and replacing and then destroying the original order that implicated her in a malevolent plan to convert Defendant Miller's Motion to Dismiss into a Motin for Summary Judgment based on her denial of Plaintiff's In Forma Pauperis application. 37. On said application, Judge Gee certified that Plaintiff had brought her appeal in

bad faith and that it was frivolous. Once she received the above-stated Notice of Correction, she removed the previous order and replaced it with one that simply stated that she denied Plaintiff's Motion to proceed in forma pauperis. But all along Judge Gee did not have the application to rule on it as it had been sent over to the court of appeal for evaluation two weeks earlier. 38. Judge Gee came into this case after Judge Carter recused himself and after

Magistrate Pym recused herself all because they had committed the same misconduct as Judge

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Gee is now committing - improper extrajudicial ex parte communications with defendants named in Plaintiff Complaint as well as one defendant / attorney of a defendant that has also now recused herself, Sarah L. Overton, Esq. 39. Judge Gee is hopelessly embroiled in this action in favor of Defendant State

Bar of California ("Defendant State Bar") and Defendant Franz E. Miller ("Defendant Miller") by virtue of her long-term position in Defendant State Bar's Judicial Nomination Evaluation ("JNE") Committee, which resulted in her appointment to the bench. Of late, Judge Gee has also exhibited a pattern of behavior which leads Plaintiff to believe that she is not only protecting Defendants State Bar and Miller, but also herself, in connection with blatant obstruction of justice manifested by her callous and reckless disregard for the law as well as Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
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40.

Judge Gee rejected, without filing, Plaintiff's January 27, 2012 filing of her

Supplemental Declaration in opposition to Defendant Miller's Motion to Dismiss. She rejected it at 5:02 P.M., the night before Defendant Miller's Reply Brief is due. If Defendant Miller opted not to file a Reply Brief, Judge Gee could have ruled on this Motion to Dismiss in the clear absence of any jurisdiction to do so. 41. In her rejection notice, Judge Gee claimed she was legally justified in her

decision to reject and return Plaintiff's Supplemental Declaration without filing it first for the sole reason that it does not have a proof of service, citing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"), Rule 5(d). 42. However, Judge Gee's action is a direct violation of FRCP Rule 5(d)(4) which

states: "The clerk must not refuse to file a paper solely because it is not in the form prescribed by these rules or by a local rule or practice." A document may be rejected and returned for correction, but the defect cannot provide the basis for rejecting a document without filing it first. No rule exists that could allow Judge Gee to arbitrarily reject a time-sensitive pleading thereby allowing her to act as if it had never been filed. 43. Judge Gee has intentionally violated Ninth Circuit 2007 precedent in Crater v.

A Motion to Dismiss for Defendant Franz Miller is a disguised Motion to Dismiss for Defendant State Bar of California as their collusory relationship led to multiple violations of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights.

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Galaza,

12

by not self-recusing when she was clearly aware of her "direct, personal, and

substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against one of the litigants," namely, Plaintiff, and when she became "part of the accusatory process. 44. The Hearing on Defendant Miller's Motion to Dismiss was stayed pending a

ruling at the time Judge Gee rejected it. It was an Emergency Petition to the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal for an "Urgent Interim Stay Order of Judge Gee's January 18, 2012 Order Granting Hearing on Defendant Miller's Motion to Dismiss." Plaintiff's Petition for this "Urgent Interim Stay Order" is a part of the pleading Judge Gee rejected without filing. 45. of Appeal are: a. A "Stay of All Proceedings in the U.S District Court Case"; and A "First Amendment Writ of Mandate; Prohibition or Other Appropriate The other parts of Plaintiff's Emergency Petition to the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court

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13

b.

Relief," requesting confirmation that two permanent injunctions ordered by Defendant Miller for the benefit of Defendant State Bar are unconstitutional. Judge Gee decided to reject Plaintiff's pleading so that she could misrepresent the fact that no evidence had been presented to her to support the fact that there were constitutional issues standing in the way of her granting Defendant Miller's Motion to Dismiss on immunity grounds. c. Saucier v. Katz,
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The U.S Supreme Court reversed a decision in the Ninth Circuit case, wherein they admonished the Ninth Circuit for attempting to rule on the

basis of immunity before performing an inquiry as to whether constitutional issues existed. Judge Gee is fully aware there are egregious constitutional issues in existence. d. In fact, Judge Gee received Plaintiff's pleading on January 27, 2012 at

10:59 a.m. and at 11:57 a.m. she committed criminal obstruction of justice by removing, replacing, then destroying an order she had previously made that certified Plaintiff's appeal as frivolous and without merit. Judge Gee had hoped that by certifying Plaintiff's appeal as frivolous, she could convert Defendant Miller's Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment thereby granting a dismissal based on erroneous claims that Plaintiff had pled facts
12

Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1131 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523).

28

533 U.S. 194 (2001).

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outside the record in her opposition to Defendant Miller's Motion to Dismiss. 46. Judge Gee rejected Plaintiff's pleading due to its contents; not because Plaintiff

failed to include a Proof of Service as she claimed. The contents implicate Judge Gee as a participant in criminal obstruction of justice in collusion with defendants named in Plaintiff's Section 1983 Complaint, namely Defendants State Bar and Miller. 47. Article III of the Constitution states that judges remain in office "during good

behavior," implying Congress can remove a judge for bad behavior via impeachment and conviction. The federal judicial officers in Baldwin's case, have committed criminal

obstruction of justice governed by 18 U.S.C.A. 15011517, legislation written to protect the integrity of federal judicial proceedings. 48. The Omnibus Clause of Section 1503 states: "WHOEVER corruptly []

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influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice is guilty of the crime of obstruction of justice." Federal courts have read this clause expansively to proscribe any conduct that interferes with the judicial process, including judicial misconduct. 49. "Whoever" includes district court judges and "due administration of justice" The commencement of a case simply requires government

includes civil proceedings.

awareness of proof that there is a pending federal judicial proceeding, the defendant knew of the proceeding, and the defendant had corrupt intent to interfere with or attempted to interfere with the proceeding. 50. These facts apply to Plaintiff's Section 1983 case and in particular the conduct

of Judge Gee, including "the concealment, alteration, removal and/or destruction of documents; the encouraging or rendering of false testimony, including the propagating, publishing and dissemination of false facts, theories and conclusions as well as the intent to retaliate against witnesses, victims, or parties for their participation in federal investigations or legal proceedings, including intimidation, physical force, threats, misleading conduct, and harassment. Actual obstruction is not needed as an element of proof to sustain a conviction. The defendant's endeavor to obstruct justice is sufficient."
14 14

18 U.S.C.A. 15011517.

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51.

On February 2, 2012, at 5:02 p.m., Plaintiff received electronic notification that

U.S. District Court Judge Dolly M. Gee ("Judge Gee") had rejected without filing Plaintiff's Supplemental Declaration in Opposition to Defendant Franz E. Miller's Motion to Dismiss timely submitted to the court five days earlier, on January 27, 2012. The reason: It did not contain a proof of service. 52. Instead of stamping the pleading "filing" in compliance with the deadline set by

Judge Gee, or immediately notifying Plaintiff of a document discrepancy so she could correct it, the pleading was marked "received" and held for five days before it was rejected without filing by Judge Gee with a Document Discrepancy Order, to wit: "Notice of Document Discrepancies and Order by Judge Dolly M. Gee, Ordering Supplemental Declaration to Opposition to Defendant Franz E. Miller's Motion to Dismiss submitted by Plaintiff Erin K. Baldwin on 1/27/2012 is NOT to be filed but instead rejected. Denial based on: No Proof of Service, F.R.Civ.P. Rule 5(d)." 53. In accordance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"), Rule 5(d)(4),

Plaintiff's pleading cannot be refused for filing, to wit: "The clerk must not refuse to file a paper solely because it is not in the form prescribed by these rules or by a local rule or practice." 54. Plaintiff's document may be returned for correction, but it cannot be rejected

without filing, particularly if the document is subject to a judge-ordered deadline ordered, as was the case here. 55. Plaintiff has a constitutional right to be heard before this Court, both by her

court papers, and in person via live court hearings. Judge Gee has violated both of these rights. a. First, in her January 19, 2012 Order she vacated the hearing on

Defendant Miller's Motion to Dismiss and took the matter under submission "on the papers" submitted by the parties. As such, she deprived Plaintiff the right to be heard personally, in a court of law. b. Second, today, February 2, 2012, Judge Gee rejected Plaintiff's papers

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in complete disregard for her own order and FRCP Rule 5(d)(4), thereby depriving Plaintiff of the right to be heard "on the papers" timely submitted to the Court. c. Therefore, Judge Gee has prevented Plaintiff from being heard

personally in a hearing before the Court; and has prevented Plaintiff from being heard "on the papers." Accordingly, Judge Gee has substantially violated Plaintiff's right to due process of law. 56. A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.
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Indeed,

the legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship. 16 This most basic tenet of our judicial system helps to ensure both litigants and the publics confidence that each case has been fairly adjudicated by a neutral and detached arbiter. An appearance of impropriety, regardless of whether such impropriety is

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actually present or proven, erodes that confidence and weakens our system of justice. 17 57. While most claims of judicial bias are resolved by common law, statute, or the

professional standards of the bench and bar, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor.
18

To safeguard the right to a fair trial, the

Constitution requires judicial recusal in cases where the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.
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The Court asks

not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is likely to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional potential for bias. 20 58. The Supreme Court has declared: "Every procedure which would offer a

possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true

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16

In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989). Hurles v. Ryan, U.S. Court of Appeals, For the Ninth Circuit, Case No. No. 08-99032 (July 11, 2011) Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997) (citations omitted). Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2262 (2009).

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between the state and the accused, denies the latter due process of law. 21 59. A claimant need not prove actual bias to make out a due process violation. 22 In

fact, the Supreme Court has pointed out that it would be nearly impossible for a litigant to prove actual bias on the part of a judge:
23

When the trial judge is discovered to have had

some basis for rendering a biased judgment, his actual motivations are hidden from view, and we must presume the process was impaired. 24 It is for this reason that the Courts precedents on judicial bias focus on the appearance of and potential for bias, not actual, proven bias. 60. Due process thus mandates a stringent rule for judicial conduct, and requires

recusal even of judges who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally if the risk of bias is too high.
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In determining what constitutes a risk of bias that is too high,

the Supreme Court has emphasized that no mechanical definition exists; cases requiring 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 62. 18 19
21

recusal cannot be defined with precision because circumstances and relationships must be considered. 26 The Supreme Court has just reaffirmed this functional approach. 27 61. The Supreme Courts judicial bias doctrine has evolved as it confronts new

scenarios which, as an objective matter, require recusal.28 The most basic example of probable bias occurs when the judge "has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against one of the litigants. 29 However, financial conflicts of interest are not the only relevant conflicts for

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Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215 (1971); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825

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(1986).
23

Caperton, Id., 129 S. Ct. at 2262-63; see also Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) Tumey, Id., 273 U.S. at 535. In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136. Id.; Also, see, In Re Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 822 (internal citations omitted). Caperton, Id., 129 S. Ct. at 2265-66. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259. Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1131 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523).

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judicial bias purposes. 30 The Court has thus required recusal if the judge becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy with one of the litigants; 31 if she becomes enmeshed in matters involving a litigant; 32 or if the judge acts as part of the accusatory process. 33 63. In In Re Murchison, The U.S. Supreme Court held, "A due process violation

occurs when a judge holds two irreconcilable roles, such that her role as an impartial arbiter could become compromised." 34 64. Any order made in conflict with the Constitution of the United States is void

and unenforceable. In, Marbury v. Madison, the U.S. Supreme Court held: "As part of their inherent duty to determine the law, the federal courts have the duty to interpret and apply the Constitution [] all judges are bound to follow the Constitution." 65. In addition, Judge Gee's Order was in violation of well-established United

States Supreme Court case law. In Holt v. Commonwealth of Virginia 35 the High Court held: "The right to be heard must necessarily embody a right to file motions and pleadings essential to present claims and raise relevant issues." 66. In Plaintiff's case, Judge Gee has already demonstrated her unwillingness to She previously

follow the law as it pertains to Defendant Miller's Motion to Dismiss.

dishonored a 2001 U.S. Supreme Court Mandate to the Ninth Circuit after reversing its case, Saucier v. Katz. 36 Justice Kennedy, speaking for the majority, held: "The first inquiry must be whether a constitutional right has
30

See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260 (explaining that judicial bias doctrine encompasses a more general concept of interests that tempt adjudicators to disregard neutrality). Id. at 2262 (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971)) Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215 (1971); Crater, 491 F.3d at 1131 (quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137). Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137; see also Crater, 491 F.3d at 1131. 381 U.S. 131 (85 S.Ct. 1375, 14 L.Ed.2d 290) 533 U.S. 194 (2001).

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 67.

been violated on the facts alleged. [] By beginning with the immunity issue, the Court of Appeals did not merely make an unwise choice; it was in error. There are substantial constitutional issues surrounding Defendant Miller and

The State Bar of California. They must be decided FIRST prior to any consideration of a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of immunity. In addition, issues other than immunity contained in Defendant Miller's Motion to Dismiss are currently on appeal. 68. The aforementioned document was attached to Plaintiff's Supplemental

Declaration in Opposition to Defendant Miller's Motion to Dismiss submitted to the Court on January 27, 2012 and rejected by order of Judge Gee without filing on February 2, 2012. 69. In support of the Saucier v. Katz mandate to inquire first whether a

constitutional right has been violated on the facts alleged, before making any decision on the basis of immunity, Baldwin submitted a document to the U.S. Court of Appeals and to the United States District Court that leaves no room for debate that Defendant Miller's Motion to Dismiss cannot be granted. 70. THAT is why Judge Gee rejected Plaintiff's pleading, not for a trivial

technicality that would never hold up under strict scrutiny. The actions of Judge Gee constitute reversible error and the U.S. Court of Appeal would review her actions de novo for clear error; improper factual determinations; and abuse of discretion. The U.S Court of Appeal would be required to reverse Judge Gee's Order due to significant procedural error by incorrectly

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applying FRCP 5(d) and deprived Plaintiff of her constitutional rights. 71. The following is an excerpt from Plaintiff's pleading rejected by Judge Gee

today without filing: "12. The State Bar maintains two factions that directly affect the judiciary in our state: The Board of Governors' Committee on Nominations and Appointments ("NAC") that, inter alia, selects the members of the Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation ("JNE"). The JNE works directly with California's Governor to evaluate all candidates under consideration for judicial appointment. 37 "13. Therefore, there is an embedded conflict of interest as to all judicial officers presiding over California cases involving the State Bar,
37

Regulated by Government Code 12011.5.

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because, in one way or the other, the State Bar has affirmatively participated in the judicial officer's appointment to the bench. Plaintiff has personally experienced this conflict of interest on numerous occasions since she filed her Complaint on August 16, 2011, and fears that as a result of same, her claims will be undeservedly dismissed without due process of law, just cause, and/or legal merit. "14. In reviewing the standards of disqualification for federal judicial officers, 38 it is quite clear that the relationship between the State Bar and federal judicial officers raises questions as to an ability of these judges to be impartial. This is, in part, why Baldwin requested a Declaratory Judgment from U.S. District Court Judge David O. Carter ("Judge Carter"): To identify the rights and responsibilities of the parties. Said request was denied by Judge Carter, without explanation, in his December 2, 2012 Order, which Order formed the basis of Baldwin's Appeal. "15. The Ninth Circuit, in Kern Oil & Refining Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 39 held: "The appellate court is entitled to review a fixed, rather than mobile record." However, since Baldwin filed her Notice of Appeal, three court orders have been entered into the record that relate directly to Baldwin's stated issues on appeal, were made without jurisdiction, adversely alter the record on appeal, prejudice Baldwin's issues on appeal, all for the purpose of "protecting" defendants named in Baldwin's Complaint. "16. On January 18, 2012, U.S. District Court Judge Dolly M. Gee ("Judge Gee"), entered an Order epitomizing the aforementioned conflict of interest; so it comes as no surprise that Judge Gee served on the State Bar Commission of JNE for four years prior to being recommended to the bench. "17. Baldwin respectfully requests that this Court disqualify Judge Gee, relate her January 18, 2012 Order to the pending appeal, and issue an Urgent Interim Stay Order for the subject of her Order, the authority to hear, under submission, the pending Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Miller. Said Order is attached hereto as "Exhibit 3." "18. Judge Gee's Order is deliberately contemptuous of the 2001 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Saucier v. Katz 40 reminding the Ninth Circuit to determine constitutional issues prior to considering immunity issues. Justice Kennedy declared: "The first inquiry must be whether a constitutional right has been violated on the facts alleged. [] By beginning with the immunity issue, the Court of Appeals did not merely make an unwise choice; it was in error. 41
28 U.S.C. 144, 28 U.S.C. 455 and a variety of Canons set forth in the Judicial Code of Conduct. 840 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1988). 533 U.S. 194 (2001). Also, see, Katz v. United States,194 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1999).

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"19. Nonetheless, Judge Gee did the opposite. She ordered a hearing, under submission, of Defendant Miller's Motion to Dismiss (based solely on immunity issues) when she knew Baldwin's Complaint contained "genuine issues of material fact, the evidence of which must be viewed in the light most favorable" 42 to Baldwin. Judge Gee also knew said facts confirmed that Baldwin's "constitutional right[s] had been violated" by Defendant Miller by his non-judicial acts, in collusion with the State Bar, inter alia, for which he has no immunity. 43 "20. Any Motion to Dismiss against Defendant Miller would be the same as a Motion to Dismiss the State Bar, as the claims against Defendant Miller are indisputably intertwined with the claims against the State Bar. "21. On January 25, 2012, Judge Gee further demonstrated prejudicial animus toward Baldwin when she denied her request for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. (See, "Exhibit 4.") The Order states: "The court has considered the Motion for Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis and the motion is denied. The Court certifies that the proposed appeal is not taken in good faith under 28 U.S.C. 1915(a) and is frivolous, without merit and does not present a substantial question within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 753(f)." "22. However, the day before, Baldwin had spoken to Howard Hom of this Court who informed her that her Motion for Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis was transferred to this Court for review and ruling, and that it is still pending a decision. After Baldwin received Judge Gee's order she contacted the Clerk of this Court who informed her that a District Court ruling has no bearing on her application before the Court of Appeal and that it is still pending. "23. All evidence points to the fact that, to date, the federal judicial officers assigned to Baldwin's Section 1983 Case are not impartial, due primarily to the fact that the State Bar is a defendant in the case. Considering

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Burke v. County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725, 730-31 (9th Cir. 2009).

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In Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (1980) the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an Arizona District Court dismissal based upon absolute judicial immunity, finding that both necessary immunity prongs were absent; later, in Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (1986), the Ninth Circuit, en banc, criticized the "judicial nature" analysis it had published in Rankin as unnecessarily restrictive. But Rankin's ultimate result was not changed, because Judge Howard had been independently divested of absolute judicial immunity by his complete lack of jurisdiction. Footnote continued

FN 34 (cont'd): Also, in Rankin, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held: "If a court lacks jurisdiction over a party, then it lacks 'all jurisdiction' to adjudicate that party's rights, whether or not the subject matter is properly before it." Indeed, when the limits of legitimate authority are wholly abandoned, the judge's acts may cease to be "judicial." Also in Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1235 (7th Cir. 1980) (judge's prosecutorial acts were non-judicial; no immunity for such acts).

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the unregulated and powerful influence the State Bar has on judicial appointments in this state, it is not surprising; however, regardless of individual proclivities or personal agendas, Baldwin expects her constitutional rights to be protected. "Therefore, Baldwin brings to this Court an Emergency Request for an Immediate Stay of All Proceedings in the District Court Pending Completion of all Matters Before this Court." 72. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 5(d)(1) states: "Any paper after the

complaint that is required to be servedtogether with a certificate of servicemust be filed within a reasonable time after service." There is no rule in existence that states a party

cannot file a document with the court unless it has a proof of service attached to it. 73. Prior to Judge Gee, U.S. Magistrate Sheri Pym had extrajudicial ex parte

communications with Sarah L. Overton, Esq., prior counsel of record for Defendant Miller, on the subject of service issues and this is most likely a repeat performance of Ms. Overton. If service has not been made at the time the pleading is submitted for filing, attaching a completed Proof of Service would be a fraud upon the court. 44 74. There is one defendant that has been served Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant

Franz E. Miller, who until February 15, 2012, was represented by co-defendant, Sarah L. Overton, Esq. 45 75. Ms. Overton received electronic service of this document from the U.S. Court

of Appeal the day before it was even filed in the District Court, on January 26, 2012. 19 20 21 22 23 24
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76.

It is not clear why the Court failed to upload Plaintiff's Supplemental

Declaration to PACER on January 27, 2012 since it was received at the Court at 10:59 A.M. Had they followed established protocol, Ms. Overton would have received her service copy that day. Instead, Judge Gee held on to the pleading and waited until the night before she could "feasibly" try to get away with ruling on Judge Miller's Motion to Dismiss to upload the
This is the case here, since Plaintiff sent her document via overnight mail to the Court to meet the January 27, 2012 deadline for opposition to this motion.
45

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As previously pled, Ms. Overton cannot represent Defendant Miller as she is a party to this action and will be called as a material witness. Therefore, service to Ms. Overton is not required by law. Whether she opts to continue to violate California Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5-210 is her prerogative, but it has no bearing on Plaintiff's responsibility to Mr. Overton.

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document just for the purposes of rejecting it on the record. 77. In summary, it is blatantly clear that Judge Gee along with other federal

officials are attempting to sabotage Plaintiff's Section 1983 Complaint to protect defendants named in her Complaint. Plaintiff requests intervention from the U.S Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal on an expedited basis. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 78. Judge Gee should disqualify herself because her impartiality is being

questioned on an objective basis. A reasonable person knowing the facts contained herein would believe that Judge Gees impartiality is questioned based upon her close personal relationship with Defendant Thomas V. Giarardi, Defendant Holly Fujie, Defendant Franz Miller, Defendant Sarah Overton, Defendant Tom Layton, Defendant Paul O'Brien, inter alia.

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79.

Judge Gee knew from her extensive relationships and communications with

Defendants Giarardi, Fujie, Miller, Overton, Layton, O'Brien, inter alia, that Plaintiff's Complaint is true. 80. Judge Gees personal prejudice and bias arose from her personal involvement

and personal relationships with those set forth in Paragraph 79, and others named in Plaintiff's Complaint, inter alia. 81. Plaintiff is now convinced that Judge Gee is attempting to assist defendants

named in Plaintiff's case in a non-judicial capacity and are her long-term personal friends that assisted her in becoming a federal judge including Defendants Giarardi, Fujie, Miller, Overton, Layton, O'Brien, inter alia. 82. Based on the foregoing, Judge Gee should be disqualified, because likes Judges

Carter, Tucker and Pym before her, she has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts learned from her experience in seeking a fed juship 83. Based on all the information contained in this Motion and other information

known to Plaintiff, the persons with whom Judge Gee has a personal relationsip will be called by Plaintiff as a witness in this case and in related cases, namely Defendants Giarardi, Fujie, Miller, Overton, Layton, O'Brien, as well as non-defendants Senators Feinstein and Leahy.

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84.

Judge Gee herself will be a material witness in this case and in related cases in

her capacity of seeking a judgeship from the defendants named in this case and from the use of misappropriated monies that were obtained from California State Bar victims that should have been paid by and through the Client Security Fund in the sun of $11 Million. Also Judge Gee will be a material witness in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal case relating to the possible disbarment of Thomas Girardi and others. 85. Judge Gee should recuse herself or be disqualified because she has a financial

interest in the outcome of these cases especially as it relates to her her close personal friends Defendants Girardi, Fujie, Miller, Overton, Layton, O'Brien, inter alia. Judge Gee cannot

determine the credibility of her close friends that put her on the bench with misappropriated money including monies that were misappropraited from the State Bar itself. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
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86.

Section 455(a) of Title 28 mandates that the court shall disqualify itself when

the judges impartiality might reasonably be in question. Added to the clear language of Section 455, which requires disqualification where the courts impartiality might reasonably be questioned, is the forceful holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Liteky v. U.S., requiring disqualification under the circumstances presented herein. 87. Section 455(a) provides that a judge shall disqualify himself in any proceeding
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clearly

in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The 9th Circuit has repeatedly invoked these objective standards in defining the basis for recusal. As acknowledged in Grodin v. Random House, Inc.,
47

assigning appropriate language in Liteky: Deep seeded

antagonism makes fair judgment impossible. 88. The plain language of 28 USC 455(b)(2) is clear: a. Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify

himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. b. He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances. i. Where in practice he/she served as a lawyer in the matter of

controversy, or a lawyer with whom he/she previously practiced law served during such

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510 US 540, 557 (1994). 61 F3d 1045, 1053

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association as a lawyer concerning the matter or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it. ii. In discussing the imports of 455(b), Chief Justice Rehnquist

noted in his dissent, in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp, 486 US 847, 871 (1988), that: Subsection b of 455 sets forth more particularized situations in which a judge must disqualify himself, Congress intended the provisions of 455(b) to remove any doubts about recusal in cases where a judges interest is too closely connected with the litigation to allow his participation. 89. Sarah L. Overton, Esq. has a long history in these cases of having extrajudicial

ex parte communications with trial judges, federal court judges, and "The Triumverate." Further, Defendant Overton has admitted to having improper ex parte communications with Erice George's father, Ronald Georger, to prejude and predetermine the outcome of cases. Ms.

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Overton, inter alia, has acted openly to prejudge and predetermine many cases, including Plaintiff's cases. 90. Because of Judge Gees close personal relationships with defendants named in

Plaintiff's Complaint especially in her capacity as State Bar insider, "State Bar Royalty," Judge Gee should recuse herself or be disqualified. 91. Further, Judge Gee should disqualify herself because of the personal

involvement of persons affiliated with Defendant Thomas V. Girardi and other defendants in this case. As set forth in United States v. Murphy,48 "Close personal relationships with counsel mandates a judges disqualification which results in a reasonable question about the judges impartiality." 92. As stated in the case U.S. v. the State of Louisiana:
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Such personal

knowledge officiates the carefully construed rules of procedure and evidence that ensure deliverable unbiased fact finding. The rule here is, "No showing of actual bias is required
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where such knowledge on the part of a judge exists."

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768 F2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985). 828 F2d. 1532, 1546 (11th Cir. 1987). In re Faulkner, 856 F.2d. 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1988).

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93.

Judge Gee will be a material witness in this case and in related cases in her

capacity as State Bar insider, "State Bar Royalty," and as a beneficiary of the $11 million misappropriated funds from James Parsa utilized, in part, to buy her judgeship and others. 94. Additionally, under 28 U.S.C. 455(b)(4): "A judge is disqualified where the
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judge could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings." 95.

This motion is timely made and was made pursuant to Judge Gees February

15, 2012 Order. 96. For the reasons stated above, Judge Gee should recuse herself and the case

referred to Chief Judge Alex Kozinski for a referral to a judge outside the district. Chief Judge Kozinski should disqualify all Central District Court Judges and appoint an independent impartial judge who is not assigned to any of the related cases to determine the disqualification

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of Judge Gee. 97. The facts show Judge Gees impartiality might be reasonably questioned based

upon her extensive involvement with the defendant named in Plaitiff's Complaint, including improper extrajudicial ex parte communications to prejudge and predetermine the outcome of this case. 98. Judge Gee cannot determine the credibility of her close personal friends who

have acted illegally in recommending her appointment to the bench using misappropriated monies that belonged to the victims of Defendants Parsa and Dastmalchi victims including the $11 million misappropriated as more fully set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint. /// /// /// /// /// /// /// ///
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Liljeberg v. Health Service Acquisition, (1988) 486U.S.847.

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99.

Plaintiff's Complaint is hereby incorporated by reference and fully supports the

disqualification of Judge Gee based on her failure to disclose her relationship with "The Triumverate" and other defendants in this case. Judge Gee had a mandatory obligation to make such disclosures and as a result of her personal involvement in this case and with the defendants, all of Judge Gee's orders are void ab initio as were the prior orders of Judge Pym, Judge Carter and Judge Tucker because their deputy courtroom clerk had personal knowledge of events that took place in this case including seeking to predetermine and prejudge the outcome of this case by the defendants. Dated: February 16, 2012 Respectfully submitted, /s/ __________________________________ Erin K. Baldwin Plaintiff, Pro Se

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