Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v.

National Labor
Relations Commission and Grace de Guzman

Facts

Grace de Guzman was initially hired by the Philippine Telegraph and

Telephone Company (PT&T) as a reliever for a fixed period from November
21, 1990, until April 20, 1991, replacing an employee on maternity leave.
She signed a Reliever Agreement wherein her employment was to end upon
the expiration of the agreed period. 2. **Successive Engagements**: De
Guzman was re-engaged by PT&T for similar brief reliever stints during June
10, 1991 – July 1, 1991, and July 19, 1991 – August 8, 1991, replacing
another employee on leave. Her services were terminated after the
respective periods ended.

On September 2, 1991, PT&T employed de Guzman as a probationary

employee for 150 days. In her job application, she declared herself single
despite having been married on May 26, 1991.

PT&T’s Baguio City branch supervisor discovered the discrepancy and on

January 15, 1992, asked de Guzman to explain. She responded on January
17, 1992, claiming ignorance of the company’s policy against employing
married women and asserted no deliberate concealment of her status. PT&T
dismissed de Guzman on January 29, 1992

De Guzman initiated a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of

cost of living allowances (COLA) with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in Baguio City. She admitted, during the preliminary
conference, to failing to remit P2,380.75 of her collections; however, this was
resolved via a promissory note.

On November 23, 1993, the labor arbiter declared de Guzman had gained
regular employee status and was illegally dismissed due to the
discriminatory company policy against married women. Reinstatement with
back wages and COLA payment were ordered.

The NLRC upheld the labor arbiter’s decision on April 29, 1994, affirming the
illegal dismissal but modifying it to impose a three-month suspension for de
Guzman’s admitted act of dishonesty. PT&T’s motion for reconsideration was
denied on November 9, 1994, prompting the petition to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

1. Whether PT&T’s policy against the employment of married women violates

Article 136 of the Labor Code?

2. Whether Grace de Guzman’s concealment of her marital status

constitutes sufficient ground for dismissal?

3. Whether the act of misappropriating company funds justified the

termination.?
Ruling:

In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are
found in Articles 130 to 138 thereof. Article 130 involves the right against
particular kinds of night work while Article 132 ensures the right of women to
be provided with facilities and standards which the Secretary of Labor may
establish to ensure their health and safety. For purposes of labor and social
legislation, a woman working in a nightclub, cocktail lounge, massage clinic,
bar or other similar establishments shall be considered as an employee
under Article 138. Article 135, on the other hand, recognizes a woman's right
against discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of employment
on account simply of sex. Finally, and this brings us to the issue at hand,
Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the
marriage of a female employee.

Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional

guarantee of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is
required, as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment
ties of an individual under his employ, to convincingly establish, through
substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing
with the services of such employee, one's labor being regarded as
constitutionally protected property.

On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the

company falls within the so-called management prerogatives, which
prescriptions encompass the matter of hiring, supervision of workers, work
assignments, working methods and assignments, as well as regulations on
the transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal,
and recall of employees. 19 As put in a case, an employer is free to regulate,
according to his discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of
employment, "from hiring to firing," except in cases of unlawful
discrimination or those which may be provided by law.

II.

In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as

disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul
of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women
workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to
petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment
on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with
the company were dissolved principally because of the company's policy that
married women are not qualified for employment in PT & T, and not merely
because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private
respondent by Delia M. Oficial, the branch supervisor of the company, with
the reminder, in the words of the latter, that "you're fully aware that the
company is not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was verbally
instructed to you." 21 Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the same
branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her
severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her
married status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the
company's policy against marriage ("and even told you that married women
employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our
company.") 22 Parenthetically, this seems to be the curious reason why it was
made to appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was represented in
this case only by its said supervisor and not by its highest ranking officers
who would otherwise be solidarily liable with the corporation. 23

Verily, private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status
from PT & T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as
she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain
a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically
forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her
civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence
is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be simulated. 24 It
must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not
on the employer's caprices. 25 Furthermore, it should never be used as a
subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified. 26

In the present controversy, petitioner's expostulations that it dismissed

private respondent, not because the latter got married but because she
concealed that fact, does have a hollow ring. Her concealment, so it is
claimed, bespeaks dishonesty hence the consequent loss of confidence in
her which justified her dismissal.

III.

Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of

the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of
stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it
likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive
a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts
inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. 38 Hence,
while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements,
terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not
be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy. 39 Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that
petitioner's policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or
common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.

Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that
the relations between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely
contractual, impressed as they are with so much public interest that the
same should yield to the common good. 40 It goes on to intone that neither
capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor impair
the interest or convenience of the public. 41 In the final reckoning, the danger
of just such a policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT & T is that it
strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable
social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the
nation. 42 That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect,
disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the
laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively required.

A.M. NO. P-08-2590* July 5, 2010

JULIE ANN C. DELA CUEVA, Complainant,

vs.
SELIMA B. OMAGA, Court Stenographer I, MTC-Calauan,
Laguna, Respondent.

Facts:

This administrative case stemmed from a sworn Affidavit-Complaint 1 dated

June 15, 2007 filed by Julie Ann dela Cueva charging respondent Selima B.
Omaga, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court, Calauan, Laguna, with
Immorality.

Complainant Julie Ann C. dela Cueva is the legal wife of P/Supt. Nestor dela
Cueva.2 They were married on July 29, 1984, and the union bore three
children. Due to the philandering ways of her husband, the couple separated
on November 30, 1994.3 Thereafter, the complainant cohabited with two
different men in succession – (1) William Castillo with whom she had three
children: Jessica, born on February 24, 1998; William Paolo, born on March 6,
2000; and Frenz William, born on August 8, 2002; and (2) Justiniano
Montillano with whom she had one child, Justin Jan, born on March 31, 2006. 4

On May 31, 2007, P/Supt. Nestor dela Cueva filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage alleging as ground his own psychological incapacity. 5 This
angered and prompted his wife, the complainant, to file a criminal complaint
against him for bigamy and concubinage. Her complaint alleged that he and
respondent, Selima B. Omaga, got married and were living together as
husband and wife despite the subsistence of his marriage with her (the
complainant).6 The criminal charges were dismissed by the provincial
prosecutor in a resolution dated August 24, 2007. 7

Complainant dela Cueva also filed an administrative complaint against both

her husband and the respondent.8 In her defense, respondent averred that
she first met P/Supt. dela Cueva in 1995 when he was assigned by the
Philippine National Police as Chief of Police in Calauan, Laguna. Their
relationship started on March 8, 1995 and continued until she received notice
of the bigamy and concubinage case filed against him. 9 It was only then that
she discovered that he was married.10 She bore P/Supt. dela Cueva three
children: John Emmanuel, born on December 27, 1996; Patrick Josef, born on
May 1, 1998; and Patricia May, born on May 18, 2000. 11 Respondent further
asserted that despite having had three children with P/Supt. dela Cueva, they
did not live together in one house but rather, he would just visit her in her
house from time to time.12

On October 23, 2008, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended

that "the complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and
that respondent be in the meantime suspended for a period six (6) months
and one (1) day, without pay with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same act would be dealt with more severely." 13

As recommended, the Court re-docketed the complaint as a regular

administrative matter in a Resolution dated December 15, 2008. 14 In another
Resolution dated June 10, 2009, the Office of the Court Administrator was
directed to assign a Regional Trial Court judge in Laguna for investigation,
report and recommendation.15 On September 17, 2009, Judge Agripino G.
Morga of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, San Pablo City, Laguna, was
designated to be the investigating judge.

Issue;

Whether or not Julie is guilty of gross immorality?

Ruling:

Well-established is the principle that public office is a public trust. 22 No less

than the Constitution requires that: "Public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives."23 In relation thereto, this Court has held that:

Employees of the judiciary, however, are subject to a higher standard than

most other civil servants. It has been written that "a place in the judiciary
demands upright men and women who must carry on with dignity and be
ever conscious of the impression that they could create by the way they
conduct themselves."25 In the case of Acebedo v. Arquero,26 this Court ruled
that:

Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position

exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an
individual than in the judiciary. That is why this Court has firmly laid down
exacting standards of morality and decency expected of those in the service
of the judiciary. Their conduct, not to mention their behavior, is
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility, characterized by,
among other things, propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the
public’s respect and confidence in the judicial service. It must be free from
any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the judicial
branch but also to their behavior outside the court as private individuals.
There is no dichotomy of morality; court employees are also judged by their
private morals.27
These exacting standards of morality and decency are required of employees
of the judiciary in order to preserve the faith of the people in the courts as
dispensers of justice.28 Our reminder, through the words of Justice Muñoz-
Palma, must be taken to heart:

The image of the court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct,

official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the
judge to the least and lowest of its personnel - hence, it becomes the
imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its
good name and standing as a true temple of justice.

This was further emphasized by the Court in Ratti v. Mendoza-de Castro:

It must be stressed that every employee of the judiciary should be an

example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, she
must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the
performance of her official duties but in her personal and private dealings
with other people. In order to preserve the good name and integrity of the
courts of justice, court personnel are enjoined to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct.

Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension of six months
and one day to one year for the first offense. 31

Immorality has been defined to include not only sexual matters but also
"conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency,
depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct
showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public
welfare."32

There is no doubt that engaging in sexual relations with a married man is not
only a violation of the moral standards expected of employees of the
judiciary but is also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of
marriage which this Court abhors and is, thus, punishable.

Respondent claims, however, that she had no knowledge that P/Supt. dela
Cueva was married and that she ended their relationship as soon as she was
made aware of his true civil status. If her contention were true, this would
serve to exculpate her from the accusation of immorality.

The Court finds respondent’s assertion to be plausible. It should be noted

that the complainant did not refute her defense that she did not learn of
P/Supt. dela Cueva’s marital status until complainant filed a complaint
against them. Indeed, there is no concrete evidence on record to show that
respondent knew of his married state at the time their relationship started.

The idea, however, that the respondent never had the slightest notion that
P/Supt. dela Cueva was married and that she did not cohabit with him
despite having three children may be quite a stretch of the imagination. It is
fairly inconceivable for a woman to have had a relationship with a married
man for more than a decade without even a tinge of suspicion that he might
have been lying about his true civil status. But then again, there is nothing
on record which can refute respondent’s allegation. In view of the lack of
proof showing that respondent willingly entered into an immoral sexual
liaison with a married man, she cannot be held liable for immoral and
disgraceful conduct.

It is a well-settled rule that administrative penalties must be supported by

substantial evidence for the imposition thereof. 33 This is in keeping with the
constitutional imperative that a person is entitled to due process of law. The
Court will exercise its disciplinary authority over respondent only if the case
against her is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 34 In
this case, the Court finds the evidence against respondent insufficient to
warrant the imposition of an administrative penalty.

We are, thus, guided by the disquisition of the Court in the case of Concerned
Employee v. Mayor.35 In said case, a court stenographer had sexual relations
with a married man. She alleged that she did not know that her lover was
married when they commenced their relationship. The Court acknowledged
the validity of such a defense:

The legal effect of such ignorance deserves due consideration, if only for
intellectual clarity. The act of having sexual relations with a married person,
or of married persons having sexual relations outside their marriage is
considered "disgraceful and immoral" conduct because such manifests
deliberate disregard by the actor of the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and our laws. The perversion is especially egregious if
committed by judicial personnel, those persons specifically tasked with the
administration of justice and the laws of the land. However, the malevolent
intent that normally characterizes the act is not present when the employee
is unaware that his/her sexual partner is actually married. This lack of
awareness may extenuate the cause for the penalty, as it did in the
aforementioned Ui case.36 (emphasis supplied)

In the cited case of Ui v. Bonifacio,37 the respondent was a female lawyer who
had a relationship with, and actually married, a man whose earlier marriage
was still subsisting. She asserted, however, that as soon as she learned that
he was married, she left him and ended their association. The Court found
that she did not deserve administrative punishment:

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent
was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains
that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent
believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and
the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Moreover,
for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly
immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

The respondent is hereby dismissed.

G.R. No. 228236. January 27, 2021 (Case Brief / Digest)

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal vs. Daisy B. Panga-Vega (Special

Leave Benefit Dispute)

Facts:

The factual backdrop of this case involves a series of events relating to Atty.
Daisy B. Panga -Vega (Panga-Vega), who was then the Secretary of the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), requesting and subsequently
attempting to return from a special leave benefit under RA No. 9710, also
known as the Magna Carta of Women.

On February 2, 2011, Panga-Vega requested a 15-day special leave benefit to

undergo hysterectomy, scheduled from February 7-25, 2011, not to exceed
two months. The HRET approved this request the following day.

After undergoing hysterectomy on February 7, 2011, Panga-Vega informed

the HRET Chairperson on March 7, 2011, of her intention to resume duties
and presented a medical certificate indicating no contraindications to resume
light to moderate activities. Subsequent medical certificates clarified her
fitness to work

Despite her readiness, the HRET directed Panga-Vega to consume her 2-

month special leave, citing her need for recovery and pending investigation
of alleged minutes tampering. Panga-Vega’s reconsideration was denied by
the HRET.

Panga-Vega appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which ruled in

her favor, asserting her right to return to work post-medically certified
recovery, contradicting the HRET’s directive. The HRET’s subsequent
petitions to the CSC and the Court of Appeals (CA) failed, with both bodies
affirming Panga-Vega’s stance

Issues:

1. Whether the HRET possessed the legal authority to file the petition?

2. Whether the rules on maternity leave can be supplementally applied to

the special leave benefit under RA No. 9710?

3. Whether Panga-Vega complied with the CSC Guidelines warranting her

early return from special leave?

Ruling:

Even on the merits, however, the petition must still fail.

Section 18 of RA No. 9710 entitles a woman, who has rendered a continuous

aggregate employment service of at least six months for the last 12 months,
a special leave of two months with full pay based on her gross monthly
compensation following surgery caused by gynecological disorders. In
relation to this provision, the case involving Panga-Vega gives rise to the
issue of whether the rules on maternity leave under Sec. 14, Rule XVI of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, which
provides that the commuted money value of the unexpired portion of the
special leave need not be refunded, and that when the employee returns to
work before the expiration of her special leave, she may receive both the
benefits granted under the maternity leave law and the salary for actual
services rendered effective the day she reports for work, may have a
suppletory application.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), acknowledges the need to guarantee the basic human
rights and fundamental freedoms of women through the adoption in the
political, social, economic, and cultural fields, of appropriate measures,
including legislation, to ensure their full development and
advancement.27 Consistent thereto, no less than the fundamental law of the
land imposes on the State the duty to protect working women by providing
safe and healthful working conditions, as well as facilities and opportunities
to enhance their welfare, and enable them to realize their full potential in the
service of the nation.28

In fulfillment of the foregoing obligation under the CEDAW, and the 1987
Philippine Constitution to advance the rights of women, RA No. 9710 was
enacted. This law acknowledges the economic, political, and socio�cultural
realities affecting their work conditions and affirms their role in nation-
building.29 It guarantees the availability of opportunities, services, and
mechanisms that will allow them to actively perform their roles in the family,
community, and society. As a social legislation, its paramount consideration
is the empowennent of women. Thus, in case of doubt, its provisions must be
liberally construed in favor of women as the beneficiaries. 30

The Court finds it just and more in accord with the spirit and intent of RA No.
9710 to suppletorily apply the rule on maternity leave to the special leave
benefit. Similar to the special leave benefit under RA No. 9710, a maternity
leave under the Omnibus Rules on Leave seeks to protect the health and
welfare of women, specifically of working mothers, as its primary purpose is
to afford them some measures of financial aid, and to grant them a period of
rest and recuperation in connection with their pregnancies. 31 The special
leave benefit should be liberally interpreted to support the female employee
so as to give her further means to afford her needs, may it be gynecological,
physical, or psychological, for a holistic recuperation. The recovery period
may be a trying time that she needs much assistance and compassion to
regain her overall wellness. Nothing in RA No. 9710 and the CSC Guidelines
bar this more humane interpretation of the provision on special leave
benefit.

Anent Panga-Vega's return to work, while RA No. 9710 and the CSC
Guidelines do not require that the entire special leave applied for be
consumed, certain conditions must be satisfied for its propriety.

Under the CSC Guidelines, a total hysterectomy is classified as a major

surgical procedure32 requiring a minimum period of recuperation of three
weeks to a maximum period of two months.33 Aside from observing this time
frame, the employee, before she can return to work, shall present a medical
certificate signed by her attending surgeon that she is physically fit to
assume the duties of her position.34

Panga-Vega underwent total hysterectomy on February 7, 2011, and decided

to return to work on March 7, 2011. As it appears, she was already able to
observe a period of recuperation of four weeks. As to the requirement for a
medical certificate, it is inconsequential to belabor the seeming deficiency of
the first medical certificate dated March 5, 2011, which merely stated that
there was no contraindication for her to resume light to moderate activities,
as she already presented a medical certificate dated March 9, 2011 signed
by her attending obstetrician/gynecologist attesting her physical fitness to
report back for work.

Based on these facts on record, the CSC found that Panga-Vega sufficiently
complied with the CSC Guidelines warranting her return to work. The Court
accords finality to these findings acknowledging the CSC's special knowledge
and expertise on matters falling under its jurisdiction as an administrative
agency,35 and given the affirmance by the CA.

G.R. No. 172013 October 2, 2009

PATRICIA HALAGUEÑA, MA. ANGELITA L. PULIDO, MA. TERESITA P. SANTIAGO,

MARIANNE V. KATINDIG, BERNADETTE A. CABALQUINTO, LORNA B. TUGAS,
MARY CHRISTINE A. VILLARETE, CYNTHIA A. STEHMEIER, ROSE ANNA G.
VICTA, NOEMI R. CRESENCIO, and other flight attendants of PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES, Petitioners,

vs.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INCORPORATED, Respondent.

A group of female flight attendants, members of the Flight Attendants and
Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), challenged the compulsory
retirement age of 55 for females and 60 for males stipulated in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between their labor union and Philippine
Airlines (PAL). On July 11, 2001, the PAL-FASAP CBA established the disputed
provisions. The petitioners considered it discriminatory and demanded equal
treatment with male counterparts. Despite written protests and demands,
the provision remained. Consequently, the petitioners filed a Special Civil
Action for Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Makati City, which resulted in
the issuance of a TRO against the enforcement of the discriminatory
retirement age.

PAL moved to question the RTC’s jurisdiction and to lift the TRO. The RTC
maintained its jurisdiction and issued a preliminary injunction, halting the
implementation of the discriminatory CBA provision. Dissatisfied, PAL
appealed to the CA, which held that the RTC had no jurisdiction, annulling its
orders and directing it to dismiss the case, considering the issue a labor
dispute. Petitioners then sought recourse in the Supreme Court.

Issues:
1. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over an action challenging the legality or
constitutionality of provisions in a CBA.
2. Whether the CA erred in considering the subject matter as a labor dispute
and subsequently annulling the orders of the RTC.

Ruling:

Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer

or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Actions
between employees and employer where the employer-employee
relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a
different source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular
court.18 Here, the employer-employee relationship between the parties is
merely incidental and the cause of action ultimately arose from different
sources of obligation, i.e., the Constitution and CEDAW.

Thus, where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to

the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining
agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute
belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the labor arbiter and the
NLRC. In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in
labor management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and
conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general civil
law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of competence or expertise
ordinarily ascribed to labor arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for
granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears. 19

If We divest the regular courts of jurisdiction over the case, then which
tribunal or forum shall determine the constitutionality or legality of the
assailed CBA provision?

This Court holds that the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrators do
not have the power to determine and settle the issues at hand. They have no
jurisdiction and competence to decide constitutional issues relative to the
questioned compulsory retirement age. Their exercise of jurisdiction is futile,
as it is like vesting power to someone who cannot wield it.

In Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd.,20 this Court affirmed the jurisdiction of

courts over questions on constitutionality of contracts, as the same involves
the exercise of judicial power. The Court said:

Whether the case involves void or voidable contracts is still a judicial

question. It may, in some instances, involve questions of fact especially with
regard to the determination of the circumstances of the execution of the
contracts. But the resolution of the validity or voidness of the contracts
remains a legal or judicial question as it requires the exercise of judicial
function. It requires the ascertainment of what laws are applicable to the
dispute, the interpretation and application of those laws, and the rendering
of a judgment based thereon. Clearly, the dispute is not a mining conflict. It
is essentially judicial. The complaint was not merely for the determination of
rights under the mining contracts since the very validity of those contracts is
put in issue.

In Saura v. Saura, Jr.,21 this Court emphasized the primacy of the regular
court's judicial power enshrined in the Constitution that is true that the trend
is towards vesting administrative bodies like the SEC with the power to
adjudicate matters coming under their particular specialization, to insure a
more knowledgeable solution of the problems submitted to them. This would
also relieve the regular courts of a substantial number of cases that would
otherwise swell their already clogged dockets. But as expedient as this
policy may be, it should not deprive the courts of justice of their
power to decide ordinary cases in accordance with the general laws
that do not require any particular expertise or training to interpret
and apply. Otherwise, the creeping take-over by the administrative
agencies of the judicial power vested in the courts would render the
judiciary virtually impotent in the discharge of the duties assigned
to it by the Constitution.

To be sure, in Rivera v. Espiritu,22 after Philippine Airlines (PAL) and PAL

Employees Association (PALEA) entered into an agreement, which includes
the provision to suspend the PAL-PALEA CBA for 10 years, several employees
questioned its validity via a petition for certiorari directly to the Supreme
Court. They said that the suspension was unconstitutional and contrary to
public policy. Petitioners submit that the suspension was inordinately long,
way beyond the maximum statutory life of 5 years for a CBA provided for in
Article 253-A of the Labor Code. By agreeing to a 10-year suspension, PALEA,
in effect, abdicated the workers' constitutional right to bargain for another
CBA at the mandated time.

In that case, this Court denied the petition for certiorari, ruling that there is
available to petitioners a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The Court said that while the petition was denominated as one
for certiorari and prohibition, its object was actually the nullification of the
PAL-PALEA agreement. As such, petitioners' proper remedy is an ordinary
civil action for annulment of contract, an action which properly falls under
the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.

The change in the terms and conditions of employment, should Section 144
of the CBA be held invalid, is but a necessary and unavoidable consequence
of the principal relief sought, i.e., nullification of the alleged discriminatory
provision in the CBA. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that a resolution of
controversy that would bring about a change in the terms and conditions of
employment is a labor dispute, cognizable by labor tribunals. It is unfair to
preclude petitioners from invoking the trial court's jurisdiction merely
because it may eventually result into a change of the terms and conditions of
employment. Along that line, the trial court is not asked to set and fix the
terms and conditions of employment, but is called upon to determine
whether CBA is consistent with the laws.

Although the CBA provides for a procedure for the adjustment of grievances,
such referral to the grievance machinery and thereafter to voluntary
arbitration would be inappropriate to the petitioners, because the union and
the management have unanimously agreed to the terms of the CBA and their
interest is unified.

G.R. No. 195244 June 22, 2015

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA, Accused-Appellant.

Facts:

Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. The party challenging the

child's competency as a witness has the burden of substantiating his
challenge.

Facts:

Under review is the decision promulgated on July 23, 2010, 1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the conviction of the
appellant for the composite crime of robbery with homicide handed down by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 211, in Mandaluyong City through its
judgment rendered on January 27, 2006.

The information charged the appellant with robbery with homicide, alleging
as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of October 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to gain, with the use of a bladed weapon, by
means of force and violence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to ₱13,000.00
belonging to JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, to the damage and prejudice of
the latter; that by reason or on occasion of said robbery, accused did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with
the said bladed weapon said JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, thereby
inflicting upon her physical injuries which directly caused her death.

The CA adopted the RTC’s summation of the evidence of the Prosecution, to

wit:

Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of
the incident, he, his younger sister Cheche, and his mother and father, were
sleeping on the ground floor of their house. He saw appellant, whom he calls
"Nonoy," enter their house and stab her mother with a knife, while he (Carl)
peeped through a chair. Although there was no light at the ground floor,
there was light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed, his father chased the
appellant. Carl saw blood come out of his mother’s lower chest. His father
then brought her to the hospital. Carl positively identified the appellant, a
neighbor who often goes to their house, as the one who stabbed his mother.
On cross-examination, he related that the assailant took money from his
father’s pocket. He likewise admitted that he did not see very well the
perpetra tor because there was no light (TSN, February 24, 2004, pp. 3, 11-
23, 28, 30-32).

Upon being asked by the trial court, Carl stated that although there was no
light when his mother was stabbed, he was sure of what he saw since there
was light at their second floor, which illumined the ground floor through the
stairway (TSN, February 24, 2004, pp. 33-34).
In turn, the appellant denied the accusation. According to him, he had
frequented the victim’s billiard hall, which was situated only four houses
away from where he lived, and, on the evening in question, he had been the
last to leave the billiard hall at 11 o’ clock p.m. and had then gone home. He
recalled that he had been roused from slumber by screams for help around
two o’clock a.m., prompting him to ask his mother for the key to the door;
that he had then gone outside where he learned of the killing of the victim;
that police officers had later on approached him to inquire what he knew
about the killing because they told him that Carl, the young son of the
victim, had pointed to him as the perpetrator, making him the primary
suspect; that he had replied that he had had nothing to do with the crime;
and that he had assured the police officers that he had never been involved
in any wrongdoing in his years of living in the neighborhood.

Issue:

Whether or not Carl is a competent witness?

The most important task of the St ate in the successful prosecution of the
accused is his credible and competent identification as the perpetrator of the
crime. Hence, this appeal turns on whether or not the identification of the
appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with homicide was credible and
competent considering that the identifying witness was Carl, a 5-year old lad,
whose sole testimony positively pointed to and incriminated the appellant as
the person who had entered their home, robbed the family, and killed his
mother.

The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate to others

the acts and events witnessed. Towards that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court makes clear who may and may not be witnesses in judicial
proceedings, to wit:

Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next

succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction

of a crime unless otherwis e provided by law, shall not be a ground for
disqualification. (l8 a)

Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. -

The following persons cannot be witnesses:

(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known
their perception to others;

(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of

perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating
them truthfully. (19a)

As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or
incident, and can communicate such awareness, experience, or observation
to others can be a witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational
attainment, or social stat us are not necessary to qualify a person to be a
witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as listed
the rules. The generosity with which the Rules of Court allows people to
testify is apparent, for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case, and
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law are not grounds for
disqualification.14

That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The
dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in
the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now
presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of
proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only when
substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to
perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or
appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on
motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child. 15

The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province of the

trial court.16 All questions bearing on the credibility of witnesses are best
addressed by the trial court by virtue of its unique position to observe the
crucial and often incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment
while testifying, something which is denied to the appellate court because of
the nature and function of its office. The trial judge has the unique
advantage of actually examining the real and testimonial evidence,
particularly the demeanor of the witnesses. Hence, the trial judge’s
assessment of the witnesses’ testimonies and findings of fact are accorded
great respect on appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to justify
the reversal of the trial court’s assessment and conclusion, like when no
significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or
disregarded, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former’s findings.
The rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court has concurred
with the trial court.17

The appellant did not object to Carl’s competency as a witness. He did not
attempt to adduce evidence to challenge such competency by showing that
the child was incapable of perceiving events and of communicating his
perceptions, or that he did not possess the basic qualifications of a
competent witness. After the Prosecution terminated its direct examination
of Carl, the appellant extensively tested his direct testimony on cross-
examination. All that the Defense did was to attempt to discredit the
testimony of Carl, but not for once did the Defense challenge his capacity to
distinguish right from wrong, or to perceive, or to communicate his
perception to the trial court. Consequently, the trial judge favorably
determined the competency of Carl to testify against the appellant.

The appellant points to inconsistencies supposedly incurred by Carl. That is

apparently not disputed. However, it seems clear that whatever
inconsistencies the child incurred in his testimony did not concern the
principal occurrence or the elements of the composite crime charged but
related only to minor and peripheral matters. As such, their effect on his
testimony was negligible, if not nil, because the inconsistencies did not
negate the positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator. Also,
that Carl did not shout to seek help upon witnessing how the appellant had
stabbed his mother to death did not destroy his credibility. For sure, he could
not be expected to act and to react to what happened like an adult. Although
children have different levels of intelligence and different degrees of
perception, the determination of their capacity to perceive and of their ability
to communicate their perception to the courts still pertained to the trial
court, because it concerned a factual issue and should not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of a strong showing of mistake or misappreciation on
the part of the trial court.
[ G.R. No. 238798, March 14, 2023 ]

CICL XXX, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

As narrated by the CA, CICL XXX was charged with the crime of Frustrated
Murder before the RTC on 1 March 2004. The Information was later amended
to Frustrated Homicide. When the victim, AAA, died on 26 November 2008,
the Information was amended anew, this time, to Homicide, the accusatory
portion of which reads:5

That on or about the 28th day of October, 2003 at ███████, Municipality of

La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with intent to kill, attack one [AAA], by hitting his left eye,
ear and head with a blunt instrument, thereby inflicting fatal injuries
on [AAA] which caused his death thereafter.

That the accused is a minor being seventeen (17) years of age at the time of
the commission of the crime.

When arraigned, CICL XXX, assisted by his counsel, entered a plea of "not
guilty." After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.7

During the trial of the case, the prosecution presented the testimonies of EEE
who is the brother of DDD and a friend of AAA, PO1 Loreto Pihoc, Dr. Romeo
Concepcion, Dr. Manuel Kelly, Jr., BBB who is AAA's mother, CCC who is AAA's
sister, and Dr. Editha Francisco. On the other hand, the defense presented
CICL XXX and YYY, the guardian of CICL XXX.8

The prosecution established that AAA testified against CICL XXX on 27

October 2003 during the hearing of the complaint for physical injuries filed
by DDD against CICL XXX before the Punong Barangay in Brgy. ███████,
Baguio City. AAA allegedly saw CICL XXX hit DDD with a bucket inside a bar
in Assumption, Baguio City.9
The next day, on 28 October 2003, at around 3:00 A.M., BBB awakened from
sleep when someone shouted "Mama! Mama!" She woke up her husband and
when they went outside the house, AAA was lying in front of their gate, his
face and eyes bloodied. Her husband washed AAA's face with water and
brought him inside the house. When asked what happened to him, AAA told
them that CICL XXX and his companion were inside their house. When AAA
asked what they were doing inside his house, CICL XXX replied they were
looking for somebody. Thereafter, CICL XXX struck his eyes. After narrating
the incident to his parents, AAA fell asleep.10

On 29 October 2003, AAA complained of dizziness. As his other eye was

already popping out, AAA was brought to the Benguet General Hospital for
treatment. On 30 October 2003, AAA was confined at the same hospital. The
CT-Scan result showed that AAA suffered severe brain damage and was
advised to transfer to another hospital. In the evening of the same date, he
was transferred to Baguio General Hospital. Dr. Romeo Concepcion, the
attending physician, remarked that when he first met AAA, the latter was
conscious and coherent and had been blind on one eye with several
abrasions on the head, face and shoulders. He wore an eye patch on his left
eye and had several bluish discolorations on his forehead and both eyes.
Based on the CT-Scan results, the victim had massive cerebral contusions
and bleeding on spaces in the brain which may have been caused by any
force or object hard enough to cause damage to the brain.11

On 31 October 2003, AAA's older sister, CCC, visited him at the hospital. AAA
told her it was CICL XXX who mauled him. A few days later, AAA could no
longer speak. He was later discharged from the hospital on 27 January 2004
in a vegetative state. After being bed-ridden for five years, AAA died on 26
November 2008. The Death Certificate issued by the Municipal Health Office
of La Trinidad, Benguet stated that the immediate cause of death
is "Metabolic Encephalopathy," the secondary cause is "Ischemic
Infarction," and the underlying cause is "Acute Intraparenchymal
Hemorrhages, Bifrontal and Right Temporal Lobes with Subarachnoid and
Subdural Extension secondary to Blunt Trauma to the Head." Dr. Editha M.
Francisco (Dr. Francisco), Municipal Health Officer of the Municipality of La
Trinidad, Benguet, explained that "metabolic encephalopathy" is the
disturbance in the brain function which may be due to "ischemic
infarction," or brain tissue death secondary to loss of blood supply. Dr.
Francisco explained that because of the blunt trauma to the head, there is
bleeding within the brain (acute intraparenchymal hemorrhages) and outside
the brain (subarachnoid).

Issue:

The issue for consideration is whether or not the CA gravely erred in

affirming CICL XXX's conviction for the crime charged
Ruling:

However, as noted by the CA, the minority of CICL XXX warrants the
retroactive application of RA 9344, as amended, insofar as it is beneficial to
him. Section 6 thereof states:

SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. – . . .

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such
child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with
this Act.

Since CICL XXX was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime,
it is imperative to determine whether he is exempt from any criminal liability.
The answer, in turn, hinges on whether CICL XXX acted with discernment in
the commission of the acts complained of.

How is discernment determined?

Discernment is defined as the capacity of the child at the time of the

commission of the offense to understand the difference between right and
wrong and the consequences of the wrongful act.35 To further our
understanding of discernment as a legal concept, a review of its
jurisprudence and history provides an enlightening discourse.

Among the earliest discussions on discernment is the 1917 case of US v.

Maralit.36 The Court stated that in establishing discernment, it must appear
from the evidence that the accused acted with knowledge of the nature of
his acts and of the results which would naturally follow therefrom. To
establish the fact that a person acted with discernment, it is not necessary
that some witness declare directly and in words that he acted with
discernment. It is sufficient that, from the evidence as a whole, it is a
necessary inference that he so acted. The trial court may take into
consideration all the facts and circumstances presented by the record,
together with the appearance of the accused as he stood and testified during
trial.37

In the 1939 case of People v. Doqueña (Doqueña),38 the Court restated that
discernment was the mental capacity to understand the difference between
right and wrong. Discernment should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances accorded by the records in
each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment
and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the
act, but also after and even during the trial.39

In Guevarra v. Hon. Almodovar (Guevarra),40 the Court had the opportunity

to distinguish discernment from criminal intent. A crime, whether committed
by dolo or culpa, requires the distinct element of intelligence. This
intelligence necessarily includes the concept of discernment:

[T]he terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While
both are products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers
to the desire of one's act while the latter relate to the moral significance that
person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person may not intend to shoot
another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent act which
may cause injury to the same person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is
not correct, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above
nine years of age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended
such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his friend, thus did not intend
to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his
negligence.

In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and

"discernment," it is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of
the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the
complete absence of intelligence freedom of action, or intent, or on the
absence of negligence on the part of the accused. . .

It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are
not capable of performing a criminal act. On the other hand, minors above
nine years of age but below fifteen are not absolutely exempt. However, they
are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but which presumption may
be rebutted if it could be proven that they were "capable of appreciating the
nature and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted with discernment."
The preceding discussion shows that "intelligence" as an element
of dolo actually embraces the concept of discernment as used in Article 12 of
the RPC and as defined in the aforecited case of People vs. Doqueña, supra.
It could not therefore be argued that discernment is equivalent or connotes
"intent" for they refer to two different concepts. Intelligence, which includes
discernment, is a distinct element of dolo as a means of committing an
offense.

In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are

indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence.
Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains
as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but
below fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a
negligent act which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be criminally liable,
he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent
act[.]41

In Remiendo v. People,42 the Court

reiterated Doqueña and Guevarra emphasizing that the prosecution is
burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment and that the
surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he
was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome
nature of the crime and the minor's cunning and shrewdness.43

The Court in Dorado v. People44 (Dorado) further elucidated that when a

minor above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old is charged with a
crime, it cannot be presumed that he or she acted with discernment. During
the trial, the prosecution must specifically prove as a separate circumstance
that the child in conflict with the law committed the alleged crime with
discernment. Notably, Dorado also specified circumstances which would
exhibit discernment, viz.:

"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from

criminal liability of a minor [. . .] who commits an act prohibited by law, is his
mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and
such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances accorded by the records in
each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment
and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the
act, but also after and even during the trial."

"The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence

of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an essential
element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power
necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from
an illicit act. On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong." As earlier stated, the
"prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment
by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before
and during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. The
surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he
was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the
gruesome nature of the crime and the minor's cunning and
shrewdness." In an earlier case, it was written:

For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is

burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial
evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he
was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstantial evidence may
include the utterances of the minor; his overt acts before, during
and after the commission of the crime relative thereto; the nature
of the weapon used in the commission of the crime; his attempt to
silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus
delicti.45 (Emphasis supplied)

The pronouncements in Dorado were recapitulated in CICL XXX v.

People,46 where the Court stressed that the prosecution must specifically
prove as a separate circumstance that the alleged crime was committed with
discernment, and for a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the
prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or
circumstantial evidence, that the minor acted with discernment.47

In People v. ZZZ,48 the Court emphasized that discernment refers to the

mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his or her
unlawful act. Discernment is determined by considering all the facts of each
case.49

On the basis of the foregoing, this Court consistently held for more than a
hundred years that in determining discernment, courts shall consider
the totality of facts and circumstances in each case.50 Further,
discernment may be established by either direct or circumstantial
evidence.51 These circumstances include, but are not limited to: (i) the very
appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said
minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after
and even during trial, (ii) the gruesome nature of the crime, (iii) the minor's
cunning and shrewdness, (iv) the utterances of the minor, (v) his overt acts
before, during and after the commission of the crime, (vi) the nature of the
weapon used, (vii) his attempt to silence a witness, and (viii) his disposal of
evidence or his hiding the corpus delicti.

Guidelines on determining discernment

In view of the discussions on discernment in our jurisprudence through the

years, there is a need to streamline the discernment determination process
for crimes involving a child in conflict with the law. Thus, We provide the
following guidelines:

1. Discernment is the capacity of the child at the time of the commission of

the offense to understand the difference between right and wrong and the
consequences of the wrongful act.82

2. The task of ascertaining discernment is undertaken preliminary by a social

worker, and finally by the court. The determination of discernment shall take
into account the ability of a child to understand the moral and psychological
components of criminal responsibility and the consequences of the wrongful
act; and whether a child can be held responsible for essentially antisocial
behavior.83 The assessment of a social worker is merely evidentiary and is
not binding upon the court. Ultimately, the court finally determines
discernment, based on its own appreciation of all the facts and
circumstances in each case.

3. In our jurisdiction, there is no presumption that a minor acts with

discernment. The prosecution must specifically prove as a separate
circumstance that the alleged crime was committed with discernment. For a
minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened to
prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he
acted with discernment.84

4. In determining discernment, courts shall consider the totality of facts and

circumstances in each case.85 Such circumstances include, but are not
limited to: (i) the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment
and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the
act, but also after and even during trial, (ii) the gruesome nature of the
crime, (iii) the minor's cunning and shrewdness, (iv) the utterances of the
minor, (v) his overt acts before, during and after the commission of the
crime, (vi) the nature of the weapon used, (vii) his attempt to silence a
witness, and (viii) his disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus delicti.