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game theory

The syllabus for Economics 159S, taught by Rodney Chan, covers Game Theory and outlines course logistics, including class times, prerequisites, and grading criteria. Students are required to complete five problem sets, a mid-term, and a final exam, with no late submissions accepted. The course emphasizes understanding decision-making in structured interactions and includes a tentative schedule of topics and assignments.

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23 views

game theory

The syllabus for Economics 159S, taught by Rodney Chan, covers Game Theory and outlines course logistics, including class times, prerequisites, and grading criteria. Students are required to complete five problem sets, a mid-term, and a final exam, with no late submissions accepted. The course emphasizes understanding decision-making in structured interactions and includes a tentative schedule of topics and assignments.

Uploaded by

CheonLee
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Economics 159S – Syllabus Rodney Chan

Game Theory Summer 2009

Instructor: Rodney Chan


Contact: rodney.chan@yale.edu
Office hours: M, W, F evening by appointment

Teaching Fellow: Rahul Deb (rahul.deb@yale.edu)


Section hours: 3:30pm-5pm Monday and Friday @HGS217A
Office hours: after sessions

Due to the fast pace of summer classes, students are encouraged to regularly attend office hours and TA sessions.

Class Time and place: M/W/F 1:00-3:15pm @ HGS 217A


Note that one TA session in the first two weeks is designated as a make-up class

Course materials: Available on http://classesv2.yale.edu/

Course description: Game theory is the study of interactions between people in a structured environment.
When making decisions, people often take into account others' behaviors, at the same
time knowing that their decisions will have influence on others. The objective of this
course is to develop tools to understand the outcomes of such interactions. The course
emphasizes on examples that illustrate differences in the types of interactions and in the
nature of the outcomes.

Prerequisites: Two college-level courses in economics (eg, econ 115, 116 or 150) or equivalent are
required. Some knowledge of calculus (Math 112, or equivalent single-variable
differential calculus class) and probability is helpful.

Optional textbook: P.K. Dutta, Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice, MIT 1999. ISBN
0-262-04169-3 (available at Yale Book Store)

Other references: A. Dixit & B. Nalebuff: Thinking Strategically, Norton 1991. ISBN 0-393-31035-3
(available at Yale Book Store)

J. Watson: Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory, Norton 2002. ISBN


0-393-97648-3 (available at Yale Book Store)

Requirements: Students are responsible for five (5) problem sets, one mid-term and one final exam.
The problem sets will be distributed in class and due at the beginning of each class
according to the schedule on the next page. No late assignment is accepted. Students are
encouraged to work together in solving problem sets, but each student must hand in
individually written answers to each assignment.

Exam: On the last day of class (Friday July 3rd, 2009). No electronics is allowed in the exam

Grading: Problem sets 25%


Mid-term 30%
Exam 45%
Occasional bonus points may be offered to students with outstanding performance.

If a student misses a problem set or the mid-term, the weight assigned to the problem set (5% each) and/or the midterm
(30%) will be reassigned to the exam. The exam is mandatory and missing the final exam will result in a grade of C- or
lower. Moreover, an optional take-home final will be offered (date TBD).
The following is a tentative outline. Dates for items in bold are fixed.

Monday Jun 1 Introduction – elements of a game and normal form representation. Dominated strategies

Wednesday Jun 3 Constructing a game; Weakly dominated strategies; Iterative deletion

Friday Jun 5 Best response and Nash equilibrium; Writing proofs. Homework 1 due

Monday Jun 8 Strategic voting; Location; Common resources; Coordination.

Make-up class Mixed strategy; Randomization, and correlating devices.

Wednesday Jun 10 Evolutionary stability and equilibrium selections. Homework 2 due

Friday Jun 12 Sequential games and backward induction.

Monday Jun 15 Credibility and trust. Ultimatum and sequential bargaining. Homework 3 due

Wednesday Jun 17 Midterm Exam. Axelrod Tournament.

Friday Jun 19 Repeated games. Finitely and infinitely repeated games.

Monday Jun 22 Introduction to information economics.

Wednesday Jun 24 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Lemon market.

Friday Jun 26 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Overcoming asymmetric information. Homework 4 due

Monday Jun 29 Review on information economics.

Wednesday Jul 1 Behavioral game theory. Exam Review. Homework 5 due

Friday Jul 3 Final Exam (in class)

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