PLATO / 33

by t he mind , not prepared by th ö ught , under the compulsiön of love, not the
provisiön of art ( techne ) .
[ 20] How then can the blame of Helen be considered just ? Whether she
did what she did , invaded by love, persüaded by speech , ı mpelled by force
or compelled by divine necessity, she escapes ali blame entirely .
[ 2 İ ] With my speech I have removed this pman’s ili repute; I have abided
^
by the. rule laid dovvn at the beginning of my speech ; I have tried to dispel
the inju ş tice of blame and the ignorance of. opinion ; I wished to write this
speech for, Helen’s encomium and my amusement .
ca . 400 B . C. E .

PLATO
c a . 4 2 7 - c a . 3 4 7 ’ B . C. E .
"

A monumental figü re in the history of VVestern philosophy, Plato looms nearly as

.
large in the history of European literary theory Indeed , for many Iiterary scholars he
marks the beginning of the tradition of literary theory, although his choice of the
dialogue format, in vvhich historical personages convey particular arguments, suggests
that the issue he raises had already been debated before he took them up as do the —
-
extant fragments of the writings of the pre Socratic philosophers . The several dozen
dialogues â ttributed to Plato engage almont every issue that interests philosophers:
the nature of being; the que$tion of how we come to know th İngs; the proper ordering

—
of human söclety; and the nature of justice, truth * the good , beauty, and love .

—
Although Plato did not set out to vvrite systematic literary theory unlike his student
ARISTOTLE, who pröduced a treatise on poetics his corisideration of phllosophical
İssues in several of the dialogues leads him to reflect on pbetry, and those reflections
have often set the terms of literary debate in the West .
. —
What binds together Plato’s various discussions of pöetry is a distrust of ntimesis
( representation or imitation ) According to Plato, ali art including poetry is a
mı mesis of nature, a copy of objects in the physical vvorld . But those objeCUpin the
material vvorld, according to the idealist philosophy that Plato propounds, are them -
—
selves only mutable copies of timeless universals, called Forms or Ideas . Poetry is
merely a copy of a copy, leading avvay from the truth rather than tovvard it . Philoso-
phers and literary critics ever since, from PLOTJNUS in the third century C . E . to
JACQUES DERRIDA in the late tvventieth century, have vvrestled vvith the terms of Plato’s
critique of poetry, revising it or attempting to point out inconsistencî es in his argu -
ment .
. Plato vvas born about four years after the beginning of the tvventy-five-year - long
Peloponnesian War betvveeri Athens and Sparta and just after the death of the great
Athenian statesman Pericles , vvho had overseen the city’s artistic golden age . His
parents both came from distinguished Athenian families , and his stepfather, an asso-
ciate of Pericles , vvas an active particip â nt in the political and cultural life of fifth -
century Athens . Plato had tvvo older brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantus , vvho appear
, . .
as characters in his longest dialogue Republic (ca 375 B *C E . ) . As a young man ,
gtovving up in a city at vvar and . in constant political turmoil, he seems to have been
.
destined for â political career But after the Peloponnesian War ended in 405 , vvith
the defeat and humiliation of Athens , the excesSes of Athenian political life under
34 / PLATO

—
the oligarchical rule ( 404 403) of the so -called Thirty Tyrants and under the restored
democracy left Plato disillusioned with political life . The execution in 399 of Socrates,
on charges of impiety and corrupting the young, was a turning point in his life. The
older philosopher vvas a close friend of Plato’s family, and Plato’s writings attest to
Socrates’ great influence on hı m . Indeed , the position of Socrates in European phi -
losophy is unique. Though he apparently never wrote a vvord , his influence on sub-
sequent thought through his follovvers , Plato in particular, is incalculable .
After Socrates’ death Plato retired from Athenian political life and traveled for a
number of yeâ rs . In 388 he journeyed to Italy and Sicily, where he became the friend
-
of Dionysius I, the ruler of Syracuse, and his brother-in law Dion . The following year
he returned to Athens, vvhere he founded the Academy, an institution devoted to
research and instruction in philosophy and the Sciences; he taught there for the rest
of his life . Plato envisioned the Academy as a school for statesmen where he could
train a new kind of philosopher- ruler (or “guardian ” ) according to the principles set
forth in his Repub İic . Unlike the older sophist GORG İ AS or Plato’s contemporary rival
Isocrates , who both taught the arts of rhetoric and persuasion, Plato focusedprimarily
.
in the Academy on mathematics , logic , and philosophy Hovvever, vvhen Dionysius
died in 367, Dion invited Plato to return to Syracuse to undertake the philosophical
.
education of the new ruler, Dionysius II Plato vvent , perhaps vvith the hope of putting
the theory of Republic into practice; but philosophy proved no match for local politics
and Dionysius’s suspicions . Indeed , a return visit resulted in Plato’s brief İmprison -
ment ; by 360 he vvas back at the Academy for good .
Plato is recognized as a master of the dialogue form and as one of the great prose
stylists of the Greek language . His published vvritings* apparently ali of vvhich are
-
preserved, consist of some twenty six dramatic dialogues on philosophical and related
themes . The central problematic posed by this form is that İ t becomes virtually impos -
sible to attribute any statement directly to Plato: he never speaks in h îs own person .
The only exceptions are a series of thirteen letters (vvhose authenticity is stili a matter

—
of scholarly debate ) vvritten İ n the last decades of Plato’s life, most addressing the
—
political sltuation in Syracuse . Only the seventh and longest letter takes up phil-
osophical issues . For the most part , Plato places his arguments in the . mouths of
characters vvho may or may not be based on historical persons . The speakers can
never be assumed to be voicing Plato’s ovvn vievvs or the vievvs of those vvhose names
they bear . In almost ali the dialogues, Socrates is the focal character and Plato’s
mouthpiece, but Plato’s Socrates is not the historical Socrates . These complications,
vvhich thvvart efforts to fix Plato’s thought vvithin a series of propositional statements,
have attracted much attention , especially from late -tvventieth -century poststructur-
alist philosophers like Derrida .
The chronology of Plato’s dialogues is highly controversial, but most scholars
divide the vvorks roughly into three periods . The earliest vvorks, begun after 399,
include the Apo î ogy of Socrates and Critot in vvhich Plato defends Socrates agâ inst
the charges that led to his death ; Gorgias , in vvhich Socrates’ opponent is the sophist
Gorgias; and ion (one of our selections), vvhich examines poetry as a kind of divine
madness . Characteristic of these early Platonic dialogues is Socrates’ disarming
claim of ignorance and a formal technique of cross-examination called elenchus, a
method of questioning designed to lead a learner through stages of reasoning and
to expose the contradictions in an opponent’s original statement . rTh İ s method of
"emptying out ” the question by Socrates to reveal his opponents’ ignorance is espe -
cially evident in his discussion of poetry vvith Ion , a rhapsode ( professional reciter
of epic poetry) . The middle period , from 380 to 367, includes the Symposiuttt , Cra-
tyluSj and Republic , ali begun after the foü nding of the Academy; they develop the
theory of Forms or Ideas anticipated in the early dialogues . The Forms constitute a
realm of unchanging being to vvhich the vvorld of individual mutabje objects is sub-
—
ordinate . Because the Forms are immutable, they are more real and more true
than the changeable material vvorld . The Form of the Good enjoys a unique status,
—
 PLATO / 35

for it is responsible for the being and intelligibility of the world as a vvhole . Plato’s
famous “Allegory of the Cave” in book 7 of Republic ( one of our selections ) , a
passage that has generated much interest among poststructuralist theorists , provides
a memorable introduction to the Platonic theory of Forms , which is reiterated in
book 10’s equally vvell known critique of artistle imitation . Cratylus is of interest to
theorists of language because the dispute in this dia İ ogue concerns the “correctness ”

— —
of names: do they point unproblematically to the “ nature of things ” that is, to the
Forms as Hermogenes contends, or are they merely a matter of convention , as
Cratylus argues? Socrates concludes that the matter is unresolvable, but that “ no
one with any understanding vvill comm ı t himself or the education of his soul to

—
names, or trust them or their givers to the point of firmly stating that he knows
something . ” To the late period ( 366 360) belong Titttaeus, which throughout the
Middle Ages was Plato's most vvidely known vvork; Critias; Sophist ; and Phaedrus,
the latter elosing vvith a notorious attack on vvriting .
In Ion, our opening seleetion , Plato 's Socrates engages Ion in a debate about the
nature of the rhapsode’s knowledge of poetry, about the nature of poetry, and about
the status of knowledge itself . Poetry, Socrates maintains, is not an art ; it is a form
of divine madness: “ the poet is an airy thing, winged and holy, and he is not able to
make poetry until he becomes inspired af ıd goes out of his mind . ” This debate betvveen
the claims of inspiration and those of art vvould subsequently have a long history in
European literary criticism . Is poetry primarily a craft with a set of rules that can be
taught and learned , as HORACE, GEOFFREY OF Vİ NSAUF, and ALEXANDER POPE argue,
or is it primarily the result of inspiration or genius , as LONGINUS, PLOTINUS , FRIED-
R İ CH VON SCHILLER , WILLIAM WORDSWORTH , RALPH WALDO EMERSON , and Others,
following Plato, have maintained ?
Plato’s Socrates goes a step further . Not only is poetry a form of divinely inspired
madness, but so is criticism . “You are povverless to speak of Homer, ” he telis Ion , “on
the basis of knowledge or mastery . ” Socrates uses the image of a magnet as a metaphor
for divine inspiration: as a magnet attracts iron and passes that sttraction along, so
the gods inspire the artist , who inspires the interpreter, who, in turn , inspires the
audience . For Plato’s Socrates , the work of poet and critic is not divided between
inspiration and rational analysis , as it is for most modern critics ( see, for instance ,
MATTHEW ARNOLD and the New Critic CLEANTH BROOKs ) ; rather, it lies on a contin -
uum , and the work of the critic is no more rational than that of the poet , the , critic’s
knovvledge no more truthful . •/

Hovvever, it is helpful when reading Plato to remember that his dialogues don’t
alvvays present a straightforvvard argument or arrive at a single unambiguous conclu -
sion . The process of elenehus and Socrates’ persistent irony often make it diffTc ult to
'

pin him down to any one position . In fon , is Socrates making fun of the pomposity
of the rhapsode, or does he seriously believe that vvhatever truth emerges from poetry
and the interpretation of poetry results only from divine madness?
On the surface, it might seem that Ion treats poetry very differently than does the
Iater Republicy our second seleetion , vvhere Plato’s Socrates argues that far from being
—
divinely inspired , poets lie and ought to be banished from the ideal republic or, at
the very least , heavily censored and kept in check . But Ion presents a vıew of knovvl -
edge that is consistent vvith the vveightier arguments jn Republic . Hovvever divinely
inspired , Socrates argues , poets’ and critics’ knovvledge is of a different order than ,
and one decidedly inferior to, the knovvledge of charioteers, fishermen , or philoso-
phers . To the modern student of literat ü re , this denigration of the poet’s learning
appears dovvnright odd . Surely the standards by vvhich the knovvledge of a charioteer
or a fisherman or a mathematician vvould be judged are irrelevant in judging the value
of poetry. Why demand that the poet “ knovv ” about horses in the same vvay that a
horseman “ knovvs ” about horses?
To understand Socrates’ remarks about knovvledge, the modern reader needs to
understand the centrality of poetry to Greek education . In a culture in vvhich literacy
36 / PLATO

vvas a relatively new and suspect technology, knovvledge vvâ s frequently encoded and
.
passedon through the mnemonic devices of music and poetry The instruction pro-
vided by the sophists and by Plato’s ma î n rival, Isocfates, was almost exclusively rhe -
.
torical and literary Even in Republic , a book cö ncerned with the ideal education of
the guardians and citizens , Socrates divides schooling into physical training for the
.
body and mlı sic and poetry for the soiıl Socrates’ criticism of poetry and its repre-
sentations appears to be directed against a culture that ' believed literally “ that poets
know ali crafts , ali human affairs . ” In such a culture * Socrates’ insistence makes more
sense: a poet needs to knovv a horse the way a horseman knovvs a horşe In his .
Academy, hovvever, Plato promoted a» Jearning whose foutıdation Vvas dialectics, dia -
logue, and philosophical reaioning. .
Both the Allegory of the Cave and Republic 10’s infamous critique of mimesis
explore the nature of knovvledge and its proper objects . The vvorld vve perceive through
the senses, Socrates argues, is illusory and deceptive < It dependfc on a prior realm of
.
separately existing Forms, organized beneath the Form of Good The realm of Forms
is accessible not through the senses , as is the vvorld of appearances, but only through
rigorous philosophic discussion and thought, based on mathematical reasoning. For
Plato’s Socrates, measuring, counting, and vveighing ali bring us closer to the realm
of Forms than do poetry’s pale representations of nature . Ali art and poetry, because
they represent vvhat is already an inferior representation of the true original ( the
Forms ) , can only lead further avvay from the truth , and further into a vvorld of illusion
and deception . Virtually every subsequent defense of poetry ( memorable examples
İ nclude those by Aristotle, SIR PHILIP SIDNEY, APHRA BEHN, and PERGY BYSSHE SHEL-
LEY ) has had to come to terms vvith Plato’s devastating attack on poetry as inferior
and deceptive mimesis .
Plato’s Phaedrus (from vvhich our final selection has been taken ) has been of inter-
est to contempö rary literary theory for : its discussion of the evils of vvriting. There
Plato has Socrates relate the story of the inven ti on of vvriting by the Egyptian god
.
Theuth (Thoth ), vvho offers it to King Thamus Thamus declines the offer, deciding
that humans are better offvvithout vvriting because it substitutes an ailen inscrip-
— —
tion lifeless signs for the authentic living presence of spoken lan ğ uage . Far from
aiding memory, vvriting vvill cause it to atrophy . For Plato, the only good memory is
anatnnesis , the recollection of spiritual truths through genuine * living vvisdom î that
.
is, through philosophy Plato reiterates this point in his Seventh Letter , ^ vvhere he
says: "anyone vvho is seriously studying high matters vvill be the last to vvrite about
them and thus expose his thought to the envy and criticism of men . * . [W] henever
vve see a book, vvhether the lavvs of a legislator or a composition on any other subject,
vve can be sure that if the author is really serious, the book does not contain his best
thoughts; they are stored avvay vvith the fairest of his possessions . And ifrhe has
committed these serious thoughts to vvriting, it is because men , not the gods, ‘have
taken his vvits avvay. ’ •” Yet Plato’s use of a myth in Phaedrus to frame his philosophical
objections to vvriting raises questions of its ovvn * since presumably myths sufferfrom
the same defects as the texts of the sophists, rhetoricians * poets, and other purveyors
.
of false vvisdom vvhom Plato criticizes elsevvhere Derrida offers a celebrated unrav -
eling of the logic of Plato’s argument against vvriting in his Dissemination ( see belovv) ,
vvhich may be the most significant encounter betvveeh a tvventieth -century philoso-
pher and Plato . >

Plato is the progenitor of Western didactic criticism and theory: the idea that lit-
.
erat ü re should serve moral and social functions Republic > vvhere . he describes an
ideal vvell -regulated community in vvhich the educâ tional curriculum promotes
respect for lavv, reason , authority, self -discipline, and piety, has been especially influ *-
ential . Although Plato’s Socrates loves and regularly cites Homer’s lliad and Odyssöys
he calls for the censorship of many passages in these >vvorks - that represent sacriL
legious, sentimental * unlavvful, and irrational behavior . Above ali else, he requires
that literat ü re teach goodness and grace . Plato’s relentless application of this Standard
 ION / 37

to ali literat ü re marks one of the most noteworthy beginnings of the ancient qu â frel
betvveen philosophy and poetry .

BIBLIOGHAPHY
The Standard Greek edition of the entire works of Plato, ı ncluding tHose of dubious
authorship, is Plâtonis Opera , edited by John Butriet ( 5 völs . , 1900 1907 ) . This edi -
tion is being updated by a team of scholars led by E . A . Duke ( 2 vols . to date, 1 995 — ) ,
—
For a handy one- volume English translation of selected dialogues by various trans-
latorsj see The Collected Dialogues of Plato , edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington
.
Caims ( 1961 ) . Plato: Complete VVbrfes, edited by John M Cooper ( 1997 ) , is the most
complete one-volume collection , vyith the best translations avaijable ( done by various
.
hands ) The best translation of Republiç. is Robin Wakefield’s 1993) .
- ^
A. E . Taylor’s Plato , the Matı and j tts \V6 rk ( 1926; 7 th ed. , 1969 ) contains a com
plete translation of Diogenes Laö rtius’s thı rd -century c . E . life of Plato, which has
-
served as the basis for modern rfecbristf ü ctions of the philosopher’s life . Several books
prövıde ğood introductionS td Plato V â esthetic theory; ı ricluding Whitney J . Oates,
Plato’s Vi iV of Art ( 1972 ) ; iris Murdoch; The Fire a üd the Suti: XVhy Plato Banished
^
the Artists ( 1977 ) ' which attempts to defend Plato’s view of the arts; and Morriss
^
Henry Partee, Plato’s Poetics: The Authority of Beauty ( 1981 ) . Gerald F. Else, Plato
and Aristotle on Poetry ( 1986 ) , i ş a comparative study of the aesthetic theory of
Greece’s two greatest philosophers . İ n Postthodern Platos ( 1985 ) , Catherine H . Zuck-
ert {examines the centrality of Platonic thought to theorists from Friedrich Nietzsche
to Jacques Derrida . Other books dealing with Plato’s importan ç e to poststructuralist
crit ıcism include Jasper Neel, Plato, Derrida , and Writtng ( 1988) , and Plato and Post -
tnodemism, edited by Steven Shankman ( 1994 ) . The Catnbridge Companion to Plato ,
edited by RichardfCraut ( 1992 ), contains eSsays on sevferal âspects öf Plato’s thought ,
including aesthetics . Andrea Wilson Nightingale’s Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the
Construct of Philosophy ( İ 996 ) examiries Plâfco's iritegrâ tion of Greek poetry and rhet -
-
or îc into his dialogues . For an irttroduction tö Republic , sdeJulia Annas , An Intro
duction to Plato’s " Repuhlic” ( 1981 ) . On Phaedrus and Plato's discussions of rhetoric
-
and ivriting, see Ronna Burger * Plato’s " Phaedrus”: A Defense of a Philosophic Art of
. -
Writing ( 1980) ; Charles Grisvvold Jr , Self Knowledge in Plato’s " Phaedrus ” ( 1986 ) ;
and David A . White, Rhetoric and Reality. in Plato’s " Phaedrus” ( 1993 ) . For an
advanced, close reading of this dialogue, see Seth Benardete’s Rhetoric of Morality
and Philosophy: Plapo s "Gorgias” and " Phaedrus ” ( 1994 ) . For feminist readings of
'
Plato, see Feminist Interpretations of Plato, edited by Nancy Tuala ( 1994 ) . Tvvo books
that analyze the Platonic dialogue as a literary form are Platonic Writings , Plafpnic
Readings, edited by Charles Griswold Jr . ( 1988 ) , and Charles H . Kahn , Plato and the
Socratic Dialogue ( 1996 ) . The most complete and up-to-date bibliography can be
found in The Catnbridge Companion to Plato ( cited above ) .

Ion 1
[ 530] SOCRATES:2 Ion ! Hello . VVhere have you come from to visit us this
time? From your home in Ephesus?
ION: No, no, Socrates . From Epidaurus , from the festival of Asclepius . 3
b Translated by Paul Woodruff , who sometimes 2 . Greek philosopher ( 469 399 B . C . E . ) and Plato’s
adds clarifying words or phrases in square brack
ets; also İ n square brackets in the text are the Ste-
- spokesperson .
3. Greco -Roman hero and god of healinc . Ep ı dau -
phanus numbers used almost universeliy in citlng rus ı smalİ Greek State on a peninsula of the
Piat ö’s works: they refer to the pages of a 1578 Saronic Gulf , famed for its 4 th -century B . C . E . tem -
edition published by Henri Estienne . ple of Asclepius .
 REPUBLIC, BOOK I I / 49

From Republic i
From Book II

‘Ali right, then let's devise a theoretical education for these people,2 as if
we were making up a story and vveren’t worried about time /
*Yes , that’s a good idea /
‘How shall we educate them, then? Or is it hard to improve on the
educational system vvhich has evolved över a long period of time? This, as
you know, consists of exercise for the body and cultural studies for the
mind . 3
‘Yes /
‘And shall we begin the cultural programme before the physical one? '
‘Of course /
‘Cultural studies include literat ü re , don't you think?’ I asked .
‘1 do /
‘Aren 't there two kinds of literat ü re, true and false? M
Yes /
[ B 77] ‘Should we include both kinds in our educational system, and start
with the untrue kind ? *
‘I don 't understand what you’re getting at / he said .
‘Don’t you realize / I asked , ‘that we start by telling children stories which
are, by and large , untrue, though they contain elements of truth? And stories
precede physical exercise in our education of children /
‘True /
‘Which is why I suggested that cultural studies should be taken up before
physical exercise /
‘It was a good suggestion / he said .
‘ Now, do you apprec ıâ te that the most important stage of any enterprise
is the beginning, especially when something young and sensitive is involved ?
You see , that’s when most of its formation takes place , and it absorbs every
impression that anyone wants to stamp upon it /
You're absolutely right / v•

‘Shall we, then , casually allow our children to listen to any old stories ,
made up by just anyone, and to take into their minds views vvhich, on the
vvhole, contradict those vve’ll want them to have as adults?’
‘No, we vvon 't allovv that at ali /

1 . Translated by Robin VVaterfield . The numbers skills above ali . But it is İ mportant to realize that
in square brackets are the Stephanus numbers the kind of education Plato is offering here, vvhich
used almost universally in citing Plato’s vvorks; they is pr İ marily education of character ( though read -
refer to the pages of a 1 578 edition published by ing, writing, and elementary arithmetic vvould be
Henri Estienne, covered by the grammatistgs , the teacher respon -
2. At this point in Republic , the philosopher Soc - sible for literat ü re, as İ t was in Athens), İs alı the
— . . .
rates ( 469 399 B C E , Plato’s spokeSperson ) and
Adeimant ü s are discussing what education the
education a contemporary Athen ıan child could
expect: he would be taught by a grammatistis , a
future ruiers ( or “guardians") of the perfect State kitharist£ s ( music and lyrfc poetry), and a paidotri-
.
should have Socrates (speaking here) leads the .
bSs ( physical exercise ) . Higher (i . e İ ntellectual )
discussion and Adeiniantus fol!ows (Socrates’ education of any kind was a novelty, introduced by
other interlocutor î n bur selections from Republic the soph ısts [ translator’s note ] . Sophists: itinerant
is Adeimantus’s brother G İaucon ) . teachers of the 5 th certtury B . C . E . , they were
3. Novvadays we think of education , especially Greece’s first profesSional teachers (see GORC î IAS ).
school education , in terms of information and 4 ; I . e. fiction or non -fiction [ translator’s notel .
50 / PLATO

‘So our first job, apparently, is to oversee the vvork of the story-writers, and
to accept any good story they vvrite but reject the others We’ll let nurses
* .
and mothers teli their children the acceptable ones, and vve’ll have them
devote themselves far more to using these stories to form their children’s
minds than they do to using their hands to form their bodies Hovvever, vve’ll .
have to disallovv most of the stories they currently teli ’ .
fWhich stories?’ he asked .
‘If we examine the grander kind of story,’ I said, ‘that will give us insights
into the more lightweight kind as well, because the same principle must be
involved and both kinds are bound to have the same effect , don’t you thinkî5’
‘That sounds fine tb me,’ he replied, ‘but I don’t even understand vvhich
stories you’re describing as grander ’ .
'The ones vvhich Hesiod , Homer,5 and their fellovv poets teli us . In the
past , it’s alvvays been the poets who’ve composed untrue stories to teli people,
and it’s no different novvadays . ’
‘Which stories?’ he asked . 'And vvhat’s their defect, in your vievv?’
‘There is no defect vvhich one ought to condemn more quickly and more
thoroughly,’ I replied , 'especially if the lies have no redeeming feature . ’
^ es, but vvhat is this defect?’
' Using the vvritten vvord to give a distorted image of the nature of the gods
and heroes, just as a painter might pröduce a portrait vvhich completely fails
to capture the likeness of the original . ’
^ es,’ he said, ‘it’s quite right to find f â ult vvith that şort of thing But hovv .
do they do that ? What kinds of things do they say?’
'First and most important, since the subject is so important ,’ I said , 'there
is no redeeming feature to the lies vvhich Hesiod repeats, about Uran ü s’
deeds and Cronus’ revenge on Uran üs. [ 378 ] Then there are Cronus’ deeds
and vvhat his son did to him . 6 Novv, I think that even if these stories are true,
they oughtn’t to be told so casually to young people and people vvho l âck
discrimination ; it’s better to keep silent, and if one absolutely has to speak,
to make them esoteric secrets told to as fevv people as possible, vvho are to
have sacrificed no mere piglet,7 but sömethihg so large and rare that the
smallest conceivable number of people get to hear them . ’
es,’ he said , ‘these stories are definitely dangerous . ’
^
‘And vve must censor them in our community, Adeimantus,’ I said . ' No
young person is to hear stories vvhich suggest that vvere he to commit the
vilest bf crimes, and vvere he to do his utmost to punish his f â ther’s crimes ,
he vvouldn’t be doing anything ö ut of the ordinary, but vvould simply be
behaving like the first and the greatest gods . ’
.
' No, I absolutely agree ,’ he said ‘I share your vievv that these stories are
unsuitable and shouldn’t be repeated ’ .
5 . Greek epic poet {ca . 8th c. B. C . E), to whom the someday . Their mother Rhea, hovvever, hid one of
.
Iliad and the Odyssey are attrİ buted Hesiod ( active them away on Crete and gave Cronus a rock to
. .
— —
ca . 700 B C . E ) , Greek epic d İ dactic poet
6 . Hesiod , Theogony 154 210, 453 506 . Uran ü s
( Heaven ) hated his children and kept them packed
in their mother Earth’s womb, to her agony. One
. swallow instead . In due course the child, Zeus,
overthrew Cronus and established himself as king
.
of the gods [ translator’s note] -. ;
7 . A pig or piglet was a Standard small sacrifice
of the children, Cronus, was persuaded by Earth and vvas usual hefore initiation into the Eleusin İ an
to castrate his father when he came to have sex mysteries [translator’s note] . "Eleusinİ an myster-
.
vvith Earth Cronus then became Iord of creation . î es ”: secret cults at Eleusis in honor of Demeter,
Cronus vvanted to rema î n king, so he svvallovved eli goddess of gra İ n , and her daughter Persephone .
of his children in case one of them might take över
 R E P U B L I C, B O O K 1 1 / 5 1

‘And that’s not ali / I said . nrhe stories which have gods fighting and schem -
ing and battling against one another are utterly unsuitable too, because
they’re just as untrue . If the prospective guard ıans of our community are to
loathe casual quarrels with one another, we must take good çare that battles
betvveen gods and giants 0 and ali the other various tales of gods and heroes
coming to blows with their relatives and friends don’t occur in the stories
.
they hear and the pictures they see No , if vve’re somehow to convince them
that fellow citizens never fail out with one another, that this is wrong, then
that is the kind of story they must hear, from childhood onwards, from the
community’s elders of both sexes; and the poets they’ll hear when they’re
older must be forced to teli equivalent stories in their poetry . But we’d better
not admit into our community the story of Hera being tied up by her son , or
the episode when Hephaestus9 is hurled away by his father for trying to save
his mother from a beating, or any of the battles between the gods which
Homer has in his poetry, whether or not their intention is allegorical . The
point is that a young person can’t teli when something is allegorical and when
it isn’t , and any idea admitted by a person of that age tends to become almost
ineradicable and permanent . Ali things considered , then, that is vvhy a very
great deal of importance should be placed upon ensuring that the first stories
they hear are best adapted for their moral improvement . ’
‘Yes, that makes sense / he said . ‘But suppose we were önce again to be
asked , in this context as well , what stories we meant , how would we respond ?’
‘Adeimantus / I said , ‘you and I are not making up stories at the moment ;
we’re founding a community . [ 379] Founders ought to know the broad out-
lines within which their poets are to compose stories, so that they can exclude
any compositions vvhich do not conform to those outlines; but they shouldn’t
themselves make stories up /
You’re right / he said . ‘But that’s precisely the point: what are these guide-
lines for talking about the gods ? ’
‘They’d be something like this / I said . ‘Whatever the type of poetry epic , —
—
lyric, or tragic God must of course always be portrayed as he really is . ’1
‘Yes , he must . ’
‘WeII, isn’t God good , in fact , and shouldn’t he be described as such?’
‘Of course /
‘And nothing good is harmful , is it ?’
‘I don’t think so . ’
‘Now, can anything harmless cause damage?’
‘No, of course not . ’
‘Can anything ı ncapable of causing damage do anything bad ?’
‘Again , no. ’
‘And something vvhich never does bad couldn’t be responsible for bad ,
could it ? ’
‘Of course not . ’

8 . For example, the war betvveen Zeus and the

Titans , vvho vvere his fother 's siblings, and the later
—
queen of the gods (see Iliad 1.591 97 ) . According
to another myth , Hephaestus fashioned a throne
revolt by the giants , defeated by ali the gods and for Hera wlth hidden chains, to punish her for
.
Heracles The Giganlomachia was a popular sub- rejeeting him .
ject for sculpture . 1 . The Greek philosophers tend to talk equally of
.
9 . Greek god of fire and metahvorking According “God’' and the “god": there is a single Divine of
to one legend , he vvas lamed vvhen Zeus cast him
out of heaven for defending his mother, Hera ,
vvhich the gods are various manifestations [ trans
Iator ’ s note ] .
-
52 / PLATO

‘Well now, is goodness beneficial ? >

'Yes /
‘And it’s responsible for doing good, then? *
‘Yes /
‘So goodness is not responsible for everything: it’s responsible for things
that are in a good State, but bad things cannot be attributed to it / .
‘Exactly / he said .
‘The same goes for God too, then,* I said . ‘Since he is good, he cannot be
responsible for everything, as is commonly said . He is responsible only for a
small part of human life, and many things cannot be attributed to him - I
mean , there’s far more bad than good in the world . He and he alone must
—
be held responsible for the good things, but responsibility for bad things must
be looked for elsevvhere and not attributed to God /
‘I think you’re absolutely right / he said .
‘So / I said , ‘we shouldn 't connive at Homer or any other poet making the
stupid mistake of saying about the gods, “Two jars sit on Zeus * threshold:
one is full of good destinies , but the other is full of wretched destinies ”, and
that if Zeus mixes the two up together and doles them out to someone, that
person “sometimes meets with bad , sometimes with good ”, whereas if he
doesn ’t mix them up, brü t allots the pernicious ones to someone in an un -
adulterated form , th t person “is driven över the glorious earth by the evil of
poverty” . 2 Nor will we^ connive at them claiming that “Zeus is the dispenser
of both good and, evil ” .
‘Moreover, we ll disapprove of the attribution of Pandarus' perjury and
truce- breaking to the agency of Athena and Zeus,3 and of the gods’ quarrel
and its resolution to Themis and Zeus;4 [380] and we’ll not allow the younger
generation to hear the idea vvhich Aeschylus 5 expresses as “When God wants
to visit utter ruin on a household , he implants the cause in men . ” No, if plays
are composed (such as the one these lines are from ) about Niobe’s afflictions,
or about the trials and tribulations of the descendants of Pelops,6 or about
the Trojan War, the playvvrights must either be prohibited from saying that
God was responsible for these events, or if they do attribute them to God ,
they have to come up vvith an explanation vvhich approximates to the one
vve’re looking for at the moment , and say that what God did vvas right and
good , in the sense that the people in question were being punished and
therefore benefited ; but poets should be prohibited from saying that these
people were in a bad vvay as a result of being punished and that this was
God’s doing. The claim that the sinners vvere badly off because they were in
need of pumshment , and that in punishing them God vvas benefiting them ,
is permissible; but the claim that God, who is good , is responsible for any
instance of badness is to be resisted as forcefully as possible by anyone who
vvants a well-regulated community, until it is never spoken and never heard

2 . lliad 24.527-32 [ translator's note ] .

—
3 . lliad 4.20 72 [ translator’s note ] , Pandarus:
Trojan archer favored by Apollo. Athena: Greek
. —
5 Greek tragedian ( 525 456 D . C . E . ); from his
Ntobe ( a lost play) . Because Niobe, wife of a Ieg
endary king öf Thebes, boasted that she had mort
-
goddess öf wisdom and wat and the patron god of children than the goddess Leto , Leto's children ,
Athens ; in the passage cited, she takes on the form Apollo and Artemis , killed her six sons and six
of a Trojan and persuades Pandarus to break the —
daughters (see lliad 24.602 17 ) .
-
—
truce ( as ZeuS has bid her to do ) .
—
4 . Perhâ ps lliad 20.1 74 or 15.12 217 [ transla
tor’s note ) Themis: Greek goddess of justice, wis
dom , and good counsel .
-
*
6 . I . e . , the iil -starred Atreus, Agamemnon, Ores
tes , and Electra : see especially Âeschylus’s Ores
teian trllogy [translator’s note}.
-
 REPUBLIC, BOOK II / 53

by anyone, of vvhatever age, whether the tale is told in verse or in prose . And
the reasons are that the voicing of these views is sacrilege, they do us no
good , and they are inconsistent with one another /
.
‘I approve of this law / he said Tll be right behind you when you cast your
vote for it / .
‘So now we have the first of the laws and guidelines which pertain to the
gods / I said . ‘Any spoken words or composed works will have to conform to
the principle that God is not responsible for everything, but only for good /
‘Well, fm certainly happy with it / he said .
‘Ali right, then . What about a second principle , as follows? Do you think
that God is a sorcerer and can by exercising his will vary his appearance from
time to time, sometimes by actually changing and transforming his appear -
ance into a large number of forms, and at other times by deluding us into
thinking that’s what he’s done? Or do you think he’s uniform and extremely
unlikely to abandon his own appearance?’
Tm not in a position to say just at the moment / he replied .
.
‘Look at it this way Isn’t it inevitable that if anything sheds its form , the
change is due either to itself or to something else?’
‘Yes /
‘Now, really good things are extremely unlikely to be altered or moved by
an external agent , aren’t they? For instance , a human body is altered by food ,
drink, and exercise, and plants are altered by the heat of the sun and by wind
and phenomena Iike that ; but the more healthy and strong a thing is, the
less likely [381] it is to be altered /
‘Of course /
‘And the more courageous and intelligent a mind is , the less likely it is that
an external agent would disturb it and alter it?’
‘Yes . ’
‘Moreover, the same principle applies universally even to manufactured
items, such as utensils, houses, and clothes: things which are well made and
are in good condition are less likely to be altered by time and other phenom -
ena /
True /

— —
‘So anything which is in a good State whether that is due to nature or
human sicili or both can hardly be changed at ali by an external agenf /
‘That sounds right /
'But God and the divine realm are of course in ali respects as perfect as
anything can be/
‘Of course /
‘From this point of view, then , God is extremely unlikely to have at his
disposal a large number of forms /
‘Yes, extremely unlikely indeed /
‘Would he, however, change and alter himself internally, by his own
resources?’
‘If he changes in the first place / he said , ‘then obviously this must be how /
‘Well , does he enhance and improve himself , or does he worsen and debase
himself ?’
/ If he changes / he said , ‘then it must be for the worse , since it’s unthink-
able that Göd ’s goodness and excellence â re anything less than perfect /
‘You’re absolutely right / I said . ‘And , Adeimantus, in this context , do you
54 / PLATO

think that anyone

in any respect ?’
—human or divine —deliberately makes himself deteriorate

‘That’s impossible,’ he said .

‘It is equally impossible, then ,’ I said , ‘for God to vvant to change himself .
Since, as we have found , the divine nature is as perfect and as good as
anything could be, then any god retains his own form in a uniform, direct
fashion for ever . ’
‘1 think that’s absolutely inevitable,’ he said .
‘It follows, Adeimantus,’ I said , ‘that none of our poets is to say, “The gods
travel around human habitations disguised as ali sorts of visitors from other
lands . ”7 Nor are they to teli lies about Proteıis and Thetis,8 or present Hera
in a tragedy or any other kind of poem in an altered form , as a mendicant
holy woman begging alms “for the life-giving children of the Argive river
Inachus ” ,9 or repeat the mass of other similar lies that have been told . Fur-
thermore, we should neutralize the poets’ influence on mothers, which
makes them scare their children with terrible stories about how some gods
tend to provvl around during the hours of darkness in a vvide variety of unfa-
miliar human guises, so that we stop the mothers blaspheming against the
gods, and at the same time stop them making their children too timid . ’
‘Yes, we should ,’ he said .
‘But even if it isn’t in the gbds’ nature act ü ally to change,’ I said, ‘do they
magically delude us into seeing them appear in ali kinds of . guises ?’
‘It’s not inconceivable,’ he said .
[ 382 ] Well , would God vvillingly mask the truth behind appearance and
4

deceive us by his vvords or actions ?’ I asked .

‘I don’t know,’ he answered .
‘Don’t you know that a true falsehood (if you ’ll allovv me the phrase ) is
loathed by everyone, divine or human ?’ I asked .
‘What do you mean ?’ he asked .
‘I mean,’ I said , ‘that no one chooses and vvants to be deceived in the most
important part of himself and about the most important things . The presence
of falsehood there is his vvorst fear . ’
‘I stili don’t understand ,’ he said .
‘That’s because you think I’m trying to make a high -powered point,’ I said .
‘ But ali Pm saying is that no one is at ali happy at being lied to arid deceived
in his mind about the facts; no one likes being ignorant, and the exi $tence
and presence of falsehood there are extremely unvvelcome to everyone; they
particularly hate it there . ’
‘They certainly do,’ he said .
*Well , î might have been perfectly correct when I described this State a

. —
moment ago as true falsehood the State of misapprehension caused by
falsehood in the mind I mean, a spoken lie is â kind of copy and subsequent
reflection of the mental condition , and no p ü re lie, don’t you think?’
‘Yes . ’
‘Now, a genuine lie is hated by men as vvell as gods . ’
- .
7 . Odyssey 1 7.485 86 [ translator’s note] . .
9 Both a river and a river god Argive: of Argos , a
8 . A sea nymph who was fated to bear a son might - - .
city state on the Peloponnese The "children ” are
ier than his father; she married the hero Peleus and
bore Achilles. Proteus: prophetic son of Poseidon ,
presumably the river’s tributaries with their "life-
gİ ving” water . The quotation is from The XantrUıit
Greek god of the sea, who had the povver to change a lost play by Aeschylus.
shape .
 REPUBLIC, BOOK I I / 55

‘1 think so /
‘What about a spoken Iie? Aren ’t there occasions and situations vvhen tell -
ing lies is helpful and doesn’t therefore vvarrant hatred ? What about when
we’re dealing with enemies , or with people vve count as friends , but vvho are
trying to do something bad because theyVe göne mad or have somehovv taken
ieave of their senses? Isn’t telling lies helpful under these circumstances as
a preventative medicine? Moreover, consider those stories vve vvere discuss-
ing not long ago: vve cannot knovv the truth about events in the past , so vve
make something up vvhich approximates as closely as possible to the truth ,
and that helps us, doesn’t it ?’
‘Yes / he said , ‘you’re quite right /
‘Which of these reasons, then , makes telling lies helpful to God ? Would
he make up something vvhich resembles the truth because he doesn 't know
the past?’
‘That's a ridiculous suggestion / he said .
‘So there’s nothing of the lying poet in God . ’
‘1 don’t think so /
‘YVould he lie out of fcar for his enemies?’
‘Hardly /
‘Because his friends have taken İ eave of their senses or gö ne mad ?’
‘Anyone vvitless or insane is no friend of God / he said .
‘So God has no reason to lie /
‘ No /
‘So it is not in the nature of deities or gods to deceive /
‘Absolutely not / he said .
‘YVhether aeting or speaking, then , God is entirely uniform and truthful .
He doesn’t actually change himself , and he doesn 't delude others either ,
during their sleeping or their vvaking hours, in hovv he appears or in vvhat he
says or in the signs he sends /
[ 383] ‘Listening to you speak / he said , ‘I find myself agreeing vvith you /
‘So do you agree / 1 said , ‘that this is the second principle to vvhich religious
—
discussions and literat ü re must conform that the gods are not shape-
shifting vvizards and do not mislead us by lying in vvhat they say or do?’
‘I agree /
‘Although there is much to commend in Homer , then, vve vvon ’t apprtTve
of the passage vvhen Zeus sends the dream to Agamemnon . 1 Likevvise , vve
won’t approve of the bit of Aeschylus 2 vvhere Thetis says that at her vvedding
Apollo “ celebrated in song hovv happy my children vvould make me hovv
t hey vvouldn’t knovv sickness and vvould live for many long years and vvent — —
on and on about hovv lucky 1 vvas and hovv the gods smiled on me , until he
made my heart glad . And since Phoebus3 is a god and abounds in prophetic
.
skill , I expected his vvords to be true But for ali his singing, for ali his sharing
of our feast, for ali these claims of his , it is he vvho has novv killed my son . ”
We’î l come dovvn hard on anyone vvho says anything Iike this about the gods:
we’ll refuse him a chorus and ban teachers from using his vvorks to educate
I . Zc ııs sends a lying dream to Agamemnon that Agamemnon: king of Mycenae and commander of
( he capture of Trov is imminent in lliad 2 . Netice the Greek expedition against Troy.
( hat Plato is not denying
< the existencc of omens 2. From a Jost play [ translator ’s note] .
a n d portents , only that they can be false or that 3 . Apollo , god of prophecy as vvell as healing and
false ones can be sent by the gods; it is we who music .
misinterpret the gods' messages [ translator’s note } .
56 / PLATO

our children . Othenvise , our guardians won ’t grow up to be religious people ,

or to be as godlike themselves as is humanly possible /
Tm in complete agreement with these principles / he said , ‘and would want
them enshrined as laws/

From Book III

[ 386 ] ‘Ali right , then / I said . ‘If people are going to revere the gods , respect
their parents, and not belittle friendship with one another, then apparently
those are the kinds of stories they should and shouldn’t hear about the gods,
from childhood onwards /
Tm sure weVe right about this/ he said »
‘What about if they are to be brave? WonV they also need stories which
are designed to make them fear death as little as possible? I mean , don’t you
think that courage and fearing death are mutually exclusive?t
*Yes , I certainly do he answered
/ .
‘What about the idea that Hades4 doesnV just exist , but is terrifying? Do
you think this goes with facing death fearlessly and with preferrİ ng death in
battle to defeat and slavery?'
‘Of course not /
‘So here's another aspect of story- telling for us to oversee, apparently We .
must ask those who take on the job of telling stories not to denigrate Hades
in the simple fashion they have been , but to speak well of it , because oth -
envise they’ll not only be lying, but also not speaking in a way that is con-
ducive to courage in battle /
‘Yes , we must / he said .
‘Then we’ll start with the follovving İines / I said , ‘and delete everything
which resembles them: ‘Td rather be a slave labouring for someone else- —
the spirits ;
—
someone without property, who can hardly make a living than rule över ali
of the dead ” and “The vile , dank halis, which
even the gods hate,
might appear to men and godş”; and “Amazing! The soul, the likeness of a
person , really does exist in Hades’ halis, but it is completely witless”; and
“ He alone had consciousness, while the rest were darting shadows ”; and “His
soul flew from his body and went to Hades bewailing its fate, forfeiting cour -
age and the glory of young manhood ”; [ 387 ] and “ Like a wisp of smoke , his
soul went down to the undenvorld with a shrill cry”; and “As when bats flit
about squeaking in the depths of an awful cave, when one of them loses its
perch on the crowded rock, and they cling to one another, so the flock of
souls vvent with shrill cries . ”5 We İI implore Homer and the rest of the poets
,
not to get cross if we strike these and ali similar İines from their works . We ll
explain that it’s not because the İines are not good poetry and don’t give
pleasure to most people; on the contrary, the better poetry they are , the more
they are to be kept from the ears of children and men who are to be auton -
omous and to be more afraid of losing this freedom than of death /
‘Absolutely /
‘Now, we’d better get rid of ali the frightening and terrifying names vvhich
crop up here . I mean names like Cocytus and Styx,6 ghost and wraith , and

4 . The Greek undenvorld .

—
5 . Quoted from , respectively, Odyssey 1 1.489 91 , . —
24.6 9 [ translator's note ] .
6 Two of the rlvers of Hades — Lamentatlon and
-
Il İ ad 20.64-66, Iliad 23.103 4, Odyssey 10.495 , Hatefui [ translator’s note] .
-
î liad 16.856-57 , Iliad 23.100 101 , and Odyssey
 REPUBLIC, BOOK I I I / 57

—
so on ali the names which are designed to make everyone who hears them
shudder . In another context , they may have a useful purpose to serve; but
our vvorry is that this shivering might make our guardians too feverish and
enervated /
‘It’s a legitimate vvorry,’ he remarked .
‘Should vve ban them , then ?'
Yes /
‘It’s names vvhich have the opposite effect that should be used in both
prose and poetry, isn 't it ?’
‘Clearly /
‘ShalI vve also remove the passages vvhere eminent men vveep and vvail in
mourning, then?’
‘We have to / he said . ‘It follovvs from vvhat vve Ve already done /
‘Let’s see vvhether or not vveYe right to remove them / I said . 'We can agree
that one good man vvill not regard death as a terrible thing for another good
— —
man a friend of his to suffer . ’
‘Yes, vve can /
‘So a good man vvon 't mourn as if the other person had suffered something
terrible /
‘No /
‘Moreover, vve can also agree that a good man is preeminently capable of
providing himself vvith a good life entirely from his ovvn resources, and is
absolutely the last person to need anyorie or anything else /
True /
‘So he*d be the last person to be overvvhelmed by the loss of a son or a
bröther or some money and so on and so forth /
‘Yes, definitely /
‘He’II also be the last person to mourn, then, vvhen some such disaster
overtakes him: no one vvill endure it vvith more equanimity than him /
‘Very true /
‘We’d be right, then , not to have famous men mourning . We can allovv
vvomen to do that ( as long as they aren’t admirable vvomen ) and any bad ’men
there might be, [ 388] so that the people vve claim to be training for gu â rdi-
anship of our land find ali that şort of behavior distasteful /
‘That’s right / he said .
‘So vve have a further request to make of Homer and the rest of the poets .
We’ll ask them not to portray Achilles , vvho vvas the son of a goddess, “at one
point lying on his side , then later on his back, and then on his front ; and
then getting to his feet and sailing, crazed vvith grief , över the sands of the
bitter sea ”, or as “pouring handfuls of filthy ashes över his head ”,7 or generally
as vveeping and vvailing to the extent and in the fashion that the poet portrays
him . And vve’ll ask them not to have Priam , a close relative of the gods by
birth, “ begging and rolling in the dung as he calls out to each man by name '/
VVe’ll be even more forceful , hovvever, in our request that they don't portray
the gods lamenting and saying things like , “Oh, poor me! Hovv vvretched I
am to have borne the noblest of children!”;9 or at the very least they ought
to stop short of giving such an inaccurate portrait of the greatest of the gods

— —
7 . î liad 24.10 J 3, 18.23 24 [ translator’s note ].
Achilles: the greatest of the Greek warr İ ors at Troy
last king of Troy, descended from Zeus .
9 . î liad 18.54 [translator’s note ) . The speaker is
and the central fig ü re of the î liad . Thetis .
—
8 . î liad 22.414 15 [ translator's note ] . Priam: the
58 / PLATO

that they have him saying, “Alas! The man I now see being chased around
Troy is dear to me, and my heart grieves”, and ‘'Alas that Sarpedon, the
dearest of men to me , is destined to fail at the hands of Patroclus the son of
Menoetius . ” 1
‘The point is, my dear Adeimantus, that if the young men of our com-
munity hear this kind of thing and take it seriously, rather than regarding it
as despicable and abs ü rd , theyVe hardly going to regard such behaviour as
despicable in human beings like themselves and feel remorse when they also
find themselves saying or doing these or similar things . Instead, they won 't
find it at ali degrading to be constantly chanting laments and dirges for trivial
incidents, , and they won’t resist doing so /
fYou re quite right / he said .
—
‘And what we’ve just been arguing, in effect and at the moment no one's
come up vvith â better argument, so we should stick to this one is that we
—
must prevent this happening /
Tes, we must /
‘Now, they’d better not be prone to laughter either . I mean , the stronger
the laughter, the stronger the consequent emotional reaction too that’s
almost inevitable /
—
‘I agree / he said .
‘We should , therefore, refuse admittance to any poetry vvhich portrays
eminent humans as being overeome by laughter, and [ 389 ] do so even more
vigorously if it shows gods in that State /
Tes, indeed / he said .
‘So we‘11 also reject the lines of Homer where he says about the gods,
“ Unquenchable laughter arose among the blessed gods as they vvatched
Hephaestus bustling about the house. ”2 According to your argument , we
should disallovv this type of passage / t :
Tes, if you want to attribute the argument to me,’ he said . ‘At any rate, we
should disallow it /
‘Next , they must rate honesty highiy . You see, if vve were right in what we
were saying a short while ago, and the gods really have no use for falsehood ,
although it can serve as a type of medicine för us humans, then clearly lying
should be entrusted to doctors, and laymen should have nothing to do with
İt .
»

‘Clearly / he said .
‘If it’s anyone's job, then , it‘s the job of the rulers of our community: they
can lie for the good of the community, when either an extemal or an internal
threat makes it necessary . No one else, hovvever, should have anything to do
with lying . If an ordinary person lies to these rulers of ours, we‘ll count that
as equivalent in misguidedness, if not worse, to a patient lying to his doctor
about his physical condition , or someone misleading a ship’s captain , vvith
respect to his ship or crew, by telling him lies about his own State or that of
one of his fellow crewmen /
Tou ’re absolutely right / he said .

—
diviner or healer of ills or carpenter”3 he is to be punished on the grounds
—
‘So if anyone else is caught lying in our community “any artisan , vvhether

—
L Iliad 22.168 69 [ Hector is being chased by
AchiUes], 16.433 [translator’s note) . Sarpedon: a
—
clus: the best friend of AchJlles.
2 . Iliad 1.599 600 [translator’s note ) .
son of Zeus vvho fought with the Trojans . Patro - —
3 . Odyssey 17.363 64 [ transl â t ör’s note].
 R E P U B L I C , B O O K III / 59

that he’s introducing a practice which is just as liable to wreck and ruin a
community as a ship . '
‘Yes, it would ,’ He said , ‘if what people did was influenced by what he had
said . ’
‘Now, won’t the young men of our community need self -discipline? '
‘Of course . ’
‘And aren't the most important aspects of self -discipline, at least for the
general rank and file, obedience to those in authority and establishing one’s
authority över the pleasures of drink , sex, and food ?’
‘I think so . ’

—
‘So I'm sure we'll approve of the kind of thing Homer has Diomedes say
“Sit down , shut up, and listen to me”4 and related passages, Iike “Exuding
—
an aura of courage, the Greeks advanced in silence , respecting their lead -
ers ”, 5 and so on and so forth . ’
‘Yes, we will . '
‘Well , what about lines like “You’re groggy with wine, you have the eyes
of a dog and the heart of a deer”6 and the next few lines ? Are they ali right?
[ 390] And what about ali the other impertinent things people have said to
their rules in works of prose or poetry?'
‘We won’t approve of t hem . ’
‘That, I suppose , is because they don’t encourage self -discipline in their
audience, though they may vvell be enjoyable from another point of view .
What do you think?'
‘I agree,' he said .
‘What about having your cleverest character saying that in his opinion
the best thing in the world is when “The iıearby tables are laden with
bread and meat , and the steward draws wine from the mixing-bowl , brings
it , and pours it into the cups"? 7 Do you think this is the right material for
a young man to hear if he is to be self -controlled ? Or “There is no death
worse than death by starvation , no more wretched fate to face ”?8 And then
—
there's the passage where , while everyone else -mortal and immortal; is
asleep, Zeus stays avvake to do some planning, but in no time at ali it is
—
driven completely out of his mind by his sexual desire , and he is so over -
vvhelmed by the sight of Hera that he doesn 't even want to go to their
room , but wants to have sex with her there and then , on the grouncf / and
he says that he's feeling more desire for her even than the first time they
slept together , “ vvithout our parents knovving” 9 And the story of how .
Hephaestus ensnared Ares and Aphrodite for similar reasons is equally
inappropriate material for them to hear '1 .
.
‘I couldn 't agree with you more,' he said ‘It's quite unsuitable ' .
‘On the other hand ,’ 1 said , ‘it 's worth their paying attention to the portrayal

4 . Iltad 4.412 [ translator’s note ] , Diomedes: a lord 8 . Odyssey 12.342; the point is that this sentiment
of Argos who was one of the Best Greek fighters at eneouraged Odysseus's men to steal the Sun - god’s
cottle [ translator’s note ] .
—
Troy .
5 . A combination of Iliad 3.8 and 4.431 [ transla
.
tor’s note ]
- 9 . Iliad 14.294 351; quotation , 296 [ translator ’s
note ] .
6 . Iliad 1.225; Ach İ lles is insulting his leader Aga
ı nemnon by calling him a lecherous , coward!y
- —
1 . Odyssey 8.266 366 [ translator's note ] . When
Hephaestus learned that his vvifc, Aphrodite , the
drunk [ translator's note ] . Greek goddess of love and beauty, vvas committing
—
7 . Odyssey 9.8 10 [ translator’s note}. The lines are
spoken by Odysseus , vvho is often described as
adultery with Ares , the god öf vvar, he fashioned a
metal net and caught the pair in bed .
clever or scheming .
60 / PLATO

on stage or in writing of occasions when famous men express, by their vvords

or actions, resistance to ali kinds of temptations . For instance, there are the
lines, “ He struck his breast and spoke sternly to his heart: ‘Patience , heart
youVe put up with worse in the past . » » »2
—
‘Absolutely,’ he said .
‘Then again , we shouldn’t let them be mercenary or avaricious. ’
‘Of course not /
‘So they shouldn’t repeat the verse “ Gifts win över even gods and magnif -
icent kings” . 3 And we won’t compliment Achilles’ attendant Phoenix on his
restraint in advising Achilles to accept the gifts he was being offered and
help the Greeks in their fight, but not to refrain from his “vvrath ” unless he
was bribed . It will also go against our wishes and our convictions for Achilles
himself to be mercenary enough to accept Agamemnon’s gifts and to refuse
to release a corpse [ 391 ] until he’d been given a ransom . 4
Yes, it would be wrong to approve of that kind of behavior,’ he said .
‘ Now, the fact that it’s Homer makes me hesitate,’ I said , ‘but I’m not sure
it’s not actually sacrilegious for us to say things like this about Achilles and
accept them when others say them . The same goes also for when Achilles
says to Apollo , “There’s no god more baneful than you you with your aloof - —
ness . You misled me , and I’d pay you back if I could . ” 5 We shouldn’t believe
that he refused to obey the river-god either, and was ready. to fight him , and
that he said of his hair, vvhich was dedicated to another river* the Spercheius,
“I hereby give my hair to the hero Patroclus: may he take it vvith him ”,6 vvhen
—
Patroclus was dead we shouldn’t believe that he did this * And vve’ll deny
the truth of the stories that he dragged Hector around Patroclus’ tomb and
slaughtered prisoners on his funeral pyre . 7 And we won’t allow our citizens
—
to believe that Achilles- the child of a goddess and of Peleus ( who was
himself a model of self -discipline and a grandson of Zeus) and tutored by
—
the sage Cheiron was so full of turmoil that he suffered from the two con -
flicting diseases of mean -spirited avarice and disdain for gods and men . ’
You’re right ,’ he said .
‘Moreover,’ I went on , we won ’t believe or tolerate the story about those
horrific kidnap projects by Theseus and Peirithous, who vvere respectively
the sons of Poseidon8 and Zeus; and in general , we find it unthinkable that
anyone with a god as a parent , or any hero, vvould be unscrupulous enough
to do the terrible, sacrilegious things people falsely attribute to them . No,
we should force the poets to deny either that the heroes did these things or
that their parents vvere gods, but not to say both; and they should also be
forcibly prevented from trying to persuade the young men of our community
that the gods are the source of evil and that the heroes are no better than
2 . Odyssey 20.17 18 [ transletor’s note ] .
— .
companion Patroclus It vvas a primitive Greck
3 . A proverb , possibly originating vvith Hesiod practice to dedicate your hair to a river; the fact
[ translator’s note] . that hair grows makes it an extemal manifestation
.
4 Achilles accepts Agamemnon’s gifts at Iliad of one’s life-force, so in dedicating your hair, you

—
19.278-81; Priam brings him gifts to release Hec
tor 's body at Iliad 24.469 595 [ translator’s note] ,
.
5 Iliad 22.15, 20 ( translator’s note ] .
- .
.
are dedicating yourself [ translator’s note}
7 Iliad 24.14-18, 23.175-77 [translator’s note ].
8 . Greek god of the sea . Theseus: î egendary hero

. —
6 . The river Scamander in Iliad 21.211 382; the
river Spercheius, Iliad 23.151 The river vvas sup -
and king of Athens, who vvas assisted by his friend
Peirithous both in carrying off Helen and in
posed to guarantee Achilles’ safe return from tne
vvar; because İ t has failed to do so, Achilles telis İ t
attempting to retrieve Persepnone from the under
world .
-
-
off and bitterly re dedicates his hair to his dead
 R E P U B L I C, B O O K I I I / 61

.
ordinary people We demonstrated earlier the impossibllity of bad things
originating with the gods; so, as we said then , these stories are not only
sacrilegious, but also false . ’
‘Of course . ’
‘And they have a pernicious effect on their audience as well , in the sense
that no one vvill find his own badness reprehensible önce he’s been persuaded
that these things are and â lvvays have been done by “immediate descendants
of the gods, close relatives of Zeus, people vvhose altar to Zeus, their father -
protector, is high on Mount Ida , above the clouds ” and “in vvhom the blood
of deities is stili fresh ” . 9 That’s why we must put an end to stories of this
nature: if we don’t , they vvill engender [392 ] in the young men of our com -
munity a casual attitude tovvards badness . ’
‘I quite agree,’ he said .
‘Novv,’ I said, ‘if we vvant to distinguish vvhat in literat ü re should be allovved
and vvhat should be censored , there’s otı e further type of vvriting vve should
stili look at , isn’t there? I mean , vVe ’ve discussed hovv gods must be por-
—.
trayed and deities , heroes, and the dead
‘Yes ’
.
‘So vvouldn’t vve be left vvith vvriting vvhich has human beings as its sub-
ject ?'
Yes, obviously ’ .
‘In fact , though, vve can’t evaluate this kind of vvriting at the moment ’ .
‘Why not?’

represent people in extremely important vvays, vvhen as they often do

they portray immoral people as happy and moral people as unhappy, and —
‘Because vvhat vve’d claim , Iimagine, is that poets and prose-vvriters mis

vvrite about the revvards of undiscovered immorality and hovv morality is good
—
-

f ör someone else, but disadvantageous to oneself . I suppose vve’d proscribe

assertions of that kind , and teli them that their poems and stories are to
make the opposite points, don’t you thirtk ?’
Tm certain vve vvould ,’ he said .

‘It follovvs, then , that good use of language, harmony, grace , and rhythm
ali depend on goodness of character . I’m not talking about the statervvhich
is actually stupidity, but vvhich vve gloss as goodness of character; I’m talking
about vvhen the mind really had equipped the character vvith moral goodness
and excellence . ’
‘Absolutely,’ he 1 said .
‘And shouldn ’t the young people of our community take every opportunity
to cultivate these qualities, if they are to do their jobs?’
Yes, they should . ’
[401 ] ‘ Novv, painting and related arts, and vveavı ng, embroidery, architec-
ture, and the manufacture of utensils in general , and also the physical struc-
tures of creatures and plants, are ali pervaded by these qualities, in the sense
that they may display grace or inelegance . And inelegance, lack of rhythm ,
.
9 Both passages « re from the Niobe of Aeschylus; note ] . Tantalus cooked his own son , Pelops, and
-
Nlobe İs talking about her father Tanta î us , a noto
rioıls criminal whoıie father was Zeus [ trenslator's
served him to the gods .
.
1 Glaucon .
62 / PLATO

and disharmony are allied to abuse of language and a corrupt character, -

whereas their opposites are allied to and reflect a disciplined and good char -
acter / .. .

‘Absolutely / he said .
‘Is it only the poets we should oversee, then, and compel to choose betvveen
imbuing their composition Vvith the image of goodness of character or not
practising their art in our . community? Don’t we also have to oversee artisans
in general and stop them imbuing their portraits of animals, their edifices,
and whatever else they rriay produce, with corruption , lack of self -restraint,
meanness of spirit, and inelegance, and punish failure to cömply vvitha ban
on vvorking in our community? Othervvise during their upbringing our
*
guardians will be surrounded by the pernicious pasturage of images of bad
ness, which will be so common that they’ll often be nibbling and feeding on
-
them , day in and day out , a little at a time, until without realizing it they'll
amass badness in their minds . No , we must look for craftsmen who have the
innate gift of tracking down goodness and grace , so that the young people
of our community can live in a salubrious region vvhere everything is bene -
ficial and where their eyes and ears meet no influences except those of fine
works of art , whose effect is like a breeze vvhich brings health from favorable
regions, and vvhich imperceptibly guides them , from childhood onvvards,
until they are assimilated to, familiar vvith, and in harmony vvith the beauty
of reason . ’
Yes, that vvould be an outstandingly fine upbringing for them / he said .
‘Novv, Glaucon / I said , ‘isn't the prime importance of cultural education
due to the fact that rhythm and harmony sink more deeply into the mind
than anything else and affect it more povverfully than anything else and bring
grace in their train? For someone vvho is given a correct education , their
product is grace; but in the opposite situation it is inelegance . And isn't its
importance also due to the fact that a proper cultural education vvould enable
a person to be very quick at noticing defects and flavvs in the construction
or nature of things? In other vvords , he’d find offensive the things he ought
to find offensive . Fine things vvould be appreciated and enjoyed by him , and
he’d accept them into his mind as nourishment and vvould therefore become
truly good ; [ 402 ] even vvhen young, hovvever, and stili incapable of rationally
understanding vvhy , he vvould rightly condemn and loathe contemptible
things . And then the rational mind vvould be greeted like an old friend vvhen
it did arrî ve, becau 9e anyone vvith this upbringing vvould be more closely
affiliated vvith rationality than anyone else /
Yes / he said , ‘to my mind those are the kinds of reasons for cultural edu -
cation /
‘It’s analogous to the process of becoming literate, then,’ I said . ‘We
vveren't literate until vve realized that, despite being fevv in number, the letters
are fundamental vvherever they occur, and until vve appreciated their impor -
tance vvhether the vvord vvhich contained them vvas great or small , and
stopped thinking that vve didn ’t rieed to take note of them , but tried hard to
recognize them everyvvhere , on the grounds that literacy vvould elude us until
vve vvere capable of doing so /
‘True . ’
‘And vve vvon’t be able to teli vvhich letters are vvhich vvhen they’re reflected
 R E P U B L I C, B O O K I I I / 63

in water or a mirror either, until we can recognize the letters themselves ,

will we? It takes the same expertise and training, doesn’t it?’
‘Absolutely . ’
‘Then this is incredibly similar to what I’ve been saying. We won’t be cul -
tured either ( and this doesn 't apply only to us, but to the people we’re claim -
ing to educate for guardianship ) until we recognize the types
self -discipline , courage , generosity, broadness of vision , and ali the qualities
—
—
which are allied and opposed to them wherever they occur, and notice
instances of their presence, vvhether it is the qualities themselves or their
reflections that we are noticing, and don’t underestimate them whether the
situation in which they're occurring is great or small , but bear in mind that
it takes the same expertise and training. Right?’
‘Definitely,’ he said .
‘ Now / I went on , ‘imagine a situation where someone combines beautiful
mental characteristics with physical features which conform to the same
principle and so are consistent and concordant with the beauty of his mind .
Could there be a more beautiful sight for anyone capable of seeing it ? '
‘Hardly . ’
‘And the more beautiful a thing is, the more lovable it is?'
‘Naturally . ’
‘Therefore, the more people are of this type, the more a cultured person
will love them . If they’re discordant , however, he will not love them . ’
‘No, he won’t / he said , ‘if they have a mental defect ; but if their flaw is
physical, he’ll put up with it and not refuse his affection . ’
.
‘I appreciate vvhat you’re saying / I said ‘I know you are or were in love
with someone like that , and I concede the point . But answer me this: can
self -discipline and excessıve pleasure go together?’
‘Of course not ,’ he said . ‘Pleasure deranges people just as effectively as
distress. ’
‘Can excessive pleasure partner any of the other virtues?’
[ 403 ] ‘No . ’
‘What about promiscuity and dissoluteness?’
‘Yes , they’re its chief partners . '
‘Can you think of any pleasure which is greater and more intense than
sexual pleasure?’
‘No , I can V he said , ‘and I can * t think of any pleasure which is more manic
either . *
‘And authentic love is a disciplined and cultured love of someone who is
restrained as well as good -looking. Yes?’
‘Definitely,’ he said .
‘Authentic love should have no involvement , then , with anything manic or
anything which bears the trace of d ıssoluteness, should it?’
‘ No, it shouldn’t . *
‘Doesn’t it follow, then , that lovers and their boyfriends who love and are
loved authentically should have no involvement vvith this pleasure and
should have nothing to do with it?’
‘That’s right, Socrates,’ he said . ‘They most certainly should not . ’
‘So you’ll apparently be making a regulation in the community we’re found -
ing to the effect that although a lover can ( if he can persuade his boyfriend
64 / PLATO

—
to let him ) kiss and spend time with and touch his boyfriend , as he would
—
his son which is to say, for honourable reasons stili his relationship with
anyone he cares for will basically be such that he never gives the impression
that there is more to it than that; Othenvise, he’ll be liable t ö condemnation
for lacking culture and moral sensibility /
'Exactly / he said .
‘Now, do you join me in thinking that weVe eompleted our discussion of
cultural studies?' I asked . ‘At any rate, weVe reached â good place to f ı nish:
I mean , it’s good for cultural studies to lead ultimately to love of beauty /
‘I agree / he said .

*
From Booh VII
[ 514 ] ‘Next / I said , ‘here’s a situation which you can use as an analogy for
—
the human condition for our educat î on or lack of it . Imagine people living
in a cavernous celi down under the ground ; at the far ç nd of the cave , a lorig
way off , there's an entrance öpen to the outside vvorld Theyve been there .
since childhood, with their legs and necks tied up in a way which keeps them
in one place and allows" them to look only straight ahead , but not to tUrn
their heads . There's Brelight burning a : long vvây further up the cave behind
them , and up the slope between the fire and the prisoners there’s a roâ d ,
beside which you should imagine a low wâ ll has been built like the partition
which conjurors place between themselves and their audienCe and above
—
which they show their tricks / ; ;
‘Ali right / he2 said .
‘Imagine also that there are people on the other side of this wall vvho are
carrying ali sorts of artefacts . These artefacts, human statuettes, and animal
models carved in stone and wood [ 515 ] and ali kinds of materials stick- out
över the wall ; and as you 'd expect , some . of the people talk as they carry these
objects along, while others are silent * .
‘Thjey’re no different from us / I said . ‘I mean in the first place, do. you
-
‘This is a strange picture you’re painting /: he said * ‘with strange prisoners /
-
think they'd see anything of themselves and one anQther ^ except the shadows
cast by the fire on to the cave wall directly opposite them "? '

.
‘Of course not / he said ‘They - re forced . t ö spend their lives vvithout moving
their heads /
‘And what about the objects ,which were being carried along? Won’t they
only see their shadovvs as well ?
‘Naturally / . . • :
-
‘ Now, supposefthey were able to talk to one another: don‘t you think they'd
assume that their; wö rds applied to what they . saw passing by in front of
them?’3
‘They couldn’t think othenvise / . -
“And whâ t if sound echoed off the prison wall opposite them? When any
of the passers- by spoke, don’t you think they'd . be bound to assume^ that the
sound came from a . passing shadow?>

2 . Glaucö n. prisoners' delusion, since oıir vvbfds really refer to

3 . İ n Platonic terms , this shows the extent of the types [ translator’s note ].
 REPUBLIC, BOOK V I I / 65

Tm absolutely certain of it / he said .

‘Ali in ali, then / I said , ‘the shadows of artefacts would constitute the only
reality people in this situation would recognize /
‘That’s absolutely inevitable / he ağreed .
‘What do you think would happen, then / I asked , ‘if they were set free
from their bonds and cured of their inanity? What would it be like if they
found that happening to them ? Imagine that one of them has been set free
and is suddenly made to stand up, to turn his head and walk, and to look
towards the f î relight . It hurts him to do ali this and he’s too dazzled to be
capable of making out the objects whose shadows he’d f örmerly been looking
at * And suppose someone telis him that what he’s been seeing ali this time
has no substance , and that he’s now closer to reality and is seeing more
accurâ tely, jbecause of the greater reality of the things in front of his eyes
what do you imkgine hifc reaction would be? And what do you think he’d say
—
if he were sho\Vn any of the passing objects and had to respond to being
asked what it was? Dön’t you think he’d be bewildered and ; would think that
there was more reality in what he’d been seeing before than in what he was
being shown now?'
‘Far more / he Said .
‘And if he were forced to look at ‘the actual fî relight , don’t you think it
would hurt his eyes? Don’t you think ı he ’d turn away and run back to the
things he could make out , and would take the truth of the matter to be that
these things are clearer than what he was being shown?’
‘Yes / he agreed *
:, ‘And imagine him being dragged forcibly away from there up the rough ,
steep slope / I went on , Svithout being released until he’s been pulled out
into the sunlight . Wouldn’t this treatment causfe him pain and distress?{516]
.
And önce he’s reached the sunlight; he Avouldn’t be able tö see a single one
of the things vvhich are currently taken to .be real , would he, because his eyes
would be oVervvhelmed by the sun ’s beams?’
‘No, he wouldn't / he answered , ‘not straight away . ’
‘He wouldn’t be able to see things up on the surface of the earth, I suppose,
ufî til he’d got used to his situation . At first, it would be a shadows that he
could most easily make ö ut , then he’d move on to the reflections of people
and so on in water,4 and later he’d be able to see the actual things theıtofeelves .
Next; he’d feast his eyes on the heavenly bodies and the heavens themselves;
which wo ü ld be easier at night: he’d lodk at the light of the stars and the
moon , rather than at the sun and sunlight during the daytime . ’
‘Of course ’ , . .
-
. •

—
, ‘And at last , , I imagine , he’d be able to discern and feast his eyes on the
-
sun * not . the displaced iniage of the sun in W‘ater or elsewhere, but the sun
on its own , in its proper place;’5
* c ^Yes , h 6’
. d inevitably come to that / he said .
‘After that, :he’d start to think about the sun and he’d deduce that it is the
so ü rce of the seasons and the yearly cycle that the whole of the visible realm
^

4 . The stage of looking at reflections and so on to return to the safety of convention [ translator's
outside the cave does not differ İ n terms of objects notej .
from the stage of looking at the effigies in the cave . .
5 The, sun in the allegory is , of course, goodness
î cult forone
But it differs ih that it is ıloW more diff [ translâ tor’s note ].
66 / PLATO

is its domain , and that in a sense everything which he and his peers used to
see is its respönsibility,’
‘Yes , that would obviously be the next point he’d come to / he agreed .
‘ Now, if he recalled the celi where he’d originally lived and what passed
for knovvledge there and his former fellow prisoners, don 't you think he’d
feel happy about his own altered circumstances, and sorry for them ?’
‘Definitely ’.
‘Suppose that the prisoners used to assign prestige and credit to one
another, in the sense that they revvarded speed at recognizing the shadovvs
as they passed , and the ability to remember vvhich ones nornıally come earlier
and later and at the same tirrie as which other ones, and expertise at using
this as a basis for guessing which ones would arrive next . Do you think our
former prisoner would covet these honours and would envy the peö ple who
had status and power there, or would he much prefet, as Homer describes
-—
it, “ being a slave labouring for someone else someone without property”,6
and vvould put up with anything at ali , in fact, rather than share their beliefs
and their life?’
^ es, I think he’d go through anything rather than live that way / he said ,
'Here’s something else I’d like your opinion about / I said . ‘If he went back
underground and sat down again in the same spot, vvouldn’t the sudden
transition from thfe sunlight mean that his eyes would be overvvhelmed by
darkness ?’
‘Certainly/ he replied .
' Now, the process of adjustment would be quite long this time, and sup -
pose that before his eyes had . settled down and while he vvasn’t seeing well,
[ 517 ] he had önce again to compete against those same old prisoners at
.
identifying those shadovvs Wouldn’t he make a fool of himself ? Wouldn’t
they say that he’d come back from his upward journey with his eyes ruined ,
and that it vvasn’t even worth trying to go up there? And vvouldn’t they if —
—
they could grab hold of anyone who tried to set them free and take them
up there and kili him?’7
‘They certainly would / he said .
‘Well, my dear Glaucon / I said , ‘you should apply this allegory, as a whole,
.
to what we were talking about before The region which is accessible to sight
should be equated with the prison celi , and the firelight there with the light
of the sun . And if you think of the upward journey and the sight of things
up on the surface of the earth as the mind’s ascent to the intelligible realm ,
you vvon’t be wrong^~at least, I don’t think you ’d be wrong, and it’s my
impression that you want to hear . Only God knows if it’s actually true , hovv -
ever. Anyway , it’s my of >inion that the last thing to be seen and it isn’t easy -—
—
to see either in the realm of knovvledge is goodness; and the sight of the
character of goodness leads one to deduce that it is responsible for everything
that is right and fine, vvhatever the circumstances, and that in the visible
realm it is the progenitor of light and of the source of light * and in the
intelligible realm it is the source and provider of truth and knovvledge . And
I also think that the sight of it is a prereq ıiisite for intelligent conduct either
of one’s ovvn private affairs or of public business . ’
‘I couldn ’t agree more,’ he said .
6 . Odj' ssey 11.489 [translator's notej . In Homer, Republtc 3.386c (see above ) , should be deleted .
the comparison is between being a livı ng slave and 7 . As Socrates was killed ( translator’s note ], found
—
ruling över the dead a passage that , according to guilty of tmpiety and coirupting Athens’ youth .
 REPUBLIC , BOOK X / 67

‘Ali right, then / I said . ‘1 wonder if you also agree with me in not finding
it strange that people whoVe travelled there don't want to engage in human
business: there’s nowhere else their minds would ever rather be than in the
upper regıon- which is hardly surprising, if our allegory has got this aspect
right as well /
‘ No, it’s not surprising,’ he agreed ,
‘Well, what about this?’ I asked . ‘Imagine someone returning to the human
world and ali its misery after contemplat ı ng the divine realm Do you think .
it’s surprising if he seems awkward and ridiculous while he’s stili not seeing
well, before he’s had time to adjust to the darkness of his situation , and he’s
forced into a contest ( in a lawcourt or wherever ) about the shadovvs of moral -
ity or the statuettes which cast the shadovvs, and into a competition vvhose
terms are the conceptions of morality held by people who have never seen
morality itself ?’ s
‘ No, that’s not surprising in the slightest ,’ he said .
[ 518 ] ‘In fact anyone with any sense / I said , Svould remember that the
eyes can become confused in two different ways, as a result of two different
sets of circumstances: it can happen in the transition from light to darkness ,
and also in the transition from darkness to light . If he took the same facts
into consideration when he also noticed someone’s mind in such a State of
confusion that it vvas incapable of making anything out, his reaction vvouldn’t
be unthinking ridicule . Instead , he’d try to find out whether this person ’s
mind was returning from a mode of existence which involves greater lucidity
and had been blinded by the unfamiliar darknfess, or whether it vvas moving
from relative ignorance to relative lucidity and had been overvvhelmed and
dazzled by the increased brightness . Önce he’d distinguished betvveen the
two conditions and modes of existence, he’d congratulate anyone he found
in the second State, and feel sorry for anyone in the first State . If he did
choose to laugh at someone in the second State, his amusement would be
less abs ü rd than when laughter is directed at someone returning from the
light above .
<
Yes ,’ he said , ‘you ’re making a lot of sense . ’

From Book X
[ 595 ] *You knovv / I said , ‘the issue of poetry is the main consideration —
—
among many others vvhich convinces me that the way we vvere trying to
found our community was along absolutely the right lines . ’
‘What are you thinking of ? ’ he8 asked .
‘That we flatly refused to admit any representational poetry. 9 I mean , its
total unacceptability is even clearer, in my opinion , hovv that vve’ve distin -
guished the different aspects of the mind . ’
‘How is it clearer?’
*Well , this is just between ourselves: please don ’t denounce me to the tragic
playvvrights and ali the other representational poets . But it looks as though
this whole genre of poetry deforms its audience’s minds, 1 unless they have
the antidote, vvhich is recognition of what this kind of poetry is actually like . ’
8 . Gloucon
9.
.
Tragedy and epic; insofar as they nre imitative ,
3 , where Socrates encourages literary representa
tion of behavior that is appropriate and good .
-
they are by definition removed from reality . The .
I Poetry deforms minds in the sense that it feeds
total ban here seems to contradict Republic 2 and our lower mind and , by virtue of the fact that its
68 / PLATO

‘What do you mean? What do you have in mind? - he asked »

‘ It's fairly clear / I said , ‘that ali these fine tragedians trace their lineage
back to Homer: they’re Homer’s students and disciples , ultimately. And this
makes it difficult for me to say vvhat I have to say, because IVe had a kind
'

of fascinated admiration for Homer ever since I vvas young. Stili , we should
value truth more than we value any person , so , as I say* Td better speak out. *
‘Yes / he said . r ‘

‘And you ’ll listen to vvhat I have to say , or rather respond to any questions
I ask?’
Yes . Go ahead and ask them /
‘Can you t£ll me vvhat representation basically is? You see , I don't quite
understarid its point myself /
‘And I suppose I do!’ he said .
‘ It vvouldn't surprise me if you did,’ I said . ‘Just because a person oan't see
very well , it doesn't mean that [ 596] he vvon’t often see things before peöple
vvith better eyesight than him /
‘That’s true,’ he said . ‘Ali the same I ’d be too shy tp explain arty views I
did have in front of you , so please try ^to come up vvith an answer yourself /
‘Ali right . Shall we get the enquiry going by dravving on familiar ideas? Our
usual position is , as you knovv , that any given plurality of things tvhich have
a single name constitutes a single specific type . 2 Is that clear to you ?*
‘Yes / . • •
‘So riow let's take any plurality you want . Would it be ali right vvith you if
we said that there were , for instance, lots ofbeds and tables?* :
‘Of course /
‘But these items of furniture comprise only tvvo types ‘the type of bed
and the type of table . *
—
Yes / - i - :. t

‘Now, we also invariably daim that the manufacture of either of these ’

items of furniture involves the craftsman looking ,to. the type and then making
the beds or tables ( or vvhatever ) vvhich we use . The point is that the type
itself is not manufactured by any craftsmân . How could it be?’
‘ It couldn't . ’
‘There’s another kind of craftsman too. I vvonder vvhat you think of him . ’
‘What kind?’
‘He makes everything—ali the . items vvhich every single manufacturer
makes /
‘He must be extraordinarily gifted /
‘Wait : you haven't heard the half of it yet . It’s not just a case of his being
able to manufacture ali the artefacts there are: every plant too, every creature
( himself included ) , the earth , the heavens , gods , and everything in the . heav-
—
ens and in Hades under the earth ali these are made and created by this
one man !
* He really must be eKtraordinariIyj Çİever , * he said .

craftsman ^
‘Don’t you believeme?’ I asked ı Tell mp , do you doubt that this kind of
could exist under any circumş tahces, or . do you admit the possi -
—
bility that a person could in one sense, at least—ç reate ali these things? I

domain is appearance , does not feed that inncr la tor’s note] .

-
organ vvhich can perceiVe truth and reâ lity ( trans 2 . That is, the Idea or Form .
 R E P U B L I C, B O O K X / 69

mean , don’t yo ü realize that you yourself could , under certain circumstances,
create ali these things?'
‘What circumstances?' he asked .
.
Tm not talking about anything complicated or rarfc,' I said ‘It doesn’t take
.
long to create the circumstances . The quickest method , I suppose, is to get

—
hold of a mitror and carry it around vvith you everywhere . You 'll soon be
creating everything I mentioned a moment ago the sun and the heavenly
bodies, the earth, yourself , and all other creatures, plants, and so on . ’
‘Yes , but I’d be creating appearances, not actual real things,' he said .
‘That's a good point / I said . ‘You’ve arrived just in time to save the argu -
ment . I mean , that's presumably the kind of craftsman a painter is . Yes?'
'Of course ’.
‘His creations aren’t real , accordiıig to you ; but do you agree that ali the
same there's a sense in vvhich even a painter cteates a bed ?'
‘Yes / he said, ‘he's another one who creates an appareht bed . '
[ 597 ] ‘What about a joiner who speeializes in making beds? Weren’t we
saying a short vvhile ago that what he niakes is a particular bed , not the type,
which is (on our vievv) the real bed?'
‘Yes, we vvere . '
‘So if there's no reality to his creation, then it isn't real; it's similar to
something real, but it isn 't actually real . It looks as though it's wrong to
attribute full reality to a joiner's or any artisan's product , doesn 't it?'
‘Yes,' he said , ‘any serious student of this kind of argument vvould agree
with yo ü . ’
‘It shouldn't surprise us, then, if , we find that <even these products are
obscure vvhen compared vvith the truth »'
‘No, it shouldn’t . ' ; :
‘ Now , vvhat about this representer vve 're trying to understand ? Shall we
see if these examples help us?’ I asked .
‘That's fine by me,' he said .
‘Well, vve’ve got these three beds . First, there's the rfeal one, and ‘ We’d say,
I imagine, that it is the product of divine craftsmanship; I ; rttean , who else
could have made it?' :•

‘No one, surely. '

‘Then there’s the one the joiner makes . '
‘Yes,' he said .
‘And then there's the one the painter makes . Yes?'
‘Yes, agreed . '
— —
‘These three, then painter, joiner, God are responsible for three differ
ent kinds of bed . '
-
‘Yes, that’s right . '
‘Now , God has produced only that one real bedi The restriction to only
one might have been his ovvn choice , or it might just be i ıtıpossible for him
to make more than one . But God never haSj and never could , create tvvo or
more such beds . ’
i ’ ; fWhy not?' he asked .
‘Even if he vvere to make only tvvo such beds,' I said, ‘an extra one vvould
emerge, and both the other tvvo vvould be of that one’s type . It, and not the
tvvo beds , vvould be the real bed . ’
‘Right ,’ he said .
70 / PLATO

.
‘God realized this, I'm sure He didn't vvant to be a kind of joiner, making
a partı cular bed : he wanted to be a genuine creator and make a genulne bed .
That's vvhy he created a single real one /
‘I suppose that's right /
‘Shall we cali him its progenitor, then , or something Iike that?'
*
Yes, he deserves the name / he said , ‘since he's the maker of this and every
other reality /
‘What about a joiner? Shall we cali him a manufacturer of beds?'
'Yes /
‘And shall we also cali a painter a manufacturer and maker of beds and so
on?’
‘No, definitely not . ’
‘What do you think he does vvith beds, then? '
‘I think the most suitable thing to cali him would be a representer of the
others’ creations,' he said .
‘Well, in that case,’ I said , ‘you 're using the term “representer” for someone
vvho deals vvith things vvhich are, in fact, two generations avvay from reality,
aren’t you ?'
*Yes / he said .
‘The same goes for tragic playvvrights, then , since they’re representers:
they’re tvvo generations avvay from the throne of truth , and so are ali other
representers /
‘I suppose so /
‘Well, in the context of vvhat vve're novv saying about representation , iVe
got a further question about jpainters. [598] Is it, in any given instance, the
actual reality that they try to represent, or is it the craftsmen’s products?'
‘The craftsmen’s products / he said .
‘Here's another distinction yoti'd better make: do they try to represent
them as they are, or as they appear to be?1
‘What do you mean?’ he asked *
TU teli you » Whether you look at a bed from the side or straight on or
vvhatever, it’s stili just as much a bed as it ever was , İ 9n*t it? I mean , İ t doesn't
actually alter it at ali: it just appears to be different , doesn't it? And the same
goes for anything else you can mention . Yes?'
‘Yes,’ he agreed . ‘It seems different, but isn’t actually /
‘So I vvant you to consider carefully vvhich of these tvvo alternatives paint -
ing is designed for in any and every instance . Is it designed to represent the
facts of the real vvorld or appearances? Does it represent appearance or
truth?'
‘Appearance ,' he said .
‘It follovvs that representation and truth are a considerable distance apart ,
and a representer is capable of making every product there is only because
his contact vvith things is slight and is restricted to hovv they look. Consider
vvhat a painter does, for instance : vve’re saying that he doesn 't have a clue
about shoemaking or joinery, but he’ll stili paint pictures of artisans vvorking
at these and ali other areas of expertise, and if he's good at painting he might
paint a joiner , have people look at it from far avvay, and deceive them if
—
they're children or stupid adults by making it look as though the joiner
—
vvere real . ’
‘ Naturally . '
 REPUBLIC, BOOK X / 71

‘1 think the important thing to bear in mind about cases like this, Glaucon ,
is that when people teli us they’ve met someone vvho's mastered every craft ,
and is the vvorld ’s leading expert in absolutely every branch of human knovvl -
.
edge, we should reply that they* re being rather silly They seem to have met
the kind of illusionist who’s expert at representation and , thanks to their ovvn
inability to evaluate knowledge , ignorance , and representation, to have been
so thoroughly taken in aş to believe in his omniscience . ’
‘You’re absolutely right ,’ he said .
‘ Novv, vve’d better investigate tragedy next ,’ I said , ‘and its guru , Homer,
because one does come across the claim that there’s no area of expertise,

—
and nothing relevant to human goodness and badness either and nothing
to do with the gods even that these poets don’t understand . It is said that
—
a good poet must understand the issues he writes about , if his writing is to
be successful, and that if he didn’t understand them , he vvouldn’t be able to
write about them . So vve’d better try to decide betvveen the alternatives .
Either the people who come across these representational poets are being
taken in and are failing to appreciate, when they see their products, that
these products are [ 599] two steps away from reality and that it certainly
doesn’t take knovvledge of the truth to create them (since what they’re cre -
ating are appearances, not reality ); or this view is valid , and in fact good
poets are authorities on the subjects most people are convinced they’re good
at writing about /
‘Yes, this definitely needs looking into,’ he said .
<
WeII , do you think that anyone vvho was capable of producing both orig-
inals and images would devote his energy to making images, and wouid make
out that this is the best thing he's done with his life?’
‘No, I don’t /
‘I’m sure that if he really knew about the things he was copying in his
representations, he’d put far more effort into producing real objects than he
vvould into representations, and would try to leave behind a lot of fine prod -
ucts for people to remember him by, and would dedicate himself to being
the recipient rather than the bestovver of praise /
' I agree,’ he said . ‘ He’d gain a lot more prestige and do himself a great deal
more good / .
‘Well , let’s concentrate our interrogation of Homer ( or any other poet you
like ) on a single area . Let ’s not ask him whether he can teli us of any patients
cured by any poet in ancient or modern times, as Asclepius 3 cured his
patients, or of any students any of them left to continue his work, as Ascle-
pius left his sons . And even these questions grant the possibility that a poet
might have had some medical knovvledge, instead of merely representing
medical terminology . No, let’s not bother to ask him about any other areas
of expertise either . But we do have a right to ask Homer about the most
important and glorious areas he undertakes to expound vvarfare , tactics,—
politics, and human education . Let’s ask him, politely, “ Homer, maybe you
aren’t two steps away from knovving the truth about goodness; maybe you
aren’t involved in the manufacture of images ( vvhich is vvhat we called rep-
resentation ) . Perhaps you ’re actually only one step away, and you do have
—
the ability to recognize vvhich practices in their private or their public
*

3. Hero and god of healing ( fn the Iliad , a mortal ) .

72 / PLATO

—
lives improve people and which ones impair them . But in that case, just as
Sparta has its Lycurgus4 and communities of ali different sizes . have their
various reformers, please teli us which community has you to thank for
improvements to its gövernment . Which community attributes the benefits
of its good legal code to you ? Italy and Sicily name Charondas in this respect,
we Athenians name Solon . 5 Which country names you? ” Will he have any
reply to make?'
‘1 don 't think so / said Glaucon . ‘Even the Homeridae’6 themselves don 't
make that claim /
[600] AVell, does history record that there was any war fought in Homers
time whose success depended on his leadership or advice?’
‘ No /
,
‘Well then are a lot of ingenious inventions attributed to him , as they are
to Thales of Miletus and Anacharsis of Scythia ?7 I mean the kinds . of inven -
tions which have practicâ l applications in the arts and crafts and elsewhere .
He is , after ali, supposed to be good at creating things /
‘ No, there’s not the slightest hint of that şort of thing / -
‘Ali right, so there’s no evidence of his having been a public benefactor,
but what about in private? Is there any evidence that, during his lifetime, he
was a mentor to people, and that they used to value him for his teaching and
'

then handed dovvn to their successors a particular, Homeric way of life? This
is what happened to Pythagoras:8 he wasn t only held in extremely high
regard for his teaching during his lifetime, but his successorS even now Cali
their way of life Pythâgoreâ n and somehow seem to stand out from ali other
people / - .*

.
î "

‘No, there's no hint of that Şort of thing either / he said ‘1 nlean Homer’s
^
associate Creophylus’9 cultural attainments wöuld turn out to be even more
derisory than his name suggests they are, Socrates, if the stories about Homer
are tr ıie . You see, Creophyl,us is said to have more or less disregarded Homer
during his lifetime/
‘Yes, that is what we’re told / I agreed . ‘But, Glaucon , if Homer really had
been an educational expert whose products were better people^^which is to
say, if he had knoVvledge in this sphere and his abilities were not limited to
—
representation don’t you think he ^d have been surrounded by hordes of
associates, who would have admired him and valued his cornpariy highly?
Look at Protagorâs of Abdera , Prodicus of Ceos,1 and ali the rest of them:
they can use their exclus ı ve tuition to make their contemporaries believethat
wİ thout them in charge of their education they won’t be capable of managing

4 . Tradit İonal founder of the Spartan polı tical, dom; he was said to have invented the potter’s
.
socî al, and legal systeıris

.
^
5 . Athenian statesman and pöet (ca . 638 559
B C . E . ) vvho reformed the city’s constitution . Char
.
ondas (6th c B. C . E . ), lavvgiver öf Çatana and othe#
— -
wheel Thales (6 th c . B. C . E . ) reputed founder of
georrtfetry and physlcal Science, who calculated
eelipses and discovered the solstice .
.
8 Greek philosopher and mathematician (6th c .
colonies of Chalcis İn Sicily . :: . . . B . C. S ) .
;
'
•

. -
'

.
6 The "gutld ” of people vvho claimed descent 9 Greek poet; his name literally means “ meat
from Homer, in the serise of maintainins â nd per - kin . ” Glaucon’s meaning is that meat vvas a more
petuatinğ his poems, ö lso claimed inside knovvl
edge of ali aspects of the poet’s life and
- important part of a coarse athlete’s diet than a cul -
tured intellectual’s; and it would have been a sign

"Sons of Homer ”
notej
.
.
perpetuated a lot of apocryphdl tales about him
[ translator’s Homeridae literally means
of culture ori Creophylus’s part not to have
negleeted his mentor [ translator’s note ]: .
1 . Greek sophlst, a contemporary of Socrates Pro-.
. .
7 Scythian prince (6 th c . B C . E . ) vvho traveled . .
tagoras ( 5th c B C . E . ) , Greek philosoph er, one öf
vvidely in Greece and gained a reputation for vvis- the most successful of the sop nists.
 R E P U B L I C, B O O K X / 73

their own estates, let alone their comm ü nities, and they’re so appreciated
for this expertise of theirs that their associates almost carry them around on
their heads . 2 So if Homer or Hesiod had been able to help people’s moral
development, would their contemporaries have allovved them to go from
town to town reciting their poems? Wouldn ’t they have kept a tighter grip
on them than on their money, and tried to force them to stay with them in
their homes? And if they couldn 't persuade them to do that , vvo ü ldn’t they
have danced attendance on them wherever they ivent , until they’d gained as
much from their teaching as they could?’
*1 don’t think anyone eould disagree with you , Socrates he said .
/
‘So shall we classify ali poets, from Homer onvvards, as representers of
images of goodness ( and of everything else which occurs in their poetry) ,
and claim that they don 't have any contact with the truth? The facts are as
we said a short while ago: a painter creates an illusory shoemaker, when not
only does he not understand anything about shoemaking, [ 601] but his audi -
ence doesn’t either . They just base their conclusions on the colours and
shapes they can see /
‘Yes /
‘And I should think vve’ll say that the same goes for a poet as well: he uses
words and phrases to block in some of the colours of each area of expertise,
although ali he understands is how to represent things in a way which makes
other superficial people, who base their conclusions on the words they can
hear, think that he’s written a really good poerrt about shoejmaking or military
command or whatever else it is that he*s set to metre, rhythm, andmusic It .
only takes these features to cast this powerful a spell: that’s what they're for .
But when the poets’ work is stripped of its musical hue9 and expressed in
plain words, I think you Ve seen what kind of impression it gives, so you kno^
what I’m talking about . ’
‘I do / he said .
‘Isn’t it / I asked , İike what noticeably happens when a young man has
-
alluring features, without actually being good looking, and then this charm
of : his deserts him?’
‘Exactly / he said .
; ‘ Now, here s another point to consider . An image maker , a repres,enter,
’ -
understands only appearance, vvhile reality is beyond him . Isn’t that ouf posi -
tion?’
‘Yes /
‘Let’s not leave the job half done: let’s give this idea the consideration it
deserves /
‘Go on / he said .
*What a painter does , vve’re saying, is paint a picture of a horse’s reins and
a bit . Yes?’
Yes /
‘While they’re made by a saddler and a smith , arenV they?’
Yes /
‘Does a painter know what the reins and the bit have to be İ ike? Surely

2 . As effigies and images of the gods were carried through the streets d ü ring a ritual procession [ translator’s
.
note ]
74 / PLATO

even their makers, the smith and the saddler , don 't know this, do they? Only
-
the horseman
, does, because he’s the one who knows how to make use of
them .
You’re quite right . ’
‘In fact , won’t we claim that it’s a general principle?’
‘What?’
That whatever the object , there are three areas of expertise: usage, man *

ufacture, and representation . ’

‘Yes ’ .
‘Now, is there any other Standard by which one assesses the goodness,
fineness, and rightness of anything (whether it’s a piece of equipment or a
creature or an activity) than the use for vvhich it was made, by man or by
nature?’
‘No. ’
‘It’s absolutely inevitable, then , that no one knows the ins and outs of any
object more than the person who makes use of it . He has to be the one to
teli the manufacturer how well or badly the object he’s using fares in actual
-
usage . A pipe player , 3 for example, telis a pipe-maker which of his pipes do
what they Ve supposed to do vvhen actually played , and goes on to instruct
him in what kinds of pipes to make, and the pipe-maker does what he’s told . ’
‘Of course . * .
‘So as far as good and bad pipes are concerned , it’s a knowledgeable person
who gives the orders, while the Other obeys the orders and does the manu -
facturing. Right?’
fYes . ’
-
‘JustiRed confidence, then, is what a pipe maker has about goodness and
badness ( as a result of spending time vvith a knowledgeable person and
having to listen to him ) , while knowledge is the province [ 602] of the person
vvho makes use of the pipes . ’
Yes . ’
'Which of these two categories does our representer belong to? Does he
acquire knovvledge about whether or not what he’s painting is good or right
from making use of the object , or does he acquire true belief because of
havjng to spend time vvith a knovvledgeable person and being told vvhat to
paipt?’
‘He doesn’t fit either case . ’
‘As far as goodness and badness are concerned , then , a representer doesn’t
have either knovvledge or true beliefs about vvhatever it is he’s representing. ’
‘Apparently not . ’
‘How nicely placed a poetic representer is, then , to knovv vvhat he’s vvriting
about!’
‘{Mot really ’ .
‘ No, because ali the same, despite his ignorance of the good and bad
aspects of things, heil go on representing them . But what he’ll be repre -
senting, apparently, is vvhatever appeals to a large, if ignorant , audience . ’
‘ Naturally . ’
‘Here are the points we seem to have reached a reasonable measure of
agreement on , then: a representer knovvs nothing of value about the things

3 . Or “ fl ü te player . ”
 REPUBLIC, BOOK X / 75

he represents; representation is a kind of game, and shouldn't be taken seri -

ously; and those who compose tragedies in iambic and epic verse 4 are , with -
out exception , outstanding examples of representers /
Yes /
‘So the province of representation is indeed two steps removed from truth ,
isn 't it ?’ I said .
'Yes /
‘ But on which of the many aspects of a person does it exert its influence?’
‘What are you getting at?’
‘Something Iike this . One and the same object appears to vary in size
depending on whether we’re looking at it from close up or far away /
'Yes /
‘And the same objects look both bent and straight depending on vvhether
we look at them when they’re in vvater or out of it , and both concave and
.
convex because sight gets misled by colouring Our mind obviously contains
the potential for every single kind of confusion like this . It’s because illusory
painting aims at this affliction in our natures that it can only be described
as sorcery; and the same goes for conjuring and ali trickery of that şort /
‘True /

— —
‘Now, methods have evolved of combating this measuring, counting, and
weighing are the most elegant of them and consequently of ending the
reign vvithin us of apparent size , number, and vveight , and replacing them
with something which calculates and measures, or even weighs Right ?’ .
‘Of course /
‘And this, of course , is the job of the rational part of the mind , which is
capable of performing calculations /
'Yes /
‘Now, it’s not uncommon for the mind to have made its measurements ,
and to be reporting that x is larger than y ( or smaller than it , or the same
size as it ) , but stili to be receiving an impression which contradicts its mea -
surements of these very objects /
'Yes /
‘Well, didn’t we say that it's impossible for a single thing to hold contra -
dictory beliefs at the same time about the same objects?'
‘Yes, we did , and we were right /
~

[603] ‘So the part of the mind whose views run counter to the measure-
ments must be different from the part vvhose views fail in with the measure-
ments /
Yes /
‘But it's the best part of the mind which accepts measurements and cal-
culations/
‘Of course /
‘The part which opposes them , therefore, must be a low-grade part of the
mind /
‘ Necessarily /
‘Well , ali that l ’ve been saying has been intended to bring us to the point
—
where we can agree that not only does painting or rather representation in
4 . The meter of epics is dactyJic hexameter ( a on the syllabic pattern short -long) vvas the most
6 -foot line based on the svllabic pattems long - common meter of dialogue and set speeches in
short -short ) ; iambic trimeter ( a 3-fool line based tragedies .
76 / PLATO

Warm ,
—
general produce a product which is far from truth, but it also f örms a close,
affectionate relationship with â part of us which is, in itS ' turn, far '

from intelligence . And nothing healthy ör authentic can eıtı erge from this
relationship . ’
‘Absolutely,’ he said .
‘A low-grade mother Iike representation, then, and an equally low-grade
father produce Iovv-grade children . ’
‘I suppose that’s right . ’ •
‘Does this apply only to visual representation ,’ 1 aşked, ‘or to aural repre-
—
sentation as well in other words, to poetry?’
*1 suppose it applies to poetry as well,’ he said .
‘Well , we’d better not rely on mere suppositions based on painting,’ 1 said .
‘Let’s also get close enough to that part of the mind which poetic represen -
tation consorts with to see whether it’s of low or high quality . ’
‘Yes, we should ’ .
‘We’d better start by having certain ideas out in the öpen . We’d say that
representational poetry represents people doing things, willingly or unwill-
ingly, and aftervvards thinking that they’ve been successful or unsuccessful ,
and throughout feeling distressed or happy . Have 1 missed anything out?’
‘ No, nothing. ’
‘Well, does a person remain internally Unanimo üs throughout ali this? We
found that, in the case bf sight , there’s conflict and people have contradictory
views within themselves at the same time about the same objects . Is it Iike
that when one is doing things too? Is there internal conflict and dissent? But
it occurs to me that there’s really no need for us to decide where we stand
on this issue now, because we’ve already done so, perfectly adequately, in an
earlier phase of the discussion,5 when we concluded that , at any given
moment, our minds are teeming with countless thousands of these kinds of
contradictions . ’
‘That’s rigHt,’ he said .
‘Yes,’ I said . ‘But that earlier discussion of otı rs was incomplete, and I think
it’s crucial that we finish it off now ’ .
‘What have we left out?’ he asked . . •
•

‘If a good man meets with a misfortunesuch as losing a son or something

else he values very highly, we’ve already said , as you know, that he l endure
this better than anyone else . ^
Tes . '
.
I

^
‘But here something for us to think about Will he feel no grief , or is that
impossible? If it’s impossible, is it just that he somehow keeps his pain within
moderate bounds?’
‘The second alternative is closer to the truth,’ he said .
[ 604 ] ‘But now I’ve got another question for you about him . Do you think
he’II be more likely to fight and resist his distress when his peers can ee
him, or when he’s ali alone by himself in some secluded spot?’
^
‘He’ll endure pain far better when there are people who can see him , of
course,’ he said .
‘When he’s ali alone, however, I imagine . he won’t stop himself expressing

5 . In Republic 4.439 b~ 444a , Where Socrates argues that each mind or soul is divided into three distltı ct
and sometimes warring parts ( the rat İonal, the spirited , and the des İ ring) . !;
-
 REPUBLIC, BOOK X / 77

a lot of things he’d be ashamed of anyone heafing, and doing a lot of things
.
>

he’d hate anyone to $ee hım do f

• ‘That’s right, * he agreed .
‘Isn't it the case that reason and conventiort recommend resistance, while
the actual eVertt pushes him t övvards distress ?'
Tfue /
‘Wheh a person is sim ü ltaneoü sly p ü lled iti öpposite directions in response
to a single object , vve’re bound to concl ü de that he has tvvo sides/
'Of course /
‘One of vvhich is preparfed t ö let convention dictate the proper co ü rse of
aetion , isn *t it ? *
‘Can yö u explairt hovv? *
‘Conventiört telis us, âs yoü know, that it 's best to remlin as ü nruffled as
possible vvheri disaster strikes and not to get upset , orl the groutıds that it’s
never clear whether an incident of this nature is good or bad, that nothing
positive is gained by taking it badly, that no aspect of human life is vvö rth
bothering about â gr£at deal, and that grief blocks our aiccess to the very
thing we need tö have avâilable a$ quickly âS possible in these circurristances /
‘What do you have in mind ?’ he askçd . '
‘The ability to think about the ı nciderit / I replied, ‘and , ü nder the guidance
of reason , tö’ mâke the best possible use of one’s situation , as one would in
a ga ıtı e of dice vvhen faced vvith h öw the dice had fallen . When children
bunip into things, they clutch the hurt spot and spend time crying; ilistead
öf behaving like that , vve should constaritly' be training our minds to vvaste

—
no time before tryiıig to heal anything vvhich is unvvell, and help anything
vvhich has fallen get up from the floor to banish mourning by means of
medicine . ’
‘Yes , that's the best way to deal with misfortune / he said .
•
‘Nöw, our pösitiön İs that the best parf öf our rilinds is perfectly happy to
be guided by feason like this / ' ; 1

‘That goes vvithout saying/

‘Whereas there’s another pö rt of out minds vvhich urğeS us to femember
the bad times and to express our grief, and vvhich is insatiâ bly greedy for
tears . What can vve say about it ? That it’s irtCâpable öf llstenihg to reason ,
that it can^t face hard vvork , that it goes hand in 'höhd vvith being friglttSned
of hardship?*
Yes, that’s right / .
y

‘Novv, although the petulant part of us is ri<fh in a Variety of representable

possibilities, the intelligent and calm side of our characters is pretty well
.
C önstö nt artd ü tı changing This riıakes it not öiıly difficult tö represent, but

^
ölso difficult ' to ü nderstand vvheri it is repr sentedi particularly vvhen the
aü dieiıce is the kind of motley crovvd you findcramrned into a theatre,
because they’re simply not acqu â inted vvith the experience that’s being rep -
ffesented to them / •

[605] ‘Absolutely . i

i 'Evidently, then , a reprfesentational poet has nothing to do vvith this part

of the mind: hjs sicili isn’t hrıade for its pleasure because othervvise he'd lose
his popular appeal . He s concerned vvith the pfetulant^ and varied side of our
,
characters because it’s easy to feprese rtt
*
/
‘Öbviously /
78 / PLATO

‘So vve’re now in a position to see that vve’d be perfectly justified in taking
hold of him and placing him in the same category as a painter . He resembles
a painter because his creations fail short of truth , and a further point of
resemblance is that the part of the mind he communicates with is not the
best part , but something else Now we can see how right we'd be to refuse
»

him admission into any community which is going to respect convention ,

because now we know which part of the mind he wakes up . He destroys the
rational part by feeding and fattening up this other part, and this is equivalent
to someone destroying the more civilized members of a community by pre -
.
senting ruffians with political power There’s no difference, we’ll claim,
betvveen this and what a representational poet does: at a personal level, he

— —
establishes a bad system of government in people’s minds by gratifying their
-
irrational side, which can’t even recognize what size things are an object
which at one moment it calls big, it might cali small the next moment by
creating images, and by being far removed from truth . ’
‘Yes . ’
‘However, we haven’t yet made the most serious allegatiön against repre
sentational poetry, It has a terrifying capacity for deforming even good peo-
-
ple . Only a very few escape . ’
*Yes , that is terrifying. Does it really do that? *
‘Here’s my evidence: you can make up your mind . When Homer or another
tragedian represents the grief of one of the heroes, they have him deliver a
lengthy speech of Iamentation or even have him sing a dirge and beat his
breast; and when we listen to ali this, even the best of us, as fm sure yöu’re
.
avvare, feels pleasure We surrender ourselves, let ourselves be carried along,
and share the hero’s pain ; and then we enthuse about the skill of any pdet
who makes us feel particularly strong feelings ’ .
.
*Yes , I’m aware of this, of course *

—
* However, you also appreciate that when vve’re afflicted by trouble in our
own lives, then we take pride in the opposite in our ability to endure pain
vvithout being upset . We think that this is manly behaviour, and that only
womeri behave in the way we were panctioning earlier ’
*1 realize that , he said .
.
’
‘So,’ I said , ’instead of being repulsed by the sight of the kind of person
vve’d regret and deplore being ourselves, we enjoy the spectacle and sanction
it . Is this a proper vvay to behave ?’
*

‘No, it certainly isn’t,’ he said . 'It’s pretty unreasonable, I’d say . ’

[606] ‘1 agree,’ I said, cand here’s even more evidence . ’
AVhatT
‘Consider this . What a poet satişfies and gratifies on these occasions is an

—
aspect of ourselves which we forcibly restrain when tragedy strikes our own
lives an aspedt which hungers after tears and the satisfaction of having
cried until one Can cry no more , since that is what it is in its nature to want
to do . When the part of us which is inherently good has been inadequately
trained in habits enjoined by reason , it relaxes its guard över this other part,
the part which feels sad . Other people, not ourselves, are feeling these feel-
ings, we teli ourselves, and it’s no disgrace for us to sanction such behaviour
and feel sorry for someone who, even while claiming to be good, is over
indulging in grief ; and , we think, we are at least profiting from the pleasure,
-
and there’s no point in throvving away the pleasure by spurning the whole
 R E P U B L I C, B O O K X I 79

poem or play. You see, few people have the ability to vvork out that vve our -
selves are bound to store the harvest we reap from others: these occasions
feed the feeling of sadness until it is too strong for us easily to restrain it
vvhen hardship occurs in our own lives /
‘You 're absolutely right / he said .
‘And doesn 't the same go for humour as vvell? If there are amusing things
which you 'd be ashamed to do yourself, but vvhich give you a great deal of
pleasure vvhen you see them in a comic representation or hear about them
—
in private company vvhen you don't find them loathsome and repulsive*
then isn't this exactly the same kind of behaviour as vve uncovered vvhen
—
talking about feeling sad ? There's a part of you vvhich vvants to make people
laugh, but your reason restrains it, because you Ve afraid of being thought a
vulgar clovvn . Nevertheless, you let it have its vvay on those other occasions,
and you donV realize that the almost inevitable result of giving it energy in
this other context is that you become a comedian in your ovvn life /
Tes, that 's very true,' he said ,
‘And the same goes for sex, anger, and ali the desires and feelings of plea -
sure and distress vvhich , vve Ve saying, accompany everything vve do: poetic
representation has the same effect in ali these cases too . It irrigates and tends
to these things vvhen they should be left to vvither, and it makes them our
rulers vvhen they should be our subjects, because othervvise - vve vvonV live
better and happier lives, but quite the opposite /
‘I can 't deny the truth of vvhat you Ve saying / he said . ;
‘Therefore, Glaucon / I vvent on, ‘vvhen ybu come across people praising
Homer and saying that he is the poet vvho has educated Gröece,7 that he's a
good source for people to learn how to manage theı r affairs and gain culture
in their lives, and that one should structure the vvhole of oneV life in accor -
dance vvith his precepts, [ 607 ] you ought to be kind and considerate: after
ali, theyVe doing the best they can . You should concede that Homer is a
supreme poet and the original tragedian , but you should also recognize that
the only poems vve can admit into our community are hymns tö the gods and
.
eulogies of virtuous men If you admit the entertaining Muse of lyric and
epic poetry, then instead of lavv and the shared acceptance of reason as the
best guide , the kings of your community vvill be pleasure and pain /
‘You ’re quite right / he agreed .
‘So / I said , ‘since vve 've been giving poetry another hearing, there's our
defence: given its nature, vve had good grounds for banishing it earlier from
.
our community No rational person could have done any different . Hovvever,
poetry might accuse us of insensitivity and lack of culture, so vve'd better
also teli her that there's an ancient quarrel betvveen poetry and philosophy .
There are countless pieces of evidence for this enmity betvveen them , but
here are just a fevv: there’s that “ bitch yelping and baying at her master";
there's “featuring prominently in the idle chatter of fools”; there's “ control
by a crovvd of knovv-alls"; there are those vvhose “subtle notions” lead them
to realize that they do indeed have “ notional incomes’\ a Ali the same, vve

6. I t i s important to remember in this pnragraph day considered an essential part of one’s education ,
that GreekOld Comedyrelied extremely neavily on not only as poetry, but as a source of vvisdom ,
vcry crude sexual humor [ transiator’s notej . morality, and ali kinds of information . This is the
7. Heroclotus said that Homer t ı nd Hesiod had background to Plato’s attack [ transiator’s notej .
described the form and function of the gods for 8 . We know the author of none of these snatches
.
the Greeks In general, Homer was stili in Plato’s of verse [ transiator’s notej .
80 / PLATO

ought to point out that if the kinds of poetry and representation vvhich are
designed merely to give pleasure can come up with a rational argument for
their inclusion in a vvell-governed community, we’d be delighted short of—
—
compromising the truth as we see it , which vvouldn’t be right to bring them
back from exile: after ali, we know from our own experience ali about their
spell . I ırtean , haven’t you ever fallen under the spell of poetry, Glaucon,
especially vvhen the spectacle is provided by Homer ?’
‘1 certainly have . ’
‘Under these circumstances, then , if our allegations met a poetic rebuttal
in lyric verse or vvhatever, would we be justified in letting poetry retutn ? *
Tes /
‘And I suppose vve’d also aIlow people who Champion poetry because they
like it , even though they can’t compose it, to speak on its behalf in prose,
—
and to try to prove that there’s more to poetry than mere pleasure that it
also has a beneficial effect orl society and on human life in general . And we
won’t listen in a hostile frame of mind, because we*ll be the vvinners if poetry
turns out to be beneficial as vvell as enjoyable . *
‘Of course we will, * he agreed. ,
‘And if it doesn’t * Glaucon , then we ll do what a lover does when he thinks
that a love affair he s invölved in is no good for him: he reluctantly detaches
*
himselfi Similarly, sirice weVe been conditioned by our wonderful societies
until we have a deep-seated love for this kind of poetry, [ 608] vveil be
delighted if there proves to be nothing better and closer . to the truth than it .
As long as it is incapable of rebutting our allegations, hovvever, then while
we listen to poetry vve'Il be chanting these allegations of ours to ourselves as
a precautionary incantation against being caught ö nce more by that childish
and pervasive love . Our message udll be that the cornmitment appropriate
for an important matter with access to the truth shouldn *t be given to this
kind of poetry . People should , instead, be vvorried about the possible effects,
on one's own' inner politica î system , of listening to it and should tread cau -
tiously; and they should let our arguments guide their attitude tovvards
poetry . *
‘I couldn’t agree more ,’ he said .
—
Tou see, my dear Glaucon, * I said , ‘vvhat’s in the balance here is absolutely
.
crucial far more so than people think It *s whether one becomes a good or
a bad person , and consequentIy has the calibre not to be distracted by pres-
tige, vvealth, politica î power, or even poetry from applying oneself to morality
and vvhatever else goodness involvfes ’ .
‘Looking back över our discussion ,* he said , ‘I can only agree with you .
And I think anyone else would do the same as vvell * .
.
ca 3? 5 B . G . E .