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Reader’s uide

Since the late 1980s, social constructivism has emerged as an influential approach in International
Relations (IR) theory. This chapter examines its impact on Security Studies and how it calls into question
the assumed orthodoxy of rationalist approaches to security and the international system by asking how
security and security threats are ‘socially constructed’. It focuses on the importance of social relations and
why identity, norms, and culture matter. Whereas rationalist approaches focus on material forces to
understand and theorize security, social constructivism argues that ideational as well as material factors
construct the world around us and the meanings we give to it. Therefore, its significance for Security
Studies is crucial in terms not only of conceptualizing security but of providing alternative readings of
security. However, constructivism is not a uniform approach. As this chapter demonstrates, it is broadly
divided into two camps, which differ on questions of methodology and particular aspects of how
knowledge and identity are interrogated. Throughout this chapter, case studies of constructivist
approaches to security questions will be discussed, and the chapter concludes with a consideration of
critiques of constructivism.

6.1 Introduction

Social constructivism (henceforth shortened to ‘constructivism’) brings to the fore the importance of
ideas, identity, and interaction in the international system, revealing how ‘the human world is not simply
given and/or natural but that, on the contrary, the human world is one of artifice; that it is “constructed”
through the actions of the actors themselves’ (Kratochwil 2001: 17). Since Nicholas Onuf coined the term in
1989, constructivism has risen rapidly, reshaping debates in IR and challenging the dominance of
1
rationalist theories such as neorealism and neoliberalism. Many of its core concepts have been inspired by
sociological theory (see Key Ideas 6.1). With the emergence of Critical Security Studies (see Chapter 7), the
2
constructivist approach forms part of the post-Cold War transformation in Security Studies and argues
that ‘security’ can be socially constructed. It therefore offers the possibility of alternative readings of
security that go beyond rationalist theorizing which preferences material over ideational forces. The world
is social, and not purely material. This has implications for thinking about security and security relations
internationally. Constructivism puts into context the actions, beliefs, and interests of actors and
understands that the world they inhabit has been created by them and impacts on them.

Constructivism has three basic ontological positions. First, normative or ideational structures are
important and matter as much as material structures. This means that ideas are centre stage and are
privileged. This presents a different picture compared to dominant theories such as neorealism and
neoliberalism. For neorealists, the key to understanding state behaviour is the anarchic international
system and the distribution of material capabilities; for neoliberals, even though cooperation and
international institutions are the focus, state interests are also defined in material terms.

The second ontological claim of constructivism is that identities matter. Identities give actors interests,
and those interests tell us something about how actors behave and the goals they pursue. Quite simply,
actors cannot act without an identity. Since neorealists see all units (states) as similar, it is difficult to
make sense of why a state such as the USA may have conflictual relations with one state (for instance,

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Iran), and friendly relations with another (say, Australia). Identity is therefore crucial to constructivists
as Alexander Wendt (1996: 50) puts it: ‘A gun in the hands of a friend is a different thing from one in the
hands of an enemy, and enmity is a social, not material, relation.’ For neorealists and neoliberals, actors
such as states are rational, unitary actors, pursuing their interests in the international arena. However, we
understand only the material interests of such actors in these two accounts. Material forces, which Wendt
(1999: 371) defines as ‘power and interest’, do not readily tell us where ideas, values, beliefs, and norms
come from; the task is to examine how their content and meaning are made up by ideas and culture. By
focusing on how interests are obtained and developed, constructivists argue that we get a better picture of
identity and relations as social. Identity is not given but is constituted through interaction.

Third, agents and structures are mutually constituted. This attention to how actors shape the world and
how the world shapes actors means that human relations are inherently social and we create the world that
we live in and it influences us as well. International politics is not something that is independent from us;
if the world ‘out there’ is a World of Our Making (as the title of Onuf’s (1989) book suggests), it means that
different understandings of security may be possible. As part of the agency–structure debate,
constructivism’s appreciation of the mutual constitution of both agents and structures is important. When
↵ Alexander Wendt (1992) states that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’, he means precisely this. If we
exist in a world of anarchy (the absence of an authority above the state), it is because we have come to
believe that is how the world is, and our actions correspond to that reading of an ‘anarchic world’. Thus, if
we find ourselves in an anarchic system, it is because we believe it is anarchic. Anarchy is not a given
feature of the international system; it is an idea that states buy into, and, because they buy into it and
understand the world as ‘anarchic’, they act accordingly.

Constructivism has contributed to understanding ‘security’ by focusing on this agenda. It has lent new
insights to topics such as European integration, NATO’s persistence and enlargement since the end of the
Cold War, national security policy, the social construction of threat (such as Islamic fundamentalism and
the ‘war on terror’ see Think Point 6.1 and immigration), the impact of norms and values in the
international system (such as respect for human rights), and, also, the possibility for change in the
international system. An important part of the constructivist agenda is to show how identity and interests
are not fixed over time and space and are open to change and revision. This has important implications for
Security Studies, offering the possibility of moving beyond the logic of anarchy and the ahistoric, ‘timeless
wisdom’ of realist theorizing. The identity and interests of states (or other actors) and their security differ
over time and place. Constructivism also brings identity, beliefs, and norms together in understanding
security: ‘Global security arrangements include beliefs about the world (e.g. the nature of security), norms
about social relationships (e.g. the appropriateness of the use of force), and identities about self and other
(e.g. enemy, rival, citizen, or friend)’ (Frederking 2003: 365).

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Key Ideas 6.1 Origins of constructivist thought

Constructivism owes its origins to earlier philosophical and sociological modes of thought. From
Kant, constructivists gain an appreciation that our knowledge about the world may never be
objective because we process that knowledge through our own structures of understanding. Social
facts, such as ‘money’, rely on common agreement about their meaning. Money in itself has no
intrinsic meaning apart from our common understanding of it. We use it to buy things, it has a
function in the market, and we may associate it with our own security. Sovereignty is a social fact
because states and citizens understand its principles of non-interference and recognition in the
international system. From Searle, constructivists understand that social facts differ from ‘brute’
facts such as a lake or a mountain; they are common understandings not only about the object but
also about its broader meaning. This implies that the world ‘out there’ is not given but constructed
by those who inhabit it. Giddens’s structuration theory has been influential here with regard to how
structure has a dual nature, constraining human actions but also altered by it (Ruggie 1998: 875).
Weber regarded humans as ‘cultural beings’, ‘endowed with the capacity and the will to take a
deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance’ (Weber, cited in Ruggie 1998:
856). His concept of verstehen (‘understanding’ the meaning that someone intends or expresses)
relates to analysing individualized experiences in a broader collective framework (Ruggie 1998:
860; Fierke 2001: 117). Social ideas and beliefs frame our understanding of the world. Durkheim
proposed that different relations in a particular social order could influence social outcomes. In
explaining why suicide was less likely to be prevalent in Catholic societies than in Protestant, he
looked to the social bonds and belief systems that constructed Catholic society and the belief that
suicide was a ‘sin’ as an explanation (Ruggie 1998: 85 –8). Berger and Luckmann (1991), by
developing a sociology of knowledge, sought to understand how everyday life and practice relate to
ideas about reality the ‘social construction of reality’. Through our actions and shared beliefs, our
reality becomes ‘institutionalized’, sedimented, and habitual.

The more critical form of constructivism draws its influences from ideas about the power of
language and speech. Wittgenstein’s notion that language is a form of action that is constitutive of
the world and Habermas’s theory of communicative action add insights into how language games,
argumentation, speech acts, and the social nature of language construct our reality. The idea that
speech is a form of action is crucial in this regard, and constructivists working along these lines
draw inspiration from Searle, Austin (who distinguished between different types of speech acts),
Foucault on discourse and its relationship to power and knowledge, and Derrida’s deconstruction
and the idea that text matters (Fierke and Jørgensen 2001: 4–5).

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Think Point 6.1 Securit as s ciall c nstructed’ the ar n terr r

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were defined by former US President George W. Bush as an attack on
freedom and democracy on a global scale, requiring a new response to a new kind of war. When
framing the attacks, Bush drew on shared values and collective meanings in both the international
and the domestic context. For the international community, the attacks represented a threat to
freedom, security, and modern ways of life. Equating the ideologies and methods of Al-Qaeda and
fundamentalist terrorism with ‘Fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism’, Bush (2001) claimed that
this is ‘the world’s fight civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and
pluralism, tolerance and freedom.’ Fierke (2002: 342) observed that the initial characterization of
the attacks as a ‘clash’ or ‘crusade’ (which could alienate Muslim populations and states) shifted to
an emphasis on bringing together a global coalition of states to ‘fight terrorism’. Domestically,
Bush drew comparisons with the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, which remains a
significant event in the American collective memory. Bush argued that the attacks represented a
new kind of war that requires new strategies, agencies, resources, and tools, such as deploying
greater intelligence, financial, diplomatic, and military force. The Office of Homeland Security is an
example; established in 2002, it coordinates multiple responses to security threats to the USA that
include border security and surveillance. At the global level, international norms have shifted as
states work to coordinate information and policy closely to combat terrorism. Notions of pre-
emptive action and the treatment of ‘enemy combatants’ at sites such as Guantanamo Bay, where
normal legal codes did not apply, are also some of the ways in which the regular norms of security
have changed. In terms of everyday life, counter-terrorism measures affect individuals in
numerous ways, such as identity fraud, heightened surveillance, and conditions on our free
movement and free speech (think here of airport security technology and regulations, and
increased concern over data and internet surveillance).

But this is one dominant ‘story’ about the war on terror. Constructivism’s task is to show how
security is a socially constructed idea. The meaning that actors give to such constructions of
security differs. For the hijackers, the suicide mission was a ‘rational act’ within their own
structures of meaning (perhaps self-sacrifice for the greater good of Allah). For those outside this
structure of meaning and even within this act was seen as ‘irrational’ (Fierke 2002: 342). Later,
Western discourses about Islamic State drew on labels of barbarism and depravity and the
sovereign state itself as Islamic State sought to build a ‘caliphate’. Richard ackson (2005: 50–1)
claims that the events of 9/11 could have been interpreted in a number of different ways (such as
the North–South divide or movements against the state and revolutionary actors), but the story
that dominated was that of the threat of barbarism versus civility, conceptualizing terrorism as a
‘threat and response’ problem. Both ackson (2005) and Hülsse (2008) suggest that terrorism
needs to be interrogated more critically and that we need to understand how it is socially
constructed by discourses and categories that are broadly accepted (see Chapter 22 for further
discussion of terrorism).

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 Key Points

Constructivism has become a major approach in IR and Security Studies, drawing attention to
the importance of ideas, identity, and interaction.

It offers alternative ways of thinking about security, such as how ‘anarchy’ itself is socially
constructed.

It gives attention to ideational factors, in contrast to rationalist approaches such as neorealism

and neoliberalism, which rely on material factors in their analysis.

6.2 Definitions and key concepts

In order to delve a bit deeper into constructivist understandings of phenomena and security, some of its
key concepts require elaboration. By focusing on identity and interests, and how they inform each other,
constructivists pay more attention to a dynamic that goes beyond causation. Considering how things are
‘put together’ or socially constructed implies interpretation and seeing how certain types of political
behaviour and outcomes are possible (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 394). This also applies to
understanding identity change. The introduction gives a snapshot of the ideas that animate
constructivists, and explores identity, collective or shared knowledge and culture, and norms, and
contrasts them with rationalist positions.

6.2.1 Identity
Identity is central to constructivism for a basic reason: identity tells us who actors are, what their
preferences and interests are, and how those preferences might inform their actions. Quite simply,
interests ↵ cannot be pursued without a particular identity, and ‘the identities, interests and behaviour
of political agents are socially constructed by collective meaning, interpretations and assumptions about
the world’ (Adler 1997: 324). Shared ideas construct identity and interests and are not given by nature. Why
does the USA consider five North Korean nuclear weapons to be more of a threat to its security and
interests compared to five hundred British nuclear weapons? Wendt (1999: 1, 255) argues that it is because
of ‘shared understandings’. The K is an ally of the SA, but, furthermore, it shares similar ideas, beliefs,
and a liberal democratic identity. It also has a historical ‘special relationship’ with the SA, one that
former Prime Minister Tony Blair (2000) claimed was ‘about bonds of kinship and history. It is about a
shared language and most of all it is about shared values.’ Intersubjective meanings are ideas and concepts
that are shared and held in common, and from these we can understand action and behaviour (Hopf 1998:
173). This differs from rationalist thinking, which relies on causality (that one thing impacts on another in
a straight line of ‘action–reaction’). Intersubjective meanings involve a different type of relationship,
where practices and meanings come from interaction (Fierke and Jørgensen 2001: 117).

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For rationalists, identity is either given (assumed to already exist and therefore unchangeable) or
negligible as a factor in relation to security. For neorealists, states are ‘like units’, all seeking security in an
anarchic world. The anarchic system ‘tells’ states what they want and what they should do to get it.
Variants of liberalism generally agree on this aspect states have certain goals to secure in the
international realm. They may try and secure those goals via cooperation, but the same assumption is the
rule states have material interests. If states cooperate in the international system, they do so for their
own (pre-given and assumed) interests; interaction for rationalists is largely for strategic reasons. If
neoliberals look to identity and interests, they may examine the domestic realm or ignore interest
formation, assuming it to be exogenous (relating to or caused by external factors) rather than endogenous
(having internal cause or origin) (Wendt 1994: 384; Ruggie 1998: 879). Constructivists, however, think
more deeply about identity and argue that the process of acquiring identity is interaction. Actors form their
identity when they meet and interact with others, and this can set up friendly, conflictual, or other types of
relations; ‘identity is formed by social processes’ (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 194). The behaviour of
states is not simply the result of exogenous forces. Historically, Germany and France were enemies, but,
through their cooperation in the context of European integration, their relationship changed. War between
the two is now considered impossible, because their relationship has evolved through interaction and the
development of shared understandings to one of friendship. Interests and therefore identities can alter due
to interaction and processes of socialization rather than purely external structural factors (see Case Study
6.1 on neutrality and its meaning for domestic identity).

Case Study 6.1 Neutrality

Realists on the whole argue that neutral states’ security policies are conditioned by the
international system and exogenously given if a state is neutral, it is because it is weak,
geographically unfortunate, or isolationist. However, the end of the Cold War saw this logic
challenged. With the end of bipolarity, rationalists expected neutrality to be consigned to the
dustbin of history after all, there was nothing to be neutral between. Neutral states were expected
to ‘get with the programme’ and join NATO. However, that logic did not readily translate into
reality. In Western Europe, neutrals such as Sweden, Austria, Finland, and Ireland did not rush to
join NATO, and, even if political leaders wanted to ditch neutrality and sign up to European security
initiatives, such a move was on the whole unpopular with the public, which came to associate
neutrality with the identity of that state. A constructivist reading of neutrality examines the norms
and values attached to neutrality over time. Constructivists argue that ‘neutrality is what states
make of it’ neutrality need not be interpreted in one way (isolationist and self-interested states
not dirtying their hands in the ugly business of war) but can also contain other meanings (neutral
states can promote change and peaceful initiatives in the international arena and are not part of
power politics). Sweden is a case in point here. Its neutrality has existed for over 200 years and it
has influenced the way in which Sweden sees security and itself. The hegemonic Social Democratic
Party also saw neutrality as part of Sweden’s domestic and international profile concepts of
solidarity, which had meaning domestically, were associated with Sweden’s foreign policy. Sweden

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 practised an ‘active neutrality policy’ and bucked the assumption that neutral states were
isolationist and self-interested. It promoted peaceful initiatives such as dialogue and cooperation,
disarmament, mediation, and peacekeeping, and took a deeper view of security in terms of
inequalities in the international system in the North–South divide. It was also a vocal critic of
superpower politics, defying the idea that neutral states are isolationist, keeping their heads down
to protect their own interests (Agius 2006).

When Sweden joined the E , it, along with Finland, ‘exported’ the core ideals associated with
neutrality to the Amsterdam Treaty of the E via the ‘Petersberg Tasks’, suggesting a less
militaristic approach to the E ’s security profile. These tasks included the areas where active
neutral states had great experience: crisis management, peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue
tasks, and peacemaking. This is an example of small states being norm entrepreneurs. However,
identities are malleable and subject to change. As Sweden interacts with the EU, it takes on its
norms and values too. Although militarily nonaligned, Sweden contributes to European security
cooperation and defines national security in the European context. Likewise, Mlada Bukovansky
(1997) analyses US neutrality as a question of domestic identity in the early nineteenth century,
arguing that, rather than isolationism, US neutrality was connected to a specific reading of US
identity, effersonian ideals, and Republicanism. Karen Devine’s (2006) work on Irish neutrality
takes a critical constructivist position, deconstructing the ‘ nneutral Ireland’ discourse that drives
the idea that Irish neutrality is a ‘myth’ (a device used by those who advocate dropping neutrality).
Agius and Devine (2011) show that competing meanings attached to neutrality are mired in a
political struggle over its meaning and status.

Wendt distinguishes between different types of identity. In an early work he contrasted corporate and
social identity. Corporate identity refers to the intrinsic, self-realized identity of an actor. The interests of
a corporate actor exist before interaction with others, and an actor can have only one corporate identity,
which is the basis for developing other identities. Social identity refers to ‘sets of meanings that an actor
attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others’. Actors can have multiple social identities that
vary in importance (Wendt 1994: 385). He later adds ‘type’, ‘role’, and ‘collective’ identity to this. Type
identities are multiple, intrinsic to actors, and self-organizing, and, in the international system, capitalist
states and monarchical states are examples of type identities (in that we can classify them according to
their ‘type’). Wendt (1999: 226) claims that these do not rely on other states for their existence. Role
identities exist only in relation to others. The example Wendt provides is that of professor and student
this is an institutionalized role, part of our ‘stocks of collective knowledge’. The role of ‘student’ cannot
exist without that of ‘professor’ or ‘teacher’, and vice versa. Collective identity ‘takes the relationship
between Self and Other to its logical conclusion, identification’. This is where self and other becomes
blurred. It is a mix of role and type identities (Wendt 1999: 22 –9). As we will see later, many scholars are
critical of this categorization of identity, but this provides some basis for thinking about how identity
differs and how it is formed in terms of process and interaction.

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6.2.2 Beliefs, collective ideas, and culture
Identity does not simply emerge but is part of a historical process of interaction, made up of beliefs, which,
according to Frederking (2003: 3 4–5), are ↵ ‘social rules that primarily make truth claims about the
world. Beliefs are shared understandings of the world.’ Shared knowledge is important in identity
formation, as it sets up common understandings between individuals, communities, states, and the
system of states. Collective meanings and shared knowledge constitute how we understand the world and
respond to it. When humans and Martians encounter each other for the first time in Tim Burton’s film
Mars Attacks!, the gesture of releasing a dove is interpreted by the Martians in a completely different way
from how we, as humans, might ordinarily understand it. We know that releasing a dove is a gesture of
peace and goodwill. The Martians, however, interpret this as hostile and obliterate it with their ray guns.
Ignoring for the moment that the Martians had intended all along to destroy Earth and happily get down
to the business of completing this task for most of the film until humans discover that country music
literally makes Martian heads explode how would they have known the symbolic significance of the act
of ‘releasing a dove’? We, as humans, are aware of the significance and meaning of this act (because it
forms part of our collective knowledge), but its construction and associations may be unknown to the
aliens.

Here, culture matters (see Key Quotes 6.1). Most constructivists regard culture as a set of practices that
give some sort of meaning to shared experiences and actions, and can influence security policy. Consider
the link between national culture and security practices as ↵ Berger outlines in his study of German and
Japanese post-war anti-militarism. By examining the domestic cultural-institutional context rather than
the anarchic structure of world politics, we can further understand both states’ defence policies. Berger
argues that defeat in the Second World War affected German and Japanese domestic societal and political
actors. Their reluctance to use military force became institutionalized, changing their approach to national
security in ways that other states may not contemplate (Berger 1996: 318). These studies of strategic
culture examine the impact that the culture of a nation may have on grand strategy, military organization,
security and defence policy, and political and societal actors. Wendt (1996: 49) described the Cold War as a
‘cultural rather than material structure’, and Huntington’s (much criticized) idea of ‘cultural clashes’ or
‘civilizational clashes’ further evidences the importance of this category. Culture can have an impact on
how states or actors see security, but it is also crucial in terms of constructing the values and rules that
inform identity. Whether it be fear of immigrants and refugees as a ‘threat’ to security, or fear of the
cultures of others that are drastically different from our own, culture can be an important underlying
reason when defining security problems that affect the state and other agents. That human rights are
considered an important issue to individual and societal security also has cultural influences, because
culture refers to standards that we set as acceptable to us.

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 Key Quotes 6.1 Culture

‘Culture refers to both a set of evaluative standards (such as norms and values) and a set of
cognitive standards (such as rules and models) that define what social actors exist in a
system, how they operate, and how they relate to one another.’

Katzenstein (1996a: 6)

Clifford Geertz (1973: 89) defined culture as ‘an historically transmitted pattern of
meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic
form by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge
about and attitudes towards life’.

6.2.3 Norms
Shared knowledge and practices produce norms, which are the ‘collective expectations about proper
behaviour for a given identity’ (Katzenstein 1996a: 5). Norms are vital to identity formation; the norms
that we adhere to (or choose not to adhere to) are part of how we define ourselves. A prominent example
can be seen in US politics with the election of Donald Trump as President in 2016. Trump was seen as a
‘norm breaker’ not only in his style of presidency but in relation to his attack on established ideas of
democracy, human rights and the rule of law (Havercroft et al. 2018). Norms can be seen as good or bad,
but they contain specific meanings for actors and provide a social guide to behaviour. Norms do not appear
out of nowhere but are constructed by actors who have strong ideas about appropriate or desirable
behaviour (see Key Quotes 6.2). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) examine the cycle of norms, which starts
when cognitive frames are set, normally against existing norms. They illustrate this in their work on
women’s suffrage, and how this confronted traditional ideas about women and the appropriate role for
women. New ideas about appropriate behaviour compete with existing norms, then cascade (or spill over)
and become institutionalized. Berger and Luckmann (1991: 70–2) see institutionalization as habitualized
human activity, from the individual to the collective. Somewhat differently, Krook and True, focusing on
N gender equality norms, argue that norms are ‘processes’ rather than ‘things’ (2012).

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 Key Quotes 6.2 Norms

‘Norms are the intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world that define
actors, their situations, and the possibilities of action. Norms are intersubjective in that
they are beliefs rooted in and reproduced through social practice. Norms constitute
actors and meaningful action by situating both in social roles.’

Farrell (2002: 49)

‘Norms do not determine outcomes, they shape realms of possibility. They influence
(increase or decrease) the probability of occurrence of certain courses of action.’ Norms
are ‘a shared expectation about behavior, a standard of right or wrong. Norms are
prescriptions or proscriptions for behavior.’

Tannenwald (1999: 435– )

‘Norms are social rules that primarily make appropriateness claims about relationships.’

Frederking (2003: 364)

Constructivists distinguish between constitutive and regulatory norms. Constitutive norms define the
identity of an actor, constituting their behaviour and interests. Regulatory norms tell us what to do; they
are the standards that tell a given identity how to act. A common illustration is that of sovereignty. The
regulative norm of sovereignty is that it tells actors how to behave in order to be identified as ‘sovereign’
and sets out the rules of the game. The constitutive effect is that, as ‘sovereign states’ behave according to
these precepts, they ‘become’ sovereign their interests and preferences are shaped by sovereignty and
others recognize this actor as sovereign (Katzenstein 1996a: 5; Hopf 1998; Ruggie 1998: 71).

Nina Tannenwald (1999) has argued that the nuclear ‘taboo’ de-legitimatizes nuclear weapons as weapons
that can be used in war and represents both a regulative and a constitutive norm. The norms (both
regulative and constitutive) surrounding nuclear weapons both stabilize and restrain states from acting in
a self-help manner on this issue. Furthermore, the taboo is international and systemic. Public opinion,
international organizations, and other types of multilateral fora all reinforce the taboo, the notion that
this weapon should not be used. International agreements and regimes exist (such as the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), arms-control agreements, and nuclear ↵ weapon-free zones, as well as
general laws of armed conflict) to control and restrict the use of nuclear weapons. Taking US policy as a
case study, she examines how norms surrounding the use of nuclear weapons shifted in decisive contexts.
When the SA used nuclear weapons against apan in 1945, no nuclear ‘taboo’ existed, even though some
forms of constraint, such as just war theory, codes of military conduct, ethical issues, and international
law, were well established. It was during the Korean War when the norm against non-use emerged,
growing in strength by the outset of the Vietnam War. By the time of the Gulf War in 1991, the norm against
use was taken for granted and institutionalized. Central to the taboo were ideas of ‘civilized states’, which

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set the boundaries for identity and behaviour. States that possessed nuclear weapons were judged by their
restraint in using them. Restraint was associated with ‘being civilized’. The taboo was both a regulative
and a constitutive norm. It proscribed behaviour (non-use, thus regulative), but it also had constitutive
effects (relating its non-use to civilizational associations of the Self and Others). The norms around the
acceptability and use of nuclear weapons continue to dominate global security. While Trump has
questioned why nuclear weapons cannot be used and North Korea has increased its testing of nuclear
weapons, other developments, such as the ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
in 2020, point to norm contestation as well as change.

Norms have been central to the work of many constructivists. Finnemore (1996) shows that humanitarian
norms have influenced patterns of humanitarian military intervention since the mid-nineteenth century.
Decolonization and the abolition of slavery are amongst her examples and she demonstrates that
unilateral and multilateral interventions on the basis of humanitarianism, whilst not entirely new, are
important and are related to what is considered appropriate over time. Newman (2001) also looks at
humanitarian intervention as part of norm change, where the individual is the referent object of security.
Intervention to protect against human rights abuses is emerging as a stable norm in the international
arena. Constructivism posits that collective meanings can change over time and affect norms. Audie Klotz
(1995) argued that transnational anti-apartheid activists influenced the USA to instigate sanctions against
South Africa. The norm operating here was a normative view of racial equality, and the activist groups
linked the issue of civil rights in the USA with apartheid. To discriminate on racial grounds was considered
by these activists to be a ‘bad thing’, even though the SA had material strategic and economic interests in
South Africa, and the norm of sovereignty (non-interference in domestic affairs) was strong. Rationalist
approaches relying on explanations of material interest, Klotz argues, do not fit this change in US policy.
Fehl (2004) also suggests that non-state actors had an important role to play in the establishment of the
International Criminal Court (see Case Study 6.2).

Case Study 6.2 The International Criminal Court

Caroline Fehl combines a rationalist and constructivist examination of the establishment of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), which came into existence in 2002 despite US opposition to it.
The US government did not wish for its own troops to be held accountable and tried outside US
jurisdiction with respect to war crimes. However, the ICC came into being without the USA, largely
because the norms of human rights and the need for international criminal justice were held not
only by the states that signed up to the ICC but by international NGOs actively lobbying for its
creation. Even though some regarded the influence of NGOs as problematic, signalling a ‘new
diplomacy’ where non-state actors have greater power, there were those who would have preferred
an effective ICC rather than one that would be watered down if the SA signed up to it. These ‘norm
entrepreneurs’ argued that problems of legitimacy existed when it came to effective criminal
justice in national and international courts (such as the UN international criminal tribunals for
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia). Fehl is interested in the constitutive effects of norms, how
human rights norms and the problem of effective international justice were of increasing concern.

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 Since the 1970s, more human rights conventions have been adopted and ratified by more and more
states, resulting in an almost universal acceptance of this norm (Fehl 2004: 371). Furthermore,
human rights norms are more than just ‘institutional rules’; they also define the identity of the
members who are part of it. Even though some states might not comply, the norm has a
constitutive effect in that it represents a standard for states. More recently, however, ‘norm
antipreneurs’ seem to indicate resistance to the anti-impunity norm of the ICC in Africa (Mills and
Bloomfield 2018).

Constructivists also examine ‘epistemic communities’ and ‘norm entrepreneurs’. The former refers to
groups with specialized expert knowledge, who share norms and create new norms informed by their
expertise. Constructivists see epistemic communities playing an important role, transmitting shared ideas
and causal belief with respect to policy problems. This form of ‘evolutionary epistemology’ (inspired by
Habermas’s notion of communicative action) sees actors alter how they deal with problems and their
notions of problem solving. Rather than adapting to the constraints of the international system (Ruggie
1998: 8 8), the ‘learning’ that takes place in epistemic communities has implications for security, as Adler
(1992) demonstrates in relation to international arms control. He argues that the high level of socialization
and shared ideas amongst those forming this epistemic community (made up of individuals from the
RAND Corporation, Harvard, and MIT) imparted essential ↵ norms about the necessity of arms control
via their scientific expertise. The diffusion of American arms-control ideas to the USSR was important
with regard to creating the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) regime.

6.2.4 Mutual constitution

For Alexander Wendt one of constructivism’s leading figures and the one who generates most debates
about constructivism (more on this later) ‘anarchy is what states make of it’. He argued that neorealism
has given anarchy a privileged position in explaining International Relations. For neorealists, anarchy
produces a self-help world. The lack of a power above the state means that the ‘logic’ of self-help produces
competition in the international system, creating security dilemmas and problematizing the possibilities
for collective action. Interaction never affects this process, and interests and identities are ignored. Wendt
argues that self-help and power politics are not a logical or causal aspect of anarchy. Anarchy contains no
logic in itself. Instead, practices matter: ‘Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential
features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt 1992: 394–5). Wendt defines institutions as ‘a
relatively stable set or “structure” of identities and interests’. These structures can take the form of rules
and norms but are dependent on collective knowledge. Institutions might be conflictual or cooperative.
Wendt (1992: 399–401) sees self-help as just one kind of anarchy, an institution.

By thinking about anarchy in this way, Wendt highlights two important critiques of the rationalist
dependency on anarchy as structuring the world. Wendt suggests that the structure is not given but rather
constituted by the actions and practices of actors, whose identities and interests have a role to play. This
relates to the agency–structure debate in IR theorizing, and here Wendt is influenced by Anthony

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Giddens’s structuration theory, which stresses the duality of structures. His ideas about identity are
informed by the symbolic interactionism of Herbert Blumer and George Herbert Mead, who examine how
the self is constituted by and reflects processes of socialization (Wendt 1992). The actions of states and
how they interact with each other constitute International Relations, and this can produce cooperation or
mistrust. Once again this reinforces the idea that the world is made up of social relations and is not simply
given.

When it comes to security, many constructivists refer back to Karl Deutsch’s idea (1957: 3 ) of a security
community, the idea that integrated interests produce a ‘we-feeling’. Security communities represent
common interests and a preference for peaceful conflict resolution. Deutsch suggested that two forms of
security communities existed: amalgamated, which refers to a unified security community where
government is shared, and a pluralistic one, where integration is deep, but states retain their political
independence. The Nordic region was seen as a pluralistic security community, where a shared sense of
culture, history, and economic links strengthened ↵ consensus and cooperation (Deutsch 1957: 6).
Adler and Barnett (1998) developed Deutsch’s ideas along constructivist lines, placing an emphasis on
shared values, identities, and meanings when they consider how security communities emerge. They
identify how conditions, process, structure, trust, and collective identity are important for the emergence
and development of security communities, from ‘nascent’ to ‘ascendant’ to ‘mature’.

If the world is not given, then this provides some scope for thinking about its dynamism and the potential
for change. This is the distinction between rationalist and constructivist approaches (Hopf 1998: 172).
Neorealist theorizing pays little attention to the possibility of change in the international system. It seeks
to identify ‘regularities’ and patterns of behaviour, but moreover neorealism tends to argue that its
account of International Relations provides a ‘timeless wisdom’ its rules and regularities can be
observed and are repeated across space and time. As Wendt points out, for neorealists, the ‘logic of anarchy
is constant’. Although neorealism acknowledges structural change, it accounts for change only with regard
to the shift from one distribution of power to another. Social change for instance, moving from
feudalism to a system of sovereign states is not considered to be structural, because anarchy still exists
and the distribution of power remains unchanged (Wendt 1999: 17). The following section examines
Wendt’s consideration of the types of anarchy that characterize the international system, and then
explores the critiques directed at his conceptualizations.

Key Points

Relations are social, not material, and identity determines interest. Identity is formed via
interaction and shared meanings.

The norms that actors hold guide their choices in the international arena, and norms are both
regulative and constitutive.

Actors and the social world they inhabit are mutually constitutive. Therefore, if we live in an
anarchic international system, it is because we make it so.

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 However, there is possibility for change. Norms and ideas can change, pushing actors to alter
their relationships and understandings, potentially from antagonistic to cooperative. Norm
entrepreneurs, epistemic communities, and other forms of shared ideas can create security
communities or more cooperative forms of security collaboration.

6.3 Wendt’s three cultures f anarch

If ‘anarchy is what states make of it’, then this opens up the possibility to explore different types of
international security worlds that go beyond neorealist configurations. Wendt developed this idea further
in Social Theory of International Politics (1999), where he proposed three cultures of anarchy: Hobbesian,
Lockean, and Kantian. Neorealists are limited to viewing anarchy as producing one type of system based on
war, military competition, and the balance of power (Wendt 1999: 247). Wendt does not stray far from
Waltz’s idea of anarchy he simply suggests that there can be more than one culture of anarchy, and
anarchy does not have to lead to a self-help system.

Wendt suggests that at the centre of each type of anarchy there exists a particular posture: in Hobbesian
cultures, the relationship between states is that of ‘enemies’. The logic of Hobbesian anarchy is that of a
‘true’ self-help system, where no self-restraint exists and actors cannot rely on each other for help.
Survival relies on military power, security dilemmas abound, and security is a zero-sum game. Wendt
(1999: 265) argues that a Hobbesian culture has characterized the international system over time, but not
all the time. A Lockean culture is characterized by rivalry, and Wendt sees this culture dominating since the
Treaty of Westphalia and the beginning of the modern system of states. In a Lockean culture, actors regard
each other as rivals but exercise some restraint in violence; warfare is accepted but at the same time
contained (Wendt 1999: 283). A Kantian culture is characterized by friendship, where force and violence
are eschewed in favour of cooperation in matters of security. Here, friendship is a ‘role structure’ where
states resolve disputes in a non-violent manner and protect each other (collective security). There exist
three levels or degrees of cultural internalization: coercion, interest, and legitimacy. When an actor is
forced to comply with a norm (because non-compliance would result in some form of punishment), this is
first-degree internalization. Second-degree internalization is different, in that states will comply with a
norm because of self-interest. When states comply with and internalize a norm as legitimate, this
represents third-degree internalization. Why does this matter? It matters because Wendt suggests that
shared ideas may not lead to cooperation. It is possible to have a Hobbesian culture that is deeply
underlined by shared ideas (that war is good) or a weak ↵ Kantian culture where ideas about security
cooperation are only weakly shared by actors (Wendt 1999: 254). Wendt is adamant that there is no such
thing as a ‘logic of anarchy’: ‘What gives anarchy meaning are the kinds of people who live there and the
structure of their relationships’ (Wendt 1999: 308–9). Structural change occurs when actors redefine who
they are and what they want. The shift from one culture to another and structural change is propelled by
four ‘master variables’ interdependence, common fate, homogenization, and self-restraint which
affect collective identity formation. The first three are active causes, and the more actors engage in these
‘prosocial’ forms of behaviour, the further the egotistic Self erodes, bringing in Others. However,

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identifying with Others might pose a threat to the Self or survival; Wendt (1999: 33 – ) suggests that the
problem of being ‘engulfed’ by Others we identify with can be managed through self-restraint. Wendt’s
view (1999: 314) is that in the West structural change signifies the move from a Lockean to a Kantian
culture in the late twentieth century, compared to most of international history resembling a Hobbesian
culture, ‘where the logic of anarchy was kill or be killed’.

Wendt’s constructivism has generated much debate, largely because he accepts a number of neorealist
tenets, such as states being the main actors in the international system and a commitment to a particular
scientific understanding of phenomena, which jars with many of his critics. In this sense he is a
‘conventional’ constructivist because he sees similarities between constructivism and rationalism. Critical
constructivists are more sceptical of this link, and the following section explores the differences between
these two brands before moving on to the critiques of rationalists and post structuralists.

Key Points

There is not one type of anarchy that is understood only in terms of self-help, and Wendt
suggests three cultures of anarchy: Hobbesian (where actors see each other as enemies), Lockean
(as rivals), and Kantian (as friends).

Each ‘culture’ does not produce a definitive structure of anarchy; this depends on how deeply
certain shared ideas are internalized.

The possibility of change in the international system exists, and Wendt believes we are moving
towards a Kantian culture.

6.4 Conventional and critical constructivism

Wendtian constructivism tends to generate the most debate, but it is important to note that constructivism
is not a uniform approach; rather it houses a number of different ways of thinking about identity and social
relations. These differences can impact the way we understand security problems. United as they may be
about the point that the ideational matters, constructivists have been broadly divided into two camps:
3
conventional and critical. What separates the two tends to revolve around questions of methodology and
how identity is interrogated. Conventional constructivists tend to accept key aspects of neorealist systemic
theorizing, such as the centrality of the state and the importance of a scientific or positivist approach to
comprehend phenomena. Constructivists such as Wendt, Katzenstein, and Adler see constructivism as a
bridge between rationalist and reflectivist approaches, enabling both to benefit from the insights of the
other. In Social Theory of International Politics, Wendt (1999: 39–40) declares he is a positivist, because he
thinks what really matters is what there is to know (ontology) rather than how we know it (epistemology)
and that science should be question-driven, not method-driven.

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Critical constructivists find this reliance on positivism problematic and argue that the distinction between
the ideational and the material world simply reproduces the binary distinctions that characterize positivist
methodology (such as strong/weak, man/woman, and, in this case, ideational/material) (Fierke 2001: 116).
Inspired by Foucault, Derrida, and Lyotard, critical constructivists query the power of discourse, language,
reality, and meaning, adopting a more cautious approach to truth claims and power relations (Fierke and
Jørgensen 2001: 5). Critical explorations of identity can also be found in the work of Doty (1996: 2), who
explores civilizing discourses in North–South relations and how they established ‘regimes of truth and
knowledge’. Weldes’s work ↵ (1999a) on the Cuban Missile Crisis presents an image of social
construction in terms of US identity and its claims to being a global power. Works such as these are
important because they remind us that ‘many of the categories we treat as natural are in fact products of
past social construction processes, processes in which power is often deeply implicated’ (Finnemore and
Sikkink 2001: 398). In this respect, critical constructivists problematize identity more so than their
conventional counterparts do, preferring to see identity as more complex than stable, less solid and given,
and more reliant on power and representation (see Case Study 6.3). For instance, when we think of
American or Australian identity, we see only the dominant interpretations, not voices that have been
silenced. These omissions are dangerous, because we privilege one construction of identity over possible
others, such as sub-national groups. There is also the assumption that domestic politics is consistent at all
times (McSweeney 1999: 12 –9).

Case Study 6.3 TO’s persistence after the ld War and its e pansi n

A number of constructivist explanations have emerged over NATO’s persistence since the end of
the Cold War (despite realist predictions that it would fold) and its enlargement to include new
members. Adler (2008) claims that NATO recognized the shifting nature of post-Cold War security,
where borders between East and West blurred, and new security threats emerged. NATO’s Strategic
Concept of 1999 adjusted the security alliance’s rationale, repositioning it from a Cold War defence
pact to a ‘security community’ based on common values of democracy, human rights, and the rule
of law. It created institutions (such as Partnerships for Peace) to prepare applicant countries for
membership through ‘social learning’ (that is, ‘teaching’ newcomers to adapt to NATO norms and
practices, such as training and assistance). Gheciu (2005a) also notes that ‘teaching and
persuasion’ were crucial for NATO in terms of projecting liberal democratic norms to the former
Eastern bloc states. NATO was able to shape ideas about appropriate action (peaceful dispute
settlement, multilateralism, and the promotion of human rights). This in turn impacted on the
national identities of the former Soviet states. Many of these states were seeking a new ‘home’ in
the international system, a ‘return to Europe’. The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary were the
first to join, because they made significant advances in internalizing Western democratic norms
and values (Schimmelfennig 1998). Networks emerged to promote cooperation in both military and
civilian circles, focusing on self-restraint and security cooperation, which in turn provided NATO

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 with a new purpose transforming it into a different security community. But these moves were
also contested, with different narratives and discourses in play, especially in the context of Russia
(Fierke and Wiener 1999; Williams and Neumann 2000).

Critical constructivists also pay deeper attention to language and point to its role in constructing reality.
The works of Onuf, Kratochwil, and Fierke focus on how language is crucial in terms of comprehending
meaning and interpreting the relationship between word and world. Onuf relates rules to language, taking
Wittgenstein’s notion of language as similar to the rules of a game. Speech acts, which relate language to
action, and rules, constitute actors. Onuf (1998: –8) identifies three types of speech acts: assertions,
directives, and commitments. Assertions relate to knowledge about the world (for instance, ‘democracies
do not fight each other’). Directives give us instructions: what to do, what will happen if we fail to do
something (punishment for non-compliance). Commitments entail promises (such as signing up to a
treaty). By examining the meanings that speech acts invoke, we gain a stronger sense of how language
structures our world and relations, and a more complex sense of communication between actors. Language
is constitutive and does not simply represent the world as it is: ‘By speaking, we make the world what it is.’
Speech produces (for instance, rules and policies) and expresses our goals and intentions (Onuf 2002: 12 –
7; see also Fierke 2002). Fierke’s focus on ‘games’ also highlights a different way of seeing security (see
Case Study 6.4). Language and speech acts have enormous importance because they can ‘securitize’, as
Huysmans (2002: 44–5) observes: ‘Language is not just a communicative instrument used to talk about a
real world outside of language; it is a defining force, integrating social relations.’ Security language can
create a different picture about a social problem or a source of ↵ insecurity, and Huysmans draws
attention to the role of language in constituting a link between migration and security problems (such as
crime, terrorism, and as a threat to the economy or the welfare state). Australia is a case in point,
associating asylum with illegal entry, deploying a militarized border policy and dedicated agencies to
‘guard’ the sovereign state, with domestic opinion shaped by media narratives of the asylum threat. The
‘security knowledges’ produced by police agencies and the military, the media and other official bodies,
are powerful in that they can articulate threat or danger; speaking and writing can construct security
problems. Those who deploy language when examining the construction of threat, danger, and identities
claim that we gain a better understanding of the complexity and construction itself.

Case Study 6.4 Cold War endings

Understanding how the Cold War ended is crucial with regard to thinking about dominating ideas of
how the demise of bipolarity was evidence of a ‘triumph of the West’ and liberal capitalist
democracy. However, constructivists and others read this change in different ways, and saw it as
linked to Soviet foreign and domestic policies of the mid-1980s–early 1990s. Rather than the
Soviet nion ‘losing’ the Cold War, it was Gorbachev’s programme of perestroika and glasnost that
set a new framework for Soviet foreign and domestic relations. For Risse-Kappen (1994: 185),

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 structural or functional explanations for the end of the Cold War (whether realist or liberal) could
not account for the change in Soviet foreign policy and the Western response to it. For Fierke (2001:
131–3), the end of the Cold War was not about a victory or the end of a game; it was about the
conflict between two different games of security. One game was defined by deterrence, the threat or
use of force and the balance of power. The other was about the possibility of change via dialogue
promoted by human rights and peace initiatives in both the East and the West, which was
eventually adopted by the superpower leaders, Gorbachev and Reagan, which resulted in the
breakdown of the Cold War structure.

At the core of the distinctions between conventional and critical variants of constructivism is the degree to
which there is an acceptance on what is ‘fixed’. Critical constructivists aim to denaturalize identity and the
logic through which we comprehend the world, focusing instead on the context of interaction and
intersubjective meanings. ttering an apology or describing a conflict as ‘genocide’ has implications for
meaning and action, constituting what is possible and what is not. The reluctance of the USA to describe
the conflict in Rwanda as ‘genocide’ existed for a reason to do so would have compelled intervention.
nderstanding the conflict as one of ‘local tribal warfare’ would not imply intervention because of the
different moves and understandings invoked by sovereignty (Fierke 2002: 348).

Key Points

Conventional constructivism puts forward the idea that there can be a via media (a synergy or
‘bridge’) between rationalist and reflectivist approaches. Critical constructivists argue that this
goal is contradictory and problematic.

Both differ in their treatment of identity. Critical constructivists argue that identity is more
complex and multiple than conventional constructivists present it. The latter tend to see identity
as uniform and solid, ignoring questions of power and representation.

Critical constructivists argue that language structures our reality and has a constitutive role,
something that conventional constructivists tend to ignore or downplay. This has resulted in a
positivist (conventional) and post-positivist (critical) divide between the two camps.

6.5 Critiques of constructivism

Critical constructivism’s problems with its conventional sibling hint at a broader set of critiques that have
emerged around this approach. Despite its stellar rise, constructivism faces a number of attacks and this
section explores the rationalist and poststructuralist complaints. Let us start with rationalism. On a
general level, rationalists claim that constructivism cannot test its claims empirically and fails to

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recognize that alternative theories may say essentially the same thing. When constructivists try to explain
how ideas have been crucial in shaping the interests and actions of states for instance, on what basis and
for what ↵ reason would a country join the E ? Moravcsik (2001: 177–84) argues that other theories
such as liberal intergovernmentalism draw upon similar explanations (see also Kowert 2001: 165). So, the
questions that Moravcsik asks are: what makes constructivism different and what sort of contribution does
it make to how we understand the world?

Kowert (2001: 1 1–5) is sceptical about the value of identity and Wendt’s lack of a theory of identity
formation. Wendt’s three cultures of anarchy also appear to be separate worlds of their own and limited to
these three images of enemy, rival, and friend. Copeland (2006) also critiques Wendt for failing to account
for an important realist category: uncertainty. Wendt does not consider that actors might deceive each
other and his theory of systemic constructivism does not comment on the present and future intentions of
other actors. Copeland suggests that we cannot know if another actor is acting cooperatively they may be
acting so in order to mask aggressive goals. Both Copeland and Krasner argue that there is little empirical
evidence about cooperation. Krasner is also doubtful about the power of norms, particularly when interests
are at stake. A norm of sovereignty is the principle of non-interference but this norm can be violated
(Krasner 2000). How can we ‘prove’ norms exist and affect behaviour? Furthermore, how do we know
which norms are at play in a given situation (Farrell 2002: 0–1)? Another common criticism is that
constructivism takes the state as given and assumes it to be the most important actor, neglecting
internationalization in a globalized world (Keohane 2000); for poststructuralists, the centrality and
reification of the state are a point of contention. Furthermore, constructivist research tends to focus on
‘good norms’, but does not engage sufficiently with why some norms are more ‘ethical’ or ‘just’ than
others, or why their emergence or transformation constitute moral progress or regress (Erskine 2012:
455).

David Campbell also sees the constructivist treatment of identity as problematic. He argues that identity is
always constructed as difference and we must be aware of how this creates ‘insides and outsides’ and the
need to confront these divides when examining the construction of danger from ‘evil others’ outside the
state. In a similar vein, Jairus Grove (2019: 80) states that constructivist claims about identity and
identification to explain war means we ‘privilege one of those processes over all others’. Identity has been
the basis of problematic interventions by states into the outside world, defining others as inferior and
relations as hierarchical. Furthermore, Campbell sees the turn to culture, norms, and ideas as troublesome.
‘Culture’ can become a variable that is given causal qualities. These categories can be constructed as a
threat, ignoring larger ethical-political issues at stake. Additionally, the notion that ideas have a causal
power is problematic. Campbell argues that, by privileging the ideational as causal, conventional
constructivists simply replace material causality with ideas. This contradicts one of the central claims of
constructivism: inter-subjectivity, which is a dialogical (relating to or in the form of dialogue)
relationship where meanings and practices stem from interaction. What is more interesting is the
possibility of deconstructing and denaturalizing identity, to consider alternative readings of identity
(Campbell 1998a: 218–23; Fierke 2001: 11 –17).

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Others have deeper concerns about the implications of constructivism. For Cynthia Weber (1999: 439–40),
constructivism is an ‘evacuation’ of politics, ‘replumbing’ neorealism through identity construction; it
privileges state-centrism and resurrects the anarchy myth. Maja Zehfuss (2002: 262) also claims that
constructivism is apolitical and limits the space for critical thinking, because it takes ‘reality’ as given,
closing off alternatives (see Think Point 6.2) and Charlotte Epstein (2011) levels a strong critique of the
constructivist understanding of ‘self’ and the use of the concept of ‘identity’ via a Lacanian approach to
the ‘speaking subject’. Moreover, Erskine (2012) and Price (2008) have queried the ethical and moral limits
of constructivism, in particular, the evaluative criteria for progressive claims or moral norms. Where some
constructivists, like Sikkink, suggest that foundational claims of human rights principles might form the
basis for this evaluative standard, this implies accepting those standards for making ethical judgements
(Erskine 2012: 457), which could entail a blindness to their biases and assumptions. This also relates to
what Havercroft, borrowing from Habermas, calls ‘cryptonormativism’, whereby ‘constructivist scholars
often assume or imply that a given norm (such as norms prohibiting weapons use, norms against torture,
or norms promoting human rights) is good without fully elaborating the reasons for it.’ (2018: 117) While
constructivists can recognize that not all norms are good, constructivism lacks an ‘explicitly normative
research agenda’. We cannot see, for example, the difference within empirical constructivism between
norms of the eighteenth and nineteenth ↵ centuries that regarded chattel slavery as legitimate because
of the norms of racial superiority that existed at the time, and contemporary norms of slavery (Havercroft
2018: 118).

Think Point 6.2 ntestable identities and the limits f Wendtian identi
ty

Wendt’s treatment of the state is problematic because he sees states as the most important actors
and takes their identity as given. Zehfuss argues that we fail to get a sense of more complex
readings of identity from Wendt’s formulation of it how do we know how it came about, what
shaped it, and if it is in fact ‘whole’? ehfuss (2002: 61) also criticizes the lack of attention to the
domestic level. In Wendt’s reading of identity and change, we only get a sense of change coming
from outside forces or influences. Zehfuss reveals the level of complexity that can be gained from a
more critical reading of identity. In her examination of Germany’s decision to undertake military
intervention in the 1990s, she argues that the discourses of the past (‘never again war’, ‘never
again dictatorship’) made German identity contestable. The power of these discourses (never again
to become an aggressive military force) competed with new challenges (what to do about ethnic
cleansing in Europe’s backyard). Its military participation in these efforts also had implications for
understanding Germany’s future identity and its place in Europe. Hence, by failing to pay attention
to language and power relations, Wendt’s identity lacks these depths. Wendt relies only on gestures
and signals where interaction is concerned, meaning we only get a sense of how states
communicate through their behaviour rather than through language (Zehfuss 2002: 48–9).

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Furthermore, Kurki and Sinclair (2010) have critiqued constructivism’s overt focus on ideational factors
(norms, rules, and intersubjectivity) at the expense of social context. The limitations are illustrated
through an examination of international law, which requires deeper consideration of its relationship to
other social structures, like patriarchy or capitalism. Havercroft likewise notes that constructivism’s focus
on the co-constitution of agency and structure means downplaying the responsibility of agents in their
actions as part of a larger social process (2018: 117). In assessing the various generations of constructivism,
McCourt (2016) has argued that US constructivism has narrowed to identity, norms, and culture as the
shapers of state action, and has forwarded a ‘New Constructivism’ that is based on the practice-relational
turn in IR that emphasizes everyday and affective underpinnings of social action and ongoing processes.
Relationalism’s complaint is that IR theory tends to focus on ‘things’ or actors; rather, ‘the social world is
made up of relations.’ (McCourt 2016: 479) McCourt argues that New Constructivism can overcome some
central dichotomies in constructivist theorizing, namely agency vs structure, the ideational vs the
material, and constitutive vs causal theorizing.

Key Points

Rationalists criticize constructivism because its claims cannot be tested or observed empirically.
Norms, values, and identities are something we cannot ‘see’. Furthermore, intentionality is
difficult to discern, and rationalists argue that we cannot say for sure which norms are operating
in a given situation.

Wendt is limited in his three cultures of anarchy and cannot tell us much about domestic identity
formation because his focus is the states system.

Poststructuralist critiques point to a reification of the state and a singular or essentialized

identity. Placing culture at the centre may be dangerous in itself and privilege dominant power
relations.

Furthermore, constructivism results in an uncritical and apolitical explanation of politics and

security problems.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter has explored some of the central themes of constructivism and how it relates to security. By
making the claim that identity matters, constructivism presents a challenge to rationalist theorizing.
Neorealist theories contend that states are bound to do the same thing in the international system seek
security and power because the anarchic international system provides the logic that this is what a state
must ↵ do to survive. Wendt’s suggestion that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ brought the debate
back to agency, arguing that it is states who make the system anarchic, not that anarchy is a natural
feature of the international system. This opened up the possibility of change. New norms can enter
collective understandings and recreate the international system of states. Interaction means that states do

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not just bump against each other as in the billiard-ball model, but through interaction states can alter
their identities and establish new frameworks for cooperation and shared understandings. Social learning
and communication are important in interaction, and actors learn from each other. France and Germany
are now allies, not enemies, via their interaction in European integration, and, although the USA treated
Iraq as an ally in the 1980s, how do we explain its shift to viewing Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s regime as an
enemy in the 1990s? How do we explain the challenges to established liberal norms and international
security that we can identify in the rise of populism in the mid-2010s? Shared norms, values, and beliefs,
constructivists argue, can explain much more than rationalist theorizing. The central point is that we
construct the world according to the meanings we give it.

Constructivism has lent insights into a number of security issues such as NATO’s survival and
enlargement, and why human rights have become a central concern in the security policies of states and
international organizations such as the UN, the OSCE, and others. But the way in which we can undertake a
constructivist analysis differs. Conventional forms of constructivism tend to accept that there exists some
compatibility between rationalist and constructivist approaches. By highlighting identity, norms, and
values, some constructivists believe that they can fill in the gaps of rationalist theories. Others remain
sceptical about this possibility, arguing that we must pay attention to power, the importance of discourse,
and language, and interrogate them critically. Conventional constructivists such as Wendt accept that the
state is the most important actor in the international system and that the identity of a state is given. Many
critical constructivists find this to be lacking and argue that we must investigate identity more rigorously
in order to uncover its meaning and construction.

Constructivism now forms one of the dominant modes of analysis in International Relations and Security
Studies. Its attention to identity, norms, values, culture, and interaction has produced some alternative
readings of security problems, how we frame and define them, and how our shared ideas impact on
security issues. The idea that we construct the world around us and what it means suggests an escape
clause from realism’s ‘timeless wisdom’.

Questions

1. Why does identity matter to constructivists?

2. What are norms and how do they affect security? How might norm change impact security, particularly in an
era of populism?

3. What is the difference between conventional and critical constructivism? Does it matter? If so, why?

4. How do constructivists think about agents and structures?

5. What is problematic about Wendtian constructivism?

6. How do constructivist accounts of security questions, such as the persistence and expansion of NATO after the
Cold War, differ from rationalist accounts?

7. Is security always about identity?

8. Do any of Wendt’s three cultures of anarchy accurately reflect the international system today?

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9. What is beneficial and problematic about conventional constructivism’s claim to build bridges between
rationalist and reflectivist approaches?

10. To what extent is culture important in terms of security?

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