Event Trees

Event Trees
Quantitative Risk Analysis
Event Trees - Overview

Definitions
Steps
Occurrence frequency
Mean Time between Shutdown
Mean Time Between Runaway
Example
Accidents do happen!
When an accident or process
deviation (i.e. an event) occurs in a
plant, various safety systems (both
mechanical and human) come into play
to prevent the accident from
propagating.
These safety systems either fail or
succeed.
Event Trees
Event trees are used to follow the
potential course of events as the
event moves through the various
safety systems. The probability of
success or failure of each safety
intervention is used to determine the
overall probability of each final
outcome.
Event Trees
An Event Tree is used to determine
the frequency of occurrence of
process shutdowns or runaway
systems.
Inductive approach
Specify/Identify an initiating even and

work forward.
Identifies how a failure can occur and the
probability of occurrence
Steps to Construct an Event Tree

Identify an initiating event of
interest.
Identify the safety functions
designed to deal with the initiation
followed by the impact of the safety
system
Construct the event tree
Describe the resulting accident event
sequences.
Identify an initiating event

May have been identified during a
HAZOP as a potential event that
could result in adverse consequences.
Usually involves a major piece of
operating equipment or processing
step, i.e. a HAZOP Study Node.
Identify safety functions

From PID, process flow sheet, or procedures find
what safety systems are in place and what their
functions are.
These can include things such as automatic
controllers, alarms, sensors, operator
intervention, etc.
On you Event Tree write across the top of the
page in the sequence of the safety interventions
that logically occur.
Give each safety intervention an alphabetic
letter notation.
Construct the Event Tree

Horizontal lines are drawn between
functions that apply
Vertical lines are drawn at each
safety function that applies
Success upward
Failure downward
Indicate result of event
Circle acceptable result

Cross-circle unacceptable result
Construct Event Tree (cont.)

Compute frequency of failures
B is the failure per demand or the

unavailability of safety function B
Occurrence Frequency
Follow process through with each
step to calculate the frequency of
each consequence occurring.
Typically three final results
Continuous operation
Shutdown (safely)
Runaway or fail
Mean time between Shutdown

Mean Time Between Shutdown, MTBS
is calculated from:
MTBS=1/occurrences of shutdowns
Mean Time Between Runaway, MTBR

is calculated from:
MTBR=1/ occurrences of runaways
Example Loss of coolant to reactor

Four safety
interventions
High temperature alarm

Operator noticing the
high temperature during
normal inspection
Operator re-establishes
the coolant flow
Operator performs
emergency shutdown of
reactor
Example Loss of coolant

Assume loss of coolant occurs once per year
(occurrence frequency 1/yr)
Alarm fails 1% of time placed in demand
(failure rate of 0.01 failures/demand)
Operator will notice high reactor temperature
3 out of 4 times (0.25 failures/demand)
Operator will successfully restart coolant flow
3 out of 4 times (0.25 failures/demand)
Operator successfully shuts down reactor 9
out of 10 times (0.10 failures/demand)
Resulting Event Tree Analysis
Example Possible outcomes

The lettering is used to identify each
final outcome.
For instance, ABDE
Indicates that after Initiating event A

occurs, that safety system B failed (high
T alarm), that safety system D failed
(the operator was unable to re-start the
coolant) and safety system E failed (the
operator was unable to successful shut
down the reactor).
Example Determination of MTBS

For Mean Time Between Shutdowns
take the reciprocal of the sum of all
sequences that resulted in a
shutdown. (Example gives 1/.225 =
4.4yrs)
For Mean Time Between Runaway do
the same thing with all sequences
that resulted in a runaway. (Example
gives 1/0.250 = 40yrs)
What is wrong with the logic of

this example analysis?
What is wrong?
If the operator
fails to notice the
high temperature
after the alarms
fails, then he/she
will never restart
the cooling.
In Class Example
Construct an Event Tree and determine the
MTBS and MTBR for a loss of coolant for the
reactor shown in Figure 11-8.
Assume loss of coolant occurs once every three

years.
Alarm fails 0.1% of time placed in demand
Operator will notice high reactor temperature 3 out
of 4 times
Operator will successfully restart coolant flow 4 out
of 5 times
Operator successfully shuts down reactor 9 out of 10
times
Solution Construct Event Tree
Solution Continued
Occurrence Frequency
Event A 0.999 0.8 0.7992
Event AD 0.999 0.2 0.9 0.17982
Event ADE 0.999 0.2 0.1 0.01998
Event AB 0.001 0.75 0.80 0.0006
Event ABD 0.001 0.75 0.20 0.9 0.000135
Event ABDE 0.001 0.75 0.20 0.10 0.000015
Event ABC 0.001 0.25 0.00025
Solution Continued
Mean Time Between Events
Mean Time Between Shutdowns
1
MTBS
Occurences of Shutdown
1
MTBS
5.56 yrs
0.17982 0.000135
Mean Time Between Runaways
1
MTBR
Occurences of Runaways
1
MTBR
49.4 yrs
0.01998 0.000015 0.00025

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Event Trees

Quantitative Risk Analysis

Event Trees - Overview

Specify/Identify an initiating even and

Steps to Construct an Event Tree

Identify an initiating event

Identify safety functions

Construct the Event Tree

Indicate result of event

Circle acceptable result

Construct Event Tree (cont.)

B is the failure per demand or the

Mean time between Shutdown

Mean Time Between Runaway, MTBR

Example Loss of coolant to reactor

High temperature alarm

Example Loss of coolant

Resulting Event Tree Analysis

Example Possible outcomes

Indicates that after Initiating event A

Example Determination of MTBS

What is wrong with the logic of

Assume loss of coolant occurs once every three

Solution Construct Event Tree

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