Mandik Chapter 1

Human Mind, Science and
Psychology
Chapter 1: Meet Your Mind

Outline
Aspects of the mind (mental states and their properties)
Philosophical problems concerning the mind

Thought and experience
Sensory experiences: colours and shapes, noises, smells, texture

and temperature
Emotional experiences: anxiety, fear
Thoughts: beliefs, judgments, doubts
Can these two groups comprise all mental states? (mental

images and emotions)
Conscious and unconscious states
Not all mental states are conscious

Freud's unconscious desires
Unconscious planning in playing the piano
Most perception is conscious

Qualia
Subjective aspects of conscious experiences that cannot be

verbally described: “what it feels like” to have pain
It is impossible to describe what red is like to someone who is

congenitally blind
Inverted spectrum: Is it possible that experiences of red/blue are

inverted in different people?
Sensory perception
The source of all knowledge according to empiricism
What is the difference between perceiving a cat and thinking of

a cat? Causal interaction with an existing object
Emotion
Thinking that there is a dog in the room vs. being happy that
there is a dog in the room
Emotions are usually positive or negative, unlike thoughts.

But this is not enough to characterize all emotions (anger vs.
fear)
Imagery
Imagining D (rotated counterclockwise) on top of J
Non-visual mental imagery as well
Images are similar to sensory experiences in one way and similar

to thoughts in another way.
Will and action
What happens to us (perception and experience) vs. what we do

(action).
Will causes actions but not perceptions. Perception is not

voluntary; actions sometimes are.
Self
Personal identity: What distinguishes you from other persons or

objects? What makes you still you when your body, your
memories, your worldview gradually change over the years?
One answer is the self.
David Hume and the Buddhists deny that selves exist: just
experiences; no separate experiencer
Propositional attitudes
Beliefs and desires are propositional attitudes; experiences are

not
Proposition: a declarative sentence
Attitudes: believing, wondering, doubting, desiring, fearing,

intending
“Believing that it will rain tomorrow”

“Fearing that you will fail the exam”
The mind-body problem
Physical states and properties (mass, in space, movement,

chemical constituents; being green) vs. mental states and
properties (thought; being painful)
What is the real difference between the physical and the mental?
(If any)
What kind of a relation can there be between physical and mental

states? (two-way causal?)
If minds are also physical, how can that be possible given that
they look so different?
Descartes' substance dualism: Thinking thing vs. thing that takes

up space (res cogitans vs. res extensa)
If so, how is interaction possible? They seem to interact both at

perception and action.
Causal interaction usually requires being at the same place. But

minds are not located in space. So there is a problem.
Also, how come your mind affects your body but not my body?
To avoid the problem of interaction, an alternative is monism:

everything is mental or everything is physical (future chapters)
Perhaps the mind is just the brain; if so, brain-body interaction

becomes possible.
The problem for physicalism is the existence of qualia. There

are no qualia in the brain (no blue thing in the brain when we
experience “blueness”)
This may lead to property dualism.

The problem of perception
In accurate perception, we interact with an object and are aware

of the object. In dreaming, hallucinating or misperceiving, you
are not aware of an object but the idea of an object. But from the
inside, the experience of accurate perception and misperception is
the same.
Because of this similarity, some philosophers say that in both

cases what we are aware of is the idea of the object. But if this is
true, the external world becomes unreachable to us and irrelevant
to perception.
The problem of other minds
Mental states are private: Only I can have direct access to my

mental states. If so, how can I know other people have mental
states?
Perhaps by observing their behaviour. But a very good actor who

acts as if in pain can deceive us.
The relation between mental states and behaviour is contingent

(no necessary connection). One solution is behaviourism.
The problem of artificial intelligence
Can computers and robots have minds? Can a machine think?
Functionalists say yes: Minds are some sort of machine. An

artificial machine that works like the mind can think.
If so, what is the difference between thinking and non-thinking

machines?
The problem of consciousness
Perhaps a machine can think. But can it be conscious, have qualia

and sensory experiences? Can a machine feel pain?
Consciousness seems different from thinking. Consciousness in

physical systems seems more difficult to imagine.
The problem of intentionality
What sort of relation is there between a thinker and the things

thought about?
Perhaps a causal relation: The things causally influence the

thinker's thoughts.
I can think about things that don't exist (e.g., unicorns), so the
relation is puzzling.
The problem of free will
We think we make free decisions and are morally responsible for

our decisions and actions.
But scientists think that everything (including human decisions

and actions) is predetermined given the laws of nature and past
events
If so, can we still be free? Is there room for free will in the
modern scientific worldview? Can determinism and free will be
reconciled?
The problem of personal identity
How much change is required when one thing becomes another

thing? Changing a chair part by part. Persons also change cell by
cell. What maintains personal identity?
What happens to a person after death? If there is life after death,

what kind of life is it? Bodily or merely spiritual?
A functionalist rejects substance dualism but can still accept life

after death: Your mind can still run on a new hardware.

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Human Mind, Science and

Chapter 1: Meet Your Mind

Aspects of the mind (mental states and their properties)

Philosophical problems concerning the mind

Sensory experiences: colours and shapes, noises, smells, texture

Thoughts: beliefs, judgments, doubts

Can these two groups comprise all mental states? (mental

Not all mental states are conscious

Most perception is conscious

Subjective aspects of conscious experiences that cannot be

It is impossible to describe what red is like to someone who is

Inverted spectrum: Is it possible that experiences of red/blue are

The source of all knowledge according to empiricism

What is the difference between perceiving a cat and thinking of

Emotions are usually positive or negative, unlike thoughts.

Imagining D (rotated counterclockwise) on top of J

Non-visual mental imagery as well

Images are similar to sensory experiences in one way and similar

What happens to us (perception and experience) vs. what we do

Will causes actions but not perceptions. Perception is not

Personal identity: What distinguishes you from other persons or

One answer is the self.

Beliefs and desires are propositional attitudes; experiences are

Proposition: a declarative sentence

Attitudes: believing, wondering, doubting, desiring, fearing,

“Believing that it will rain tomorrow”

Physical states and properties (mass, in space, movement,

What kind of a relation can there be between physical and mental

Descartes' substance dualism: Thinking thing vs. thing that takes

If so, how is interaction possible? They seem to interact both at

Causal interaction usually requires being at the same place. But

To avoid the problem of interaction, an alternative is monism:

Perhaps the mind is just the brain; if so, brain-body interaction

The problem for physicalism is the existence of qualia. There

This may lead to property dualism.

In accurate perception, we interact with an object and are aware

Because of this similarity, some philosophers say that in both

Mental states are private: Only I can have direct access to my

Perhaps by observing their behaviour. But a very good actor who

The relation between mental states and behaviour is contingent

Can computers and robots have minds? Can a machine think?

Functionalists say yes: Minds are some sort of machine. An

If so, what is the difference between thinking and non-thinking

Perhaps a machine can think. But can it be conscious, have qualia

Consciousness seems different from thinking. Consciousness in

What sort of relation is there between a thinker and the things

Perhaps a causal relation: The things causally influence the

We think we make free decisions and are morally responsible for

But scientists think that everything (including human decisions

How much change is required when one thing becomes another

What happens to a person after death? If there is life after death,

A functionalist rejects substance dualism but can still accept life

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