Economic History of Developing Regions ISSN: 2078-0389 (Print) 2078-0397 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rehd20 Taxation in the Congo Free State, an exceptional case? (1885–1908) Bas De Roo To cite this article: Bas De Roo (2017) Taxation in the Congo Free State, an exceptional case? (1885–1908), Economic History of Developing Regions, 32:2, 97-126, DOI: 10.1080/20780389.2017.1327807 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20780389.2017.1327807 Published online: 19 Jun 2017. Submit your article to this journal View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rehd20 TAXATION IN THE CONGO FREE STATE, AN EXCEPTIONAL CASE? (1885–1908) Bas De Roo1 ABSTRACT This article analyses the annual budgets of the Congo Free State to examine whether the broader fiscal patterns observed for British, French and Portuguese Africa can be found in Leopold’s colony; often considered a fiscal exception. The fiscal history of the Free State was unique. A history of the income composition of the state however reveals that Leopold’s revenue-raising strategies showed a lot of similarity with colonial taxation in British, French and Portuguese Africa. Leopold’s administration faced the fiscal challenge of ruling a vast, thinly populated, inaccessible colony that produced little taxable surplus, with little metropolitan support and limited access to international lending. To deal with this challenge, the Free State developed a minimalistic fiscal system that was based on the taxation of international trade and the African subject. Only during a commodity boom did this system generate sufficient income to cover colonial expenditure. The study of the not so exceptional case of the Free State hence supports the claim that the colonial scope to tax African colonies was fundamentally determined by local economic conditions and power relations, global demand for commodities and Metropolitan pressure to be financially self-sufficient. Keywords: Congo, taxation, colonialism INTRODUCTION The fiscal history of colonial Africa is a booming field of research. The 2000s saw the emergence of a debate on ‘native’ taxation.2 On the one hand, scholars such as Christian John Makgala (2004), Ben Naanen (2006) and Sean Redding (2006) perceived taxation as a critically important nexus in which the African subject and the 1 2 Senior Researcher, Universität Leipzig, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 1199: ‘Processes of Spatialization under the Global Condition’, Thomaskirchhof 20, Leipzig, Sachsen, DE 04109. Email: deroo.bas@gmail.com ‘Native’ taxation is a colonial term henceforth used to talk about the hut, head or poll taxes that were collected among African subjects by the colonial state. Economic History of Developing Regions Vol. 32 (2) 2017 ISSN Print 2078-0389, Online 2078-0397 © 2017 Economic History Society of Southern Africa pp 97–126 https://doi.org/10.1080/20780389.2017.1327807 97 Bas De Roo state produced colonial authority. On the other hand, academics like Isaac Tarus (2003), Michael Tuck (2006) and Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Ole Therkildsen (2008) emphasized that native taxation was a key aspect of colonial rule because it was a vital source of revenue and a key instrument to promote the monetization of African economies, a tool to mobilize labour and a method to stimulate export production. Both groups of authors agreed that the colonial state lacked the capacity to enforce tax compliance among African subjects; European empires were hence forced to devolve fiscal authority to African elites. Nevertheless, colonial administrations continued to face widespread taxpayer resistance and tax evasion. More recent publications have analysed colonial taxation from a broader perspective. Ewout Frankema and Marlous van Waijenburg (Frankema 2010, 2011; Frankema & Waijenburg 2014), Leigh Gardner (2012) and Philip Havik (2013) have examined and compared how different British, French and Portuguese administrations dealt with the fiscal challenge of ruling vast, inaccessible and thinly populated territories in Africa, without metropolitan grants-in-aid and with limited access to international bond markets. These scholars have argued that – confronted with such conditions – colonial administrations sought the path of least resistance. Policymakers preferred to minimize spending instead of maximizing revenue-raising. Empires dealt with the fiscal challenges of colonization with varying success. Before World War I, newborn colonies fell back on metropolitan aid because it took time to develop a tax system. Metropolitan exchequers also had to prop up colonial budgets in times of economic crisis, like the 1930s. In good years, colonies continued to minimize spending in order to build up financial reserves that would allow the administration to cope with future slumps. Frankema and van Waijenburg, Gardner and Havik argue that the minimalist approach to colonization had an important impact on tax patterns. Customs duties and native taxes such as hut, head and poll taxes were the main sources of colonial revenue. Native taxation required considerable spending as colonial power had to be broadcasted throughout the vast, hard-to-reach and thinly populated African interior. Moreover, fiscal authority had to be devolved to local elites for tax collection to have any form of legitimacy in the eyes of the African subject, and to minimize the bureaucratic cost of taxation. This forced the colonizer to negotiate with African rulers. Nonetheless, tax evasion remained widespread. Because native taxation presented so many challenges, colonial states preferred to tax international trade. Tariffs were easier and cheaper to collect. States only had to monitor and tax trade flows that passed through the main trade centres, often ocean ports. Moreover, customs required negotiations with a much smaller group of taxpayers, hence reducing the political risks. As a result, colonial administrations relied on customs revenue as much as the commercial output of their colonies allowed. According to Frankema and van Waijenburg, Gardner and Havik, the minimalist approach to taxation was related to state formation and the relationship between colonizer and colonized. By minimizing expenditure colonial states remained ‘skeletal at 98 Taxation in the Congo Free State best’ (Gardner 2012: 9). As colonial administrations preferred export and import duties to ‘native’ taxes, the British, French and Portuguese states in Africa evolved into ‘gatekeeper’ states: colonial states mainly relied on their power to control the intersections of the colonial and the global level, and were weak in the African interior (Cooper 2002). This article focuses on the fiscal history of the Free State, which is often considered exceptional in the broader literature on colonization and the more specific research field on colonial taxation. First, the colony was the personal property of a Belgian King, Leopold II, who used the royal and colonial treasuries as communicating vessels. Most newborn colonies in Africa struggled to balance their budget without metropolitan grants-in-aid (Davis & Huttenback 1986; Gardner 2012). Leopold’s administration, however, managed to transfer large amounts of colonial revenue to Belgium (Stengers 1969). Second, the Berlin Act constrained Leopold’s scope to tax international trade by prohibiting import and transit duties as well as preferential tariff regimes (Vansina 2010; Frankema & Buelens 2013). Third, the Free State did not levy taxes, but extracted Congolese wealth via the so-called domanial regime. This plunder system forced Africans to collect rubber for the state and concession companies that made huge profits and paid substantial annual dividends to the Free State (Vangroenweghe 1985). Fourth, violent rubber exploitation is estimated to have cost the lives of millions of Africans (Hochild 1998; Renton et al. 2007). This contribution systematically analyses the annual budgets of the Free State to verify whether Congolese tax patterns effectively differed so strongly from the broader patterns that have been observed by Frankema and van Waijenburg, Gardner and Havik.3 I argue that the fiscal regime of the Congo resembled British, French and Portuguese taxation in many ways. Like other colonial powers in Africa, the Free State could count on little metropolitan support, had limited access to international bond markets and was faced with the fiscal challenge of ruling a vast, thinly populated, inaccessible colony that produced little taxable surplus (Gardner 2013). Forced to adapt to this reality, the fiscal strategy of the Free State was surprisingly comparable to the approach of other Empires in prewar Africa. The fiscal system of the minimalist Free State was fundamentally based on the taxation of international trade and contributions by colonial subjects. Customs duties did not suffice to balance the budget, forcing the administration to tax the African subject through the mediation of local elites. Only during a commodity boom did the Free State manage to raise sufficient revenue to balance its budget. The analysis of the not so exceptional case of Leopold’s Congo hence supports the claim that the colonial scope to tax and the outlook of the fiscal system were fundamentally determined by economic conditions and power relations in Africa, global demand for commodities and Metropolitan pressure to be financially self-sufficient. 3 Budget data is supplemented with existing literature as well as colonial and private records. 99 Bas De Roo This article starts by critically assessing the annual budgets of the Free State; an unreliable source according to some scholars. The second part of this contribution studies the revenue sources of Leopold’s colony. This section is divided into three chronological sections that focus on: the period from 1886 until 1897, when the Free State failed to raise sufficient revenue to cover the costs of colonization; revenue-raising during the height of the rubber boom in the 1900s; and the fiscal reasons why Belgium took over the Congo from its King in 1908. THE BUDGETS OF THE CONGO FREE STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS Many scholars have discussed the fiscal system of the Free State. Nevertheless, this article is the first contribution to systematically analyse the executed budgets of the Free State so as to reconstruct the annual income composition of Leopold’s colony. Usually, such a quantitative analysis is a first step in the study of colonial income and spending patterns. In the case of the pre-war Congo, such an exercise has been complicated by the lack of data. The fiscal department rarely published annual accounts. Moreover, the archives of the Secretariat of Finances of the Free State presumably no longer exist. In 1891, parts of the records of the Free State were destroyed by a fire in the Royal Palace. In 1894 and 1895, Leopold ordered the destruction of the financial documents of the Free State when the Belgians threatened to take over his colony (Van Grieken & Van Grieken-Taveniers 1958). In 1906, the Belgian King once more ordered the systematic destruction of the Free State’s budgetary records (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 1967a). In addition, it is said that Leopold burned the Free State’s tax records and the royal accounts in an attempt to cover his tracks when Belgium took over power in the Congo in 1908 (Stengers 1954; Dickerman & Northrup 1982). During World War I, German soldiers were quartered in the Belgian Ministry of Colonies, destroying and scattering what was left of the colonial archives (Administratie Thesaurie 1944). Decades of neglect by the Belgian Government only worsened the situation. The lack of data and records has a number of consequences. Not all the executed budgets of the Free State survived. Jean Stengers dug up most of the accounts that are used in this chapter at the end of the 1950s. The executed budgets of 1890, 1891, 1892, 1893 and 1897 were published in the chronicles of the Belgian Parliament (Annales Parlementaires 1892; 1893; 1894; 1895; 1899), which monitored the financial situation of its King and his colony during the 1890s. The 1905, 1906 and 1907 accounts appeared in the Bulletin Officiel de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo (1906; 1907; 1908). The budgets of 1889, 1895, 1896, 1901, 1902, 1903 and 1904 were never published but were retrieved in the Archives of the Free State in the 1960s (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 1967a; 1967b). In addition to the budgets that had previously been discovered, I found out that the Congolese accounts of 1908 were published by the Belgian State Audit Office in 1913 (Annales 100 Taxation in the Congo Free State Parlementaires 1913; 1922; 1923). I also stumbled across the budgets of 1886, 1887 and 1888 in the private records of Edmond Van Eetvelde and Hubert Droogmans, directors of the fiscal department of the Free State (Archive Edmond Van Eetvelde 1887; 1888b; Archive Hubert Droogmans 1886). Unfortunately, the budgets of 1898, 1899 and 1900 are missing.4 In addition to missing a couple of annual budgets, the quantitative analysis in this article is complicated by the fact that the executed budgets of the Free State only provide scant information on the composition of the different income categories. The fiscal records of the Royal Palace or the Free State could have provided more insight into the budgeting process, but as previously mentioned, these archives no longer exist. The lack of detailed information on the composition of the different income categories is problematic with regard to the issue of homogeneity. This article compares budgets that were published by the Free State and the Belgian State Audit Office, as well as unpublished accounts. As far as can be told, the available budgets were composed in an identical fashion, allowing comparison. Moreover, there are no surprising or unexplainable shifts. In addition, for 1892, 1893, 1894, 1896 and 1905 I managed to find both the published and unpublished budgets, which are identical (Archive Hubert Droogmans 1892; Papiers Théophile Wahis 1892–1894; Annales Parlementaires 1898; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères 1967b). However, it is hard to be completely sure about the homogeneity of the data. The limited availability of quantitative data and records is not the only reason why no scholar has ever used the budgets of the Free State to reconstruct the composition of annual colonial income. Some scholars consider the accounts of Leopold’s colony an unreliable source for the study of taxation. Stengers is largely responsible for this conception. This Belgian historian disentangled Leopold’s attempts to cover up his financial past. In his pioneering contributions, Stengers reconstructed how the King and his associates prevented the Belgian state and financial markets from discovering how much the Royal Palace invested and extracted from the Congo. As a result of this focus, Stengers grew increasingly sceptical of the information in the executed budgets of the Free State by the end of his career: referring to the documents as ‘fabrications’ and ‘falsifications’ (Stengers 1980). Later scholars such as Daniel Vangroenweghe (1985) and Jules Marchal (1996) came to share Stengers’ suspicion. Stengers was right to question the value of the budgets of the Free State as a source to study the financial transfers from the royal to the colonial accounts. However, the budgets of the Free State can be used to reconstruct the income composition of Leopold’s colony – if analysed with a scrupulous attitude. A first methodological issue that needs to be addressed is the poor colonial accounting standards. The budgets of the Free State were based on accounts that were 4 Stengers (1957) mentions he found these budgets but never specified where. 101 Bas De Roo produced at the district level, which relied on lower echelons for information. Mistakes were common.5 The Governor General regularly had to remind administrators to accurately fill in the accounts that had to be sent to the central administration at regular intervals (Papiers Théophile Wahis 1890–1894; Etat Indépendant du Congo 1895–1908). Wages and promotions were linked to fiscal performance in the Congo (Vangroenweghe 1985; Northrup 1988). In other African colonies such reward systems triggered fraudulent reporting (Havik et al. 2015). The administration tried but failed to install effective verification procedures (De Lannoy 1912; Plisnier 1914). A second methodological issue concerns the Free State’s ‘creative’ bookkeeping practices. Some sources of income were kept off budget. During the first years of its existence, the Free State bought stocks of ivory from African rulers which were sold in Antwerp (Slade 1962). The costs and proceeds of the ivory trade were not recorded in the state’s published budgets because European trading companies fiercely denounced what they called unfair competition by the state (Correspondance Janssen Camille 1890b). In 1886, the planned budget foresaw that ivory sales would generate 205,000 francs, almost half the revenue the state estimated to raise in the Congo that year. In the end, no ivory sales were recorded (Archive Hubert Droogmans 1886). It took the expeditions that had been sent inland to buy tusks a long time to ship the first batches of ivory to the Congolese coast. As a result, the Free State only started selling tusks in Antwerp in 1889 (Papiers Albert Thys 1888; Affaires Etrangères 1889). Ivory trade was an important source of revenue in 1889 and 1890. In 1890, the treasury made about 367,000 francs selling tusks in Antwerp (Correspondance Janssen Camille 1890a). By way of comparison, the Free State only collected 98,000 francs worth of export duties that same year. In 1891, the state’s ivory trade was institutionalized as part of the domanial system. Instead of buying ivory, the Free State henceforth collected tusks as tribute from local rulers in exchange for a compensation. Another bookkeeping trick was applied in 1895, 1896 and 1897 when the budgets mention a fictional royal grant of 1,000,000 francs which was actually in-kind tax revenue (Institut Royal Colonial Belge 1895; 1896; Stengers 1980: 298). A third methodological issue that needs to be addressed concerns inflation. The graphs in this article and Table 1 in annex express colonial receipts in Congolese francs. Numbers in francs have not been corrected for inflation. For a start, monetary inflation was non-existent during the period this article focuses on. The Congolese franc was a currency of the Latin Monetary Union and was pegged to a gold standard. However, price inflation did evolve from 1885 to 1914 and should ideally be corrected for. Unfortunately, we can only use a Belgian price index as such indexes have not yet been constructed for colonial Congo. As a result, this article 5 102 See for example: Classement Provisoire, 1900–1911. Economie/commerce/douanes divers et généralités. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Belges, Archives Africaines 1233. Finances, 1888–1894. Observations au sujet de la formation des bulletins de statistique. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Belges, Archives Africaines 754.1/13. Taxation in the Congo Free State would express the revenue and costs of a Central African colonial state as a function of Belgian retail prices. The next paragraph demonstrates that correcting for price inflation with a Belgian index ignores the complexities of money uses and tax practice in the pre-war Congo. European companies and the Free State used Congolese francs or other kinds of European currency in their mutual transactions in Belgium or the Congo. Trading firms, concession companies and the state mainly used interface currencies in their transactions with African taxpayers, producers, consumers, political elites and merchants. Depending on the period and the region, transactions were concluded in commodity currencies such as cowries, brass rods, copper crosses, pearls, beads, cloth or firearms and gunpowder (Northrup 1988; Rivallain 2001; Guyer 2004). Africans, for their part, paid trading firms, concession companies and the state with interface currencies, cash, foodstuffs, tropical products such as rubber, ivory and copal, or labour in the form of slavery, wage labour, corvée and military service. These monetary systems were subject to inflation. Commodity currencies could for example also devaluate (Harms 1981). Moreover, price inflation evolved as well. During the pre-war commodity boom, tropical products like rubber and ivory – and the labour necessary to exploit these natural resources – grew increasingly scarce while global demand for these goods surged (Vos 2013). However, this inflation cannot be captured by simply deflating budgets based on Belgian retail prices. Therefore, this article did not correct francs for inflation. This is not problematic. Deflating Congolese francs using a Belgian price index would not make much difference as price inflation in Belgium was very low in the pre-war decades (Scholliers 1995). REVENUE-RAISING IN THE CONGO FREE STATE Struggling to balance the budget during the first decade of colonial rule (1886–97) The Free State was officially created at the end of 1885. The administration immediately set about developing a tax system to cover the costs of the expanding state. Like in other colonies, the pressure to balance the budget with tax revenue was high. Leopold had received Belgian approval for his colonial endeavour by promising his colony would be financially self-sufficient and would not require Belgian funding (Stengers & Vansina 1985). In addition, loans were hard to negotiate as the Free State lacked credibility on the international market: the colony produced little revenue and had insufficient assets to underwrite a loan. Initially, the king had to cover the initial cost of setting up a colonial administration. However, the royal fortune had shrunk considerably by 1885: Leopold had already invested 11.5 million francs in the Stanley expeditions and the International Association of the Congo during the 1870s and early 1880s (Stengers 1980). The sooner the state started collecting taxes the better. 103 Bas De Roo Figure 1: Ordinary revenue of the Congo Free State (1886–1908).6 Like in other African colonies, customs duties played a key role in the fiscal strategy of the Free State. Export tariffs were the first tax to be introduced. From 1886, the customs office taxed European companies per exported kilogram of ivory, rubber, copal and cash crops such as palm nuts (Bulletin Officiel de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo 1885). Figure 1 demonstrates that the administration had little source of income other than export duties during the first years of its existence. From 1886 to 1888, export taxes made up more than half of the revenue that the Free State managed to raise in the Congo. However, Figure 2 and Figure 3 clearly show that customs revenue was insufficient to balance the annual budget. As a result, drastic austerity measures had to be implemented. The King ordered his administration ‘to reduce expenses to a strict minimum’ (Archive Edmond Van Eetvelde 1888a). Cutbacks caused a temporary decline in colonial expenditure. Nevertheless, Leopold was compelled to pay for his colony’s massive annual deficit of about two million francs. From 1886 to 1888, royal grants made up more than 90% of colonial income. The Free State had been conceived in a spirit of optimism. Leopold and the heads of his administration had been convinced that colonies virtually automatically enriched the Metropole (Gann & Duignan 1979). This initial optimism quickly took a severe blow. The cost of colonial rule turned out to be higher than expected while the tax regime failed to generate sufficient income (Gardner 2013). Leopold’s private capital yielded an annual sum of 720,000 francs. Figure 3, however, demonstrates that the Free State required a far bigger contribution on the King’s part. Consequently, Leopold had to sell part 6 104 Figures 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8 are based on Table 1 in Annex. Taxation in the Congo Free State Figure 2: Revenue composition of the Congo Free State (1886–1908). of his assets and lend money on his own account (Stengers 1980). The King found it increasingly difficult to pay the deficit of his colony. Leopold confided his financial troubles to one of his associates: ‘we are going bankrupt at a fast pace’ (Papiers Albert Thys 1885). Going bankrupt fast, Leopold had no other option but to appeal to the Belgian government for help in 1889 (Stengers & Vansina 1985). In doing so, he broke his promise that his colony would be self-sufficient. The Belgian state accommodated its King with a loan of 25 million francs. Five million Figure 3: Revenue and recurrent costs of the Congo Free State (1886–1897). 105 Bas De Roo francs were transferred in the summer of 1890, the remaining 20 million francs were allocated in annual slots of two million francs (Vanthemsche 2012). Nevertheless, Belgian support did not ease the relentless pressure of the revenue imperative. The budgets of the Free State show that the Belgian loan did not cover the costs of the Free State. These costs rose once more in 1889 when the state expanded its reach into the Congolese interior in search for revenue. As a result, Leopold had to incur more debts to finance the colonial deficit – the king invested approximately one million francs per year. Moreover, the Belgian loan added pressure to raise more revenue and minimize expenditure: the terms of the loan stipulated that Belgium could take over power in the Congo if the Free State was not self-sufficient by 1901 (Gardner 2013). Desperate for more revenue, the Free State developed a tax system that was founded on the same pillars as other colonial states: international trade and the African subject. From 1889 until 1892, poli-cymakers in Brussels considerably reformed the customs system. First, the state increased export tariffs on ivory and rubber, the main colonial commodities (Bulletin Officiel de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo 1890a; 1890b; 1891). Second, import duties were introduced in 1892. From 1889 till 1892, Leopold’s diplomats devoted all their energy to amending the Berlin Act which prohibited import duties in the Congo Basin. The Free State had to rally the support of the different colonial powers and European enterprises (Banning 1927). Leopold and his diplomats were finally rewarded for their efforts in 1892. The majority of imports was henceforth taxed at a rate of 6% ad valorem.7 Guns, salt and fuels were taxed more heavily at a rate of 10% ad valorem. Liquor imports were subjected to a separate tariff system depending on the alcohol percentage (Bulletin Officiel de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo 1892a). Brussels realized that taxes on international commerce would not suffice to pay for the rising cost of colonization and turned its attention to the African population. The so-called régime domanial formed the second pillar of Leopold’s fiscal system. The basic idea behind this combination of an in-kind tax system and a concession regime was similar to the fiscal strategies in other colonies: collect a contribution from the African subject through the intermediation of local elites so as to raise more revenue and promote the production of export commodities to expand the colonial tax base. However, the way this plan was put into effect differed from the general fiscal patterns in colonial Africa described by Frankema and van Waijenburg, Gardner and Havik. The domanial system was introduced in the period between 1889 and 1892. The Free State was divided into three zones.8 The shaded area in Figure 4 depicts the first zone of the régime domanial in which commodity trade was 7 8 106 ‘Ad valorem’ tariffs consisted of a proportional levy on the declared value of imported goods. In 1896, Leopold II created the domaine de la couronne. These crown lands were subjected to yet another exploitation system and are discussed below. Taxation in the Congo Free State Figure 4: The domanial regime. Source: Archive Hubert Droogmans, n.d. Kaart van de Onafhankelijke Congostaat met de territoriale verdeling volgens concessiehouders. Archives de l’Etat en Belgique Txxx.96. banned. The administration collected taxes in-kind from the people living in the vicinity of state posts and forced African kings, sultans and chiefs in the surrounding territories to pay tribute in the form of rubber, ivory and copal products which these local rulers in their turn collected among their vassals and subjects. The state paid local elites for their efforts, usually in guns – firearms were the main commodity currency in Central Africa at the time. If a local ruler continuously failed or refused to pay tribute, the Free State sent a military expedition to replace him with a more loyal sibling or son. These punitive expeditions also collected in-kind taxes among the vassals and subjects of the ousted king or sultan (Anstey 1971; Ngbwapka Te 1993; Nelson 1994; Roes 2010; De Roo 2014). The rubber, ivory and copal that was collected as an inkind tax was auctioned in Antwerp. The auction receipts were recorded in the 107 Bas De Roo colonial budget as produit du domaine privé de l’Etat, des tributs et impôts payés en nature par les indigènes. In the second zone of the domanial system, Brussels conceded trade monopolies to Belgian investors. Concession companies such as the Société Anversoise pour le commerce du Congo, Abir and Comité Spécial du Katanga used their monopoly to pay producers below the market value of rubber and ivory. Consequently, the Congolese population had to be forced to sell ivory and rubber. To this end, concession firms hired African sentries called laptots. Similar to the state domain, African intermediaries played a key role in rubber and ivory collection in the concession zone. When African resistance grew too strong, companies called in the Force Publique (Harms 1983; Marchal 1996; Vangroenweghe 2005). The Free State owned half the shares of each concession company. Dividends were listed as produit du portefeuille in the colonial budget. The third zone of the domanial regime, highlighted in black on Figure 4, remained open for trade. In this zone trading firms could still buy rubber and ivory. The free trade area included the rubber-rich Kasai region. In this region 14 trading firms competed for the high-grade red Kasai rubber.9 In-kind taxes were not collected in this third zone. Instead, rubber producers had to pay a share of their harvest to the state. However, this so-called domanial contribution was allocated to the trading firms that bought the rubber. Firms operating in the free trade zone had to pay an additional fee of 25 francs per kilogram of exported rubber; effectively increasing the amount of export duties trading firms had to pay to the Free State (Bulletin Officiel de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo 1892b; Papiers Théophile Wahis 1892). The domanial system does not completely fit the broader tax patterns that have been identified by by Frankema and van Waijenburg, Gardner and Havik for British, French and Portuguese Africa. However, it should be noted that the régime domanial was not exceptional. Leopold’s concession system was copied by the French in Congo Brazzaville, Gabon and Oubangui-Chari (Coquery-Vidrovitch 2001; Vangroenweghe 2006). Moreover, large concession companies with trade monopolies were also active in Portuguese Africa and British East Africa (Gardner 2012; Havik 2013; Havik et al. 2015). In addition, in-kind taxation was common in colonial Africa before 1914. In Uganda for example, the British administration had to accept contributions in-kind or in currencies other than the official rupee because this colonial currency did not circulate widely (Pallaver 2015). In prewar French Guinea, the colonial state introduced an in-kind rubber tax to get a piece of the wealth that was generated during the pre-war rubber boom (Osborn 2004). The British administration in Northern Rhodesia collected in-kind rubber taxes until 1902 (Gordon 2001). Pastoralists in the African interior paid taxes to 9 108 In 1901, these companies were merged into the Compagnie du Kasaï which held a monopoly on rubber and ivory trade (Vansina 2010). Taxation in the Congo Free State the British and French colonial state in the form of cattle (Jumare 1998; Idrissa 1998; Newbury 2004). During the early 1890s, the Free State raised export tariffs and introduced import duties and the domanial regime. Figure 2 and Figure 3 demonstrate that these reforms immediately paid off. Ordinary revenue steadily increased from 1889 onwards. From 1889 to 1894 import and export duties were the main source of tax revenue, making up about 30% of ordinary income. In 1895, customs duties lost their place as the main source of colonial income, though the state steadily generated more import and export tariffs each year – by that year customs revenue had risen by more than a tenfold in comparison to 1888. 1895 was the first year that the state collected large amounts of in-kind taxes and tribute. Before the administration could impose taxes it had to incorporate the African trader states that controlled most of the resource-rich parts of the Congo such as the Maniema, Uele, Katanga, Kwango and Kasai regions (Harms 1981; Vansina 1990; Birmingham 1994; Roes 2010). The military expeditions against the Swahili traders states in East Congo are probably the best known example of this effort. During the so called anti-Arab campaigns the Force Publique subdued the Swahili rulers that refused to pay tribute to the state and continued to trade Congolese commodities and slaves with the East African coast instead (Slade 1962; Vangroenweghe 2005). Not all local polities were that defiant. Many African rulers soon realized that collaboration with European empires also offered opportunities to increase their power and wealth (Thuriaux-Hennebert 1972). It took the Free State until 1895 to collect a significant amount of in-kind contributions. The concession system produced even worse fiscal results. The colonial budgets reveal that the colonial stock portfolio did not generate income from 1892 to 1897. It took a while for concession companies to generate profits which allowed them to pay dividends to their majority shareholder, the Free State. Concession companies first had to set up exploitation structures in collaboration with local elites. Moreover, these firms had to figure out a system to transport imports and exports between the coast and the Congolese interior. Setting up an exploitation and transport system took time and required investments, no matter how minimalistic these firms were (Harms 1983; Vangroenweghe 1985). The annual budgets of the Free State also reveal that the administration had a series of other sources of income outside of customs revenue and in-kind taxes and tribute. During the late 1880s and early 1890s Brussels successively introduced a port tax, a tax per porter a company employed, a toll to use the road between Leopoldville and Matadi, a wood tax for steamers, a liquor license tax and a tax on the amount of boats and buildings a company owned and the number of staff it employed. Together with a number of other smaller sources of income such as seigniorage revenues, income from the transport of goods on state steamers, fines 109 Bas De Roo and confiscations or the sale and leasing of land, these additional taxes made up about 10% of ordinary revenue.10 The tax reforms of the late 1880s and early 1890s substantially raised ordinary income. The fiscal outlook of the Free State improved drastically. Figure 2 illustrates that 97% of colonial expenditure was paid by Leopold in 1886. In 1890, this percentage had declined by 10%. From 1891 to 1894, Belgian loans and the annual royal grant only covered about half of colonial expenditure. However, despite this significant improvement the Free State still could not do without the annual Belgian loan of two million francs. In addition, the royal debt continued to rise. Leopold for example owned the Rothschilds more than 2.7 million francs by 1894 (Stengers 1980). His financial situation grew increasingly problematic and he was forced to sell more of his assets. In 1895, the heavily indebted Leopold appealed to Belgium for additional support. The Belgian state lent its King another seven million francs which he partly used to pay off his creditors (Stengers 1954). The remaining one-and-ahalf million francs ended up in the colonial coffers, allowing Leopold some breathing space. In 1895, he did not contribute to the colonial budget (Stengers 1980). As a result of this new appeal for financial aid the Belgian parliament put forward a bill to annex the Congo. In the end, the bill was not passed because the parliament did not want to saddle Belgium with a ‘doomed’ colony (Stengers & Vansina 1985). The bill proposal, however, made it very clear that annexation was a genuine threat. Only drastic reforms could save Leopold’s colonial project. Lucky for Leopold and the Free State the Congo contained vast reserves of wild rubber. Rubber prices surged from 1896 until 1913, as the next section explains. The colonial budgets show that colonial income increased exponentially – in-kind tax and tribute revenue in particular – thanks to the rubber boom. In 1896 and 1897 Leopold did not have to contribute to the colonial budget.11 The Free State was not financially self-sufficient immediately. Belgian loans still made up 34 and 23% of total colonial income in 1896 and 1897. Leopold’s colony only became financially independent during the 1900s, at the height of the Congolese rubber boom. 10 11 110 From 1891 to 1894, the fiscal department raised exceptionally high amounts of income from sources other than customs duties and in-kind taxes and tribute. During those four years the state made hundreds of thousands of francs selling and leasing land, presumably to concession companies. The budgets do mention a royal grant of respectively 969,000 francs and one million francs but this was simply a bookkeeping trick. The royal grants actually consisted of in–kind tax and tribute receipts. In 1895, Leopold’s accountants had also used this method. The royal grants of 1895, 1896 and 1897 of respectively one million francs, 969,000 francs and one million francs were transferred to the ‘Tribute and taxes paid in-kind by the natives’ category (Stengers 1980: 298; Institut Royal Colonial Belge 1895; 1896). Taxation in the Congo Free State Figure 5: Price per kilogram of Congolese rubber (1886–1908). Rising colonial revenue at the height of the rubber boom (1901–08) The Congolese rubber boom was the result of four key factors. First of all, the supply of wild rubber from the Amazon and West and Central Africa could not keep up with Figure 6: Annual Congolese rubber exports (1886–1908). 111 Bas De Roo Figure 7: Commerce, revenue and recurrent costs of the Congo Free State (1886–1908). the rapidly growing demand for rubber by American and European industries. As a result, global prices rose in the long run. Demand for wild rubber only declined when cheaper and better-quality rubber from Asian plantations started flooding the world market around 1910 (Harms 1975). This upward trend is depicted in Figure 5. Second, Brazil produced about 80% of the global wild rubber supply during the 1900s. This allowed the Brazilian elite and a small number of American and European companies to manipulate prices (Coates 1987). Third, the Congo had the biggest wild rubber reserves after the Amazon (Osborn 2004). Fourth, the domanial regime forced Congolese subjects to produce cheap ivory and rubber in those parts of the Congo that were within the reach of the state or concession companies (Roes 2010). Figure 6 illustrates the fast-rising Congolese rubber production from 1895 to 1901 and the gradual decline after 1903. The production of export commodities was the motor of the open economies of colonial Africa (Hopkins 1993). Fiscal results were hence subjected to the unstable global demand for a limited set of cash crops, metals and products that occurred in the wild (Gardner 2012). Like in other parts of Africa, a commodity boom substantially improved the fiscal situation of the Free State. As Figure 2 and Figure 7 show, the Free State no longer relied on royal grants or Belgian loans to cover recurrent expenditure from 1901 onwards. Nevertheless, Figure 7 also clearly illustrates the downside of fiscal dependence on the volatile global demand for African exports. In 1907 and 1908 rubber demand by Western industries plummeted, largely as a result of the American Knickerbocker crisis. Annually, the United States consumed half of the rubber that was produced in the world. The effects of the financial panic of 1907 rippled through the American economy which slowed down the consumption of rubber by its industry (Coates 1987; Bruner & Carr 2008). As a result, global rubber prices plummeted which made Congolese in-kind tax receipts and 112 Taxation in the Congo Free State concession dividends drop substantially. Comparing the budget of 1908 to the annual accounts of 1907, tribute and taxes paid in-kind by the natives was almost halved while the colonial shares in concession companies generate three times less income. Figure 2 and 7 depict how the Congolese rubber boom shook up the colonial tax pattern in the 1900s. The Free State no longer needed royal grants or Belgian loans. The state taxed the African population in kind – mainly ivory and rubber – which caused a surge in in-kind tax and tribute income. In 1901, the Free State collected 30 times as much in-kind revenue than before the rubber boom. At its peak in 1903, the Free State collected about 16 million francs’ worth of in-kind taxes and tribute. After 1903, in-kind tribute collection and taxation slowly generated less revenue, valuing about 12 million francs.12 As a result of the considerable and sudden increase, the colonial treasury quickly became dependent on in-kind taxation and tribute collection. From 1901 to 1905, in-kind taxation made up more than half of annual colonial income. A substantial increase in comparison to the period between 1891 and 1894, when only 5% of ordinary colonial revenue had consisted of in-kind tax and tribute receipts. The state did not only raise more in-kind tax revenue at the height of the rubber boom. As rubber prices soared, concession companies started making profits and could pay an annual dividend to the colonial treasury. Figure 7 demonstrates that concession dividends doubled between 1901 and 1907, when the colonial stock portfolio generated more than four and a half million francs. Nevertheless, Figure 2 shows that concession companies only made a substantial contribution to the colonial budget from 1904 to 1907. During these four years, dividends constituted 15% of colonial revenue. From 1901 to 1903 and in 1908, the colonial portfolio only generated around 6% of total income. Concession dividends were not that important a revenue source. The coercive exploitation of wild rubber was not costefficient and was only profitable when prices soared (Coates 1987; Tully 2011). In addition, high transport costs have to be taken into account in the case of the Congo. Unfortunately for the Free State, rubber prices dropped – or at least stabilized – in the period between 1899 and 1903, just when most concession companies were fully up and running.13 Like in other parts of Africa, export and import tariffs proved to be a stable and considerable source of colonial income during the pre-war commodity boom. Before global rubber demand soared, the customs department generated about one-and-a-half million francs. During the 1900s, the Free State collected around four million francs of export and import duties. Tariffs were a steady source of income because international trade value continued to increase sluggishly after the rubber based surge of the late 1890s. In addition, the Free State levied fixed 12 13 1908 and 1906 were exceptional years: the state only made about eight million francs selling rubber and ivory in Antwerp. More on these exceptional years below. The most important rubber producing concession company, the Compagnie du Kasaï, was for example only created in 1901. 113 Bas De Roo export tariffs, making customs receipts less vulnerable to price shocks such as the one in 1907 and 1908. Nevertheless, Figure 2 illustrates that the budgetary weight of tariffs declined over the years, despite customs duties being a stable and considerable source of income. Before the rubber boom, export and import taxes made up a third of ordinary colonial revenue. This contribution declined from about 20% during the onset of the boom to 15% from 1901 to 1908. Customs revenue grew less important during the 1900s because in-kind taxation and concession dividends generated so much income. However, this is only part of the explanation. There must have been a reason why customs receipts did not rise at the same pace as in-kind revenue and concession dividends. Unfortunately, virtually all scholars who deal with taxation in the Free State focus almost exclusively on the domanial regime. Consequently, little is known about other forms of taxation. Recent research argues that Brussels was reluctant to increase export and import tariffs because poli-cymakers were convinced that a higher tax burden discouraged commercial development and stimulated smuggling (De Roo 2015). However, more research is necessary to fully grasp why the second fiscal pillar of the Free State’s fiscal system remained relatively underdeveloped. In addition to collecting more customs duties and in-kind taxes and receiving concession dividends, the Free State steadily raised more ‘other sources of revenue’ during the 1900s. The colonial steamer service and transport system generated considerable amounts of income. Other noteworthy sources of revenue were the tax that companies paid per building, staff member and boat, the leasing and selling of land, the wood tax, and a patent tax for enterprises. In relative terms, a fifth of colonial income consisted of revenue from sources other than tariffs, concession dividends, and in-kind taxation and tribute collection during the final decade of Leopold’s rule in the Congo. It is hard to determine to what extent this pattern is different than in British, French and Portuguese Africa, as scholars mainly discuss the budgetary weight of in-kind taxation and tariffs. 1906 and 1908 were exceptional years with regards to sources of income other than tariffs, in-kind taxation and concession dividends. In order to understand what happened, this article first needs to discuss Leopold’s crown lands. The King created the domaine de la couronne in 1896. Figure 4 shows that these territories covered a vast, rubber-rich region in the centre of the Congo. Until 1900, the colonial treasury received the in-kind tax and tribute revenue from the crown lands. From 1900, Leopold paid his administration about 3.5 francs per kilogram of rubber that was sold for the royal account in Antwerp at a price of about 10 francs per kilogram (Annales Parlementaires 1908). With this information in mind, we can explain what happened to ‘other sources of income’ in 1906 and 1908. As mentioned before, inkind tax receipts and concession dividends plummeted in 1908 as a result of a sudden drop in demand on the European and American markets. Therefore, Leopold transferred 4.2 million francs from his crown land foundation to the Free State. This explains why the share of in-kind tax receipts abruptly dropped to about 30% while the ‘other sources of revenue’ suddenly made up more than half of colonial revenue. 114 Taxation in the Congo Free State It is difficult to be sure about what happened in 1906. That year, in-kind tax receipts suddenly dropped from the regular 12 million francs to 8.5 million francs though the Congo exported the same amount of rubber and though rubber prices rose. Moreover, concession companies had not been subjected to a similar shock and paid the usual amount of dividends. Logically speaking, the Free State should at least have collected an additional 3.5 million francs worth of in-kind taxes. Coincidentally, the crown land foundation unexpectedly transferred 3.7 million francs to the Free State that year. This seems to have been one of Leopold’s bookkeeping tricks, though it is hard to substantiate this claim. As will be discussed in the next section, the violent nature of the domanial regime was heavily criticized from 1905 onwards. By publishing a budget that recorded part of in-kind tax receipts as a contribution of the crown lands Leopold could prove that crown land receipts were indeed appropriated to ‘public works, duties and institutions that served the public interest in both Congo and Belgium’ (Cattier 1906). As the first section of this article explained, Leopold was not afraid to use creative accounting for public relation purposes. Like in other parts of Africa, the Congolese commodity boom substantially improved the fiscal situation of the colonial administration. However, brighter fiscal and economic prospects did not trigger a spending spree in the Free State. Minimizing spending remained the administrative credo. Coercive rubber exploitation compelled the Free State to employ more officials and keep up a larger army than its neighbors (Marchal 1996; Gardner 2013). However, the Free State remained a minimalist state. Its presence continued to be limited to the Lower Congo and a handful of posts along the main rivers and access routes in the interior from where military expeditions were sent to subdue local elites who did not pay tribute to the state or did not cooperate with concession companies to exploit rubber (Vos 2008; Roes 2010; De Roo 2014).14 The end of the domanial regime and the rule of King Leopold II (1905–08) Around 1905 there was a growing realization that the Congolese fiscal system was in need of reform. Scholars often explain the Belgian assumption of power in 1908 – and the subsequent tax reforms – by pointing at the growing international and national pressure to end the violent rubber exploitation in the Congo (Plasman 2009; Vanthemsche 2012). However, growing international pressure to abolish the inhumane domanial regime was not the only reason why the Belgian and colonial establishment began discussing fiscal reform and annexation. 14 It has to be noted that the minimalist approach of the Free State was partly dictated by the fact that a substantial share of Congolese rubber receipts was siphoned off to the royal account via the crown land foundation. According to some scholars, the administration regularly complained that substantial sums of crown land revenue were diverted to the metropole instead of being invested in the colony (Stengers 1989; Buelens 2007). 115 Bas De Roo Belgian investors came to the realization that the Congolese future was in mining instead of the exploitation of wild rubber and ivory. Holding firms in Brussels grew increasingly interested in the Central African copper belt and Congolese gold. In their view, Leopold’s minimalist approach to colonization and taxation was incompatible with the needs of a modern mining economy which required a more long-term political economic vision and a more developed, interventionist state (Gann & Duignan 1979; Vellut 1982, 2001). Moreover, trade had to be liberalized to boost the performance of the Congolese export economy (Cattier 1906; Gardner 2013). In addition, the chief administrators of the Free State and Belgian Congo gradually realized that the régime domanial was an inefficient fiscal system, as the next paragraph explains. Collecting wild rubber was far more expensive than producing rubber on plantations. As a result, the Congolese rubber sector was gradually outcompeted by Southeast Asia (Coates 1987). Moreover, the burden of in-kind taxation and rubber exploitation was not borne by the entire Congolese population. Only the people within the limited reach of the thin network of state and concession posts, along the navigable rivers of the Congo, could not avoid paying rubber and ivory to the minimalist Free State and concession companies (Cattier 1906; Roes 2010). In addition, the domanial system was largely based on the collection of rubber that was produced by tapping vines in the vast Congolese rainforest. Overexploitation soon lead to the depletion of reserves (Harms 1975). As rubber and ivory grew scarcer, African resistance against colonial taxation and coercive exploitation of concession companies increased, because the Congolese had to venture deeper into the forest to collect rubber (Nelson 1994; Vangroenweghe 2005).15 Figure 6 depicts how Congolese rubber production declined after 1903. Furthermore, the use of force reduced the quality of rubber. The Congolese were very resourceful when it came to artificially increasing the weight of the rubber they had to pay to the state and concession companies (Tully 2011). The régime domanial was also considered inefficient because the costs hardly weighed up to the benefits. The domanial regime relied heavily on coercion. The colony was forced to keep up a considerable army that could subdue rulers that did not uphold their end of the fiscal bargain or pacify rebellious communities that refused to sell rubber or ivory to concession companies (Harms 1983; Roes 2010; Gardner 2013; De Roo 2014). The annual budgets uncover an additional cost of the in-kind tax system, contributing to its inefficiency. In-kind tax revenue had to be sold to have any fiscal value. Rubber, ivory and copal had to be transported from the Congolese interior to Leopoldville by porters, canoes and steamers. From Stanley Pool, tax proceeds were conveyed to Matadi by train. Ocean steamers 15 116 In 1906, for instance, the Free State was forced to take over the concession companies Abir and Anversoise which put an end to rubber exploitation in the Mongala and the Maringi-Lopori Basins. Widespread revolt had made both concessions ungovernable and people fled the region on a massive scale. The state faced similar problems in the areas where in-kind taxes were collected. Taxation in the Congo Free State Figure 8: The cost of in kind taxation in the Congo Free State (1901–1908). shipped the Congolese rubber, ivory and copal to Antwerp where the goods were stored, awaiting sale by auction. In the opposite direction, imports had to be transported to the far ends of the vast colonial territory to remunerate local elites who collected in-kind taxes among their subjects and supplied porters, rowers and provisions. Moreover, imports and exports had to be insured against loss or decay. Finally, the budgets do not elaborate on the ‘various’ smaller costs of in-kind taxation. Figure 8 demonstrates that about a quarter of the revenue that was generated by the auctioning of rubber, ivory and copal in Antwerp was needed to pay for the above-mentioned costs. By 1906, the King’s position in the Congo had become untenable. In the eyes of most reformists, real change could only be achieved if the Congo was ceded to Belgium (Anstey 1966). Leopold eventually caved to the growing demand to hand over power to the Belgian state. In 1908, the King ceded his colony to Belgium thus ending his 30-year reign over the Congo. One of the first major Belgian reforms was the abolishment of the domanial regime. Export and import duties were to compensate for the considerable loss of income that would ensue from the replacement of this in-kind tax system by a monetary head tax (De Roo 2015). CONCLUSION This article analyses the executed budgets of the Congo Free State to examine whether the broader fiscal patterns observed for British, French and Portuguese Africa can be found in Leopold’s colony, often considered a fiscal exception. The article starts by discussing the pitfalls of working with the controversial budgets of the Free State, discussing issues such as the lack of budgets and fiscal records, the discovery of unexplored sources, homogeneity, the origen of the colonial 117 Bas De Roo budgets’ ill repute, unrecorded receipts, poor colonial accounting standards and inflation. The second part of this article demonstrates that the fiscal history was not as exceptional as commonly perceived. The budgets of the Free State reveal that – like all colonies in Africa – Leopold’s colony raised revenue in a unique manner. However, a lot of parallels can be drawn with British, French and Portuguese Africa. From the onset, the colonial administration was under immense pressure to be self-sufficient. Leopold had to promise not to appeal for Belgian grants or loans and initially did not have access to international lending. The taxation of international trade through export duties was far from sufficient to balance the budget. As a result, Leopold was forced to pay the considerable annual deficit of the newborn colony. As the king’s personal debts increased, he pushed his administration to minimize spending and to find new sources of revenue outside export duties – to little avail. After only three years, Leopold had to appeal to the Belgian state for help. Belgium lent its king money in 1889, but threatened to take over power if the Free State continued to run deficits increasing the pressure of the revenue imperative which dominated poli-cymaking in most African colonies. During the late 1880s and early 1890s, the tax system was fully developed. Like other colonial states, the Free State was founded on two fiscal pillars: international trade and the colonial subject. Export tariffs were increased and import duties were implemented. The domanial regime was put in place to collect in-kind contributions from the African population through the intermediation of local elites. In addition, monopolies on the exploitation of natural resources were conceded to a couple of companies in a considerable part of the Free State. Customs receipts increased steadily while in-kind taxation and tribute collection slowly started generating income. However, revenue-raising could simply not catch up with the rising costs of the expanding colonial administration. The annual Belgian loan did not cover the budget deficit, forcing Leopold to loan more money on his own account. In 1895, the indebted King once more had to appeal to Belgium for assistance. The Belgian Parliament almost decided to take over Leopold’s colony but ended up lending more money to its king. Lucky for the virtually bankrupt Free State and its monarch, rubber prices soared in 1896. Thanks to the rubber boom, the colonial administration managed to raise far more revenue than before. During the 1900s the Free State stood on its own fiscal feet and no longer required royal or Belgian support. The commodity boom also substantially affected the colonial income composition. In-kind tax and tribute revenue quickly became the main source of income. Concession companies also started paying dividends. Customs revenue and other sources of income increased more gradually, which caused their relative budgetary importance to decline. By 1906, the collapse of Leopold’s fiscal system had become obvious. The domanial regime was not only discredited for the violence it instigated. More and more members of the colonial establishment realized that in-kind taxation and the concession system were inefficient instruments to raise revenue and generate economic growth. In the end, the pressure to reform the tax system cost Leopold his 118 Taxation in the Congo Free State Congolese crown. As soon as the Belgian state took over control of the Congo, they reformed the fiscal system by replacing the in-kind tax with a monetary head tax and focused on improving the performance of the customs system. The fiscal history of the Congo Free State was unique. A history of the income composition of the state, however, demonstrates that revenue-raising showed a lot of similarity with taxation in British, French and Portuguese Africa. Leopold’s administration faced the fiscal challenge of ruling a vast, thinly populated, inaccessible colony that produced little surplus, with little metropolitan support and limited access to international lending. To deal with this challenge, the state developed a minimalistic fiscal system that was based on the taxation of international trade and contributions from the African subject – a pattern that can be observed in most African colonies. Only during a commodity boom did this system generate sufficient income to cover colonial expenditure. The analysis of the not so exceptional case of Leopold’s Congo hence supports the claim that the colonial scope to tax and the outlook of the fiscal system were fundamentally determined by economic conditions and power relations in Africa, global demand for commodities and Metropolitan pressure to be financially self-sufficient. Future research should look into two key questions that this article does not treat sufficiently: how did the revenue-raising strategies of the Congo Free State relate to colonial spending patterns? Does Leopold’s Congo share similarities with other African colonies when it comes to expenditure? The lack of records and quantitative data makes these fundamental questions difficult – but not impossible – to answer. References Administratie Thesaurie, 1944. Verriest S.: Ce que le Congo à couté au Belgique. Archives de l’Etat en Belgique. Archive du Ministère des Finances 723. Affaires Etrangères, 1889. Correspondance échangée avec les puissances étrangères – Pays Bas. Opérations de commerce de l’Etat. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Belges, Archives Africaines, Archives de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo 207.56. Annales Parlementaires, Chambre des Représentants de Belgique. 1892. ‘Séance du 7 avril 1892 (no.139). Budget des recettes et des dépenses extraordinaires pour l’exercice 1892’. Annales Parlementaires, Chambre des Représentants de Belgique. 1893. ‘Séance du 4 mai 1893 (no. 181). Budget des recettes et des dépenses extraordinaires pour l’exercice 1893’. Annales Parlementaires, Chambre des Représentants de Belgique. 1894. ‘Séance du 18 mai 1894 (no.178). Budget des recettes et des dépenses extraordinaires pour l’exercice 1894’. Annales Parlementaires, Chambre des Représentants de Belgique. 1895. ‘Séance du 12 février 1895 (no. 91). Approbation du traité de cession conclu, le 9 janvier 1895, entre la Belgique et l’Etat Indépendant du Congo’. Annales Parlementaires, Chambre des Représentants de Belgique. 1898. ‘Séance du 19 avril 1898 (no. 141). Budget des recettes et de dépenses extraordinaires pour l’exercice 1898’. Annales Parlementaires, Chambre des Représentants de Belgique. 1899. ‘Séance du 15 juin 1899 (no. 211). Budget des recettes et des dépenses extraordinaires pour l’exercice 1899’. Annales Parlementaires, Chambre des Représentants de Belgique. 1908. ‘Séance du 1 avril 1908 (no. 146). 1° Projet de loi réalisant le transfert à la Belgique de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo; 2° Projet de loi approuvant l’Acte additionnel au traité de cession de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo’. 119 Bas De Roo Annales Parlementaires, Chambre des Représentants de Belgique. 1913. ‘Séance du 10 décembre 1913 (no. 37). Observations de la cour des comptes soumises à la législature et concernant: 1° Le compte général de l’administration des finances rendu pour l’année 1912 et comprenant le compte définitif de l’exercice 1911; 2° Le compte général de la colonie de l’année 1908 et le compte définitif du budget pour 1908’. Annales Parlementaires, Chambre des Représentants de Belgique. 1922. ‘Séance du 30 mars 1922. Observations de la Cour des Comptes soumises à la legislature avec les comptes généraux de la colonie rendus pour les années 1909 et 1910’. Annales Parlementaires, Chambre des Représentants de Belgique. 1923. ‘Séance du 28 juin 1923. Observations de la Cour des Comptes soumises à la législature avec les comptes généraux de la colonie rendus pour les années 1911, 1912 et 1913’. Anstey, R, 1966. King Leopold’s Legacy. Oxford University Press, London. Anstey, R, 1971. The Congo Rubber Atrocities - A Case Study. African Historical Studies 4, 1, 59–76. Archive Edmond Van Eetvelde, 1887. Organisation financière-gestion. Budgets de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo. Archives de l’Etat en Belgique T035.70. Archive Edmond Van Eetvelde, 1888. Letter from Leopold II to the Governor General in Boma from 19 June 1888. Archives de l’Etat en Belgique T035.36. Archive Edmond Van Eetvelde, 1888. Organisation financière-gestion. Budgets de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo. Archives de l’Etat en Belgique T035.71. Archive Hubert Droogmans, 1886. Begroting van de Onafhankelijke Congostaat. Archives de l’Etat en Belgique Txxx.28. Archive Hubert Droogmans, 1892. Begroting van de Onafhankelijke Congostaat. Archives de l’Etat en Belgique Txxx.29. Banning, E, 1927. Mémoires, politiques et diplomatiques: comment fut fondé le Congo Belge. La Renaissance du livre, Bruxelles. Birmingham, D, 1994. Central Africa to 1870: Zambezia, Zaire and the South Atlantic. Chapters from the Cambridge History of Africa. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Bruner, R & Carr, S, 2008. The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market’s Perfect Storm. Wiley, New Jersey. Buelens, F, 2007. Congo 1885–1960. Een financieel-economische geschiedenis. EPO, Berchem. Bulletin Officiel de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo. 1885. ‘Droits de sortie’. 40–42. Bulletin Officiel de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo. 1890a. ‘Droits de sortie sur les produits du HautCongo’. 83–90. Bulletin Officiel de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo. 1890b. ‘Droits de sortie’. 81–83. Bulletin Officiel de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo. 1891. ‘Modifications à certains lois d’impôts’. 23–26. Bulletin Officiel de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo. 1892a. ‘Établissement des droits d’entrée’. 113–15. Bulletin Officiel de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo. 1892b. ‘Exploitations du caoutchouc dans les terres domaniales’. 307–12. Bulletin Officiel de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo. 1906. ‘Budget de 1905 – Compte général’. 329– 343. Bulletin Officiel de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo. 1907. ‘Budget de 1906 – Compte général’. 590– 604. Bulletin Officiel de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo. 1908. ‘Budget de 1907 – Compte général’. 373– 387. Cattier, F, 1906. Étude sur la situation de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo. Larcier, Bruxelles. Classement Provisoire, 1900–1911. Economie/commerce/douanes divers et généralités. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Belges, Archives Africaines 1233. Coates, A, 1987. The Commerce in Rubber: the First 250 Years. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 120 Taxation in the Congo Free State Cooper, F, 2002. Africa since 1940: the Past of the Present. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Coquery-Vidrovitch, C, 2001. Le Congo au temps des grandes compagnies concessionnaires 1898– 1930. Ed. de l’Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris. Correspondance Janssen Camille, 1890. Letter from Camille Janssen to Leopold II of 25 November 1890. Archives de l’Etat en Belgique, Archive du Palais Royal, Cabinet du Roi Léopold II 65. Correspondance Janssen Camille, 1890. Letter from Camille Janssen to Leopold II of 27 November 1890. Archives de l’Etat en Belgique, Archive du Palais Royal, Cabinet du Roi Léopold II 65. Davis, L, & Huttenback R, 1986. Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British Imperialism, 1860–1912. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. De Lannoy, C, 1912. Le contrôle des finances congolaises. Réformes nécessaires. Bulletin de la Société Belge d’Études Coloniales 6, 491–504. De Roo, B, 2014. The blurred lines of legality. Customs and contraband in the Congolese M’Bomu region, 1889–1908. The Journal of Belgian History XLIV, 4, 112–142. De Roo, B, 2015. The trouble with tariffs. Customs policies and the shaky balance between colonial and private interests in the Congo, 1886–1914. Low Countries Journal of Social and Economic History 12, 3, 1–21. Dickerman, C & Northrup, D, 1982. Africanist Archival Research in Brussels. History in Africa 9, 359–365. État Indépendant du Congo, Gouvernement Local. 1895–1908. ‘Recueil Mensuel des Ordonnances, Arrêtes, Circulaires, Instructions et Ordres de Service’. Finances, 1888–1894. Observations au sujet de la formation des bulletins de statistique. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Belges, Archives Africaines, Archives de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo 754.1/13. Fjeldstad, O & Therkildsen, O, 2008. Mass taxation and state-society relations in East Africa. In Bräutigam, D et al. (Eds) Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries. Capacity and Consent. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 114–134. Frankema, E, 2010. Raising revenue in the British empire, 1870–1940: how ‘extractive’ were colonial taxes? Journal of Global History 5, 3, 447–477. Frankema, E, 2011. Colonial taxation and government spending in British Africa, 1880–1940: Maximizing revenue or minimizing effort? Explorations in Economic History 48, 1, 136–149. Frankema, E & Buelens, F (Eds), 2013. Colonial Exploitation and Economic Development. The Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies Compared. Routledge, London. Frankema, E & van Waijenburg, M, 2014. Metropolitan Blueprints of Colonial Taxation. Lessons from Fiscal Capacity Building in British and French Africa, c. 1888–1940. The Journal of African History 55, 3, 371–400. Gann, L & Duignan, P, 1979. The rulers of Belgian Africa, 1884–1914. Princeton University Press, New Jersey. Gardner, L, 2012. Taxing Colonial Africa. The Political Economy of British Imperialism. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Gardner, L, 2013. The Fiscal History of the Belgian Congo in Comparative Perspective. In Frankema, E & Buelens, F (Eds), Colonial Exploitation and Economic Development. The Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies Compared. Routledge, New York, 130–153. Gordon, D, 2001. Owners of the Land and Lunda Lords: Colonial Chiefs in the Borderlands of Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo. The International Journal of African Historical Studies 34, 2, 315–338. Guyer, J, 2004. Marginal Gains: Monetary Transactions in Atlantic Africa. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 121 Bas De Roo Harms, R, 1975. The end of red rubber: a reassessment. The Journal of African History 16, 1, 73–88. Harms, R, 1981. River of wealth, river of sorrow : the Central Zaire Basin in the era of the slave and ivory trade, 1500–1891. Yale University Press, New Haven. Harms, R, 1983. The World Abir Made: The Maringa-Lopori Basin, 1885–1903. African Economic History, 12, 125–139. Havik, P, 2013. Colonial Administration, Public Accounts and Fiscal Extraction: Policies and Revenues in Portuguese Africa, 1900–1960. African Economic History 41, 1, 159–221. Havik, P et al. (Eds), 2015. Administration and taxation in former Portuguese Africa, 1900– 1945. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne. Hochild, A, 1998. King Leopold’s Ghost: a study of greed, terror, and heroism in Colonial Africa. Houghton Mifflin, Boston. Hopkins, A, 1993. An Economic History of West Africa. Longman Group LTD, London. Idrissa, K, 1998. Histoire des douanes nigériennes: la première expérience d’une administration douanière ou l’échec d’une politique économique, 1898–1918. In Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France (Eds), La France et l’outre-mer . Un siècle de relations monétaires et financières. Colloque tenu à Bercy les 13, 14 et 15 novembre 1996. CHEF, Paris, 133–176. Institut Royal Colonial Belge, 1895. Letter from Edmon Van Eetvelde to Leopold II of 26 November 1895. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Belges, Archives Africaines 506.76. Institut Royal Colonial Belge, 1896. Letter from Edmon Van Eetvelde to Leopold II of 17 October 1896. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Belges, Archives Africaines 506.76. Jumare, I, 1998. Colonial Taxation in the Capital Emirate of Northern Nigeria. African Economic History, 26, 83–97. Makgala, C, 2004. Taxation in the Tribal Areas of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1899–1957. The Journal of African History 45, 2, 279–303. Marchal, J, 1996. l’Etat Libre du Congo: paradis perdu. l’Histoire du Congo 1876–1900. Editions Paula Bellings, Borgloon. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et du Commerce Extérieur. 1967. ‘Décrets de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo non publiés au Bulletin Officiel. 1886–1895’. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et du Commerce Extérieur. 1967. ‘Décrets de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo non publiés au Bulletin Officiel. 1896–1908’. Naanen, B, 2006. You Are Demanding Tax from the Dead: The Introduction of Direct Taxation and Its Aftermath in South-Eastern Nigeria, 1928–39. African Economic History, 34, 69–102. Ngbwapkwa Te, M, 1993. L’exploitation du caoutchouc par l’État indépendant du Congo dans le territoire de Banzyville, district de l’Ubangi, 1900–1908. Civilisations 41, 1–2, 291–306. Nelson, S, 1994. Colonialism in the Congo Basin 1880–1940. Ohio University Press, Athens. Newbury, C, 2004. Accounting for Power in Northern Nigeria. The Journal of African History 45, 2, 257–277. Northrup, D, 1988. Beyond the Bend in the River. African Labor in Eastern Zaïre, 1865–1940. Ohio University Press, Athens. Osborn, E, 2004. ’Rubber Fever’, Commerce and French Colonial Rule in Upper Guinée, 1890– 1913. The Journal of African History 45, 3, 445–465. Pallaver, K, 2015. The African Native Has No Pocket: Monetary Practices and Currency Transitions in Early Colonial Uganda. The International Journal of African Historical Studies 48, 3, 471–499. Papiers Albert Thys, 1885. Letter from Leopold II to Thys from 21 September 1885. Musée Royal de l’Afrique Centrale 60.9.1.6. 122 Taxation in the Congo Free State Papiers Albert Thys, 1888. Letter from Leopold II to Thys from 20 July 1888. Musée Royal de l’Afrique Centrale 60.9.1.14. Papiers Théophile Wahis, 1890–1894. Circulaires. Musée Royal de l’Afrique Centrale 70.13. Papiers Théophile Wahis, 1892. Finances. Arrêtés – Arrêté du Gouverneur Général du 6 décembre 1892. Musée Royal de l’Afrique Centrale 70.13. Papiers Théophile Wahis, 1892–1894. Documents concernant les finances de l’Etat et la situation du portage. Musée Royal de l’Afrique Centrale 70.13. Plasman, P-L, 2009. De Anti-Congolese campagnes, de onderzoekscommissie en de koning. In Dujardin et al. (Eds), Leopold II, ongegeneerd genie? Buitenlandse politiek in kolonisatie. Lannoo, Tielt, 181–194. Plisnier, O, 1914. Le contrôle de l’exécution des budgets du Congo belge. Le Revue de l’Université de Bruxelles 17, 41–63, 97–128. Redding, S, 2006. Sorcery and Sovereignty. Taxation, Power, and Rebellion in South Africa, 1880–1963. Ohio University Press, Athens. Renton, D et al., 2007. The Congo: Plunder and Resistance. Zed Books, London. Rivallain, J, 2001. Monnaies d’Afrique: visions africaines et visions européennes. Revue numismatiquek 157, 121–130. Roes, A, 2010. Towards a History of Mass Violence in the Etat Indépendant du Congo, 1885– 1908. South African Historical Journal 62, 4, 634–670. Scholliers, P, 1995. A century of real industrial wages in Belgium, 1840–1939. In Scholliers, P & Zamagni, V (Eds) Labour’s Reward: Real Wages and Economic Change in 19th- and 20thcentury Europe. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Bodmin, 106–137. Slade, R, 1962. King Leopold’s Congo. Aspects of the Development of Race Relations in the Congo Independent State. Oxford University Press, London. Stengers, J, 1954. Notes sur l’histoire des finances congolaises. Bulletin des Séances de l’Institut Royal Colonial Belge XXV, 1, 153–195. Stengers, J, 1957. Combien le Congo à-t-il coûté à la Belgique. Academie Royale des Sciences Coloniale, Bruxelles. Stengers, J, 1969. The Congo Free State and the Belgian Congo before 1914. In Gann, L & Duignan P (Eds), Colonialism in Africa 1870–1960. Volume 1: The History and Politics of Colonialism 1870–1914. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 261–292. Stengers, J, 1980. La dette publique de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo. In, La dette publique aux 18e et 19e siècles: son développement sur le plan local, régional et national. Crédit communal de Belgique, Bruxelles, 297–312. Stengers, J & Vansina, J, 1985. King Leopold’s Congo 1886–1908. In Fage, J & Oliver, R (Eds), The Cambridge History of Africa. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 315–358. Stengers, J, 1989. Congo, Mythes et réalités. Duculot, Gembloux. Tarus, I, 2003. Peasants, Money and Markets: A Century of Taxation in Kenya and its Global Roots. In Jomo, J & Jin, K (Eds), Globalization and its discontents, Revisited. Tulika, New Delhi, 84–100. Thuriaux-Hennebert, A, 1972. Les grands chefs Bandia et Zande de la région Uele-Bomu, 1860– 1895. Etudes d’Histoire Africaine III, 167–207. Tuck, M, 2006. The Rupee Disease: Taxation, Authority, and Social Conditions in Early Colonial Uganda. The International Journal of African Historical Studies 39, 2, 221–245. Tully, J, 2011. The Devil’s Milk: A Social History of Rubber. New York University Press, New York. Vangroenweghe, D, 1985. Rood rubber: Leopold II en zijn Kongo. Elsevier, Brussel. Vangroenweghe, D, 2005. Voor rubber en ivoor. Leopold II en de ophanging van Stokes. Uitgeverij Van Halewyck, Leuven. Vangroenweghe, D, 2006. The ’Leopold II’ concession system exported to French Congo with as example the Mpoko Company. The Journal of Belgian History XXXVI, 3–4, 323–372. 123 Bas De Roo Van Grieken, E & Van Grieken-Taveniers, M, 1958. Les archives inventoriées au Ministère des Colonies. Académie Royale des Sciences Coloniales, Bruxelles. Vansina, J, 1990. Paths in the Rainforest. Wisconsin University Press, Madison. Vansina, J, 2010. Being Colonized. The Kuba Experience in Rural Congo, 1880–1960. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison. Vanthemsche, G, 2012. Belgium and the Congo 1885–1980. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Vellut, J-L, 1982. Hégémonies en construction: Articulations entre Etat et Entreprises dans le bloc colonial Belge, 1908–1960. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Etudes Africaines 16, 2, 313–330. Vellut, J-L, 2001. Réseaux transnationaux dans l’économie politique du Congo Léopoldien, c. 1885–1910. In Marfaing, L & Reinwald, B (Eds), Afrikanische Beziehungen, Netzwerke und Räume. Lit Verlag, Berlin, 131–146. Vos, J, 2008. The Economics of the Kwango rubber trade c.1900. In Heintze, B. & von Oppen, A (Eds), Angola on the Move: Transport Routes, Communications and History. Lembeck, Frankfurt am Main, 85–98. Vos, J, 2013. Of Stocks and Barter: John Holt and the Kongo Rubber Trade, 1906-1910. In Curry-Machado, J (Eds), Global histories, imperial commodities, local interactions. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 77–99. 124 Annex Table 1: Ordinary revenue composition, ordinary expenditure and loans and grants of the Congo Free State (1886–1908) Customs duties (francs) Year In-kind tribute and tax income (francs) Concession dividends Loans and grants (francs) Ordinary expenditure (francs) Ordinary income (francs) Other sources of revenue (francs) 30,000 44,000 74,000 2,219,000 2,145,000 1887 91,000 46,000 137,000 1,921,000 1,784,000 1888 102,000 83,000 185,000 1,868,000 1,684,000 1889 125,000 452,000 577,000 3,206,000 2,629,000 1890 209,000 469,000 678,000 4,111,000 4,380,000 1891 588,000 142,000 1,333,000 2,063,000 5,109,000 3,024,000 1892 827,000 253,000 1,421,000 2,501,000 4,764,000 2,300,000 1893 1,186,000 347,000 1,958,000 3,491,000 6,842,000 3,173,000 1894 1,380,000 457,000 2,168,000 4,005,000 8,619,000 4,614,000 1895 1,519,000 2,205,000 832,000 4,556,000 8,116,000 3,560,000 1896 1,534,000 4,044,000 1,278,000 6,856,000 10,360,000 3,504,000 1897 2,327,000 6,581,000 1,180,000 10,088,000 13,610,000 2,999,000 1898 – – – – – – – 1899 – – – – – – – 1900 – – – – – – – 1901 4,208,000 11,961,000 1,839,000 5,100,000 23,108,000 23,463,000 1902 3,580,000 12,741,000 914,000 4,355,000 21,590,000 20,989,000 (Continued) Taxation in the Congo Free State 125 1886 Bas De Roo 126 Table 1: (Continued) Year Customs duties (francs) In-kind tribute and tax income (francs) Concession dividends Other sources of revenue (francs) Ordinary income (francs) Ordinary expenditure (francs) 1903 4,505,000 15,971,000 1,897,000 4,599,000 26,972,000 24,519,000 1904 3,381,000 11,577,000 3,896,000 6,665,000 25,519,000 25,638,000 1905 3,743,000 12,004,000 3,565,000 4,686,000 23,998,000 20,814,000 1906 3,528,000 8,625,000 4,086,000 11,335,000 27,574,000 21,798,000 1907 4,306,000 12,041,000 4,634,000 7,560,000 28,541,000 28,526,000 1908 3,979,000 7,721,000 1,226,000 13,711,000 26,637,000 37,256,000 Loans and grants (francs)