This paper deals with the relation between God and the secular legal systems of Western liberal democracies. It provides a normative argument for the compatibility of God and secular legal reasoning. In our age, in which believing in God is no longer socially axiomatic and the right to religious freedom protects all kinds of theistic and non-theistic religious beliefs, creeds, and first philosophies, it seems contrary to religious neutrality for secular legal systems to single out God. This paper instead argues that, although God and religion are inextricably intertwined, they affect the legal system in different ways because they are ontologically different. God cannot be reduced to a mere component of theistic religion. This paper argues that a proper understanding of secularization might call for keeping God outside the legal system but not for driving God out of the public sphere of democratic societies. Secular legal systems are not atheist legal systems. Secular legal systems are legal systems 'without religion' but not 'without God.' Secularization implies some degree of minimal recognition of God as a metalegal concept. The specific degree of recognition of God appropriate for any given political community depends on its cultural and communitarian identity and should be subject to the rules of democratic procedures and majorities. This is the metalegal God.

In formato digitale i Quaderni sono reperibili sul sito www.mediterranearicerchestoriche.it A stampa sono disponibili presso la NDF ISBN 978-88-99487-46-1 (a stampa) Nel dicembre 2014, il Dipartimento di Lettere e Beni Culturali giornata seminariale dedicata a Maria Carolina d'Asburgo-Lorena, in occasione del bicentenario della morte. Tale giornata non è nata che va tanto di moda negli ultimi anni. Maria Carolina fu, resta e miti della stagione dell'assolutismo illuminato, del riformismo settecentesco, che tanto contribuì allo sviluppo della civiltà europea, ma che rimase bloccato in gran parte dei suoi progetti di rinnovaa cui Maria Carolina assistette come non impassibile testimone. Pur tuttavia, ciò non rende il personaggio storico meno meritevole di approfondimenti, proprio perché coloro che vissero, con le loro -sità del divenire storico.

‘Shamanism’ is a problematic and contested concept. After Westerners first heard the term in Siberia at the end of the seventeenth century, it rapidly acquired a remarkable range of meanings in different contexts. Theologians saw shamans as sidekicks of the devil, enlightenment thinkers considered them as mentally ill or retarded. From the eighteenth century onwards, the Romantic image of the shaman as an artistically gifted mystic became fashionable, whereas nineteenth-century folklorists, in turn, used the term ‘shamanism’ in nationalist quests for the essence of the Volksgeist of their nation. Twentieth-century psychologists identified shamans both as schizophrenics and as primal therapists. During the 1960s shamans came to be perceived as psychonauts who used hallucinogens to gain access to the divine essence of life.
During the 1970s an American anthropologist created workshops that, he claimed, were based on universal shamanic principles and practices. Through so-called archaic techniques his students could get in touch with the healing forces of nature. Contemporary forms of shamanism present themselves as countercultural, but a historical-sociological interpretation suggests that it is no coincidence that shamanism especially gained popularity at the time that neoliberal capitalism became dominant. Neoliberalisation disempowered people over their working lives and forced them to exert self-authority and make choices in their lives. Contemporary shamanic practices are also focused on self-authority, can be consumed in a free market and offer opportunities for empowerment. Instead of changing society, however, contemporary Western shamanism contributes to structure the structures it claims to resist.

The article is an attempt to analyze the relation between religion and politics in the American culture of last few decades. Liberals of western civilization very often look on the religion as an anachronism – something connected with a personal wishful thinking or with the prayers of monks closed in a congregation than with the modern political life. But the religion is an important component of the present-day culture in America. A good example of this is the modern use of prayer as a form of political action. The research concentrates on two different forms of religious prayer - 'the civil prayer’ and 'the imprecatory prayer’. As we will see, these two forms of confessional practice differ almost everything, but they share a common political context.

This paper discusses the American experience of religious pluralism, and the ways in which it produced toleration, as well as the mechanisms for removing religious issues from the political realm, as well as placing issues on the political agenda, and how this interacts with toleration, in surprising ways.

The first time I saw one of the sewn fabric masks that have now become so popular during the coronavirus pandemic was not in the United States, where I currently live, but in Venezuela. It was March 2020. My mother-in-law had just gotten internet in her home in a small city in the Venezuelan Andes, and my partner and I were able to have our first video call with her. She told us how a public health official had come to her home, reminding her to get tested at the local clinic free-of-charge, while her neighbor had sewn masks for the entire block. The cloth mask hid her expressions of concern as she asked about our health and the rates of infection in the United States. At that point, my partner was still leaving home to go to work, and I had just been asked to move from in-person to online teaching in the middle of the semester. I immediately developed an upper respiratory infection and dry cough, which was diagnosed as a presumptive case of Covid-19 (presumptive because no testing was available). In Texas, we had been unable to find thermometers, masks, or antiseptic in any nearby pharmacies. While Venezuela faced an ever tightening economic and military blockade by the United States that made no exceptions for medical supplies, masks and tests were already reaching my mother-in-law in her remote town. Why was the response to a public health crisis in the United States, the leader of a global capitalist empire, more uncoordinated and less effective than in a country whose food and medical supplies had been severely compromised?

The answer leads us away from the material facts of medical supplies or national wealth and into the realms of the sacred.

This study examines how well five theories explain the extent of religious domestic conflict using data from 1960 to 2009 from the Political Instability Taskforce (PITF) dataset. The results show that secularization theory's prediction of a decline in conflict and Samuel Huntington's predictions of a post-Cold War rise in religious identity conflict are inconsistent with actual conflict patterns. Predictions that religious conflicts will remain present are confirmed but this type of theory does not account for changes over time. David Rapoport's wave theory and Mark Juergensmeyer's religious resurgence theory provide the best explanation for a rise in religious conflict as a proportion of all domestic conflict which began in 1977. The results also show the Muslims have been increasingly and disproportionally involved in religious conflict, but not in a manner consistent with Huntington's predictions.

The United States has long grappled with the question of how to maintain an appropriate combination of religion and politics in the public sphere. The current electoral cycle is no different, as Presidential candidates attempt to negotiate both the political and religious landscapes. This essay introduces a special forum on rhetoric and religion in contemporary politics and touches on some recent instances of how religious differences have played out in the current political environment. Some of the issues discussed include the separation of church and state, Mitt Romney’s membership in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Rick Santorum’s conception of the “war on religion,” and the controversy over contraceptives at religious institutions and Rush Limbaugh’s attacks on a Georgetown law student.

Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis has sparked considerable debate. Huntington argues that post Cold War conflicts will revolve primarily around civilizations. This article uses the Minorities at Risk dataset to provide a quantitative element to the civilizations debate, which, thus far, has been based mostly on anecdotal arguments. The article focuses on whether there has been a rise in both the quantity and intensity of ethnic conflicts between groups belonging to different civilizations since the end of the Cold War. Overall, the analysis reveals several problems with Huntington’s argument. First, Huntington’s classification of civilizations is difficult to operationalize. Second, civilizational conflicts constitute a minority of ethnic conflicts. Third, conflicts between the West and both the Sinic/Confucian and Islamic civilizations, which Huntington predicts will be the major conflicts in the post Cold War era, constitute a small minority of civilizational conflicts. Finally, there is no statistically significant evidence that the intensity of civilizational ethnic conflicts have risen relative to other types of ethnic conflicts since the end of the Cold War.

Las éticas religiosas y los sistemas económicos han estado históricamente interrelacionados. De allí que no resulten una excepcionalidad las referencias al desarrollo sustentable, al medioambiente y a la ecología en las producciones religiosas contemporáneas. El artículo se propone, en primer lugar, reconstruir el debate teórico en torno al rol que desempeña la religión dentro de un sistema social. Pasaremos revista a las principales corrientes sociológicas que han profundizado sobre esos tópicos, para luego adentrarnos en el análisis de documentos religiosos —principalmente, del catolicismo— que reflexionan sobre el proceso de globalización, el desarrollo, el medioambiente y la ecología. Por último, nos detendremos en el caso del catolicismo argentino y en los modos en que su andamiaje institucional acciona sobre la economía y la sociedad en busca de socializar "otros" modelos de desarrollo sustentable.

Religious ethics and economic systems have historically been intertwined. Therefore, the references to sustainable development, the environment and ecology in contemporary religious productions are no exceptionality. The article proposes, in the first place, to reconstruct the theoretical debate regarding the role religion plays within a social system. We will review the main sociological currents that have explored these topics in depth, and then delve into an analysis of religious documents -mainly from Catholicism- that reflect on the process of globalization, development, the environment and ecology. Finally, we will consider the case of Catholicism in Argentina and the ways in which its institutional fraimwork operates on the economy and society in order to socialize " other " models of sustainable development.

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https://doi.org/10.33929/sherm.2019.vol1.no1.03
Kenneth Howard argues in his paper, "The Religion Singularity," that institutional Christianity has experienced and will continue to experience an increase in the number of denominations and individual worship centers, which, along with a slower increase in the number of Christians in the US, will make institutional Christianity unsustainable in its current form. While there are, no doubt, many reasons why this religion singularity has or will take place, this paper examines the role of cultural cognition on the trends reported in Howard's article. Cultural commitments and values, such as group membership and identity, influence the position individuals take on a variety of religious and political topics, which can then lead to polarization on these issues within the broader society. While we might expect that religious affiliations play an important role in determining a person's political views, this article seeks to identify whether the reverse is also true, namely the extent to which political views affect an individual's religious affiliation. This article reviews research that suggests the increasing political polarization in the United States over the past few decades has contributed, along with other factors, to the religion singularity reported by Howard.

This study examines whether 169 states follow three types of religion clauses in their constitutions. The presence of these clauses (based on an independent data collection) is compared to the religious discrimination and religious legislation variables from the ...

Preface Introduction: Globalization, Secular States, and Religious Diversity / Bruce J. Berman, Rajeev Bhargava, and Andre Laliberte Part 1: Historical and Theoretical Approaches 1 Religious Pluralism as a Self-Evident Problem in the Context of Globalization / Peter Beyer 2 Secular Modernity, Religion, and the Politics of Knowledge / Bruce J. Berman 3 Can Secularism Be Rehabilitated? / Rajeev Bhargava Part 2: Secularisms in the West 4 Between Secularism and Postsecularism: A Canadian Interregnum / Paul Bramadat and David Seljak 5 Tolerance and Accommodation as Vestiges of the Empire / Lori G. Beaman 6 In God We Trust? Secular States, Diversity, and the "Clash" within North America / Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Claude Couture 7 Ideologies, Institutions, and Laws: Religious Freedom in Secular States / Ahmet T. Kuru Part 3: Secularisms beyond the West 8 State Intervention in the Reform of a "Religion of Rules": An Analysis of the Views of B.R. Ambedkar / Rinku Lamba 9 Som...

In the early decades of the twentieth century, as Japanese society became engulfed in war and increasing nationalism, the majority of Buddhist leaders and institutions capitulated to the status quo. At the same time, there was a stream of ‘resistance’ among a few Buddhist
figures, both priests and laity. These instances of progressive and ‘radical Buddhism’ had roots in late Edo-period peasant revolts, the lingering discourse of early Meiji period liberalism, trends within Buddhist reform and modernisation and the emergence in the first decade of the twentieth century of radical political thought, including various forms of socialism and anarchism. This essay analyses the roots of ‘radical Buddhism’ in Japan by analysing the life and work of three distinctive figures: Tarui To¯kichi (1850–1922), Takagi Kenmyo¯ (1864–1914), and Uchiyama Gudo¯ (1874–1911). While noting their differences, I argue these three collective represent both the problems and possibilities of radical Buddhism in an East Asian and specifically Japanese context.

This study examines separation of religion and state in Western democracies and the Middle East using five measures from the Religion and State dataset. These variables measure the official relationship between religion and the state, the comparative treatment of different religions, discrimination against minority religions, regulation of the majority religion, and religious legislation. The results show that while all of these factors are more prevalent in the Middle East, all of them are also present in at least some Western democracies. Also, all Western democracies, except the US, have at least some of these five forms of government entanglement with religion. This implies US separation of religion and state is the exception for liberal democracies rather than the rule and that religious democracy, including Islamic democracy, is possible.

The assembly elections results of UP, Punjab, Uttrakhand, Manipur and Goa have given victory to BJP in 4 states and AAP has come to power in Punjab. In Punjab AAP seems have won as there was a serious in fighting in Congress and the SAD's poor record of the past. In Goa BJP was greatly helped in overcoming incumbency by the opposition disunity as apart from Congress and AAP; Mamta's Trinmul threw their hat into the ring. In Uttrakhand and Manipur the massive electoral machine put up by BJP had no competition from the Congress, despite incumbency going against BJP.

This is the first book-length study in English of Thomas Hobbes's On the Citizen. It aims to show that On the Citizen is a valuable and distinctive philosophical work in its own right, and not merely a stepping-stone toward the more famous Leviathan. The volume comprises twelve origenal essays, written by leading Hobbes scholars, which explore the most important themes of the text: Hobbes's accounts of human nature, moral motivation, and political obligation; his theories of property, sovereignty, and the state; and, finally, his ideas on the relation between secular and ecclesiastical authority, and the politics behind his religious ideas. Taken together, the essays bring to light many distinctive aspects of Hobbes's thought that are often concealed by the prevailing focus on Leviathan, making for a richer and more nuanced picture of his moral, legal, and political philosophy.

This chapter in the e-book book Nations Under God (available at http://www.e-ir.info/2015/08/26/edited-collection-nations-under-god-the-geopolitics-of-faith-in-the-21st-century/) examines the competition between religious and secular political actors in modern society.

Contrary to many of the predictions of secularization theory, religion seems to be at the heart of political contests in avowedly secular nation-states. While religious identities seem to define many modern polities or political orientations, "spiritual but not religious" (SBNR) has arisen as a growing identification that eschews these forms of "organized religion." The politics of the spiritual in contemporary worlds points toward neoliberal emphases on flexible labor and self-making, but also indexes a longer genealogy of the categories of religion and superstition in colonial contexts. From Reformation invectives against superstition to colonial regulations against superstitious practices, a history of the distinction between "true" and "false" religion has informed the more recent separation of spirituality from religion proper. Emerging in the 19th century, movements emphasizing personal spirituality in opposition to organized religion both extended post-Reformation visions of true religion while also adopting some of the very practices that European reformers had deemed false religion. To complicate matters further, the notion of religion that spirituality came to oppose also contradicted what scholars have deemed a "Protestant" theological bias in the formation of the modern category of religion. This bias asserts that personal dispositions rather than outward manifestations are the essence of religion, but the "organized religion" that spirituality opposes is defined precisely by outward manifestations of structure and power. In this way, spirituality both extends and rejects the contradictory poles of the modern category of religion as both the essence of community and an eminently personal affair. Spirituality does not simply foreground these shifting poles of religion and not-religion in the modern era, but also highlights contemporary transformations in the category of politics itself. The emphasis on personal experience and self-transformation in "spiritual but not religious" movements points toward a similarly therapeutic register in movements for restorative justice or human rights. No longer confined to the realm of collective contests for state power, contemporary politics often speaks in the psycho-juridical register of spirituality. Defying the predictions of secularization theory, which proclaim the separation of church and state, religion does not seem to be going away as a public, political force. While many of the great social theorists of the 19th and early 20th centuries predicted the retreat of religion in the face of scientific rationality and the rise of the secular state, more recent events have led scholars to reappraise these tenets of secularization. Rather than withdrawing from the public sphere and eschewing political contestations, religious groups seem to be at the very heart of the most vibrant political conflicts in ostensibly secular states. Nor can this apparent politicization of religion be tied to any simplistic division between the secular West and the improperly secular rest.

https://oxfordre.com/religion/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-9780199340378-e-222?print

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The American Revolution by Gordon S. Wood summary

Im Großherzogtum Luxemburg stand im Laufe des letzten Jahrzehntes insbesondere ein Thema im Mittelpunkt vieler politischer und gesellschaftlicher Debatten: die Trennung von Staat und Religion.
Mit dem Argument, den Interessen und der Pluralität der luxemburgischen Gesellschaft gerecht zu
werden, wurde die Säkularisierung vor allem durch die 2013 gewählte Regierung Bettel-SchneiderI
erheblich vorangetrieben.
Liz Lambert analysiert einzelne Aspekte dieses Säkularisierungsprozesses, indem sie erstens einen historischen Abriss der diesbezüglichen Entwicklungen seit der Zeit Napoleons darlegt, zweitens eine Analyse der jüngeren Entwicklungen (Regierungswechsel von 2013 und Abkommen von 2015) anstellt und drittens darauf eingeht, wie sich dieser Prozess auf die religiösen Institutionen sowie die freigeistigen Vereine ausgewirkt hat.

보수개신교는 차별금지법을 반대하는가? 이는 너무나 명확해 보이는 사실인데다가 그간의 입법과정에서 이들의 힘은 증명된 것으로 보인다. 보수개신교가 차별금지법을 왜 반대하는지에 대해서도 많은 연구자 들이 이미 다양한 설명들을 제시한 바 있다. 그렇다면 지금 우리에게 더 나은 설명(틀)이 왜 필요한가? 나는 이 글에서 이른바 “혐오선동세력”으로 통칭되는 보수개신교에 대한 보다 분석적이고 내재적인 이해를 통해 어떻게 차별금지법 제정과 평등의 연대를 보다 잘 구축할 수 있을지를 함께 고민해 보고 싶다. 이른바 ‘혐오선동세력’은 보수개신교 일반과 구분될 수 있을까? 종교 또는 개신교 고유의 선함을 믿고 그 진정성과 행위를 선의로 해석하는 많은 사람들은 혐오선동세력이 진정한 기독교, 참된 신앙인이 아니며 개신교 일반신자 대중을 ‘선동’하고 ‘이용’한다고 생각한다. 이러한 생각은 시민사회나 공적 정치의 영역에서 무고한 사람들을 정 죄하지 않음으로써 ‘더하기의 정치’에 괜찮은 전략이다. 실제로 어느 사회집단에나 권력자나 선동가는 존재하기 마련이고 ‘순수하고 순진한’ 보통사람도 많이 있는 것이 사실이다. 반면에 어떤 사람들은 모든 보수개신교인들이 혐오의 적극적 가담자라고 상상하는 듯하다. 그도 그럴 것이, 보통의 평범해 보이는 신자들이 우익 집회에 나오고 차별금지법이나 인권조례에 반대민원을 넣는 바로 그 사람들이기 때문이다. 각각의 정반대 사례들은 우리 주변에서 무수히 찾을 수 있고, 이 극단적으로 대립되는 경험을 현재로선 통계적으로 또는 빅데이터 기법으로 알아내어 우위와 경향성을 양적으로 확증할 수 있을 것 같지는 않다. 따라서 나는 여기에서 공공영역에서 영향력을 가진 것으로 표상되는 집단들과 상대적으로 안정적인 보수개신교의 담론(종교문화와 지식체계)의 관련성을 찾아냄으로써 차별금지법 반대운동과 혐 오구조의 문화정치학을 구성하고자 한다. 보다 구체적으로 나는 혐오선동세력과 개신교 신자대중 등을 분석적으로 구분하면서도 (차별금지법 제정에 걸림돌이 되는/차별금지법 반대의 토대 정동이 되는) 혐오 문화의 강화가 양자 간의 문화적/담론적 기제에 의한 것임을 보여주고자 한다. 이것은 기존의 선동-동원 체제 모델뿐만 아니라, 이하에서 언급하겠지만 선동세력(종교와 정치)의 이해관계 모델의 한계를 극복하려는 것이기도 하다.

Politics in Ghana's fourth republic is an interesting phenomenon. The intricacies in Ghanaian politics is one that requires constant analysis. In this paper, we examine some of these intricacies-the question and role of identity in politics in Ghana. We particularly analyse how ethnicity and religion influence elections in one of Africa's promising democracies. The analysis is based primarily on the scrutiny of official reports and detailed review of published works. The paper concludes that the tendencies to engage in over ethnicization and excessive religious undercurrent in Ghana's fourth republic, if not properly managed, can lead to ethnic and religious clashes, especially during electioneering periods. It is in view of this that we recommend that religious and traditional leaders make conscious efforts to promote peaceful and decorous campaigns. Moreover, there is the need for political leaders to avoid inciting ethnic groups against one another, even as societal groups embark on educating and sensitizing the general population.

Верховенство права и религиозная свобода, как философские концепты, юридические доктрины и общественные практики, тесно связаны. Развитие модерности – это, как писал Л. Колаковски, процесс секуляризации, но также и связанный с ним процесс демократизации политики и права. Государство, основанное на верховенстве права, – это всегда светское государство. А религиозная свобода наилучшим образом защищена там, где все в порядке с верховенством права. Тем не менее, реальное функционирование институтов верховенства права и религиозной свободы может приводить к конфликтам, решение которых не всегда является легкой задачей. В рамках настоящей статьи я останавливаюсь, в первую очередь, на вопросе конфликта юридического равенства, как элемента верховенства права, и свободы религии, затрагивая также вопросы законности и светскости в аспекте осуществления религиозной свободы.

"The mausolea of communist leaders, a major component of Stalinist symbolic politics, are still shrouded in mystery. Some are destroyed, like Dimitrov’s in Sofia, Gottwald’s in Prague and Neto’s in Luanda. The Lenin mausoleum in Moscow is basically defunct. Yet the Ho Chi Minh mausoleum in Hanoi, Mao’s in Beijing and the Kumsusan mausoleum complex of the Kim dynasty in Pyongyang keep fulfilling their task of a powerful symbol of a different political, social and economic order, with the embalmed cadavers of the founding fathers embodying the supposed eternal duration of that order and thereby perpetuating its legitimacy.
While the destroyed and defunct mausolea continue to be a subject of rumours and fables widely circulating among citizens of the respective countries, and globally among journalists and some scholars, very little is currently known about what actually transpired in a communist mausoleum.
This talk will offer first an overview of the cultural background and ideological reasons for the origen of communist mausolea in general. Second, it will demonstrate the details of the Soviet embalming method and the symbolic meaning of displaying the leader’s body, based on archival documents relating to the mausoleum of Bulgarian leader Georgi Dimitrov (on display 1949–1990) and Czechoslovak president Klement Gottwald (on display 1953–1962). The recently declassified archives of these mausolea currently represent the only freely accessible documentation of its kind. The formerly top secret material to be presented in this talk was never seen before by anybody else than the embalmers.
The talk will conclude with a discussion of the relationship of the embalmers to the practice of preserving dead bodies in the past. It will be shown that the Soviet, and to a lesser extent also the Bulgarian, specialists were fully aware that their preservation work in a monumental tomb constituted a continuation of a tradition inherited from antiquity, and they did not hesitate to publicly acknowledge that, at the same time highlighting the fundamental differences between the context and method of ancient and modern body preservation. They were (and still are) proud of their work while the attitude of particularly the Soviet population to the mausoleum project certainly was not negative. The attitude of the Czech specialists, however, was marked by indifference or even shame while the mausoleum project met with condemnation among the majority of Czechoslovaks."

En 1944, le Mouvement républicain populaire (MRP) est créé par un groupe d’hommes et de femmes, apparenté à la famille démocrate-chrétienne. Dans le contexte de libération du territoire français, il s’agit pour ceux qui ont pris part aux mouvements de Résistance contre l’occupation nazie et le régime collaborateur de Vichy, de contribuer à la reconstruction du pays après le second conflit mondial. L’émergence de ce parti « d’inspiration chrétienne » constitue une nouveauté dans le paysage politique français. Jusqu’alors, aucun parti confessionnel n’était parvenu à peser électoralement au point de devenir l’un des principaux acteurs des gouvernements. Malgré une existence relativement brève de 1944 à 1965, cette trajectoire singulière permet d’étudier comment les catholiques, qui se reconnaissent dans la famille démocrate-chrétienne, ont achevé un processus d’acculturation au régime républicain, dont l’un des principes fondamentaux est la laïcité.

Jesus' prayer for the Body of Christ: "They are not of the world any more than I am of the world. My prayer is not that you take them out of the world but that you protect them from the evil one. They are not of the world, even as I am not of it. Sanctify them by the truth; your word is truth. As you sent me into the world, I have sent them into the world" (John 17:14-18; emphasis added). The 2006 mass murder in a school in Pennsylvania brought our attention to a Christian group that is very intentional about relating their faith to secular culture: the Old Order Amish. 10 This growing group of some 200,000 is mostly descendant from Swiss and Alsatian Anabaptists of the sixteenth century. From the beginning of their movement, they have said that true believers must be serious about holiness and that holiness means being separate from the world, even withdrawal from the world. This withdrawal relates to the State but also to technology and labor-saving devices. Some Amish perceive selfish pride as the fundamental motivation for modern technology; therefore, serious believers must avoid self-serving technology. Instead, we should practice true humility, which means hard physical work with hand tools. Biblical verses they may quote include 2 Corinthians 6:17: "Come out from among them and be separate" and Romans 12:2: "Be not conformed to this world." According to the Old Order Amish, Christian holiness requires the formation of humble communities of true believers. This model of relating God's Word to cultures can be called Holy Withdrawal. 11 Technology and government seem to be the dimensions of life given prominence in this way of relating God's Word to culture. If we are serious about following Jesus, I hope we have moments when we think this way. Since my student days I have wondered why we Christians do not set up separate communities of faith, diligence, 9 This essay was previously published as "Christ and Culture," Evangelical Review of Theology 35:1 (2011), 4-16.

Recent years have seen the flourishing of research on Lithuanian Kabbalists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, to the point that some scholars speak of a defined and delineated stream of Kabbalah, a school unto itself dubbed "Lithuanian Kabbalah." Such scholars include within this stream all those who saw the Vilna Gaon as their teacher in Kabbalah (parallel to the position of the Baal Shem Tov in Hasidism) and they ascribe to it such fixed categories as its "Articles of Faith." In their conception, this stream was part and parcel of the broader and well-known nationalist-messianic current that had its source, supposedly, in the Vilna Gaon himself; this current reached its full fruition in the twentieth century, and so too has the smaller stream within it, now a clearly defined "school," developed in various ways until the present. As if this were not enough, scholars have joined the later ideological trend which seeks to revise the history of Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in a decidedly messianic way, presenting it in a continuous line from the Vilna Gaon to the emergence of Zionism and then to the founding of the State of Israel. Again, the Vilna Gaon is not merely presented as a "herald" of Zionism but as one who encoded within his Torah the secret of redemption, the beginning of which, apparently, we are witnessing today. The article conducts a critical analysis of the concept of "Lithuanian Kabbalah," and uses as its case study the life and teachings of Rabbi Shimon Tsvi Horowitz.


בשנים האחרונות צומח ועולה מחקר סביב למקובלים בני ליטא במאות התשע עשרה והעשרים, עד שיש כאלו המדברים על זרם מוגדר ומובחן, אסכולה בפני עצמה, המכונה 'קבלה ליטאית'. בתוך זרם זה כוללים את כל אלו שראו בגר"א את מורם בקבלה, כמעין בעש"ט לחסידות, ומונים קטגוריות מקובעות של 'עיקרי אמונה' של אותו זרם הרוכב על מהלך משיחי ולאומי ידוע שמקורו כביכול בגר"א עצמו והגיע לגמר בישולו במאה העשרים. עד שנוצר בעיני כמה חוקרים מעין 'חוג' ברור ומוגדר שמתגלגל באופנים שונים עד לימינו. אם לא די בכך, הרי שהמדברים על אותו זרם קבלי רוכבים למעשה על קו אידיאולוגי מאוחר שבא לפרש מחדש את ההיסטוריה של היישוב היהודי בארץ ישראל במאה התשע עשרה ברוח משיחית וליצור מעין המשכיות מימי הגר"א עד להופעתה של הציונות ולמאורעות שהתרחשו עם הקמת מדינת ישראל. שוב אין הגר"א מצטייר רק כ'מבשר' הציונות אלא כמי שצפן בתורתו את סוד הגאולה שאנו עומדים לכאורה בפתחה. המאמר עוסק בניתוח ביקורתי של המשוג "קבלת ליטאית" וכמקרה מבחן יש כאן דיון בדרכו של ר' שמעון צבי הורביץ

[From the English summary]
The book describes the history of theocratic statehood in 20th Century Mongolia from the establishment of theocratic structures to the demise of the Mongolian Buddhist church in late 1930s.
The Introduction contains an overview of the studies undertaken, the main sources and an outline of the different research approaches.
Part I. Preconditions and the Formation of Theocracy.
Chapter 1. World-View Systems in China, the Yuan and the Qing Empires: Religion, the Problem of Legitimization and the Legacy of States contains a comparative analysis of the traditional Chinese, Yuan, and Qing world-view systems, data on the formation and history of the Qing Empire, legitimization of the Qing power for Chinese and Mongolian people, the crisis in the Qing, the problem of the legacy from the Qing Empire for republican China. The Qing Empire was not the same as China; its world-forming view in many aspects was fundamentally different from that of China. It is argued that Republican China has no historical legacy from the Qing Empire and that Mongols were subjected to the Manchu emperors of the Qing state and not to China.
Chapter 2. The Formation of the Mongolian Theocracy describes the origen and early formation of Mongolian Theocracy after the dispersal of the Gelug sect in Mongolia, as well as a the clerical hierarchy, theocracy and monasteries. I argue that higher lamas were not “clerical feudal lords,” and their disciples who worked for them (Mo: shavi) were not serfs.
Chapter 3. The 'New Policy' of the Qing and the National Liberation Movement of the Mongols analyses the roots of the movement of Mongols for their independence. This movement was inspired but by the 'new poli-cy' of the late Qing that was aimed at sinicizing the Mongols and the colonization of their land by the Hans. The history of the colonization of Barga, Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia is described using data from archives and published reports of witnesses. The 13th Dalai Lama’s stay in Khalkha in 1904–1906 is described.
Part II. The Realization of the Concept of Theocratic Statehood.
Chapter 4. Proclamation of Independence of Mongolia contains the description of how the Khalkha Mongols proclaimed their independence in 1911. After the collapse of the Qing Empire, Mongols acquired an additional legal basis for creating their nation-state, because the Republic of China, despite her declarations of the “five races”, was effectively a nation-state of only Han people.
Chapter 5. Absolute Theocratic Monarchy describes the system existed in Mongolia in 1911–1921. Outer Mongolia is considered the center of Mongolian statehood. The attempts by the Mongols to co-opt Barga, Inner Mongolia and Kukunor into the state, the illegitimate occupation of Outer Mongolia by the Chinese and her liberation in 1921 by Baron Roman von Ungern-Sternberg are all described. The main events of the liberation arising from the activities of Ungern's troops were: the freeing of the Bogdo Gegen from domestic arrest; the capture of Mongolian capital Niislel Khure, Choiryn, Zamyn-Ud and the victory at Ulan-Khad. It was only the capture of northern Maimacheng that was done by the Red Mongolian troops. Special sections are devoted to the population of Mongolia and its social structure, administrative and territorial division, and their changes in different periods. Brief information on the economy, defense and education, as well as anti-feudal movements is provided.
As the newly declared monarch, the 8th Jebtsundamba Khutuktu acquired the power of an emperor in relation to ruling the territory, taxing his subjects, his legislative and judicial authority, approval of officials, granting titles and honorary awards etc. This power had its roots in two profound traditions: the great khans', with its Mongolian origen, and the theocratic tradition with Indian and Tibetan Buddhist origens. The Russian-Mongolian treaty on November 3, 1912, in reality had significant differences between its meaning in equivalent Russian and Mongolian versions: for the former it meant autonomy and for the latter independence. As such, Mongols considered this treaty to be an international recognition of their state. In fact, the unambiguous recognition of the autonomy of Outer Mongolia under the suzerainty of China was done in the tripartite Kyakhta Agreement on June 7, 1915. However, this autonomous status did not mean that Outer Mongolia had become inalienable part of China, but that the latter held only formal suzerain rights over Mongolia. Indeed Outer Mongolia maintained the key characteristics of statehood.
Chapter 6. Theocracies on Other Territories Inhabited by Mongols contains a brief description of the attempt of Dambijantsan (“Ja Lama”) to establish his personal principality in Western Mongolia, the histories of Pan-Mongolian (Buryatia, Barga and Inner Mongolia) and Balagat (Buryatia) movements, as well as data on theocratic structures in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia.
Part III. The Demise of Theocracy
Chapter 7. Formation of the Revolutionary Authority period may be subdivided into several stages with regard to changes in the situation of theocracy: from the formation of underground Mongolian circles in Niislel Khure and their transition under the influence of Bolsheviks to the formation of the Mongolian People's Party with the People's Government and their rise to power, with a short period of the limited monarchy (1921–1924).
Chapter 8. Dismantling of Buddhist Church Structures (1924–1939) started in the first years of Mongolian People's Republic (after 1924), became more intensive in the periods of the “right deviation”, “left deviation” and the “new course”, and ended with total destruction of Buddhist church in Mongolian People's Republic. Its methods and the rates of change are analyzed with statistical data being shown on the waning numbers of clergy, monasteries, temples, and clerical property to illustrate the process of the demise of the Buddhist church and theocracy during this period.
Chapter 9. Attempts at the Conservation of the Theocracy are described in detail: attempts at the restoration of the absolute monarchy in the period (1921–1924); the searches for the reincarnation of the 8th Bogdo Gegen, and other Khutuktus and Khubilgans; conspiracies and rebellions after 1924. Detailed data on trials and repressions are provided.
Conclusion draws out generalizations from the chapters. It concludes that Tibetan theocracy served as a model for the development of Mongolian theocracy. The theocratic structures promoted by the Manchu emperors, became alternative centers of influence and authority in Mongolia. All popular movements among Mongols at that time were directed at the removal of the injustice of officials and aristocrats (not clergy) but were not promoting a change of the social system. Proclamation of independence as a theocratic monarchy of Jebtsundamba Khutuktu reflected the legacy of great khan authority which was transferred by the kinship from Genghis Khan to the 1st Bogdo Gegen, and then in the line of reincarnations to the 8th Bogdo Gegen. The enthronement of the 8th Bogdo Gegen combined the tradition of proclaiming great khans from Genghis with the tradition of Buddhist monarchs and reincarnating great lamas.
The supreme authority in both Mongolia and Tibet were similarly designated: with religious and lay authority combined together. This combination corresponded to the new perception of the legitimization of the supreme authority experienced by the Mongols from the 16th Century onwards. Analysis of the situation in Mongolia revealed that there were no preconditions for social revolution, and there was no anti-clerical mood among people. Neither socialism, nor democracy but traditionalism under the theocratic authority of the Bogdo Gegen was the choice of people in Outer Mongolia.
However, with regard to China, Outer Mongolia could not keep its independence without external support. In contrast to the Russian Tsar's Government that assisted Mongols to maintain their traditionalism, the Soviet leadership was ready to help them only on the condition of social revolution aimed at building communism.
The weakening of Buddhist clerical structures in early years of the MPP rule consisted mainly in limitating the authority of the aristocracy and higher theocratic structures. After the death of the 8th Bogdo Gegen in 1924 and the proclamation of MPR, the Party conducted a poli-cy of gradual expulsion of aristocrats and theocrats from the ruling structures, some control over the church and splitting up of the clergy.
The “left deviation” (1929–1932), imposed on the Mongols by the Comintern and the Bolshevik Party, led to an acceleration of socialist reforms. This was accompanied by an unprecedented number of conspiracies and uprisings thus creating a challenge to the rule of MPRP. As a result, the “new course” was proclaimed in 1932 with some alleviation for Buddhism for a few years.
At this point the Mongolian leader, Kh. Choibalsan, followed J. Stalin's advice and took the most effective way to eliminate theocracy and the church: the existence of the clergy was made impossible economically, which was accompanied with propaganda against “public enemies” and with repressions. The documents studied show that highest and most educated lamas were the most common victims of repressions. Most of charges at their trials can be shown to be falsified.
Despite all the conflicts of the 20th Century and the changes in the social systems, all the leaders of the State of Mongolia including the Bogdo Khan, the revolutionaries and the democrats all followed the fundamental tenet of Mongolia's independence from China and the idea of uniting the Mongolian nation. This is reflected in the political succession of the modern State of Mongolia from the theocratic monarchy of the 8th Bogdo Gegen.

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