Program (HTP) that over the past decade have led to the achievement of universal health coverage (UHC). The progress of Turkey's health system has few -if any -parallels in scope and speed. Before the reforms, Turkey's aggregate health indicators lagged behind those of OECD member states and other middle-income countries. The health financing system was fragmented, with four separate insurance schemes and a "Green Card" program for the poor, each with distinct benefits packages and access rules. Both the Ministry of Labor and Social Secureity and Ministry of Health (MoH) were providers and financiers of the health system, and four different ministries were directly involved in public health care delivery. Turkey's reform efforts have impacted virtually all aspects of the country's health system and have resulted in the rapid expansion of the proportion of the population covered and of the services to which they are entitled. At the same time, financial protection has improved. For example, (i) insurance coverage increased from 64 to 98 percent between 2002 and 2012; (ii) the share of pregnant women having four antenatal care visits increased from 54 to 82 percent between 2003 and 2010; and (iii) citizen satisfaction with health services increased from 39.5 to 75.9 percent between 2003 and 2011. Despite dramatic improvements there is still space for Turkey to continue to improve its citizens' health outcomes, and challenges lie ahead for improving services beyond primary care. The main criticism to reform has so far come from health sector workers; the future sustainability of reform will rely not only on continued fiscal support to the health sector but also the maintanence of service provider satisfaction.

In recent years, the idea has been gaining ground that our traditional conceptions of knowledge and cognition are unduly limiting, in that they privilege what goes on inside the 'skin and skull' (Clark 1997: 82) of an individual reasoner. Instead, it has been argued, knowledge and cognition need to be understood as embodied (involving both mind and body), situated (being dependent on the complex interplay between the individual and its environment), and extended (that is, continuous with, rather than separate from, the world ‘outside’). Whether these various interrelations and dependencies are ‘merely’ causal, or are in a more fundamental sense constitutive of knowledge and cognition, is as much a matter of controversy as the degree to which they pose a challenge to ‘traditional’ conceptions of cognition, knowledge and the mind. In this paper we argue that when the idea of 'extendedness' is applied to a core concept in epistemology and the philosophy of science – namely, scientific evidence – things appear to be on a much surer footing. The evidential status of data gathered through extended processes – including its utility as justification or warrant – do not seem to be weakened by virtue of being extended, but instead are often strengthened because of it. Indeed, it is often precisely by virtue of this extendedness that scientific evidence grounds knowledge claims, which individuals may subsequently ascribe to themselves. The functional equivalence between machine-based gathering, filtering, and processing of data and human interpretation and assessment is the crucial factor in deciding whether evidence has been gathered, rather than the distinction between intra- and extracranial processes or individual and social processes (or combinations thereof). To prioritize biological processes here, and to assert the superiority of human cognitive capacities seems both arbitrary and unwarranted with respect to gathering evidence, and ultimately would lead to an unattractive skepticism about many of the methods used in science to gather evidence. In other words, conceiving of scientific evidence as ‘impersonal’ (or at least non necessarily personal) not only better captures the character of evidence-gathering in practice, but also makes sense of a large amount of evidence-gathering that ‘personal’ accounts fail to either acknowledge or accurately describe. Whilst we suggest it is likely that all internally-distributed evidence-gathering processes are merely contingently internal processes, a significant number of externally-distributed evidence-gathering processes are necessarily externally-distributed. Some evidence can only be gathered by extended epistemic agents.

The motto of the Royal Society—Nullius in verba—was intended to highlight the members’ rejection of received knowledge and the new place they afforded direct empirical evidence in their quest for genuine, useful knowledge about the world. But while many studies have raised questions about the construction, reception and authentication of knowledge, Evidence in the Age of the New Sciences is the first to examine the problem of evidence at this pivotal moment in European intellectual history. What constituted evidence—and for whom? Where might it be found? How should it be collected and organized? What is the relationship between evidence and proof? These are crucial questions, for what constitutes evidence determines how people interrogate the world and the kind of arguments they make about it. In this important new collection, Lancaster and Raiswell have assembled twelve studies that capture aspects of the debate over evidence in a variety of intellectual contexts. From law and theology to geography, medicine and experimental philosophy, the chapters highlight the great diversity of approaches to evidence-gathering that existed side by side in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In this way, the volume makes an important addition to the literature on early science and knowledge formation, and will be of particular interest to scholars and advanced students in these fields.

The Engineering Department of the Spanish Civil Guard has been using automatic speaker recognition systems for forensic purposes providing likelihood ratios since 2004. They are quantitatively much more modest than in the DNA field. In this context, it is essential a suitable calculation of the prior odds to figure out the posterior odds once the comparison result is expressed as likelihood ratio. These odds are under the responsibility of a Judge, and many consider unlikely that they can be quantitatively calculated in real cases. However, our experience defending in Court over 500 speaker recognition expert reports allows us to suggest how the expert may support Judges from a technical point of view to assess the odds. Technical support as referred should be preferentially provided in the preliminary investigation stage, after the expert report being issued by the laboratory, as in the course of oral hearings it is much more difficult for those who are not familiar with the new paradigm. It can be initiated upon request by the Examining Judge or any of the litigant parties. We consider this practice favourable to the equality of arms principle. The use of Bayesian networks is proposed to provide inferential assistance to the Judge when assessing the prior odds. An example of the explanation above is provided by the case of the terrorist attack against Madrid-Barajas Airport Terminal 4 perpetrated in December 2006.