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1. Watch your words: An experimental study on communication and the opportunity cost of delegation. (2023). Pavesi, Filippo ; D'Agostino, Elena ; Corazzini, Luca ; Antinyan, Armenak.
   In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
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2. Lying aversion and vague communication: An experimental study. (2023). Papadokonstantaki, Stella ; Sun, Keh-Kuan.
   In: European Economic Review.
   RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:160:y:2023:i:c:s0014292123002398.

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3. Lying Aversion and Vague Communication: An Experimental Study. (2023). Papadokonstantaki, Stella ; Sun, Keh-Kuan.
   In: Papers.
   RePEc:arx:papers:2301.00372.

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4. Communication-Enhancing Vagueness. (2022). Wood, Daniel H.
   In: Games.
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5. Reacting to ambiguous messages: An experimental analysis. (2022). Riener, Gerhard ; le Quement, Mark T ; Kellner, Christian.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:136:y:2022:i:c:p:360-378.

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6. Intention or Request: The Impact of Message Structures. (2021). Flannery, Timothy ; Wang, Siyu.
   In: Games.
   RePEc:gam:jgames:v:12:y:2021:i:1:p:12-:d:490664.

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7. Vagueness in multidimensional proposals. (2020). Zhang, Qiaoxi.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:121:y:2020:i:c:p:307-328.

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8. (Dis)honest Politicians and the Value of Transparency for Campaign Promises. (2020). Schudy, Simeon ; Lang, Matthias ; Dermot, Simeon Andreas.
   In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8366.

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9. Watch your Words: An Experimental Study on Communication and the Opportunity Cost of Delegation. (2019). pavesi, filippo ; Dagostino, Elena ; Corazzini, Luca ; Antinyan, Armenak.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:ven:wpaper:2019:31.

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10. Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining. (2019). Isoni, Andrea ; Tsutsui, Kei ; Sugden, Robert ; Poulsen, Anders.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:114:y:2019:i:c:p:193-214.

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11. A theory of focal points in 2 × 2 games. (2018). Leland, Jonathan W ; Schneider, Mark .
    In: Journal of Economic Psychology.
    RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:65:y:2018:i:c:p:75-89.

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12. Spin Doctors: A Model and an Experimental Investigation of Vague Disclosure. (2018). Schwardmann, Peter ; Ispano, Alessandro ; Deversi, Marvin.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7244.

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13. Do we need to listen to all stakeholders?: communicating in a coordination game with private information. (2018). Ray, Indrajit ; Gürgüç, Zeynep ; Drouvelis, Michalis ; Cabrales, Antonio ; Gurguc, Zeynep.
    In: Cardiff Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2018/23.

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14. Evasive Lying in Strategic Communication. (2017). Werner, Peter ; Khalmetski, Kiryl ; Rockenbach, Bettina.
    In: Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking.
    RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168119.

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15. Watch your Words: an Experimental Study on Communication and the Opportunity Cost of Delegation. (2017). pavesi, filippo ; Corazzini, Luca ; Antinyan, Armenak ; D'Agosotino, Elena.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ver:wpaper:18/2017.

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16. Does Focality Depend on the Mode of Cognition? Experimental Evidence on Pure Coordination Games. (2017). Boncinelli, Leonardo ; Bilancini, Ennio ; Luini, Luigi .
    In: Department of Economics University of Siena.
    RePEc:usi:wpaper:771.

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17. Evasive Lying in Strategic Communication. (2017). Werner, Peter ; Khalmetski, Kiryl ; Rockenbach, Bettina.
    In: Working Paper Series in Economics.
    RePEc:kls:series:0092.

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18. Evasive lying in strategic communication. (2017). Werner, Peter ; Khalmetski, Kiryl ; Rockenbach, Bettina.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:156:y:2017:i:c:p:59-72.

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19. Coordination and Cheap Talk: Indirect versus Direct Messages. (2016). Küçükşenel, Serkan ; Buyukboyaci, Muruvvet.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:68964.

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20. Cheap Talk with Multiple Strategically Interacting Audiences: An Experimental Study. (2016). Peeters, Ronald ; Li, Xinyu.
    In: PLOS ONE.
    RePEc:plo:pone00:0163783.

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21. Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Cheap Talk Games. (2015). Onderstal, Sander ; Adrian de Groot Ruiz, ; Offerman, Theo.
    In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150012.

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22. Is No News (Perceived as) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure. (2015). Martin, Daniel ; lMartin, Danie ; Luca, Michael ; Jin, Ginger Zhe.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21099.

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23. Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games. (2015). Onderstal, Sander ; de Groot Ruiz, Adrian, ; Offerman, Theo.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:91:y:2015:i:c:p:14-25.

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24. Strategic coordination in forecasting – An experimental study. (2015). Meub, Lukas ; Spiwoks, Markus ; Bizer, Kilian ; Proeger, Till.
    In: Finance Research Letters.
    RePEc:eee:finlet:v:13:y:2015:i:c:p:155-162.

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25. Strategic coordination in forecasting: An experimental study. (2014). Bizer, Kilian ; Proeger, Till ; Spiwoks, Markus ; Meub, Lukas.
    In: Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:cegedp:195.

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26. For those about to talk we salute you: an experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC. (2014). Onderstal, Sander ; Offerman, Theo ; Ruiz, Adrian Groot .
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:17:y:2014:i:2:p:173-199.

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27. Language and government coordination: An experimental study of communication in the announcement game. (2013). schotter, andrew ; Agranov, Marina.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:104:y:2013:i:c:p:26-39.

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28. An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC. (2011). Onderstal, Sander ; Adrian de Groot Ruiz, ; Offerman, Theo.
    In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110153.

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29. Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent. (2011). Onderstal, Sander ; Adrian de Groot Ruiz, ; Offerman, Theo.
    In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110037.

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