1. Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Respect for Improvements. (2023). Hirata, Daisuke ; 奥村, 保規, ; Okumura, Yasunori ; 糟谷, 祐介, ; Kasuya, Yusuke ; 平田, 大祐, .
   In: Discussion Papers.
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2. Sticky matching in school choice. (2017). Barlo, Mehmet ; AFACAN, MUSTAFA ; Aliogullari, Zeynel Harun .
   In: Economic Theory.
   RePEc:spr:joecth:v:64:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-016-0995-y.

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3. Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching. (2014). Romm, Assaf.
   In: Social Choice and Welfare.
   RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:43:y:2014:i:4:p:851-875.

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4. Optimal truncation in matching markets. (2014). Shorrer, Ran.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:591-615.

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5. Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets*. (2013). Pathak, Parag ; Kojima, Fuhito ; Roth, Alvin E.
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   RePEc:hrv:faseco:30831454.

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6. Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets. (2010). Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Kojima, Fuhito.
   In: NBER Working Papers.
   RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16028.

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7. Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets. (2009). Pathak, Parag ; Kojima, Fuhito.
   In: American Economic Review.
   RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:3:p:608-27.

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8. Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets. (2008). Ehlers, Lars.
   In: Mathematics of Operations Research.
   RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:33:y:2008:i:2:p:327-335.

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9. School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms. (2008). Pintér, Ágnes ; Pais, Joana ; Pinter, gnes .
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:1:p:303-328.

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10. College admissions and the role of information : an experimental study. (2008). Veszteg, Róbert ; Pintér, Ágnes ; Pais, Joana.
    In: UC3M Working papers. Economics.
    RePEc:cte:werepe:we080302.

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11. Constrained School Choice. (2008). Klijn, Flip ; Haeringer, Guillaume.
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12. School Choice and Information. An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms. (2007). Pintér, Ágnes ; Pais, Joana ; Pinter, Agnes .
    In: Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena.
    RePEc:usi:labsit:018.

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13. Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets. (2007). Masso, Jordi ; Ehlers, Lars.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:136:y:2007:i:1:p:587-600.

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14. School Choice and Information An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms. (2006). Pintér, Ágnes ; Pais, Joana ; Pinter, gnes .
    In: Working Papers Department of Economics.
    RePEc:ise:isegwp:wp142006.

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15. Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy. (2006). Triossi, Matteo ; Romero Medina, Antonio.
    In: Carlo Alberto Notebooks.
    RePEc:cca:wpaper:22.

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16. Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets. (2004). Masso, Jordi ; Ehlers, Lars.
    In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
    RePEc:aub:autbar:637.04.

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17. Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matching. (2003). Majumdar, Dipjyoti.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242988.

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18. Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matchings. (2003). Majumdar, Dipjyoti.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:crd:wpaper:05001.

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1. Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement. (2015). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose.
   In: QM&ET Working Papers.
   RePEc:ris:qmetal:2014_001.

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2. Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market. (2015). Velez, Rodrigo.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:1114-1129.

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3. A School Choice Compromise: Between Immediate and Deferred Acceptance. (2014). Harless, Patrick.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:61417.

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4. A new dynamic mechanism to the marriage problem with a variant. (2014). Evci, B..
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp973.

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5. A further note on the college admission game. (2012). Sotomayor, Marilda.
   In: International Journal of Game Theory.
   RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:1:p:179-193.

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6. Promoting School Competition Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach. (2012). Kojima, Fuhito ; Narita, Yusuke ; Hatfield, John William .
   In: Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:sip:dpaper:12-036.

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7. Let them cheat!. (2012). Velez, Rodrigo ; Thomson, William.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:948-963.

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8. Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games. (2011). Diamantoudi, Effrosyni ; Bloch, Francis.
   In: International Journal of Game Theory.
   RePEc:spr:jogath:v:40:y:2011:i:2:p:263-280.

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9. Fair School Placement. (2011). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose.
   In: QM&ET Working Papers.
   RePEc:ris:qmetal:2011_001.

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10. On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems. (2011). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose ; Romero-Medina, Antonio .
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:28831.

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11. Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem. (2011). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose ; Romero-Medina, Antonio .
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:28206.

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12. Fair School Placement. (2011). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose ; Perez, Jose Alcalde .
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
    RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2011-22.

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13. A magyarországi felvételi rendszerek sajátosságai. (2010). Kóczy, László ; Koczy a., Laszlo, .
    In: Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences).
    RePEc:ksa:szemle:1148.

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14. Manipulation via capacities revisited. (2010). Ehlers, Lars.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:69:y:2010:i:2:p:302-311.

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15. Let them cheat!. (2009). Velez, Rodrigo ; Thomson, William.
    In: RCER Working Papers.
    RePEc:roc:rocher:552.

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16. Manipulation via Capacities Revisited. (2009). Ehlers, Lars.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:mtl:montec:04-2009.

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17. Matching Markets with Signals. (2009). Kushnir, Alexey.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2009.39.

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18. Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities. (2009). Takamiya, Koji .
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:45:y:2009:i:1-2:p:199-204.

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19. Constrained school choice. (2009). Klijn, Flip ; Haeringer, Guillaume.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:5:p:1921-1947.

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20. Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability. (2009). Triossi, Matteo.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:1:p:566-575.

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21. Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems. (2008). Wen, Quan ; Suh, Sang-Chul.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:31:y:2008:i:1:p:163-174.

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22. Constrained School Choice. (2008). Klijn, Flip ; Haeringer, Guillaume.
    In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
    RePEc:aub:autbar:671.06.

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23. Matching Markets under (In)complete Information. (2007). Masso, Jordi ; Ehlers, Lars.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:mtl:montec:01-2007.

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24. Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism. (2006). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Ergin, Haluk.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:90:y:2006:i:1-2:p:215-237.

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25. On the equivalence of G-weak and -strong cores in the marriage problem. (2006). Takamiya, Koji .
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2006:i:20:p:1-8.

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26. On the equivalence of G-weak and -strong cores in the marriage problem. (2006). Takamiya, Koji .
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-06c70009.

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27. On the Equivalence of G-weak and -strong Cores in the Marriage Problem. (2006). Takamiya, Koji .
    In: ISER Discussion Paper.
    RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0652.

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28. Preference Revelation Games and Strong Cores of Allocation Problems with Indivisibilities. (2006). Takamiya, Koji .
    In: ISER Discussion Paper.
    RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0651.

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29. Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy. (2006). Triossi, Matteo ; Romero Medina, Antonio.
    In: Carlo Alberto Notebooks.
    RePEc:cca:wpaper:22.

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30. Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms. (2005). Sanver, Remzi ; Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:50:y:2005:i:3:p:304-317.

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31. Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism. (2005). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Ergin, Haluk.
    In: Boston College Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:boc:bocoec:619.

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32. In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm. (2004). Ehlers, Lars.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:48:y:2004:i:2:p:249-270.

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33. Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. (2004). Sotomayor, Marilda.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:1:p:199-212.

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34. Decentralized Job Matching. (2003). Wooders, Myrna ; Haeinger, Guillaume.
    In: The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS).
    RePEc:wrk:warwec:688.

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35. Decentralized job matching. (2003). Wooders, Myrna ; Haeringer, Guillaume.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bge:wpaper:40.

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36. Human capital, marriage and regression. (2002). Mukherjee, Diganta.
    In: ISER Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ese:iserwp:2002-15.

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37. Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: applications. (2002). Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:44:y:2002:i:3:p:253-276.

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38. A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure. (2002). Sotomayor, Marilda ; Perez-Castrillo, David.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:103:y:2002:i:2:p:461-474.

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39. Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems. (2000). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:31:y:2000:i:2:p:294-302.

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40. A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure. (2000). Sotomayor, Marilda ; Perez-Castrillo, David.
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
    RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0704.

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41. - SEQUENTIAL DECISIONS IN THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM. (1999). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose.
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
    RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1999-16.

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42. The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets. (1999). Revilla, Pablo ; Alcalde, Jose.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:62:y:1999:i:2:p:189-195.

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43. Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations. (1998). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Perez-Castrillo, David ; Alcalde, Jose.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:82:y:1998:i:2:p:469-480.

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44. Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations. (1997). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Perez-Castrillo, David ; Alcalde, Jose.
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
    RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1997-10.

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45. Games of Manipulation in Marriage Problems. (1997). Sönmez, Tayfun.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:20:y:1997:i:2:p:169-176.

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46. Implementation in generalized matching problems. (1996). Sönmez, Tayfun.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:26:y:1996:i:4:p:429-439.

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47. Nash Implementation of Matching Rules. (1996). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Kara, Tarik.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:68:y:1996:i:2:p:425-439.

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48. A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems. (1996). Suh, Sang-Chul ; Shin, Sungwhee .
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:51:y:1996:i:2:p:185-189.

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49. A NOTE ON STABILITY OF BEST REPLY AND GRADIENT SYSTEMS WITH APPLICATIONS TO IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MODELS. (1995). Mas-Colell, Andreu ; Corchon, Luis.
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
    RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1995-18.

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50. Exchange-Proofness or Divorce-Proofness? Stability in One-Sided Matching Markets. (1995). Alcalde, Jose.
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
    RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1995-04.

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