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1. Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement. (2015). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose.
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2. Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market. (2015). Velez, Rodrigo.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:1114-1129.

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3. A School Choice Compromise: Between Immediate and Deferred Acceptance. (2014). Harless, Patrick.
   In: MPRA Paper.
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4. A new dynamic mechanism to the marriage problem with a variant. (2014). Evci, B..
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5. A further note on the college admission game. (2012). Sotomayor, Marilda.
   In: International Journal of Game Theory.
   RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:1:p:179-193.

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6. Promoting School Competition Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach. (2012). Kojima, Fuhito ; Narita, Yusuke ; Hatfield, John William .
   In: Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:sip:dpaper:12-036.

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7. Let them cheat!. (2012). Velez, Rodrigo ; Thomson, William.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:948-963.

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8. Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games. (2011). Diamantoudi, Effrosyni ; Bloch, Francis.
   In: International Journal of Game Theory.
   RePEc:spr:jogath:v:40:y:2011:i:2:p:263-280.

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9. Fair School Placement. (2011). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose.
   In: QM&ET Working Papers.
   RePEc:ris:qmetal:2011_001.

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10. On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems. (2011). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose ; Romero-Medina, Antonio .
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:28831.

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11. Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem. (2011). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose ; Romero-Medina, Antonio .
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:28206.

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12. Fair School Placement. (2011). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose ; Perez, Jose Alcalde .
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
    RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2011-22.

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13. A magyarországi felvételi rendszerek sajátosságai. (2010). Kóczy, László ; Koczy a., Laszlo, .
    In: Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences).
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14. Manipulation via capacities revisited. (2010). Ehlers, Lars.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:69:y:2010:i:2:p:302-311.

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15. Let them cheat!. (2009). Velez, Rodrigo ; Thomson, William.
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16. Manipulation via Capacities Revisited. (2009). Ehlers, Lars.
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17. Matching Markets with Signals. (2009). Kushnir, Alexey.
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18. Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities. (2009). Takamiya, Koji .
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:45:y:2009:i:1-2:p:199-204.

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19. Constrained school choice. (2009). Klijn, Flip ; Haeringer, Guillaume.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
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20. Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability. (2009). Triossi, Matteo.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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21. Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems. (2008). Wen, Quan ; Suh, Sang-Chul.
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22. Constrained School Choice. (2008). Klijn, Flip ; Haeringer, Guillaume.
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23. Matching Markets under (In)complete Information. (2007). Masso, Jordi ; Ehlers, Lars.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
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24. Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism. (2006). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Ergin, Haluk.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:90:y:2006:i:1-2:p:215-237.

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25. On the equivalence of G-weak and -strong cores in the marriage problem. (2006). Takamiya, Koji .
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2006:i:20:p:1-8.

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26. On the equivalence of G-weak and -strong cores in the marriage problem. (2006). Takamiya, Koji .
    In: Economics Bulletin.
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27. On the Equivalence of G-weak and -strong Cores in the Marriage Problem. (2006). Takamiya, Koji .
    In: ISER Discussion Paper.
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28. Preference Revelation Games and Strong Cores of Allocation Problems with Indivisibilities. (2006). Takamiya, Koji .
    In: ISER Discussion Paper.
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29. Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy. (2006). Triossi, Matteo ; Romero Medina, Antonio.
    In: Carlo Alberto Notebooks.
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30. Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms. (2005). Sanver, Remzi ; Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:50:y:2005:i:3:p:304-317.

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31. Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism. (2005). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Ergin, Haluk.
    In: Boston College Working Papers in Economics.
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32. In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm. (2004). Ehlers, Lars.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:48:y:2004:i:2:p:249-270.

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33. Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. (2004). Sotomayor, Marilda.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:1:p:199-212.

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34. Decentralized Job Matching. (2003). Wooders, Myrna ; Haeinger, Guillaume.
    In: The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS).
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35. Decentralized job matching. (2003). Wooders, Myrna ; Haeringer, Guillaume.
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36. Human capital, marriage and regression. (2002). Mukherjee, Diganta.
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37. Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: applications. (2002). Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu.
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38. A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure. (2002). Sotomayor, Marilda ; Perez-Castrillo, David.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
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39. Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems. (2000). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:31:y:2000:i:2:p:294-302.

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40. A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure. (2000). Sotomayor, Marilda ; Perez-Castrillo, David.
    In: Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers.
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41. - SEQUENTIAL DECISIONS IN THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM. (1999). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose.
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42. The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets. (1999). Revilla, Pablo ; Alcalde, Jose.
    In: Economics Letters.
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43. Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations. (1998). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Perez-Castrillo, David ; Alcalde, Jose.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:82:y:1998:i:2:p:469-480.

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44. Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations. (1997). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Perez-Castrillo, David ; Alcalde, Jose.
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
    RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1997-10.

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45. Games of Manipulation in Marriage Problems. (1997). Sönmez, Tayfun.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:20:y:1997:i:2:p:169-176.

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46. Implementation in generalized matching problems. (1996). Sönmez, Tayfun.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:26:y:1996:i:4:p:429-439.

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47. Nash Implementation of Matching Rules. (1996). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Kara, Tarik.
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48. A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems. (1996). Suh, Sang-Chul ; Shin, Sungwhee .
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49. A NOTE ON STABILITY OF BEST REPLY AND GRADIENT SYSTEMS WITH APPLICATIONS TO IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MODELS. (1995). Mas-Colell, Andreu ; Corchon, Luis.
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50. Exchange-Proofness or Divorce-Proofness? Stability in One-Sided Matching Markets. (1995). Alcalde, Jose.
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    RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1995-04.

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