Psychological terms, such as ÔmindÕ, ÔmemoryÕ, ÔemotionÕ and indeed ÔpsychologyÕ itself, have a history. This history, I argue, supports the view that basic psychological categories refer to historical and social entities, and not to Ônatural kindsÕ. The case is argued through a wide ranging review of the historiography of western psychology, first, in connection with the fieldÕs extreme modern diversity; second, in relation to the possible antecedents of the field in the early modern period; and lastly, through a brief introduction to usage of the words ÔsoulÕ, ÔmindÕ, ÔmemoryÕ and ÔemotionÕ. The discussion situates the history of psychology within a large historical context, questions assumptions about the continuity of meaning, and draws out implications for the philosophical and social constitution of ÔpsychologyÕ and Ôthe psycho-logicalÕ from the existing literature. The historical evidence, this paper concludes, does not support the conventional presumption that modern psychological terms describe Ônatural kindsÕ.

In: Eugene H Casad (Ed.) (1996). Cognitive Linguistics in the Redwoods: The Expansion of a New Paradigm in Linguistics. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, pp. 175-206., 1996

From cognitive psychology to cognitive linguistics ancl back againl T'he study ofcategory tíucture Barbara C, MaLt Historical aspects of categorization Gábor Gy ri Unpacking markedness Laura A. Jand.a Section lI: Within morphology and the lexicon The cognitive frame of a set ofcricket teíms WiLLetn J. Botha Towards a cognitive account of the use of the prcpositions por and para in Spanish Níct:;Ie Delbetque What,.ue copula verbs? Brucc I Ioflon

2018

The reflection upon the categories leaves a fundamental mark in the history of philosophy. By theorizing such issue, philosophy gains a meta-reflexive feature, which is probably one of the most distinguishing traits of this kind of knowledge, including its method. In the history of philosophy, the question of the categories has been gradually investigated and clarified but it still remains to be solved. Therefore, from a philosophical perspective, the history of the categories is far from coming to an end: since ancient times, it has been debated and discussed, thus revealing all its theoretical potential. Such a broad history should be taken into account by any present study that wants to represent a real progress in the research, in order to avoid repeating errors that have been already made in the past. Among other things, this is one of the objectives of the present volume, which comes from the will to describe some paths and perspectives of this history, without claiming to deliver an exhaustive overview and rather representing the rst partial contribution to a wider project.

Cognitive Systems Monographs, 2012

Categories. Histories and Perspectives 2, 2019

This is the second volume devoted to the history of the question of categories, an issue which was also the focus of the collective volume published in 2017. The aim is still to describe some trajectories and perspectives of this history, without claiming an exhaustive overview of it, but rather representing a contribution to a wider project, which is gradually reaching its goal. In this volume the problem of categories has been investigated in the work of further philosophers, from Plato to Quine; in this way the present work complements that done in the fi rst volume. Th e question of categories has been dealt with in diff erent times and contexts, sometimes coming into the foreground and sometimes concealing itself-and this is something worthy of investigation in itself. It is also interesting to understand why in particular contexts greater attention is paid to a particular issue that had previously lost its centrality.

Categoricity is a certain semantic property that belongs to a set of sentences of an uninterpreted formal language with respect to the set of interpretations of the language. Other such properties are consistency [sc. satisfiability], inconsistency [sc. unsatisfiability], completeness, independence, and tautologousness. Each sentence [sc. of an uninterpreted formal language] is either true or false in each interpretation [sc. of that uninterpreted formal language]. A categorical set of sentences implicitly defines (completely describes, or characterizes up to isomorphism) the structure of one of its models, often its intended interpretation or standard model. It is a crucial mistake to omit or ignore the words ‘the structure of’ in the previous sentence: according to the currently accepted viewpoint, it is impossible to define a particular interpretation by means of a set of sentences. The best-known categorical set of sentences is the postulate set for number theory attributed to Peano, which completely characterizes the structure of an arithmetic progression. This structure is exemplified by the system of natural numbers with zero as distinguished element and successor (addition of one) as distinguished function. Other exemplifications of this structure are obtained by taking as distinguished element an arbitrary integer, taking as distinguished function the process of adding an arbitrary positive or negative integer, and taking as universe of discourse (or domain) the result of repeated application of the distinguished function to the distinguished element. (See, e.g., Russell’s Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, 1919.) More precisely, a postulate set is defined to be categorical if every two of its models (satisfying interpretations or realizations) are isomorphic (to each other), where of course, two interpretations are isomorphic if between their respective universes of discourse there exists a one-to-one correspondence by which the distinguished elements, functions, relations, etc., of the one are mapped exactly onto those of the other. The importance of the analytic geometry of Descartes involves the fact that the system of points of a geometrical line with the “left-of relation” distinguished is isomorphic to the system of real numbers with the “less-than” relation distinguished. Categoricity, the ideal limit of success for the axiomatic method considered as a method for characterizing subject matter rather than for reorganizing a science, is known to be impossible with respect to certain subject matters using certain formal languages. The concept of categoricity can be traced back at least as far as Dedekind; the word is due to Dewey. After a short preface, the first of the three sections of this paper is devoted to historical and philosophic aspects of categoricity. The second section is a self-contained exposition, including detailed definitions, of a proof that every mathematical system whose domain is the closure of its set of distinguished individuals under its distinguished functions is categorically characterized by its induction principle together with its true atoms (atomic sentences and negations of atomic sentences). The third section, dealing with applications especially those involving the distinction between characterizing a system and axiomatizing the truths of a system, contains many surprising delights. See also Corcoran, J. 1999. “Categoricity”. Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. R.Audi, Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. p.122.

2007

The field of psychology established itself as a study in the late 1800’s through the contributions of many psychologists, theorists, and concepts pertaining to the human mind, behaviors, and purpose. During the pre-modernism era, fundamental thoughts and ideas were composed without a specific place to be directed. However, in Germany, doctors and philosophers such as Wundt contributed to the uprising of a field that was dedicated to the study of thoughts and concepts. The development of psychology progressed greatly through modernism by taking a scientific approach and establishing groundbreaking theories that would define the field. Several psychologists such as Freud, Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner implanted their efforts into making the field of psychology logical, practical, and scientific which led to the growth of what is psychology during the post-modernism era. New psychologists emerged to revise existing theories from the founding fathers and created an updated format of future ideas that reflect society today. Ideas such as existentialism developed into humanistic psychology while the contribution of women and minorities were added to the history of psychology. Overall, the study of the thoughts, ideas, and behaviors was a rough draft concept that lacked a foundation until the pre-modernism era. The development of psychology has taken a course through its roots in Germany and planted itself in American history. Due to the effort and contribution of researchers, the field of psychology has found a scientific path that legitimizes the purpose and study for the human mind and behavior.

The paper begins with a comparison between the history of the neologisms of ontology and psychology. If from a historical point of view there are many similarities of the diffusion of the two terms, from an epistemological point of view we encounter great differences. Ontology has always been collocated in the field of metaphysics, while psychology, before becoming an independent science, was a discipline divided between physics and metaphysics. Next, there is a focus on the debate of the status of the science of the soul developed in the centuries since Aristotle (2.1). During the Reformation Era the term was coined and the science of psychology had a great diffusion amongst philosophers and in university disputes (2.2). The paper sustains several new historical findings in regards to the first occurrences of the term. A historical assessment (3) on the early history of psychology concludes the paper