Metemphysics and the Philosophy of Concepts

Nathan Coppedge

Metemphysics and the Philosophy of Concepts

Nathan Coppedge

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Metemphysics is a new discipline defined by this paper. A single axiom is provided, along with a method for reaching qualified metem-physical statements using the axiom.

METEMPHYSICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONCEPTS DRAFT ABSTRACT: Metemphysics is a new discipline defined by this paper. A single axiom is provided, along with a method for reaching qualified metem-physical statements using the axiom. ------------------------------------------------------------- There have been prior attempts to extend the physical idea. First there were the physiologoi, who philosophized about various types of matter and their relative importance in the universe. This was, in some sense, a genuine physical stage. Next was a metaphysical stage, introduced officially by Aristotle in his work, which was the first to be called Metaphysica. This stage, over the course of over two thousand years, became predominantly religious. Next was the synthetic stage, embodied by the scientific physicists. In this view, which for its most elementary aspect depended on an idea that had come before the theologians, pantheists, and metaphysicians, it was clear that physics was predominantly an empirical view. This was made official around the time of Hume, the natural scientist who felt that all practical claims depended on the senses. Clearly, if physics was in some sense an extension of the physiologoi, the natural third category was philosophy, a kind of combination of science and religion. But predominantly this bridge could not be made. Theology was not physics without adopting some kind of magical belief, like telekinesis. What is needed is a fourth category: metemphysics, which extends philosophy into physics without the implication either of mathematical physics, or of religious spiritualism. This type of physics does not have the unlucky backdrop of the philosophical tradition. Instead, it is pure conceptualization about something which is neither material, nor spiritual, nor paradoxical. It is the study of the materialism of ideas. What on earth could bridge the gap between a non-religious, non-physical philosophy, and some actual theory of materialism? I propose that there is no such bridge, and this new theory must be entirely grounded in itself. By this I do not mean phenomenology, although it also has that reputation. I do not mean an existential experiencing which brings familiar films of emotion into view, or brings some historical gestalt nearer to hand. I certainly do not mean mere negation, either. The prefix metem-, coming from a word meaning ‘intermediate’ or ‘joining,’ combines with the word ’physics’ to serve as the most basic guide to the meaning of this new territory. By metemphysics what I mean is a physics which joins other types of territories, and which consequently serves as an intermediate ground, not dissimilar to a sounding board. But a sounding board the function of which was not discovered until the discipline was created. Perhaps, as often happens in the history of philosophy, this new radical idea is merely a re-discovery of some of the old vibes which earlier philosophers meant to pursue after they had crossed some indefinite hurdle which they then became obsessed with, elaborating the earlier stages while forgetting the later ones. I have experienced that superstitious feeling in my own work, and endeavored to overcome it wherever I can. But my feeling is that this impulse to re-connect with earlier impulses is just as futilistic as the concept that these now-occurring impulses were once forgotten. It is better, when looking for ambitious ideas, to focus on the new, until what is had is the most complex and most perfect potential context for explanation. Not just perfection, but complexity, hence technology. And not just technology, but newness. So far as I’m concerned, that brief explanation is itself still philosophical in nature. It is a deviation from the metem-physical. (The lemma of this distraction is that philosophy is fundamentally a theory of explanation, whether or not such explanation is required. Thus, when explanation is not perfected, there is no hope of realizing the nature of philosophy, because under this theory, philosophy is no more than an explanation. The concept that philosophy is unnecessary is implied, but itself unnecessary. It is sufficient to say that philosophy involves explanation, and follow any related conclusions from that premise). I am attempting to describe how elaborate the metem-physical could be. For just as the philosopher aims to apprehend concepts like the seventeen typological patterns of nature, or the five or six kingdoms of life, so too the physicist aims to find deductive shortcuts, and an entire way of life. In-between these two major examples is the terrain of metemphysics, and a simple way to illustrate is by mere comparison of similarities amongst differences. The first principle of metemphysics may be the following: that when two sets of categories constitute systems, but are opposed in nature, the classifications of systems combined produces a metem-physical systems category. In other words, in our earlier examples, the seventeen typological patterns may be ways to live a life. Or, the five or six kingdoms of life may be forms of deduction. This is more true, according to the rule, if philosophers have already defined life to consist of a certain number of categories which are not typological patterns, or if deduction has been determined to not cause anything to occur. In this way, the opposing principle introduces something missing from the definition in two directions. If it were defined in this way artificially, the effect would not be as genuine. But there are certainly cases where opposites develop naturally. And it is still legal to use artificiality in creating the comparison, so long as each set of categories is itself situated meaningfully. After all, we would not say that anything without appropriate references has a sense of meaning. Not usually, at least. Here is another example: on the one hand there is the field of psychology, defined roughly as the game between the sane and insane. Now we can adopt ‘game’ as a label, and ‘psychology’ as a label, and ‘sane’ and ‘insane’ become constituent categories for which we seek opposites. However, according to the metem-physical rule, we have to find opposites in a different discipline, ideally, a different classification of discipline, a discipline or non-discipline or set of categories opposite (or at least different) in every way. The simple way to find the appropriate answer is to cheat by choosing opposite labels, and then justify them with another binary or greater choice of categories. Since the choice of comparison is artificial anyway, this does not pose any problem to the set of reasoning. So we have ‘game of psychology’ then we look for a contrast to games, and a contrast to psychology, and we get something like ‘art of paradox.’ Art of paradox can be defined, ideally, in terms of a binary or greater set that is the opposite of the earlier constituent terms, in this case ‘sane’ and ‘insane.’ However, the answer cannot be ‘insane’ and ‘sane’ as that would defeat the purpose. For our purposes, a discipline that reads backwards is the same as a discipline that reads forwards. So the definitions must be different, to serve our rule. In this case we will simply choose a pair that works for the art of paradox, and loosely fit’s the rule. Perhaps ‘not’ and ‘opposite’ would work. At this point there are two choices, to use the loose comparison between the labeling terms, or to use the stricter relation between the constituent terms, with the assumption that reasoning was used. In any case, the metem-physical result is something like ‘art games are psychological paradoxes’ or ‘opposites are insanely rational negations.’ These are meant to be statements which are invisibly qualified (think invisible qualifier) to mean that they have the qualities of metemphysics. With that statement, this article ends. Nathan Coppedge, SCSU 11/03/2013

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