Heidegger’s critique of modern technology and its relation to metaphysics has been widely accepted in the East. Yet the conception that there is only one—originally Greek—type of technics has been an obstacle to any original critical thinking of technology in modern Chinese thought.

Yuk Hui argues for the urgency of imagining a specifically Chinese philosophy of technology capable of responding to Heidegger’s challenge, while problematizing the affirmation of technics and technologies as anthropologically universal.

This investigation of the historical-metaphysical question of technology, drawing on Lyotard, Simondon, and Stiegler, and introducing a history of modern Eastern philosophical thinking largely unknown to Western readers, including philosophers such as Feng Youlan, Mou Zongsan, and Keiji Nishitani, sheds new light on the obscurity of the question of technology in China. Why was technics never thematized in Chinese thought? Why has time never been a real question for Chinese philosophy? How was the traditional concept of Qi transformed in its relation to Dao as China welcomed technological modernity and westernization?

In The Question Concerning Technology in China, a systematic historical survey of the major concepts of traditional Chinese thinking is followed by a startlingly original investigation of these questions, in order to ask how Chinese thought might today contribute to a renewed, cosmotechnical questioning of globalized technics.

Everybody is talking about China now. The competition between China and the Western world is not only about economic growth, technological advancement, and military strength. What is ultimately at stake is a key theoretical question: Can China's political traditions and current practices (such as one-party meritocracy) offer a legitimate and desirable alternative to the ideal of liberal democracy? This course aims to approach this question through the lens of intellectual history and political theory. Attention is given to how Chinese thinkers since 1895 have conceived of China's place in the world, how they have used Western political ideas to transform China, how they have creatively transformed Chinese traditions to meet the challenge of modernity, and, most importantly, how they have advanced political ideals that claim to be able fix the problems in the West (such as imperialism and capitalism). We will also learn how Western thinkers are responding to the challenge from China. The first half of the course covers foundational texts in Chinese intellectual history from 1895 to the Maoist Era. The second half is about political thinking in contemporary China. No prior knowledge about China, Chinese, or political theory/philosophy is required.

In this article, I offer a provisional analysis of the philosophical semantics of " wisdom " in the thought of the New Confucian thinker Tang Junyi. I begin by providing some pointers concerning the concept of wisdom in general and situating the discourse on wisdom in comparative philosophy in the context of the later Foucault's and Pierre Hadot's historical investigations into ancient Graeco-Roman philosophy as a mode of spiritual self-cultivation and self-transformation. In the remainder of the paper, I try to describe and think through what Foucault identifies as a " Cartesian moment, " in which self-knowledge becomes the ultimate precondition for the ethico-spiritual project of " caring for the self, " in Tang's approach of wisdom. In the course of my argument, I outline the complex relation between his vision of a renewed Confucian mode of religious practice on the one hand and his philosophical presuppositions concerning the transcendental status of subjectivity and the reflexivity of consciousness on the other. Keywords Tang Junyi, wisdom, New Confucianism, modern Chinese philosophy, transformative knowledge, philosophy as a way of life

This is the English translation of 《為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言：我們對中國學術研究及中國文化與世界文化前途之共同認識》（A Manifesto on the Reappraisal of Chinese Culture：Our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to World Cultural Outlook, 1958）written by Dr. Zhang Junmai. The manifesto was drafted and signed by New Confucian philosophers including Mou Zongsan, Tang Jungyi, Zhang Junmai and Xu Fuguan, and is widely considered as the declaration defining New Confucian movement.

While the Chinese version circulates among scholar rapidly, Zhang's English translation did not draw lots of attention. It is extremely difficult to find his English translation of the Manifesto. The attached file is scanned from Zhang's The Development of Neo-Confucian thought Vol. 2 (1962).

Efficacy of a leadership approach may be highly dependent upon cultural factors, making additional research in foreign contexts necessary. A methodology was developed to investigate the relationship between Confucian values and leadership preferences. Responses on the Chinese Values Survey (CVS) were compared to those of the Vannsimpco Leadership Survey (VLS) for both Korean (N = 48) and American (N = 47) university respondents. Correlations for both groups revealed a link between Confucian values and hybrid leadership styles. Among Korean faculty, this link was even more pronounced, yielding significant correlations to autocratic-transformational (rs [30] = .513, p < .05), autocratic-transactional (rs [30] = .420, p < .05), democratic-transformational (rs [31] = .567, p < .001), and democratic-transactional (rs [31] = .482, p < .01) leadership. Results suggest that simple theoretical approaches to leadership do not address the complex interplay between autocratic (Li) and democratic (Ren and Yi) Confucian virtues.

“体知”是杜维明提出的一个重要概念，用来说明儒家传统所强调的 一种特殊的知识类型。这种知识类型在宋明儒学中被称作“德性之知”，而与“闻 见之知”相区别。这种知识有两个主要特征:一方面，要获得这样的知识，不能只 靠理智的认知活动，还需要有内心的体验活动;另一方面，这样的知识不只让其拥 有者知道孰是孰非，而且还会让他好是恶非、行是除非。这种知识类型既与西方传 统认识论强调的命题性知识(knowing-that)不同，也与 20 世纪中叶为赖尔所强调 的能力之知(knowing-how)不同。就其能够驱使其拥有者做出与这种知识相应的 行动而言，它是一种动力之知(knowing-to);就这种知识不只是信念(belief)而且 也是欲望(desire)而言，它是一种信欲(besire)。在这个意义上，作为动力之知的“体知”概念的提出是对当代认识论特别是道德认识论的一个重要贡献。

Note: this is an accepted journal paper expected to be published in Dec 2020. For the quotation please follow the format of Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies: Tam, Andrew Ka Pok, 'On the Relation between Watsuji’s Ningen Rinrigaku and Mencius’ Five Relationships', Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies 17, no. 2, (Dec, 2020)

Watsuji Tetsurō’s idea of aidagara (間柄, often translated as ‘betweenness’) is an essential concept in his ningen rinrigaku with a robust Confucian heritage as he begins his reflection on aidagara from Mencius’ concept of gorin or five relationships; it seems that Watsuji tries to reinterpret gorin. However, unlike Yangmingism and the twentieth-century Chinese New Confucianism, Watsuji does not emphasise individual subjectivity; instead, in both Rinrigaku and Fūdo, Watsuji reduces individual self into aidagara and aidagara into the Buddhist notion of Kū.
Based upon Mou Zongsan’s moral metaphysics, this paper argues that Watsuji’s ningen rinrigaku fails to provide a consistent interpretation of Mencius’ teaching of gorin. According to Mou, an individual’s subjectivity whose mind nature is granted by Heaven precedes and produces mutual relationships among human beings; but the idea of Heaven is omitted in Watsuji’s anti-Neo-Confucian understanding of Mencius. Instead, Watsuji that the individual’s moral consciousness arises from aidagara, which is the negations of self and others, while the notion of self-negation contradicts with Mencius 7A. However, instead of accusing Watsuji of misunderstanding Mencius, this paper suggests one may understand Watsuji’s ningen rinrigaku as non-Confucian ethics instead of a consistent interpretation of Mencius.

「間柄」是和辻哲郎的人間倫理學中深受儒學影響的重要概念。他對間柄的 反思始於孟子的五倫概念;故此，和辻似乎嘗試重新詮釋五倫。然而，與陽明學 及二十世紀中國新儒家相反，和辻並不強調個人主體性;反之，在《人間倫理學》 及《風土》裡，和辻把個人主體還原成間柄，又將間柄歸於佛教「空」的概念。
根據牟宗三的道德形而上學，本文認為和辻的人間倫理學無法為孟子之五倫 提供一致的詮釋。根據牟宗三，個人主體所具有天賦之心性乃先於並生出人倫關 係。然而，「天」的概念卻不見於和辻對《孟子》的反理學詮釋。和辻認為個人 道德意識緣起於作為對自我與他者否定之間柄，可是自我否定之主張卻與《孟子. 盡心上》的說法相違。然而，本文指出，除了批評和辻曲解《孟子》以外，讀者 或可理解和辻的人間倫理學為一非儒學的新倫理學，而非對孟子的一致詮釋。

In this paper, I will analyse the background of the discourse on the relationships between traditional East Asian culture represented by Confucianism and the economic development of contemporary East Asia.  I will argue that New Confucian scholars have exaggerated the contribution of Confucianism as the driving force of the rapid economic and business development of East Asia in the late 20th Century as their explanation of the cultural factors behind the economic miracle of contemporary East Asia.  The driving force of the rapid economic development of East Asian areas like Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore and Mainland China in the late 20th Century, which were historically under the influence of Confucianism, was not the core teachings, notions, values and ideals of Confucianism or Neo-Confucianism.  The driving force was the combination of East Asian people’s cultural characteristics and orientation conducive to commercial development (which were not the results of Confucian teachings), their strong urge to elevate their living standard and pursue economic success, East Asian governments’ policies of supporting business and pursuing economic growth, as well as many different political, economic and international factors during this period.  The rapid economic development of East Asia in the late 20th Century was actually facilitated by the disappearance or weakening of the traditional social system and values influenced by Confucianism, which had previously constrained the development of commerce and capitalism in pre-modern East Asia.  We can only say that certain traditional East Asian social and cultural values inspired by Confucianism had become positive factors to the business activities, enterprise management and economic development of contemporary East Asia.

The papers in this research dialogue section are the product of a project that examines intellectual life in China since the 1990s-chiefly the efforts by academic public intellectuals to rethink China's past, present, and future in light of the excesses of Mao's revolution, the challenges emerging from reform, and the rise of China to the status of world economic power. Chinese scholars, having benefited from China's openness to the world and the relative relaxation of political pressure in China (until recently), have much to say about China and the world that merits our attention. Through creative collaboration between Chinese and international scholars, the articles collected here explore that intellectual public sphere since the late 1990s. The articles were written in Chinese by young PRC scholars and rendered into English through 'collaborative translation' teams that pair these Chinese with non-Chinese scholars based in Canadian universities. The net result, grounded on repeated conversations and revisions, is not a simple translation but a co-production of knowledge about China that aims to capture the discourse of Chinese scholarship in a way to make it meaningful to anglophone readers. The articles themselves are not traditional surveys of academic scholarship. Rather they map significant areas of an intellectual world and the arguments within it. Three widely accepted intellectual streams of thought (sichao 思潮) organize these soundings: liberals, New Left, and New Confucian. These reports explore connections between and diversity within and beyond each.

This book is meant to serve as an entry point for the English reader into the vast and profound ocean of East Asian philosophy. Focusing on China, it outlines the basic contours of the three major philosophical streams found in East Asia: Daoism (Taoism), Confucianism, and Buddhism. Beginning with the classical period, the book details the Daoist philosophies of Laozi and Zhuangzi, and the early Confucianism of Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi. Next, the book explains the transmission of Buddhism from India to China, and provides individual chapters on the Chinese Buddhist schools of Huayan and Chan (Zen). This is followed by chapters on the Neo-Confucian philosophies of Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi, Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming; and the modern “New Confucian” thought of Fung Yu-lan and Tu Wei-ming. The final two chapters turn to Japan and investigate the Zen philosophy of Dogen and the modern Kyoto School.

This article asks how can we articulate the limit of artificial intelligence, which virtually has no limit? Or maybe the definition of AI already implies its limit, how Marvin Minsky once declared that there is no generally accepted theory of intelligence, and that AI is only one particular way of modelling it. This article revisits the debate between Minsky and Hubert Dreyfus and repositions them in terms of an opposition between mechanism and organism, in order to expose the limit of Dreyfus's Heideggerian critique. It suggests reflecting on the relation between noodiversity and technodiversity to methodologically broaden the concept of intelligence, and on how different concepts of intelligence could be thought by introducing the Chinese philosopher Mou Zongsan's interpretation of Kant's intellectual intuition.

Few words in english since, for italian speakers, all this and more can be found in the Introduction. This work is the result of more than three years of research, conducted literally stealing time to each every moment of the day, when I was not at job - fundamental instrument to earn a living but, at the same time, greedy Moloch demanding more and more energy - or being involved in family life activities. For this reason it represented the greatest possible effort in my whole life, culminated when, more than an year ago, I presented it to the commission for the final examination, and it was awarded with honours. One year passed and life goes on, a carriage is not a pumpkin and a clerk in a transport company remains a clerk. So I decided to “publish” it, to make it public, since to see it covered with dust on my shelf would have been a nonsense and, in last analysis, the umpteenth insult to what I’ve always believed (и всё таки я верю...). It’s in italian but, for interested people, it wouldn’t be a problem for me to translate selected parts into the other languages that I speak. Of course, of all the mistakes that you may (and will) find in it, I am the only responsible.

Presenting a contextual portrayal of the interpretation of Chinese and Buddhist philosophy in early twentieth-century German philosophy, Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought examines the implications of these interpretations for contemporary issues in comparative and intercultural philosophy. Through a series of case studies from the late 19th-century and early 20th-century, Eric Nelson focuses on the reception and uses of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism in German philosophy, covering figures as diverse as Buber, Heidegger, Misch, Rosenzweig, and Zhang Junmai. He argues that the growing intertextuality between traditions cannot be appropriately interpreted through notions of exclusive identities, closed horizons, or unitary traditions and  challenges the idea of the exclusively Occidental nature of philosophy. Providing an account of the contexts, motivations, and hermeneutical strategies of early twentieth-century German thinkers’ interpretation of Asian philosophy, Nelson also throws new light on the question of the relation between Heidegger and Asian philosophy. Reflecting the growing interest in the possibility of intercultural and global philosophy, Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought opens up the possibility of a more inclusive intercultural conception of philosophy.

Reviews:
“Eric Nelson's book has the great merit of drawing our attention to the experiences of some great forerunners in intercultural philosophy in Weimar Germany from the end of World War I to the rise of National Socialism in 1933. Nelson's book is not merely a work on some historical episodes of intercultural philosophy but also a work showing the how of intercultural philosophy in itself … [A] very rich and detailed reconstruction of the intercultural openings undertaken by German philosophers.” –  Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

“Nelson shows great erudition in bringing together a wide variety of thinkers from both East and West, including importantly some lesser known, but very relevant thinkers from both the Western tradition and Eastern philosophy.” –  Global Intellectual History

“This book offers lots of valuable information and entries for further research. It is well-written and has all the tools for easy reference and an impressive bibliography.” –  Phenomenological Reviews

“A remarkably well-researched, thoughtful, and timely book. Its content lives up to its informative and wonderfully provocative title ... One of Nishitani's central claims is that nihilism can be overcome only by way of stepping back all the way through it ... we can thank Nelson for reintroducing us to this insight and for demonstrating how to heed it.” –  Research in Phenomenology

“The breadth of Nelson's knowledge and the deftness with which he winds his way through so many figures and their respective conceptual vocabularies is mesmerizing ... a book unlike any other [which] raises the bar for anyone who teaches or writes comparative philosophy.” –  Philosophy East and West

“This book is a revelation, tracing how ideas have traveled more than we have generally recognized. The dialogues between east and west have often been interpreted primarily as a one way exchange about how the East has learned from the West. It is time to appreciate the ways in which multiple journeys have occurred and how Eastern thought has, as a matter of fact, informed and been taken up in Western thought, particularly in German philosophy as illustrated in this work. This book is one of a kind and exemplifies all that we need to engage, to learn, and to become philosophers in the twenty-first century.” –  Robin R Wang, 2016-17 Berggruen Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Science, Stanford University, USA and author of Yinyang The Way of Heaven and Earth in Chinese Thought and Culture

“In this groundbreaking study, Eric S. Nelson examines the impact of Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy on 20th Century German Thought. Through illuminating chapters on Buber, Heidegger, Misch, and others, Nelson sheds a unique light on the development of German Philosophy in the 20th Century, as well as on contemporary Comparative philosophy. This is an original and important work which reveals the influence of Asian Philosophy on Contemporary Continental thought, and which opens new perspectives for intercultural and comparative philosophy.” –  Francois Raffoul, Professor of Philosophy and French Studies, Louisiana State University, USA

“This is a landmark study in comparative thought. By tracing Chinese and Japanese influences on modern German philosophy, Eric S. Nelson examines a pressing question of our troubled times: is there a common ground for universal wisdom? Is there a path forward? Perhaps the most satisfying outcome of this book is that the careful consideration of Asian sources sheds light on the ideas in Heidegger's later work. By explaining how these influences clarify key contentions in German philosophy, Nelson breaks new ground.” –  Martin Schönfeld, Editor, Journal of Global Ethics and Professor of Philosophy, University of South Florida, USA

“Nelson has written an important ... riveting book.” –  Philosophy

More Information:
https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/chinese-and-buddhist-philosophy-in-early-twentieth-century-german-thought-9781350002562/

Since Immanuel Kant’s seminal essay “What is Enlightenment?”, independent, autonomous and critical thinking has stood at the forefront of any “progressive” (and even any reasonable) theory of education. In today’s neo-liberal and globalized world, the common trend of making everything a marketable commodity has also affected this, notwithstanding the fact that the ability to establish one’s
critical and independent judgement remains the very basis of becoming an autonomous individual, and represents a central pillar of democracy. As such, critical  thinking has become a product that can be bought, sold or even stolen––just like its traditional breeding ground, namely institutionalized education. It may thus be time to mourn the loss of the critical mind, and so mark the sad end of a certain kind of education, one which gave a key place to the humanities. However, instead of grieving for such losses and memorializing the end of the European subject, who has obviously lost his free will in the whirlwind of the
all-embracing market economy, and sadly died in front of the barbed-wire fences defending his homeland from thousands of unarmed, weakened, starving and freezing refugees, we are searching for alternatives.
As such, we present in this issue another kind of education. Admittedly, the values Confucian education aimed to foster did not include much absolute independence, but it still laid emphasis on autonomous critical thinking and genuine humaneness.
While many believe that Confucianism is incompatible with the critical mind and personal autonomy, this issue aims to show that this wide-spread prejudice is rooted in a lack of knowledge. The most common image of Confucianism is that it was advocating a strict, rigid and hierarchically structured society based on the absolute
obedience of those at the subordinate levels of the system, and, analogously, on absolute power of their superiors. However, we would like to present another Picture of Confucian education, one that is more academically justified and closer to the truth. It is important to recall that this model was originally, and especially in the classical Confucian teachings, rooted in the principles of complementarity and reciprocal
responsibility. Moreover, while the autocratic model of hierarchy, by which the ruler’s authority was absolute and their responsibility towards their subordinates reduced to a mere formalism or symbolism, has undeniably held sway in Chinese history, we must also bear in mind that Confucianism in its role as the state doctrine represented the interests of the ruling class, and as such was defined by legalistic elements that are not found in original Confucianism. We must not forget that hierarchic structures are also present in Western democratic systems, and most importantly, authority based on experience, knowledge and abilities is not necessarily a negative ideal, or a threat to individual autonomy.
The Confucian classics stress the important role of ideational and axiological elements, like rituality, relational ethics, the virtues of humaneness and justice, and the crucial role of education as a basic means of cultivating and thus improving (inborn) humaneness in order to achieve progress and social development. While they also lay stress on the so-called “Six Arts”—ritual, music, archery, chariot-riding, calligraphy, and computation—it is clear that the Confucian classics
see morality as the most important subject. Confucian didactic methods are rather remarkable. Like Confucius, a Confucian teacher never lectures at length on a subject. Instead, he or she poses questions, quotes passages from the classical works, or applies fitting analogies, and then waits for the students to find the right
answers “independently”––by themselves. According to the Analects, Confucius pointed out that thinking without learning is blind, and learning without thinking dangerous. Besides, he also asserted that
attacking the views of others is harmful. This tolerance is based on a notion of moral autonomy, which is typical for the Confucian ideal personality, and implicit in most of the Confucian discourses. As such, promoting education is one of the most important Confucian values, and it is better to educate one’s children than to give them wealth. However, education is not only the wealth of a person, but also that of the cultures and societies he or she lives within. It is the most valuable
inheritance we can give future generations. Moreover, in today’s globalized world, in which different traditions can interact and learn from each other, this kind of inheritance can be exchanged, combined, synthesized and thus enriched. Therefore, this special issue wishes to present different approaches to achieving and preserving this, in the West, at least, hidden treasure. It also aims to raise awareness regarding a particular, culturally and historically conditioned model of
institutions, didactic structures and axiological priorities, which differs profoundly from traditional Euro-American educational models.

I am better at writing apologies than conveying thanks, but here goes. First of all I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my promoter, Bart Dessein. Without his encouragement, I would never have thought of beginning the research for this dissertation in the first place, and without his generous efforts to keep me on track, I would have certainly never made it this far. His courses on Buddhism and Chinese philosophy, society, and politics were a great source of inspiration for me during my studies.

The present issue of The Journal of Asian Studies is dedicated to problems linked to the specific features of Chinese modernization, as viewed through the lens of Modern Confucianism. It contains selected contributions from the international symposium, Contemporary Confucianism and Chinese Modernization, Reykjavik, 7–8 September 2013, which was organized by Geir Sigurðsson, in cooperation with the Northern Lights Confucius Institute and the Chinese Studies  department of the University of Iceland.
Modern Confucianism arose China at the edge of the previous century and was later developed further by theorists from Taiwan, and, to a lesser degree, from Hong Kong. Unlike the People’s Republic of China, where Confucianism was considered to be the “ideology of outdated feudalism” and therefore silenced (at least formally) until the 1980s, in Hong Kong and Taiwan, both of which were defined by post-colonial social discourses, a number of intellectuals began  opposing the growing Westernization of their societies already in the 1950s. Due
to the multilayered cultural, national and political situation in Taiwan, intellectuals from that country played an important role in developing this new philosophical current from the very outset.

ABSTRACT: This research, in the first half, provides an outline of Confucian cultural practices as evidence of the promotion of Confucianism and national tradition in South Vietnam in 1955-1975, in the context of East Asian Confucianism from the 1950s to 1970s. The second half focuses on Nguyễn Đăng Thục, a leading scholar in South Vietnam, in order to investigate the motivation for his promotion of Confucianism as a national tradition of Vietnam. Influenced by the decolonization movement in Asian countries after World War II, and particularly by the 1947 Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, Nguyễn Đăng Thục arguably assumed nationalistic and decolonizing approaches to his examination of Vietnamese culture and the traditional cultures of Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Asia as a whole. By analyzing his Confucian activities and research, this paper also argues that, to a certain extent, Nguyễn Đăng Thục should be labeled a “New Confucian” scholar of Vietnam.

KEYWORDS : Confucianism, New Confucianism, tradition, South Vietnam, decolonization, nationalism

Li Zehou, one of the leading Chinese theorists of the current Confucian revival, has had a great impact not only on Chinese, but also on global theories of ethics, humanism, aesthetics and philosophical anthropology. The present paper focuses on his views on Chinese modernization which, like those of the Modern Confucians, are grounded on the belief that Chinese modernization cannot be equated with Westernization. The author compares Li’s thought with the works of this current and offers a general evaluation of the specific features of Li Zehou’s philosophical system, focusing on his attempts to upgrade Marxist theories and to re-evaluate traditional Chinese and, especially, Confucian philosophy. The paper casts a critical light on a number of problems linked to the intercultural methodology that underlies this approach. Despite the very problematical nature of attempting to synthesize ideational systems that are rooted in different referential frameworks, the author reveals the innovative nature of Li’s philosophy and its significant contribution to contemporary philosophical debate at the global level.

Гуцуляк О.Б.  Феномен китайского миросозерцания : сокрытые истоки и причины. – Івано-Франківськ : Новий Гостинець, 2021. –  200 с., фото. – (Серия «Библиотека Мезоевразии»).
Oleg Gutsulyak, Ph.D.The Phenomenon of the Chinese Worldview: Hidden Origins and Causes

Văn hóa học đường là một tiểu văn hóa ứng với môi trường giáo dục, vừa chứa đựng sắc thái văn hóa dân tộc vừa chuyển tải và chia sẻ các giá trị đặc thù chung toàn nhân loại. Văn hóa học đường hình thành phải dựa trên những giả định ban đầu (niềm tin, giá trị, tầm nhìn, sứ mệnh, mục tiêu v.v.), trở thành môi trường và chất xúc tác để hoạt động dạy và học, các sinh hoạt gắn với môi trường học đường cũng như mục tiêu giáo dục con người được thực hiện suôn sẻ và hiệu quả. Bài viết này đi từ khái luận đến cấu trúc các thành tố văn hóa học đường, trong đó đặc tả một số thành tố tiêu biểu nhất để phác họa bức tranh nội hàm của văn hóa học đường qua nền tảng lý luận và kinh nghiệm thực tiễn của thế giới.
Nghiên cứu này được thực hiện dưới góc nhìn văn hóa học, lấy yếu tố nghi lễ (trọng tâm là các nghi thức cận “ngưỡng” trong học đường) và hiệu quả của nó (quan điểm của Victor Turner (1968/1969) và Seligman và Weller (2012) làm môi trường và thước đo cho sự kiến tạo và vận hành văn hóa học đường. Theo đó, điểm mấu chốt quyết định tính chất và hiệu quả của văn hóa học đường nằm ở việc kiến tạo “ngưỡng”, trạng thái “cộng cảm”, “chia sẻ” và các khả năng sáng tạo chứa đựng các giá trị giả định của các hoạt động và yếu tố mang tính lễ tục trong nhà trường.

This study provides an analysis of the discourse on tradition of two of the first texts written in the Republican period which endeavoured to oppose the May Fourth portrayal of Confucianism as an artifact of the past and which enjoyed a significant amount of success at the moment of their publication and thereafter: Liang Shuming’s Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies (Dongxi wenhua jiqi zhexue 東西文化及其哲學; 1921) and the classical Chinese edition of Xiong Shili’s New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness (Xin weishi lun 新唯識論; 1932).
Through discourse analysis, this study examines two interrelated aspects of the texts: their discourse on the role tradition plays in individual emancipation or in a modernization process teleologically oriented toward human liberty on the one hand, and the discursive techniques they employ in order to legitimize their discourse through the authority of tradition. My central aim is to see which discursive tools could be employed in texts that are presented as reactivating the Confucian dao (道) within the modern Chinese context, especially as one of their main objectives is to oppose the modern discourse of anti-traditionalism which emerged during the May Fourth Movement.
My contention is that both texts are for the most part as anti-traditional as the most iconoclastic of May Fourth discourses, as they both deny that traditions can contribute to individual emancipation and to the modernization process, and both conceptualize emancipation as a breaking free from the hold of traditions. There is an exception to this general rule, however. The Confucian tradition (as they define it), and to some extent the Buddhist one, are singled out as traditions which can point the way to a transcendence and a liberation from tradition. Traditions are therefore valueless unless they represent what I call “traditions of anti-traditionalism”: traditions that show the way to a final liberation from tradition.
At work in these claims, I argue, is a dialectic whereby the texts salvage particular traditions yielding trans-historical truths from the dustbin of history before presenting themselves not only as contemporary representatives of those traditions, but also as their highest point: a point at which these traditions of truth are entirely subsumed, clarified, finalized, and monopolized by the contemporary texts. The texts, moreover, not only re-appropriate the modern discourse of anti-traditionalism to their own ends; they also redefine it in a way that relegates the Euro-American conceptualization of modernity (as a tradition of anti-traditionalism) at a lower echelon while celebrating their own vision of Confucian and Buddhist traditions as the highest form of a universal culture capable of emancipating once and for all humanity from the shackles of tradition and history. These texts, in other words, offer alternative visions of a tradition of anti-traditionalism which compete with that of the Euro-American discourse of modernity, but do so in a manner that is for the most part equally hegemonic in its rejection of competing perceptions of truth.

Through an in-depth reading of the New Confucian thinker Tang Junyi's (1909-1978) philosophical engagement with the Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith in his On the Origins of Chinese Philosophy (Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun), this chapter provides a critical analysis of Tang's interpretation of the "one mind, two gateways" model put forward in the Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith. In doing so, I argue that Tang's approach to this model testifies to his staunchly transcendentalist outlook: his insistence on the ontological as well as epistemological irreducibility of the mind vis-à-vis its various "horizons" (jingjie), and his related endeavor of channeling the soteriological potential of philosophy as a form of spiritual practice.

n the final decades of the 20th century, the majority of modern
Sinophone scholars believed that Confucianism was an outdated
and obsolete ideology that was not only unsuitable for the development of modern science and democratic societies, but also
responsible for the deep social and political crisis that had branded
China for the previous two centuries. Modern New Confucians,
however, never assumed that the Confucian system was responsible for such a situation. Most of them believed that Confucianism
was compatible with science and democracy. Moreover, the majority of them assumed that the East Asian cultures would never be
able to develop truly democratic structures of their societies unless
they incorporated the appropriate elements of their own, i.e.
Confucian, traditions. This paper critically analyses the theoretical
models of Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan on the possible revival and
development of Confucian proto-democracies.

This chapter investigates the tension between the moral and the sociopolitical positions in Confucian discourse primarily through the writings of the mainland Confucian scholar Chen Lai 陈来 (b. 1952), a philosopher based at Tsinghua University. However, it also connects Chen Lai’s writings with the work of Tu Wei-ming 杜维明 (b. 1940), the “Boston Confucian” who is perhaps the most famous exponent of “New Confucianism” (xiandai xin rujia 现代新儒家, dangdai xin rujia 当代新儒家, or dangdai xin ruxue 当代新 儒学). The reason behind this choice is that Tu Wei-ming played a prominent role in the debates in the United States, as well as in introducing the debates in a mainland Chinese context. In addition, the two scholars were intellectually related: Chen Lai studied with Tu Wei-ming twice. However important the connection between both scholars is, looking at Chen Lai’s writings per se offers us a valuable insight into debates on Confucianism in the light of changes in mainland China specifically. This chapter focuses on Chen Lai’s writings from the 1990s because significant discussions on New Confucianism took place in mainland China during this period following the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Incident and the demonstrations on Tiananmen Square in 1989. Additionally, this chapter incorporates analyses and critiques from before and after the 1990s, as well as writings by other scholars, in an attempt to extend the discussion and to ponder the fate of Confucianism in the twenty-first century. This chapter raises the question whether Confucianism can function in two opposite roles. Can it be an antidote against the ills of capitalism and the de-humanization inherent in modernization on the one hand, and a driving force of East Asian capitalism on the other? To some Chinese scholars (including Chen Lai and Tu Wei-ming), the contradiction between the two opposite roles of Confucianism does not seem to be problematic. More interestingly, they tend to speak of the two roles of Confucianism as if they are mutually supportive. In a final section, some possible explanations as to why both Tu Wei-ming and Chen Lai do not perceive any contradiction between the two types of rationality will be explored further.

In China, Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885-1968) is typically regarded as one of the most important Chinese philosophers of the twentieth century. Conventionally, he is also recognized as a founding figure of the modern New Confucian school of philosophy (see confucianism). Xiong's "ultimate concern" throughout his long intellectual career was to show that "Reality and function are nondual" (ti yong bu er 體用不二) (see nondualism). Reality (ti; also variously benti 本體, shiti 實體) is the "locus" that ontologically grounds the phenomenal (function; yong) yet is not different from the phenomenal, just as the sea supports the waves yet is not different from the waves. Opposed to ontological dualism and pluralism, Xiong's principle objection to religion is that it separates ti from yong, as exemplified by doctrines of radical transcendence and anthropomorphized deities. Xiong's ontology-which he continuously modified over the course of four decades-drew syncretically on a diverse range of resources in the Chinese philosophical tradition to construct his own overarching metaphysical vision. He was particularly inspired by the view found in Yijing 易 經 (Book of change) that the cosmos is perpetually and vigorously changing. He also subscribed to the notion of the mind as inherently awakened, but obscured by defilements, a view common to several Sinitic systems of Buddhist thought-Tiantai, Huayan, and Chan (see china, buddhist philosophy in)-which drew on the late sixth-century Chinese composition, Dasheng qixin lun 大乘起信論 (Treatise on awakening Mahāyāna faith). Xiong's philosophical training began with Buddhist philosophy-in particular, Yogācāra Buddhism (see yogācāra buddhism in china). Over the 30-year period from the early 1920s he moved from a largely uncritical belief in Yogācāra philosophy to a position where it served as a foil for his own syncretic metaphysics, although his major criticisms were already prosecuted in his 1932 publication, Xin weishi lun 新 唯 識 論 (New treatise on nothing but consciousness), in which he targets examples of what he identifies as Yogācāra's ontological dualism and pluralism. These critiques are grounded in the Mahāyāna doctrine of dependent arising (yuanqi 緣 起 PRATĪTYASAMUTPĀDA), that everything arises from causes and conditions and has no self-nature, no intrinsic nature (zixing 自 性 *svabhāva). In turn, madhyamaka-the other main system of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy-provided a deconstructive method, a radical apophasis, central to which is the concept of emptiness (kong 空ŚŪNYATĀ). Even if phenomena are experienced as temporally extended continua, they "exist" only interdependently and conventionally. There can be no arising, ceasing, change, or movement for that which is devoid of inherent nature. To be a conventional phenomenon is to be empty.

The present chapter deals with the epistemological theories proposed by the central representatives of Modern Confucianism’s intellectual current, formed in China at the threshold of the 20th century, and presents a current of thought defined by a search for a synthesis between the Chinese ideational tradition and Western theoretical systems. Following the presumption that Chinese modernization must not be equated with Westernization, the Modern Confucians strove for a reinvigoration of this tradition and its adaptation to the conditions of the new era. In this context, their epistemological discourses were no exception, for they were equally rooted in the specific features of traditional Chinese epistemological thought and defined by a search for their fruitful amalgamation with contemporary Western theories of knowledge. In this field, they were most interested in the relation between reason and intuition, for the latter concept belongs to principle traditional epistemological notions, and the former to the concepts that are crucial for the establishment of modernization theories.

Tu Weiming’s concept of humanism illuminates the essential difference between the context and philosophy of traditional Confucianism and the importance of New Confucianism improvement.
Tu Weiming’s concept of humanism was arguably derived from flawed Enlightenment Humanism in its anthropocentric lack of social solidarity. Humanistic values as understood and integrated in Western philosophy exist in a multicultural society. They describe humanistic ideals of Confucian philosophy as core principles.
Tu Weiming’s concept of humanism was a significant improvement on New Confucianism. Its different context improved such matters as a legacy of feudalistic views and Chinese familial adherence. It is open to influence by Western philosophy in such aspects as individualism, scientific rationality, and Christian transcendence.  The Confucian Humanism ideal is improved, to become consistent with multicultural society. As a result, Confucianism becomes a use of intellectual knowledge to expand human views of the self, society, and the surrounding world.

Hội nhập khu vực là xu hướng chính trị - ngoại giao quan trọng đang diễn ra trong thế giới đương đại như là một hệ quả trực tiếp của quá trình toàn cầu hóa kinh tế. Đi cùng với kinh tế là các mặt giáo dục và văn hoá, thậm chí hai lĩnh vực này phải giữ vai trò tiên phong do chúng gắn liền với nền tảng tư tưởng xã hội. Hội nhập đòi hỏi các bình diện văn hóa - tư tưởng phải tái nhìn nhận, đánh giá cấu trúc, tính chất và hiệu quả để đảm bảo lợi ích của tiến trình hội nhập. Trong quá trình ấy, việc tiếp nhận, thâu nạp và tái tạo một số hệ thống các giá trị, các quan niệm mới là điều cần thiết và có ý nghĩa. Hậu hiện đại là một trào lưu tư tưởng - văn hóa như vậy.
Bài viết này áp dụng các phương pháp sử dụng các tài liệu thành văn, phân tích tổng hợp và so sánh dưới góc nhìn văn hóa học để đánh giá xu thế mới của quản lý và văn hóa quản lý thời hậu hiện đại vốn đang dần trở nên phổ biến ở các quốc gia tiên tiến, đặc biệt làm rõ khoảng cách giữa nó với phong cách quản lý truyền thống ở Việt Nam (và Đông Á), đồng thời hình thành phương pháp luận cho việc đổi mới văn hóa quản lý ở Việt Nam. Nghiên cứu cho thấy, truyền thống quản lý kiểu Nho giáo “nửa vời” pha trộn với nhiều dòng triết học Pháp gia, Thiền tông và trọng cộng đồng của người Việt Nam có một tiền đề khá thuận lợi cho việc tích hợp, chuyển đổi theo cung cách quản lý Hậu hiện đại; song tính cách văn hóa và tâm lý ưa nhàn rỗi của một bộ phận người dân đã và đang tạo nên lực cản cho quá trình chuyển đổi ấy

This article examines the significance of reflexive self-critical modernity in the development of early "New Confucianism" by reconsidering the example of Zhang Junmai in the context of the May Fourth and New Culture Movements. Whereas these intellectuals advocated scientific rationality and complete Westernization, Zhang's education and research in Germany before and after the First World War led him to a critical perspective on Western modernity informed by its contemporary crisis tendencies and Western philosophical and social-political critics. Zhang adopted elements from German Idealism, life-philosophy, and social democracy to critique the May Fourth and New Culture Movements and reconstruct the "rational core" and ethical sensibility of Confucian philosophy. Zhang's "self-critical modernity" was oriented toward a moral and social-political instead of a scientific and technological vision of Westernization. Zhang's position was condemned by New Culture champions of scientific modernity who construed Zhang's position as reactionary metaphysics beholden to the past without addressing his self-critical interpretation of modernity that adopted early twentieth century Western critiques of the spiritual and capitalist crisis-tendencies of modernity. In response to this complex situation, Zhang articulated a phenomenological interpretation of the social-political, ethical, and cultural lifeworld, drawing on classic and contemporary Chinese and Western sources, which endeavored to more adequately address the paradoxes of Westernization and modernization and the crisis of Chinese ethical life.

摘要： 面對基督教對儒家的批評，謂儒學無法為人提供終極的安身立命，因其超越性不足。當代 新儒家藉由整合儒家思想中的天、命、仁、及他們提出的人文世界等概念，構建儒家的安 身立命思想以回應基督教的挑戰。依他們的論述，命兼具超越和命運二義，故「立命」是 人藉由道德踐履體現也體證了天命之內在於自己，更由此而知外在命運的限制，明白在此 限制或境遇中，行當然之義以回應超越的天的呼叫，身也含二義，「安身」即謂人身應安 頓於體現在人道德實踐中的天及轉化了的人文世界；其一視安身即立命，立命即安身，以 見內在超越之具體呈現於人之道德實踐中，其二則是人之安身於人文世界，並視之為超越 體現於人間，成就一切價值。故此，在當代新儒家眼中，儒家並非像基督教所指的缺少了 超越根源，因而也沒有究極的終極關懷，而其安身立命思想更是既深且廣，涵義豐富，將 形上形下、個人與社會統合於一起。藉由當代新儒家的安身立命思想，可知儒家的終極關 懷既在天，也在人及其生活於其中的社會。 關鍵詞：超越性、終極關懷、安身、立命、人文世界 二十世紀以來，儒學與基督教 1 對話的一個重要課題便是儒學有沒有讓人足以安身立命的 終極關懷。一般基督教學者認為儒學不論多高明，始終缺乏如基督教的終極關懷，故不能 為中國人提供足以安頓其心靈的根據。然作為高級的智慧傳統(或具宗教性的傳統或宗教)， 儒學若缺少了安身立命之學，則不獨不能安頓國人的心靈，亦無法為化解當代人類面對的 1 基督教在此取其廣義，但於此文中只涵蓋新教與天主教，不涉東正教。然而，必須指出的是，當代新儒家 對基督教的了解主要仍是正統的基督教思想，較少涉及二十世紀以來基督教神學的發展或新的神學思想。 劉述先是少數留意西方神學思想發展的(第三代)當代新儒家。 精神危機作出貢獻。故成熟於二十世紀中葉的當代新儒家知識群體，無法接納基督教對儒 學的結論，指出儒家有其獨特的安身立命之道 2 。究竟當代新儒家所言的安身立命具有什 麼特色？其具體內容為何？這將是本文論述的重點所在，而在構建和闡釋當代新儒家的安 身立命說的同時，將能解答儒家是否有其本身的終極關懷，及其形態如何有別於基督教的 問題。 假若視當代新儒家的安身立命思想為對基督教挑戰的回應 3 ，則須先瞭解基督教對 儒家的批評。其次，論者或會質疑構建當代新儒家的安身立命說的可行性，因他們似乎並 沒有系統的安身立命論述；故此，本文先簡略處理這兩個問題， 然後才較詳細梳理當代 新儒家的安身立命思想。 一、基督教對儒家的批評 基督教自十九世紀中葉重臨中國，便亟欲把中國轉化為一基督教的國度，以拯救國 人的靈魂，在中國實現天國。但在一個深受儒家文化影響的國家裏，這個目的幾近不可能， 故在傳教的策略上，傳教士除了興辦學校，建立醫院，救濟貧苦等有形的「社會福音」手 段外，更嘗試從思想層面爭取中國人(尤其是知識階層)的支持。他們的策略是先指出基 督教與儒家思想的相容性，但繼而說儒家的倫理道德思想雖完美，卻需待基督教來完成 4 ， 他們更進一步解釋中國之能創立了優美的倫理道德思想，也是源於上帝的啟示。中國基督 徒所欲傳遞的信息是極明顯的，即基督教實優於儒家，而其根本乃在於神 /天主的超越性 5 。 當然，不是所有基督徒或學者皆採儒家思想缺乏超越性之說，然儘管如此，他們還是認為 儒家所具的超越性並不充分 6 。換句話說，中國的基督徒認為無論儒家的價值有多高，它 最終還是要在基督教中實現其價值，蓋超越的上帝才是一切價值的根源，也就是說，對基 2 參看唐君毅，《中國人文精神的發展》(臺北：學生書局，1974)，頁 306-309。 3 必須強調，當代新儒家的安身立命思想並不能只視為對基督教挑戰的回應，否則便無法瞭解儒家安身立命 說對化解人類的精神危機和社會失序的可能貢獻，但是，我們也不應及不須放開基督教挑戰這一視角來詮 釋儒家的安身立命思想，蓋當代新儒家所強調的「超越性」與基督教對儒學的批評是密切相關的， 而「超 越性」在當代新儒家的思想體系中是佔有極重要的地位的，儘管一些學者不同意以「超越性」來詮釋儒家 的天，如安樂哲(見其與郝大維合著的《孔子哲學思微》，江蘇人民出版社， 1996)及任劍濤(見氏著《複調

"The vision of Occidentalist International System into its historical evolution about the Ingurgitate Process of others living imperial social-orders and them intercultural systems of all over the world, since the historical seed of Welfen victory against the Waiblingen social order of Friedrich II's Holy Roman Empire (1250), up till the intetional delegitimization of last living Imperial Social Order of Japan after the second world war (1948).
Into last "great biforcation" of the second post-war process of anglo-saxonization around the world, the real centre of international anglo-saxon powership of London conduct the river water of spontaneous history inside mechanical channels of  binds inside the international system.
The univoque and convergent trend of decadence process of International System go toward the unique possible realization of an Imperial Social Order, in both possiblity as Dark Empire inside feudal elites dinasties, faked by democratic institutions, or as Light Empire of human family unity inside a new emergent and sincronical aristocratic hierarchy restauration of the ancient imperial social order, on the path of ethical common values inside civilizations, because other solutions can be only disasters. As though is been demonstrated by Raymond Aron, french author of International Relation Studies, the Empire is the only possible social order that really can assure a real and durable time of peace for the peoples, yesterday as today too. From this general vision, the containment of thesis develop his perspective from a New Confucianist Epistemology of science, as application of a defined complexity epistemology of dynamical systems and its bifurcation theory, analyzing the historical vectors of Occidentalism, Colonialism, Capitalism as the triad of a unique historical social process vortex started into a european medieval time that, contrary to the academic mainstream of actual storiography, is a process that isnt been never close but again living under different forms, as the medieval survivals istitutions of Europe as the studies of Ervin Laszlo on complexity of historical social orders can demonstrate about a substantial degeneration of social evolution respect the more complex social systems of traditional empires, in Europe as in all over the world."

This article argues that Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies adopts an ambiguous attitude vis-à-vis the relation between tradition and modernity, incorporating both traditionalist and anti-traditionalist attitudes with an at-times reconciliatory approach to tradition and modernity. This ambiguity, it is argued, can be seen as representative of historical tensions the text set out to resolve.

บทคัดย่อ

บทความนี้มุ่งศึกษาทำความเข้าใจเบื้องต้นเกี่ยวกับความหมายของ “ขบวนการขงจื๊อสมัยใหม่” เพื่อชี้ให้เห็นว่า แนวคิดสำนักขงจื๊อมีการพัฒนาปรับปรุงให้สอดคล้องเหมาะสมกับสังคมที่เปลี่ยนแปลงไปอยู่ตลอดเวลา หาใช่แนวคิดที่หยุดนิ่งแต่อย่างใดไม่ โดย “ขบวนการขงจื๊อสมัยใหม่” เป็นพัฒนาการทางความคิดของแนวคิดสำนักขงจื๊อที่กำลังดำเนินอยู่ในปัจจุบัน มีจุดเริ่มต้นจากความพยายามของปัญญาชนจีนกลุ่มอนุรักษนิยมที่ต้องการธำรงรักษาแนวคิดสำนักขงจื๊อให้สามารถยืนหยัดอยู่ต่อไปได้ ท่ามกลางกระแสล้มล้างวัฒนธรรมดั้งเดิมของจีนอย่างถอนรากถอนโคน แต่ด้วยบริบททางสังคมการเมืองที่เปลี่ยนแปลง อีกทั้งบรรดาปัญญาชนจีนกลุ่มอนุรักษนิยมมีโอกาสศึกษาและแลกเปลี่ยนกับบรรดานักวิชาการระดับสากล กลายเป็นปัจจัยสำคัญที่ส่งเสริมให้ “ขบวนการขงจื๊อสมัยใหม่” เริ่มเปิดกว้างพร้อมยอมรับ การประสมประสานประนีประนอมทางความคิดกับแนวคิดและทฤษฏีตลอดจนหลักปรัชญาตะวันตก มาใช้เป็นฐานคิดในการพัฒนาปรับปรุงให้เนื้อหาสาระของแนวคิดสำนักขงจื๊อสอดคล้องเหมาะสมกับสภาพสังคมพหุวัฒนธรรมในปัจจุบัน
คำสำคัญ ขบวนการขงจื๊อสมัยใหม่; สำนักขงจื๊อ; ปรัชญาจีนสมัยใหม่; วัฒนธรรมจีน

Abstract
This article aims to examine the meaning of the New Confucianism and to indicate the development of Confucius philosophies as a result of societal changes over time. The New Confucianism, the modification of Confucianism, first came into existence by Chinese conservatives, whose attempt was at the preservation, as well as the perpetuation, of Confucius values, amidst the contemporary idea of complete Westernization. With the socio-political changes and more opportunities to participate in constructive dialogues with academics worldwide, however, the New Confucianism started to become integrated with western ideas, culminating in a philosophical adaptation of Confucius thoughts to today's multicultural society
Key words   New Confucianism; Confucianism; Modern Chinese History; Chinese Culture

摘要
本篇主要闡述研究“現代新儒家”的概念，並指出儒家思想不是局限於特定歷史時代與社會形態的普遍性價值，而是跟著時代的變化而變化。“現代新儒家”在儒家傳統文化中已取得了一席之位。它是一批中國保守主義者因嚴感受到中國文化在面臨著意義危機而生的，即認爲儒家在中國文化局於主導和核心地位,以繼承、闡揚傳統文化中所包含的哲學和人生智慧為責任。但隨著時代的進步，中國保守主義者就開始吸納、融合、會通西方哲學來探討儒家傳統文化的現代多元化發展之路。

關鍵詞 現代新儒學；儒家； 現代中國哲學 ； 中國文化

When dealing with the study of diverse Confucian traditions in eastern Asia, we are often confronted by the issue of the religious dimension of Confucianism and how can it be compared to the Western (or ‘general’) connotations of the term. Proceeding from the basic question as to how Confucianism sees itself, the paper focuses on the approaches of two representatives of the Modern Confucian intellectual movement, namely Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan. In addition, we shall also take into consideration the various contemporary Confucian interpretations of the previously delineated problems, for instance Liu Shu-hsien’s or Chen Lai’s. Based on these discourses, the paper clarifies the reasons for Modern Confucian interpretations, according to which Confucianism is not a religion in the Western sense but a discourse that represents both a practical moral teaching and an abstract philosophy of immanent transcendence.

KEYWORDS: Confucianism, Chinese religion, Chinese philosophy, Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan

This chapter provides an overview of the historical background as well as philosophical outlook behind the twentieth-century Confucian thinker Liang Shuming’s 梁漱溟 (1893-1988) engagement with the movement for “rural reconstruction” (xiangcun jianshe 鄉村建設) which took off during the 1930s in Republican China. After situating Liang’s turn toward the countryside and his activities in Shandong province as leader of the Institute for Rural Reconstruction in their broader socio-political context and his own trajectory as an intellectual and reformer, I describe and analyze the complex constellation of cultural, historical, social, political, and economic elements in his 1937 Theory of Rural Reconstruction (Xiangcun jianshe lilun 鄉村建設理論). In doing so, I pay particular attention to the relation between Liang’s idiosyncratic reinterpretation of premodern China’s social order as grounded in an affirmation of “reason” (lixing 理性) and his vision for a form of “national self-awakening” (minzu zijue 民族自覺) rooted in the countryside as a place where the traditional Confucian primacy “ethical relations” (lunli 論理) has supposedly been preserved. In conclusion, I argue that Liang’s idea of rural “collective life” (tuanti shenghuo 團體生活) as the basis for a wholly new form of society counts as a non-state-centered approach to modernization which continues to resonate in contemporary postrevolutionary China.