Ablaufmodell 26n absolute reality, see reality accuracy 149, 162, 191, 195, 241, 243, 262 adherents, first of a new theory 239-240 aesthetic considerations 241-242, 258 algorithm in theory comparison 151, 250-251 analogy, concrete problem solutions as sources of 136 analyst´s viewpoint 54, 58, 68-69, 86, 122-130 analytic philosophy of science 92 analytic sentences 210 analytic/synthetic distinction 62-63, 103n, 107, 115, 121, 156n, 210-211, 256 anglo-saxon case law 118 anomalies 22, 40, 148n, 259, 265 -and crises 230-233, 235-236 -dissolvement of 224 -distinction between mere and significant 225-226 -exist only relative to theory 226, 237 -identification of 225

Öz Auguste Comte'dan bu yana, yani başlangıcından beri bilim tarihi çalışmaları 'ilerleme' kavramı üzerine odaklanmıştır. Akademik bir disiplin olarak bilim tarihinin kurucu babası George Sarton bilim tarihini bilimsel bilginin gelişim tarihinin betimlenmesi ve açıklanması olarak tanımlar. Bilimin bütün bu gelişme süreci ilerlemenin tarihidir. Bilim tarihsel yöntemlerin kullanılmasıyla bu süreç bilimsel olarak açıklanabilir ve bu açıklama yoluyla da bilim insanlık için daha anlaşılır kılınabilir. Ayrıca bu bilgiden açığa çıkan öngörüler bilim politikalarını da belirleyecektir. Tam bu noktada çalışmanın ikinci sorusu gündeme gelmektedir. Bilimi, öngörüde bulunamayan bir tarihsel yöntemle açıklamak nasıl mümkündür? Mamafih davranışı değiştirmeyen bilgi işe yaramazdır. Fakat davranışı çok hızlı değiştiren bilgi de hızla bağlamını yitirir. Ne kadar çok verimiz varsa ve tarihi ne kadar iyi anlarsak, tarihin yönü o kadar hızlı değişir ve bilgimiz o kadar hızlı biçimde güncelliğini ve geçerliliğini yitirir. Buna Oedipus Etkisi denmektedir ve bu etki tarihsel ve sosyal bilimlerin ürettiği bilginin paradoksudur. Fakat belki de bütün sosyal bilimler bu etkiden ve paradokstan muzdaripken, bilim tarihi disiplini bir istisnadır. Bu istisnanın nedeni esasında basittir. Bilim tarihinin konusu bilimin ta kendisidir ve bilim ilerleyebilen tek entelektüel ve pratik girişimdir. Bu bağlamda bilim tarihinin öngörüde bulunabilmesinin tek bir şartı vardır: Kuramsallaşmış bir bilim tarihi.

Abstract
History of Science, Why Now? How?
At the beginning, ever since the time of Auguste Comte, history of science studies has focussed on the concept of 'progress'. The founding father of the history of science as an academic discipline, George Sarton, defines the history of scince as the description and explanation of the development of scientific knowledge. This whole process of the development of the science is the history of progress. By the using of the scientific historical methods, this process could be explained and by this explanation the science will be more understandable for humanity. Also by the prediction that released from this knowledge will determine the science policies At this point, the second question of this paper raises. How is it possible to explain the science with a historical method that cannot make a prediction? At the same time, knowledge that does not change behaviour is useless. But knowledge that changes behaviour quickly loses its relevance. The more data we have and the better we understand history, the faster history alters its course, and the faster our knowledge becomes outdated. This is called the Oedipus effect and this effect is the paradox of historical and also social scientific knowledge. But maybe there is no social science discipline that does not suffer from Oedipus effect other than the history of science. Its reason is very simple. The subject of the history of science is the epitome of science. And science is the only intellectual and practical approach that can be in progression. In this context there is only one condition that the history of science can make predictions: A history of science discipline that build on a theory.

In his mature works, Kuhn abandons the concept of a paradigm and becomes more interested in the analysis of the conceptual structure of scientific theories. These changes are interpreted as resulting from a ‘linguistic turn’ that Kuhn underwent sometimes around the 1980s. Much of the philosophical discussions about Kuhn’s post-‘linguistic turn’ philosophy revolves around his views on taxonomic concepts. Apart from taxonomy, however, the mature Kuhn introduces other concepts, such as conceptual networks and lexicons. This article distinguishes these three concepts and shows that adopting each one of them has different impacts on Kuhn’s model of science. After distinguishing and assessing the concepts of taxonomy, network, and lexicon, it will be argued that the latter not only fits the Kuhnian model of science better, but it also helps capture the wide sense of Kuhn’s early concept of a paradigm.

Thomas Kuhn defined the characteristics of scientific revolutions based to a large extent upon his knowledge of the first and second Scientific Revolutions. He concluded that scientific revolutions are the result of crises faced by previous theoretical paradigms. However, he missed some important clues of how revolutions develop. Instead of emphasizing the crises, historians should look at the major trends in scientific and human thought prior to the revolutions. By doing so, they could actually gain a better understanding of how scientific revolutions emerge during the normal course of scientific evolution and progress. Instead of defining revolutions by the crises that precede them, revolutions actually emerge from the successes of previous theoretical attempts while each revolution contains the seeds for the next revolution that follows. These seeds eventually grow into the crises that trigger revolutions. Under these circumstances, it can be shown that the space-time revolution of relativity theory was never completed, thus laying the foundations for the next revolution in science. Knowing this, we can consider the possibility that we have already entered a pre-revolutionary period for the Third Scientific Revolution.

Thomas Kuhn's "paradigms" and Michel Foucault's "epistemes" are often seen as similar concepts, in that both would establish necessary conditions of knowledge. However, how close are they to each other? The aim of this article is to compare these two concepts in detail. Firstly, I discuss the similarities and differences between paradigms and epistemes regarding a number of aspects, as well as their respective functions within Kuhn's and Foucault's approaches. The analysis is organized around a series of topics, such as "definition" and "scope," with the intention of facilitating the comparison. Next, I examine some comments that Foucault and Kuhn made on each other's work, paying particular attention to matters related to the nature and role of paradigms and epistemes.

"O objetivo descrito nesse artigo, portanto, é evidenciar os pressupostos centrais do pensamento de Thomas Kuhn, em sua obra clássica, e contribuir na compreensão, interpretação e representação de seus argumentos fundamentais sobre a ciência e o contexto das descobertas, especialmente no
campo da pesquisa jurídica".

Este artículo fue publicado en el volumen colectivo coordinado por Eduardo Scarano. Ed. Macchi, Buenos Aires, 1999, pp. 221- 245.
Hacia 1960, Thomas Kuhn publica un libro, "La estructura de las revoluciones científicas", que obliga a replantear los supuestos existentes acerca de la ciencia. Al decir de Javier Muguerza -quien escribe la introducción de un volumen en el cual los principales especialistas discuten este texto- “era una de esas obras que estaba haciéndose esperar”, añadiendo que “venía a llenar un vacío”.1
Estaba en el aire la idea de que la concepción tradicional de la ciencia -luego de un período prolongado de intensas realizaciones- se encontraba en un punto de su desarrollo que podría describirse como de crisis, cuestionada por diversos autores que pensaban que sus supuestos básicos -empirismo estricto, inductivismo, progreso acumulativo- no reflejaban adecuadamente al conocimiento científico. Además, al no haber podido formalizar ninguna teoría importante, y limitar los análisis lógicos a enunciados científicos simples -en el supuesto de que todo lo que se dice de ellos pudiera trasladarse sin pérdida a las teorías- se generaban dudas acerca de las afirmaciones epistemológicas realizadas, puesto que dependían de que ese supuesto fuera correcto. La ciencia parecía ser mucho más compleja de lo que mostraban esos sencillos ejemplos.2
Thomas Kuhn responde a muchas de esas inquietudes cuando abre el camino para una nueva comprensión del quehacer científico sólidamente asentada en la historia de la ciencia -y no en la lógica-. Formula para ello una (meta) teoría de la ciencia que redefine completamente no sólo cuál es la estructura del conocimiento científico, y cómo se relaciona con la realidad, sino también la forma en la que evoluciona en el tiempo. Un camino que transitan historiadores de la ciencia y epistemólogos durante largos años, completando los aportes realizados por Kuhn, rectificándolos en parte, y dándoles mayor rigor formal. En cierto sentido devino un paradigma metacientífico que es seguido por una comunidad de pensadores, tal como sucede en la ciencia.
Presentaremos a continuación lo que nos dice acerca de la estructura de la ciencia -lo que llamaríamos su enfoque sincrónico-, para referirnos luego a su concepción acerca cómo evoluciona el conocimiento científico -enfoque diacrónico-, a sabiendas de que separamos a los efectos del análisis dos partes que son solidarias, puesto que lo que evoluciona en el tiempo es esa estructura que llama paradigma.

La interpretación que propongo es quizás -históricamente- sólo posible en nuestros días, cuando ya conocemos la evolución posterior de Kuhn, y sabemos cuáles han sido los caminos que transitó la aceptación de su obra en el seno de la comunidad filosófica.
Sólo ahora podemos ver con claridad lo que no se percibió en sus comienzos, pero que explica, desde sus orígenes, la evolución de este paradigma epistemológico tanto en sus aspectos teóricos como sociales.
Contra los supuestos de quienes lo atacaron en un comienzo, no abreva en las fuentes del sociologismo, del psicologismo, ni del relativismo. No compartió nunca estos estilos de pensamiento, que no aparecen en ningún desarrollo posterior de la noción de paradigma, ni del propio Kuhn, ni de quienes conformaron su comunidad de pensamiento.
Sí se observaron en el uso que han hecho de él, por fuera del círculo de profesionales de la filosofía y de la historia de la ciencia, legos que utilizan vulgarizaciones de sus conceptos para los más diversos -y exóticos- fines.4
No son estas vertientes las que pertenecen a su desarrollo ulterior.
Kuhn comparte la creencia de sus oponentes en los factores internos de la ciencia, aunque difiera en cuáles son éstos, e incluya en su teoría de la ciencia factores sociales y psicológicos.
Iniciemos, pues, el análisis de las grandes continuidades que aparecen en el pensamiento kuhniano, los grandes tópicos que defiende y acerca de los cuales argumenta a lo largo de treinta años de investigaciones. Tienen que ver con las relaciones, conflictivas e intensas, que establece en el seno de su campo cultural. Sus relaciones con las concepciones heredadas.
En el transcurso de la argumentación, se mostrará lo inadecuado de algunas objeciones que suscitó la obra de Kuhn y que -de diversas maneras- no han terminado de sostenerse, así como las razones que incidieron en su aceptación o su rechazo.

The Rosenheim Poltergeist of 1967, is cited everywhere as probably the most serious and trustworthy detection of a paranormal event, by technicians and instruments from companies and institutions like Deutsch Post, Siemens, Max Planck Institute. And yet, so far any attempt to frame this phenomenon within the known laws of physics-including quantum mechanics-failed. Therefore, a new scientific paradigm is being proposed here, in order at least to categorize-if not to explain-this kind of paranormal events. § Introduction:

Article reprinted in: Madill, A., & Gough, B. (2016). Qualitative research and its place in psychological science. In A. E. Kazdin (Ed.), Methodological issues and strategies in clinical research (4th ed., pp. 437–458). American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/14805-028

In discussing the place of diverse qualitative research within psychological science, the authors highlight the potential permeability of the quantitative-qualitative boundary and identify different ways of increasing communication between researchers specializing in different methods. Explicating diversity within qualitative research is facilitated, initially, through documenting the range of qualitative data collection and analytic methods available. The authors then consider the notion of paradigmatic frame and review debates on the current and future positioning of qualitative research within psychological science. In so doing, the authors argue that the different ways in which the concept of paradigm can be interpreted allow them to challenge the idea that diverse research paradigms are prima facie incommensurate. Further, reviewing the ways in which proponents of qualitative research are seeking to reconfigure the links between paradigms helps the authors to envisage how communication between research communities can be enhanced. This critical review allows the authors to systematize possible configurations for research practice in psychology on a continuum of paradigm integration and to specify associated criteria for judging intermethod coherence.

En este artículo se analizan dos de las estrategias de Kuhn para defender la inconmensurabilidad. Estas estrategias son la separación tajante entre interpretación y traducción y el reclamo de Kuhn de tener en cuenta los aspectos intensionales en los procesos de traducción. Se argumenta que ambas estrategias descansan en errores metodológicos. Por tanto, el argumento de Davidson contra la inconmensurabilidad puede defenderse aún.

A publicação de A Estrutura das Revoluções Científicas (1962) é considerada um ponto de inflexão na história da filosofia da ciência anglófona. Com essa obra, original e sugestiva, Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) tornou-se um dos mais influentes filósofos da ciência do final do século XX. O elemento filosófico central desse clássico é o conceito de paradigma. Não obstante, o uso do vocábulo na obra ocasionou, logo após a sua publicação, uma série de críticas que questionavam a natureza, a utilidade e o caráter polissêmico do termo. Este trabalho apresenta uma investigação sobre as diferentes concepções do vocábulo em alguns momentos da obra kuhniana, a saber, (i) A Estrutura das Revoluções Científicas (1962), a partir das críticas apresentadas em “A natureza de um paradigma” (1970) de Margareth Masterman e “A estrutura das revoluções científicas” (1964) de Dudley Shapere, (ii) “A tensão essencial: tradição e inovação na investigação científica” (1959), (iii) “A função do dogma na pesquisa científica” (1963), (iv) “Posfácio” (1969) e (v) “Reconsiderações acerca dos paradigmas” (1969). A investigação sobre os usos e os sentidos de ‘paradigma’ na obra kuhniana nos serviu de indicação para pensar de que modo podemos transpor alguns dos problemas suscitados pelo uso do termo na Estrutura. Considera-se que o caráter polissêmico do vocábulo sugere questões que não se reduzem a aspectos meramente editoriais ou a incongruências semânticas que, por fim, seriam resolvidas com uma referência a este ou aquele significado principal. Cogita-se que tal imprecisão e ambiguidade podem advir do fato de que Kuhn, mesmo que de modo não intencional, levava a cabo uma pesquisa que se não ultrapassou o âmbito do próprio campo científico, esteve em seus limites.

The publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) is a remarkable event in the history of the anglophone philosophy of science. Kuhn became one of the most influent philosophers of science with his original and suggestive book. The central philosophical element of this classic is the concept of paradigm. Nevertheless after its publication, the use of the word 'paradigm' generated a flood of doubts and criticisms on the nature, usefulness, and the polysemic character of this term. This work presents an investigation about the different conceptions of the term 'paradigm' in several moments of the kuhnian writings. In particular, (i) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) considering two criticisms addressed to Kuhn: “The nature of the paradigm” (1970) by Margareth Masterman and “The structure of scientific revolutions” (1964) by Dudley Shapere, (ii) “The essential tension: tradition and innovation in scientific research” (1959), (iii) “The function of dogma in scientific research” (1963), (iv) “Postscript” (1969) and (v) “Second thoughts on paradigms” (1969). The research into the uses and meanings of the paradigm concept in the kuhnian writings indicated how to overcome some problems raised by the use of this word in Structure. For the American philosopher, the polysemic character of this term suggests questions merely editorial or semantic inconsistencies that lead to a single and mean meaning. Therefore, we consider that the inaccuracy and ambiguity of this term come from the fact that Kuhn was developing research that was, at times, on the frontiers of the scientific field.

Seguiremo all’inverso KUHN [1970], il cui indice generale sarà invertito. Se Kuhn dalle rivoluzioni giunge alle caratteristiche della conoscenza scientifica, dalle caratteristiche della conoscenza scientifica noi giungeremo ad accennare appena l’evento-rivoluzioni. Il perché sarà ampiamente motivato nella trattazione. Tuttavia, già da ora, occorre esplicitare quanto segue: si parla di conoscenza, e non di conoscenze scientifiche. È un distinguo epistemologico che il lettore dovrà sottolineare. E la ragione è bene esporla subito, onde evitare ambigui fraintendimenti.
Indagare sulla conoscenza, impone un’esposizione articolata e approfondita sull’attività del conoscere. Questa attività è l’oggetto di indagine. In realtà, paradossalmente, occorre ammettere che, purificando sempre più tale attività dalle incrostazioni speculative più invadenti, emergerà chiara e distinta un’esigenza teoretica: non è possibile considerare l’oggetto come oggetto puramente materiale; l’oggetto, in realtà, è un soggetto, sebbene non logicamente. L’indagine sull’attività conoscitiva è indagine sul soggetto conoscente: i due ambiti non possono essere scissi nettamente. Si apre, già nelle premesse, il conflitto fra epistemologia e le pseudoscienze, in particolare la sociologia e la psicologia. Possono quest’ultime fornire un contributo nell’analisi del progresso della conoscenza scientifica? Ancora una volta: il progresso è epistemologico-filosofico o storico-sociale? Le difficoltà maggiori, in corso d’opera, hanno condotto a queste domande, accettando la sfida kuhniana a riscrivere il suo pensiero in ordine inverso. È emersa, limpidamente, la particolarità indiscussa dell’attività scientifica: essa non è mai squisitamente individuale, tantomeno perciò solo materiale. È il singolo scienziato ad elaborare teorie e a condurre esperimenti e ad accogliere o escludere osservazioni fenomeniche. Tuttavia, il sostrato teorico e socio-psicologico che costituisce la sua attività normale, quotidiana, è più che determinante e, sorprendentemente, determinato. Occorre allora chiedersi quali elementi distinguano l’attività scientifica da altre imprese conoscitive e pratiche. Per quali vie procede questa attività: teoriche o pratiche?

por múltiples razones. Porque en lo personal me ha permitido seguir mi carrera académica en un clima propicio. Porque como institución ha decidido encarar caminos creativos no tradicionales, lo cual permite que sus docentes, investigadores y alumnos puedan desarrollar sus tareas en un ambiente estimulante, de interacción entre sí y con la comunidad. Porque ha afrontado en toda su magnitud el desafío de ser una universidad pública con cuyos valores tradicionales-autonomía, excelencia, gratuidad y democracia-renuevo permanentemente mi compromiso.

Simandan D (2005) "Pragmatic Scepticism and the Possibilities of Knowledge" Timisoara, Editura Universitatii de Vest/West University Press, 256 pp.

This book distiled my own way of understanding the relation between epistemology, ontology, and politics, and the best name I found for labelling that way is pragmatic scepticism. Throughout the book, I stay away from the temptation to give a dictionary-like definition of this philosophy. I do not even like to think of it as a philosophy. Instead, I see pragmatic scepticism as a way of being and as a way of relating. A way of being human, i.e. enmeshed in language and limited by our senses; and a way of relating, i.e. crafted by the happy and sad encounters with theories, things, and lifeís happenings. The book is structured in three parts, which together give a sense of the potentials of pragmatic scepticism: as a way of thinking about the world, as a way of approaching theoretical dilemmas, as a way of mapping one's inner contradictions. The first part of the book introduces pragmatic scepticism in relation to the general questions underwriting the philosophy of knowledge and the study of science. The second part is more specific in that it deploys the pragmatic sceptical attitude to the central metatheoretical questions of the discipline of geography. The last part of the book groups under the heading "philosophies of struggle" two more applied essays on the political economy and the political epistemology of conflicts over knowledge in the globalised landscape of higher education in general and geography in particular.

La rápida e intensiva evolución que han experimentado las tecnologías biológicas y digitales a finales del siglo XX, han producido importantes transformaciones en nuestros hábitos cotidianos y laborales.
En el campo específico de la arquitectura, se iniciaba con esto, un universo de nuevos planteos que desafían las concepciones tradicionales del diseño, dando lugar a una arquitectura con una expresión espacial germinal, fluida, en continuo proceso de cambio y de transformación hasta su concreción física final. Una arquitectura de modelos digitales producidas a través de una amplia gama de herramientas tecnológicas: modelos paramétricos, algoritmos genéticos, tecnologías CAD/CAM, que permiten optimizar los recursos de un modo lógico, más allá de la construcción gráfica o del discurso exclusivamente conceptual. Revelando el peso de lo biológico y de lo digital en la práctica del arquitecto contemporáneo.

En este ámbito, la presente investigación parte de la hipótesis de que un nuevo paradigma está surgiendo en el modo de concebir la arquitectura.

Dentro de la situación contemporánea donde los límites disciplinares parecieran ser difusos, algunos afirman que la arquitectura biodigital es la nueva vanguardia, otros que es una moda formalista pasajera que en muy poco tiempo será olvidada. Hasta qué punto constituye dicho marco un nuevo paradigma es aún un tema sometido a debate. ¿“Revolución científica” o “anomalía”? Esta dicotomía presenta un campo abierto que será objeto de esta investigación cuyos límites y consecuencias son impredecibles.

Art exists and changes through time, but in what form is such change encoded in time, and vice versa? How are we best to describe and understand the restless and turbulent currents, tides, and storms of artistic movement that unfold through time? Can our histories be histories yet avoid arresting and sedimenting the time-of-art into a lithic epochal stratigraphy? Despite the strong self-critical trends and powerful new methodologies of recent decades, the history of art at the turn of the millennium remains in many ways closely attached to a nineteenth-century stratigraphie practice (with origins stretching back to Vasari and Petrarch): the familiar system of Romanesque, Gothic, Renaissance, Baroque, and so on, and subcategories (and parallel systems in non-Western zones). One might think that this system would by now have been fully historicized, manifest mainly as quaint traces of an archaic discourse. This is far from being the case. Most scholars, of course, realize that all of these terms are problematic and that they are interrelated in a tangle of often perverse, perplexing hierarchies, yet it seems difficult for many of us to imagine art history without this mapping. This group of essays grew out of a College Art Association session (2000) that I chaired, which sought to interrogate this antiquated diachronic system, posing two questions: In concrete terms of specific case studies, how does it continue to affect art historical practices? Second, is such a stratigraphy of discrete historical spaces, defined stylistically or otherwise, necessary to chronology and the diachronics of practice, or are there possible alternatives? These questions were not conjured out of thin air but stemmed from problems that deeply affect my own work in the trecento, early Renaissance, and northern Gothic architecture. It is out of the transhistorical perspective of my teaching and scholarship that metacritical questions have emerged and risen to a state of urgency in my thinking. In Dominion of the Eye, for example, one of my principal aims was to deconstruct the hierarchical, stratigraphie layering of quattrocento over trecento, the still all-to-widely practiced submergence of the medieval by the Renaissance in the domain of urbanism as well as in major aspects of the other arts, despite all the protests of self-reflective awareness about this question.

Contrairement aux grandes figures du pragmatisme classique (Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead), Richard Rorty a souvent été accusé de prôner une pensée irrationaliste, hostile aux sciences. Dans cet article, je me propose de nuancer un tel verdict en présentant les enjeux, inséparablement philosophiques et métaphilosophiques, du débat que Rorty a instauré avec les principales branches de la philosophie des sciences contemporaine, autour des questions de l’essentialisme (la science comme « genre naturel »), du réalisme et de l’instrumentalisme scientifiques. Je propose en outre d’évaluer la manière dont Rorty a redécrit l’activité scientifique comme visant à la solidarité et à la création poétique.

Richard Rorty: Science as Representation and as Solidarity

Contrary to the great figures of classical pragmatism (Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead), Richard Rorty has often been accused of advocating an irrationalistic thinking, averse to science. In this article, I intend to qualify such a verdict by presenting the issues, inseparably philosophical and metaphilosophical, of the debate that Rorty has started with the main branches of contemporary philosophy of science, about topics such as essentialism (science as a “natural kind”), scientific realism and instrumentalism. I also intend to assess the way in which Rorty has redescribed scientific activity as aimed at solidarity and poetic creation.

The Twin Earth scenario assumes reference to natural kinds is unique and never changes (rigid designation), and that we can give justice to the intuition of reference-permanence and things having a deep structure only by pushing meaning outside the brain or mind (semantic externalism). This, I'll show, doesn't follow. Besides, the intuition itself is misconstrued here. To say the term “water” expressed a thought or concept or belief denoting H2O before its actual discovery around 1750, is to make a claim without real content and be guilty of after-the-fact rationalizing. If anything, Twin Earth undercuts the theory of semantic externalism and its core-notion of rigid designation. A pluralized, descriptivist model of reference, I claim, is a better fit for our scientific data and ordinary intuitions either way.

This is a book on Thomas S. Kuhn's intellectual development until the publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. It's based on original research into the MIT archives, where Kuhn's documents are deposited, just as my old 2004 PhD dissertation and many papersI have published during these years. This is the updated version of my views on the origins of Structure.

The paper deals with Kuhn’s development immediately before Structure and during the last two decades of his life. I discuss Kuhn’s development from his penultimate draft of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to its final version, and his unfinished book manuscript entitled The Plurality of Worlds: An Evolutionary Theory of Scientific Development.

Thomas Kuhn is still being accused of defending an irrational picture of scientific activity or theory choice, and/or of severely criticizing its methodology and findings in Turkish philosophical literature, with just a few outstanding philosophers being the exception to the norm. He has been accused of undermining the importance of science and the reliability of its capacity to produce reliable knowledge. In this study, it is argued that the claim that Kuhn’s notion of science is irrational is profoundly mistaken. The following reasons are presented: (i) for Kuhn, science was an intrinsically rationalistic activity; (ii) he assumed that there are and should be good and possibly compelling reasons, at least for some individual scientists, to promote theory choice; and (iii) what he argued against is the thesis that stipulates that “the possibility and existence of logically and/or experimentally (also, universally) compelling arguments for theory choice is a prerequisite” for the existence of scientific rationality.

Thomas Kuhn bugün halen, çok az sayıdaki istisnai felsefeci hariç, Türkçe felsefe literatüründe bilimsel faaliyeti, onun yöntemlerini, bulgularını veya bilimsel alandaki kuram seçimini irrasyonel gibi gösteren bir felsefeci olarak değerlendiriliyor. Hatta bilimin kendisini, güvenilir bilgi üretme kapasitesini oldukça küçümsediği ve onu sert şekilde eleştirdiği söyleniyor. Bu çalışmada ben, Thomas Kuhn'un bize sunduğu bilim imgesinde bilimin irrasyonel bir faaliyet olarak resmedildiği iddiasının şu nedenlerden ötürü temelden hatalı olduğunu öne sürüyorum: (i) Kuhn'a göre bilim zaten içsel olarak, neredeyse tanımı gereği, rasyonel bir insan faaliyetidir, (ii) Kuhn kuram seçimi konusunda iyi ve ikna edici gerekçelerin sunulabileceğini fikrini tartışmasız kabul eder, (iii) Kuhn'un itiraz ettiği şey, kuram seçiminde bağlamdan yani dönemden veya disiplinden bağımsız evrensel, deneysel veya mantıki bakımından karşı konulamaz türden argümanların geliştirilebilmesini rasyonalitenin ön şartı olarak gösteren tezdir.

Thomas Kuhn'un "Bilimsel Devrimlerin Yapısı" isimli eseri bilim tarihi çalışmalarında yeni bir perspektifin başlangıcı olmuştur. Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi Lisansüstü Eğitim Enstitüsü'nde yapılan bu sunumda Kuhn'un eseri ve temel kavramları ele alınmıştır.
Faydalı olması dileğiyle...

The publication of Thomas S. Kuhn’s "Structure of Scientific Revolutions" in 1962 stands for a turning point in the history and philosophy of science. The repercussions of this work have rearticulated the theoretical framework of history and philosophy of science and have also generated discussions that contributed to the formation of the communities of historians as well as philosophers of science in many parts of the world. Different approaches to history of science have since emerged and most of them have the "Structure" as their reference point. In October 2012, a conference at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science brought together some of the historians of science whose work has played a decisive role in the ways history of science has evolved as a field of research in the past 50 years, both intellectually and institutionally. This volume gathers reflections by many of these historians on the history of the history of science, based on the presentations and discussions at the conference. The topics covered range from personal recollections of working with Thomas Kuhn to broad overviews of the historical development of the history of science as a discipline in the past half-century. The series Proceedings of the Max Planck Research Library for the History and Development of Knowledge presents the results of scientific meetings on current issues and supports further cooperation on these issues via an electronic platform. The volumes are available both as print-on-demand books and as open-access publications on the Internet. The material is freely accessible online at www.edition-open-access.de.

Thomas  Kuhn’un  1962  yılında  yayımlamış  olduğu “Bilimsel  Devrimlerin  Yapısı” adlı  kitabı bilimsel gelişme, bilimin doğası ve bilimsel bilginin özerkliği gibi çeşitli bilim felsefesi konularında farklı tartışmaların  ortaya  çıkmasına  neden  olmuştur.  Bu  tartışmalardan  birisi  de  Kuhn’un  bilim alanında rölativist ya  da  göreci bir anlayışa katkıda bulunarak bilimin  sarsılmaz statüsüne zarar verip  vermediğine  yöneliktir.  Kuhn’un  rölativistlikle  suçlanmasına  yol  açan  argümanlardan  ön plana  çıkan  ikisi;  iki  farklı  rakip  paradigmaya  bağlı  olan  kuramların  kıyaslanmasının  mümkün olmadığını ileri süren  metodolojik eşölçülemezlik  argümanı  ile kuramdan bağımsız nötr gözlem önermelerinin olamayacağını belirten gözlemlerin kuram yüklü olduğu savıdır. Kuhn bu argümanlar çerçevesinde  kendisine  getirilen  görecilik  iddialarına  karşı  çıkar  ve  bilim  felsefecilerinin  ona yöneltmiş  olduğu  eleştirilere  yıllar  içerisinde “Bilimsel  Devrimlerin  Yapısı” kitabının  ek bölümlerinde cevap vermektedir. Bu bağlamda, Kuhn’un bu iddialara ikna edici bir cevap verip vermediğini  tespit  edebilmek  ve  onun  gerçekten  bilim  ve  bilimsel  bilginin  statüsü  konusunda rölativist  olup  olmadığını  soruşturmak  için  ortaya  konulan  eleştirilerin  etraflıca  ele  alınması gerekliliği ortaya  çıkmaktadır. Diğer  bir  deyişle,  Kuhn'un görecilik  konusu ile ilgili bir  neticeye varabilmek amacıyla onun bütün bilim anlayışının göz önünde  bulundurulması  önemlidir. 4 Dolayısıyla Kuhn'un genel bilim tasviri bu çalışmanın odağını oluşturmaktadır. Bu bakımdan çalış mada,  ilk  olarak  kısaca  “göreciliğin”  ne  anlama  geldiği  ortaya  konulacak,  ardından  Kuhn’un eşölçülemezlik ve kuram yüklülük tezleri ayrıntılandırılarak, bu çerçeve içerisinde neden rölativist olarak kabul  edildiği  serimlenecektir.  Nihai  olarak,  Kuhn'un  kendisine  getirilen  eleştirilere  karşı ortaya  koyduğu  cevapların  rölativist  suçlamalardan  sıyrılması  için  sağlam  gerekçeleri sağlayamadığı ortaya konulacaktır.

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, published by Thomas Kuhn in 1962, has led to different debates on the philosophy of science, such as scientific development, the nature of science and the autonomy of scientific knowledge. One of these discussions is about whether Kuhn contributes to a relativist understanding in science and harms the untouchable status of science. Two arguments lead to Kuhn's accusation of relativism. These are the arguments of methodological incommensurabiliy and the theory-ladenness. Kuhn responds to the critics of relativism directed by the philosophers of science in the postscript of the Structure of Scientific Revolutions. It is important to consider Kuhn's whole understanding of science in order to reach a conclusion on the subject of Kuhn's relativity. Therefore, Kuhn's general description of science is the focus of this study. In this respect, first of all, it will be briefly explained what relativism means, and then Kuhn's thesis of incommensurability and theory-ladenness will be elaborated. Within this framework, it will be shown why Kuhn is accepted as relativist. Ultimately, it will be revealed that Kuhn's responds to criticism have failed to provide solid grounds for eluding relativist accusations.

Bilime ve onun bilgisine akademik, politik, ekonomik ve kamusal alanlar olmak üzere birçok alanda diğer bilgi iddialarına kıyasla daha fazla güven duyulmaktadır. Bilime duyulan bu güvenin temelinde büyük ölçüde bilimsel süreçlerin ve yöntemlerin nesnel bir şekilde yürütülmesi ve bu nesnel sürecin bir ürünü olarak bilimsel bilginin tarafsız bilim insanları tarafından ortaya konulduğu düşüncesi yatmaktadır. Bu bakımdan toplum tarafından bilimin tartışılmaz statüsünün ve bilimsel bilgiye verilen değerin belirleyicisi olarak nesnellik özelliği ön plana çıkmaktadır. Bilhassa doğa bilimleri söz konusu olduğunda bilimsel yöntemin olgulara ve dış dünyaya ilişkin nesnel bilgiler sağladığı düşünülmektedir. Bu bakımdan doğa bilimleri, bilimde nesnelliğin paradigmatik örnekleri olarak kabul görmektedir. Beşeri ve sosyal bilimler alanında ise doğa bilimlerine kıyasla nesnellik algısı düşük olmasına rağmen, yöntemlerinin bilimsel yöntemle çalışılmaya uygun olmasından dolayı en azından ilke olarak nesnel olduğu değerlendirilmektedir. Bilimin değerler alanından ziyade olgu alanına ilişkin çalışmalar yürütmesi, bilim insanlarının değerler, anlamlar ve ideallerinden de kendisini izole ederek bilimsel nesnelliği temin edilebileceği konusunda genel bir kavrayışa yol açmaktadır. Bu görüşün önde gelen düşünürü Karl Popper’dır. Popper bilimsel nesnelliğin, olgusal içerikli önermelerin – protokol önermeleri – öznelerarası sınanabilir olması ile temin edilebileceğini ve böylece bilim insanlarının çalışmalarında kültür, değer ve inanç gibi öznel kanılarının bilimsel bilginin temellendirilmesi ve sınanması noktasında kullanılamayacağını ifade etmiştir. Ancak bilimin doğasına yönelik bir soruşturma bilimsel bilginin düşünüldüğü kadar nesnel bir sürece sahip olmadığını, bilim faaliyetini gerçekleştiren bilim insanlarının kişisel çıkarlarının, değerlerinin ve içinde yaşamış oldukları kültürel faktörlerin bilimsel bilginin elde edilmesi sürecinde etkili olabileceğini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu bakımdan bilimin doğasını doğru bir şekilde anlayabilmenin yolu bilimlerde nesnellik ölçütünün sosyolojik ve kültürel unsurlarla yakından ilişkili olduğunu bilmekten geçmektedir. Thomas Kuhn bilimsel değerlendirmelerde değer yargılarının ve kültürel unsurların kaçınılmaz olduğu düşüncesindedir. Kuhn, Popper’ın aksine sosyolojik etmen ve değerleri de işin içerisine katarak bir bilimsel nesnellik değerlendirmesi yapmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, o bilimde fazlasıyla öznel unsurları vurguladığı eleştirilerine imkân vermeyecek şekilde bilim insanlarının takip etmesi gereken ve tavsiye niteliğinde olan belirli değerler neticesinde bilimsel nesnelliğin ve rasyonalitenin sağlanabileceğini ifade etmektedir. Bu kapsamda çalışmada, bilimin en bilinen özelliği olarak göze çarpan nesnellik kavramı ve düşüncesine yönelik kavramsal bir belirlemenin ardından kültür ve değer gibi sosyolojik unsurların bilimsel objektifliğin ayrılmaz bir parçası olduğu argümanı, Popper ve Kuhn’un çalışmaları göz önünde bulundurularak serimlenecektir.

This article does three things. First, it asks a new question about transformative education, namely 'what is the role of power and trust in the decision of whether to transform one's meaning scheme in the face of new information or whether to simply reject the new information?' Secondly, it develops a five-stage model which elaborates on the role of this decision in transformative learning. 1 Finally, it uses grounded-theory and the five-stage model to argue that power and trust play an important role in facilitating transformative learning.

It has been frequently claimed that Kuhnian picture of science is the following: (i) According to Kuhn, science is not progressive, (ii) is progressive but not cumulative, (iii) is progressive but not-linear (iv) normal science (cumulatively) progresses but paradigm change is not (or not cumulatively) progressive. All these four mistakes, I try to show, are the results of some other mischaracterizations about some basic elements of Kuhnian picture of science. For Kuhn, normal science and the notion of paradigm is so closely associated. Therefore, any misperception about one of them would have repercussions into the other. However, because the shattering of normal science through emergence of a new paradigm results in the situation in which scientists have to make paradigm choices, the following problem immediately emerges: If a philosopher mistakes Kuhnian ideas regarding theory choice, then she would easily mistake Kuhnian ideas related to scientific progress, whether it be normal or extraordinary science. Here I argue that Kuhn has defended the existence, importance, and (in a certain sense) the cumulative character of scientific progress, both within normal science and also through scientific revolution.