1 CRIMINAL LAW I | UP Law D2013 | Sandra M.T.

Magalang
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY1
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
A. Definition of Felony
Art.3, RPC: Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault
(culpa).
There is deceit when an act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when
the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
Felonies distinguished from crimes.
Acts and omissions punishable by RPC are felonies. Felonies are mala in se, i.e. wrong by itself.
Crime is a more generic term which includes felonies and offenses. By itself, it could pertain to
socially harmful behavior regulated by other special laws enacted by congress. Crimes and
offenses may either be mala in se or mala prohibita.
B. Elements of criminal liability
1. Physical element (actus reus) Objective element
a. Act
- Bodily movements that are willed (as opposed to bodily movements that are not
willed, i.e. muscle spasm, involuntary twitches, etc. not an act as envisioned
by RPC)
- Bodily movements tending to produce an effect in the external world which is
identifiable and observable
- Includes possession of prohibited substances/items (i.e. drugs, firearms)
o Possession does not even include any bodily movement
o However, mere possession, despite lack of bodily movement, is
considered an act.
o The concept of possession as a criminal act poses an ethical
dilemma.
Possession per se does not lead to socially harmful behavior.
Person is being punished for the presupposed harm he will/might
do.
Akin to punishing a person for mere status/propensity, not for
actual wrong. beginning of a very slippery slope
Criminalizing possession must be balanced with societys
reasonable expectation of a wrongdoing occurring from the
possession of an illegal object.
Hence, there are very few crimes of possession.
- Act sometimes requires more than bodily movement, i.e. will; and sometimes
requires less than bodily movement, i.e. possession. Hence, actus reus = willful
bodily movement or possession.
- Criminal liability requires an act to be done, because a person cannot be
punished for mere status or state of being.
1

Guide to SMM notes :D

-

Green font indicates a principle that is the holding of a certain case.

The holdings of cases are sometimes highlighted in red if they are the very ratio of the case. (Sometimes, they
are highlighted just because they are the important part connected to the lesson, not because it is the ratio.)
Most notes contain personal opinions and understanding of the lessons. If you do not agree, then dont pay
attention to it. (Oh, but feel free to ask for clarifications, and please inform me if theres something really
wrong, just in case. )
Cases marked with * are en banc decisions.

2 CRIMINAL LAW I | UP Law D2013 | Sandra M.T. Magalang

o

Condemn people for what they do, not for who they are.

POWELL vs. TEXAS

June 17, 1968
Facts: Appellant was arrested and charged with being found in a state of intoxication in a public
place. He was tried and found guilty of violating Art.477 of Texas Penal Code. On appeal, Powell
invokes the precedent of Robinson vs. California, arguing that he is ill with chronic alcoholism
which impairs his freewill, and punishing him for being intoxicated in public would be cruel and
unjust as doing so would be tantamount to punishment for mere status/condition.
Held: Powell is being punished for his action, i.e. appearing drunk in public, not for his status of
being an alcoholic. General rule, that is, an action is required for criminal liability to incur, is
upheld. Robinson precedent does not apply, because it is an exemption grounded on it punishing
a narcotics addict for being the status of being an addict, without having used or bought any
narcotic drug within the State. Also, Court is not convinced that chronic alcoholism is indeed a
disease that impairs free will, taking judicial notice that the medical community is still debating
about the definition of the disease, its proper method of cure, and that Powell himself, who
claims to be a chronic alcoholic, admits that the act of taking his first drink is voluntary.
b.
-

Omission
Inaction
Failure to perform a positive duty which one is legally bound to do.
This duty does not necessarily have to be defined in the RPC; such duty can be
found in other laws enacted by Congress (e.g. Civil Code)
There is no law that punishes a person who does not report a crime or prevent
the commission thereof.

PEOPLE vs. SILVESTRE AND ATIENZA

December 14, 1931
Facts:
Martin Atienza was convicted as principal by direct participation and Romana
Silvestre as accomplice of the crime of arson by the CFI.
On the night of November 25, 1950, while the defendants and Nicolas De la Cruz and his
wife were gathered after dinner, Martin Atienza ordered them to take their furniture out of the
house as he was going to set it on fire to get revenge on the people of Masocol, who instigated
the charge of adultery against him and Silvestre and drove them out of town. As Atienza had a
gun in hand, nobody said anything. The de la Cruz couple left to alert the barrio lieutenant, but
before they got there they heard the cries of Fire! Fire! and looked back to see their home on
fire. The fire destroyed about 48 houses. Romana was accused for listening to her co-defendants
threat without raising a protest, and not giving the alarm when the latter set fire to the house.
Issue: WON Silvestres failure is an omission that belongs properly to the meaning in Art.3 and
hence, punishable.
Held: NO. Mere passive presence at the scene of anothers crime, mere silence and failure to
give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, is not punishable. An accomplice
is one who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not induce other to
commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would not
have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous
actions.
There is no evidence of conspiracy or cooperation. Mere passive presence at the scene of
anothers crime does not constitute the cooperation required in Article 14 of the Penal code.
Decision: Romana Silvestre was acquitted.

3 CRIMINAL LAW I | UP Law D2013 | Sandra M.T. Magalang

PEOPLE vs. TALINGDAN

July 6, 1978
Facts: Teresa Domogma was married to Bernardo Bagabag and lived together with their
children. After some time, their relationship became strained, and Teresa started having an illicit
relationship with Talingdan. Bernardo knew about this, and he and Teresa has a huge fight about
it wherein he disavowed filiation of Teresas child, if she is pregnant. Two days before he was
killed, they had a quarrel, with Bernardo slapping Teresa several times. This prompted Teresa to
seek help from the police. Talingdan, a police officer, later came by to challenge Bernardo, left
after the latter refused to see him, but not without threatening to kill Bernardo someday. The
following day, Corazon (Bernardo and Teresas daughter) saw her mother meeting with coappellants. She heard one of them say could he elude a bullet. When she was seen by Teresa,
the latter allegedly shoved her saying tell your father that we will kill him.
On June 24, 1967, while Corazon was cooking dinner, she again saw her mother meet with
the appellants. After the meeting was over, her mother went back in the house. Shortly
thereafter, Bernardo, who was eating dinner, was fired upon. Seeing that he was still alive,
Talingdan and Tobias went upstairs and fired at him again. After the murder, Teresa came out of
the room and asked Corazon if she recognized the perpetrators. Saying yes, Corazon was warned
by her mother not to reveal the identity of the killers to anyone, and if she did so she would kill
her.
ISSUE: WON Teresa can be held criminally liable, provided that she did not join in the actual
commission of the crime.
HELD: YES. Teresa is criminally liable as an accessory for her positive act in preventing her
daughter from reporting her knowledge of the crime. Properly, Teresa invokes Silvestre and
Atienza in that even if she knew the plan to kill her husband, such knowledge does not make her
criminally liable. However, her subsequent actions after the crime constitute concealing or
assisting in the escape of the principal, which makes her liable as an accessory. In this case,
Teresa is not punished for an omission, but rather for an act of concealing the crime.
DISPOSITIVE: Teresa found to be guilty as an accessory (5 to 8 years in prison); co-appellants
sentenced to death.
2. Mental element (mens rea; intent) Subjective element
- There is no direct evidence to prove mens rea, it can only be INFERRED from the
actus reus.
- It being an inferred element causes some critics to question the necessity of
including mens rea as an element necessary for criminal liability to incur.
- 2 possible mental states: dolo and culpa
a. Dolo (deliberate intent)
i. Elements of dolo:
1. Freedom person is in a position to choose to act or not to act
2. Intelligence person has understanding of the nature of his action
and knowledge of the consequences of such action
Encompasses knowledge of facts
A mistake of facts negates intelligence (US vs. Ah Chong)
3. Malicious intent intention to commit wrongdoing or cause injury
to another person.
o It is possible to have only one or two of the three elements of dolo. (i.e. it
is possible to have freedom, but neither intelligence nor malicious intent;
freedom and intelligence, but no malicious intent; intelligence, but neither
freedom nor malicious intent)
o However, it is not possible to have malicious intent without intelligence
and freedom.

4 CRIMINAL LAW I | UP Law D2013 | Sandra M.T. Magalang

Intent to do wrong needs intelligence.
Intent to do wrong needs will/freedom.
Although its existence presupposes the two other elements, it is still
necessary to prove freedom and intelligence because malicious
intent is typically inferred from the existence of these two.
For dolo to exist, all three of the elements should be present. Otherwise,
there is no dolo. Hence, there is no mens rea. Without mens rea, there is
no criminal liability

ii. Two aspects of deliberate intent:

1. General intent consciousness to do harm in general; general
intent to do wrong
2. Specific intent deliberate intent to do a particular act or bring
about a particular wrong. Specific intent is helpful in differentiating
among variant felonies possibly committed by the offender.
In cases where the actus reus partakes the nature of several
variant offenses, inferring general intent is not sufficient to
determine the specific felony committed by an individual.
Hence, it is useful to look at the specific intent of the accused
to determine what among the variant felonies chargeable is
committed.
PEOPLE vs. PUNO
February 17, 1993
Facts: The accused were charged in the Information with kidnapping for ransom. Upon
arraignment, it was revealed that the victim, Maria Socorro Sarmiento, is a businesswoman. One
day, she was told by the accused Puno, the driver of her husband, that her own driver could not
make it because of an emergency and he (Puno) will take the formers place. Socorro agreed,
and so she got into the car of her husband with accused Puno as driver. Before long, it stopped
and a young man, accused Enrique Amurao, nephew of Puno, boarded the car beside the driver.
Once inside, Enrique clambered and went onto where Socorro was seated at the rear, and poked
a gun at her. Puno announced their intention to get money from Socorro. Socorro said she has
money in her bag and they can just take it if they want. They took the bag which contained
P7,000 in cash. However, the two told her they wanted P100,000 more, and so Socorro,
frightened, drafted 3 checks, two in denominations of P30,000 and one for P40,000. Puno told
her they only did this so that he can have his ulcer treated. Their plan was to take her home after
the robbery. However, they changed their minds when they thought that there was a chance of
them getting caught if they return to Balintawak area. Thus, they let the respondent out of the
car when they reached Sta. Rita exit. On the other hand, Socorro claims that she was not let out
of the car and she, out of desperation jumped out of the car in the highway and thus was able to
escape her captors. RTC found them guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a highway,
punishable under PD No.532 and both are sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Issues: What crime was committed by the accused-appellants, highway robbery under PD
No.532, kidnapping for ransom under Art.267 of RPC, or simple robbery under par.5 of Art294 of
the RPC?
Held: The accused-appellants committed simple robbery under par.5 of Art.294 of the RPC.
1. Actus reus of accused-appellants constitutes of any of the three crimes. So, in the
determination of the crime for which the accused should be held liable in instances where
his acts partake the nature of variant offenses, his motive and specific intent in
perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct
appreciation of the nature of the crime.
2. Not highway robbery because there was a specific victim targeted by the accused; not
indiscriminate as to victim.

5 CRIMINAL LAW I | UP Law D2013 | Sandra M.T. Magalang

3. Not kidnapping for ransom because there was no showing of specific intent to deprive the
victim of her liberty. Rather, the deprivation of liberty is incidental, the intent being to
extort money from the victim under duress (inferred from the act of the accused
announcing that they demand money).
4. There is showing that their only motive or intent in perpetrating the crime is to extort
money from her under the compulsion of threats and intimidation. Hence, simple robbery
under par.5 of Art.294.
iii. Mistake of fact Mistake of fact is a misapprehension of facts on the
part of the person who caused the injury to another. Ignorance or mistake
of fact works against intelligence, hence relieving the accused from
criminal liability (ignorantia facti excusat).
US vs. AH CHONG
March 19, 1910
Facts: Ah Chong was a cook in Fort McKinley. Together with his roommate, Pascual Gualberto,
he resided in Officers Quarter No.27. Ah Chong was afraid of bad elements who often robbed the
area. One evening while asleep, he heard someone trying to forcefully open the door. He called
out twice, Who is there? but no one answered. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he
shouted If you enter I will kill you. But at that precise moment he was struck on the knee by
the chair placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion, he thought he was being
attacked by the intruder and with a kitchen knife struck wildly and fatally wounded the person,
who turned out to be his roommate Pascual.
Issue: WON defendant could be acquitted on basis of self-defense.
Held: All three elements of self-defense are present, hence Ah Chong would indeed be
exempted from criminal liability if the facts were as he thought them to be. However, it is clear
that such was not the case. Court ruled: whenever a man takes self-defense, he is justified in
acting on the facts as they appear to him. lf he defends himself according to what he supposes
the facts to be, the law will not punish him though the facts that the person believes to be true
are otherwise. Ah Chong was acquitted because of mistake of fact.
The element of dolo missing in the case is intelligence. Hence, no dolo and no criminal
liability.
PEOPLE vs. OANIS
July 27, 1943
Facts: Chief of Police Oanis and his co-accused Corporal Galanta were under instructions to
arrest one Balagtas, a notorious criminal and escaped convict, and if overpowered, to get him
dead or alive. Proceeding to the suspected house, they proceeded to the room of Balagtas
paramour where he was said to be staying. Upon seeing a man sleeping with his back towards
the door, they opened fire at him without first making a reasonable inquiry as to his identity. The
victim turned out to be an innocent man, Tecson, and not the wanted criminal.
Issue: WON accused can be acquitted by reason of mistake of fact.
Held: NO. Accused were found guilty of murder because they did not bother to confirm the
identity of the victim especially when they had ample time to do so. Actus reus shows that their
intent is to kill the person, which is not permitted by law even when apprehending the most
notorious criminal. That it happened to be another person does not count as mistake of fact,
because the intent behind mistake of fact should be lawful. Also, it is not merely criminal
negligence because negligence implies lack of deliberate intent, the injury caused to another
being unintentional. In the case at bar, deliberate intent to injure or harm the victim has been
clearly established.
The Oanis case is different from Ah Chong because the latter acted without fault or
carelessness because there is no time or opportunity to make any further inquiry as to the
identity of the deceased. Ah Chong acted without deliberate intent. Oanis, on the other
hand, found no circumstances whatever which would press them to immediate action. In

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fact, the victim being sleeping and unarmed, they could have effected a bloodless arrest
which is what the law requires them to do. Killing the fugitive from justice is only justified
when he is determined to fight the officers of the law who are trying to capture him.
iv. Malum prohibitum exception to the requirement of mens rea
1. Mala in se wrong by itself
Inherently wrong in the moral and legal sense, and accepted
by society as so (i.e. murder, rape, etc.)
Put into RPC because by general consensus, it is wrong. All
felonies in the RPC are mala in se and require all three
elements of dolo to be present.
HOWEVER, crimes mala in se can also be found in special
laws. If the definition of the crime requires malicious intent,
then it is mala in se.
2. Mala prohibita wrong because the state says so.
Prohibited by the State to protect common good, or to secure
a more orderly regulation of society.
Generally, promulgated in special laws and statutes in the
exercise of police power (i.e. Bouncing Checks law, illegal
possession of firearms). HOWEVER, special laws may also
cover crimes mala in se (i.e. Anti-Rape Law)
In crimes mala prohibita, it is not required that the person be
with malicious intent. The only inquiry is, has the law been
violated? Hence, it cannot be defended by good faith or lack
of malicious intent.
o Crimes mala in se are those so serious in their effects on society as to call
for almost unanimous condemnation of its members while mala prohibita
are violations of mere rules of convenience designed to secure a more
orderly regulation of the affairs of the society. In mala in se intent
governs; but in mala prohibita the only inquiry is whether the law has
been violated.
PADILLA vs. DIZON
February 23, 1988
Facts: Padilla filed an administrative complaint against the respondent judge for rendering a
manifestly erroneous decision in the case People vs. Lo Chi Fai. In that case, Lo Chi Fai was
caught at the Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and
foreign exchange instruments out of the country, without any authority as provided by law.
Accused was able to exhibit two spurious currency declarations at the time of his capture. An
information was filed for violation of CB Circular No.960, but Lo Chi Fai was exonerated based on
his defense that the forex instruments he was bringing out of the country were contributions of
his business partners for supposed investments in the Philippines, which did not push through
because of the revolution happening in Manila at that time.
Respondent judge held that the factual issue to determine was whether or not the accused
willfully violated Sec.6 of CB Circular No. 960, for only an intent to do wrong would make him
criminally liable.
Issue: WON malice or deliberate intent is necessary to convict Lo Chi Fai for violation of CB
Circular No.960.
Held: NO. Proof of malice or deliberate intent is not essential in offenses punished by special
laws, which are mala prohibita. The act alone is sufficient to convict the accused for violating a
special law. Hence, the respondent judge showed gross ignorance of the law for holing that the
prosecution must establish that the accused had criminal intent to violate the law, and severely
criticized for believing the fantastic tale of the accused. RTC judged was dismissed from the
service.

7 CRIMINAL LAW I | UP Law D2013 | Sandra M.T. Magalang

MAGNO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

June 26, 1992
Facts: Petitioner Magno wanted to put up a car repair shop but had no capital to purchase
equipment. He approached Corazon Teng, VP of Mancor Industries, a distributor of equipment he
needs. Admitting that he had no funds, Teng referred him to LS Finance. Lease/purchase
agreement was made with specification that Magno had to put up a warranty deposit worth 30%
of equipment to be purchased. Magno, who could not afford it, asked for a 3 rd party lender who
could lend him the amount. Unbeknownst to him, the 3 rd party lender was Teng herself. Magno
issued postdated checks to LS Finance, who gave it to Teng. When check matured, Magno said
he could not cover it and he was not banking with Pacific Bank anymore. In lieu, he issued 6
checks. The first 2 checks were honored, but when the business failed, and Magno could no
longer pay rent to LS Finance, LS pulled out equipment. Magno promised to pay the rest of the
warranty deposit, but the remaining checks were no longer honored because of closed account.
He was convicted of four counts of violating BP 22. CA affirmed this decision because issuing a
bouncing check is a crime mala prohibita (no need for intent).
Issue: Could Magno be convicted upon review of the circumstances brushed aside by the RTC
and CA?
Held: NO. The transaction did not become a purchase when Magno failed to continue paying the
rent and LS Finance pulled out the equipment. Hence, there is no logical reason why Magno
should continue paying the warranty deposit which is for the supposed purchase of the said
equipment. Moreover, he did not hide the fact that he could not pay the warranty deposit, and
the 4 checks were issued to collateralize an accommodation and not to cover the receipt of an
actual account or value as this was absent.
Note: here, Magno was not acquitted because of lack of intent, but because his action did
not constitute the wrong punishable.
Dispositive: Decision reversed. Not guilty.
GARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
March 14, 2006
Facts: In the 1995 senatorial elections, Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. accused Herminio R. Romero,
Renato R. Viray,
Rachel Palisoc, Francisco de Vera and Arsenia B. Gardia of decreasing the number of votes he
received from 6,921 to 1,291. Decreasing the number of votes of a candidate is a violation of
Sec.27(b) of RA 6646. The accused, except for petitioner Garcia, were acquitted. Petitioner
appealed before the CA, which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision, increasing the
minimum penalty imposed from 6 months to 1year. Petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals' judgment is erroneous and that there was no motive on her part to reduce the votes of
private complainant. Respondent contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an
election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.
Issues: 1.) Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act 6646 classified under mala in se or
mala prohibita?
2.) Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
Held: Acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se, i.e. intent is needed, for otherwise even
errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Intentionally
increasing/decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is mala in se because it is
inherently immoral; it is done with malice and intent to injure another. Criminal intent is
presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, and
whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the burden of proving its existence. However,
petitioner could not successfully invoke this defense because her actions are constructive of an
intent to perpetuate an erroneous entry made in the COC because of her erroneous
announcement of votes.

8 CRIMINAL LAW I | UP Law D2013 | Sandra M.T. Magalang

v. Distinguished from motive Motive is the moving power which impels
one to action for a definite result. Motive is not an essential element of a
crime, and hence, need not be proved. An extreme moral perversion may
lead a man to commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake
of committing it. One may be convicted of a crime whether his motive
appears to be good or bad or even though no motive is proven.
b. Culpa (Constructive intent) implies lack of malicious intent, instead of
malicious intent, the person was either negligent or imprudent. (e.g. reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide.)
o Culpa is punishable because a man must use common sense, and exercise
due reflection in all his acts. It is his duty to be cautious, careful and
prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment,
otherwise his own person, rights and property and those of his fellow
beings would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.
o Culpa, to be punishable, requires a resulting harm and a logical causation
between the culpable act and the resulting wrong. If there is no resulting
harm, then imprudence and negligence cannot be punished.
o While it is not possible for a single person to have both dolo and culpa in a
single act, it is possible for a single crime committed by more than one
offender to involve both dolo and culpa. (People vs. Pugay)
i. Elements:
1. Freedom
2. Intelligence
3. Negligence, Imprudence, Lack of foresight, or lack of skill
replaces malice
ii. Imprudence or lack of skill
Person fails to take necessary, minimum, reasonable precaution to
avoid injury to person or damage to property
Reasonability is based on the (persons observation of the) current
situation that one is in.
An imprudent person is precisely aware of the possible wrongful
consequences, but he couldnt care less. hence, not lack of
foresight!
Hence, driving while drunk is considered imprudence.
iii. Negligence or lack of foresight person is unaware of the danger.
Person fails to pay proper attention and to use due diligence in
foreseeing injury or damage that might be caused.
A negligent person lacks the foresight of a reasonable man; i.e. he
is unaware of the danger, when he could have been aware if he
paid proper attention or reasonable diligence.
i.e. A bus driver who knows he will drive for a long trip, but did not
bother to check whether the tires are good or worn out, is unaware
of the danger, but will be negligent if such lack of foresight causes
injury or death.
o Difference between dolo, imprudence, and negligence:
Person with dolo intended to do harm
Imprudent person intended to place others at risk/expose them to
harm
Negligent person unconsciously places people at risk or harm
PEOPLE vs. PUGAY

9 CRIMINAL LAW I | UP Law D2013 | Sandra M.T. Magalang

November 17, 1988
Facts: Accused Pugay and Samson were held liable for the death of one Bayani Miranda. One
evening during fiesta, Pugay and Samson, apparently drunk, were seen by eyewitness Gabion
making fun of Miranda. They were making the victim dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing, Pugay took a can of gasoline from under the ferris wheel
and doused Miranda with it. Samson took a match and lighted the victim, making a human torch
out of him. When Miranda burned, both Pugay and Samson were shocked.
Issue: What are the respective criminal liabilities of Pugay and Samson for the death of
Miranda?
Held: Pugay was liable for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide (culpa). He knew what he
poured on Miranda was gasoline, because gasoline has a stinging smell which could not have
escaped anyones notice. He should have known, as any reasonable person would have known,
that dousing a person with gasoline will expose him to risk or harm, as what happened in this
case. Pugay was punished for exposing the victim to harm, which here resulted to the latters
death.
Samson, on the other hand, was guilty of homicide (dolo). Even granting that his actions
were done in the spirit of fun, Samson, in intending to set Mirandas clothes on fire, had intent to
do harm. That it resulted to a harm greater than what he intended does not exculpate him from
criminal liability for committing a felony with deliberate intent. However, the crime is only
homicide and not murder, it being shown that: 1.) there is no animosity between the accused
and the victim, and 2.) both Pugay and Samson were shocked speechless after they saw the
victim burning.
c. Transferred intent Art.4, Par.1, RPC2
o Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony,
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
o Person should be committing a felony.
Persons committing perfectly legal acts are not liable (e.g. person
committing suicide: A jumps off a building, hits person B in the
sidewalk. B dies as a result. A is not liable.)
Covers only felonies. Does not cover violation of special laws.
o Felony committed should be intentional (dolo).
Does not cover culpa.
o Transferred intent cannot be carried into an unnatural consequence. It can
only go so far as to cover instances wherein the wrong done is the direct,
natural, logical consequence of the felony committed.
It can only be applied in cases where the resulting crime requires a
specific intent that is not so far removed from the intended wrong
committed.
Example: A and B are wrestling each other. In the confusion, the
broomstick A was using was forcefully inserted into Bs orifice. A
could not be held guilty of rape, because the intent to injure is far
removed from the intent to have carnal knowledge against the
person of B.
i. Aberratio ictus mistake in the blow
PEOPLE vs. GUILLEN
January 18, 1950
2

Art.4, Revised Penal Code: Criminal liability Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1.

By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.

10 CRIMINAL LAW I | UP Law D2013 | Sandra M.T. Magalang

Facts: Guillen wanted to assassinate President Roxas. During a pro-parity amendment rally in
Plaza Miranda, he hid one hand grenade in the plant pot located close to the platform where
President Roxas will be speaking. After the Presidents speech, Guillen hurled the other hand
grenade to the Presidents person. An alert general saw the smoking, hissing grenade, kicked it
away from the platform, and covered the President with his own body. The grenade exploded in
the middle of a group of persons standing close to the platform and as a result seriously injured
5 men, with one dying from the wounds caused by fragments of the grenade.
Issue: WON Guillen was guilty of murder for the death of one Simeon Varela, even though that
person was not the one he intended to kill.
Held: YES. In throwing the hand grenade at the President, Guillen acted with malice. He is
therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act, for in accordance with Article 4,
Par.1 of RPC, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
ii. Error in personae mistake in the identity of the victim
PEOPLE vs. SABALONES
August 31, 1998
Facts: Roling Sabalones et al., during the wake of his younger brother who died of violent
causes, heard the news of the death of one Nabing Velez. Afraid that they were being suspected
of his death and hoodlums of the deceased Velez were out to get them, Sabalones et al. riddled
with gunfire two vehicles that arrived in the middle of the night, which resulted to the death of
two persons and wounding of three others. The victims, however, were only there to park the car
of their friend who were with them in a wedding party.
Issue: WON Sabalones et al. were guilty of two counts of murder and three counts of frustrated
murder.
Held: YES. Article 4, Par.1 of RPC, states that criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In
the case at bar, the prosecution having proved treachery, the accused are guilty of murder, even
though the victims be different from those they wanted to kill. Mistake in the identity of the
victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim.
iii. Praeter intentionem felonious act results in a graver harm than
originally intended
PEOPLE vs. ALBURQUERQUE
December 19, 1933
Facts: Accused, a widower with 9 children suffering from partial paralysis, wanted to threaten
one Manuel Osma for impregnating his daughter and refusing to marry her. One day he visited
Osma at work. The two went downstairs. Accused proposed to the deceased to marry his
daughter, and upon hearing that the latter refused to do so, he whipped out his penknife. A
scuffle ensued. Accused wanted to stab the victim on his face (scar him), but due to his lack of
control of the movement of his arm, the weapon landed on the base of the neck of the deceased,
causing his death.
Issue: WON accused is guilty of homicide.
Held: YES. Again, Article 4, Par.1 of RPC, states that criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Although accused did not intend to cause so grave an injury as the death of the deceased, for in
fact it would frustrate his plan of compelling him to marry, or at least support his daughter,
accused has to be held liable for the consequences of his intent to do harm. Also, his theory that
he was acting in legitimate self-defense lacks merit, inasmuch as he provoked and commenced
the aggression by brandishing his penknife.
3. Concurrence between the actus reus and mens rea

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-

Example: A and B were friends, agreed to meet at Bs house. B was late and told
A to just climb the window and wait for him inside. Once inside, A sees an IPad
and takes it for himself. Q: what was the crime committed: robbery or theft?
Answer: Theft. Robbery involves forceful entry. In this case, the difference lies in
the concurrence between the actus reus of taking and the mens rea of intent to
gain. When B entered the house through the window (forceful entry), there is not
yet a concurrence between that actus reus and mens rea to gain. Hence, B is
guilty of only theft.

4. Resulting harm some crimes require a specific injury/result (i.e. murder, arson,
rape, etc.)
- When a crime requires a result, it becomes important to look at the causation.
5. Causation in determining criminal liability for complicated events where the direct
cause of the injury is difficult to point out, we look not only for the actual cause but the
proximate cause of the injury or harm.
- Proximate cause = the act or omission which is the start, or the trigger, of the
natural, continuous, logical sequence of events that ends with the resulting
harm; i.e. the actus reus whose logical consequence results to a series of events,
unbroken by intervening events, that culminates to the harm or injury.
- Actual cause = but for cause; if not for this event, then harm will not happen.
- Governed by the questions of fairness and common sense. In determining
criminal liability by the principle of proximate cause, we ask the fairness behind
holding a person criminally liable, and into common sense, logic, and natural
human experience.
- General rules in determining the proximate cause of an injury/harm:
o There is no active force that intervened between the cause and effect.
Active force is distinct and absolutely foreign from the felonious act.
I.e. A hits B, B falls to the ground, hits his head and died as a result.
passive. A is criminally liable for death of B
I.e. A hits B, B falls to the ground, and is stomped by a rampaging
horse in the head, causing his death. rampaging horse is an
active force distinct and absolutely foreign from A hitting B.
Supervening event is present, hence A no longer criminally liable
for death of B.
Generally, passive circumstances do not constitute an efficient
supervening cause:
Insufficient hospital resources
(Simple) negligence on the part of the hospital staff (case to
case)
Acquired infection
o The resulting injury is not due to the intentional, malicious act of the
victim.
o The physical constitution of the victim does not affect the criminal liability
of the offender.
o When the consequence has reached the point of apparent safety, the
chain of cause and effect is already broken. (The condition of apparent
safety constitutes a supervening event.)
o Omission of others does not exculpate the offender from criminal liability.
That a graver injury results from the omission of others, i.e. an
unrelated third party C refusing to help the victim B, does not
exculpate the offender A from criminal liability.

12 CRIMINAL LAW I | UP Law D2013 | Sandra M.T. Magalang

Contributory negligence will mitigate, but not exculpate, the liability of an
offender.
Example: A and B, without conspiracy, both shoots C at the same time. As shot
causes a tear in the heart and the lung, while Bs shot causes an arm wound,
which nevertheless causes bleeding. C dies of massive hemorrhage. Who is
liable?
o Law does not bother with trifling events. A is liable.
o

Vda. de BATACLAN vs. MEDINA

October 22, 1957
Facts: Salud Bataclan sues defendant Medina, owner of Medina Transportation, for the damages
arising from the death of her husband, Juan Bataclan. Bataclan was a passenger in one of the
buses of Medina Transport that met an accident. After trial, it was established that, prior to
leaving the station, the driver was informed by Medina to change the worn tires. The driver
ignored his instructions. He was speeding along Imus when one of the front tires burst, causing
the bus to zigzag until it fell into a canal and overturned. Bataclan and four other passengers
were trapped inside, asking for help. After some time, some villagers, carrying torches (because
it was dark and there was no electricity yet in that rural area) approached the overturned bus to
help. Immediately, a fierce fire ensued, consuming the bus and the four passengers trapped
inside.
Issues:
1.) Who should be liable for the death of Bataclan et al.?
2.) Assuming the carrier is liable, to what degree?
Held:
1.) There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable, it being
shown that the accident is a breach of contract to bring the passengers safely from one
point to another.
2.) The answer is found by finding the proximate cause of death of Bataclan et al. Proximate
cause is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. SC held that the proximate cause of death of Bataclan was the overturning of
the bus. This being the case, the defendant carrier is liable not only for the injuries
sustained by Bataclan before the bus caught fire and killed him, but for his very death.
Disposition: Defendant held liable, with a recommendation to pursue the criminal case against
the driver (for reckless imprudence). Damages awarded.
C. Liability for incomplete elements
- Although all elements need to be present for criminal liability to incur, there are
situations punished by law even though the resulting harm does not actually
occur. The presence of the first three elements, namely, the concurrence
between an actus reus and a mens rea, is sufficient to warrant punishment by
the law.

Actus
reus
Mens rea
Concurren

Impossible
crime
/
/
/

Preparatory
Stage
[Preparatory
acts]
X
X

Attempted
felony
[Incomplete]

Frustrated
felony
/

Consummated
Felony
/

/
/

/
/

/
/

13 CRIMINAL LAW I | UP Law D2013 | Sandra M.T. Magalang

ce
Result

1. Impossible crime (Art.4, par.2)3

- Art.4, paragraph 2, states that persons who commit an impossible crime also
incur criminal liability. An impossible crime must be:
o A crime which would have been an offense against persons or property
(Title VIII and X)
o Performed with evil intent
o Nevertheless, cannot (as opposed to did not frustrated crime) produce
the intended effect because:
It is inherently impossible
Physical impossibility
Legal impossibility
The means employed were ineffective or inadequate
- Intod et al.s actions were constitutive of impossible crime because:
o It would have been a crime against persons (i.e. murder)
o There was intent to kill
o Nevertheless, it was physically impossible to kill the target
- First three elements are present and complete, but there is no result because:
a.) it was inherently impossible to produce one, or b.) on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means
o Physical impossibility i.e. killing a dead person
o Legal impossibility i.e. stealing but finding out that the item stolen was
actually yours
- To be liable for impossible crime, the person should not be guilty of another
crime punished in the RPC.
o Reason: punishment for impossible crime is very light, because no crime
actually results. However, a preventive penalty is imposed on account of
the criminality or criminal tendency exhibited.
- Critique: I believe that factual impossibility, as that used in Intod, should not be a
defense that the crime is impossible of accomplishment. Intod could be an
attempted felony, not an impossible crime. But the ruling of the court may also
be in recognition that an attempted felony would be factually different from
those circumstances obtaining in Intod (e.g. Situation A Intod fires upon the
house, but unknown to him target wasnt there impossible crime. Situation B
Intod fires upon the house; target was there, but he missed attempted felony)
INTOD vs. COURT OF APPEALS
October 21, 1992
Facts: Intod et al., with intent to kill, fired upon the house (specifically, the bedroom) of one
Bernardina Palangpangan, thinking she was there. However, at that moment Bernardina was in
another city, and the occupants of the house were only her son-in-law and his family. No one was
hit by the gunfire. Before they left the premises, they shouted that they will come back to kill
Bernardina if she was not injured.
Held: Intod et al. would have been guilty of homicide had Bernardina actually been there and
died as a result of the gunfire. (The actus reus and mens rea for the crime of homicide concurs,
and the only missing element is the result.) Bernardinas being in another city constituted the
3

Art.4, Revised Penal Code: Criminal liability Criminal liability shall be incurred:
2.

By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means.

14 CRIMINAL LAW I | UP Law D2013 | Sandra M.T. Magalang

physical impossibility of Intod et al.s felonious act achieving its result. The offense cannot be
produced because the commission of the offense, i.e. killing Bernardina, is inherently impossible.
Intod et al. guilty of impossible crime. No harm having resulted, but taking in mind the criminality
exhibited, they were sentenced to six months of arresto mayor.
Sir Jimenez believes this should only be attempted homicide. There is not much difference
between missing a victim by an inch and by a mile, because the same result obtains.
However, using time and distance as a standard for impossibility is difficult to apply. IN
this case, it can be argued that it was actually an attempted felony, since Intod et al.
commenced in executing the killing, but were not able to execute all acts necessary for
the commission of the crime, i.e. they were not able to inflict a mortal wound on
Bernardina (missing actus reus, hence incomplete execution, hence attempted stage
only).
In other words, Bernardinas not being in the house at that time is not a factor that would
have made the crime inherently impossible of accomplishment. Had she been in there,
then the crime would be possible.
Impossible crime vs. attempted felony:
o Impossible crime all actus reus is present; what is missing is result because of
physical or legal impossibility
o Attempted incomplete actus reus, so no result obtains.
PEOPLE vs. SALADINO
May 30, 1951
Facts: Felix Pasion reported to Corporal Saladino and Private Alejo that he had been robbed, and
one of the robbers was Luis Bernabe. The next morning, Saladino, Alejo and others went to the
house of Bernabe. Upon finding him, they brought him to the house of Pasion for questioning.
Bernabe denied the allegations, whereupon Saladino commenced torturing him (kicking, boxing,
whipping the victim) in order to extract a confession. At some point, Bernabe lay motionless on
the floor. When an old man checked the pulse of Bernabe, he pronounced him dead. Realizing
the situation, Saladino ordered Alejo to shoot him now and we will say that he ran away.
Complying with the corporals orders, Alejo shot Bernabe four times.
Issue: Was Alejos act of shooting Bernabe constitutive of an impossible crime?
Held: Yes. Bernabe was already dead when Alejo shot him, and so he cannot cause any further
injury to Bernabe. The act of shooting Bernabe manifested no harmful result, hence it is
considered an impossible crime. However, Alejo is guilty as an accessory to the crime by
performing acts that would conceal Saladinos crime by making it appear that Bernabe had ran
away.
It is not impossible crime because Alejo knew that Bernabe is already dead, and he could
not cause any further injury. The requisite of criminal intent (i.e. causing injury) may not
be present.
Knowledge, or lack thereof, that a person is dead is material in determining liability for
impossible crime.
2. Uncompleted crimes Art.6, RPC4
a. Attempted and frustrated felonies, in general
4

Art. 6: Consummated, frustrated, attempted felonies. Consummated felonies, as well as those which are frustrated
and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present;
and it is frustrated when all the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does
not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance.

15 CRIMINAL LAW I | UP Law D2013 | Sandra M.T. Magalang

US vs. EDUAVE
February 6, 1917
Refresher: Crime was frustrated murder. There was intent to kill, qualified by treachery. Eduave
stated his intention to kill the girl who accused him of raping her, attacked her treacherously,
thought he had killed and threw the body into the bushes. He gave himself up and declared that
he had killed the complainant.
Doctrine: Distinguished an attempted from a frustrated felony.
Attempted the offender, after beginning the commission of the crime by overt acts, is
prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from performing all the acts which should
produce the crime. The subjective phase has not yet been passed.
Frustrated - a crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which should result in the consummation of the crime, but the crime is not
consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
The offender has passed the subjective phase in the commission of the crime. Subjectively, the
crime is complete. He did all that was necessary to commit the crime; however, the crime did not
result due to causes that were beyond his control.
Subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between
the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender
which, with prior acts, should result in the consummated crime, has not yet been passed.
Thereafter, the phase is objective.
BALEROS vs. PEOPLE
February 22, 2006
Refresher: Overt acts. Unclear mens rea, cannot engage in speculation. Convict offender of a
crime where the mens rea concurs with the proven actus reus.
Facts: Chito was accused of attempted rape. Malou was awakened by Chito pinning her down
and pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in her face to induce her to sleep. However, Malou
succeeded in extricating herself, grabbed hold of his sex organ which she then squeezed. Chito
let her go and fled. They were both still fully clothed.
Held: Chito acquitted of attempted rape. His mens rea (whether he intended to have sexual
intercourse with Malou or not) being unclear at that point, the Court cannot engage in
speculation by saying that the logical consequence of his actions would be rape.
An attempt is defined as the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, which was
nevertheless stopped by reason of some cause other than the offenders voluntary desistance.
Overt act is defined as some physical activity or deed indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete
termination following its natural course, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense. Chitos act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou does not constitute
an overt act of rape. However, inasmuch as said action (already) concurs with the intent to
coerce, Chito held guilty of light coercion.
b. Examples of specific felonies
i. Illegal Trespass
PEOPLE vs. LAMAHANG
August 3, 1935
Refresher: Lamahang was caught making an opening on the wall of a store. At that time, the
owner and another person was sleeping inside. He was convicted of attempted robbery in the
lower court. SC, saying that Lamahangs action is not yet an overt act of robbery (inasmuch as
what he wants to do once inside the store is not yet certain), reversed and held him guilty of
attempted illegal trespass.
Held: Actus reus of Lamahang (i.e. making an opening on the wall) concurs with the mens rea of
illegal entry. However, Lamahang having been caught before actually entering, he was not able

16 CRIMINAL LAW I | UP Law D2013 | Sandra M.T. Magalang

to perform all the acts which would produce the crime of illegal trespass. Hence, his crime is
attempted illegal trespass.
ii. Physical injuries, Homicide, Murder
Required mens rea: intent to kill
Required actus reus: inflicting a mortal wound
Qualifying circumstance: if attended by qualifying circumstances
found in Art.248, crime becomes murder.
Per Epifanio vs. People: physical injuries, attempted, frustrated homicide/murder
differentiated from each other:
In homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the
wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim barring medical
intervention or attendance. If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the
crime committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to
kill the victim; or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if
the offender intends to kill the victim.
[It is an attempted homicide/murder if the offender is unable to perform all acts of
execution necessary, i.e. was not able to inflict a mortal wound, by reason of causes other than
his own voluntary desistance. It is frustrated if a mortal wound has been inflicted but the victim
nevertheless does not die by reason of causes independent of the will of the offender].
Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of
weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on
the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at
the time the injuries were inflicted by him on the victim.
PEOPLE vs. BORINAGA
December 18, 1930
Refresher: Borinaga intended to kill Mooney treacherously. He tried to stab the back of the
victim, but instead hit the frame of the chair where the victim was sitting. He came back again
to try to kill Mooney, but this time was surprised by Mooney who readied a flashlight. Court held
Borinaga guilty of frustrated murder, but it should be attempted murder because Borinaga was
never able to inflict a mortal wound.
PEOPLE vs. KALALO
March 17, 1934
Refresher: Homicide and attempted homicide resulting from a land dispute. Marcelo Kalalo
killed Arcadio Holgado, and since neither treachery nor evident premeditation was established, it
was homicide. He fired four shots at the person of Hilarion Holgado, who was fleeing from the
scene, but missed. Court held him also liable for attempted homicide.
PEOPLE vs. TRINIDAD
January 9, 1989
Refresher: Trinidad shot and killed the two passengers of a fish van. Tan, the driver, fearing for
his own life, jumped from the van. Trinidad ran after him, tried to kill him, but was never
successful in inflicting a mortal wound. He was guilty of two counts of murder and one count of
attempted murder.
MARTINEZ vs. CA
April 13, 2007
Refresher: Frustrated murder arising from offender and victim allegedly having the same
mistress. Martinez attacked Dongui-is with a bolo as the latter exited the bank, continuing to
chase the victim as the latter ran to take cover behind the bank counter. Due to timely medical
intervention, Dongui-is did not die.

17 CRIMINAL LAW I | UP Law D2013 | Sandra M.T. Magalang

Note: Illustrative case of justifying circumstance, since Martinez raised self-defense. However,
he failed to prove his claim.
MONDRAGON vs. PEOPLE
June 30, 1966
Refresher: Mondragon was found guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide in the lower court
for striking complainant on different parts of the body with his bolo as a result of the dispute over
a water dam. However, it was established in Court that he did not intend to kill the victim, as in
fact Mondragon retreated after complainant drew his own bolo and hacked the former on the
head and forearm by way of defense. The injuries sustained by the complainant were not fatal.
Court held Mondragon guilty of less serious physical injuries.
PEOPLE vs. SY PIO
April 30, 1954
Refresher: Sy Pio, who has a grudge against his victims, entered the store where they were
working one morning and without warning shot Jose Sy. Jose Sy died. Tan Siong Kiap asked Sy,
what is the idea? and thereupon defendant shot him also. Kiap was able to run to a room
behind the store to hide. He heard gunshots fired, but afterwards Sy Pio ran away. In this case,
Sy Pio was pronounced guilty of attempted murder, and not frustrated murder as previously
held, because he did not perform all the acts of execution in order that the purpose and intention
that he had to kill his victim might be carried out, knowing full well that Tan Siong Kiap was still
alive.
EPIFANIO vs. PEOPLE
June 26, 2007
Refresher: Appeal on the charge of frustrated murder, Court held it was only attempted
murder.
Appellant was accused of frustrated murder for surprising and stabbing one Crisaldo while
walking on his way home. Crisaldo sustained a wound on his back and a fracture on his rib, but
his wounds were immediately wrapped with a blanket and he was taken to the hospital. Epifanio
was found guilty of frustrated murder, and goes on appeal on the theory that Crisaldos wounds
were never proven to be fatal, hence he should be guilty of only attempted murder.
Held: Petitioner is guilty only of attempted murder. Intent to kill and treachery having been
proven, the crime is murder, but the execution of the crime was interrupted by Allan rushing to
help Crisaldo, causing petitioner to scamper away. Thus, the subjective phase of the crime had
not been completed. Also, material in the determination that the crime was only attempted is the
failure of the prosecution to establish that the wound sustained by Crisaldo was fatal, the
infliction of a mortal wound being the last act necessary for the execution of the crime.
Ascertaining the degree of injury sustained by a victim is important, for it is well-settled
that where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not
medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted,
not frustrated, murder.
However, remember that it is not the gravity of the wounds alone which determines
whether a felony is attempted or frustrated, but whether the assailant had passed the subjective
phase in the commission of the offense.
iii. Theft
Required mens rea: intent to gain
Required actus reus: taking

The question posed by Sir Jimenez is, what are the elements of
taking?
o Material possession person already has control over the
article

18 CRIMINAL LAW I | UP Law D2013 | Sandra M.T. Magalang

Per US vs. Adiao, ability to freely dispose is not an
element of theft and hence immaterial in
determining criminal liability
Per People vs. Dino, it is material
Physical possession only requirement of taking, per
Valenzuela vs. People

Qualifying circumstance: property belongs to another person;

taking is without permission

US vs. ADIAO
October 8, 1918
Refresher: Adiao, a customs inspector, filched a belt from a Japanese national and secreted the
belt in his desk, where it was found by other customs employees. Court, opining that material
possession is not required by the definition of theft, and hence immaterial in determining
criminal liability, held Adiao guilty of theft, and not just frustrated theft.
PEOPLE VS. DINO
February 18, 1948
Refresher: Dino, a truck driver, was driving his way to the check point of South Harbor, when he
was caught by an MP who discovered four boxes of carbine hidden in his truck. Because at that
stage, he had no ability to freely dispose of the articles stolen (i.e. no material possession), Dino
was pronounced guilty only of frustrated theft.
Sir Jimenez: Since no material possession yet, which should be part of actus reus,
incomplete actus reus. Should have been attempted theft.
PEOPLE VS. ESPIRITU
Refresher: In the Supply Depot at Quezon City, Espiritu removed from the pile nine pieces of
hospital linen and took them to their truck where they were found by a corporal of the MP guards
when they tried to pass through the checkpoint. They were pronounced guilty of consummated
theft.
On its face, appears to conflict with Dino.
But if we follow Sir Jimenez framework that material possession is an element of actus
reus, Espiritu already has material possession. Hence, it is consummated theft.
VALENZUELA VS. PEOPLE*
June 21, 2007
Refresher: Valenzuela and Calderon were caught by security guard Lago of SM North in the act
of stealing Tide products. Valenzuela was pushing cart containing Tide products and unloaded
these at the parking area where Calderon was waiting. They hailed a taxi, loaded the products,
but the taxi was stopped by Lago who demanded receipt of the merchandise. The two reacted
by fleeing on foot, but Valenzuela was apprehended.
Issue: Whether the crime is theft or just frustrated theft.
Held: No such crime as frustrated theft in our jurisdiction. The actus reus required by theft is
unlawful taking, and hence when the last act of execution necessary is accomplished (i.e. the
article was taken), the crime necessarily results. Put in another way, theft is already produced
upon the taking of personal property of another without the latters consent.
Taking, when present, already constitutes consummated theft. However, what Sir Jimenez
disagrees with is the holding that only physical possession constitutes taking. In his
opinion, material possession should be considered an element of the actus reus of taking.
Material possession is not a result, as contemplated by Villanueva. Why? Because it would
be too simplistic to hold purely physical possession as the only measure to determine
when theft has already taken place.
Under Sir Jimenezs framework, when you complete all the actus reus (physical possession
characterized by an ability to freely dispose of the article stolen), the theft is already

19 CRIMINAL LAW I | UP Law D2013 | Sandra M.T. Magalang

consummated. So, Dino would be an attempted theft, while Espiritu would be
consummated theft.
iv. Robbery
There are specific crimes such as frustrated robbery with homicide,
attempted robbery with homicide, that is unique in robbery and not
found in theft. Robbery involves entirely different rules in
determining attempted and frustrated stages of execution
PEOPLE vs. DIO
June 29, 1984
Facts: Dio and Tobias attempted to rob Crispulo Alega of his Seiko watch. Crispulo resisted their
attempt and fought the robbers. At this junction, Tobias stabbed him on the neck. Crispulo ran
after the robbers, fell down and expired with the Seiko watch still strapped to his wrist.
Held: Dio and Tobias guilty of special complex crime of attempted robbery with homicide.
v. Rape
Mens rea: to have sexual intercourse
(Last) actus reus: sexual intercourse (full penetration not required)
Qualifying circumstance: Without consent; under 12 years old or
demented
BALEROS vs. PEOPLE to be held liable for attempted rape, the offenders actus reus must
clearly show that the mens rea is to penetrate/have sexual intercourse with the victim.
PEOPLE vs. ORITA no such thing as frustrated rape.
c. Light felonies punishable only when consummated Art.7, RPC 5
- General rule: Light felonies are punishable only when consummated
- Exception: Except when light felony is a crime against person or property
punishable even when attempted or frustrated only
d. Proposals and conspiracies Art.8, RPC
D. Liability for multiple, complex and continuing crimes
PEOPLE vs. SANCHEZ
PEOPLE vs. HERNANDEZ
ENRILE vs. SALAZAR
PEOPLE vs. VALDEZ
E. Liability under special laws

Article 7, RPC. When light felonies are punishable. Light felonies are punishable only when they have been
consummated, with the exception of those committed against persons or property.
Article 9, par.3 (RPC): Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, or both, is provided.