Flowback Audit

Sample Oil Company

Boots & Coots
Well Number: Weldon Cox Gas Unit 2H

Date: Thursday, January 14, 2010

7908 N. Sam Houston Pkwy. W. 5th Floor

Houston, Texas 77064
United States of America
TEL No. 281-931-8884
FAX No. 281-931-8302
Website www.bootsandcoots.com

Audit Report
Audit Name:
Audit Type:
Audit Date:

Sample Oil Company, Flowback Audit, Well Number: Weldon Cox

Gas Unit 2H
Flowback Audit
2010/01/14

Completed By:
Comments:

Client:
Company Man:
Flowback Supervisor:
Flowback Contractor:
Country:
Field:
Well Number:
Activity at Time of Audit:
Chock Manifold Size:
Pressure Rating:
Number of Manual Chokes:
Number of Hyd. Chokes:
Hyd. Closing Unit Type:
No. of Bottles:
Wellhead Size:
Press. Rate-Lower Conn.:
Plug Catcher:
Sand Trap:
Power Source:
Frac Tree Config./Specifications:

imported audit

Sample Oil Company

Nelson James
Michael Griffin
B&C
Limestone County Texas, U.S.A.
Bear Grass
Weldon Cox Gas Unit 2H
RIH E-line
2 1/16"
15M
2 positive test manifold
2 (T3) hydraulic choke manifold
Koomey. Electric motor only, no secondary air pump
4 X10 gal.ea.=20 usable gals.
7 1/16"
15M
7 1/16" 15M. 4" Screen. 2" By-Pass.
13 5/8" I.D. 15M
Rental generator and air compressor
7 1/16" 15M (Wood Group) manual lower master, flowcross with
dual gate ea. side & outside remote.7 1/16" 15M Swab Valve. No lower
masterr valve.

Auditors:

Freeman, Mike

Executive Summary
Customer:
Location:

Sample Oil Company

Flowback Audit, Well Number Weldon Cox Gas Unit 2H

Audit Name:

Flowback Audit V1.1

Audit Date:

2010/01/14

Executive Summary:
Audit Comments:

Identification of risks associated with any business, and the management of those risks, are important aspects of
business management in todays competitive world. It is even more relevant when we talk about the oil and gas
exploration and production field. Our Flowback Audit services help in addressing identified risks and it is
used as a risk analysis tool to proactively prevent loss of well control. It helps to visualize and measure the present
condition of the Flowback components by mitigating damages and taking corrective actions to have the Flowback
equipments readily available in proper conditions when trying to handle an event. Boots & Coots Flowback Audit
can help reduce the likelihood and consequences of an incidents and ensure the integrity of your facilities,
improve productivity and protect your assets, your employees and the public. Our Flowback Audit has allowed
many operators around the world to save time and money by reducing the frequency of critical well events.
Boots & Coots Risk Management Services personnel evaluated the Weldon Cox Gas Unit 2H in Limestone County
Texas. The scope of the evaluation was to assess the Flowback Package components and determined if they are
correctly configured according to the needs of the well being serviced. A post audit meeting was conducted with the
Company Representative Nelson James and Service Supervisor Michael Griffin and Operations Manager Glen Hendrix
to review findings and recommendations. There were nine Critical non-compliant findings which are listed immediately
below.
Overall, the majority of the working components were all in good shape and in working order. The general working
environment was positive although as you will find in our findings and recommendations there are some areas for
improvement. Observations were listed as Non Compliant Items. The Recommendations Section offers our solutions
to the Non Compliant Items.
Critical Items that are in Non Compliance identified in this report have the potential to lead to a catastrophic event
such as a Blowout with injury to personnel, environmental destruction, and equipment damage. Detailed observations
and recommendations for the rig are listed below.

The findings in this report are defined and weighted as follows for Non Compliance items:

Critical Findings
Critical findings are based on shortcomings found during an audit which have the potential to lead to loss of well
control in the event of a kick. The critical points found in the audit have a weight of 15 points per question.

Major Findings
Major findings are based on shortcomings which may lead to damage to essential equipment or have a detrimental
effect on well control operations as a result of inadequate use and/or failure of equipment. The major points found in
the audit have a weight of 10 points and have the potential for the escalation of well control problems

Minor Findings
Minor findings are based on shortcomings which may lead to situations that contribute to an incident or to
circumstances in which the required standards of operation are not met. These have a weight of 5 points.

Critical Non Compliant Findings

Is the flow equipment (flow iron, adaptors, flanges, etc.) inspected/tested and documented on location?
During flow back is the wellhead configured using a plug valve downstream of the outside casing valve?
Is the lower master gate valve designated as closed in as a last resort and used only to allow
downstream repairs? NOTE: The lower master should remain open after testing.
If H2S is expected is all equipment H2S compatible and is equipment and personnel H2S certified with
certification and documents available in the command center?
Are specific procedures / work instructions / forms reviewed and discussed with employees during
meetings, training sessions or drills?

Major Non Compliant Findings

Is the crew current on HSE training?
Is an equalize loop or auxiliary pump used to equalize the pressure before opening a valve with
differential pressure?
Are Emergency Phone Numbers posted?
Are JSAs being utilized on a daily basis by the crews?
Are drills performed weekly of various scenarios (uncontrolled release of pressure from rupture, pipe
in hole, injury to personnel and medi-vac, use of fire extinguisher, etc) timed, evaluated, post drill
meeting held and event recorded to daily report and training drill form?

Minor Non Compliant Findings

Is the S.T.O.P. program being used successfully?

Pre-Operations
Equipment Operations
Procedures, Policies and HSE
Overall Rig Rating
Rig Rating Score
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor

Total Possible Score

210
700
895
1805

Total Score
135
635
490
1260

Rating
64.29%
90.71%
54.75%
69.8%

90-100
80-89
70-79
0-69

900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

Total Possible Score

Total Score

Pre-Operations

Equipment
Operations

Procedures, Policies
and HSE

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%

Pecentage Passed

40%

Total Possible Rating

30%
20%
10%
0%
Pre-Operations

Equipment Operations Procedures, Policies

and HSE

Detailed Non Compliance Findings

Actual
Score

1-3-7

Is the flow equipment (flow iron, adaptors, flanges, etc.) inspected/tested and
documented on location?

Possible
Score

0.00 / 15.00

REF:
API Spec 7L Procedures to Mfg., Inspect, Repair, and Remanufacture Drilling Equipment.
Criteria:
"The procedure for testing the BOP stack, drill string safety valves, choke kill lines, and
manifold upstream of the buffer chamber are usually similar for most rigs. The mfg.
operating and maintenance documents, contractor maintenance programs, and operating
experiences should be incorporated into the specific tests procedures."
"Documented instructions and procedures for any system assembly, testing, and
commissioning that is required to be performed at the installation site shall be available
prior to commencing installation."

Consequence:
Injury to personnel. Faulty equipment leads to inability to control well in critical situation.

Recommendation:
Recommend archiving testing documentation for reference.
2-1-2

During flow back is the wellhead configured using a plug valve downstream of the
outside casing valve?
REF:
Best Industry Practice.
Criteria:
The use of a plug valve eliminates wear on production valves.
Consequence:
Loss of well control. Damage to the equipment.

Recommendation:
Recommend installing a 1 plug valve outboard side of B section casing valve to be used
to equalize above closed hydraulic upper master valve (see below) when a pump is
unavailable.

0.00 / 15.00

2-1-11

Is the lower master gate valve designated as closed in as a last resort and used
only to allow downstream repairs? NOTE: The lower master should remain open
after testing.
REF:
API RP 5C7. 7.6.1.(e).Equipment Rig-Up Considerations. Onshore and Offshore
Operations.
Criteria:
The operator should be aware of and have authorized all wellhead operations.
Consequence:
Damage the equipment . Loss of well control.

Recommendation:
Recommend installing a 7 1/16 HCR Gate Valve above the lower master valve. This
allows your last resort to remain open after initial testing and only closing the lower
master valve to make downstream repairs.

0.00 / 15.00

2-2-10

If H2S is expected is all equipment H2S compatible and is equipment and

personnel H2S certified with certification and documents available in the command
center?

0.00 / 15.00

REF:
API RP 5CR. 6.9.1. Applicability. 7.3.7 Documentation and Safety Guidelines
Criteria:
Well control equipment should comply with API Recommended Practice 53, Section 9,
when the equipment may be exposed to fluids from hydrogen sulfide gas zones that could
potentially result in the partial pressure of hydrogen-sulfide exceeding 0.05 pounds per
square inch absolute in the gas phase at the maximum anticipated pressure. Check this for
ppm: Documentation and safety guidelines include the following: a. Operator-supplied
procedures and guidelines. b. Contractor-supplied procedures and guidelines. c. Health,
safety, and environment contingency plans. d. Pre-job and safety meeting.
Consequence:
Death or injury to personnel and or equipment due to lack of proper procedures and
requirements when working in an H2S environment.

Recommendation:
Recommend filing or posting, as applicable, documentation of equipment tests and
certification, H2S certification of personnel and equipment, meetings held, JSAs, drills
performed, emergency response plans, S.T.O.P. cards and footprint of location showing
muster points and location of bleed-off points of equipment and position of fire
extinguishers.
3-3-5

Are specific procedures / work instructions / forms reviewed and discussed with
employees during meetings, training sessions or drills?
REF:
Internal HSE Program
Criteria:
Employees should have a written description of their job obligations and a schedule of
training and milestones to be reached for promotion to next higher level of expertise.
Consequence:
Time delays, confusion to work, injury to personnel and incorrect operation of
equipment.

Recommendation:
Recommend JSA and S.T.O.P. program, pre-tour meetings and hand-over meetings
held and documented. A wide variety of crew drills of different scenarios performed and
documented.

0.00 / 15.00

1-3-1

Is the crew current on HSE training?

0.00 / 10.00

REF:
API RP 54 6.1.6, 7. API RP 55. 5.2,3,4
Criteria:
(6.1.6) "Personnel should receive instruction in correct work methods to reduce chance
of injury to themselves or fellow personnel." (7) "A safety program should be
established and maintained."
The value
of training and periodic drills in an oil and gas producing and gas processing plant
operations cannot be over emphasized. The uniqueness or complexity of a specific
facility or operation will determine the extent of the training deemed necessary for the
assigned personnel.
Those personnel
assigned supervising responsibilities at the site shall have additional training in the
following elements: (a)Supervisor responsibilities of the contingency plan. (b)Effects of
hydrogen sulfide on components of the hydrogen sulfide handling system.
A formal recurring training program shall be implemented to maintain proficiency in the
elements listed in the above as appropriate.
Consequence:
Inability to properly perform safely job duties due lack of up to date training,
certification.

Recommendation:
It is recommended that the service company HSE representative install the company
HSE program ASAP.
2-1-13

Is an equalize loop or auxiliary pump used to equalize the pressure before opening
a valve with differential pressure?
REF:
API 5C7. 6.8.9. Equalizing Valve(s)

Criteria:
The well bore pressure must be equalized before attempting to open wellbore
isolation valve(s). The equalizing system shall remain closed at all times and opened
only to equalize the differential pressure in order to open the valve(s) during
operations.
Consequence:
Damage to equipment. Loss of well control.

Recommendation:
Recommend installing a 1 plug valve outboard side of B section casing valve to be
used to equalize above closed hydraulic upper master valve when a pump is unavailable.

0.00 / 10.00

3-6-5

Are Emergency Phone Numbers posted?

0.00 / 10.00

REF:
API RP 74 12.2.1

Criteria:
Telephone numbers, location, and other relevant information pertaining to availability
of medical personnel, transportation, and medical facilities shall be available.
Consequence:
Danger to all personnel if not complied with standard.
Recommendation:
Recommend implementing emergency response plan from company HSE program.
3-8-1

Are JSAs being utilized on a daily basis by the crews?

REF:
Safety and Health Guidelines (2) Worksite Analysis (C)
Criteria:
Perform routine job hazard analysis.
Consequence:
Unknown work procedures for employees. Unsafe acts. Unknown risks. Failure to use
JSA will create a danger to employees.

Recommendation:
Recommend implementing company JSA program from company HSE program.

0.00 / 10.00

3-15-1

Are drills performed weekly of various scenarios (uncontrolled release of pressure

from rupture, pipe in hole, injury to personnel and medi-vac, use of fire
extinguisher, etc) timed, evaluated, post drill meeting held and event recorded to
daily report and training drill form?

0.00 / 10.00

REF:
API RP 54. 6.1.3,6.4.6,7.2.8. American Petroleum Institute 59 Recommended Practice
for Well Control Operation, Sec 11.3 MMS 250.408 (a) (3) (4)

Criteria:
Personnel should be trained in basic well control, as needed, in relation to their job
duties. BOP drills should be conducted under a variety of conditions.
Crew members shall be familiarized with the location of fire control equipment (such as
drilling fluid guns, water hoses, and fire extinguishers) and selected personnel trained in
the use of such equipment.
(3) The drill shall be carried out during periods of activity selected to minimize the risk of
endangering the operation. In each of these drills, the reaction time of participants shall
be measured up to the point when the designated person is prepared to activate the
closing sequence of the well control system. The total time for the crew to complete its
entire drill assignment shall also be measured. This operation shall be recorded on the
driller's report as "Well-Control Drill". This operation shall be performed at least once
each week (well conditions permitting) with each crew. The drills shall be timed so they
will cover a range of different operations which include on-bottom drilling and tripping.
Consequence:
Confusion to procedures leading to catastrophic event.

Recommendation:
Recommend implementing training program per company policy, performing drills and
documenting results after review with crew.
3-14-2

Is the S.T.O.P. program being used successfully?

REF:
Best Industry Practices
Criteria:
The program shall be reviewed during a Management Rig Visit with an Evaluation
Checklist.
Consequence:
Not utilizing safety tool leads to greater potential for accidents. Risk. Hazards.

Recommendation:
Recommend implementing S.T.O.P. program per company policy.

0.00 / 5.00