United States v. Aguayo-Gonzalez, 10th Cir. (2007)

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
January 3, 2007
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 05-2349
H ECTO R M A N U EL A G U A YOGO NZA LEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR T HE D ISTRICT OF NEW M EXICO
(D.C. NO . CR-02-2080)
Howard A. Pincus, Assistant Federal Public Defender, (Raymond P. M oore,

Federal Public Defender, with him on the briefs) Denver, Colorado, for the
Defendant-Appellant.
Terri J. Abernathy, Assistant United States Attorney, (David C. Iglesias, United
States Attorney, with her on the brief) Las Cruces, New M exico, for the PlaintiffAppellee.
Before HA RTZ, ANDERSO N, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judge.
Hector M anuel Aguayo-Gonzalez was charged in the District of New

M exico with illegal reentry after conviction of an aggravated felony, in violation
of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2), and with making a false citizenship claim, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 911, both of which are felonies. He was also charged
with assaulting, resisting, or impeding a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. 111.
M r. Aguayo-Gonzalez went to trial on all three counts. At trial, the
defendant and his law yer conceded most of the facts necessary to prove the two
felony counts. During her opening statement, the defendants attorney said that
M r. Aguayo-Gonzalez was not going to necessarily fight [the] allegations that
he had been deported, and will not fight [the] evidence that he made a false
declaration of citizenship. R. Vol. IV, at 12. The defendant himself, on direct
examination, testified that he was a M exican national, had previously been
deported from the United States, and knew that he did not have legal permission
to enter the country. He also testified that he had misrepresented his status to
border officials by claiming that he was a U.S. citizen.
The third count in M r. Aguayo-Gonzalezs indictment can be either a
misdemeanor or a felony, depending on the seriousness of the conduct. 18 U.S.C.
111. Section (a) of the provision, which is a misdemeanor, imposes up to one
year of imprisonment on anyone who forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes,
intimidates, or interferes with an officer performing his official duties. Id.
Section (b) raises the crime to a felony, punishable by up to 20 years
imprisonment, if the defendant uses a deadly or dangerous w eapon or inflicts
bodily injury. Although the indictment did not specify whether M r. Aguayo-2-
Gonzalez was being charged under section (a) or (b), both parties and the judge,
at trial, in the jury instructions, and at sentencing, treated the charge as a
misdemeanor. Both parties assume the charge to be a misdemeanor for purposes
of this appeal.
The jury convicted M r. Aguayo-Gonzalez on all counts. The presentence
report grouped the two felonies together at offense level 24, and the misdemeanor
was assigned an offense level of 9. 1
W hen a defendant faces sentencing for
charges of greatly disparate severity, the lesser charges are ignored when
determining the Guidelines range: D isregard any Group that is 9 or more levels
less serious than the Group with the highest offense level. Such Groups will not
increase the applicable offense level but may provide a reason for sentencing at
the higher end of the sentencing range for the applicable offense level. U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines M anual 3D1.4(c) (2003). The defendants misdemeanor
was fifteen levels lower than his felonies, so the court based its Guidelines
calculations entirely on the first tw o charges.
Because M r. Aguayo Gonzalez had contested the misdemeanor charge, the
judge denied him a reduction under the Guidelines for acceptance of
responsibility, stating that although the defendant did not contest that he was in
The sentencing at issue in this case was M r. Aguayo-Gonzalezs second

for these charges. The first sentence was overturned due to an error in the
calculation of the Guidelines. United States v. Aguayo-Gonzalez, 139 Fed. App
937 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion).
-3-
the United States illegally[, h]e did contest and aggressively took issue with the
governments contention that he assaulted, resisted, or impeded a federal officer.
Aplt. App., Doc. 2, at 10. As applied, the Sentencing Guidelines range was 63-78
months; with two points off for acceptance of responsibility, it would have been
51-63 months. The sentencing court also considered M r. Aguayo-Gonzalezs
sixteen prior convictions that did not result in criminal history points, as well as
his apparent substance abuse problems. Aplt. App., Doc. 2, at 12. The court
imposed a sentence of sixty-six months. 2
II.
On appeal, M r. Aguayo-Gonzalez challenges his sentence as unreasonably
disparate from the sentences of defendants similarly situated. In the wake of
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a district court still must calculate
the G uidelines and apply applicable upward adjustments and downward
departures. Subsequently, the court may use its discretion to impose a sentence
either within the Guidelines range or outside of it, relying on the sentencing
The court also imposed a $100 special assessment for each of the three
counts. This appeal initially included a claim that the $100 fee for the
misdemeanor conviction was improper because the relevant statute authorizes
only a $25 fee for Class A misdemeanors. 18 U.S.C. 3013(a)(1)(A)(iii). After
acknowledging the error in its briefs and at oral argument, the government moved
in district court to remit the $100 fee to the defendant. The district court granted
that motion, rendering the issue moot on appeal. D. N.M ., Case 02-cr-02080,
Docket, Doc. 82, 83.
-4-
factors set out in 18 U .S.C . 3553(a). In evaluating the resulting sentence, we

first determine whether the court calculated the correct Guidelines range; if so,
we examine the sentence for reasonableness, using a presumption of
reasonableness for w ithin-G uidelines sentences. United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d
1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 2006).
Because the defendant does not argue that the district court incorrectly
calculated his Guidelines range, we jump directly to the second Kristl inquiry and
address whether his sentence was unreasonable. 3
M r. Aguayo-Gonzalez claims
that his sentence violates the mandate in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) that the court avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(6).
It is not entirely clear that the Guidelines were in fact properly applied.
Our Court has not determined and does not do so here whether acceptance of
responsibility is an all-or-nothing proposition under the Guidelines. Precedent in
other circuits is fractured on whether a defendant must accept responsibility for
all charged crimes, or merely all crimes in a given Guidelines grouping, in order
to receive a reduction. Four courts of appeals have held that a defendant must
accept responsibility for all charged conduct in order to receive a reduction, but
none of those cases involved or considered a defendant who had pleaded guilty to
all charges within one Guidelines grouping and disputed others outside that
grouping. United States v. Thom as, 242 F.3d 1028, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Chambers, 195 F.3d 274, 278-79 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Ginn, 87 F.3d 367, 370-71 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Kleinebreil, 966 F.2d
945, 952-53 (5th Cir. 1992). The two courts of appeals to address explicitly the
question have held that the acceptance of responsibility reduction is proper when
a defendant pleads guilty to one set of grouped charges, even if he contests other
charges that are grouped separately. United States v. Wattree, 431 F.3d 618, 62123 (8th Cir. 2005); U nited States v. W illiams, 344 F.3d 365, 379-80 (3d Cir.
2003). Because the defendant conceded the issue, we do not address it here.
-5-
In order to determine whether the defendant has been subjected to an

unwarranted sentencing disparity, we must ascertain whether he is similarly
situated to a defendant who has received a reduction for acceptance of
responsibility. To do so, we briefly examine the nature and purpose of the
reduction. The Guidelines offer up to a three-point reduction in a defendants
offense level for admitting the truth of the charges against him: two for clearly
demonstrat[ing] acceptance of responsibility for his offense, U.S.S.G.
3E1.1(a), and one for timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea
of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial.
U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b). The Guideline Notes explain that section (a) is not
intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof
at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only
then admits guilt and expresses remorse. U.S.S.G. 3E1.1 cmt. n. 2. There are,
however, some exceptional circumstances that allow a defendant to receive a
reduction after a jury verdict, as the Notes explain:
In rare situations a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance of
responsibility for his criminal conduct even though he exercises his
constitutional right to a trial. This may occur, for example, where a
defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to
factual guilt (e.g., to make a constitutional challenge to a statute or a
challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct). In each such
instance, however, a determination that a defendant has accepted
responsibility will be based primarily upon pre-trial statements and
conduct.
Id. (emphasis added).
-6-
W e have employed this exception sparingly. In United States v. Gauvin,

173 F.3d 798, 806 (10th Cir. 1999), we upheld a district court adjustment under
3E1.1 where the defendant admitted to his criminal conduct in testimony at trial
but disputed whether he had the necessary mens rea. Key to the Gauvin result,
however, is the fact that the defendant admitted to all facts pertaining to the
crime, disputing only the the legal element of intent. Id. W e have held in
numerous other cases that any defendant who attempted at trial to deny a key
factual element of the crime . . . forfeited his claim to an adjustment under
3E.1.1. United States v. Salazar-Samaniega, 361 F.3d 1271, 1281 (10th Cir.
2004).
M r. Aguayo-Gonzalezs conduct departs in several ways from the
acceptance-of-responsibility standard enunciated above, making his situation
distinguishable, for purposes of 3553(a)(6), from that of defendants who receive
the reduction. First of all, M r. Aguayo-Gonzalez makes no claim that he accepted
responsibility before trial. He went to trial on all three counts, and the
government was forced to put forward witnesses to prove both felony counts. In
United States v. Eaton, 260 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2001), we upheld the district
courts refusal to apply an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction when the
defendant testified truthfully at trial to committing the elements of the crime
but offered no evidence of pre-trial statements or conduct indicating acceptance
of responsibility. Id. at 1237. M r. Aguayo-Gonzalezs conduct on the stand is
-7-
similarly not comprehensive enough, and did not occur early enough, to indicate
acceptance of responsibility.
M oreover, even if we were to credit the defendants statements from the
stand, his argument hinges on the premise that those statements admitted all facts
necessary to convict him on the two felony counts. That is not precisely true. In
count 2 of the indictment, M r. Aguayo-Gonzalez was charged under both sections
(a) and (b) of 8 U.S.C. 1326. He did admit to sufficient facts for section (a),
which sets a two-year fine for an alien who has been . . . deported . . . and
thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States.
1326(a). Section (b), however, contains additional requirements and imposes
additional penalties. It provides that any alien . . . whose removal was
subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony . . . shall be . .
. imprisoned not more than 20 years. 1326(b)(2). At no time during the trial
did either M r. Aguayo-Gonzalez or his lawyer acknowledge that his deportation
followed an aggravated felony. It follows that he took no affirmative steps to
accept responsibility for the much more serious portion of the charges against
him. This distinguishes his case from Gauvin and from the example in the
Guidelines N otes, in w hich defendants conceded all facts and disputed only
m atters of law .
Finally, even assuming arguendo that M r. Aguayo-Gonzalez did accept
responsibility for the first two counts, his contesting of the third count makes it
-8-
reasonable to differentiate his sentence from that of a defendant who had accepted
responsibility on all counts. The Sentencing Guidelines require acceptance of
responsibility on multiple counts for good reasons: to spare the government the
expense of putting on a trial, and to force a defendant to accept responsibility,
without reservations, for his conduct. U.S.S.G. 3E1.1 cmt. n. 2; Thom as, 242
F.3d at 1034 (a defendant who is unwilling to accept responsibility for some of
the charges against him has not really come clean and faced up to the full
measure of his criminal culpability). By contesting the third count, M r. AguayoGonzalez negated any such benefits.
M r. Aguayo-Gonzalezs argument that he looks far more like a person
who has admitted guilt on all counts than one who has denied guilt on any count
is beside the point, Aplt. Br. at 24, as is the governments contention that he is
more similarly situated to someone who contested all the charges against him
than to someone who entered guilty pleas on all the charges. Appellee Br. at
10-11. The defendants argument for a non-Guidelines sentence was addressed to
the discretion of the district court, which bears primary responsibility for
determining whether to vary from the advisory Guidelines, and we have no basis
for saying its judgment was unreasonable. The district court examined the proper
Guidelines sentence, took account of M r. Aguayo-Gonzalezs history, noted his
cooperation at trial, and selected a sentence it deemed no harsher than necessary.
-9-
III.
Because we find the defendants sentence to be reasonable, we AFFIRM
the decision of the district court. Appellants motion to supplement the record on
appeal is granted.
-10-

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F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS

U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,

H ECTO R M A N U EL A G U A YOGO NZA LEZ,

A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Howard A. Pincus, Assistant Federal Public Defender, (Raymond P. M oore,

Before HA RTZ, ANDERSO N, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.

M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judge.

Hector M anuel Aguayo-Gonzalez was charged in the District of New

W hen a defendant faces sentencing for

The sentencing at issue in this case was M r. Aguayo-Gonzalezs second

factors set out in 18 U .S.C . 3553(a). In evaluating the resulting sentence, we

In order to determine whether the defendant has been subjected to an

W e have employed this exception sparingly. In United States v. Gauvin,

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