McCarn v. Beach, 4th Cir. (1996)
McCarn v. Beach, 4th Cir. (1996)
McCarn v. Beach, 4th Cir. (1996)
emerging from the house. But according to Hilda she never referred
to herself as a hostage. "I never told any officer that Terry would not
let me come outside the house. The windows and storm windows
were closed in the house. I never heard a request for me to come outside." Defendants say that Hilda said Terry was sitting on the living
room floor, holding the shotgun in his lap. In any event, Hilda was
not permitted to reenter her house.
Meanwhile, unsuccessful attempts were made to contact Terry by
telephone and over public address speakers. At some point thereafter,
Assistant Chief Fuller walked from the yard to the porch railing and
called to Terry in an unsuccessful attempt to establish communication.
At about 3:15 p.m. the police arranged for the electricity to the
house to be disconnected. According to Officer Ivey, the officers did
this because they were concerned for Terry's health and safety. Since
it was 106 degrees outside and the house was unshaded, they felt that
turning off the power (in case Terry had a fan on) would drive him
from the house. This effort failed, and the officers became concerned
that Terry might be suffering from heat exhaustion. The officers then
warned Terry that they were going to introduce pepper gas into the
house. They reasoned that the pepper gas would force Terry out of the
house and at the same time force him to abandon his weapon. They
also reasoned that if he did not exit the house, they would know that
he had been disabled by the heat.
Around 4:00 p.m. two officers broke a window in the rear of the
house and began to introduce the pepper gas. In response, Terry fired
a shotgun once through the broken window, and the officers retreated.
After a second deployment of gas, Terry emerged from the house carrying a shotgun. He yelled at the police and told them to leave or
"somebody was going to get shot." Terry walked down the steps and
out into the yard towards the end of the porch. As he turned the corner
of the house, he saw Officer Harris and began leveling his shotgun at
him at a range of just a few feet. Three weapons fired, those of Officer Harris, Officer Isenhour, and Terry. Terry was fatally shot.
Terry's parents, Hilda and Jack, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
In a lengthy opinion, a magistrate judge granted summary judgment
5
to Terry and that leaving the scene altogether would allow Terry to
pose a threat to others. In light of these circumstances, a reasonable
officer could have believed that the escalation of force was objectively reasonable. See id. Thus, the officers are entitled to qualified
immunity on the excessive force claim.
III.
Plaintiffs next argue that Officers Fuller, Isenhour and Ivey violated Terry's Fourth Amendment right to be free from a warrantless
arrest in his home absent exigent circumstances. We believe the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim as well.
Qualified immunity shields police officers from civil liability
unless their actions "violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Plaintiffs are correct
that absent exigent circumstances, the police may not enter a person's
home to effect a warrantless arrest. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 590 (1980). However, in this case, even assuming the police
entered Terry's home to effect a warrantless arrest, see United States
v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1451 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1104 (1991); United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 893 & n.1
(9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1144 (1986); United States v.
Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1166 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1061 (1985); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 6.1(e), at 262
(3d ed. 1996), we cannot say that it was clearly established in July
1993 that the circumstances confronting the officers were not exigent.
Factors relevant to the issue of exigency include: (1) the degree of
urgency involved and the amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant, (2) the possibility of danger to police guarding the site, (3) the
gravity of the offense involved, and (4) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed. See United States v. Reed, 935 F.2d 641,
642 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 960 (1991); United States v.
Cucci, 892 F. Supp. 775, 786 (W.D. Va. 1995). Here, the police knew
Terry was armed with a shotgun. They were aware of his epilepsy and
his tendency towards unpredictable, angry outbursts. As previously
explained, they knew he had already fired the gun, and they believed
he had done so to threaten his father. They also believed that Terry
had held his mother hostage. We have found no cases indicating that
7
it was clearly established in July 1993 that these facts would not
amount to exigent circumstances.
Plaintiffs insist, however, that United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d
1158 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1061 (1985), is just such
a case. Morgan held that there was no exigency sufficient in that case
to justify the officers' warrantless entry into the suspect's home in
order to arrest him. However, we believe Morgan is distinguishable.
There, the record revealed that there was "no[ ] immediate threat or
security risk to the officers . . . ." Id. at 1163. The court continued,
[T]he evidence shows that the occupants of the[Morgan]
house were peaceful until startled by the [police]. Moreover,
Morgan's prior contact with police officials had been
friendly and cooperative. There was no substantiated evidence that Morgan was dangerous or that a grave offense or
crime of violence had occurred or was even threatened.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the circumstances in
Morgan were sufficiently different from those presented here, we
believe Morgan did not render the "unlawfulness . . . [if any, of the
officers' actions here] apparent." See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 (1987). Therefore, we hold that the officers are entitled to
qualified immunity on the warrantless arrest claim.
IV.
Finally, we believe summary judgment was properly granted in
favor of Gaston County, Ken Beach in his official capacity as Gaston
County Chief of Police, and Officers Fuller, Isenhour and Ivey in
their official capacities. "[C]laims against[ ] officers in their official
capacities are claims against the entities for which the officers were
acting." Giancola v. State of West Virginia Dep't of Public Safety,
830 F.2d 547, 550 (4th Cir. 1987); see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 165-66(1985). In this case, Chief Beach and Officers Fuller,
Isenhour and Ivey were acting on behalf of Gaston County. However,
local governments such as Gaston County cannot be liable under
1983 by virtue of respondeat superior . Monell v. New York City
Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Rather, local governments are liable under 1983 only when local government officials
8