Critiqued Chechen Deception Efforts Between The First and

Second Wars
Prepared by; David Doolittle
Prepared for; Dr. Richard Rita
APUS/AMU INTL413
March, 2016

Internal faults with the Russian government often is attributed to their failure in the first
Chechen War (Blank, 1995). Chechen forces arguably won the first war because of strategic
denial and deception. Chechen strategic denial and deception focused on exploiting weak centers
of gravity Russia had. Chechnya lost the second war due to adopting terrorism, and Russian
efforts to protect vulnerable centers of gravity from deception. Terrorism requires extensive use
of denial and deception in acts of indiscriminate violence to be successful (German, 2007).
Terrorist deception generally hides a threat then produces surprise in committing the act (ibid).
Strategic denial and deception uses campaign or theater level actions to pursue a congruent
narrative while achieving a cumulative objective (Godson, 2002). Chechen forces built
advantages around Russias faulty centers of gravity and controlling information. These were
negligible advantages when the Chechen concerted denial and deception strategy from the first
war, was replaced with building a Caucasus wide Islamic caliphate in the second war.
Chechnya traditionally is the land between: the Sunja River to the west, Terek River in
the north, Andis mountain range to the east, and Caucasus mountains south (Galeotti, 2014).
Tribes established this border (Blandy, 2000). Chechnyas capital is Grozny. Between 1994 and
2009 Chechens fought two wars with Russia. Russia entered the first war with the stated
objective to restore Russian constitutional order (Main, 2000). In 1991 Chechnya broke into two
entities the Chechnyan Republic of Icheira (CHRI) and Ingushetia (ibid). CHRI remained an
autonomous state of Russia until declaring independence in 1993 (Galeotti, 2014). The first
Chechen War was from 1994-1996, and ended with a Russian withdrawal of forces. A series of
terrorist bombings in 1999 around Moscow created popular support for a war to combat
terrorism in Chechnya Ingushetia and Dagestan (Main, 2000).
August 1999 Russia invaded Chechnya again. Russia remedied the exploited centers of
gravity from the first war when preparing for the second. Russian weakness in the first war
included: an unprepared army (Finch, 1998), engaging in war while having exploitable political
weakness (Lieven, 1998), ineffective communications command control (C3) infrastructure
(Main, 2000), and having a disadvantage in the information war (Thomas, 2000).
The first and second wars were fought by two types of Chechen forces. The first war war
largely fought by rememenant Soviet era veterans (Finch, 1998). Chechens began exploring the
roots of the continued conflict with Russia, namely Russia preventing Chechnya becoming an
Islamic state. Chechen commanders openly accepted terrorists into their ranks (Bodansky, 2007).
By the second war the Chechen army shifted force types to primarily Islamic militants (ibid).
Chechnya had been a land of warrior raiders believing in tribal religions for thousands of
years. Sufi Muslim Sheikh Mansur in 1784 campaigned with the tribal warlords to abandon adat
(traditional law) and use Islamic law (Galeotti, 2014). Russia responded by subjugating the
Chechen territory, and martyring Mansur (ibid). Russia separated the warlords by creating
borders of autonomous republics, removing the geographical boundaries Chechens established
(ibid).
In World War II Chechen warlords allied with the Nazis against the Soviet Union
(Lieven, 1998). After the war Russia forcefully moved the Chechen population to Kazakhstan as
a consequence (ibid). It is believed nearly half of the population died in transit (ibid). When the
Soviet Union collapsed the installed President of CHRI, Dudayev, declared independence
(Blandy, 2000). The Chechen military was prepared to defend their sovereignty with Soviet
remnant equipment and an organized army (Finch, 1998). These veterans had an intricate
1

knowledge of Russian warfare (ibid). This proved highly exploitable to Russias weak centers of
gravity using strategic denial and deception.
Dudayev was highly disrespected by the people and military of CHRI. Culturally the
leader who could unite was highly respected and Dudayev was incapable (Galeotti, 2014).
Military strategy fell to warlord commanders (ibid). Notable commanders in the first war
included: Shamil Basayev, Salman Raduyev, and former Soviet colonel Aslan Maskhadov.
Basayevs denial and deception effort led to a temporary ceasefire, but more importantly
demonstrated a weakness in the political structure of Russia (Galeotti, 2014). June 1995,
Basayev led 195 Chechen fighters into the Russian state of Stavropol. He was able to do so
hiding them in coffins while pretending to be transporting dead Russian soldiers to Moscow
(ibid). Basayev intended to bring his trojan horse to Moscow while President Yeltsin attended
his first G7 summit (ibid). Fighters intended to hold hostages in a prominent location until a
Chechen-Russian ceasefire was negotiated (ibid). He may have understood Yeltsin would be
forced to negotiate or diminish his standing with the G7. Yeltsin publicly showed his desire to
have Russia be part of the world order after the Soviet Union (Plater-Zybek, 2000). A
authoritarian reaction to domestic terrorism would likely jeopardize those ambitions.
Basayev may have made it to Moscow but ran out of money (Galeotti, 2014). 70 miles
north of the Chechen border his fighters occupied a city taking 1,800 hostages there (ibid).
Basayevs timing was impeccable, with Yeltsin away, the negotiator to the end the standoff was
compliant (ibid). The hostage situation forced the Russian government to base the decision on
the Russian populations opinion. Russias conflict now affected areas of civillianslike
Buddonnysk in Stavropol. The hostage scenario likely was impossible without the deception
Basayev used.
55,000 Russian troops and security forces were scattered throughout the Caucasus region
during the first Chechen war (Finch,1998). 195 combatants trying to make it through successive
checkpoints may easily have been stopped before reaching the Chechnya-Stavropol border.
Chechens saw the effectiveness of concessions through hostage taking and duplicated the
strategy (Main, 2000). 5 hostages were killed by the Chechens at Buddonnysk to show Russia
conditions of hostage release were not negotiable (ibid). The ceasefire was temporary and Russia
proceeded to take Grozny when fighting resumed.
Russia took a overwhelming firepower strategy in taking Grozny during the first war
(Love, 2000). After the first war over half the buildings in the city were destroyed by artillery
(ibid). A heavy artillery presence provided a significant disadvantage to Chechen fighters
defending or later retaking the city. Soldiers used a variety of deceptive ruses and feints to limit
the strategic effectiveness Russian artillery had on holding Grozny.
Chechens would use the correct technical language on enemy radios in Russian to call
artillery strikes on positions (Chechen.., 1999). Units would move between two artillery units at
night firing in both directions (Gerwehr, 2002). The artillery then fired on each other. A known to
be monitored Chechen radio would be hung in a tree above a Russian position (Dzhangir, 2000).
Fighters then made incoming calls on unsecured channels in the Chechen language to the radio
drawing fire on the Russian location (ibid). Chechen decoys in Grozny, and the countryside, also
wasted limited Russian artillery resources (Orr, 2000).
These efforts ultimately proved effective because Russian artillery was not integrated into
an effective C3 system. When structure did not exist to maintain unit cohesion (cite), know the
location of Russian units (Orr, 2000), and defense departments failed to cooperate a ineffective
C3 existed (Main, 2000). Firing on friendly positions decoys and other artillery batteries cost the

Russians strategic artillery use. Artillery commanders did not accurately communicate supply
needs after wasting resources leading to shortages (Orr, 2000). Resupply was difficult because
the Russian army was broke. Funding to train and supply forces was at 10% of Soviet Union era
budgets (Main, 2000). A untrained disorganized artillery structure existed before the first
Chechen war began. Shortages forced artillery commanders to limit their strikes becoming more
careful about target selection. Batteries were so inadequately funded some units lacked radios to
communicate between each other (Dzhangir, 2000). Orders were either the commander's
judgment, or directed by Russian intelligence efforts that was often also misled by Chechen
deception (Gerwehr, 2002) Experienced with the Russian military, Chechen military
commander's, likely also knew the Russian C3 was broken. Maskhadov was after all a Soviet
artillery colonel (Galeotti 2014). Deception efforts exploited pre known deficiencies to create
desired strategic results in limiting Russias artillery advantage.
Towards the end of 1995 the first battle of Grozny was over. Russian commanders
believed Chechen forces had now pushed south into the Caucasus mountains. Commanders
directed forces into the mountains leaving Grozny vulnerable with limited artillery support if
retaken by separatists. Russias mountain divisions encountered feints and ambushes referred to
as base traps when the war pivoted to the south (Militant Tactics, 2003). Base traps helped
draw more Russian commanders into believing the Chechen strongholds were in the mountain
ranges.
Base traps were fake military camps set up at the end of a forest road in the mountains,
normally between a valley (ibid). Separatists would leak information to Russian intelligence
about a camp location. Aerial surveillance would see a horse tied to a tree or smoke above the
treetops from a campfire (ibid). A Russian mountainous unit would sweep the area (ibid).
Separatists would be positioned on the sides of the valley and the ambushed forced the Russian
soldiers into a difficult to escape kill zone. Heavy losses sustained by the Russians at base traps
created the illusion of force multiplication. Russian commanders estimated 10,000-12,000
separatist fighters were active (Lieven, 1998). The true force size is estimated to have been
around 6900 (ibid). Base traps were integral to a force multiplication and location disorientation
strategy Chechen commanders used in this phase of the conflict. A separatist commander Khattab
was told to carry out 1-2 similar operations a month by senior leadership (Militant Tactics, 2000).
The continuous base trap operations forced Russian military strategist to conclude a
majority of Chechen forces were hiding in cave systems, or among civilians in the southern
mountain villages. Russian commanders were certain the major Chechen base was in the
foothills of the Caucasus range at Alkhan-Yurt (Plater-Zybek, 2000). Spies spread disinformation
to Russian intelligence a large gathering of commanders and soldiers was occurring in AlkhanYurt (Lieven, 1998). Seeing an opportunity to end the war Russian commanders pulled a
majority of their forces out of Grozny to attack Alkhan-Yurt (Galeotti, 2014).
Maskhadovs greatest feat was retaking of Grozny in 1996, to do so he utilized strategic
deception. Maskhadovs soldiers helped build the deception efforts leading the Russian military
away from Grozny. To solidify the disinformation narrative Maskhadov left a small contingent of
his forces garrisoned in Alkhan-Yurt, then built decoys and fake signs of troops presence aerial
surveillance would recognize (Galeotti, 2014). When Alkhan-Yurt was attacked the contingent
retreated into the Caucasus foothills. There the Russians encounter limited resistance from a
force thought to be larger from estimates (Blandy, 2000). As Russia attacked Alkhan-Yurt, 1500
separatists moved in 25 man teams secretly into Grozny (Galeotti, 2014). Units used various
forms of camouflage to move into the city (ibid). In previous engagements Chechen fighters

dressed as non combatants (Ivashenko, 2002), disguised their vehicles as red cross (ibid), and at
night covered themselves in cellophane to avoid thermal detection (Baranets, 2002). Likely the
same forms of deceptive camouflage were applied to move the 25 man teams into Grozny. On
January 1st 1996 Maskhadovs separatists took back Grozny, in a series of surprise attacks on
key infrastructure and state buildings, within a couple hours (Galeotti, 2014).
Maskhadov timed the operation to coincide with president Yeltsins renaugaration
(Lieven, 1998). Yeltsin was facing heavy criticism already for what was considered a rigged
election and various failed national economic reform programs (Galeotti, 2014). Faced with
losing Grozny again, limited capability to finance another year long artillery campaign to take it
back, unpopular global support, and Russian commanders rejecting appointments to direct the
conflict Yeltsin pulled Russia out. Yeltsin negotiated peace with Maskhadov in 1996 (PlaterZybek, 2000).
If Chechens had not created erroneous Russian estimates of force numbers through
strategic denial and deception efforts, the Russians may not have believed the Alkhan-Yurt
deception or seen Grozny burdensome to reclaim. 1500 ground soldiers took back Grozny from
the Russians who had a military over 10 times that size in Chechnya (Galeotti, 2014). The
Russians also had artillery, a air force, tanks, mechanized infantry, and hind helicopter gunships
albeit all poorly funded (Plater-Zybek, 2000). The initial Russian air assault in 1994 destroyed
most of Chechnyas non ground forces appropriated from the former Soviet Union military
giving Russia a significant force strength advantage (Galeotti, 2014). Following the erroneous
estimate narrative, it is likely Russian command believed a larger amount of soldiers took back
Grozny in January then actually did.
Maskhadov earned his victory but it was not without contention from Salafist Muslims in
Chechnya. Salafist jihadists, willingly incorporated into Rudayev ranks, now pushed for a Sharia
based government (Bodansky, 2007). Most were also not satisfied with the current borders
Chechnya and Russia agreed on (ibid). Salafist clerics envisioned a Caucasus wide caliphate,
returning the borders to the original geographic boundaries present at the time of Sheikh Mansur
(ibid). Maskhadov was a secularist with a Sufi Muslim background. He was elected president by
a landslide (Blandy, 2000). Maskhadov failed to unite the Salafist jihadists behind his version of
Chechen governance, creating divisions in the Chechen warlords whom saw strength as the
ability to unify (Bodansky, 2007). Strong loyalists to Maskhadov split from the Chechen forces,
and Islamist warlords again ruled large portions of the country (Galeotti, 2014). Chechen
warlords raided border villages in Dagestan and Ingushetia raising tension again with Russia
(ibid).
Chechen terrorists kidnapped 6 Russian officers and several journalists in 1997 (Main,
2000). Instead of exchanging the hostages for secessions from the Russian government, the
Chechen jihadists beheaded them on film then released it to the media (ibid). Russias
indiscriminate targeting of civilians was widely broadcast during the first war. This message
resonated with middle eastern Muslims who heard the civilian death toll and saw Muslims being
killed by the Russians (Thomas, 2000). Clerics within Chechnya called on the Mujahideen to
come to their aid on middle eastern news channels (Bodansky, 2007). Indiscriminate bombing of
Grozny helped create the terrorist threat in Chechnya, and the western media fostered global
sympathy. It is estimated over 90% of the media generated from Chechnya during the first war
originated from the separatists (Thomas, 2000). Chechen separatists carefully orchestrated scenes
creating the most emotional impact when producing media (ibid). The United Nations did a
human rights investigation into the treatment of refugees fleeing Grozny during the fighting, as a

result of media supposedly showing conditions there (Waters, 2000). The results were
inconclusive, as Chechen soldiers used non combatants or dressed as them to retreat from the
city and Russia justified certain questionable actions as security measures (ibid). The Chechens
widely used the internet (Thomas, 2000).
Even if Russian security services were able to close down a Chechen website covering
the conflict, two more took its place (ibid). The world was only beginning to understand the
importance of validating internet sources. Any news during the first war was largely accepted at
face value by mainstream media (ibid). Chechens blanketed the coverage with tales discrediting
the Russian soldier and proposed Russia was guilty of war crimes (Waters, 2000). The coverage
that was news or propaganda was mostly indiscernible. It did serve a strategic end of deceiving
the global outlook on the first Chechen war, causing significant global support for independence
and denying Russia information presentation advantages (Thomas, 2000). Chechens exploited
Russias inability to control information channels leaving the combat zone because of the
fighters adaptation of the internet.
Growing use of terrorism strained western views of the Chechen resistance. The filmed
beheadings in 1997 ended Chechnyas control on the information war. In the second war Russia
met few objections to severely limiting press coverage of the war (ibid). The major control
Chechens had on the media to accept their version of events disappeared now that Russia was
fighting savage terrorists. In the second war Russia was able to level Grozny again with
extensive bombing without much international condemnation (Love, 2000). Press coverage
barely covered the second war. Internet communications by Chechens on Russias inhumane use
of thermobaric weapons was mostly discredited as propaganda (Thomas, 2000).
August 1999 Russian forces entered Chechnya again with a new playbook. A C3
operations center was established in Stavropol (Main, 2000). The SVR built an effective network
of well vetted spies in the Chechen ranks (Orr, 2000). Spies reported accurate intelligence for
operations to be conducted (ibid). Elite counterterrorism units took the fight to individual cells of
Chechen terrorists (Bodansky, 2007). This highly differed from using heavy ground presence and
overwhelming artillery support during the first war. Counter terrorism units mimicked the
formation of 25 man units Maskhadov retook Grozny with (Graw, 2000). The units were
separated into 3-5 man teams or troijka groups as Chechen guerillas also utilized (ibid). Areas of
operations with suspected heavy combatant control were carpet bombed by the Russian air force,
then occupied by security forces (ibid). Security forces and soldiers were trained how to conduct
themselves around Chechens with respect (Orr, 2000). Russia responded with smart efficient and
controlled action. Ultimately this limited Russias exploitable centers of gravity. Chechnyas
force size was devastated in the second war (Bodansky, 2007). Combining a reduction of force
size, with the removed capability to effect strategic centers of gravity, Chechen deception efforts
relied heavily on terrorism.
Improvised explosive device (IED) traps, assassinations, and periodic ambushes served
little strategic value to removing Russia again from Chechnya. Psychologist Martha Crenshaw
suggests groups engage in terrorism because they are often presented with limited options to
achieve political goals (Crenshaw, 1998). The difference between political violence and terrorism
is the indiscriminate targeting of noncombatants (ibid). Terrorism can only achieve short term
political goals then because majority support is often needed to ensure lasting change. Chechen
jihadist strategy in the second war was to build an Islamic state through ridding Chechnya of
infidels (Bodansky, 2007). It was ineffective because Chechen terrorists targeting non
combatants dissuaded popular support of their cause. Terrorism needs an illusion of force

multiplication to project a cause is stronger than it appears, or is more popularly supported then it
actually is. Force multiplication is achieved by terrorists appearing to be seemingly everywhere
and illusive of every security apparatus in place when a surprise act does occur. Surprise creates
attention, positively or negatively, to the political goal (Kam, 1988). Surprise was achieved in a
terrorism centric strategy in the second Chechen war using tactical denial and deception.
The Russian journal Vlast contained photos of various IEDs russian soldiers and MVD
encountered during the second Chechen war (Kulikov, 2003). These included: a book that when
opened exploded, a bomb inside a beer can that triggered popping the top, and a flashlight that
when turned on detonated (ibid). Chechens also hid bombs in wood piles in Russian camps in the
forests (ibid). When soldiers would gather the firewood a pressure plate relieved activating the
explosive.
As the conflict drew on suicide bombers began to target non combatants outside
Chechnya (Bodansky, 2007). The most common suicide bombers in the second Chechen war
were women (ibid). Muslim women dressed in the niqab are covered except at their eyes. Given
the Russian soldiers and security forces had strict orders to respect Chechen civilians, asking a
Muslim women to reveal what was underneath her niqab would be a culturally insensitive
disrespect. Suicide bombers used this to hide devices. These bombers detonated their devices in
crowded civilian establishments around the Caucasus region. Hiding the device in a functional
item or person is very deceitful and successful. Deceit is created by hiding the real while
showing the false (Johnson, 2003). The functional items were used everyday. Chechen terrorists
likely created fear the next normal item a soldier or civilian uses and Muslim women in a niqab
they pass on the street has an explosive device. Evidence of this is the tendency for Russian
soldiers and security forces to stay in their posts during periods of Chechen bombing escalations
(Main, 2000). This served a tactical advantage to Chechen fighters, allowing greater freedom of
movement when the enemy restricted theirs. The IEDs and suicide bombings didnt however
force Russia to the negotiating table as Basayev or Maskhadov deceptions led to.
Chechnyas initial independence effort successful. Using directed denial and deception at
strategically weak Russian centers of gravity, separatists achieved intended outcomes of enemy
withdrawal. Terrorism in the second Chechen war aided in creating the same weak centers of
gravity for the Chechen. Chechen terrorists were unprepared for the advancements the Russian
military had made, and the adoption of guerilla tactics in counterterrorism. Chechen C3
weakness occurred in the lack of organization terrorist cells had in the Caucasus region during
the second war. Before the declaration of Dokka Umarov as emir, the jihadists remained a very
loosely organized network of cells (Bodansky, 2007). The Chechen army that supported
Maskhadov did not back the jihadist groups or warlords of the country after the first war
(Galeotti, 2014). A political divisive environment signalled another exploitable characteristic of
Chechen weakness. The use of surprise terrorist acts showed Chechens did not have the
command structure or capabilities in place to orchestrate sweeping strategic deception
campaigns. Deception was primarily tactical which created the need for repeated tactical
deception to achieve goals.
The two Chechen wars offer a comparative examination of the use of strategic and
tactical deception. Additional study may establish further links between strategic deception being
essential to a comprehensive victory in modern warfare when it uses weak centers of gravity for
exploitation. In the second Chechen war strategic deception possibly could have changed the
outcome if those capabilities existed and commanders had addressed terrorist elements

originating from the first war. This would have involved identifying new centers of gravity, as
Russias had evolved between the wars.

Works Cited:
Baranets, Viktor, Endless Warfare! We Just Managed to Depart ShatoyWhy Cant the Federal Army finish off the
Uncoordinated Bands? Komsomolskaya Pravda, 20 September 2002, pp 4-5 as translated and downloaded from
the FBIS web site on 20 September 2002.
Blandy, C.W. Moscow's Failure to Comprehend. Shrivenham, Wilts: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute (in
Association with Conflict Studies Research Centre), 2000.
Blank, Stephen, and Earl H. Tilford. Russia's Invasion of Chechnya: A Preliminary Assessment. Carlisle Barracks,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995.
Bodansky, Yossef. Chechen Jihad: Al Qaeda's Training Ground and the next Wave of Terror. New York, NY:
Harper, 2007.
"Chechen Commander: On Urban Warfare in Chechnya," working draft received from the Marine Corps, 1999.
Crenshaw, Martha. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Washington, DC:
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998.
Dzhangir Aras, Vooruzhennyy Kavkaz, Reference Book on Military Systems of North Caucasus Nations, Volume
III, 2000, p. 57-58
Finch, Raymond C. Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lesson
Learned, Foreign Military Studies Office, 1998.
Galeotti, Mark. Russia's Wars in Chechnya, 1994-2009. London, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2014
German, Mike. Thinking like a Terrorist: Insights of a Former FBI Undercover Agent. Washington, D.C.: Potomac
Books, 2007.
Gerwehr, Scott, and Russell W. Glenn. Unweaving the Web: Deception and Adaptation in Future Urban
Operations. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002.
Godson, Roy, and James J. Wirtz. Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-first Century Challenge. New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002.
Ivashenko, Viktor. Encyclopedia of War, Soldat Udachi, May 2004, p. 4
Johnson, Mark. "Military Deception: Hiding The Real - Showing The Fake." Joint Forces Staff College Joint and
Combined Warfighting School. March 7, 2003. Accessed March 18, 2016.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/deception.pdf.
Kam, Ephraim. Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.
Kulikov, Sergey A. The Tactics of Insurgent Groups in the Russian Federation Republic of Chechnya, translated
by Robert Love, Foreign Military Studies Office. This article later appeared in the November December 2003 issue
of Military Review.
Lieven, Anatol. Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.

Love, Robert. "Foreign Military Studies Office Publications - The Second Chechen War: The Information
Component." Foreign Military Studies Office Publications - The Second Chechen War: The Information
Component. 2000. Accessed March 22, 2016. http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/secchech/secchech.htm.
Main, S. J. North Caucasus Military District: Defending Russia's Interests in the Caucasus (1996-August 1999).
Camberley, Surrey: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2000.
Militant Tactics, Soldat Udachi (Soldier of Fortune), 3 September 2003 as translated and downloaded from the
FBIS web site on 19 March 2016.
Plater-Zybek, Henry. The Russian Decision Makers in The Chechen Conflict. 2000.
Orr, Michael. Better Or Just Not So Bad? An Evaluation of Russian Combat Effectiveness in The Second Chechen
War. 2000.
Thomas, T.L. Manipulating the Mass Consciousness: Russia and Chechnya "information Warfare" Tactics.
Shrivenham, Wilts: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute (in Association with Conflict Studies Research Centre),
2000.
Waters, T.R.W. Human Rights in Chechnya, A Lost Cause? Shrivenham, Wilts: Strategic and Combat Studies
Institute (in Association with Conflict Studies Research Centre), 2000.